Beijing briefing: is the Belt and Road going nowhere? The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 July 2022

Scaling back infrastructure plans and investment in the Global South could cause China problems, says Yu Jie.

Over the past two decades, China specialists around the world have tried to analyze Beijing’s approach to developing countries in the Global South, including Africa, Latin America, parts of Asia and the Pacific islands.
 
China’s relationships with nations in these regions vary considerably. In some, ideology or geography are the biggest influencing factors; for others, economic and commercial gains matter most. However, many of Beijing’s recent engagements have attracted more criticism than praise. A domestic economic downturn means that Beijing has tightened its belt, spending less on overseas development.

When President Xi Jinping came to power, he was keen to highlight how China’s power could shape and dictate the global agenda across multilateral platforms. His vision was for China to project discursive power and become an agenda-setter rather than a rule-follower. The Global South is the route to fulfilling his proposal.

To this end, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the latest Global Development Initiative are the means to Beijing’s ends. The former, launched in 2013, focuses on building physical infrastructure linking Global South countries; the latter aims to allow development through grants and capacity-building in line with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.

China’s engagements with Africa and Latin America seem characterized by the rapid extension of Chinese finance to resource-rich African states, particularly oil producers, since the early 2000s. From 2003, for example, oil-backed infrastructure loans were made to the Angolan government for reconstruction after decades of civil conflict. By 2016, they totalled some $15 billion. 

However, Beijing’s appetite for offering cheap loans in exchange for natural resources has shrunk. It faces a dilemma between protecting the value of its investments while also defending its strategic interests and maintaining its self-image as a partner, not a predator, of Africa.

Beijing has historically preferred bilateral relationships for its development finance and investments over multilateral ones. This allows China control over the terms and conditions, while demonstrating its unwillingness to accept without question rules and frameworks devised years ago by western countries.

China has already realized that some elements of its engagements with the Global South are no longer the flavour of the day, partly because some of its programmes include serious climate and financial risks without proper third-party due diligence in place. 

Growth through gigantic infrastructure investments of the sort that drove China’s own economic miracle is not a panacea applicable everywhere. Nor is relentlessly seeking endorsements from its neighbours and other countries from afar.

China wants to be a ‘brother’ to the Global South

Ideologically, China wants to be seen and respected as a leader of the Global South. Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic has maintained a ‘brotherly’ relationship with developing countries, notably in the UN context, where it remains a member of the G77 group of developing nations. 

The West has responded to China’s development agenda with its own infrastructure programmes, such as Washington’s Build Back Better World and the European Union’s Global Gateway. 

Great power rivalry should not be ignored, but it shouldn’t blind world powers to the need for collaboration in tackling global poverty and sustainable development. Nor should Beijing’s efforts to adjust its diplomatic and aid programmes to become a likeable partner of choice in search of a better economic future, be disregarded.

Since launching BRI, China has poured hundreds of billions of dollars into building infrastructure in the Global South. And many developing countries hope that advanced economies and China can continue to act to alleviate poverty. But the brakes have been applied to Beijing’s spree as a result of China’s domestic economic slowdown. It has no wish to continue spending its foreign reserves.

To go forward, China must remain open to what others want – or fear – from Beijing’s development initiatives and infrastructure investments. Many developing countries, facing insurmountable costs and damage exacerbated by the Covid pandemic, crave meaningful assistance rather than diplomatic rhetoric. 

The ultimate test of Beijing’s economic statecraft is whether it can engage with the Global South beyond relationships built on financial resources and political capital. It must also become more self-aware of how its words and deeds are received – and then act accordingly. Showering dollars and renminbi is not always guaranteed to win hearts and minds. In this respect, Beijing has more bridges to build.

Managing Risks Along the Belt and Road 27 March 2018 — 8:30AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 5 March 2018 Chatham House, London

China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ offers potential benefits in connectivity, infrastructure and trade, through significantly increased Chinese engagement across many different countries. However, many of these countries face internal tensions and have relatively underdeveloped market structures, legal systems and governance frameworks. While Belt and Road investments can make positive contributions in host countries, there is also the potential for these investments to exacerbate tensions and risks.

This roundtable, held in partnership with the Security & Crisis Management International Centre (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences-UNITO), will seek to examine risk management along the Belt and Road, differentiating between roles that can be played by public sector and private sector actors.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Belt and Road Is Not a (Completely) Closed Shop Expert comment sysadmin 22 March 2018

Though the infrastructure initiative will continue to be led in many places by Chinese investment, where there are benefits of scale, effectiveness and risk management, outside participation will be welcome.

First announced in 2013, President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative promises, at a minimum, to improve infrastructure and connectivity between China and the rest of Eurasia. Any bold plan to finance infrastructure on a large-scale across so many low-income economies deserves a sympathetic ear and a positive reception. But many wonder how large the role can be for non-Chinese players in what is clearly an initiative of the Chinese government.

