Democrats don't listen.

The post Deaf Democrats appeared first on Clash Daily.

If Democrat politicians want our votes in the future then it would be nice if they said they were sorry for what they have done in the past. We don’t have far to look. Let’s see at why they lost and how they can win.

The post Why Democrats Lost the 2024 Elections appeared first on Clash Daily.

A.F. Branco Cartoon — Desperation has consumed the Harris campaign, which has brought out the “Trump is Hitler” card just..

The attack on the US Capitol, and subsequent threats of violence surrounding the inauguration of the new US administration, has moved us to reflect and reacquaint ourselves with the reality that however good the maker’s intentions, technology can amplify the ability to cause great harm. This includes us and our products at Basecamp. Therefore, we… keep reading

Conservative activist Scott Presler, whose organization Early Vote Action helped swing Pennsylvania to the right in the general election, announced Monday he will be working to do the same in […]

The post Democrats Have Another Problem to Worry About as Man Who Helped Trump Win Has Eyes on Blue State appeared first on The Western Journal.

Left-wing networks had plenty of bad news for their viewers as former President Donald Trump stormed to victory in the Nov. 5 election. Now, they’re getting plenty of bad news […]

The post Insult to Injury: MSNBC and CNN Suffer Staggering Ratings Plunge Following Trump Victory appeared first on The Western Journal.

A Chicago-area Democrat hurled an insult at police Sunday after being charged with drunken driving, according to local news reports. Samantha Steele represents the Second District on the Cook County […]

The post Democratic Politician Crashes Her Car While Allegedly Drunk, Hurls Vile Insults at Responding Officer: Police Report appeared first on The Western Journal.

Pro-Trump businessmen Elon Musk (the richest man in the world) and Vivek Ramaswamy have officially joined the incoming Trump administration. President-elect Donald Trump announced in a statement published Tuesday that […]

The post Breaking: Musk, Ramaswamy Officially Join Trump Administration - Their Job Is to Destroy Bureaucracy appeared first on The Western Journal.

The rare feat of winning both the Two Oceans and Soweto marathons has marked Onalenna Khonkhobe’s breakthrough season, establishing him as one of South Africa’s rising road-running stars.

American Media Periscope Published  Sep. 19, 2022 In this episode of MSOM, Sean Morgan interviews Ladislav Vrabel about the populist movement in Czech Republic. Next Cynthia Farahat explains the secret apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood. CynthiaFarahat.com https://americanmediaperiscope.com/amp/signup Check Out This Episode’s Podcast: https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-chpay-12c2875

By Walter Donway, Savvy Street originally published on Dec. 4, 2022 Book Review: The Secret Apparatus: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Industry of Death by Cynthia Farahat, Post Hill Press, Bombardier Books (2022) A grim irony of twentieth-century history (but, of course, also predating it) is that the most horrendous threats to humanity have simply been too monstrously evil […]

Sustainability Accelerator Summer Drinks 2024 6 September 2024 — 5:30PM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 August 2024 Chatham House

Join us for the Sustainability Accelerator’s annual summer drinks reception.

This event brings together a diverse group of thinkers and changemakers from our network, as well as our collaboration partners, to reflect on our successes over the past year and give an opportunity to meet new people.

The reception will follow the Sustainability Accelerator’s annual UnConference, but is a separate event. Unless you have received confirmation of your place at UnConference, you must register for the summer drinks reception via this webpage to secure your place.

Celebrating Black History Month at Chatham House 24 October 2024 — 6:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 October 2024 Chatham House

Join us for the ‘Beyond expectations: The impact and legacy of migration exhibition 2024’ exhibition and drinks reception.

About the Photographer  

Neil Kenlock, a photographer and media professional, has lived in London since arriving from Jamaica in 1963 to join his parents. He spent the early years of his career as a professional photographer, specialising in fashion, beauty, celebrities, and the cultural lifestyles of Black people in the UK. In the late 1960s and 1970s, he captured images of the UK Black Panther movement and documented demonstrations and anti-racism protests across the country.

“Neil Kenlock helps us to better understand the story of London’s Black communities and to appreciate the huge artistic and cultural impact they have had on all our lives. He is a significant photographer whose work documents a key chapter in London’s post-war history.” — Mike Seaborne, former curator of photographs at the Museum of London.

About the exhibition

This exhibition unveils a collection of photographs by Neil Kenlock, capturing Black British individuals who migrated from their homelands and settled in the UK. Curated by his daughter Emelia Kenlock, the series explores the theme of ‘expectations’ and its enduring legacy, featuring African and Caribbean subjects who brought their skills, passions, and dreams—contributions that have profoundly shaped British culture today.

Reflecting on the work, Kenlock stated: “Over 50 years since the concept of ‘black excellence’ first manifested, and more than 70 years since the Windrush, I truly hope this exhibition will add to the national cultural narrative and resonate with new audiences.” 

Water, Ecosystems and Energy in South Asia: Making Cross-Border Collaboration Work Research paper sysadmin 29 June 2016

A new paper sets out the factors that have made previous cross-border projects in South Asia successful, arguing that cooperation around water is feasible despite the region’s political differences and economic assymetries.

