In a new paper, William Galston and Elaine Kamarck argue that the laws and rules that shape corporate and investor behavior today must be changed. They argue that Wall Street today is trapped in an incentive system that results in delivering quarterly profits and earnings at the expense of long-term investment.

As Galston and Kamarck see it, there’s nothing wrong with paying investors handsome returns, and a vibrant stock market is something to strive for. But when the very few can move stock prices in the short term and simultaneously reap handsome rewards for themselves, not their companies, and when this cycle becomes standard operating procedure, crowding out investments that boost productivity and wage increases that boost consumption, the long-term consequences for the economy are debilitating.

Galston and Kamarck argue that a set of incentives has evolved that favors short-term gains over long-term growth. These damaging incentives include:

• The proliferation of stock buybacks and dividends
• The increase in non-cash compensation
• The fixation on quarterly earnings
• The rise of activist Investors

These micro-incentives are so powerful that once they became pervasive in the private sector, they have broad effects, Galston and Kamarck write. Taken together, they have contributed significantly to economy-wide problems such as: (1) Rising inequality, (2) A shrinking middle class, (3) An increasing wedge between productivity & compensation, (4) Less business investment, and (5) Excessive financialization of the U.S. economy.

So what should be done? Galston and Kamarck propose reining in both share repurchases and the use of stock awards and options to compensate managers as well as refocusing corporate reporting on the long term. To this end, these scholars recommend the following policy steps:

• Repeal SEC Rule 10-B-18 and the 25% exemption
• Improve corporate disclosure practices
• Strengthen sustainability standards in 10-K reporting
• Toughen executive compensation rules
• Reform the taxation of executive compensation

Galston and Kamarck state that the American economy would work better if public corporations behaved more like private and family-held firms—if they made long-term investments, retained and trained their workers, grew organically, and offered reasonable but not excessive compensation to their top managers, based on long-term performance rather than quarterly earnings. To make these significant changes happen, the incentives that shape the decisions of CEOs and board of directors must be restructured. Reining in stock buybacks, reducing short-term equity gains from compensation packages, and shifting managers’ focus toward long-term objectives, Galston and Kamarck argue, will help address the most significant challenges facing America’s workers and corporations.  

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Major changes in geopolitics, political economy, and energy markets are altering the global energy landscape. A potential nuclear deal with Iran has raised the possibility of new supplies coming online, and ongoing political gridlock in Iraq has hampered the country’s ability to expand supply. The U.S. energy boom is increasingly viewed as a long-term phenomenon, while a prolonged crisis in Ukraine threatens to impact Russian gas supplies to Europe.

How will the political developments in Iraq and Iran affect oil supply? What will be the impact of the Ukraine crisis on Europe, Russia, and China? How will these shifts help shape the energy markets of tomorrow?

Read the paper online: Brookings Doha Energy Report 2014

The 2014 Doha Energy Forum convened prominent industry experts and policymakers from Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the United States for an in-depth dialogue on the rapidly changing global energy landscape. Based on the Forum’s plenary and roundtable sessions, this paper from the Brookings’ Doha Center and Energy Security Initiative reflects much of the discussion and debate around these changes. It also outlines the complexity of today’s energy markets and the geopolitical factors that set them in motion.

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Since September of 2014, Jordan has joined other Western and Arab coalition partners in striking Islamic State (IS) positions in Syria, with the country’s King Abdullah framing the war against IS as a “third world war.” How have conflicts on Jordan’s borders and now the country’s direct intervention strained the country’s resources? How have the country’s leaders presented their participation at home and abroad?

In a timely Policy Briefing based on field research, Sultan Barakat and Andrew Leber assess Jordan’s vulnerabilities to regional conflicts and domestic pressures. Despite broad public support for action against IS, they note a growing gap between state and society only exacerbated by adverse events such as the capture and uncertain fate of a downed Jordanian pilot.

Read "Fortress Jordan: Putting the Money to Work"

Ultimately, Barakat and Leber note Jordan’s strategic importance to its allies but caution against it playing a front-line combat role. The authors contend that reducing threats to Jordanian stability lies not in “taking the fight to IS” abroad, but in strengthening Jordanian society at home.

While calling for improved governance in the Kingdom, the authors note reluctance on the part of Jordan’s ruling elites and their allies to promote full-scale political reforms. Barakat and Leber contend that they should therefore channel their fears about regional instability and extremism into productive action on Jordan’s economy. This will entail restructuring aid flows to the country toward productive investment, selectively incorporating Syrian refugees into the workforce, and putting forward a credible vision for the country’s economic future.

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The need to confront and drive back the forces of the Islamic State (IS) has pushed long-term reform efforts in Iraq far down the list of priorities. Yet pressing economic reforms – such as restructuring and rebuilding the country’s energy sector – increasingly seem a strategic necessity, as oil prices have fallen far below government projections. How can politicians be persuaded to invest in Iraq’s long-term future at a time of imminent security threats? How can the efforts to reform the Iraqi electricity network be harnessed to reestablish government authority in newly retaken areas?

Luay Al-Khatteeb and Harry Istepanian address these questions through analysis of past attempts at electricity sector reform. They argue that even before IS advances plunged Iraq into a deep political and security crisis, divisions within the Iraqi parliament and various government agencies had stymied efforts at reform. Still, they note that improving the provision of electricity is a clear opportunity to improve basic services to its citizens, boosting government legitimacy and acceptance in areas under its control, especially as it seeks to retake territory from IS.

Khatteeb and Istepanian hold that a comprehensive strategy is needed, one that incorporates an expanded role for the private sector, rationalized electricity tariffs, and a host of technical fixes to improve efficiency. Ultimately, they contend, much will depend on whether the government of Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi views the IS threat as an excuse for inaction or an impetus for change.

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The Muslim Brotherhood has faced a great deal of opposition in the Middle East in recent years, with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates all declaring it to be a terrorist organization. Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood, which has historically operated as a loyal opposition to the palace, has also come under fire as regional instability has dampened Jordanians’ appetite for protest and reform. While the group still enjoys significant public support, it is facing a number of internal tensions, culminating in its recent split. How can the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood retain its political clout? Can it play a role in stabilizing and strengthening Jordan?

Read The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan: Time to reform

In this new Policy Briefing, Neven Bondokji discusses the various reform efforts undertaken by Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood since 2010, and argues that it urgently needs to see them through. She identifies key challenges, including the division over the Zamzam reform initiative, overlap between the movement and its affiliated political party, the inclusion of women, the ongoing ideological shifts in the movement’s political discourse, and generational tensions. Additionally, Bondokji examines how Jordan’s East Banker-Palestinian fault line is manifested within the Brotherhood.

Bondokji makes a series of recommendations, including that the Muslim Brotherhood ensure the independence of its political party’s leadership and decision-making, actively engage in and disseminate discourse on plural politics and policy debates, and introduce new leaders and styles of communication. She also asserts that Jordan’s government must empower political parties and allow for a more representative parliament. The application of such reforms, Bondokji concludes, would allow Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood to be an asset in the country’s efforts against destabilizing extremism.

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From the rapid fall in oil prices to the conflicts that have threatened key energy sources and transit routes in the Middle East and North Africa, the global energy landscape has shifted dramatically over the past year. The change of a single number – the price of a barrel of crude oil – can carry profound implications for government policies and company decisions around the world, from efforts at subsidy reform to shale oil extraction. Understanding the interplay between key geopolitical events and energy markets remains crucial.

Has Asian consumers’ growing dependence on Middle Eastern energy supplies prompted greater interest in providing for the region’s security? How will new sources and new transit routes reshape the global LNG and natural gas landscape? What has been the impact of falling energy prices on unconventional production and investment in renewable energy resources?

At the fourth annual Brookings Doha Energy Forum, experts and policymakers from around the globe met to discuss the key global energy trends. In broad plenary sessions and focused roundtable discussions, industry leaders from the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the United States wrestled with these and other questions. The findings of these many conversations are reflected in this report, jointly prepared by the Brookings Doha Center and the Energy Security and Climate Initiative.

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Over the past several years, thousands of foreign fighters have traveled to Syria and Iraq on a scale unprecedented in modern history. While most foreign fighters remain engaged in combat, some have begun to return, posing a real, if sometimes exaggerated, security threat to home countries. In such situations, how should governments aim to respond? Are there policies that can defuse the security threats posed by returning fighters without alienating individuals and communities key to countering violent extremism?

Read "Returning foreign fighters: Criminalization or reintegration?"

Drawing on case studies from countries such as France, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, this Policy Briefing by Charles Lister points to the necessity of counter-terrorism measures, yet cautions against allowing these policies to translate into blanket criminalization of individuals or communities. On a basic level, policymakers will have to navigate between “hard” policies of criminal investigation and prosecution and more “liberal” policies that that aim to rehabilitate fighters and better reintegrate them into their home communities.

Lister concludes that countries should adopt a nuanced approach toward returning foreign fighters, relying on closer coordination between local authorities and community leaders, improved information sharing on the foreign-fighter phenomenon, and a better understanding of the dynamics of recruitment and radicalization.

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Americans — especially low- and middle-income workers — are simply not saving enough for retirement. The current retirement income deficit—the gap between what Americans will need in retirement and what they will actually have—is well over $6 trillion. This gap will be insurmountable without a significant change to current tax policy to help incentivize more Americans to save for their own retirement.

On September 9, the Retirement Security Project at Brookings hosted a briefing in collaboration with the Senate Special Committee on Aging to examine new ways to help Americans save for retirement without increasing government spending. A panel of experts on tax, retirement and budget policy explored ideas to modify the tax incentives for retirement savings.

After the panel, participants took audience questions.

Audio

• Rethinking Incentives to Save for a Secure Retirement

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• 20110909_retirement_saving_incentives

      

The new 2013 budget unveiled by President Obama on Monday again contains the Automatic IRA, which was developed by Brookings' Retirement Security Project in conjunction with The Heritage Foundation. This year's version again includes an important change that will also encourage more employers to offer a 401(k) account to their workers. However, important changes to the Saver's Credit, which had been in previous budgets failed to make it this year.

Nearly half of American workers - an estimated 78 million- currently have no employer-sponsored retirement savings plan. The Automatic IRA is a simple, easy to administer and understand system that is designed to meet the needs of small businesses and their employees. Employers facilitate employee savings without having to sponsor a 401(k)-type plan, make matching contributions or meet complex eligibility rules. Employees are enrolled automatically into an IRA with a simplified system of investment choices and a set automatic savings level. However, they retain complete control over all aspects of the account including how much to save, which investment choice to use, or even to opt out completely. Automatic IRAs also offer savings options for the self-employed, for independent contractors, as well as providing those who are changing jobs the ability to continue their retirement savings.

The new 2013 budget would also double the size of the tax credit that employers receive in return for starting a new 401(k) plan from $500 annually for three years to $1,000 annually for the same period. This increase will ensure that the credit covers more of an employer's costs, and should encourage more employers to offer such a plan. This is a very good move, but the credit could be still further expanded to $1,500 for three years as will be proposed by a new House bill coming from Rep. Richard Neal. As Congress examines the proposal, it will have the opportunity to also expand the smaller credit that would be offered to employers that start an Automatic IRA to ensure that they are fully reimbursed for all expenses connected with starting and operating such an account for their workers.

A disappointing development is the failure to again include proposals to expand and improve the Saver's Credit by making it fully refundable. The Saver's Credit is an incentive for middle-and lower-income taxpayers to save in 401(k)-type accounts or IRAs. Retirement Security Project research found that more than 69 million taxpayers had income that was low enough for them to be eligible for the Saver's Credit in 2007. However, nearly 45 million of these filers actually failed to qualify for the credit because they had no federal tax liability. If the Saver's Credit was made refundable as RSP has proposed and deposited directly into the account as a match for savings, those 45 million taxpayers could have taken advantage of the program and had significantly higher retirement savings.

      

Editor's Note: this article originally appeared in the 2012 Print Version of AARP: The Journal.

Using one platform to offer a variety of services

Known in the UK under the term “corporate platform” to indicate that it expands options available on the employer’s benefit platform, the development allows employees to use the employer’s retirement savings mechanism to save and invest for additional nonretirement purposes. When the corporate platform is fully implemented, employees will be able to man­age almost all of their investments and savings plans from one location, thus giving them a con­solidated view of their entire financial status. If carried to its full potential, the expanded saving platform will allow employees to shop for sav­ings products, among options that are available on the platform, instead of having to seek them out from individual suppliers—a search that often takes up work hours. Of even greater value, it gives employees one source to go to for indi­vidualized advice or financial literacy training.

The enhancement has special significance in the UK, where by fall 2012, the larger employers that don’t offer any other type of pension or retirement savings plan, must begin to automatically enroll their employees into basic retirement savings accounts. This requirement is causing a great deal of discussion about the future role of employer-provided benefits, as well as recon­sideration of the fees and services included in a traditional package. The platform enhancements allow an employer to differentiate its employee benefit package from the required basic account structure. It also gives younger employees a benefit of more immediate value, than they would have from a retirement savings account that they won’t access for a good 40 years.

Presentations from a variety of service providers at an October 2011 summit hosted by Pensions Insight, a UK trade journal, showed that the platform can be easily customized to meet the special needs of a specific workforce. Using a single computer interface, employees can select from a wide variety of savings and investment options that are appropriate for their income level and stage of life. Thus, an upper income manager who manages his or her own finances could see more sophisticated products, while an entry-level worker sees more basic sav­ings products. Live presentations by financial professionals who explain what is available on the computer platform add to the system’s value and increase its use.

A place to provide choice and to build financial literacy

The platform will have special value for moderate- and lower-income employees. While higher salaried employees may appreciate the opportunity to build their investments, the real value of the platform will be to enable moder­ate- and lower-income workers to find savings opportunities that they might otherwise miss because they don’t know where to go, are uncertain about what is a fair price, or for a variety of other reasons. Because employees tend to believe that services included on the corporate platform are implicitly endorsed by the employer, they usually have greater faith that the services are from legitimate providers at a fair price.

Employees at all levels can also use the site to receive guidance on individual products or basic financial literacy training. Individuals can choose from a range of options, from short videos on a specific topic by experts or fellow employees, to longer connected courses designed to meet the needs of specific age or income groups. Use is increased when employ­ees receive emails or text messages geared to birthdays or other life events, or generated after the employee visits a specific part of the website.

Understanding the value of peer evaluations to motivate others, some providers include a place where employees can post feedback about spe­cific products or savings choices. These postings help to guide other employees’ decisions and build the reputation of the platform as a source of unbiased information. The site can also include links to outside advisors who can answer specific questions, guide employees to another site for more information, or perform other services either online or over the telephone.

Differing age groups can be contacted and guided through different technologies. At the UK platform summit, David Harris, of Tor Financial Consulting, showed that younger employees preferred different communication methods than either older workers or the usual way employers provide information. However, the platform is able to use a wide variety of methods and is equally effective no matter which is used.

The platform’s value to international policy makers

Although the UK’s platform is intended as an enhancement to employer-provided benefits, it can also be used for a wide variety of policy goals, as the basic structure can be easily adapted to meet almost any nation’s specific tax and savings system. In the United States alone, policy experts have proposed dedicated savings accounts for nonretirement purposes ranging from unemployment benefits and retraining, home purchases, health care, and long-term health care coverage, to repaying student loans or building college balances for children or grandchildren. However, if all of these various accounts were established and funded, it is doubtful the employee would have any money left for food, clothing, and shelter.

Rather than having a host of specific savings programs, employees may be better served by more flexible accounts usable for a variety of purposes, as outside developments or chang­ing needs dictate. The platform concept would allow individuals to choose which purposes they need to save for and how much to save for each. Combined with targeted guidance or education, this structure could expose individuals to pos­sibilities they might not have considered before.

The structure is ideally suited to employment situations, but it could also be used by the self-employed or by consultants at sites aimed specifically at them and sponsored by trade associations, unions, or even government agen­cies. While their circumstances may preclude payroll deductions, the same products could be offered through direct debits to bank accounts.

The added value of nudge

The flexibility of the platform allows it to be used by employees with all levels of financial sophistication, but new participants would benefit from a variation on automatic enroll­ment that places certain amounts, in addition to the retirement savings amount, into a general savings account or similar vehicle. The automatic savings amounts deducted need not be large, and where the law allows, could vary according to employee age, with a larger proportion of the overall deduction going to nonretirement purpose for younger employees and to retirement for older ones.

As with automatic retirement enrollment, the employee would have the ability to vary amounts, divide the total among various accounts, and even stop all future contributions. However, automatic enrollment would offer workers direct experience with the nonretire­ment side of the platform. By varying enrollment in various accounts according to employees’ age, automatic enrollment could encourage them to consider saving for various purposes, such as a first home, college tuition for children, or additional health services.

Improving retirement security

Although the platform is applicable to a wide variety of other uses, its primary purpose is to build retirement security. Before retirement, the platform helps employees understand how to save, what they have, and how much more they need for a comfortable lifestyle. The other savings provide funds that can be used in the event of an emergency, thus helping to reduce leakage from retirement accounts in countries that allow early access to that money. At retire­ment, the platform helps individuals to see what other assets are available, and what loans or other liabilities must be factored in. In the UK, it is also being used to encourage individuals to use annuities and add them to their invest­ments. The UK experience can help to guide US policymakers in their efforts to increase the use of similar products.