So far, Chinese state and policy banks account for the overwhelming majority of the financing – and this money then flows to Chinese enterprises, mainly state-owned. One study found that 89% of the work went to Chinese contractors on China-funded projects.

Yet, recently in Paris, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the Belt and Road was a ‘sunshine initiative’ that was open and for all to benefit from. He declared that there were to be ‘no backroom deals. There is openness and transparency.’ The Belt and Road Initiative will ‘respect international rules’ and ‘will run according to market rules’.

There are some notable instances of Belt and Road projects changing to conform more to international rules as they develop. For example, work on the Belgrade–Budapest high speed rail link originally ran into problems. Contracts were allegedly awarded to Chinese companies without following the EU-mandated competitive procurement processes. Now, the most recent round of contracts is to be awarded by tender.

Such a switch perhaps does not herald the unrestricted ‘market rules’ that Wang speaks of, but it does highlight that China is willing to turn Belt and Road towards openness in certain instances. These will be cases where it clearly brings benefits for China – but also where private sector players can be convinced of good commercial returns. These benefits are most likely to lie in three areas: scale and access, effectiveness and risk management.

Mutual benefits

Firstly, scale and access. Belt and Road can achieve greater scale if additional financing comes in alongside the current Chinese state and policy bank lending. This can come both by working together with multilateral institutions and with private sector institutions. This will in turn require defining projects or structuring financing with attractive risk-return trade-offs. In some cases, this will be feasible – in others not.

Getting bigger also necessitates initiating meaningful Belt and Road activity in more countries. As the Belgrade–Budapest rail experience has shown, approaches vary in terms of competitive tendering requirements and consideration of non-Chinese bidders. An approach that works in, say, Tajikistan, may not be effective in Poland. This is a pragmatic recognition of context that is quite separate from debates on what the ‘right’ approach to these standards should be. Both these elements suggest that a more open Belt and Road will be a larger and more far-reaching one.

Secondly, effectiveness. Despite extensive experience building infrastructure within China, many Chinese companies are much less familiar operating outside of China. Western, Japanese and Korean companies can bring their own experience to the table and help the success of these projects. By doing so, they also put competitive pressure on Chinese companies to improve and upgrade, while providing opportunities to learn. This in turn creates a stronger, more productive Chinese economy.

Beyond physical hardware, the ‘software’ is also critical to success. Again foreign companies have much to contribute. Areas such as maintenance, training, legal and accounting services are all in demand. Indeed, many such British and other companies are already actively engaged in working on projects with Chinese companies to help in these areas.

Finally, risk management. Beyond the usual project management risk of large projects, Belt and Road brings additional challenges. Many countries have weak governance, internal divisions and security issues, all within distinctively different cultures and traditions. Chinese companies with little experience of local conditions will struggle. Going it alone may provide what is an illusion of control, but exposure to social and political dynamics can rebound on China in unexpected ways.

Cooperating with others who have a history of in-country experience is a way to manage these risks. Examples would include British and Chinese cooperation both at company and governmental level in engaging in particular African countries, in partnership with the relevant country government.

Mixed system

Mechanisms that encourage competitive choices and restrain corruption are positive, but mechanisms that slow decision-making to a crawl also prevent countries from getting benefits of infrastructure projects. Conversely, continuing along the current path of Chinese-led investment does have some clear attractions in certain settings, at least to those directly involved. It combines the ability of Chinese policy banks to provide large-scale funding in even high-risk environments with the relevant experience and production capacity of Chinese state-owned businesses. It allows for government-to-government deals, pragmatic negotiations and all-encompassing accords, at times out of the public eye. In many cases, it is hard to make a commercial case for the investments.

But in cases where there is mutual benefit, engagement and will, there will be a role for international partnerships.

Managing Risk to Build a Better Belt and Road Expert comment sysadmin 4 July 2018

Risk management is a key part of economic development. China could use some simple principles for managing risk to improve the prospects of its flagship infrastructure initiative.

One of the original motivating forces for China’s Belt and Road Initiative is risk management: the aim being to use infrastructure to drive economic development, so improving political stability and creating a favorable impression of China in countries bordering China and beyond.

Yet these investments themselves are inherently risky: large-scale, debt-financed, long-term infrastructure projects in countries that often have weak governance, undefined or poorly-executed rule of law and corruption. China has experience managing infrastructure risks within its borders in its own ways, but it has much less experience overseas.

And, while well-executed investments can enhance stability, the same investments, executed poorly, can create their own backlash in countries that see costs exceed benefits. This increases rather than reduces risks – not just the risks of defaulting on loans, but also the risk of damage to physical assets, loss of life and deteriorating relations with China.