• The countries of South Asia share some of the world’s major river basins – the Ganga (or Ganges), the Brahmaputra and the Indus. These rivers and their tributaries flow through seven countries, support more than 1 billion people, irrigate millions of hectares of land and are of cultural importance to many of those who rely on them.
• River management presents common challenges across the region. These include physical factors such as droughts, flooding, cyclones and climate change, as well political and institutional factors impeding the development of solutions and policies to improve resource management and reduce vulnerability. Water is increasingly seen as a source of competition, with population growth, industrialization and urbanization exacerbating the pressures on supply.
• Although South Asian examples of regional cooperation in general are limited, there is a clear positive trend. In areas such as disaster response and cross-border power trading, regional and bilateral engagement is beginning to take place. Multilateral official arrangements exist for trade and other economic issues, but there is none on water or ecosystems. However, as the benefits from cooperation become proven, its desirability is likely to gradually enter mainstream policy thinking on water issues.
• This research paper sets out the factors that have enabled cooperation, and the processes adopted, in previous successful cross-border projects. It focuses on four categories of cooperation: development of early-warning systems for natural disasters, in particular floods; protection of cross-border ecosystems; sharing of learning, through the showcasing of innovative approaches in one country that can be adopted by others; and power trading, in particular the development of hydropower in Bhutan and its export to India.
• The paper argues that cooperation around water in South Asia is feasible despite political differences and economic asymmetries. Different forms of collective action, and common understanding of both the threats and the shared benefits from cooperation, are required to foster more partnerships within the river basin states.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives 2019-24 – Workshop 2 24 September 2019 — 9:00AM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the UK strategic and policymaking communities to explore British perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024.

The roundtable took place at Chatham House in London. The report below contains a summary of the discussions.

Read a summary

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives 2019-20 – Workshop 1 11 September 2019 — 10:00AM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 East-West Center, 1819 L St., NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20036, USA

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the US strategic and policymaking communities to explore American perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, the East-West Center in Washington D.C.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Satu Limaye, Vice President and Director of the East-West Center in Washington, DC.

Read a summary report and essay

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives to 2024 - Workshop 3 17 October 2019 — 9:30AM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2019 Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, 27 rue de la Procession, 75740 Paris Cedex 15, France

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the French strategic and policymaking community to explore French perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, the Institut français des relations internationals in Paris.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Céline Pajon, Research Fellow, Center for Asian Studies, Institut français des relations internationals.

Read a summary and essay

International Arbitration: Exploring India’s Potential 15 November 2019 — 9:30AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

As India’s economic clout grows, so does its aspiration to become a favoured arbitration destination in a globalized world dominated by foreign investments flows and cross border transactions. India’s bid to enhance its status as an arbitration destination depends largely on the suitability of its legal environment in meeting the demands of an increasingly sophisticated approach to disputed resolution. This conference will assess these, and other related, issues.

To register your interest in attending this event, please contact Nisha Ramdas by phone +91 9650977833 or by e-mail nisha@globaldialoguereview.com.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook to 2024 - Workshop 4 26 November 2019 — 9:30AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 January 2020 Gateway House, Stevens Street, Colaba

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within India’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Indian perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, Gateway House in Mumbai.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by the International Security Studies Programme at Gateway House.

Read a summary and essay

Network Power in the Asia-Pacific: Making Sense of the New Regionalism and Opportunities for Cooperation 7 February 2020 — 9:45AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The Asia-Pacific region continues to increase in geopolitical and geoeconomic importance. The rise of China and tensions with the US are affecting bilateral relationships and traditional alliances in the region. Whether seen from the perspective of the Quad – Australia, India, Japan and the US – or the Indo-Pacific concept embraced by a wide range of countries but with no shared consensus on scope and objectives or with ASEAN who insists on the importance of its own centrality, the region is redefining and reconceptualising itself.

With a diverse range of initiatives – including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) – there are a plethora of regional agreements and institutional groupings that add further complexity.

As the Bretton Woods architecture continues to be dominated by Western powers, China is also spearheading parallel governance initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a means of enhancing its geopolitical and geoeconomic influence.

This one-day conference will focus on how such networks and alliances have been built, and sustained, in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to understand how new regional initiatives might open up opportunities for new forms of international cooperation, the conference will focus on the themes of cyber-technology and innovation, sustainable development and mitigating the impacts of climate change and new infrastructure initiatives. It will assess whether there is a zero-sum conflict between competing networks and agendas or whether a common approach can be developed.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook From Now to 2024 - Workshop 5 18 February 2020 — 12:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 February 2020 Langafonua Centre

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Tonga’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Tongan perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Nuku’alofa and was co-hosted by the Royal Oceania Institute in Tonga.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Lady Fane Fakafanua, Director of Operations at the Royal Oceania Institute.

Read a summary and essay

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives until 2024 – Japanese perceptions 24 February 2020 — 9:00AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 March 2021 Chatham House

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Japan’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Japanese perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Tokyo and was organized in partnership with the Indo-Pacific Studies Group.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Hiroki Sekine, Visiting Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House.

Read a summary and essay

Nuclear proliferation in a fragmenting world 13 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2022 Online

Where does the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) stand in 2022?

With the war in Ukraine and China–US tensions rising, the threat of a nuclear arms race has never been as high since the Cold War.

Global efforts to control the appropriation and use of nuclear weapons are strained with the war in Ukraine, US–Russia and US–China tension, Iran on the nuclear threshold, instability in Pakistan and the ongoing threat from North Korea.

The Review Conference of the NPT that took place in New York this August sought to deal with the multiple nuclear threats, but new missile technology such as hypersonic glide vehicles and torpedoes are not covered by a treaty.

Russia and the US are in a development phase for a host of new technologies and delivery systems, especially after both withdrew from various arms-control treaties in the 2000s and 2010s. Now the nuclear stockpile is growing again and major superpowers are adopting confrontational geostrategic positions.

As the world’s established orders and system fragment, there is a possibility the nine countries with confirmed nuclear weapons could grow. Events in Ukraine highlight the need for a new, modern agreement on nuclear weapons control, needed today more than ever.

The panel of experts discuss key questions including:

• What did ‘RevCon’ in New York tell us about the adoption or update to the NPT?