The enhanced information and flexibility of the corporate platform should help individuals to better understand their finances and how to meet their goals. It moves retirement savings plans from a minor part of employees’ financial lives, to a central feature that has many more uses than just an event many years in the future. This promotes regular use of the platform, and a fuller understanding of what is necessary for a comfortable retirement.

      

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Australia's mandatory Superannuation Guarantee requires its citizens to save at least 9 percent of their income towards retirement. In many Asian nations, economic growth has spurred reexamination of pension systems to meet the needs of rapidly evolving societies. Would a mandatory savings plan be more effective than the current U.S. voluntary system? How have Asian nations have restructured their pension systems to deal with legacy costs? And what can Americans learn from the way Australia uses both employer and employee representatives to shape investment choices?

On September 17, the Retirement Security Project at Brookings and the AARP Public Policy Institute hosted a discussion of what the United States might learn from retirement savings systems in Australia and Asia. Opening speakers included Nick Sherry, who helped shape the Australian system as a cabinet minister and ran a Superannuation fund in the private sector, and Josef Pilger, an advisor on pension reform to both the Malaysian and Hong Kong governments and many industry providers. Steve Utkus, David Harris and Benjamin Harris, retirement experts from both the United States and the United Kingdom, considered how reforms in Australia and Asia can shape the American debate and whether this country should adopt key features from those foreign systems.

 

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• Retirement Savings in Australia, Asia and Beyond: What are the Lessons for the United States?

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• 20130917_retirement_savings_transcript

      

Thank you for allowing me to testify before you today on the need to improve retirement savings opportunities for employees of private sector small businesses and ways to structure such an effort.

I am David John, a Senior Strategic Policy Advisor in AARP’s Public Policy Institute, AARP’s internal think tank. In addition, I am a Deputy Director of the Retirement Security Project at the Brookings Institution. Before I joined AARP last year, I was a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation for almost 15 years.

My testimony this afternoon will focus on three areas: first, that there is a very real and growing retirement security problem in the United States; second, that the existing products and efforts are not resolving this problem; and third, that there are some approaches that Oregon could take that are compatible with existing law and would help future retirees to have a more comfortable retirement. These proposed actions would also help both your state and the country as a whole avoid the high costs of doing nothing. Let me be clear from the start that simply talking about increased education is not enough. This is a problem that will require action to improve.

The Problem Facing Us

Oregon and our nation face a serious problem if a large proportion of our workforce remains unable to save for retirement through an employer-related payroll deduction plan. This situation affects both those approaching retirement and those who are just starting their careers. However, older workers may have much higher access to defined benefit plans, and thus be much better off than younger employees who will have nothing to rely upon other than savings and Social Security.

Social Security is the foundation of retirement security both here and nationwide. In Oregon alone, its benefits keep hundreds of thousands out of poverty, but for most people, Social Security’s average benefit level of about $1,300 a month[1] does not provide enough for a comfortable retirement. That is about $15,600 a year. Economic security requires both Social Security benefits and sufficient additional savings to supplement them.

The lack of savings—and the opportunity to save at work through payroll deduction—is where the problem lies. Various industry groups and columnists have claimed that all is well, and that there really is not a problem. However, on close examination, there are holes in their figures, and they often focus on today’s retirees and those close to retirement, people who are much more likely to have a traditional defined benefit pension plan than younger workers who need to be saving now will have.

Even then, the numbers are not pretty. National data from the non-partisan Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) show that in 2013, 51 percent of workers aged 45–54 had less than $25,000 in total savings and investments.[2] These are people between 10 and 20 years from retirement. Among workers aged 55 and above, those within 10 years of retirement, 43 percent had less than $25,000 in total savings and investments. These household savings numbers exclude home equity and defined benefit pensions (if any). Savings of that amount will not take an individual through one year of retirement, much less the 20 plus years that most healthy 65-year-olds are likely to experience.

Interestingly, the question in 2014 was revised to separate out those with access to an employer-sponsored retirement savings plan or pension and those without.[3] The answers showed once again the value of such a plan and the cost of not having one. About 62 percent of employees with access to a retirement saving plan through their employer had more than $25,000 saved, and 22 percent had $100,000 or more. However, 94 percent of those without access to such a plan had under $25,000 in total savings and investments, and only 3 percent had $100,000 or more.

Just to place these numbers in perspective, any amount of retirement savings is certainly better for a retiree than no retirement savings at all, but it takes a significant amount gradually built over a long period of time to build a significant level of financial security. Retirement savings of $100,000,[4] a sum that only 30 percent of the workers age 45–54 and only 42 percent of those age 55+ in the EBRI survey will equal or exceed, buys additional monthly income of $589 ($7,100 annually) for men at age 65 and $552 a month ($6,600 annually) for women at that age.[5] That would give men with $100,000 in retirement savings and average Social Security benefits a monthly retirement income of about $1,800 ($22,700 annually) and women with the same savings and Social Security benefits a monthly income of $1,750 ($22,200). Neither figure is likely to produce a comfortable retirement, and the EBRI data suggest that even that is out of reach for well over half of all Americans.

Admittedly, these are rough numbers, and many people will receive higher-than-average Social Security benefits. However, many other people will end up receiving much less than average. We know from other research that five groups are most likely to undersave: small business employees, lower-income individuals, women, younger workers, and members of minority groups. However, the problems are not limited to just these five groups. By the way, the recent column by Robert Samuelson[6] that repeats industry assurances that all is well cited the Investment Company Institute (ICI) as saying that the median value of IRA and 401(k) accounts held by people aged 55–64 is $100,000.[7] If that is true, then half of all those with such accounts would have annual retirement incomes equal to or less than the $22,000-plus level I just mentioned if they receive average Social Security benefits.

To make matters worse, when calculating the average amount in such accounts, researchers usually exclude those who have no account at all. In the case of the ICI data Samuelson cites, it appears that approximately 25 percent of households aged 55–64 did not have either a 401(k) or an IRA. They face an even worse future.

How can industry researchers present the existing retirement system as working very well? The answer is by using selective statistics. As an example, the EBRI study includes a question asking how many employees have saved for retirement.[8] The answer for 2013 is 66 percent of all workers and 74 percent of those aged 55 to 64. If one stopped there, the picture would look very good. It is only when one digs in deeper and asks how much they have saved that the true problem becomes evident. Similarly, other studies[9] that show no serious problem focus on today’s retirees, who had much more access to a traditional defined benefit pension than tomorrow’s retirees will. While many of today’s retirees are comfortable, their success does not imply that younger workers will automatically have the same future.

Access to Workplace Savings Is Essential

It is not that people do not want to save or cannot save. They do. The problem is often the lack of access to a convenient savings plan, and the inability to understand the many savings options that exist.

The existence of a workplace retirement savings plan is important. A recent Boston College Center for Retirement Research paper[10] found that access to a workplace retirement savings plan or pension is second only to having a job as the most important factor in assisting moderate- to low-income individuals to build retirement security. A wide variety of research shows that only about half of the U.S. workforce has the ability to save for retirement or has a pension at work. While there are a variety of data sources, each with its own strengths and weaknesses, another Boston College study[11] found that the coverage statistics are comparable between data sources when the same standards are applied. This included a study of IRS records[12] that appeared to show otherwise.

Regardless of the exact percentage point used to estimate coverage, the sad fact is that millions of Americans currently lack the ability to save for retirement at work through payroll deduction. This is especially true for small business employees. A recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study[13] found that only about 14 percent (one in seven) of businesses with 100 or fewer employees offer their employees such a plan, and that between 51 percent and 71 percent of the roughly 42 million people who work for a small business lack the ability to save for retirement.

PPI research shows that about 642,000 Oregonians between the ages of 18 and 64—about 47.6 percent—are employed by a company that does not offer a pension or retirement savings plan.[14] The Oregon number is slightly better than the 51.1 percent national figure. That translates into 57 million Americans who are employed by the private sector and cannot save for retirement at work. These are not just younger employees who are new to the workforce. They include midcareer individuals who move from a large company that offered a retirement plan to a smaller company that does not. Often, these midcareer workers end up with a gap in their savings history that damages their ability to build economic security.

The Need for Better Coverage Is Widely Acknowledged

AARP is certainly not the only organization to recognize the need to increase the number of people able to save for retirement through a payroll deduction plan or account. Here, in Oregon, the Retirement in Reach Coalition[15] is a broad-based collection of business, professional, labor, and civic groups that have come together to help more Oregonians to save.

Nationally, a number of organizations, including many prominent research institutions, have written about the number of people who lack the ability to save for retirement and the need to improve coverage. Please note that these organizations do not necessarily support any specific solution or, indeed, any solution at all. However, all have written about either the need to expand coverage or how retirement security would be improved through greater coverage. As an example, Putnam Investments CEO Robert L. Reynolds has written about the need to improve the ability to save in a short paper titled “Three Steps that Could Shore up Retirement.”[16] The paper noted that “today—two years since the first boomers turned 65—the Employee Benefit Research Institute estimates that 49% of American workers are still ‘not confident at all’ or ‘not too confident’ about having enough money in retirement, 57% of pre-retirees have less than $25,000 saved for the future, and 32% of all workers do not have access to a retirement saving plan at work.”

The paper’s Step Two was: “Access to workplace savings for all workers. Any worker paying FICA taxes should have access to a retirement savings plan at work.”

Other organizations that have either issued papers or made statements about the number of people who lack an employer-sponsored retirement savings or pension plan include the following: the Brookings Institution’s Retirement Security Project,[17] the New America Foundation,[18] the Aspen Institute,[19] the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,[20] the Heritage Foundation,[21] and the Urban Institute.[22]

Again, this is not to imply that any of these organizations endorse any approach that Oregon might decide to take on retirement savings or that they support any part of my testimony. I mention them solely to show that concern about limited opportunities to save for retirement is widespread.

Those without an Employer-based Plan

In theory, everyone without an employer-based plan could save in an IRA, but EBRI research estimates that only about 1 out of 20 actually does so regularly.[23] In addition, payroll deduction is viewed as very important for encouraging retirement savings by people at every income level[24]. Overall, 61.5 percent of those surveyed in the EBRI 2011 Retirement Confidence Survey said that payroll deduction was very important for encouraging them to save for retirement, and another 27.8 percent said that it was somewhat important. Together, 89.3 percent said that it was either very or somewhat important. Further, the survey also found that a significant number of those currently saving would either stop or reduce their saving if payroll deduction was not available. It is much easier for people to save regularly if their savings are deducted from their paycheck before they receive it. Otherwise, the press of immediate bills tends to crowd out savings for longer-term goals.

Another factor in the extremely low savings rate among those who can use only an IRA is availability and trust. Especially in low-income neighborhoods, there are often no financial institutions nearby other than check-cashing outlets. Low-income individuals are often reluctant to go to financial outlets in other areas as they may feel that they are not welcome or that they will be treated poorly. Another drawback that applies to individuals of all income levels is the fear that they will be taken advantage of. Because financial professionals will know much more about the subject than their potential customers and may use unfamiliar terms, people have a very real fear that they will be talked into something that benefits the financier rather than the saver.

In addition, behavioral research shows that when people are faced with an important decision where they are uncertain what to do, they do nothing. This inertia factor is especially present in financial decisions like retirement savings.

These are reasons why an approach that focuses solely on additional education is extremely unlikely to succeed. Such an approach does nothing to increase the number of local financial outlets or opportunities to save. In addition, such financial literacy training often uses the same complex terms that potential savers find confusing. There is a value to training, but only in addition to expanded access to retirement savings.

On the other hand, when employees are presented with a plan at work that is structured in a way that provides guidance, they take the opportunity to save. This is true at all income levels. The Boston College study on why lower-income people are less likely to save that I mentioned earlier[25] showed very similar take-up rates between income levels. Eighty-six percent of those with incomes under 300 percent of the poverty line participated in a retirement savings system or pension if they were offered one and were eligible, compared to 95 percent of those with higher incomes.

Existing Products Are Not the Solution

Opponents of a state-sponsored retirement savings effort often cite the number and kind of existing products that are currently available to small businesses. A joint IRS/U.S. Department of Labor publication[26] lists seven types of retirement savings plans that are currently available. Unfortunately, most of them are both expensive and complicated or require the employer to make a contribution. Only one that is not widely available really enables small businesses to offer their employees an opportunity to save without saddling them with high costs or requiring savings.

Both the traditional 401(k) and the automatic enrollment 401(k) are excellent solutions for employers who are willing to offer them. However, the GAO found[27] that smaller employers can pay much higher administrative costs than those paid by larger employers. In addition, they can be complicated and require employers to play a more active role than many are willing to do.

Three other plans, the SEP IRA, the SIMPLE IRA, and the safe harbor 401(k), are either totally financed by employer contributions or require employers to make contributions. In addition, another of the seven options—a profit-sharing plan—is both completely financed with employer contributions and doesn’t require regular funding. While this plan does allow for profit sharing in good years, it does not necessarily include regular contributions that an individual can use to finance a retirement income.

The seventh type of retirement savings account available to small businesses is the payroll deduction IRA. It does not require (or allow) any employer contribution, or saddle the employer with complex regulatory burdens or impose significant costs. All the employer has to do is make it available to employees, deduct the contributions from their paychecks, and then send it to the financial provider. Unfortunately, it is not widely available or sold, as it offers financial services companies only limited income potential. Oregon can help to change that situation.

Another type of retirement savings tool, MyRA, was announced in President Obama’s January State of the Union speech. MyRA has some very positive features,[28] but it is not a solution or a substitute for anything Oregon might decide to do to help more people to save for retirement. A key weakness is that an individual can only have a maximum of $30,000 in MyRA. That is not nearly enough for any appreciable improvement in financial security. Second, MyRA savings will be deposited only in government bonds. While that investment is completely safe, it does not allow any real investment growth. An individual with just a MyRA is likely to get little more than the inflation-adjusted amount they contributed.

Why Oregon Should Be Concerned about This Problem

This is a state problem because doing nothing will mean higher state and local taxes for your children and grandchildren. Low-income retirees will need state and local services financed by state and local taxes for health care, housing, senior centers, and a host of other services. As Oregon ages and the baby boomers retire, the demand from this population for additional state government services will only grow. However, there is a simple, low-cost alternative to taxpayer-funded government services.

What Oregon Can Do to Help

The statute that created the Oregon Retirement Savings Task Force includes the limitation that you cannot recommend anything that might be contrary to the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Some would have you believe that this limits you to proposing additional employee education. This is not the case.

While ERISA as it is currently written does limit Oregon’s options, there are still avenues open to the state that would help to directly increase the number of Oregonians who can save for retirement at work. Oregon could still sponsor a payroll deduction IRA[29] that could be available at low cost to every resident of the state who is not currently covered by another retirement savings or pension plan. Such an account could be available through either state-managed investments or one or more private sector providers chosen and monitored by a state agency.

The state, the employer, or any private sector provider would not be responsible for the performance of the savings, and there would be no promised retirement benefits. All of the savings would come from and be owned exclusively by the individual saver. It would be up to the saver to monitor his or her eligibility and compliance with contributions rules. The small costs of such a program could be paid out of fees assessed on the accounts, or the start-up costs could be subsidized by the state.

A key fact is that the only liability faced by the employer would be to collect and forward individual contributions to the provider or agency on a timely basis. In theory, such contributions could be forwarded using the same schedule as the state currently uses to collect its income tax revenues. Federal law limits the role of the employer to encourage its employees to save for retirement through providing general information about the payroll deduction IRA program. The employer is also allowed to answer any questions about the program or to refer them to the IRA provider and provide any informational materials written by the IRA provider, as long as no endorsement by the employer is provided. At all times, the employer must remain neutral about the provider.

This is not a perfect plan, and it does not include features that many who support increased access to retirement savings would like to see. However, we believe that such a plan would be legal and, if combined with an educational program, could increase retirement savings among Oregonians. As federal law either changes or is reinterpreted, additional features and services could be added. This would be a starting place, not a final destination.

Automatic Enrollment

At this point, any Oregon plan would probably not require the use of automatic enrollment. However, as both state and federal law evolve, it would be helpful to explore encouraging that feature in any retirement savings plan. Under automatic enrollment, an employee continues to have total control over his or her retirement savings decisions, but unless the employee decides otherwise, he or she is enrolled and saves a set percentage of income in a specific investment choice. Automatic enrollment uses behavioral economics to make inertia work for the employee. These features work. The five groups mentioned earlier that are most likely to undersave (women, younger employees, small business employees, lower-income employees, and minority groups) all see their participation rates climb from very low levels to close to 90 percent.

And employees like automatic enrollment. A 2007 survey[30] of automatically enrolled workers showed that 95 percent found that it made saving easy. Eighty-five percent started to save earlier than they would have without it. Almost all of the employees who were automatically enrolled and remained in the plan said that they were satisfied with the process (97 percent) and were glad their company offered automatic enrollment (98 percent). Even those who were automatically enrolled and decided not to save liked the feature, with 90 percent being satisfied with the process and 79 percent being glad their company offered automatic enrollment.