Moreover, China states its desire for greater private sector and non-Chinese involvement in Belt and Road. This will be needed if China is to realize some of its larger ambitions for the initiative. But companies seek attractive returns – adjusted for risk. It is the perceived and actual riskiness of projects that makes commercial involvement a challenge. Focusing on the risk rather than return may be the better place to start to attract partners alongside Chinese institutions.

The risks on the Belt and Road

Overall, these risks fall into four categories.

The first and most critical issues are when projects cannot even get initial funding. Concerns about compliance, corruption and project governance combined with high costs and low revenues mean that the numbers simply do not add up. Working on any of these dimensions to improve them means more projects will get off the ground.

Secondly, there are the familiar risks during construction – budget overruns, unforeseen design issues and work delays, all commonplace in such challenging operating environments. Alongside these are risks to personnel caused by internal tensions and security challenges.

Thirdly, once completed, financial and non-financial risks remain. At its simplest, revenues may fall short and the project debt cannot be repaid. A series of other factors may reduce willingness to pay: difficulties in enforcing penalties against non-repayment; fiscal pressures elsewhere in the budget; popular resistance to sending money to overseas financiers. And the completed projects and individuals operating them often remain at risk to local political tensions and security challenges.

Finally, throughout the whole process, projects risk stirring up resentment and hostility rather building stability through economic growth. Incumbent governments may make project commitments that fit their own interests rather than those of the country – or at least are perceived to do so. Sri Lanka and Malaysia offer current examples. The way in which projects are implemented can compound the problem – for example, if promised job creation among local contractors does not happen or local ethnic rivalries are not taken into account.

Approaches to risk

How then to address these risks? Some simple principles about risk management highlight avenues to explore and institutions to get involved.

First, what can actions be taken to mitigate or reduce the risks and who is best-placed to do this?

Secondly, who is best-placed to bear and accept risks that cannot be reduced at an economical cost? Should the risk be diversified across many different parties so that each bears only a portion of the risk or rather concentrated and held by those who are knowledgeable on the specifics of the risk?

Thirdly, for those who end up bearing the remaining risk, how large is it and what actions are needed now to protect against future loss?

The myriad of risks along the Belt and Road suggests a myriad of risk solutions and participants. Putting that all together is in itself a skill and will not happen of its own accord. It requires active planning and structuring of which partners to involve where in a way that makes sense for all involved. Three areas stand out.

Successful construction is more than an engineering exercise. It requires positive engagement with local communities; credible, active communication of the benefits that the project brings; and protection of the people and equipment involved in the work. Doing this well means understanding the specific situation on the ground in often remote regions and acting accordingly.

Donor agencies, NGOs, other multinationals and provincial and national governments all have experience to bring to the table. Chinese contractors have demonstrated success in rapid, low-cost implementation and are learning about how to work in a wide range of countries. This is, though, an opportunity to draw on the experience of contractors from other countries, local subcontractors and the experience of multilateral organizations.

Financing is at core about the risk/return-based allocation of capital. The raison d’etre of the insurance sector is risk management. Multilateral institutions have a complementary role to play alongside private sector financial institutions. Drawing on this experience can play an important role in making investment projects economically attractive and bankable.

The opportunity to match the investment portfolios of long-term institutional investors with the long-term financing needs of infrastructure has long been a topic of discussion: the Belt and Road provides a new menu of projects. These approaches all thrive on verifiable data, standardization and transparency clarity and standardization.

Not all projects will fit these requirements, but some will. And in all cases, drawing on sector- and country-specific risk management experience from banks and insurers can reduce risks.

Government can be thought of as the ultimate back-stop, a risk manager for its people across the entire risk spectrum. Actions that strengthen the capacity of all governments involved to assess and address risk mean more effective risk management, greater success and the avoidance of ‘debt traps’.

Examples include sharing experience between countries; multilateral or bilateral support with the assessment of financial burden and debt terms; support to strengthen governance and oversight of project implementation; and approaches that ensure the involvement of affected local populations. Making use of dispute resolution procedures that are accepted by the key participants reduces risk all round.

Countries, businesses and individuals grow through the judicious taking of risks. But unnecessary risk-taking is wasted effort. Belt and Road projects will be most effective when those best-placed to tackle risks and opportunities are encouraged to do so.

China Needs to Make the Belt and Road Initiative More Transparent and Predictable Expert comment sysadmin 29 April 2019

The global infrastructure project must move beyond mish-mash of opaque bilateral deals

As China welcomes dozens of world leaders to Beijing for its second Belt and Road forum, it has one simple aim: relaunching President Xi Jinping’s controversial global infrastructure drive.

Since it began five years ago, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has sunk hundreds of billions into port, railway and power projects stretching from south-east Asia to central Europe. But its path has been bumpy, drawing sharp criticism over the ruinous debts that some countries have racked up amid Chinese largesse.

Xi will stress sustainable financing and transparency this week, amid the usual talk of ‘win win’ cooperation. Yet BRI’s problems are structural, not presentational. For any pledges to be meaningful, China must move beyond its present mish-mash of opaque, bilateral deals.