• Will the war in Ukraine deter or prevent any agreement between nations or does nuclear weapons control represent an area of potential multilateral harmony?

• Are we likely to see a new arms race akin to the Cold War? Where does China fit into this race?

• How has technology changed the arms control landscape?

 As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.

Transatlantic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

This project aims to recommend ways for the US, UK and EU member-states to work together more effectively to achieve shared aims in the Indo-Pacific.

This project is Phase II of a wider research collaboration with the Royal United Services Institute: “An Evolving Transatlantic Agenda to Meet the Challenge of China in the Indo-Pacific”. The work is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Through interviews with policymakers and workshops, the project will:

• Identify specific areas of policy convergence and divergence;
• Establish practical recommendations for how the US, UK and EU member-states can better align and coordinate their activities in the Indo-Pacific.

The project is led at Chatham House by the Asia-Pacific Programme, working with the Global Economy and Finance Programme and the Europe Programme.

The researchers are Ben Bland (project lead), Dr Yu Jie, Dr Gareth Price, Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, and Alice Billon-Galland.

The project builds on research from Phase I, a Transatlantic Dialogue on China, which explored how transatlantic partners are responding to China’s rise and its effects in the Indo-Pacific.

Next steps for EU-US cooperation on trade and technology 8 December 2022 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 November 2022 Online

How can the EU and US increase cooperation on AI, semi-conductors and funding information communication technology services?

On trade and technology policy, the EU and the US are making meaningful progress towards cooperation while at the same time navigating tensions. As senior officials meet on 5 December for the third meeting of the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), both sides have vowed to move towards concrete results. But can the US and EU increase cooperation on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and funding information communication technology services? 

This event draws on insights from a forthcoming Briefing Paper by Marianne Schneider-Petsinger that explores next steps for US-EU cooperation on trade and technology, which is part of a project supported by the Hanns Seidel Foundation. 

Offsetting the North Korean strategic challenge 16 March 2023 — 9:30AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 8 March 2023 Online

This event explores what balance between pressure and dialogue is most likely to incentivise North Korea to limit its provocations.

With North Korea having steadily increased its nuclear and conventional security capabilities over the course of recent months, the speakers explore practical options for lowering tensions on the Korean peninsula.

They consider how best to re-engage diplomatically with North Korea, including the role of key actors such as the US, South Korea, Japan, and European states, in advancing a constructive resolution of current tensions.

The discussion explores finding a balance between pressure and dialogue which is most likely to incentivise North Korea to limit its provocations, assess the risks of a possible seventh nuclear test, and consider the viability of multilateral cooperation in enhancing regional security in north-east Asia.

This event forms part of the Korea Foundation Korea Fellowship, funded by the Korea Foundation and Taejae Academy.

US and Europe Strategic Security Cooperation: The View from Washington 27 March 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 March 2023 Chatham House

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership?

Thank you for your interest in joining our event. Please plan to arrive at Chatham House from 08:45 GMT as the event will begin promptly at 09:00.

The Biden administration’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine and the rise of a globally assertive China, as articulated in the 2022 US national strategy, is to ‘constrain Russia and out-compete China’. It needs Europe as a partner and ally for both – yet Europe is also an object and a battleground in this era of strategic competition.

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership? Can Europeans, in particular, move from deepening dependency to greater agency and self-reliance? What is the role for Germany – and for the UK?

SVB collapse shows interest rate financial stability threat Expert comment LJefferson 15 March 2023

Governments must resist pressure to relax post-financial crisis regulation, while central banks should moderate their attack on inflation if financial stability is at risk.

The collapse of California’s Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) on 10 March has triggered a wave of volatility in global bank equity prices, raised questions about whether US bank regulation and its tech industry funding model are fit for purpose, and forced a rethink on the extent and pace of monetary policy tightening appropriate for the US and other advanced economies.

SVB was the US’s 16th largest bank with total assets of $212bn at the end of 2022 and a presence in eight countries around the world, including the UK. Since it was founded 40 years ago, it has maintained a strong focus on the technology sector, claiming recently that nearly half of all US venture-backed technology and life science companies banked with it. Partly as a consequence, some 95 per cent of its deposits came from corporates and hedge funds, far higher than the one-third typical of similarly sized banks.

What led to SVB’s collapse?

Ironically, SVB’s failure did not result from its core business model of serving a relatively high-risk and fast-growing sector, but rather from a dramatic failure in liquidity management. During the pandemic, SVB saw a very large inflow of corporate deposits. But rather than disincentivizing depositors or investing the funds attracted in assets of matching maturity, it chose to invest them in low credit risk, but long maturity bonds attracted by a small pick-up in return over shorter-term assets. 

When US interest rates began to rise rapidly in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the value of SVB’s long-term bond portfolio declined sharply. It was left facing a large capital loss of some $15bn, roughly equivalent to its total shareholder funds. The management attempted to repair SVB’s balance sheet last week by crystalizing some of the loss and raising new capital.

But when this failed, the US supervisory authorities had no choice but to step in and close the institution.  This action was quickly followed by emergency action from other regulators vis-a-vis SVB subsidiaries and offices around the world.

The US entity has formally been taken over by the FDIC and a bridge bank established. All depositors have had their funds guaranteed, going beyond the normal federal deposit insurance limit of $250,000 per customer. However, bond holders and equity holders have been wiped out. The authorities have said that any loss will be covered by the industry as a whole via the FDIC.

In the UK, the Bank of England was able to sell the ring-fenced UK subsidiary of SVB to HSBC for £1 over the weekend, so that all its depositors and other liability holders have effectively had their funds guaranteed. In contrast to previous Bank of England rescues (such as Johnson Matthey Bank in 1984, the ‘small banks’ crisis in 1991 and the global financial crisis in 2008-9) no public money has been put at risk.