Conclusion

Again, thank you for allowing me to testify today. Improving the ability to save for retirement through the increased availability of payroll deduction savings would address a real need both here in Oregon and nationwide. From a policy standpoint, an active program that increases the access that small business employees have to payroll deduction retirement savings plans would help the nearly 650,000 Oregonians who don’t currently have such an opportunity. It would enable them to build economic security through their own efforts.

BEST PRACTICES:

• A universally available payroll deduction IRA that is available to any Oregonian who currently lacks an employer-provided retirement savings or pension plan.
• A very short list of available investments that includes both a stable value fund and a balanced or target date fund. New savers would go into a previously designated investment unless they chose otherwise. Savers wishing other investments would be able to find other IRA accounts.
• Regular statements that clearly indicate investments, earnings, fees, and account balance. A number indicating the monthly retirement income that such a plan could produce if the current amount is saved would be very helpful.
• A coordinated statewide education program that explains the accounts and how to use them as well as the value of saving for retirement.
• Financial literacy classes in every school.

      

American experience strongly suggests that the coming UK pension freedoms sound better in theory than they will work in practice. After nearly a decade where the UK has been the gold standard for retirement savings policy, it is about to take a step that it may regret.

As annuity purchases are not required, very few Americans buy them, feeling that they are spending a great deal of money for a comparatively small monthly income. Even those in traditional DB pension plans usually take a lump sum if they are allowed to do so. As a result, many US retirees spend unwisely, trust the wrong financial advisor, or make other financial mistakes.

Many people greatly overestimate how long their savings will last. Most others assume (often wrongly) that they can manage their own money as well as anyone else or that they can live comfortably on Social Security alone. U.S. Social Security pays a benefit that depends on the retirees’ individual income history. The average annual amount is about $13,000 (GBP 8,700).

One survey found that in West Virginia, a state with a relatively low average income, 78% of those near retirement and 67% of those at retirement would likely outlive their financial assets. Workers with lower incomes are most at risk. A recent national study found that by the 20th year of retirement, more than 81% of Americans with incomes up to $27,000 would run short of money, as would 38% of those earning up to $42,000, and 19% of those with incomes up to $65,000.  Even 8% of those with the highest incomes could not meet their expenses.

Advice alone is not likely to help. US experience shows that literally every minute that passes after general advice is given reduces the chance that the consumer will act on it – even when they have decided to do so. And even a significant number of those who consult with a financial planner fail to act on that guidance.

What does show promise is income illustration. In a 2014 U.S. survey, 85% of plan participants found estimates of the income they could anticipate from their retirement savings useful, and 35% said that they would save more. Income illustrations change the framing of retirement saving from gross amounts saved to retirement income.  Annuity-like products become insurance against running out of money, something Americans are increasingly concerned about.

Two other potential developments may help. One is longevity insurance, an annuity that provides income only after a set age. Purchasing a policy defines how long one must make retirement savings last, and the retiree is protected against running out of money. Because longevity insurance is deferred, one can receive higher amounts of monthly income for a lower cost.  In 2014, $50,000 would buy $275 a month at age 65 or $1200 a month starting at age 80.

Another idea is an automatic enrollment trial annuity. As developed by several Brookings Institution colleagues and me, new retirees would automatically use part of their savings for a two year annuity unless the retiree refused it. The rest of their savings would be available as a lump sum. After the trial period, the annuity would become permanent if they did nothing or they could cancel it and take the rest of their money as a lump sum.

The many annuity horror stories from the UK show a definite need for change, but the coming reforms go too far. US experience suggests that too many UK retirees are likely to see their savings exhausted all too quickly. There are alternatives that could do a better job of protecting retirees.

       

Increasingly, many Marylanders are unprepared for retirement.

The US has the broadest range of retirement savings options in the world. There are thousands of retirement products offered. But most Marylanders don’t use them.

The need is growing. The Baby Boomers are the largest generation in history. They will live longer in retirement than any generation in history.

But – financially – many are not prepared. Many have virtually no retirement savings: more than a third those within ten years of retirement age have saved less than $10,000. $10,000 invested and spent over the average person’s retirement works out to about $1,000 of income per year. Even with Social Security, that’s not much to live on.

Fears about retirement are the #1 economic concern. Many Marylanders know they’re unprepared – and they’re worried about it. Concerns about retirement security are now more broadly based than the cost of health care, fear of job loss or other economic concerns – and have been for over a decade.3 Those concerns have grown since the financial crisis, even though the stock market has recovered. Many know they’ll have to defer retirement—and many fear they will never be able to afford to retire at all.

The key to retirement saving is having a retirement plan and contributing to it every paycheck. But many businesses, including most smaller businesses, don’t offer retirement plans. As a result 1,000,000 Marylanders working in private businesses across the State don’t have a retirement plan. There are, of course, individual retirement accounts (IRAs) -- but almost no one uses them who didn’t get access through an employer-based plan via payroll deduction.

Having a plan is essential, but not a panacea. Even when plans are available, many employees don’t join. Many who do contribute and save less than they need to meet their own goals. Even with plans, many will need to save more.

The challenge continues at retirement, because most of these plans are paid out in a single lump sum payment—few plans offer reliable retirement income for life that traditional pensions do. Since most retirees do not consult financial advisors and are not financial experts themselves, some who live longer than average or are unlucky in their investments will find that they haven’t saved enough and will exhaust their savings.

They will, of course, have Social Security. That’s why it’s so important that Social Security be both preserved and strengthened. But the average monthly benefit in Maryland is about $1,300 and for most people Social Security covers only a fraction of their basic needs in retirement. Most Marylanders will need additional income from retirement savings – and the State of Maryland can help them get it.

Other states and other governments are making it easier for people to save and for private employers to help them do it. Maryland should, too. Acting now will save Maryland taxpayers millions in the future.

California, Massachusetts, and Illinois have already enacted legislation. Illinois created a new program that requires employers who have no retirement plan to automatically enroll their employees in a state-created program. Massachusetts authorized a program for uncovered employees of non-profits. California created a board to plan and propose program similar to that in Illinois. Similar legislation is being or has been introduced in some fifteen other states – states all across the country with varying political orientations, populations, and economic bases.

Although there are many variations under consideration, these programs generally provide for an automatic payroll deduction of a set amount unless the employee opts out. Funds are to be invested professionally and may be pooled to achieve higher returns and lower costs. Those who cannot or do not want to make complex financial decisions are not required to do so – their contributions are placed automatically into a reliable fund or set of funds.

In order to ensure that employers – many of whom are small businesses – can participate in a program, it must be designed to help them avoid significant disruption, expense or administrative burden. This can be accomplished by enabling employers to use current payroll processes to help their employees to build retirement security, without requiring employers to make contributions themselves.

If Maryland doesn’t act now, Maryland taxpayers will face higher costs for decades to come.

These plans are designed to be self-sustaining: their operating costs are paid for by plan contributions and the State would not assume any obligations. In practice, however, these plans will end up saving taxpayer funds: If Maryland doesn’t act now, Maryland taxpayers will face higher costs for decades to come, as retirees are forced to turn to State assistance instead of living on their own savings.

There are many ways to improve retirement security. The key is for businesses to help their employees save, without becoming overburdened themselves.

Task Force is not recommending any one approach, but strongly recommends that Maryland join other states, by developing and implementing a plan that helps Marylanders have more secure retirements.We recommend development of a specific state-based program that meets Maryland’s needs from the options discussed in our report.

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Since it was created in 1935, Social Security has grown from covering about half of the work force to covering nearly all workers.  The largest remaining exempted group is a subset of state and local government workers (SLGWs).  As of 2008, Social Security did not cover about 27 percent of the 23.8 million SLGWs (Congressional Research Service 2011).  Non-coverage of SLGWs is concentrated in certain states scattered around the country and includes workers in a diverse set of jobs, ranging from administrators to custodial staff.  Some police and fire department employees are not covered.  About 40 percent of public school teachers are not covered by Social Security (Kan and Alderman 2014).    

Under current law, state and local governments that do not offer their own retirement plan must enroll their employees in Social Security.  But if it does offer a retirement plan, the state or local government can choose whether to enroll its workers in Social Security.  

This paper reviews and extends discussion on whether state and local government workers should face mandatory coverage in Social Security.^[1]  Relative to earlier work, we focus on links between this issue and recent developments in state and local pensions.  Although some of the issues apply equally to both existing and newly hired SLGWs, it is most natural to focus on whether newly hired employees should be brought into Social Security.^[2]  

The first thing to note about this topic is that it is purely a transitional issue.  If all SLGWs were already currently enrolled in Social Security, there would not be a serious discussion about whether they should be removed.  For example, there is no discussion of whether the existing three quarters of all SLGWs that are enrolled in Social Security should be removed from coverage.

Bringing state and local government workers into the system would allow Social Security to reach the goal of providing retirement security for all workers.  The effects on Social Security finances are mixed.  Bringing SLGWs into the system would also help shore up Social Security finances over the next few decades and, under common scoring methods, push the date of trust fund insolvency back by one year, but after that, the cost of increased benefit payments would offset those improvements. 

Mandatory coverage would also be fairer.  Other workers pay, via payroll taxes, the “legacy” costs associated with the creation of Social Security as a pay-as-you-go system.   Early generations of Social Security beneficiaries received far more in payouts than they contributed to the system and those net costs are now being paid by current and future generations.  There appears to be no convincing reason why certain state and local workers should be exempt from this societal obligation.  As a result of this fact and the short-term benefit to the program’s finances, most major proposals and commissions to reform Social Security and all commissions to shore up the long-term federal budget have included the idea of mandatory coverage of newly hired SLGWs.

While these issues are long-standing, recent developments concerning state and local pensions have raised the issue of mandatory coverage in a new light. Linking the funding status of state and local pension plans and the potential risk faced by those employees with the mandatory coverage question is a principal goal of this paper.  One factor is that many state and local government pension plans are facing significant underfunding of promised pension benefits.  In a few municipal bankruptcy cases, the reduction of promised benefits for both current employees and those who have already retired has been discussed.  The potential vulnerability of these benefits emphasizes the importance of Social Security coverage, and naturally invites a rethinking of whether newly hired SLGWs should be required to join the program.  On the other hand, the same pension funding problems imply that any policy that adds newly-hired workers to Social Security, and thus requires the state to pay its share of those contributions, would create added overall costs for state and local governments at a time when pension promises are already hard to meet.  The change might also divert a portion of existing employee or employer contributions to Social Security and away from the state pension program. 

We provide two key results linking state government pension funding status and SLGW coverage. First, we show that states with governmental pension plans that have greater levels of underfunding tend also to have a smaller proportion of SLGW workers that are covered by Social Security.  This tends to raise the retirement security risks faced by those workers and provides further fuel for mandatory coverage.  While one can debate whether future public pension commitments or future Social Security promises are more risky, a solution resulting in less of both is the worst possible outcome for the workers in question.  Second, we show that state pension benefit levels for career workers are somewhat compensatory, in that states with lower rates of Social Security coverage for SLGWs tend to have somewhat higher pension benefit levels.  The extent to which promised but underfunded benefits actually compensate for the higher risk to individual workers of non-Social Security coverage is an open question, though.  

Mandatory coverage of newly hired SLGWs could improve the security of their retirement benefits (by diversifying the sources of their retirement income), raise average benefit levels in many cases (even assuming significant changes in state and local government pensions in response to mandatory coverage), and would improve the quality of benefits received, including provisions for full inflation indexation, and dependent, survivor and disability benefits in Social Security that are superior to those in most state pension plans.  The ability to accrue and receive Social Security benefits would be particularly valuable for the many SLGWs who leave public service either without ever having been vested in a government pension or having been vested but not reaching the steep part of the benefit accrual path.  

Just as there is strong support for mandatory coverage in the Social Security community and literature, there is strong opposition to such a change in elements of the state and local government pension world.  The two groups that are most consistently and strongly opposed to mandatory coverage of newly hired SLGWs are the two parties most directly affected – state and local governments that do not already provide such coverage and their uncovered employees.  Opponents cite the higher cost to both employees and the state and local government for providing that coverage and the potential for losing currently promised pension benefits. They note that public pensions – unlike Social Security – can invest in risky assets and thus can provide better benefits at lower cost.  This, of course, is a best-case alternative as losses among those risky assets could also increase pressure on pension finances.

There is nothing inconsistent about the two sides of these arguments; one set tends to focus on benefits, the other on costs.  They can be, and probably are, all true simultaneously.  There is also a constitutional issue that used to hang over the whole debate – whether the federal government has the right to tax the states and local government units in their roles as employers – but that seems resolved at this point.

Section II of this paper discusses the history and current status of Social Security coverage for SLGWs.   Section III discusses mandatory coverage in the context of Social Security funding and the federal budget.  Section IV discusses the issues in the context of state and local budgets, existing pension plans, and the risks and benefits to employees of those governments.  Section V concludes.

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Note: A revised version of this paper is forthcoming in The Journal of Retirement.

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In many policy-related situations, the states can be useful laboratories to determine the most appropriate federal actions. Variations across states in health care programs, earned income credit rules, minimum wages, and other policies have helped inform debates about federal interventions.

In this paper, we reverse that approach. Many state and local governments currently face difficulties financing future pension obligations for their workers. The federal government, however, faced similar circumstances in the 1980s and successfully implemented a substantial reform. We examine the situation the federal government faced and how it responded to the funding challenge. We present key aspects of the situation facing state governments currently and draw comparisons between them and the federal situation in the 1980s. Our overarching conclusion is that states experiencing distress today about the cost and funding of its pension plans could benefit from following an approach similar to the federal government’s resolution of its pension problems in the 1980s.

The federal government retained the existing Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) for existing employees and created a new Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) for new employees. FERS combined a less generous defined benefit plan than CSRS, mandatory enrollment in Social Security, and a new defined contribution plan with extensive employer matching. Although we do not wish to imply that a “one size fits all” solution applies to the very diverse situations that different states face, we nonetheless conclude that the elements of durable, effective, and just reforms for state pension plans will likely include the major elements of the federal reform listed above.

Section II discusses the federal experience with pension reform. Section III discusses the status and recent developments regarding state and local pensions. Section IV discusses the similarities in the two situations and how policy changes structured along the lines of the federal reform could help state and local governments and their employees.

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Many American workers do not have access to employer-sponsored payroll deduction plans for retirement saving. Groups with low rates of access include younger workers, members of minority groups, and those with low-to-moderate incomes. Small business employees are especially at risk. Only about 14 percent of businesses with 100 or fewer employees offer their employees a retirement plan, leaving between 51 and 71 percent of the roughly 42 million people who work for a small business without access to an employer-administered plan (Government Accountability Office 2013).

Lack of access makes it difficult to build retirement wealth. A study by the Employee Benefit Research Institute (2014) shows that 62 percent of employees with access to an employer-sponsored plan held more than $25,000 in saving balances and 22 percent had $100,000 or more. In contrast, among those without access to a plan, 94 percent held less than $25,000 and only 3 percent hold $100,000 or more. Although workers without an employer-based plan can contribute to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), very few do. But employees at all income levels tend to participate at high rates in plans that are structured to provide guidance about the decisions they should make (Wu and Rutledge 2014).

With these considerations in mind, many experts and policy makers have advocated for increased retirement plan coverage. While a national approach would be desirable, there has been little legislative progress to date. States, however, are acting. Three states have already created state-sponsored retirement saving plans for small business employees, and 25 are in some stage of considering such a move (Pension Rights Center 2015).

This policy brief, based on John and Gale (2015), highlights a variety of issues that policymakers will need to address in creating and implementing an effective state-sponsored retirement saving plan.

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Feminism needs fathers. Unless and until men and women share the responsibilities of parenting equally, gender parity in the labor market will remain out of reach.

As Isabel Sawhill and I argued in our piece on “Men’s Lib” for the New York Times, “The gender revolution has been a one-sided effort. We have not pushed hard enough to put men in traditionally female roles—that is where our priority should lie now.”

Dads on the home front: Paternity leave

An important step towards gender equality is then the provision of paternity leave, or at least forms of parental leave that can be taken up by fathers as well as mothers. Right now the U.S. is one of the few advanced nations with no dedicated leave for fathers:

But there are reasons to be hopeful. More companies are offering paternity leave or, like Amazon, a “leave bank” that parents can share between them. Hillary Clinton is promising to push for paid family leave if she wins in November. Recent studies of California’s paid leave scheme, introduced in 2004, suggest that there are significant benefits for fathers.

The number of fathers taking leave while the mother is in paid work rose by 50 percent, according to an analysis of the American Community Survey by Ann Bartel of Colombia and her colleagues.

Fathers of sons are more likely to take leave than those with daughters, suggesting that parents particularly value father-son bonding. Fathers were also very much more likely to take leave if they worked in occupations with a high share of female workers, indicating that workplace culture is also a big factor.