After bad headlines last year, BRI has in fact enjoyed a good run in recent weeks. Malaysia announced it would resume a previously cancelled high-speed rail project, while Italy’s decision to join up last month marked a further European incursion. Indeed, if attendance is any guide to success, BRI looks in fine fettle. The first forum in 2017 attracted 29 world leaders. China says 37 will turn up this week. Phillip Hammond, UK chancellor, arrives hunting deals too, just a day after news that Chinese technology group Huawei will be allowed to help build 5G networks in Britain.

Even so, three interlinked problems remain at the heart of President Xi’s pet project, all of which must be addressed if BRI is to move beyond the pitfalls that have damaged its reputation.

The first and most obvious is debt. Critics allege that China ‘traps’ its BRI partners financially, often pointing to a debt-for-equity deal that handed China control of a port in Sri Lanka. These claims are exaggerated — few other projects have ended up this way. Yet poorer nations from Laos to Tajikistan are still signing up to vastly expensive Chinese schemes that offer poor value for money while straining their public finances.

The second problem is transparency. Despite its grand scale there is still no reliable list of BRI projects, no disclosure of the lending standards China follows, nor even the amount China has invested. Beijing claims more than $1 trillion; independent estimates suggest perhaps a few hundred billion. Either way, it will be hard for China to convince doubters on debts until it is open about the criteria it uses in deciding who to lend to and why.

BRI’s third and most important challenge is its muddled organization. Despite BRI’s image as a centrally run mega-project, China has allowed many deals to be struck locally, via a mix of state-backed companies, public sector banks and freewheeling regional governments. And it is here that the problems began.

Infrastructure deals are notoriously complex, especially for transnational projects like high-speed rail. Renegotiations are common, even for experienced bodies like the World Bank. Yet BRI has repeatedly seen terms negotiated behind closed doors, in countries such as Malaysia and Pakistan, come unstuck in the face of public outcry.

Rather than seeking to trap others with debt, China’s central government more often has to step in to fix dubious projects agreed by underlings lower down the chain.

These negotiations go one of two ways. Either China’s partners complain and win terms, as was true in Malaysia and in Myanmar over a multibillion-dollar deep-sea port. Or, as in the case of Sri Lanka, the renegotiations go in China’s favour, but at the cost of accusations of debt trickery. In both cases China looks bad.

Speaking last year, Xi responded to criticism of BRI by describing it as ‘an open platform for cooperation’. Yet, so far, he has proved resistant to the step that would deliver on that vision — namely turning BRI into an institution with open standards and international partners.

The reasons for his reluctance are obvious. Ending BRI’s reliance on loose bilateral deals would limit Beijing’s room for geopolitical manoeuvre. Yet what might be lost in political flexibility could easily be gained in economic credibility, while avoiding some of the painful renegotiations that have dogged many BRI projects.

At a time when China’s economy is slowing and its current account surplus is shrinking, formalising and institutionalising, BRI could also help avoid wasting scarce public resources on white elephant projects. China even has an easy template in the form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Beijing-based institution that has won plaudits for its project quality and openness since it started in 2016.

Whichever model is chosen, a dose of Chinese-style central planning is called for, along with more openness. Without it, the oddly chaotic and decentralised model pioneered in BRI’s first five years is unlikely to help the project thrive over the next five.

This article was originally published in the Financial Times.

Mitsunori Fukuda
Jun 1, 2008; 7:1031-1042
Research

From local to global: A roadmap for US climate action 14 April 2021 — 6:30PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 March 2021 Online

Ahead of Biden’s Earth Day Summit, panellists discuss a range of climate issues, from city-level climate management to the international security implications of climate deals.

On their first day in office, the Biden-Harris administration sent a strong message to Americans and allies by rejoining the Paris Agreement. Experienced climate and environmental leaders were appointed to senior leadership roles as part of a ‘whole of government approach’ to climate action.

Although decisive action is welcomed by many Americans and international partners, the divided domestic perspectives on climate and a changed international landscape pose significant challenges.

Ahead of the Earth Day Summit on April 22, an event hosted by Joe Biden to mark America’s formal return to global climate talks, panellists discuss a range of climate issues, from city-level climate management to the international security implications of climate deals.

• How will post-COVID domestic priorities and policy influence the international approach of the US to climate action?
• How will US policy, both foreign and domestic, need to respond to the security and geopolitical elements posed by climate change?
• What actions are needed during the upcoming Earth Day Summit for the US to establish credibility as a climate leader?
• What shape are key debates taking on US-China climate relations ahead of COP 26, and how might climate issues be approached in relation to wider geopolitical tensions?

Climate finance and conflict dynamics on the road to COP27 21 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 September 2022 Online

Stakeholders discuss the role of conflict and conflict sensitivity in climate finance and action.