Four key questions

SVB’s rapid collapse raises four central questions:

First, how was it that the bank was able to take on such a risky interest rate maturity mismatch in its US operations? Maturity transformation is standard banking industry practice, but it is usually closely monitored by regulators who place limits on the extent of interest rate maturity mismatch and require liquidity buffers to offset the risk of deposit flight and forced asset sales.

SVB’s very high concentration of corporate deposits as compared to ‘sticky’ retail deposits, means that the risk of deposit flight was unusually high and so the bank should have been more, not less, cautious in its liquidity policy. SVB was classed as a regional bank in the US which means that it did not have to meet international regulatory standards under Basle III. And in 2018, the Trump administration approved legislation removing the post-financial crisis requirement that banks with assets under $250bn submit to stress testing and relaxing liquidity buffer requirements.

But it is still hard to understand why regulators allowed SVB to commit such a classic banking error. On Monday, the Federal Reserve ordered an inquiry into what it has correctly described as a regulatory failure. This should look at the role played by all the elements of the oversight system including the auditors, KPMG.

Second, does SVB’s failure reflect a much bigger underlying risk in the US banking sector, and potentially other banking systems around the world, built up over the prolonged period of ultra-low interest rates? SVB’s collapse was followed by the failure of the $110bn Signature Bank in New York, as well as sharp falls in US regional bank stock prices – by close of play on 14 March, the S&P Regional Bank Index was down 22 per cent on a week before, with some individual bank stocks seeing much sharper falls.  

To the extent that banks have been covered by international bank regulatory requirements, the risk of a much broader problem should be limited because stress testing and other regulatory tests would have looked at precisely the scenario that has happened. Even where large market losses have been incurred, capital buffers should be sufficient to cover them. But as SVB has shown, there are some large banks that are seemingly not required to follow international rules, while the latest developments at Credit Suisse indicate that market concerns may still arise when other factors are in play.

Third, how far, in the light of the potential vulnerability in banking systems, should central banks in advanced countries moderate their efforts to squeeze out inflationary pressures? While inflation already appears to have peaked in many economies and the pace of interest rate rises was expected to slow, inflation is far from vanquished, as recent data in the US has demonstrated.

Fourth, does the failure of SVB tell us something new about the financial risks facing the high technology sector?  It was remarkable that a single (and not particularly large, by international standards) financial institution could have played such a central role in the tech sector in both the US and UK. 

Why was this the case and does it reflect special features of the tech/start-up sector (e.g. the need for substantial cash deposits to cover relatively large negative cash flows in the early years of operation, or the need for highly specialized lending expertise). If so, should governments take steps to mitigate such risks, given the outsized importance of this sector in many national economic strategies? 

World in brief: Ukraine and nuclear proliferation to dominate G7 The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

Following Russia’s ongoing intimidation, Japan will use its presidency of the G7 – and its history – to prioritize the dangers of nuclear threats, writes James Orr.

Two issues are expected to dominate the agenda as Japan hosts the G7 summit in Hiroshima from May 19-21. Central to talks will be the conflict in Ukraine, with member states eager to highlight a message of unity and resolve in the face of Russia’s continuing aggression.

Fumio Kishida, Japan’s prime minister, made an unannounced visit to Kyiv on March 21, meeting the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy.  This coincided with a visit to Moscow by China’s leader Xi Jinping, who described Russian president Vladimir Putin as a friend and partner.

‘Absolutely unacceptable’

Hosting the G7 summit in Hiroshima is significant, too, with Kishida expected to emphasize the ‘absolutely unacceptable’ threat of nuclear proliferation. Ongoing tensions between China and Taiwan, together with recent North Korean ballistic missile tests, have heightened fears of a breakdown in security in the region.

Meanwhile, President Vladimir Putin’s menacing references to the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine has raised the prospect of a potentially devastating conflict with NATO. ‘Kishida’s principal goal for the presidency of the G7 is to try to draw the world away from the path of destruction that is another nuclear conflict,’ said Duncan Bartlett, a research associate at SOAS, the School of Oriental and African Studies, in London.

‘Early last year, Putin warned of terrible consequences if NATO and the West interfered in the Ukraine conflict, and that was widely seen as being a nuclear threat. North Korea is also pursuing its nuclear weapons programme, and in February an intercontinental ballistic missile went into the sea just near the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido,’ said Bartlett.

After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Kishida has taken a firm position on Putin, in line with his G7 peers. President Zelenskyy has addressed the Japanese parliament via video link and Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s minister of foreign affairs, was invited by his Japanese counterpart to a G7 meeting held during the Munich Security Conference earlier this year.

Kishida committed $600 million in financial support to Ukraine and his government may well announce the provision of further non-lethal assistance to Zelenskyy at the summit. The country’s constitution effectively outlaws the export of deadly weapons to foreign forces. On his visit to Kyiv, Kishida promised a further $30 million to Ukraine.

‘Kishida has revised key defence documents and is pursuing a radical and controversial expansion of Japan’s defence budget and capabilities,’ said Hugo Dobson, Professor of Japan’s International Relations at the University of Sheffield.

‘He and his G7 partners have signed historic defence agreements, pledged to strengthen ties or declared the inseparability of their security in light of actual conflict in Ukraine and potential conflict in East Asia. Kishida has linked the two by emphasizing that Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,’ said Dobson.

Aside from security matters, Kishida will at the summit address issues on clean energy, climate change, global health and boosting multilateral cooperation to drive post-pandemic economic recovery.

Invitation to Nagasaki

He is understood to have invited President Joe Biden to visit Nagasaki, where the second of America’s two atomic bombs is estimated to have killed 60,000 people in August 1945. No sitting US president has ever visited the city, and Kishida, who grew up in Hiroshima, may see the visit as an opportunity to boost his flagging domestic approval ratings. It may also serve as a timely reminder to Russia and others that the G7 opposes any future nuclear weapon use.

