As a geographical concept, ‘Indo-Pacific’ has existed for decades. As a political and strategic concept, it has since 2010 gradually become established in the foreign policy lexicon of some countries, especially Australia, India, Japan and the United States. However, China seems to be reluctant to identify itself as part of the Indo-Pacific; Chinese leaders believe that the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy aims to contain China's rise. While the battle between the two geographical concepts ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘Asia–Pacific’ may be fairly easily settled in the future, US–China strategic competition has just begun. Will the Indo-Pacific become a battlefield for US–China rivalry? How will China cope with the US ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy? How will other regional actors respond to the US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific? What are the strategic implications of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept for regional order transformation? How will the Indo-Pacific be institutionalized, economically, politically and strategically? This article introduces the January 2020 special issue of International Affairs, which aims to address those questions, using both country-specific and regional perspectives. Seven articles focus on the policy responses of major players (Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and ASEAN) to the US FOIP strategy and related US–China rivalry in the region. A further three articles examine the profound implications of Indo-Pacific dynamics for regional institution-building and for geopolitical and geo-economic architecture.

Almost four years since it was established, the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has approved 49 projects and proposed 28. The AIIB claims to be more efficient and less bureaucratic than traditional multilateral development banks (MDB’s) which has threatened the existing model of multilateral development finance. At the same time, China’s increased role in previously Western-led economic institutions, such as the WTO and IMF, has raised questions over the future of the international trade order. How will a rising China shape the international institutional order? Where are there opportunities for potential collaboration and what areas pose challenges? And how should other states and international organizations respond?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

As a geographical concept, ‘Indo-Pacific’ has existed for decades. As a political and strategic concept, it has since 2010 gradually become established in the foreign policy lexicon of some countries, especially Australia, India, Japan and the United States. However, China seems to be reluctant to identify itself as part of the Indo-Pacific; Chinese leaders believe that the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy aims to contain China's rise. While the battle between the two geographical concepts ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘Asia–Pacific’ may be fairly easily settled in the future, US–China strategic competition has just begun. Will the Indo-Pacific become a battlefield for US–China rivalry? How will China cope with the US ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy? How will other regional actors respond to the US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific? What are the strategic implications of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept for regional order transformation? How will the Indo-Pacific be institutionalized, economically, politically and strategically? This article introduces the January 2020 special issue of International Affairs, which aims to address those questions, using both country-specific and regional perspectives. Seven articles focus on the policy responses of major players (Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and ASEAN) to the US FOIP strategy and related US–China rivalry in the region. A further three articles examine the profound implications of Indo-Pacific dynamics for regional institution-building and for geopolitical and geo-economic architecture.

In recent years, cybercrime has evolved from a niche technological concern into a prominent global issue with substantial preventative and remedial costs for businesses and governments alike. Despite heavy investment in sophisticated cybersecurity measures and the adoption of several legal, organizational and capacity-building measures, cybercrime remains a major threat which is evolving on a daily basis. Today’s cybercrime is more aggressive, more complex, more organized and – importantly – more unpredictable than ever before.

The challenges posed by cybercrime are experienced acutely by countries undergoing digital transformations: as the level of connectivity rises, so too does the potential for online theft, fraud and abuse. Cybercrime is pervasive but governments can work to limit its impact by creating a resilient overall economy and robust institution, and appropriately equipping law enforcement and the justice system to navigate its novel challenges.

To advance the discourse surrounding these issues, this workshop will assess the current cyber threat landscape and how it is evolving. It will identify the main obstacles encountered by law enforcement, the judiciary and prosecutors in their fight against cybercrime. It will also compare national, regional and global approaches that countries can use to effectively curb cybercrime and tackle its emerging challenges.

As countries move towards the fifth generation of mobile broadband, 5G, the United States has been loudly calling out Huawei as a security threat. It has employed alarmist rhetoric and threatened to limit trade and intelligence sharing with close allies that use Huawei in their 5G infrastructure.

While some countries such as Australia have adopted a hard line against Huawei, others like the UK have been more circumspect, arguing that the risks of using the firm’s technology can be mitigated without forgoing the benefits.

So, who is right, and why have these close allies taken such different approaches?