Men are more likely to take leave when it is exclusively available to them—with a so-called “use it or lose it” design—and when the period of leave is paid. The Quebec Parental Insurance Plan, for instance, which offers fathers three to five weeks at home with a child, resulted in a 250 percent increase father’s participation in parental leave.

Benefits of paternity leave

Of course, there are costs. Paid leave has to be funded: either through payroll taxes (as most Democrats including Senator Kirsten Gillibrand want), taxes on the wealthy (Clinton’s preferred approach), or tax breaks for firms (as Marco Rubio has suggested).

So what are the upsides? Among the potential benefits from paternity leave are:

• A more equal division of labor in terms of parenting and childcare
• More equal sharing of domestic labor, including housework
• Less stress on the family
• Closer father-infant bonding
• Higher pay for mothers (according to a study in Sweden, future income for new mothers rises by 7 percent on average for every month of paternity leave taken by the father)

More than a day

Gender roles have evolved rapidly in recent decades, especially in terms of the place and status of women. But the evolution of our mental models of masculinity, and especially fatherhood, has been slower. Helping fathers to take time to care for their children will help children, families, and women. Fathers need more than a day.

       

British politics is starting to resemble a bowling alley. One after another, political figures are tumbling–including the leading lights of the Brexit campaign. They sowed the wind and now are reaping the whirlwind.

First to topple was the prime minister. After the referendum, David Cameron announced that he would step down. Last week fellow Conservative Boris Johnson, the leading light of the Brexit campaign, said he would not run to succeed Mr. Cameron after his ally Michael Gove, the justice secretary, concluded, in quintessentially British style, that Mr. Johnson lacked “the team captaincy” required. Then Nigel Farage stepped down as leader of the UK Independence Party, saying “I want my life back.” Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn has lost the support of his parliamentary colleagues and may be next to fall.

The exit of the leading Brexiteers is a relief. The skills required to run a populist, fact-averse campaign are not the same skills needed to lead a nation. For all his mercurial talents, on full display during his colorful stint as mayor of London, Boris Johnson would have been a disastrous prime minister. The alternatives–especially Mr. Gove and Home Secretary Theresa May–are steadier souls. Both are also better positioned to unite Conservative members of Parliament and hold on until the next scheduled general election, in 2020.

Mr. Corbyn is likely to go; the question really is when. It he doesn’t, the Labour Party will break apart. In his case the departure will be only slightly about the vote to remain in or leave the European Union. Broadly, his fellow Labour MPs didn’t want him as their leader in the first place; it was the votes of more left-wing party members that propelled him to the leadership, and many see him as an electoral liability. (He is.)

There is no direct connection between Brexit and Donald Trump. But a few things can still be deduced on this side of the pond. First, Mr. Trump may succeed in making the connection tighter. His immediate announcement that the vote was about “declaring independence” reflected his sharpening political instincts. The day after the vote, Mr. Trump said: “The people of the United Kingdom have exercised the sacred right of all free peoples. They have declared their independence from the European Union. … Come November, the American people will have the chance to re-declare their independence. Americans will have a chance to vote for trade, immigration and foreign policies that put our citizens first.”

Independence is a powerful populist theme, one Mr. Trump is likely to exploit it to its fullest.

Brexit and the economic and political chaos it has already sparked are proof that no matter how crazy or far-fetched an electoral outcome appears, it can happen. Right up to the last minute, many believed that even if the vote were close, it would be to remain in the EU. At some level we just couldn’t imagine the alternative. Maybe Mr. Cameron and Mr. Corybn felt the same, which is why they were so complacent. Not so, the other side.

All this suggests the wisdom of treating every poll with a fistful of salt. Electorates are becoming more volatile and more visceral. Pollsters are getting it wrong as often as they get it right. The last general election in the U.K. is another case in point. Populist sentiment wrecks standard political models. When people are angry, they don’t weigh the costs and benefits of their actions in the usual way; that’s true in life and it’s true in voting.

It’s also why it’s risky to allow populist campaigners near the levers of power. I’ve written in this space before about the dangers of injecting direct democracy in a parliamentary political system. Think of referendums as akin to Ming vases: something rare, to be handled with great care. The British Parliament is now acting as a firebreak. The leading populists will not get the keys to 10 Downing Street.

But the United States holds direct elections for president. If Donald Trump wins in November, he will assume the most powerful office in the world. There is no firebreak, no buffer, no second chance.

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Editor's note: This piece originally appeared on the Wall Street Journal's Washington Wire blog.

       

Editor's Note: In the coming decade, China’s economic growth is projected to slow from its long-run average annual rate of 10 percent, sustained over the past three decades. The imminent slowdown also reflects a variety of specific structural challenges. Arthur Kroeber argues that responding effectively to these challenges requires a broad set of reforms in the financial sector, fiscal policy, pricing of key factors such as land and energy which are now subject to extensive government manipulation, and the structure of markets.

In the coming decade, China’s economic growth will certainly slow from the long-run average annual rate of 10% sustained over the past three decades. In part this is a natural slowdown in an economy that is now quite large (around US$7 trillion at market exchange rates) and solidly middle-income (per capita GDP of about US$7,500, at purchasing power parity). Despite the certainty of this slowdown, China’s potential growth rate remains high: per-capita income is still far below the level at which incomes in the other major northeast Asian economies (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) stopped converging with the US level; the per-capita capital stock remains low, suggesting the need for substantial more investment; and the supply of low-cost labor from the traditional agricultural sector has not yet been exhausted. All these factors suggest it should be quite possible for China to achieve average annual real GDP growth of at least 7% a year through 2020.[1]

But the imminent slowdown also reflects a variety of specific structural challenges which require active policy response. Inadequate policies could result in a failure of China to achieve its potential growth rate. Three of the most prominent structural challenges are a reversal of demographic trends from positive to negative; a substantial secular decline in the contribution of exports to growth; and the very rapid increase in credit created by the 2009-10 stimulus program, which almost certainly led to a substantial reduction of the return on capital. Responding effectively to these challenges requires a broad set of reforms in the financial sector, fiscal policy, pricing of key factors such as land and energy which are now subject to extensive government manipulation, and the structure of markets. This paper will argue that financial sector reform is the best and most direct way to overcome these three major structural challenges.

1. China’s growth potential

There are several strong reasons to believe that China has the potential to sustain a fairly rapid rate of GDP growth for at least another decade. We define “fairly rapid” as real growth of 7% a year, which is a very high rate for an economy of China’s size (US$7 trillion), but substantially below the average growth rate since 1980, which has been approximately 10%.

The most general reason for this belief is that China’s economic growth model most closely approximates the successful “catch-up” growth model employed by its northeast Asian neighbors Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in the decades after World War II. The theory behind “catch-up” growth is simply that poor countries whose technological level is far from the global technological frontier can achieve substantial convergence with rich-country income levels by copying and diffusing imported technology. Achieving this catch-up growth requires extensive investments in enabling infrastructure and basic industry, and an industrial policy that focuses on promoting exports. The latter condition is important because a disciplined focus on exports forces companies to keep up with improvements in global technology; in effect, a vibrant export sector is one (and probably the most efficient) mechanism for importing technology.

A survey of 96 major economies from 1970 to 2008 shows that 14 achieved significant convergence growth, defined as an increase of at least 10 percentage points in per capita GDP relative to the United States (at purchasing power parity). Eight of these countries were on the periphery of Europe and so presumably benefited from the spillover effects of western Europe’s rapid growth after World War II, and from the integration of eastern and western Europe after 1990. The other six were Asian export-oriented economies: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand and China. Most of these countries experienced a period of very rapid convergence with US income levels and then a sharp slowdown or leveling off. On average, rapid convergence growth ended when the country’s per capita GDP reached 55% of the US level. The northeast Asian economies that China most closely resembles were among the most successful: convergence growth in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea slowed at 90%, 60% and 50% of US per capita income respectively. In 2010 China’s per capita income was only 20% of the US level. Based on this comparative historical experience, it seems plausible that China could enjoy at least one more decade of relatively rapid growth, until its per capita income reaches 40% or more of the US level.[2]

So China’s growth potential is fairly clear. But realizing this potential is not automatic: it requires a constant process of structural reform to unlock labor productivity gains and improve the return on capital. The urgency of structural reform is particularly acute now. To understand why, we now examine three structural factors that are likely to exert a substantially negative effect on economic growth in coming years.

2. Challenges to growth

When considering China’s structural growth prospects, it is necessary to take account of at least three major challenges to growth. Over the past three decades, rapid economic growth has been supported by favorable demographics, a very strong contribution from exports, and a large increase in the stock of credit. The demographic trend is now starting to go into reverse, the export contribution to growth has slowed dramatically in the last few years, and the expansion of credit cannot be safely sustained for more than another year or two at most.

Demographics. From 1975 to 2010, China’s “dependency ratio”—the ratio of the presumably non-working (young people under the age of 15 and old people above the age of 64) to the presumably working (those aged 15-64) fell from approximately 0.8 to 0.4. Over the same period the “prime worker ratio”—the ratio of people aged 20-59 to those 60 and above—stayed roughly stable at above 5. Both of these ratios indicate that China’s economy enjoyed a very high ratio of workers to non-workers. This situation is favorable for economic growth, because it implies that with a relatively small number of dependent mouths to feed, workers can save a higher proportion of their incomes, and the resulting increase in aggregate national saving becomes available for investment in infrastructure and basic industry.

Over the next two decades, however, these demographic trends will reverse. The dependency ratio will rise, albeit slowly at first, and the prime worker ratio will decline sharply from 5 today to 2 in the early 2030s. These demographic shifts are likely to exert a drag on economic growth, for two reasons.

The first impact, which is already being felt, is a reduction in the supply of new entrants into the labor force—those aged 15-24. This cohort has fluctuated between 200m and 230m since the early 1990s, and in 2010 it stood at the upper end of that range. By 2023 it will have fallen by one-third, to 150m, a far lower figure than at any point since China began economic reforms in 1978. Because the supply of new workers is falling relative to demand for labor, wage growth is likely to accelerate above the rate of labor productivity growth, which appears to be in decline from the very high levels achieved in 2000-2010. As a result, unit labor costs will start to rise (a trend already in evidence in the manufacturing sector since 2004) and inflationary pressures will build. In order to keep inflation at a socially acceptable level, the government will be forced to tighten monetary policy and reduce the trend rate of economic growth.

The second impact will be the large increase in the population of retirees relative to the number of workers available to support them. This is the effect described by the prime worker ratio, which currently shows that there are five people of prime working age for every person of likely retirement age. As this ratio declines, the overall productivity of the economy slows, and the health and pension costs of supporting an aging population rise. The combination of these two effects can contribute to a dramatic slowdown in economic growth: during the period when Japan’s prime worker ratio fell from 5 to 2 (1970-2005), the trend GDP growth rate fell from 8% to under 2% (though demographics, of course, does not explain all of this decline). Over the next 20 years China’s prime worker ratio will decline by exactly the same amount as Japan’s did from 1970-2005.

Export challenge. Another element of China’s extraordinary growth was its rapidly growing export sector. Exports are a crucial component of catch-up growth in poor economies because, as explained above, they act as a vector of technology transfer: in order to remain globally competitive, exporters must continually upgrade their technology (including their processes and management systems) to keep up with the continuous advance of the global technological frontier.

Precisely measuring the impact of exports on economic growth is tricky, because what matters is not headline export value (which contains contributions from imported components and materials), but the domestic value added content of exports. In addition, a dynamic export sector is likely to have indirect impacts on the domestic economy through the wages paid to workers, the long-run effect of technological upgrading and so on. If we ignore these second-round impacts and focus simply on the direct contribution to GDP growth of domestic value added in exports, we find that exports contributed 4.6 percentage points to GDP growth on average in 2003-07. In other words, exports accounted for about 40% of economic growth during that period.[3]

Such a high export contribution to growth is on its face unsustainable for a large continental economy like China’s, and in fact the export contribution has slowed substantially since the 2008 global financial crisis. In 2008-11 the average contribution of export value added to GDP growth was just 1.5 percentage points – about one-third the 2003-07 average. It is likely that the export contribution to growth will fall even further in coming years.

Credit challenge. China responded to the global financial crisis with a very large economic stimulus program which was financed by a large increase in the credit stock. The ratio of non-financial credit (borrowing by government, households and non-financial corporations) rose from 160% in 2008 to over 200% in 2011. While the overall credit/GDP ratio remains lower than the 250% that is typical for OECD nations, a rapid increase in the credit stock in a short period of time, regardless of the level, is frequently associated with financial crisis. In China’s case, it is evident that the majority of the increase in the credit stock reflects borrowing by local governments to finance infrastructure projects which are likely to produce economic benefit in the long run but which in many cases will result in immediate financial losses.[4] To avert a potential banking sector crisis, therefore, it would be prudent for government policy to target first a stabilization and then a decline in the credit/GDP ratio.

The good news is that China has recent experience of deflating a credit bubble. In the five years after the Asian financial crisis (1998-2003), the credit/GDP ratio rose by 40 percentage points (the same amount as in 2008-11) as the government financed infrastructure spending to offset the impact of the crisis. Over the next five years (2003-08), the credit/GDP ratio fell by 20 points, as nominal GDP growth (17% a year on average) outstripped the annual growth in credit (15%). This experience suggests that, in principle, it should be possible to reduce the annual growth in credit significantly without torpedoing economic growth.

The bad news is that the 2003-08 deleveraging occurred within the context of the extremely favorable demographics, and unusually robust export growth that we have just described. Not only are these conditions unlikely to be repeated in the coming decade, both these factors are likely to exert a drag on GDP growth. Given this backdrop, any reduction in the rate of credit growth must be accompanied by extensive measures to ensure that the productivity of each yuan of credit issued is far higher than in the past.

3. The role of financial sector reform

The three growth challenges described above are diverse, but they are reflections of a single broader issue which is that China’s ability to maintain rapid growth mainly through the mobilization of factors (labor and capital) is decreasing. Much of the high-speed growth of the last decade derived from a rapid increase in labor productivity which was in turn a function of an extremely high investment rate: as the amount of capital per worker grew, the potential output of each worker grew correspondingly (“capital deepening”). But the investment rate, at nearly 49% of GDP in 2011, must surely be close to its peak, since it is already 10 percentage points higher than the maximum rates ever reached by Japan or South Korea. So the amount of labor productivity gain that can be achieved in future by simply adding volume to the capital stock must be far less than during the last decade, when the investment/GDP ratio rose by 10 percentage points.

The obvious corollary is that if China’s ability to achieve rapid gains in labor productivity and economic growth through mobilization of capital is declining, these gains must increasingly be achieved by improved capital efficiency. More specifically, the tightening of the labor supply implied by the demographic transition means that unit labor cost growth will accelerate; all things being equal this means that consumer price inflation will be structurally higher in the next decade than it was for most of the last. This in turn means that nominal interest rates will need to be higher. As the cost of capital rises, the average rate of return on capital must also increase; otherwise a larger share of projects will be loss-making and the drag on economic growth will become pronounced.

On the export side, the dramatic slowdown in the contribution to economic growth from exports means the loss of a certain amount of “easy” productivity gains. Greater productivity of domestic capital could help offset the deceleration in productivity growth from the external sector. Finally, as just noted, the need to arrest or reverse the rapid rise in the credit/GDP ratio means that over the next several years, a given amount of economic growth must be achieved with a smaller amount of credit than in the past—in other words, the average return on capital (for which credit here serves as a proxy) must rise.

Conceptually this is all fairly straightforward. The problem for policy makers is that measuring the “productivity of capital” on an economy-wide basis is not at all straightforward. In principle, one could measure the amount of new GDP created for each incremental increase in the capital stock (the incremental capital output ratio or ICOR). But in practice calculating ICOR is cumbersome, and depends heavily on various assumptions, such as the proper depreciation rate. Moreover, in an industrializing economy like China’s, the ratio of capital stock to GDP tends to rise over time and therefore the ICOR falls; this does not mean that the economy misallocates capital but simply that it experiences capital deepening. Sorting out efficiency effects from capital deepening effects is a vexing task.[5]

A more practical approach is simply to examine the ratio of credit to GDP. There is no one “right” level of credit to GDP, since different economies use different proportions of debt and equity finance. But the trends in the credit to GDP ratio in a single country (assuming there is no major shift in the relative importance of debt and equity finance), which are easily measured, can serve as a useful proxy for trends in the productivity of capital, and provide some broad guidelines for policy.

Figure 1 shows the ratio of total non-financial credit to GDP in China since 1998 (all figures are nominal). Total non-financial credit comprises bank loans, bonds, external foreign currency borrowing, and so-called “shadow financing” extended to the government, households and non-financial corporations; it excludes fund-raising by banks and other financial institutions. This measure is similar to the measure of “total social financing” recently introduced by the People’s Bank of China. 

This shows, as noted previously, that the credit to GDP ratio rose sharply from 160% of GDP in 2008 to 200% in 2010. The current ratio is not abnormally high: many OECD countries have credit/GDP ratios of 250% or so, and Japan’s is around 350%. But it is obvious that the trend increase is worrying: if credit/GDP continues to rise at 20 percentage points a year then by 2015 it would hit 300%, a level much higher than is normal in healthy economies. It seems intuitively clear that to ensure financial stability, policy should target a stabilization or decline in the credit/GDP ratio. Success in this policy would imply that the productivity of credit, and capital more generally, improves.