Dongmei Cheng
Jun 1, 2006; 5:1158-1170
Datasets

Ivan Matic
Jan 1, 2008; 7:132-144
Research

Jacek R. Wiśniewski
Dec 1, 2014; 13:3497-3506
Research

Tamar Geiger
Mar 1, 2012; 11:M111.014050-M111.014050
Special Issue: Prospects in Space and Time

Qiang Tian
Oct 1, 2004; 3:960-969
Research

Ludovic C. Gillet
Jun 1, 2012; 11:O111.016717-O111.016717
Research

Ignat V. Shilov
Sep 1, 2007; 6:1638-1655
Technology

Linn Fagerberg
Feb 1, 2014; 13:397-406
Research

Jürgen Cox
Sep 1, 2014; 13:2513-2526
Technological Innovation and Resources

Shao-En Ong
May 1, 2002; 1:376-386
Research

Lys234 is one of the residues present in class A β-lactamases that is under selective pressure due to antibiotic use. Located adjacent to proton shuttle residue Ser130, it is suggested to play a role in proton transfer during catalysis of the antibiotics. The mechanism underpinning how substitutions in this position modulate inhibitor efficiency and substrate specificity leading to drug resistance is unclear. The K234R substitution identified in several inhibitor-resistant β-lactamase variants is associated with decreased potency of the inhibitor clavulanic acid, which is used in combination with amoxicillin to overcome β-lactamase–mediated antibiotic resistance. Here we show that for CTX-M-14 β-lactamase, whereas Lys234 is required for hydrolysis of cephalosporins such as cefotaxime, either lysine or arginine is sufficient for hydrolysis of ampicillin. Further, by determining the acylation and deacylation rates for cefotaxime hydrolysis, we show that both rates are fast, and neither is rate-limiting. The K234R substitution causes a 1500-fold decrease in the cefotaxime acylation rate but a 5-fold increase in kcat for ampicillin, suggesting that the K234R enzyme is a good penicillinase but a poor cephalosporinase due to slow acylation. Structural results suggest that the slow acylation by the K234R enzyme is due to a conformational change in Ser130, and this change also leads to decreased inhibition potency of clavulanic acid. Because other inhibitor resistance mutations also act through changes at Ser130 and such changes drastically reduce cephalosporin but not penicillin hydrolysis, we suggest that clavulanic acid paired with an oxyimino-cephalosporin rather than penicillin would impede the evolution of resistance.

This article is by Toni Šušnjar.

Strategy and Enemies

The structure of an army will depend on the strategy, as strategy will determine the army’s role and tasks. A state which carries out expansion through outright territorial conquest will have large numbers of heavy infantry, combat engineers and artillery, and possibly some heavy cavalry as well (e.g. Roman Empire, 10th century Byzantine Empire). If conquest is done by slowly destroying an opponent’s economic and social structures through constant raiding (such as chevauchee or razzia / ghazw), then majority of the army will be light cavalry, with some heavy cavalry support (e.g. Seljuk and Ottoman Empires), and light infantry will be used if terrain is unsuitable for cavalry. If a state is defending against cavalry raids, then light cavalry will be dominant (e.g. 15th century Hungary), whereas heavy cavalry will predominate if enemy raiders are primarily infantry. If enemy armies are too powerful to face in the field, light and heavy cavalry will be used to harass the invading army and cut off its supplies and foraging. In terrain unsuitable for cavalry operations, heavy infantry will be used instead.

Raiding — as a strategy — is generally preferred against a peer opponent, especially if a state cannot have a developed logistical support system.

Continue reading Building a Fantasy Army — Strategy & Organization at Mythic Scribes.

Time to accelerate the sustainability pivot Expert comment NCapeling 26 May 2021

Higher stakes make it more important than ever to safeguard the integrity of sustainability commitments, and ensure high quality in delivery and implementation.

Regular headlines reaffirm the rise of sustainability on the global stage. Political momentum behind climate action has not been derailed by COVID-19, sustainability is increasingly central to national political debates, and what once might have been confined to scientific pursuits and UN conferences has now percolated through to international financial affairs and the wider political summits.

Much is made of the scale of the challenge, from climate change, water stresses, and biodiversity loss to the looming spectre of environment-induced societal breakdown triggering unprecedented civilizational challenges on the back of decades of systemic neglect over the true cost of social and environmental imbalances and unencumbered consumption.

But the good news is that talk of sustainability solutions is picking up pace and growing in its reach into the mainstream. The Wall Street Journal recently charted the shift of sustainable finance from being a niche interest of socially conscious investors into a sustainable ‘gold rush’, further bolstering its financial credentials with trillions of dollars designated for the global energy transition.

Assets in investment funds with links to the environment came to almost $2 trillion globally in the first quarter of 2021, more than tripling in just three years, and investors are putting some $3 billion a day into these funds while bonds and loans worth $5 billion looking to bankroll green initiatives are issued every day.

Climate ambitions and power diplomacy

Should the number of zeros fail to persuade, other signs of a sustainability pivot abound. Climate ambition was the driving force in major power diplomacy as France, Germany, China, and the US jostled for leadership positions in a high octane theatre of ‘climate one upmanship’ in the run-up to the Climate Summit hosted by US president Joe Biden. The G7 has agreed to stop international financing of coal projects, and an International Energy Agency report says delivering net zero emissions by 2050 means no new coal, oil, or gas development from now on.