The risks

Long-standing concerns relating to Huawei are plausible. There are credible allegations that it has benefitted from stolen intellectual property, and that it could not thrive without a close relationship with the Chinese state.

Huawei hotly denies allegations that users are at risk of its technology being used for state espionage, and says it would resist any order to share information with the Chinese government. But there are questions over whether it could really resist China’s stringent domestic legislation, which compels companies to share data with the government. And given China’s track record of using cyberattacks to conduct intellectual property theft, there may be added risks of embedding a Chinese provider into critical communications infrastructure.

In addition, China’s rise as a global technological superpower has been boosted by the flow of financial capital through government subsidies, venture and private equity, which reveal murky boundaries between the state and private sector for domestic darlings. Meanwhile, the Belt and Road initiative has seen generous investment by China in technology infrastructure across Africa, South America and Asia.

There’s no such thing as a free lunch or a free network – as Sri Lanka discovered when China assumed shares in a strategic port in return for debt forgiveness; or Mexico when a 1% interest loan for its 4G network came on the condition that 80% of the funding was spent with Huawei.

Aside from intelligence and geopolitical concerns, the quality of Huawei’s products represents a significant cyber risk, one that has received less attention than it deserves.

On top of that, 5G by itself will significantly increase the threat landscape from a cybersecurity perspective. The network layer will be more intelligent and adaptable through the use of software and cloud services. The number of network antennae will increase by a factor of 20, and many will be poorly secured ‘things’; there is no need for a backdoor if you have any number of ‘bug doors’.

Finally, the US is threatening to limit intelligence sharing with its closest allies if they adopt Huawei. So why would any country even consider using Huawei in their 5G infrastructure?

Different situations

The truth is that not every country is free to manoeuvre; 5G technology will sit on top of existing mobile infrastructure.

Australia and the US can afford to take a hard line: their national infrastructure has been largely Huawei-free since 2012. However, the Chinese firm is deeply embedded in other countries’ existing structures – for example, in the UK, Huawei has provided telecommunications infrastructure since 2005. Even if the UK decided tomorrow to ditch Huawei, it cannot just rip up existing 4G infrastructure. To do so would cost a fortune, risk years of delay in the adoption of 5G and limit competition in 5G provisioning.

As a result, the UK has adopted a pragmatic approach resulting from years of oversight and analysis of Huawei equipment, during which it has never found evidence of malicious Chinese state cyber activity through Huawei.

At the heart of this process is the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre, which was founded in 2010 as a confidence-building measure. Originally criticized for ‘effectively policing itself’, as it was run and staffed entirely by Huawei, the governance has now been strengthened, with the National Cyber Security Centre chairing its oversight board.

The board’s 2019 report makes grim reading, highlighting ‘serious and system defects in Huawei’s software engineering and cyber security competence’. But it does not accuse the company of serving as a platform for state-sponsored surveillance.

Similar evidence-based policy approaches are emerging in other countries like Norway and Italy. They offer flexibility for governments, for example by limiting access to some contract competition through legitimate and transparent means, such as security reviews during procurement. The approaches also raise security concerns (both national and cyber) to a primary issue when awarding contracts – something that was not always done in the past, when price was the key driver.

The UK is also stressing the need to manage risk and increase vendor diversity in the ecosystem to avoid single points of failure. A further approach that is beginning to emerge is to draw a line between network ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ components, excluding some providers from the more sensitive ‘core’. The limited rollouts of 5G in the UK so far have adopted multi-provider strategies, and only one has reportedly not included Huawei kit.

Managing the risks to cyber security and national security will become more complex in a 5G environment. In global supply chains, bans based on the nationality of the provider offer little assurance. For countries that have already committed to Huawei in the past, and who may not wish to be drawn into an outright trade war with China, these moderate approaches offer a potential way forward.

Examining obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and exploring new approaches that NATO could adopt to reconcile strategic stability with nuclear disarmament policies which could be introduced at the 2020 NPT Review Conference (RevCon).

The project facilitates the reconciliation of different positions in advance of the RevCon by providing a platform for stakeholders to communicate their respective positions and engage in constructive dialogue. Key research findings and contemporary analysis will be disseminated to officials and the policy community.