The large increase in the credit/GDP ratio in 2008-10 is not unprecedented. Following the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the total credit stock rose from 143% of GDP in 1998 to 186% in 2003, an increase of 43 percentage points in five years, as a result of government spending on infrastructure and the creation of new consumer lending markets (notably home mortgages). During this period the credit stock grew at an average annual rate of 15.9%, but nominal GDP grew at just 10% a year.

Over the next five years, 2004-08, the average annual growth in total credit decelerated only slightly, to 14.8%. But thanks to a gigantic surge in productivity growth—caused by a combination of the delayed effect of infrastructure spending, deep market reforms (such as the restructuring of the state owned enterprise sector), and a boom in exports—nominal GDP growth surged to an average rate of 18.3%. As a consequence, the credit/GDP ratio declined to 160% in 2008, a decline of 26 percentage points from the peak five years earlier.

This experience shows that, in a developing country like China, it is quite possible to deflate a credit bubble relatively quickly and painlessly. To do so, however, two conditions must be met: the projects financed during the credit bubble must, in the main, be economically productive in the long run even if they cause financial losses in the short run; and structural reforms must accompany or quickly follow the credit expansion, in order to unlock the productivity growth that will enable deleveraging through rapid economic growth rather than through a painful recession. These conditions were clearly met during the 1998-2008 period: the expanded credit of the first five years mainly went to economically useful infrastructure such as highways, telecoms networks and port facilities; and deep structural reforms improved the efficiency of the state sector, expanded opportunities for the private sector, and created a new private housing market. This combination of infrastructure and reforms helped lay the groundwork for the turbo-charged growth of 2004-08.

The credit expansion of 2008-10, following the global financial crisis, was about the same magnitude as the credit expansion of a decade earlier: the credit/GDP ratio rose 40 percentage points, from 160% to 200%. But the expansion was much more rapid (occurring over two years instead of five), and while the bulk of credit probably did finance economically productive infrastructure, there is evidence that the sheer speed of the credit expansion led to far greater financial losses. A large proportion of the new borrowing was done by local government window corporations, often with little or no collateral and in many cases with no likelihood of project cash flows ever being large enough to service the loans. A plausible estimate of eventual losses on these loans to local governments is Rmb2-3 trn, or 4-7% of 2011 GDP.

Furthermore, whereas in the late 1990s restructuring of the state enterprise sector and creation of the private housing market took off at the same time the government began to expand credit, the 2008-10 credit expansion occurred without any significant accompanying structural reforms. In sum we have significantly less reason to be confident about the foundations for economic growth over the next five years than would have been the case in 2003.

On the assumption that the trend rate of nominal GDP growth over the next five years is likely be quite a bit less than in 2003-08, just how difficult will it be for China to stabilize or better yet reduce the credit to GDP ratio? For the purposes of analysis, Figure 1 proposes two scenarios. Both assume that nominal GDP will grow at an average rate of 13% in 2012-2015 (combining real growth of 7.5% a year with economy-wide inflation of 5.5%). The “stabilization” scenario assumes that total credit grows at the same 13% rate, stabilizing the credit/GDP ratio at around 200%. The “deleveraging” scenario assumes that credit growth falls to 9.5% a year, enabling a reduction in the credit/GDP ratio of 25 percentage points to 175%--about the same magnitude as the reduction of 2003-08.

A quick glance suggests that achieving either of these two outcomes will be far more difficult than in the previous deleveraging episode. In 2003-08, the average annual rate of credit growth was just one percentage point lower than during the credit bubble of 1998-2003. In other words, the work of deleveraging was accomplished almost entirely through economic growth, rather than through any material constraint on credit.

In the three years following the global financial crisis, by contrast, total credit expanded by 22.7% a year, generating nominal GDP growth of 14.1% on average. The required drop in average annual credit growth is 10 percentage points under the stabilization scenario and 13 points under the deleveraging scenario, while nominal GDP growth declines by only a point. In other words, this episode is likely to be the reverse of the 2003-08 episode: deleveraging will need to come almost entirely from a constraint on credit, rather than from economic growth.



Another way of looking at this is to examine the relationship between incremental credit and incremental GDP—that is, how many yuan of new GDP arise with each new yuan of credit. This calculation is presented in Figure 2. This shows that in 1998-2003 each Rmb1 of new credit generated Rmb0.39 of new GDP; this figure rose to 0.72 in 2003-08, an 84% increase in the productivity of credit. The GDP payoff from new credit in 2008-10 was far worse than in 1998-2003. Simply to stabilize the credit/GDP ratio at its current level will require a 73% increase in credit productivity. To achieve the deleveraging scenario, a 150% improvement will be required.

The good news is that under the deleveraging scenario, the average productivity of credit in 2011-2015 only needs to be the same as it was in 2003-08. In principle, this should be achievable. But as previously noted, the mechanism of improvement needs to be quite different this time round. In 2003-08, the productivity of credit rose because credit growth remained roughly constant while GDP growth surged, thanks to structural reforms that accelerated returns to both capital and labor. Over the next several years, by contrast, the best that can be hoped for is that GDP growth will remain roughly constant. Consequently any improvement in credit productivity must come from constraining the issuance of new credit, while substantially raising the efficiency of credit allocation and hence the returns to credit.

What are the main mechanisms for improving the efficiency of credit, and of financial capital more generally? Broadly speaking, there are two: diversification of credit channels, and more market-based pricing of credit. Historically most credit has been issued by large state-owned banks, which are subject to political pressure in their lending decisions, and the majority of credit has gone to state-owned enterprises. Diversifying the channels of credit to include a broader range of financial institutions, a more vigorous bond market, and even by encouraging the creation of dedicated small- and medium-size enterprise lending units within the big banks, should improve credit allocation by giving greater credit access to borrowers who were previously shut out simply by virtue of a lack of political connections. Over the past decade government policy has been broadly supportive of the diversification of credit channels: specialized consumer credit, leasing and trust companies have been allowed to flourish, and there is some anecdotal evidence that SME lending at the state owned banks has begun to pick up steam.

The government has been far more reluctant, however, to embrace systematic measures for improving the pricing of credit. Bank interest rates remain captive to the policy of regulated deposit rates. Guaranteed low deposit rates means that banks have little incentive to seek out and properly price riskier assets, and are content to earn a fat spread on relatively conservative loan books. Bond markets, which in more developed economies form the basis for pricing of financial risk, are in China large in primary issuance, but small in trading volumes. The majority of bonds are purchased by banks and other financial institutions and held to maturity, make them indistinguishable from bank loans. Active secondary market trading by a wide range of participants is the essential mechanism by which bond prices become the basis for financial risk pricing.

4. Conclusions and recommendations

China still has potential for another decade of relatively high speed growth, but a combination of structural factors means that “high speed” in future likely means a trend GDP growth rate of around 7%, well below the historic average of 10%. Moreover, a combination of negative trends in demographics and the external sector, and the need to constrain credit growth after the enormous credit expansion of 2008-2010, mean the obstacles to realizing this potential growth rate are quite large. In order to overcome these obstacles, the efficiency of credit, and of capital more generally, must be improved. A large increase in credit efficiency was achieved in the previous economic deleveraging episode of 2003-08, but that increase in efficiency resulted mainly from an acceleration in GDP growth due to capital deepening, rather than from a constraint on credit. Over the next several years, the best that can plausibly be achieved is a stabilization of nominal GDP growth at approximately the current level. Any increase in credit efficiency must therefore come from a constraint on credit growth and direct improvements in credit allocation, rather than from capital-intensive economic growth.

In order to achieve this improvement in credit efficiency, three improvements to China’s financial architecture are urgently needed. First, the diversification of financial channels should continue to be expanded, notably through the acceptance and proper regulation of so-called “shadow financing” activities, which reflect market pressure for higher returns to depositors and greater credit availability (at appropriate prices) for riskier borrowers. Second, the ceiling on bank deposit rates should gradually be lifted and ultimately abolished, in order to give banks incentives for increased lending at appropriate prices to riskier borrowers who (it is to be hoped) will deliver a higher risk-adjusted rate of return than current borrowers. Third, steps should be taken to increase secondary trading on bond markets, in order to enable these markets to assume their appropriate role as the basis of financial risk pricing. Particular stress should be laid on diversifying the universe of financial institutions permitted to trade on bond markets, to include pension funds, specialized fixed-income mutual funds and other institutional investors with a vested interest in active trading to maximize both short- and long-term returns.

 

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Following the global financial crisis of 2008, China’s authorities took a number of steps to internationalize the use of the Chinese currency, the renminbi. These included the establishment of currency swap lines with foreign central banks, encouragement of Chinese importers and exporters to settle their trade transactions in renminbi, and rapid expansion in the ability of corporations to hold renminbi deposits and issue renminbi bonds in the offshore renminbi market in Hong Kong.

These moves, combined with public statements of concern by Chinese officials about the long-term value of the central bank’s large holdings of U.S. Treasury securities, and the role of the U.S. dollar’s global dominance in contributing to the financial crisis, gave rise to widespread speculation that China hoped to position the renminbi as an alternative to the dollar, initially as a trading currency and eventually as a reserve currency.

This paper contends that, on the contrary, the purposes of the renminbi internationalization program are mainly tied to domestic development objectives, namely the gradual opening of the capital account and liberalization of the domestic financial system. Secondary considerations include reducing costs and exchange-rate risks for Chinese exporters, and facilitating outward direct and portfolio investment flows. The potential for the currency to be used as a vehicle for international finance, or as a reserve asset, is severely constrained by Chinese government’s reluctance to accept the fundamental changes in its economic growth model that such uses would entail, notably the loss of control over domestic capital allocation, the exchange rate, capital flows and its own borrowing costs.

This paper attempts to understand the renminbi internationalization program by addressing the following issues:

1. Definition of currency internationalization

2. Specific steps taken since 2008 to internationalize the renminbi

3. General rationale for renminbi internationalization

4. Comparison with prior instances of currency internationalization, notably the U.S. dollar after 1913, the development of the Eurodollar market in the 1960s and 1970s; and the deutsche mark and yen in 1970-1990

5. Understanding the linkage between currency internationalization and domestic financial liberalization

6. Prospects for and constraints on the renminbi as an international trading currency and reserve currency

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• China’s Global Currency: Lever for Financial Reform

      

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In recent years, China has increasingly confronted new challenges in economic policy, including rising labor costs, low household consumption, rapid urbanization and inefficient domestic investment. While it is now widely acknowledged in Beijing that major structural adjustments are needed to address these issues, implementing serious reforms pose major challenges for the newly installed leadership.

On April 16, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings and China’s Caixin Media Group hosted a conference to examine the daunting challenges confronting China’s new leaders. The morning panels featured a discussion of the financial sector as well as the relationship between the domestic agenda for financial reform and China’s evolving strategy for outbound investment. The afternoon panels took a close look at the political obstacles to implementing major economic reform in areas such as tax policy, the household registration system and land transfers, as well as explore the impact of environmental and natural resource constraints on China’s economic growth.

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• Part 1 - The Road Ahead for China’s Economy
• Part 2 - The Road Ahead for China’s Economy

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• 20130416_china_economy

      

The recent gyrations in the Chinese interbank market underscore that the chief risk to global growth now comes from China. Make no mistake: credit policy will tighten substantially in the coming months, as the government tries to push loan growth from its current rate of 20% down to something much closer to the rate of nominal GDP growth, which is about half that. Moreover, in the last few months of the year the new government will likely start concrete action on some long-deferred structural reforms. These reforms will bolster China’s medium-term growth prospects, but the short-term impact will be tough for the economy and for markets.

The combination of tighter credit and structural reforms means that with the best of luck China could post GDP growth in 2014 of a bit over 6%, its weakest showing in 15 years and well below most current forecasts. A policy mistake such as excessive monetary tightening could easily push growth below the 6% mark. Banks and corporations appear finally to be getting the message that the new government, unlike its predecessor, will not support growth at some arbitrary level through investment stimulus.

The dire performance of China’s stock markets in the past two weeks reflects this growing realization among domestic investors, although we suspect stocks have further to fall before weaker growth is fully discounted.

Slower growth… but no Armageddon

But the China risk is mainly of a negative growth shock, not financial Armageddon as some gloomier commentary suggests. Financial crisis risk remains relatively low because the system is closed and the usual triggers are unavailable. Emerging market financial crises usually erupt for one of two reasons: a sudden departure of foreign creditors or a drying-up of domestic funding sources for banks. China has little net exposure to foreign creditors and runs a large current account surplus, so there is no foreign trigger. And until now, banks have funded themselves mainly from deposits at a loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) of under 70%, although the increased use of quasi-deposit wealth management products means the true LDR may be a bit higher, especially for smaller banks. The danger arises when banks push up their LDRs and increasingly fund themselves from the wholesale market. So a domestic funding trigger does not exist—yet.

The People’s Bank of China clearly understands the systemic risk of letting banks run up lending based on fickle wholesale funding. This is why it put its foot down last week and initially refused to pump money into the straitened interbank market. Interbank and repo rates have dropped back from their elevated levels, but remain significantly above the historical average. The message to banks is clear: lend within your means. This stance raises confidence that Beijing will not let the credit bubble get out of control. But it also raises the odds that both credit and economic growth will slow sharply in the coming 6-12 months.

If the economy slows and local stock markets continue to tumble, doesn’t this mean the renminbi will also weaken sharply? Not necessarily. Beijing has a long-term policy interest in increasing the international use of the renminbi, which can only occur if the currency earns a reputation as a reliable store of value in good times and bad. Allowing a sharp devaluation now runs against this interest, and also would be a sharp break from a long-established policy of not resorting to devaluation to stimulate growth, even at moments of severe stress (as in 1997-98 and 2008-09). So while our call on China growth has been marked down, our call on the renminbi has not.

Short-term pain is better than long-term stagnation

From a broader perspective, the biggest China risk is not that the country suffers a year or two of sharply below-trend growth. If that slowdown reflects more rational credit allocation and the early, painful stages of productivity-enhancing reforms, it will be healthy medicine. And even a much slower China will still be growing faster than all developed markets and most emerging ones.

The real risk is rather that the new government will show a lack of nerve or muscle and fail to push through financial sector liberalization, deregulation of markets to favor private firms, and fiscal reforms to curtail local governments’ ability to prop up failing firms, overspend on infrastructure, and inflate property bubbles. The old government wasted the last three years of its term doing none of these things despite the obvious need. The new leaders are talking a better game, but they have a year at most to articulate a clear reform program, begin implementation (liberalizing interest rates and freeing electricity prices would be a good start), and ruthlessly removing senior officials who stand in the way. If they fail to deliver, then the short-term slowdown could become a long and dismal decline.

       

The much anticipated Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s 18^th Congress closed its four-day session last Tuesday. A relatively bland initial communiqué was followed today by a detailed decision document spelling out major initiatives including a relaxation of the one-child policy, the elimination of the repressive “re-education through labor” camps, and a host of reforms to the taxation and state-owned enterprise systems. Today’s blizzard of specific reform pledges allays earlier concerns that the new government led by party chief Xi Jinping and premier Li Keqiang would fail to set major policy goals. But is this enough to answer the three biggest questions analysts have had since Xi and  Li ascended a year ago?

Those questions are, first, do Xi and his six colleagues on the Politburo standing committee have an accurate diagnosis of China’s structural economic and social ailments? Second, do they have sensible plans for addressing these problems? And third, do they have the political muscle to push reforms past entrenched resistance by big state owned enterprises (SOEs), tycoons, local government officials and other interest groups whose comfortable positions would be threatened by change? Until today, the consensus answers to the first two questions were “we’re not really sure,” and to the third, “quite possibly not.”

These concerns are misplaced. It is clear that the full 60-point “Decision on Several Major Questions About Deepening Reform”[1] encompasses an ambitious agenda to restructure the roles of the government and the market. Combined with other actions from Xi’s first year in office – notably a surprisingly bold anti-corruption campaign – the reform program reveals Xi Jinping as a leader far more powerful and visionary than his predecessor Hu Jintao. He aims to redefine the basic functions of market and government, and in so doing establish himself as China’s most significant leader since Deng Xiaoping. Moreover, he is moving swiftly to establish the bureaucratic machinery that will enable him to overcome resistance and achieve his aims. It remains to be seen whether Xi can deliver on these grand ambitions, and whether his prescription will really prove the cure for China’s mounting social and economic ills. But one thing is for sure: Xi cannot be faulted for thinking too small.