Governments are sending unmistakable policy signals which are redrawing multiple frontiers of the real economy, such as the banning of single use plastic in multiple jurisdictions from Europe, China, and more than 30 African states as well as New York and California. The sale of internal combustion engine vehicles is also set to end by 2035 or sooner in the EU, the UK, and California, and China is expected to follow suit with similar plans. France has proposed a ban on domestic flights when there are less carbon intensive alternatives on the ground.

But these signals did not spring out of a political vacuum. A global climate poll conducted by the United Nations (UN) in 50 countries showed two-thirds of the 1.2 million people polled thought there is a global climate emergency, and most indicated their support for stronger climate action even in countries with strong fossil energy interest.

Real economy responses to noticeable changes in risk calculus and political appetite will likely underpin further rapid shifts in market sentiment as investors begin to fully factor in the scale of the challenge and escalate their interrogation of company-level climate action plans.

Rapid pace of change still needed

But despite this ever-clearer direction of travel and growing availability of new technology and policy options, the need for speed remains. The rationale for moving fast in the next decade and a half to avoid the clear and present threats of environmental and breakdown is increasingly clear.

Getting up to scale is an ongoing and daunting challenge not least because exponential growth has brought growing pains. The recent spat over the definition and the usefulness of net zero targets for corporations and investors as seen in the shareholder votes over the climate plans put forward by Shell and other companies are all testimony to the challenge of mainstreaming.

While some have characterized these debates as political infighting, the reality is higher stakes simply mean it is more important than ever to safeguard the integrity of sustainability commitments as well as the quality of their delivery and implementation.

The move from ‘what’ to ‘how’ points to a clear demand for new, innovative collaborative efforts to help mitigate myriad political economy challenges associated with the upcoming great transition and ensure this sustainability pivot will deliver the promised outcomes. Launching the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator in support of these once-in-a-generation efforts is a proud moment for the institute, and a clear sign that this pivot to sustainability is here to stay.

AUKUS reveals much about the new global strategic context Expert comment NCapeling 17 September 2021

The new AUKUS partnership as well as the furore in Paris surrounding its announcement says a lot about the new geopolitical landscape.

The growing diplomatic drama surrounding the announcement of the new Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) risks concealing rather than highlighting what the deal reveals about profound changes in the global strategic context. Several elements stand out.

First, Australia’s decision to break off the $66 billion contract it signed with France in 2016 to purchase a new fleet of diesel electric submarines underscores the heightened level of concern in Canberra about China’s growing naval capabilities.

Despite all the industrial, legal, and diplomatic disruption, the Australian government has decided only the stealthy nuclear-powered submarines developed by Britain with US support can provide the genuine naval capability it needs long-term.

Next, in helping Australia resolve this conundrum, the British government has revealed the versatility of its new foreign policy. Part of the reason UK prime minister Boris Johnson eschewed the concept of a formal foreign policy and security treaty in the post-Brexit deal with the European Union (EU) was to pursue freely new ventures such as the recent ‘G7-plus’ summit in Cornwall, and enhanced cooperation among the Five Eyes allies. AUKUS reveals that this approach can produce real results.

Europe or the Indo-Pacific

During this week’s Polish-British Belvedere Forum in Warsaw, one of the main Polish concerns was that this ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific could overstretch Britain’s scarce resources when it should be focusing on Europe, where they are most needed.

But AUKUS does not over-extend Britain. There is no military commitment involved in the agreement. The UK also remains outside the Quad – made up of the US, India, Japan, and Australia. And the ongoing stately voyage of its new aircraft carrier from the Mediterranean into the South China Sea provides better insight into the substance of the UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt.

Much derided for not carrying enough of its own aircraft – and for depending on US and Dutch escort vessels – the UK has in fact managed to coalesce a flexible group of allies around the Queen Elizabeth while enabling it to fly the British flag in Asian waters and strengthening interoperability with its allies for future joint operations.

Despite the hype, Britain’s main defence investments and deployments remain firmly focused in Europe, as laid out by the recent Integrated Review. And the decision to draft a new NATO Strategic Concept – midwifed by Britain at the 70th anniversary NATO summit hosted in London in December 2019 and confirmed during Joe Biden’s visit to NATO headquarters in June – will give Britain’s role in European security a new purpose and focus in the coming years.

Alone on the strategic landscape

For France, of course, the cancellation of its submarine deal is a painful humiliation, and a severe blow to thousands of workers in its hi-tech defence industry. It also comes at a sensitive moment politically, with Emmanuel Macron keen to demonstrate his international standing ahead of the 2022 presidential election. Instead, France now looks rather lonely on the strategic landscape alongside the more homogeneous and collectively powerful AUKUS trio.

But, rather than take the high road, a furious French reaction has compared Biden to Donald Trump and argued that this defence industrial failure for France should drive an acceleration towards European – for which, read EU – strategic autonomy.

This implies France sees European strategic autonomy as protecting and extending its own sovereign power and industrial interests rather than as a process for EU members to achieve more together in security and foreign policy than they can alone – thereby undermining rather than enhancing its case.

The gap between European strategic rhetoric and practical action was further highlighted by the AUKUS partnership being announced the evening before the EU launched its own Indo-Pacific strategy, and on the same day as China refused to allow a German frigate its first planned port visit to Shanghai.

America is still back

There is still a long way to go before the new submarine deal becomes reality. Australia needs to extricate itself from the French deal, decide how to secure the highly enriched uranium to power its new nuclear submarines, decide with the US and UK the division of labour and technology transfer of production, and assuage the International Atomic Energy Agency’s concerns about the precedent this deal sets. The fruits of this dramatic announcement will, therefore, be a long time in coming.

But, however the details play out, 15 September 2021 was a consequential day. The AUKUS announcement showed that China’s growing hard power is now eliciting a genuinely tough and structural political-military reaction.