With climate change, fragility and conflict challenges worsening, the role of international climate finance is more urgent than ever.

From the implementation of climate finance and who it reaches to the rush for renewable energy, the inclusion of conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity principles often remain absent from climate finance discussions and planning.

With COP27 around the corner and for the occasion of International Peace Day, stakeholders ranging from government representatives to climate activists discuss their perspectives on the role of conflict and conflict sensitivity as part of climate finance and action.

This event was organized in partnership with International Alert.

Tangled Bank posted a photo:

Tangled Bank posted a photo:

Tangled Bank posted a photo:

Broad-specificity glycoside hydrolases (GHs) contribute to plant biomass hydrolysis by degrading a diverse range of polysaccharides, making them useful catalysts for renewable energy and biocommodity production. Discovery of new GHs with improved kinetic parameters or more tolerant substrate-binding sites could increase the efficiency of renewable bioenergy production even further. GH5 has over 50 subfamilies exhibiting selectivities for reaction with β-(1,4)–linked oligo- and polysaccharides. Among these, subfamily 4 (GH5_4) contains numerous broad-selectivity endoglucanases that hydrolyze cellulose, xyloglucan, and mixed-linkage glucans. We previously surveyed the whole subfamily and found over 100 new broad-specificity endoglucanases, although the structural origins of broad specificity remained unclear. A mechanistic understanding of GH5_4 substrate specificity would help inform the best protein design strategies and the most appropriate industrial application of broad-specificity endoglucanases. Here we report structures of 10 new GH5_4 enzymes from cellulolytic microbes and characterize their substrate selectivity using normalized reducing sugar assays and MS. We found that GH5_4 enzymes have the highest catalytic efficiency for hydrolysis of xyloglucan, glucomannan, and soluble β-glucans, with opportunistic secondary reactions on cellulose, mannan, and xylan. The positions of key aromatic residues determine the overall reaction rate and breadth of substrate tolerance, and they contribute to differences in oligosaccharide cleavage patterns. Our new composite model identifies several critical structural features that confer broad specificity and may be readily engineered into existing industrial enzymes. We demonstrate that GH5_4 endoglucanases can have broad specificity without sacrificing high activity, making them a valuable addition to the biomass deconstruction toolset.

The synthesis of cholesterol requires more than 20 enzymes, many of which are intricately regulated. Post-translational control of these enzymes provides a rapid means for modifying flux through the pathway. So far, several enzymes have been shown to be rapidly degraded through the ubiquitin–proteasome pathway in response to cholesterol and other sterol intermediates. Additionally, several enzymes have their activity altered through phosphorylation mechanisms. Most work has focused on the two rate-limiting enzymes: 3-hydroxy-3-methylglutaryl CoA reductase and squalene monooxygenase. Here, we review current literature in the area to define some common themes in the regulation of the entire cholesterol synthesis pathway. We highlight the rich variety of inputs controlling each enzyme, discuss the interplay that exists between regulatory mechanisms, and summarize findings that reveal an intricately coordinated network of regulation along the cholesterol synthesis pathway. We provide a roadmap for future research into the post-translational control of cholesterol synthesis, and no doubt the road ahead will reveal further twists and turns for this fascinating pathway crucial for human health and disease.

COP27: Navigating a difficult road to Sharm El-Sheikh Expert comment NCapeling 6 July 2022

Against a backdrop of rising urgency, COP27 in Egypt will bring all aspects of climate action into the spotlight – but especially the role of the host country.

As COP26 drew to a close in Glasgow, Egyptian officials announced their priorities for COP27, emphasizing climate finance and climate adaptation – a new approach given previous COPs mainly focused on mitigation, reducing emissions to limit climate damage.

This was followed by the COP27 presidency outlining its vision at MENA Climate Week 2022 to achieve ‘substantive and equal progress’ on all aspects of the negotiations, and Egypt emphasizing its intention to focus on implementing existing carbon reduction targets rather than pushing for further carbon cuts.

Egypt argues it is hosting COP27 on behalf of African nations and that, while it is promoting the interests of the developing world, it will be an impartial arbiter. However it is also useful to consider its priorities from the Egyptian government’s perspective.

Agenda drivers

Egypt has long prioritized climate finance and adaptation because it remains in need of technical and financial support to adapt, especially in agriculture and tourism.

It plans to expand its access to climate funding and investment, an area in which Egypt has been relatively successful as it currently receives 27 per cent of all multilateral climate finance in the MENA region and has issued the region’s first sovereign green bonds.

With public debt currently 94 per cent of GDP, Egyptian officials have also called for debt relief for Egypt and other developing countries.

Egypt’s Climate Change Strategy reflects this approach, aiming to enhance Egypt’s rank on the Climate Change Performance Index in order to ‘attract more investments and acquire more climate funding’.