Main objective: get the government out of resource allocation

The four main sources we have so far on Xi’s reform strategy are the Plenum’s Decision, the summary communiqué issued right after the plenum’s close,[2] an explanatory note on the decision by Xi,[3] and a presumably authoritative interview with the vice office director of the Party’s Financial Leading Small Group, Yang Weimin, published in the People’s Daily on November 15, which adds much useful interpretive detail.[4] Together they make clear that the crucial parts of the Decision are as follows:

• China is still at a stage where economic development is the main objective.
• The core principle of economic reform is the “decisive” (决定性) role of market forces in allocating resources (previous Party decisions gave the market a “basic” (基础）role in resource allocation.
• By implication, the government must retreat from its current powerful role in allocating resources. Instead, it will be redirected to five basic functions: macroeconomic management, market regulation, public service delivery, supervision of society (社会管理), and environmental protection.

In his interview, Yang Weimin draws a direct comparison between this agenda and the sweeping market reforms that emerged after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992, claiming that the current reform design is a leap forward comparable to Deng’s, and far more significant than the reform programs of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

This a very bold and possibly exaggerated claim. But the basic reform idea – giving the market a “decisive” role in resource allocation – is potentially very significant, and should not be dismissed as mere semantics. Over the last 20 years China has deregulated most of its product markets, and the competition in these markets has generated enormous economic gains. But the allocation of key inputs – notably capital, energy, and land – has not been fully deregulated, and government at all levels has kept a gigantic role in deciding who should get those inputs and at what price. The result is that too many of these inputs have gone to well-connected state-owned actors at too low a price. The well-known distortions of China’s economy – excessive reliance on infrastructure spending, and wasteful investment in excessive industrial capacity – stem largely from the distortions in input prices.

Xi’s program essentially calls for the government to retreat from its role in allocating these basic resources. If achieved, this would be a big deal: it would substantially boost economic efficiency, but at the cost of depriving the central government of an important tool of macro-economic management, and local governments of treasured channels of patronage. As a counterpart to this retreat from direct market interference, the Decision spells out the positive roles of government that must be strengthened: macro management and regulation, public service delivery, management of social stability, and environmental protection. In short, the vision seems to be to move China much further toward an economy where the government plays a regulatory, rather than a directly interventionist role.

Keep the SOEs, but make them more efficient

Before we get too excited about a “neo-liberal” Xi administration, though, it’s necessary to take account of the massive state-owned enterprise (SOE) complex. While Xi proposes that the government retreat from its role in manipulating the prices of key inputs, it is quite clear that the government’s large role as the direct owner of key economic assets will remain. While the Decision contains a number of specific SOE reform proposals (such as raising their dividend payout ratio from the current 10-15% to 30%, and an encouragement of private participation in state-sector investment projects), it retains a commitment to a very large SOE role in economic development. The apparent lack of a more aggressive state-sector reform or privatization program has distressed many economists, who agree that China’s declining productivity growth and exploding debt are both substantially due to the bloated SOEs, which gobble up a disproportionate share of bank credit and other resources but deliver ever lower returns on investment.

The communiqué and the Decision both make clear that state ownership must still play a “leading role” in the economy, and it is a very safe bet that when he retires in 2022, Xi will leave behind the world’s biggest collection of state-owned enterprises. But while privatization is off the table, subjecting SOEs to much more intense competition and tighter regulation appears to be a big part of Xi’s agenda. In his interview, Yang Weimin stresses that the Plenum decision recognizes the equal importance of both state and non-state ownership – a shift from previous formulations which always gave primacy to the state sector. Moreover, other reports suggest that the mandate of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (Sasac), which oversees the 100 or so big centrally-controlled SOE groups, will shift from managing state assets to managing state capital.[5] This shift of emphasis is significant: in recent years SOEs have fortified their baronies by building up huge mountains of assets, with little regard to the financial return on those assets (which appears to be deteriorating rapidly). Forcing SOEs to pay attention to their capital rather than their assets implies a much stronger emphasis on efficiency.

This approach is consistent with a long and generally successful tradition in China’s gradual march away from a planned economy. The key insight of economic reformers including Xi is that the bedrock of a successful modern economy is not private ownership, as many Western free-market economists believe, but effective competition. If the competitive environment for private enterprises is improved – by increasing their access to capital, land and energy, and by eliminating regulatory and local-protectionist barriers to investment – marginal SOEs

must either improve their efficiency or disappear (often by absorption into a larger, more profitable SOE, rather than through outright bankruptcy). As a result, over time the economic role of SOEs is eroded and overall economic efficiency improves, without the need to fight epic and costly political battles over privatization.

Can Xi deliver?

Even if we accept this view of Xi as an ambitious, efficiency-minded economic reformer, it’s fair to be skeptical that he can deliver on his grand design. These reforms are certain to be opposed by powerful forces: SOEs, local governments, tycoons, and other beneficiaries of the old system. All these interest groups are far more powerful than in the late 1990s, when Zhu Rongji launched his dramatic reforms to the state enterprise system. What are the odds that Xi can overcome this resistance?

Actually, better than even. The Plenum approved the formation of two high-level Party bodies: a “leading small group” to coordinate reform, and a State Security Commission to oversee the nation’s pervasive security apparatus. At first glance this seems a classic bureaucratic shuffle – appoint new committees, instead of actually doing something. But in the Chinese context, these bodies are potentially quite significant.

In the last years of the Hu Jintao era, reforms were stymied by two entrenched problems: turf battles between different ministries, and interference by security forces under a powerful and conservative boss, Zhou Yongkang. Neither Hu nor his premier Wen Jiabao was strong enough to ride herd on the squabbling ministers, or to quash the suffocating might of the security faction. By establishing these two high-level groups (presumably led by himself or a close ally), Xi is making clear that he will be the arbiter of all disputes, and that security issues will be taken seriously but not allowed to obstruct crucial economic or governance reforms.

The costs of crossing Xi have also been made clear by a determined anti-corruption campaign which over the last six months has felled a bevy of senior executives at the biggest SOE (China National Petroleum Corporation), the head of the SOE administrative agency, and a mayor of Nanjing infamous for his build-at-all-costs development strategy. Many of the arrested people were closely aligned with Zhou Yongkang. The message is obvious: Xi is large and in charge, and if you get on the wrong side of him or his policies you will not be saved by the patronage of another senior leader or a big state company. Xi’s promptness in dispatching his foes is impressive: both of his predecessors waited until their third full year in office to take out crucial enemies on corruption charges.

In short, there is plenty of evidence that Xi has an ambitious agenda for reforming China’s economic and governance structures, and the will and political craft to achieve many of his aims. His program may not satisfy market fundamentalists, and he certainly offers no hope for those who would like to see China become more democratic. But it is likely to be effective in sustaining the nation’s economic growth, and enabling the Communist Party to keep a comfortable grip on power.

Editor's Note: Arthur Kroeber is the Beijing-based managing director of Gavekal Dragonomics, a global macroeconomic research firm, and a non-resident fellow of the Brookings-Tsinghua Center. A different version of this article appears on www.foreignpolicy.com.

       

A year after he and his colleagues took control of China’s government, Xi Jinping has emerged as an extraordinarily powerful leader, with a clear and ambitious agenda for remaking the Chinese governance system. Economic, social and foreign policy are now on a far more clear and decisive course than they were during the drifting and unfocused last years under president Hu Jintao and premier Wen Jiabao.

Xi arguably wields more personal authority than any Chinese leader since Mao: he has subdued the fragmented fiefdoms that arose under Hu; has arrogated all key decisions to himself, unlike Jiang Zemin who delegated much economic policy power to his premier Zhu Rongji; and does not have to deal with the cabal of conservative patriarchs that often hemmed in Deng Xiaoping.

Perhaps the biggest surprise of Xi’s first year was the speed with which he consolidated his power and signaled his policy intentions. He achieved this through two big house-cleaning drives. First was an anti-corruption campaign that neutralized a powerful political enemy (former security boss Zhou Yongkang), brought to heel a powerful vested interest (state oil giant China National Petroleum Corporation, much of whose senior management was arrested) and signaled the costs of opposing his reform agenda by sweeping up 20,000 officials at all levels of government. The other was the so-called “mass line” campaign that involved party, government and military officials engaging in “self-criticism” sessions and getting marching orders from party central.

So there is no question that Xi has power. What does he intend to do with it? The Decision document that emerged last November from the Communist Party plenum made clear that his aim is comprehensive governance reform. This does not mean eroding the party’s monopoly on power; quite the reverse. The intention is to strengthen the party’s grip by improving the administrative system, clarifying the roles of the market and the state (resulting in a more market-driven economy but also in a more powerful and effective state), and permitting a wider role for citizen-led non-governmental organizations—so long as those NGOs effectively act as social-service contractors for the state and do not engage in advocacy or political mobilization.

And at the recent National People’s Congress (NPC) we got additional detail on Xi’s economic program, which is the most comprehensive structural reform agenda since the late 1990s. (Xi’s propagandists make the bolder claim that it is the most sweeping reform program since Deng’s original “reform and opening” drive of the late 1970s.) Much commentary has focused on the Plenum Decision’s emphasis on giving the market a “decisive role,” and this shift is indeed important. But Xi is not some Chinese version of Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher: for him and his colleagues, the market is a tool, not an end in itself. The respective roles of state and market need to be clarified, but the state role will remain very large. Xi’s economic agenda is not just about deregulation and improving the environment for private enterprise; it is also about fixing the state-enterprise and fiscal systems so that they become more effective instruments for achieving state aims.

If Xi succeeds, the result will be a China with a more efficient economy, a better run and somewhat more transparent government—and a Communist Party with enhanced legitimacy and tighter control of all the crucial levers of power. But there are also two less rosy potential outcomes. One is that his reforms fail, and China is left with a debt ridden, slow-growing economy with an overbearing state sector and an increasingly dissatisfied population. Another is that he succeeds—but either becomes a permanent dictator himself, or establishes the belief that China only be ruled by a strongman, thereby retarding the development of a more open and participatory political system.

It’s the economy, and we’re not stupid

On the immediate economic policy questions, a gulf has opened between foreign and many non-official domestic analysts on the one hand, and the apparent stance of the government on the other. According to the prevalent outside view, China’s biggest problem is the huge increase in leverage since the 2008 global financial crisis: total non-financial credit rose from 138 percent of GDP in 2008 to 205 percent last year. Unless this spiraling leverage is brought under control, the argument goes, China risks some sort of financial crisis. To stabilize the credit/GDP ratio, annual credit growth must fall from its current rate of around 17 percent to the trend rate of nominal GDP growth, which now appears to be around 10 percent. But such a dramatic fall in credit growth must almost certainly cause a drop in real GDP growth, at least in the short run. The conclusion is therefore that if Beijing is serious about controlling leverage, it must accept significantly lower growth for at least a couple of years. If on the other hand the leaders insist on keeping economic growth at its current pace, this means they cannot be serious about controlling leverage and imposing structural reform, and a train wreck is more likely.

As far as we can tell from the agenda laid out at the Plenum and the NPC, Xi and his colleagues do not agree with this analysis. Their priorities are to restructure the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the fiscal system, and maintain real GDP growth at approximately its current rate of 7.5 percent. The leverage problem, by implication, can be sorted out over several years.

The argument in favor of this approach is that SOE and fiscal reform strike at the root causes of the debt build-up. Local governments have borrowed because their expenditure responsibilities exceed their assigned revenues, they have an implicit mandate to build huge amounts of urban infrastructure, and they face no accountability for the return on their investments. SOEs have borrowed because their return on capital has deteriorated sharply. Improving SOEs’ return on capital and cleaning up local government finance, should greatly reduce the demand for unproductive debt, and hence bring credit and economic growth back into alignment—eventually. In the meantime credit will flow at whatever rate permits real GDP to keep humming at 7 percent or more, meaning that leverage will continue to rise.

In other words, the government thinks the debt build-up is merely a symptom, and it intends to attack the underlying disease while letting the symptoms take care of themselves. One can feel comfortable with approach this on two conditions: first, that the government is right that the debt buildup does not itself pose an immediate threat to economic health; and second that the government is serious about tackling the structural problems.

Debt – what, me worry?

The safety of the current debt trajectory is a judgment call. On the plus side, the last several months have seen a steep decline in year-on-year credit growth, with very little apparent impact on economic activity. Growth in broad credit (including activity in the “shadow” financing sector) peaked at 23.5 percent in April 2013 and declined continuously to 17 percent in February, while GDP growth remained basically steady in both real and nominal terms. If this pattern holds, it suggests that leverage will continue to increase, but at a slower rate than in the past two years, so the runaway-train risk is reduced.

The government’s own case for the safety of the present debt situation implicitly rests on a report by the National Audit Office (NAO) in late December, which found the debt position of local governments to be poor but manageable. Total liabilities of local governments as of 30 June 2013 were found to be Rmb18 trn (US$3 trn), or approximately 31 percent of GDP; of these liabilities 40 percent were guarantees and contingencies (and thereby not an imminent risk to local finances). NAO’s estimate of consolidated public debt, including the central government, came in at about 53 percent of GDP, well below the levels of public borrowing in most OECD countries.

Another basis for the sanguine view on debt was an extensive national balance-sheet analysis published in December by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the party’s main think-tank. CASS’s calculation methods differ from NAO’s, so the two sets of figures are not directly comparable. CASS found that total government debt was 73 percent of GDP in 2011, and that broad public-sector liabilities (including the debt of SOEs and policy banks) were 151 percent of GDP. This sounds scary until you inspect the asset side of the balance sheet, which comes in at a more cheerful 350 percent. This figure is almost certainly too rosy: nearly three-quarters of it represents the land holdings of local governments and SOE assets, whose reported values are probably well above their true market values. But even discounting these values substantially, it is still possible to conclude that the public sector’s assets comfortably cover its liabilities.

Whether one agrees with these estimates or not, it is clear that policy makers accept the central conclusion that the nation’s debt problem is serious but manageable, and that direct efforts to deleverage immediately are not warranted. The important question then becomes whether Beijing’s efforts to tackle the underlying structural problems are bearing fruit.

Rolling back the SOE tide

So what are those efforts? The agenda on SOE reform is now clear. SOEs will be compelled to focus on improving their return on capital, rather than expanding their assets; private capital will be permitted to enter previously restricted sectors; direct private investment in SOEs and in state-led investment projects will be encouraged; and most likely (although government officials have been coy on this point), a swathe of underperforming locally-controlled SOEs in non-strategic sectors will be privatized or forced into bankruptcy.

In essence, this revives the zhuada fangxiao (grasp the big, release the small) SOE reform strategy of the late 1990s. The idea was that the state would retain control, and try to improve the operational efficiency, of a relatively small number of very large enterprises in strategic sectors such as railways, aviation, telecoms, power and petrochemicals, while privatizing most activity in competitive consumer goods and services sectors. This strategy was successful: in the decade ending in 2008, the number of SOEs fell from 260,000 to 110,000, the private sector’s share of national fixed investment rose from less than a quarter to 58 percent, the profitability and return on assets of state firms rose dramatically and came close to matching the returns in private firms, and the proportion of SOE assets in “strategic” sectors rose to an all-time high of 62 percent.

Thanks to the Hu/Wen leadership’s lack of enthusiasm for state sector reform, and their mandate that state firms support the massive 2009 economic stimulus, some of these gains have been reversed. Crucially, the return on assets in SOEs plummeted to less than half the private-sector average, and state firms began to re-colonize sectors from which they had previously retreated: by 2011, half of SOE assets were in these non-strategic sectors.

Now the reformers are back in charge and aim to complete the zhuada fangxiao objective. This does not mean eliminating the state sector, or privatizing the core centrally-owned firms on the economy’s commanding heights. But it does mean a determined push to shed non-core SOEs and assets, abandon consumer-facing sectors in favor of private firms, and improve the operational efficiency of the remaining SOES. The headline efforts in this direction so far have been an announcement by the Guangdong provincial government that it aims to move 80 percent of provincial SOEs to a mixed-ownership structure, with no predetermined minimum state shareholding; and an announcement by petrochemicals giant Sinopec that it will seek private investment for an up to 30 percent share of its downstream gasoline and diesel distribution operations.

Funding the unfunded mandates

SOE reform was a surprisingly strong component of the Third Plenum decision; fiscal reform took center stage in the recent NPC session. China’s central fiscal problem is unfunded mandates for local governments. Localities control less than half of revenues but are responsible for 85 percent of government expenditure. In theory, the gap is supposed to be bridged by transfers from the central government, but in practice the transfers often do not match up well with localities’ actual needs. Not surprisingly, they respond to this structural deficit by resorting to a variety of off-budget funding schemes, a lot of which involve grabbing land and selling it to developers at a big markup.

A mismatch between local expenditure and revenue was a deliberate feature of the landmark 1994 tax reform (in whose design finance minister Lou Jiwei was involved as a junior official). But until the early 2000s, localities’ expenditure share was roughly stable at around two-thirds of the total; unfunded mandates and chronic deficits have grown dramatically in the past decade.

The centerpiece of Lou’s fiscal reform strategy is a recentralization of expenditure responsibility and a more flexible transfer system, reducing incentives for local-government rapacity. But in his budget speech he outlined a host of other detailed reforms, whose combined effect would be curb over-investment in real estate and heavy industry, permit fiscal policy to become more countercyclical and increase budget accountability. The main items include:

• Revenue estimates “are now seen as projections instead of tasks to accomplish.” This aims to discourage the current practice of trying to increase tax collections during economic downturns.
• Adoption of a three-year budget cycle and accrual accounting.
• Increase local government borrowing authority (from a small base), via provincial and municipal bonds.
• Make budgets at both the central and local level more open and transparent.
• Clean up the maze of local government tax breaks.
• Impose the long-delayed tax on property values, establish an environmental protection tax and hike the resource tax on coal.