Through dialogue and research, the project aims to reduce polarisation in the nuclear field and consequently lay a foundation for increased collaboration during the discussions. It also provides a unique opportunity for NATO countries to explore specific new approaches, including in relation to identifying and analysing relevant geopolitical conditions for nuclear disarmament measures that will inform their inputs into the RevCon and related policy framework discussions.

This project is supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

President Cyril Ramaphosa led the African National Congress (ANC) to electoral victory in South Africa in May 2019. His promise of rooting out corruption and generating job-creating growth resonated with an electorate scarred by corruption scandals and structural economic and racial inequality.

However, divisions within the ruling party have meant that the delivery of these promises has been slow. Complex and often divisive racial dynamics continue to dominate political discourse especially around land reform and economic transformation.

The country’s main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), faces its own political crisis following the resignation of former leader Mmusi Maimane, bringing into question the role of opposition parties in the young democracy. 

At this event, South African journalists, Martin Plaut and Carien du Plessis, discuss their new book, Understanding South Africa, providing insights into the current and historical trends that define the political fault lines of modern South Africa. Is Ramaphosa shying away from the difficult political decisions necessary to encourage meaningful change in South Africa’s political environment? And how should the international community understand the trends and dynamics that dominate South African politics?

Africa’s dinosaur leaders are members of an increasingly small and unstable club. Popular protests last year forced Algeria’s president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, out of office after almost 20 years in power, as well as Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, who ruled for 30 years. In 2017, Robert Mugabe was deposed in a military coup (although this was denied) after 40 years. 
And in 2011, mass protests led to the downfall of Tunisia’s president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, after he had been in power for 23 years.

Somewhat smoother are the political transitions in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). José Eduardo dos Santos, after almost 38 years in power, stepped down from office in 2017 as his term ended. So did his younger neighbour, Joseph Kabila, in January 2019, after 18 years in the presidency.

What the six former leaders had in common was that they wanted to remain heads of state and considered succession planning or stepping down only as a last resort. This year will be crucial for the six countries in political transition particularly as the reform-window period is short.

From A to Z 

Algeria: Tens of thousands of protesters have rallied in the capital Algiers and other cities against the December 2019 elections, rejecting what they see as sham transitional politics. A soft landing for Algeria in 2020 is unlikely, and what happens in the year has significant regional implications.

Angola: A transition is under way, led by President João Lourenço. This shift is smoother than many others, but 2020 will be the watershed year. The country has been in economic recession for four years but is predicted to see gross domestic product growth in 2020. Investment and job creation will determine the pace of change. The honeymoon period has ended and there are signs of increasing frustration among the urban youth and the middle class.

DRC: Despite his constitutionally mandated term expiring in December 2016, Joseph Kabila continued his presidency by continuously postponing elections until 30 December 2018. This election saw a three-way contest between the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDSP), the Engagement for Citizenship and Development party and the People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD). Fèlix Tshisekedi of the UDSP was declared the winner by the Independent National Electoral Commission on January 10 last year with 38.6% votes. He was followed by Martin Fayulu of the Engagement for Citizenship and Development party, with 34.8%. He denounced the election results. In third place was Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, of the PPRD, a key ally of Kabila.

Although this was the first peaceful transition of power in DRC, there were widespread electoral inconsistencies and some observers believed that Fayulu was the legitimate winner. In 2020 it will become clearer whether a genuine transition from Kabila’s influence is taking place.

Sudan: More promising than the DRC or Algeria, a 39-month transitional administration led by a technocratic prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, has been established and enjoys domestic and international goodwill. This honeymoon is likely to be short, and the transitional administration needs to show results. The United States can help by removing Sudan from its terror list, thereby lifting the de facto ban on Sudan’s access to the dollar-based international financial system.

Tunisia: A low-profile, conservative law professor beat a charismatic media magnate released from prison in the presidential election runoff in October 2019. Kais Saied won 70% of the vote and his victory and the putting together of a new governing coalition is another step forward in an open-ended democratic transition that started in 2011 after Ben Ali fell.