Limiting the mitigation scope and the focus on finance also echoes Egypt’s own reluctance to make carbon reduction commitments. The Egyptian nationally determined contribution (NDC) – its 2030 pledge under the Paris Agreement – does not include any quantifiable emission reduction targets.

Egypt is one of only a few countries which failed to submit an updated NDC in 2021 and its upcoming update will not include an economy-wide carbon reduction target.

Egypt has also never published a long-term strategy and has no decarbonization plans despite independent estimates it should cut rising emissions by one-quarter by 2030, and by two-thirds by 2050 to be aligned with the Paris Agreement. This partly explains why observers rate Egypt’s climate action as highly insufficient.

Furthermore, Egypt’s championing of ‘moving from pledges to implementation’ without having quantifiable carbon reduction pledges of its own effectively exempts it from both pledging and implementation.

As a developing country, Egypt’s negotiating position is supported by UNFCCC provisions which recognize differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities of nations.

Its proposal to focus COP27 on the implementation of climate action and finance pledges is important in consolidating progress. But not pushing for more emission reductions at this critical moment risks derailing global decarbonization momentum and undermining global climate action.

According to optimistic estimates, if current climate pledges were implemented the world would still remain on track for 2°C of warming by the end of the century, with far worse impacts than if warming was curbed at 1.5°C.

Under a 2°C scenario, 37 per cent of the global population could regularly be exposed to extreme heat waves compared to 14 per cent in a 1.5°C warmer world, with developing countries expected to be worst-affected.

A 2°C trajectory also runs the risk of tipping points such as the melting of ice sheets in Antarctica and Greenland, triggering runaway climate change. Time to change the warming trajectory is running out as the latest IPCC assessment warns the window of opportunity is now ‘brief and rapidly closing’, and the UN Secretary General recently called for faster carbon cuts by the end of 2022 to avoid a ‘climate catastrophe’.

A different energy transition

Egypt opted not to join any of the voluntary sectoral coalitions at COP26 on reducing methane, clean energy transition, transition to zero-emissions vehicles, or moving beyond oil and gas.

This position is explained by its growing role as an exporter and advocate for fossil gas in the energy transition. Egypt is the second-largest producer of natural gas in Africa and is emerging as a fossil gas hub for the eastern Mediterranean, which is shaping its domestic energy policy.

Its 59GW electricity generation capacity is almost double the peak demand and is dominated by gas-powered electricity generation, which currently represents 42 per cent of all Africa’s gas generation.

Egypt’s climate policy is also shaped by fossil gas, and its national Climate Change Strategy encourages the expansion of gas use by promoting a transition to compressed natural gas for vehicles, the expansion of its domestic natural gas network – despite having universal access to electricity – and shifting to a gas-fuelled shipping sector.

Egypt also voiced support for other African countries to extract and deploy fossil gas and oil resources, making it one of the protagonists of the ‘great fossil gas pushback’. These advocates defend the right of developing countries to deploy fossil gas as a ‘transition fuel’ and champion its necessity to solve energy poverty.

But their position is not shared by all African and developing countries, and is rejected by some civil society groups, who argue it risks locking in greenhouse gases and local emissions for decades as well as delaying future development of low carbon energy systems.

Egypt’s huge spare generation capacity has contributed to a slowdown in renewable energy projects over the past two years. With renewables representing just 6GW, Egypt is expected to miss its renewable energy target for 2022, set at 20 per cent of generating capacity.

Engaging Egypt better

But these positions are more malleable than they seem, and Egypt is open to dialogue – not just on refining the COP27 agenda but also on reviewing its own climate priorities and leveraging its energy sector for a more ambitious transition.

The road to COP27: In conversation with US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry 27 October 2022 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

What will progress on climate change look like at COP27?

With global attention zeroing in on COP27, policymakers and world leaders will meet in Egypt to take the next step in the fight against the climate crisis. The planet is on course to warm well beyond 1.5°C and climate hazards are increasing our exposure to climate risk. Violent and unpredictable weather events increasingly leave devastation among communities, particularly in vulnerable countries.

At the same time, the ripple effects of the conflict in Ukraine will have wide-ranging economic, social and geopolitical consequences for years to come. Whilst some finance is being made available, more is needed to properly address the damage caused by climate change and fund the transition to net zero worldwide. These challenges have become more acute as the world grapples with a growing energy crisis, the war in Ukraine and a troubling economic outlook.

Joined by US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry, the following questions are considered:

• Is ‘1.5 degrees’ still on track?

• How can countries better collaborate to move to net zero faster?

• How can we achieve progress on adaptation, climate finance, and loss and damage?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 

Turkey at a crossroads 4 May 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 April 2023 Chatham House and Online

What is at stake in the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections?