Across the Atlantic, it also allowed President Biden – flanked ‘virtually’ by the British and Australian prime ministers – to send the global message that America is indeed back, just three weeks after the ignominious retreat from Afghanistan and chaotic exit from Kabul. And it offered him the opportunity to remind the world that the Indo-Pacific is where the US will be putting its main effort in the future.

For many in China, AUKUS now confirms their belief that the US and its principal allies are determined to contain China’s rise in its own ‘backyard’, where it believes it has the right to flex its muscles. For others, it will confirm Xi Jinping has overreached and China is now paying the price of his more assertive strategy. Either way, the Chinese are on notice that the ambivalent nature of the Obama pivot to Asia has given way to a more determined pivot under Biden.

While the US is stepping up, the UK has shown it is in the mix, leveraging opportunities as they arise. For example, the goodwill the UK has generated in Tokyo with this new partnership with Australia could help its case as it pursues membership of the Transpacific Partnership trade area in 2022.

The EU looks like a bystander in comparison and ill-equipped for the geopolitical competition inherent in this new strategic context. It is essential, therefore, once the dust has settled from these fraught few days, that the US and UK reach out to find ways to involve France and its EU partners in a meaningful, shared transatlantic approach to the Indo-Pacific.

Independent Thinking: UK Integrated Review, Georgia protests Audio NCapeling 16 March 2023

Episode 19 of our weekly podcast examines the AUKUS deal, UK defence priorities, and the state of Georgia’s democracy following anti-government protests.

The UK and Australia will soon be building nuclear submarines together, but is the UK’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific sustainable? Two years on from the last Integrated Review, has the UK finally clarified its foreign policy priorities on Russia, China, and on defence? And is the money there to do it all?

Also on the show, the panel discusses Georgia following recent anti-government protests in Tbilisi. Following the Rose revolution in 2003, Georgia seemed to be on a path towards closer ties with NATO and the European Union (EU). But the country’s government has recently moved closer to Russia and Vladimir Putin. What is the state of Georgia’s democracy and where is the country heading?

Joining Bronwen Maddox from Chatham House is Creon Butler, director of our Global Economy and Finance programme, Professor Andrew Dorman, editor of the International Affairs journal, and Alice Billon-Galland, research fellow in our Europe Programme.

They are joined by Natia Seskuria, associate fellow with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and Arthur Snell, former diplomat and host of the podcast Doomsday Watch.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Accumulation of the microtubule-associated protein tau is associated with Alzheimer's disease (AD). In AD brain, tau is abnormally phosphorylated at many sites, and phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 plays critical roles in tau accumulation and toxicity. Microtubule affinity–regulating kinase 4 (MARK4) phosphorylates tau at those sites, and a double de novo mutation in the linker region of MARK4, ΔG316E317D, is associated with an elevated risk of AD. However, it remains unclear how this mutation affects phosphorylation, aggregation, and accumulation of tau and tau-induced neurodegeneration. Here, we report that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases the abundance of highly phosphorylated, insoluble tau species and exacerbates neurodegeneration via Ser-262/356–dependent and –independent mechanisms. Using transgenic Drosophila expressing human MARK4 (MARK4wt) or a mutant version of MARK4 (MARK4ΔG316E317D), we found that coexpression of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased total tau levels and enhanced tau-induced neurodegeneration and that MARK4ΔG316E317D had more potent effects than MARK4wt. Interestingly, the in vitro kinase activities of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D were similar. When tau phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 was blocked by alanine substitutions, MARK4wt did not promote tau accumulation or exacerbate neurodegeneration, whereas coexpression of MARK4ΔG316E317D did. Both MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased the levels of oligomeric forms of tau; however, only MARK4ΔG316E317D further increased the detergent insolubility of tau in vivo. Together, these findings suggest that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases tau levels and exacerbates tau toxicity via a novel gain-of-function mechanism and that modification in this region of MARK4 may affect disease pathogenesis.

Alzheimer's disease (AD) is characterized by neuronal loss and accumulation of β-amyloid-protein (Aβ) in the brain parenchyma. Sleep impairment is associated with AD and affects about 25–40% of patients in the mild-to-moderate stages of the disease. Sleep deprivation leads to increased Aβ production; however, its mechanism remains largely unknown. We hypothesized that the increase in core body temperature induced by sleep deprivation may promote Aβ production. Here, we report temperature-dependent regulation of Aβ production. We found that an increase in temperature, from 37 °C to 39 °C, significantly increased Aβ production in amyloid precursor protein-overexpressing cells. We also found that high temperature (39 °C) significantly increased the expression levels of heat shock protein 90 (Hsp90) and the C-terminal fragment of presenilin 1 (PS1-CTF) and promoted γ-secretase complex formation. Interestingly, Hsp90 was associated with the components of the premature γ-secretase complex, anterior pharynx-defective-1 (APH-1), and nicastrin (NCT) but was not associated with PS1-CTF or presenilin enhancer-2. Hsp90 knockdown abolished the increased level of Aβ production and the increased formation of the γ-secretase complex at high temperature in culture. Furthermore, with in vivo experiments, we observed increases in the levels of Hsp90, PS1-CTF, NCT, and the γ-secretase complex in the cortex of mice housed at higher room temperature (30 °C) compared with those housed at standard room temperature (23 °C). Our results suggest that high temperature regulates Aβ production by modulating γ-secretase complex formation through the binding of Hsp90 to NCT/APH-1.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s foreign policy priorities 29 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

The DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs discusses the country’s approach to regional stability and the role of international partnerships in securing economic prosperity.

At this event, HE Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC, will discuss DRC’s regional diplomatic priorities and international agency, including its ambitions around global critical mineral supply chains.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) faces foreign policy tests as it manages a complex security crisis and regional tensions, alongside global economic and trade partnerships.