Zimbabwe: This is a deeply troubled transition with an acute foreign exchange liquidity crisis, a deteriorating economy, hyperinflation and underperforming government. The state’s clinics and hospitals are closed or turn away patients as medical supplies run out and the doctors’ strike over decimated wages continues. There are power outages and almost half of the people face hunger and starvation as a result of drought and the economic crisis.

Zimbabwe’s 2020 looks bleak, a far cry from the euphoria of two years ago when a “military assisted transition” removed Mugabe and replaced him with Emmerson Mnangagwa.

More changes coming

So what do these political developments in 2019 tell us more broadly?

Long-standing leaders have been persistent in Africa, despite the end of single-party rule in favour of a multiparty system. About a fifth of all African heads of state since independence can be classed as long-standing leaders — in power for more than a decade — and only five countries have never experienced one. But the trend is in decline.

It remains most resilient in central Africa and in the Great Lakes regions. Cracks are appearing in their citadels in Malabo and Kampala, but in 2019 Equatorial Guinea’s President Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo celebrated 40 years in power and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni 33 years.

Will there be any more departures from the dinosaurs club in 2020?

One of the shortest serving members of this club, President Pierre Nkurunziza (14 years in power) has said he will not stand for the 2020 elections in Burundi, although this is uncertain given that a 2018 constitutional referendum could allow him to stay in power until 2034. Togo’s Faure Gnassingbé (14 years in power) will stand for re-election to the presidency again after Parliament in 2019 approved a constitutional change permitting him to potentially stay in office until 2030.

Amending constitutions to change term limits so that incumbent leaders can run for office is a favoured tactic. Rwanda’s Paul Kagame (19 years in office) and the Republic of Congo’s Denis Sassou Nguesso (25 years in power) have done this. But Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki has never held an election during his 16 years in power.

Attempts at dynasties have been less successful, such as with Grace Mugabe in Zimbabwe or Gamal Mubarak in Egypt, but Obiang is grooming his playboy son Teodorin to succeed him and Gabon’s Ali Bongo and Togo’s Gnassingbé both succeeded their fathers.

The year is a reminder that more of these long-standing leaders will, in 2020 and beyond, step down or die. Most long-standing leaders in Africa are over the age of 70, with Paul Biya, aged 86, having served 37 years as Cameroon’s president.

Some former leaders capitulated under internal pressure: in Algeria, Sudan, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. Only in Angola and the DRC was a transition process organized as part of an elite bargain.

What the political transitions have in common is that honeymoons are short and that, whether they are led by interim administrations or elected leaders, they need to deliver political and socioeconomic improvements to succeed, but have inherited shambolic economies. Their success depends on accountable political leadership and domestic and international support.

This article was originally published by the Mail & Guardian.

Almost four years since it was established, the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has approved 49 projects and proposed 28. The AIIB claims to be more efficient and less bureaucratic than traditional multilateral development banks (MDB’s) which has threatened the existing model of multilateral development finance. At the same time, China’s increased role in previously Western-led economic institutions, such as the WTO and IMF, has raised questions over the future of the international trade order. How will a rising China shape the international institutional order? Where are there opportunities for potential collaboration and what areas pose challenges? And how should other states and international organizations respond?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Does the rule of law matter to maritime security? One way into the question is to examine whether states show a discursive commitment that maritime security practices must comply with international law. International law thus provides tools for argument for or against the validity of certain practices. The proposition is thus not only that international law matters to maritime security, but legal argument does too. In this article, these claims will be explored in relation to the South China Sea dispute. The dispute involves Chinese claims to enjoy special rights within the ‘nine-dash line’ on official maps which appears to lay claim to much of the South China Sea. Within this area sovereignty remains disputed over numerous islands and other maritime features. Many of the claimant states have engaged in island-building activities, although none on the scale of China. Ideas matter in such contests, affecting perceptions of reality and of what is possible. International law provides one such set of ideas. Law may be a useful tool in consolidating gains or defeating a rival's claims. For China, law is a key domain in which it is seeking to consolidate control over the South China Sea. The article places the relevant Chinese legal arguments in the context of China's historic engagement with the law of the sea. It argues that the flaw in China's approach has been to underestimate the extent to which it impinges on other states' national interests in the maritime domain, interests they conceptualize in legal terms.