Turkey is heading towards a fateful presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2023. These elections are taking place against the background of a deepening economic downturn and a devastating earthquake. The elections will bear a major impact on the future of Turkish democracy, economy and foreign policy. At stake is the nature of Turkey’s political system, its geopolitical identity and the health of its democracy.

To unpack the significance and implications of this election, this event aims to address the following questions:

• What kind of political visions do the main presidential candidates offer for the country?
• How do they differ on the main domestic and foreign policy issues?
• How do the presidential candidates feature in public surveys?
• What does this election mean for Turkey’s foreign policy?
• What is the likely impact of the election on Turkey’s place in the transatlantic alliance and its relations with Europe?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Russia and 9/11: Roads not taken Expert comment NCapeling 9 September 2021

Many Russia watchers recall the fleeting moment 20 years ago when the country could have moved away from a path of confrontation with the US.

On 12 September 2001, Russian president Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to call George W. Bush to express his condolences – and to offer him support.

Just the previous year, Putin had said Russia joining NATO was a possibility and it suited Russia to draw parallels between the terrorist attacks on the US and its own ‘anti-terrorist’ campaign in Chechnya at the time.

Even though much of the Russian commentary about 9/11 professed empathy rather than sympathy, in their eyes the US was both a victim – as Russia likes to see itself – and ‘had it coming’ while Russia was blameless.

At that time, many in the West were still tempted by the idea Putin’s Russia might develop in a liberal direction, and Putin himself wanted to be seen as constructive especially after Chechnya. He may also have also assumed that, if Russia joined the international alliance, it would be as a co-leader with the US.

An offer which was never stated

Whether he was sincere in his condolences or not, Putin was of course not offering something for nothing – but then few countries ever do. Although less than one-tenth into his time in control of Russia (so far), Putin was still feeling his way but was not a naive president having already been through the controversial sinking of the Kursk submarine.

His first move was to facilitate access to bases in Central Asia for the US campaign in Afghanistan – vital initially but less so later. Apparently, this offer was against the wishes of many of his senior military commanders – although the extent to which it was in his gift to grant such access is questionable.

The quid pro quo, unstated and only dawning on Washington much later, was for the US to keep out of what Russia saw – and still sees – as its backyard. Putin probably misjudged that the US would have neither the inclination nor the capacity to be in that region for anything other than supply chain purposes. And he hoped America now needed Russia after the humiliations of the 1990s.

Common interests could once have been the basis of a partnership with Russia; but to Moscow that meant a partnership of equals which recognized the Kremlin’s self-declared right to conduct out-of-area operations. But the US took a different view and, with nothing written down and no memorandum ever signed, the ensuing disappointment for Russia was gradual but inexorable.

A purely practical reason for declining the ‘offer’ was that, despite its own illusions, Russia had little to bring to the table which was useful and could be offered on acceptable terms. Subsequent initiatives – from specific joint terrorism initiatives to a ‘grand reset’ – could not narrow differences to the point where the character of the relationship changed.

The Northern Distribution Network for supplying US forces in Afghanistan – Russia’s most practical contribution to the notional common cause – took almost a decade to be established and was plagued by problems which often come with a dependence on Russian goodwill.

The Kremlin also had the pleasure of watching US hubris lead to failure in Iraq. And, although knowing the US intervention in Afghanistan would never end well, even Russia could not have foreseen the scale of the defeat and humiliation of chaotic withdrawal.

US achievements with Russia’s neighbours

When it comes to Russia’s post 9/11 ‘offer’ and subsequent expectations, many of the other newly independent countries might never have achieved what they have over the past 20 years if the US had agreed – tacitly or otherwise – to sit back and accept Moscow’s droit de regard over them.

From the Kremlin’s perspective, these states were Russia’s ‘kith and kin’ but it underestimated US willingness to support smaller states over a ‘great power’ – especially as George H.W. Bush pleaded to those states not to go too far too fast. Albeit uneven, most have benefitted from US support for their own independence as well as practical assistance to strengthen their institutions and diversify external relationships.

The three Baltic states consolidated their democracies while their economies, which severed many ties with Russia early, are flourishing and prosperous in contrast to those still in the Russian orbit. They are not only members of NATO and the European Union (EU) but have on occasion been moral leaders as in the case of Lithuania facing down both Belarus and China.

Ukraine has undergone two revolutions in attempting to follow the paths of the Baltic states that continues today. After many false starts Moldova has undergone a similar change recently but at the ballot box not on the streets, to give itself another shot at the prize of true democracy and international acceptance.

Georgia conducted the most radical governance reforms seen in the region after its own revolution although it has taken a few steps backwards of late. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have strengthened their independence since then and adjusted their modus vivendi with Russia to their advantage. Putin would hardly be able to give the same assurances about use of bases there today – and indeed reportedly brushed off a request by Biden to use them in the current withdrawal.

Only a minority of formerly Soviet republics have made no progress whatsoever at the governmental level – Belarus and Turkmenistan for sure, perhaps Azerbaijan and Tajikistan too depending on the criteria.