Good diagnosis, but will the cure cause more harm?

All in all the reform agenda is a strong one: its diagnosis of China’s economic ills is compelling, and the proposed cures seems sensible. There are three concerns. First, there is the worry that the government has underestimated the financial risks of the burgeoning debt burden and a rapidly-changing financial system. The only clear promise of stronger financial regulation so far is Lou’s statement that a deposit insurance system will be launched later this year. This would reduce moral hazard by clarifying for investors which financial assets are guaranteed and which are risky. But more action to cut debt and restrain the “shadow banking” sector may be needed.

Second, it is possible that reforms may be thwarted by powerful bureaucratic and business interests: some reforms (like the property tax) have been proposed in the past but gone nowhere. On the whole, Xi’s success at whipping officialdom into line by the anti-corruption and mass line campaigns suggests he will be more effective than his predecessor, but there is no guarantee. Finally, there is the worry that Xi’s program succeeds, and validates highly centralized and authoritarian style of governance that could harm China’s long-term prospects for development into a more open and liberal society.

       

In the last two months China has executed a decisive change in its policy for managing its currency, the renminbi. Ending an eight-year period of slow but relentless appreciation against the U.S. dollar, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) engineered a swift devaluation of about 3 percent, and doubled the size of the currency’s daily trading band. These moves took financial markets by surprise and sowed confusion. Was Beijing simply trying to re-ignite export growth by making its currency cheaper? Or was it making a more fundamental shift?

The answer is straightforward. China has taken a huge step towards making its exchange rate more flexible and market determined. In doing so, the authorities have clearly signaled their intention to switch from a monetary policy that mainly targets the exchange rate, to one that mainly targets domestic interest rates. The change in renminbi policy is thus part of a broad and ambitious financial reform strategy, reflecting the agenda laid out last November in the “Decision” published following the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress. It is all about improving China’s macroeconomic management, and has little or nothing to do with boosting exports.

Four Phases of China’s Exchange Rate Management

To understand the significance of the new renminbi policy, some background is helpful. The history of China’s exchange rate management can be divided into four phases. In the first, from 1979 to 1994, there was a steady depreciation in order to wean the country off the artificially overvalued exchange rate inherited from the previous period of Communist autarky. During this period Beijing maintained a dual exchange rate system. This consisted of an official rate, still overvalued, but gradually converging toward reality, which essentially applied to the capital account; and a more market based “swap rate” which was available to exporters. The purpose of this arrangement was to enable a competitive (though rudimentary) export economy to develop while still keeping the local price of imported capital goods relatively low, and avoiding the collapse in living standards that a full-on depreciation would have caused.

The second phase was a brief transition period in 1994-1995 when the two exchange rates were combined and the currency was allowed to float more or less freely in order for fair value to be established. In late 1995 the value of the renminbi was fixed at a rate of 8.3 against the U.S. dollar, initiating the third phase—a hard peg against the U.S. dollar—which lasted until July 2005.

It’s important to recall that the first test of this regime was the refusal to devalue in 1998 in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, when the currencies of the countries with whom China was then competing for export orders all fell dramatically. Rather than devaluing to help out exporters, Beijing hardened its peg. This was costly: China’s exports flatlined in 1998, and arguably the relatively strong currency played a role in the deflation that China suffered for the next four years. One reason the government hardened the peg, rather than devaluing, was to establish that China was a dependable player in the world system and that its currency could be relied on as a store of value. The short-term hit to exports was more than offset by the strategic gain in China’s reputation as “responsible stakeholder” and a safe place for foreign direct investment.

The hard peg against a declining U.S. dollar led eventually to a depreciation of the trade-weighted, inflation-adjusted exchange rate (known as the real effective exchange rate, or REER) that contributed to the exploding exports and ballooning trade surpluses of the early 2000s. This in turn prompted the fourth phase of Chinese currency policy: a crawling peg against the U.S. dollar, starting in July 2005. Each day, the PBOC fixed a reference rate for the renminbi against the dollar, and permitted the currency’s value to fluctuate within a narrow band around the reference. The daily trading band was initially set at 0.3 percent (in either direction), and subsequently widened to 0.5 percent in 2007 and 1 percent in April 2012. Over eight years, the crawling-peg system delivered a 35 percent appreciation against the U.S. dollar and a 40 percent appreciation of the REER.

In light of the vociferous criticism China endured for its undervalued exchange rate, it is striking in retrospect how swift Beijing was to change its currency regime once a serious external imbalance appeared. As late as 2004, China’s merchandise trade balance was around 2.5 percent of GDP, just slightly above the 15-year average. In 2005 it jumped to 5.5 percent, and the decision to let the currency rise was immediate. At first the rise was too timid, and the trade and current account balances continued to expand. But by mid-2007 the appreciation pace picked up to 5 percent a year. The ultimate result of the crawling-peg regime was a reduction in the current account surplus from its peak of 10 percent of GDP in 2007 to the measly 0.8 percent recorded in the first quarter of 2014.

As the above account makes clear, mercantilist motives historically played a secondary role in China’s exchange rate policies—and after 2007 China pursued an anti-mercantilist policy of deliberately shrinking its trade surplus. Beijing’s bigger concerns were the exchange rate’s role in facilitating a broad shift from administered to market prices (1978-1995), as an anchor for monetary policy (1995-2013) and as instrument for correcting an external imbalance and promoting a shift in favor of domestic demand (2007-2013). Lying in the background was the idea that a relatively stable exchange rate was strategically beneficial. After the Asian crisis, foreign investors were reassured that China was a safe place for direct investment; and after the 2008 global crisis the case for the renminbi as an international trade-settlement and portfolio investment currency was strengthened.

Given this history, we can safely rule out the theory that this year’s devaluation is a tactic to boost exports at a time of flagging domestic demand. An explanation that better fits both the recent facts and the historical context is that, in line with the Third Plenum Decision, Beijing wanted to make the exchange rate more flexible and market-determined. But it faced a problem: for almost 18 months from September 2012, the daily market rate of the renminbi was at or near the top of the 1 percent trading band, because investors assumed (rightly) that the Chinese currency would always go up: it was a “one-way bet.” The one-way bet caused large-scale capital inflows that were routinely much larger than the monthly trade surplus. Under these conditions, if the central bank had simply widened the daily trading band, traders would quickly have pushed the value of the currency to the top of the new band, and even more capital would have flowed in. To prevent this outcome, the PBOC in late February starting pushing down its daily fixing, and ordered Chinese state-owned banks to sell renminbi and buy dollars. In mid-March, when the “one-way bet” psychology had been chased out of the market, PBOC doubled the daily trading band to 2 percent.

Welcome to the Managed Float

It is clear that China has entered a new phase of currency management, and the rulebook that has worked well since 2005 must be heavily revised. Two observations inform this judgment. First, the main aims of the strong renminbi policy have been achieved. The current account surplus has been virtually eliminated, and at least one serious technical study of the currency (by Martin Kessler and Arvind Subramaniam of the Peterson Institute for International Economics), the structural undervaluation of the renminbi has been eliminated.

Second, the adoption of a 2 percent daily trading band means that, on a day-to-day basis, the renminbi rate can now be determined mainly by the market most of the time (since only at times of extreme stress do currencies move more than 2 percent in a day). This newfound capacity seems consistent with the broad aim articulated in the Communist Party’s reform agenda last November, of having market forces play a “decisive role” in resource allocation. A willingness to let the currency float more freely is also consistent with the apparent agenda to liberalize deposit interest rates within in the next two years, which implies shifting from a monetary policy that mainly targets the exchange rate to one that mainly targets a domestic money-market interest rate.

It is also clear, however, that the renminbi will not simply be left to its own devices: the float will be a heavily managed one. Mechanically, it will likely operate much like the Singapore dollar “basket, band and crawl,” or BBC system, with an undisclosed trade-weighted index target, a 2 percent daily trading band puts a limit on extreme movements and a periodic readjustment of the slope of the policy band to prevent a major misalignment of the currency emerging (as it did at the end of China’s hard-peg era).

Strategically, the two most important aims of Beijing’s exchange rate regime will be maintaining stability of both the current and capital accounts, and providing support for the emergence of the renminbi as a serious international currency. (For an analysis of the renminbi-internationalization drive, see China’s Global Currency: Lever For Financial Reform.)

The first factor basically means that when capital flows (in or out) threaten to become destabilizing, the PBOC will use the exchange rate to reverse those flows; the same applies to extreme movements in the current account. In effect, Beijing will try to keep both parts of the balance of payments in roughly neutral position, while it undertakes deep reforms of the domestic economy.

The second aim means that sustained depreciation is unlikely to be tolerated, since as the new kid on the block the renminbi still must convince global investors that it is a reliable store of value over the medium to long term. Yet intolerance for sustained depreciation is perfectly compatible with significant short-term depreciations lasting several months or more, to correct current or capital account imbalances. The days of the one-way bet are over.

The bottom line is that Beijing has made a decisive commitment to a much more flexible and far more market-driven exchange rate—exactly what the U.S. Treasury Department and the International Monetary Fund have been suggesting for years. This commitment means that the exchange rate will cease to be a major point of friction between China and its trading partners. The interesting question now is how quickly China will follow up with the even bigger task of liberalizing its domestic financial system.

       

After the enthusiasm which greeted the launch of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s landmark reform blueprint at the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in November 2013, the mood among observers of China’s economy has gradually soured. A common view is that progress on economic reforms has been slow, bogged down not only by the opposition of vested interests but also by the government’s own distraction with its endless anti-corruption campaign, and by its anxiousness to support short-term growth through easy monetary policy.

This popular take misses the mark in three respects. First, the top priority of Xi’s reform is not about economics; it is to remake China’s system of governance. Successful reform of government and administration, along with more specific market reforms, will, in turn, enable more sustainable economic growth. Second, China’s leaders clearly reject the view that to be serious about structural economic reform, they must accept a sharp cyclical slowdown. Instead, they believe that maintaining relatively rapid growth in the short term will give them more breathing room to push through their complex economic agenda. Finally, a tally of economic reform measures this year shows that progress has in fact been impressively brisk.

Governance, Not Economics, Tops the Agenda

Understanding the primacy of governance reform is essential to grasping the role of the anti-corruption campaign, which has resulted in the investigation or disciplining of over 70,000 officials at all levels of government in virtually every province, and has now spread to senior levels of the People’s Liberation Army. This campaign is often portrayed as a cynical effort by Xi Jinping to consolidate power, eliminate his enemies and curtail the influence of retired senior leaders, notably former Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. These motives no doubt play a large role, but the campaign is too far-reaching, and has gone on for too long, for them to be a full explanation.

It is now apparent that the campaign’s central goal is to sharply reduce the system’s tolerance of corruption, which has been quite high since the beginning of economic reforms in the late 1970s. This, in turn, suggests a desire to renegotiate the basic bargain between the central and local governments that has held throughout the reform period. In essence, that bargain tasked local officials with maximizing economic growth, in exchange for which they were tacitly permitted to skim off part of the financial gains from that growth. Central authorities only cracked down when the graft reached grotesque proportions (as with smuggling scandals in Xiamen and other coastal cities in south China in the late 1990s), or when political and policy interests converged in an exemplary prosecution (as in the purge of Shanghai party Secretary Chen Liangyu in 2005, which both removed a Politburo rival to Hu Jintao and sent a message to cities to rein in property speculation).

This bargain proved effective in stimulating sustained rapid growth while China was still a low-income country. But the nation’s economy has now matured and with a per capita national income of $6,560, China now qualifies as an upper-middle income country, by the World Bank’s definition. To sustain high growth at this income level, China needs better governance, a more reliable legal system and considerably less corruption. Thus, the anti-graft campaign is not incidental to or a distraction from the main reform agenda—it is an essential part of the foundation of a more successful economic and political system.

Similarly, the legal system reform outlined at the Fourth Plenum in October, while disappointing many Western observers because it sanctified the Communist Party’s position above the laws that apply to everyone else, is in fact a significant step towards a more consistent, predictable, rules-based system. As Cheng Li has pointed out, the very act of devoting a Plenum to legal issues has made possible a discussion about how to create rule of law in China (see “Fourth Plenum Has Opened Discourse on Constitutionalism, Governance”). And the specific reforms that legal scholars believe are likely—creation of circuit courts to limit the influence of parochial interests, more consistent publication of court decisions, prohibition on Party interference in most cases and the creation of limited avenues for public-interest litigation against polluting industries—have the potential to make Chinese governance fairer, more transparent and more responsive to citizens' concerns. As with the anti-corruption drive, a key theme is to readjust the balance of power in favor of the central government at the expense of the localities.

A final element in the governance reform agenda is the important but often-overlooked fiscal program adopted by the Politburo on June 30. By 2016, China will complete its first major overhaul of the nation’s taxation and government spending system in two decades. Key items include the elimination of land-based local government financing and its replacement by provincial bond issues; restructuring of taxes to reduce local governments’ revenue shortfalls and encourage them to promote consumer services, rather than heavy industry; and stronger resource and environmental taxes to arrest environmental degradation and promote more efficient energy use. Once more, much of the focus is on redefining the core role of local governments: their main mission will shift from promotion of economic growth to effective provision of public services.

Cyclical Economic Management Supports the Reform Agenda

Once we understand the primary role of governance, the sequencing of reform measures becomes more evident, and the relative tardiness of more narrowly economic reforms becomes more understandable. But skeptics have another concern: that the government is losing sight of its long-term structural reform goals in a desperate effort to keep short-term gross domestic product (GDP) growth above seven percent. The premise of this worry is that unless the authorities are willing squeeze out inefficiencies and curb the rapid rise in debt—measures which inevitably require a sharp slowdown in growth—then the structural reforms have little chance of success. In short, the economic model cannot change unless the old, bad habits are punished by clear failure.

Two pieces of recent evidence support this view. First, early in 2014, Beijing relaxed monetary policy and started removing long-standing administrative restrictions on house purchases, in order to prop up a property market that seemed on the brink of collapse. These measures reversed the tight monetary policy of the second half of 2013, which succeeded in bringing credit growth down from 23 percent in April to around 16 percent by the end of the year. Second, the new, looser policy meant that the country’s aggregate debt-to-GDP ratio continued to rise in 2014. After rising from 145 percent of GDP in 2008 to 220 percent in 2013, this ratio continued to climb in 2014 and now exceeds 230 percent of GDP. In absolute terms, this figure is not alarming—most developed countries, including the United States, have significantly higher ratios. But the rapid increase in leverage in a short time is usually a harbinger of financial problems.

It is a mistake, however, to assume that the continued increase in leverage shows that Beijing is incurably addicted to its old debt-fueled growth model, or that the authorities have decided to prioritize growth over reform. First of all, the credit stimulus used to support the property market this year was extremely modest: the year-on-year growth rate of credit ticked up only about one percentage point for a few months, and quickly dropped again once stimulus was withdrawn. The removal of administrative restrictions on house purchases arguably played a larger role in the property stabilization than did easy credit.

More important, Beijing’s approach to deleveraging is a deliberate policy choice driven by the conviction that growth and reform are partners, rather than antagonists. A relevant comparison is the debate between U.S. and European policymakers after 2008 about the appropriate response to the global financial crisis, which left the rich economies stuck with low growth and big debts. Washington argued that policy must focus on sustaining growth (through ultra-easy monetary policy and large fiscal deficits), and that fiscal consolidation should take a back seat. European officials, especially in Germany, argued that fiscal consolidation and debt reduction had to be a top priority, even if it harmed growth. Beijing obviously favors an American-style approach to deleveraging and structural adjustment. Given the superior performance of the U.S. economy (relative to Europe) since the global crisis, this is a defensible choice.

Economic Reforms are Proceeding Smartly

The last point is that, in fact, China’s rollout of specific reform measures over the past year has been impressive. In addition to the fiscal reform package, whose significance has been severely underrated by the market-obsessed international financial media, achievements of 2014 include:

• Abolition of registered capital requirements for new firms, which caused growth in new-company registrations to surge to over 20 percent, the highest rate in a decade.

• Switching the resource tax on coal from a volume to a value basis, a long-delayed measure which should discourage excessive investment and promote energy efficiency.

• Publication of a plan to deregulate all pharmaceutical prices beginning in 2015.

• Publication by virtually all provinces of plans for “mixed-ownership” reform of state enterprises.

• A significant opening of the capital account via the Shanghai-Hong Kong Connect program which permits investors in those two financial hubs to put money directly in each others’ stock markets.

• The publication of draft rules on deposit insurance, paving the way for implementation next year, followed by full liberalization of deposit interest rates.