Entrenched conflict in eastern DRC continues to have wider regional implications. Troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) deployment are tackling a growing mandate as the UN’s peacekeeping mission prepares to withdraw. Tensions with Rwanda also remain high despite mediation efforts under the Luanda process.

As a major producer of critical minerals for the global energy transition, the DRC seeks to benefit from growing international demand without sacrificing value addition. New and existing frameworks with international partners will remain key to this vision, including for the development of regional infrastructure networks such as the Lobito Corridor.

At this event, HE Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC, will discuss the DRC’s regional diplomacy and international agency, including the country’s positioning in global critical mineral supply chains.

Please note that in-person attendance for this event will be balloted. Guests looking to join in-person must register interest in joining. Full confirmations to successful applicants will be sent on Friday 25 October.

US election rhetoric on migration undermines Washington’s soft power in Latin America Expert comment jon.wallace 23 October 2024

As US public opinion hardens, the Democratic party takes a tougher stance, and Donald Trump proposes mass deportations, Latin American leaders note a lack of long-term policy.

The US’s broken immigration system has become a central theme of the 2024 election campaign. But the discussion on immigration, undocumented immigrants, and asylum seekers – increasingly lurching into dehumanizing rhetoric – extends beyond US borders. 

As one former senior director of the National Security Council told me, ‘when the president travels or meets with heads of state from Latin America what comes up –regardless of the country – isn’t US–Cuba policy or even trade. It’s immigration’. How the US talks about and treats citizens of Latin American and the Caribbean matters to elected politicians in the region. 

The roots of the US immigration debate go deep and will not be easily resolved, even with a sweeping reform of the system. 

According to a January 2024 Pew survey, 78 per cent of Americans ‘say the large number of migrants seeking to enter the country at the Mexico border is either a crisis (45 per cent) or a major problem (32 per cent)’. Worries about the border are not limited to Republican voters: 73 per cent of Democrats feel that the issue is either a crisis or major problem. 

Despite the heated popular temperature, the numbers of undocumented immigrants encountered at the US–Mexico border has actually dropped in recent months. US Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) reported 301,981 encounters with irregular border crossings in December 2023; by August 2024 this had dropped to 107,473.  

Nevertheless, illegal border crossings have increased under Biden. During his administration USCBP reported 8 million encounters along the Mexico border compared to 2.5 million under Donald Trump. 

Mexico

Any attempt to address the issue promises to affect US relations with Mexico, requiring the cooperation of newly elected president Claudia Sheinbaum. Her predecessor and founder of her Morena party, leftist Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), proved an unexpectedly cooperative partner for the previous Trump administration and Biden White House. 

But that came at a cost, particularly for Biden. In return for AMLO’s cooperation, the US soft-pedalled criticism over his failures to disrupt narcotics trafficking and criminal networks and for his steady weakening of checks on executive power. 

Mexico’s borders with other countries are also under pressure. Mexico remains the primary sending country to the US. But political repression and insecurity in countries including Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala and Venezuela has pushed their citizens to travel across Mexico to the US. Economic collapse and humanitarian crises in Cuba and Venezuela have further fuelled the flight.

Rhetoric

The Kamala Harris and Trump campaigns have struck different positions on how to stem the flow of illegal immigration. But as US public opinion shifts, both parties are talking tougher. 

Harris is continuing Biden’s hardening stance, including the controversial move to bar those who cross the border illegally from applying for asylum. 

Biden’s early ‘roots’ strategy, to provide economic and security support in countries from where migrants are travelling, has fallen by the wayside. 

The Trump campaign is taking more extreme positions. The Republican presidential candidate mentions immigration in almost every campaign speech. 

He proposes to carry out the ‘largest deportation in US history’, using ICE personnel, the National Guard and local police forces to round up undocumented immigrants, including in their workplaces. 

The campaign has also pledged to end birth-right citizenship and Biden’s programme of parole for humanitarian reasons. Trump also plans to restore his first term policies including construction of the border wall. 

Trump’s proposals provide little opportunity for a broad, bipartisan consensus on immigration. Should he win in November he is likely, as he did in his first term, to attempt to push his policies via executive action, opening up challenges in federal court. 

A Harris victory would at least create space for the resurrection of the Biden administration’s 2024 immigration enforcement bill, originally supported by moderate Republican leadership in the Senate, but defeated following pressure from Trump. 

The bill would have toughened enforcement at the border – increasing funding for detention centres, asylum hearings and for local governments and border patrols. It would also permit ICE to shut down the border when crossings surpassed an average of 5,000 per day or 8,500 on a single day.

Undermining US influence

But such legislation, while promising to address domestic US perceptions of the crisis, threatens to reduce US soft power in Latin America. That would be counterproductive at a time when the US is attempting to consolidate global support in its competition with China and conflict with Russia. 

For Latin American leaders, US rhetoric on immigration rankles. The priorities of Latin American and Caribbean leaders and their voters are long term: economic growth, improved security, and climate change. These issues require investment and commitment from an engaged and reliable US partner. Sadly, Latin Americans can see such issues are not on the domestic agenda in US politics. 

To improve regional perceptions of US intentions after the election, new policy should seek to address the root causes of migration. That will require a multi-pronged, bipartisan approach that focuses attention and resources on US neighbours south of the border.  

The US’s immigration system will need to broaden paths for legal immigration to meet US labour needs, while delivering increased support for border security, and accelerated (and humane) processes for detaining and repatriating illegal border crossers and asylum claims.  

But any sustainable answer also requires addressing the multifaceted reasons driving migrants north. Any future US administration will need to risk unpopularity with some voters at home and engage with sending countries and their neighbours.