The roads not taken

America’s failure was not so much rejecting Russia’s offer of partnership but failing to pay sufficient attention to it because Russia was still regarded as weak despite being relatively strong in its immediate neighbourhood.

The question of whether it was worth alienating Russia is a moral one. Refusing to sign the Paris Charter – which recognizes the right of independent states to form their own alliances – would have been a further betrayal of people who have long been subjected to their future being decided by stronger powers around them. But Russia may have chosen a path of confrontation anyway as, for the Kremlin, suzerainty over its former republics is considered an entitlement which comes with being a great power.

Although impossible to conclusively prove, all previous frameworks of Russian assumptions and habits of Russian behaviour indicate Moscow would have pocketed the deal and simply moved on anyway. It certainly seems likely that Russia’s other outrages and offenses over the years – from the murders of Litvinenko and Skripal in the UK to the manipulation of information and elections – would still have occurred even if a shabby deal had been made over the heads of the new states on Russia’s borders.

The atrocity of 9/11 was really an opportunity for Russia, a genuine potential turning point and a chance to create a new relationship with the outside world – but its expectations were unrealistic. Russia blew it with demands at the time that could not be met – and rightly were not met. The US rarely receives credit for withstanding Russian blandishments at a moment when its own aura of strength had been so cruelly and effectively punctured by the most brazen of attacks.

Turkey Is on the Road to a Severe Economic Crisis Expert comment sysadmin 12 July 2018

The deteriorating state of the economy is President Erdoğan’s Achilles’ heel and the biggest threat to his currently unrivalled leadership.

Fifteen days after Turkey’s parliamentary and presidential elections, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appointed a new government under radically enhanced executive powers granted by the constitution. He chose 16 loyalists and partisan figures to ensure that he remains front and centre in decision-making and policy formation.

Most notably, Erdoğan sacrificed the former deputy prime minister and ex-Merrill Lynch chief economist Mehmet Şimşek in favour of his inexperienced son-in-law Berat Albayrak as finance and treasury minister to manage the fragile economy. Whether he has the competence to placate jittery financial markets and foreign investors is debatable.

Erdoğan will prioritize short-term growth at all costs to the detriment of macroeconomic and financial stability. That entails foregoing interest rate hikes needed to contain runaway double-digit inflation and to support a plummeting lira that depreciated nearly 20 per cent this year. It also means loosening the purse strings, flooding the markets with cheap credit and sponsoring rampant construction and mega-infrastructure projects.

True to his promise, he has appropriated to himself, by presidential decree, the right to hire the central bank governor, deputies and monetary policy committee members for a four-year term. This completes the politicization of the once-respected and independent central bank and is in line with his unorthodox monetary views that higher interest rates equates with higher inflation.

Erdoğan associates progress with gleaming high-rise buildings, gargantuan infrastructure show-pieces and elevated growth rates. He is spiking the fuel to boost the speed of the sputtering mid-sized Audi-style Turkish economy to achieve superior Ferrari growth rates. As any mechanic knows, these tactics are unsustainable in the long term. Eventually, the engine will burn out.

He does not seem to appreciate that Turkey’s growth model requires an overhaul to join the league of rich economies. It is too reliant on consumer spending and government-sponsored infrastructure and construction projects funded by speculative financial flows rather than on sustained private investment and exports.

Net result: the corporate sector’s foreign-exchange liabilities have climbed to a record $328 billion as of the end of 2017. When netted against foreign-exchange assets, it is still a worrying $214 billion. Its US dollar and euro debt pile has more than doubled since 2008, 80 per cent of which is held by domestic banks. Given these acute balance-of-payments conditions, it is not farfetched that Turkey may impose capital controls in the short-to-medium term to restrict the outflow of foreign assets. At $50 billion, the current account deficit – defined as the sum of the trade balance and financial flows – is not even covered by the central bank’s net international reserves at nearly $45 billion.

Unsurprisingly, some major Turkish companies are negotiating with their bondholders to restructure their sizeable foreign loan obligations as lira devaluation increases the financial burden. Should a significant number of Turkish corporates default on their foreign obligations, this would reverberate across the Turkish economy, cause mass consumer panic, shake the confidence of international financial markets and potentially lead to a crisis within the Turkish financial system and to a deep and prolonged economic recession.

Revealingly, Erdoğan’s nationalist allies, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), refused to join his government. Perhaps Devlet Bahçeli, the MHP leader, learned the lessons of the 2001 financial crisis as a member of a three-party government. So he is opting to project influence from the outside, rather than risk being tainted with responsibility for an economic downturn.

Turkey’s president is doubling down on his singular approach to governance irrespective of the fallout. Notwithstanding his current political dominance, the deteriorating state of the economy is his Achilles’ heel and the biggest threat to his currently unrivalled leadership.

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