Clearly these are just initial steps and much work needs to be done to broaden these reforms in ways that will have material impact on China’s $8 trillion economy. But it is hard to think of another major world leader whose government has accomplished so much in such a short period of time. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, for instance, came to office two years ago promising “three arrows” of monetary easing, expansive fiscal policy and deep structural reform. So far he has delivered only one—monetary easing, which has driven the yen down and the stock market up—but structural reform is missing in action and fiscal policy was disastrously captured by Ministry of Finance hawks, whose consumption-tax increase drove the country into a needless recession. The U.S. government is gridlocked and is still fighting over a health care reform law passed five years ago. Six years after the global crisis, Italy has just begun to put in place long-overdue reforms to its labor market, and France, under its last two presidents, has done nothing at all to address its structural economic malaise. Xi Jinping can certainly be criticized on many issues, but failure to deliver on his reform agenda is not one of them.

       

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While countless factors have contributed to China’s dramatic economic transformation, the groundbreaking economic reforms instituted by Premier Zhu Rongji from 1998 to 2003 were critical in setting the stage for China to become one of the world’s dominant economic powers. From combatting corruption and inefficient state-owned enterprises at home to engineering China’s ascension to the World Trade Organization, Zhu left behind a legacy on which successive administrations have sought to build. What similarities, differences or parallels can be drawn between Zhu’s time and today? And what lessons can China’s current leaders learn from Zhu’s reforms?

On January 9, the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution launched the second English volume of Zhu Rongji: On The Record (Brookings Press, 2015), which covers the critical period during which Zhu served as premier between 1998-2003. In addition to highlighting Zhu’s legacy, this event also featured public panel discussions outlining the past, present and future of Chinese economic reform and its impact domestically and internationally.

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• Chinese Economic Reform: Past, Present and Future - Part 1
• Chinese Economic Reform: Past, Present and Future - Part 2

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• Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20150109_china_economic_reform_transcript

       

       

       

What makes the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) consequential?

Since the onset of the 21st century, countries from every corner of the world have vigorously negotiated free trade agreements (FTAs) based on the principle of preferential market access (as opposed to the most-favored nation obligation of the WTO). This has resulted in a veritable avalanche of such trade deals, with close to 400 FTAs notified to the WTO in the past 20 years. If the negotiation of preferential trade agreements is now the dominant trend in the trading regime, and almost no country has escaped contagion from the FTA syndrome, why does one agreement in particular—the TPP—remain the focal point of policy debates on trade?

Chart 1. Multilateral trade regimes and FTA proliferation

The TPP generates most attention because it has spurred the emergence of mega trade agreements (as compared to the mostly small bilateral trade deals that had characterized the FTA wave), and has offered a new platform to advance the trade agenda as negotiations on the Doha Round continue gridlocked. The TPP has come a long way from its humble beginnings as a trade grouping of four small open economies (Brunei, New Zealand, Chile, and Singapore). Today, it comprises 12 nations, covers 26 percent of world trade, and is expected to generate global income gains in the neighborhood of $492 billion by 2030.

Chart 2. From humble beginnings to mega trade deal

But the significance of the TPP is not to be grasped by numbers alone. Consider the following defining traits of this trade agreement:

1. Its high level of ambition for tariff liberalization vowing to disallow sectoral carve-outs. While it is true that sensitive sectors asserted their political weight by deferring or limiting tariff elimination (e.g., autos for the United States and five agricultural commodities for Japan), the commitment of TPP countries to eventually eliminate 99-100 percent of tariff rates is indeed impressive. Japan does stand out for a lower level of committed tariff elimination (95 percent); but again this is the highest level of liberalization that Japan has ever committed to in any trade negotiation.
2. Its comprehensive set of rules to target non-tariff barriers by introducing disciplines on issues such as regulatory coherence, state-owned enterprises, competitiveness, supply chains, etc. With 30 chapters and over 5,000 pages of text, grasping the reach of TPP rules will certainly take time. However, a quick glance does reveal novel, and needed, disciplines in important areas of the economy. For example, the e-commerce chapter establishes a binding obligation for governments to allow free data flows, disallows forced localization of data servers (except for the financial sector), and mandates that all countries must provide a legal framework to protect personal information. Another important innovation is the TPP provision that governments cannot require the transfer of source code from private companies operating in their market.
3. Its expansive vision as an Asia-Pacific platform with aspirations to set global standards. Its open architecture with a docking mechanism to encourage further member expansion and its explicit aim to establish a trans-regional platform that bridges Asia and North and South America are strong selling points for the TPP. It undercuts the oft-mentioned fear of using preferential trade agreements to create closed-off regions, and it gives its rules and standards the opportunity to disseminate far and wide.
4. Last but not least, the TPP has emerged as a central policy priority for both the U.S. and Japan to hone their international economic competitiveness and achieve broader foreign policy goals. In the area of foreign economic policy, the TPP is one of the most compelling frameworks to encourage China to deepen its market reforms and sign on to more ambitious liberalization commitments. The TPP, therefore, has emerged as a central arena for the interaction of the three giants of the world economy.

The TPP’s effect for the United States and Japan

The United States as a Pacific power

The U.S. expects to reap important economic benefits from the TPP. It is a trade agreement that taps into the areas of competitive strength of the American economy: agricultural exports, trade in services, the digital economy, to name a few. Econometric studies put the expected income gains of the TPP for the U.S. in the order of $131 billion per year, and to the extent that the TPP becomes a global standard, these gains will grow. Indeed, the TPP is the centerpiece of the American trade agenda. Its success is required for continued momentum in the on-going trans-Atlantic trade negotiations, but it could also influence other important trade initiatives. For example, TPP disciplines on services and state-owned enterprises are expected to influence deliberations on the Trade in Services Agreement, a plurilateral trade negotiation carried out under the aegis of the WTO.

From the point of view of global governance, the TPP is a litmus test of the U.S. ability to provide leadership at a time of great complexity in the world economic order: one where supply chains have emerged as a main driver of production and trade, where emerging economies are increasingly vocal in the management of the global economy, and where the test of updating Bretton Woods institutions looms large. Through the TPP, the U.S. can display its convening power to negotiate novel trade rules, to devise new institutional forms that complement and spur on the multilateral regime, and to be proactive and not just reactive to initiatives from rising economic powers.

But the TPP is also a pillar of U.S. Asia policy, one that solidifies the U.S. commitment to remain an engaged Pacific power. This trade agreement increases the appeal of the rebalancing policy by defining it not just as a reorientation of military resources toward a region undergoing a significant power transition; but also as the pursuit of a common endeavor: furthering economic interdependence with rules that match the realities of the 21st century economy, and potentially establishing a bridge toward China with the prospect of TPP membership.

Japan is an essential partner for the U.S. to achieve these important goals. Japan came late to the TPP negotiations (in the summer of 2013), but it transformed the economic and political significance of this deal. Japan’s participation allowed the TPP to qualify as a mega trade agreement. For the U.S. alone, the projected economic gains with Japan on board tripled. This is not surprising given the size of the Japanese market and the fact that the U.S. and Japan do not have a bilateral trade agreement; nor has Japan ever accepted these levels of liberalization. Moreover, prior to Japan joining the TPP there were doubts as to whether this could indeed become an Asia-Pacific platform of economic integration since no major Asian economy was participating. Japan’s entry put those objections to rest.

Japan as a reviving power

For Japan as well, the TPP negotiations have had salutary effects on its trade diplomacy and on the pursuit of central domestic and foreign policy priorities. Prior to joining the TPP, Japan’s trade strategy had achieved modest results: it lagged behind its peer competitors in negotiating an FTA network that covered a substantial share of its trade, it had faced difficulty in persuading Southeast Asian countries to adopt many WTO+ rules, it had received the cold shoulder from the U.S. and Europe as it proposed the negotiation of trade agreements, and remained deadlocked with China over the membership configuration of an East Asian trade grouping. The TPP altered the parameters of Japanese trade policy. It allowed the country to negotiate preferential access to main markets of destination, to disseminate next frontier trade rules, and to undertake concurrent mega trade negotiations. As a reaction to Japan’s courting of TPP membership, China recalibrated its trade policy to speed up the launch of trilateral trade negotiations in Northeast Asia and was now amenable to a 16-member trade grouping upholding the principle of ASEAN centrality (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership or RCEP), and the Europeans also came to the negotiation table.

As a full participant in the mega FTA movement, Japan can aim high in order to pursue signature objectives such as:

• Negotiate deep integration FTAs that enhance the international competitiveness of Japanese global supply chains. An assessment of Japan’s core competencies in the 21st century should start with the recognition that a significant share of industrial capacity has been relocated overseas. On-shoring of manufacturing operations is not a viable goal given projected demographic trends. Rather, the aim should be to sustain and strengthen Japan’s role in global supply chains (the leading force of international production and trade today). Japan’s international diplomacy has a role to play here by negotiating deep FTAs that meet the needs of fragmented production chains. Additionally, deep FTA commitments will also help Japan address its own domestic inefficiencies such as the modest liberalization of the services sector.
• Lock-in structural reforms. One of the main benefits of linking the domestic structural reform agenda to international trade commitments is that it will be harder to roll back the reforms if and when political circumstances change (this is indeed a major lesson of the failure to institutionalize Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s reforms). Importantly, the TPP negotiations do not conform to the old-style gaiatsu pattern where a reluctant Japan would deflect U.S. pressure for it to change its ways. This time Japan has eagerly sought to be at the TPP table and has—of its own accord—identified the synergies between the new trade commitments and its own efforts to reform the domestic economy.
• Manage the transition from “regime-taker” to “regime-maker.” With the stagnation of the WTO, we have moved to a system of decentralized competition whereby different clusters of countries seek to define the standards for economic integration. The costs of a passive trade policy are much higher today than in a most favored nation (MFN) world where preferential trade agreements were the exception and not the rule. The expectation of steady liberalization benefits through successive multilateral trade rounds has been sharply revised. Therefore, countries that want to avoid the discriminatory effects of existing preferential trade deals and to improve access to important markets through additional elimination of tariffs and the adoption of rules that address behind-the-border barriers have resorted to an active FTA diplomacy. More broadly, Japan has much to win from displaying leadership in international economic governance, in a manner that resonates with the goals of the Abe administration to play a proactive role in world affairs.

Conclusion of TPP talks: Significance and impact

For all the shared interests between the U.S. and Japan in the TPP project, negotiations over long divisive market access terms proved difficult and frustratingly long. Of course, a host of other issues also kept the larger TPP membership apart. Biologics especially was the last topic to close in the final TPP ministerial held in Atlanta in October 2015, and negotiations went to the wire. Despite all these difficulties, the ability to strike a TPP deal last fall represents a big win for the trade regime which has not seen a success of this magnitude in two decades. Since its creation, the WTO has not updated the rules of international trade and investment, and the Doha Round lingers on life support. Many were skeptical that a major trade negotiation tackling front and center the complex and unwieldy behind-the-border agenda could succeed. This is the most powerful message coming from Atlanta: it can be done.

With a TPP deal in hand there is greater hope that we can manage the tectonic changes in international trade governance. The transformation of the trade agenda (increasingly about regulatory matters) and the limitations of the WTO as a negotiation forum, have called into question the pure multilateral ideal—one set of binding rules for 150+ countries. Instead, the center of action is now on what we call “variable geometry” arrangements where subsets of countries negotiate next-frontier rules: the plurilaterals in the WTO and the preferentials through mega trade agreements. The emerging system for trade governance is not risk-free, and much effort will be required to forestall potential dangers: fragmentation (if TPP-like standards do not disseminate widely) and exclusion (if less developed countries are bypassed by the FTA wave).

Moreover, the TPP deal opens a new and promising chapter in U.S.-Japan relations. It is certainly more than a U.S.-Japan trade agreement—it represents the ability of 12 countries at varying levels of development and with very different regulatory regimes to agree on the most substantive trade liberalization to date. But it is also true that at the core of the TPP, the U.S. and Japan as the largest and most developed economies have acted as an engine of negotiations. The TPP marks a milestone in U.S.-Japan relations, as an effective instance of cooperation to upgrade the international economic architecture. In the TPP, the U.S. and Japan are on close alignment on the rules area of the talks and were able to reach an agreement on market access issues that in the past had proven intractable.

Ratification, reform, and reach

None of these effects will be long lasting nor will they reach their full potential, if TPP countries (and the U.S. and Japan in particular) do not double down on the next crucial steps. For simplicity sake, these can be dubbed the three “Rs” of ratification, reform, and reach.

Ratification

Ratification rules in the TPP require that six countries representing 85 percent of combined GDP approve the agreement before it enters into force. Therefore, to meet this numerical requirement both the U.S. and Japan must ratify. However, for the U.S., TPP ratification will represent a steep political battle in the midst of an American presidential election year. Despite public opinion polls showing that most Americans see in international trade an opportunity, the politics of trade agreements are fractious. Long-standing opposition by environmental groups and unions to trade agreements has resulted in their active mobilization against the TPP. And the debate on the merits of trade agreements has only become more heated as critics suggest that trade globalization is to be blamed for growing income inequality and the erosion of state regulatory powers.

For both national parties, the TPP is a divisive issue. While President Barack Obama has made TPP negotiation and ratification a central priority of his administration, Democrats in Congress have not backed his trade initiative in large numbers, in part due to the opposition of the party’s traditional base, labor unions. The internal dynamics of the Republican Party have shifted dramatically, complicating the odds for the TPP. The Republican Party has become less cohesive with the emergence of the Tea Party wing determined to deny Obama a legacy-making trade agreement. The support of key Republican figures in the Senate has also waned due to dissatisfaction over the tobacco carve-out from investor-state dispute settlement and the exclusivity period for biologics. And the business community has also criticized these provisions, offering only qualified support for the TPP deal.

The U.S. has yet to fail in ratifying a negotiated trade agreement. And a vote down on the TPP would be singularly costly for the credibility of U.S. foreign policy and the evolution of the international trade regime.

Reform

One of the most powerful benefits of trade agreements is the ability of governments to use them as commitment devices to implement needed economic changes. Reform is in fact the crucial issue for Japan as it tries to leave behind stagnant growth. Economic revitalization certainly goes beyond agricultural reform, to encompass the host of productivity-enhancing measures across all areas of the economy, the internationalization of services, the promotion of inward direct investment, and the further upgrading of regional and trans-regional production networks.

Yet, farming countermeasures adopted in the wake of the TPP deal have raised doubts about the government’s resolve to transform its agricultural sector. Japan’s TPP market access commitments do include a 56,000-ton import rice quota (to grow eventually to 78,400 tons). But the government promptly announced an increase in stockpiling purchases to match the TPP quota, effectively preventing a drop in the price of rice and market adjustment. This artificial support preempts the modernization of the agricultural sector since it enables part-time farmers to continue operating in tiny plots, hindering the emergence of commercial farming. The government also submitted a generous 2016 supplementary budget with 312 billion yen earmarked for agricultural TPP countermeasures. But informed experts question its impact in boosting farming competitiveness since public works allocations still loom large (30 percent of outlays will go to land reclamation projects).

Just as the electoral cycle has not facilitated TPP ratification in the U.S., the looming Japanese Upper House election in July is not conducive to moving past prior trade compensation practices.

Reach

The release of the TPP text has clarified a very important point: membership can be extended not only to APEC economies but also to other countries that are willing to meet TPP disciplines. Enlargement will be critical to avoid the above-mentioned risks of fragmentation and exclusion by helping disseminate TPP standards. In the short and medium term, the conclusion of the TPP talks is expected to have two main effects: increase the list of potential applicants, and encourage a higher level of ambition among on-going trade negotiations.

The number of economies expressing an interest in joining the TPP has grown to include South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Colombia, and Costa Rica, among others. Regarding the second wave of accession the key issue will be readiness to undertake the ambitious liberalization commitments of the TPP, and the list of prospective applicants shows wide variation on this score. The conclusion of TPP talks also creates an incentive for the updating of existing FTAs and/or scaling up the level of ambition in ongoing trade negotiations, as countries outside the TPP want to secure export markets, attract foreign direct investment, and embed their companies in global supply chains.

In the long run, the key challenge will be to devise an effective strategy to engage emerging economies, such as China, India, and Brazil. This is still the gaping hole in the U.S. plans to develop trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic trade groupings. Certainly, putting in place the TPP and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is the first step in such strategy since it changes the incentive structure for these countries to entertain further market liberalization. But at the end of the day, these emerging economies must reach the determination that it is in their national interest to abide by these economic standards, and find the political will to tackle vested interests. This is a tall order indeed.

The most pressing question may well be how China will position itself vis-à-vis the TPP. Can we expect it to act on past precedent and seek TPP accession just as in the past it used WTO membership to advance economic reforms? Or will it choose instead to champion the negotiation of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) after both the TPP and RCEP materialize, in order to play a more proactive role in the international economic architecture—more in conformance with the recent launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank?

The recently struck TPP agreement underscores the potential of furthering U.S.-Japan cooperation to supply needed international economic governance. However, the overview of remaining challenges also shows that clinching a TPP deal is just the first step.

This article originally appeared in the March/April 2016 issue of Economy, Culture & History Japan SPOTLIGHT Bimonthly.

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• The high stakes of TPP ratification: Implications for Asia-Pacific and beyond