INTRODUCTION

In December 2011, the United Nations State of the World’s Volunteering Report was released at the U.N. headquarters in New York along with a General Assembly resolution championing the role of volunteer action in peacebuilding and development. The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) Program report states that:

The contribution of volunteerism to development is particularly striking in the context of sustainable livelihoods and value-based notions of wellbeing. Contrary to common perceptions, the income poor are as likely to volunteer as those who are not poor. In doing so, they realize their assets, which include knowledge, skills and social networks, for the benefit of themselves, their families and their communities…Moreover, volunteering can reduce the social exclusion that is often the result of poverty, marginalization and other forms of inequality…There is mounting evidence that volunteer engagement promotes the civic values and social cohesion which mitigate violent conflict at all stages and that it even fosters reconciliation in post-conflict situations...

The “South Africa Conference on Volunteer Action for Development” convened in Johannesburg in October 2011, and the July 2012 “Africa Conference on Volunteer Action for Peace and Development” co-hosted with the Kenya’s Ministry of East African Community, the United Nations and partners in Nairobi give further evidence to the rise of and potential for volunteer service to impact development and conflict. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring, youth volunteer service and empowerment have emerged as a pivotal idea in deliberations aimed at fostering greater regional cohesion and development.

In “Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2012,” Mwangi S. Kimenyi and Stephen N. Karingi note that: “One of the most important pillars in determining whether the positive prospects for Africa will be realized is success in regional integration… This year is a crucial one for Africa’s regional integration project and actions by governments, regional organizations and the international community will be critical in determining the course of the continent’s development for many years to come.”

The authors note the expected completion of a tripartite regional free trade agreement by 2014 and the expected boost to intra-African trade, resulting in an expanded market of 26 African countries (representing more than half of the region’s economic output and population). At the same time, the declaration from the “South Africa Conference on Volunteer Action for Development” calls on “Governments of Southern African member states and other stakeholders to incorporate volunteering in their deliberations from Rio +20 and to recognize the transformational power as well as economic and social value of volunteering in achieving national development goals and regional priorities, which can be achieved by facilitating the creation of an enabling environment for volunteering to support, protect and empower volunteers.” This speaks directly to the urgent need to factor the social dimension into the regional integration agenda in the different African subregions.

This paper includes examples of the growth of volunteer service as a form of social capital that enhances cohesion and integration across three regions: southern, western, and eastern Africa. It further highlights civil society best practices and policy recommendations for increased volunteering in efforts to ensure positive peace, health, youth skills, assets and employment outcomes.

The importance of volunteering to development has been noted in recent United Nations consultations on the Rio+20 convening on sustainable development and the post-2015 development framework. As the U.N. reviews its Millennium Development Goals (MDG) process, Africa’s regional service initiatives offer vital lessons and strategies to further achieve the MDGs by December 2015, and to chart the way forward on the post-2015 development framework.

But how does volunteerism and civic service play out in sub-Saharan Africa? What are its institutional and non-institutional expressions? What are the benefits or impacts of volunteerism and civic service in society? Our specific purpose here is to provide evidence of the different manifestations and models of service, impact areas and range of issues in three African regions. In responding to these questions, this analysis incorporates data and observations from southern, western and eastern Africa.

In conclusion, we provide further collective insights and recommendations for the roles of the Africa Union and regional economic communities (RECs), youth, the international community, the private sector and civil society aimed at ensuring that volunteerism delivers on its promise and potential for impact on regional integration, youth development and peace.

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At a time of decelerating regional growth in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa—one of the continent’s leading economies—is facing the brunt of concurrent external and domestic growth shocks. During a Brookings event on April 14, 2016 moderated by Africa Growth Initiative Director Amadou Sy, South African minister of finance, the Honorable Pravin Gordhan, provided cause for encouragement, as he highlighted strategies that South Africa is implementing to reverse slowing growth trends, boost social cohesion, and springboard inclusive, sustainable development.

Throughout the event, Minister Gordhan emphasized that South Africa is refocusing its efforts on implementing homegrown policies to mitigate the effects of global and domestic shocks: “Our approach is not to keep pointing outside our borders and say, ‘That’s where the problem is.’ We've got our own challenges and difficulties, and potential and opportunities. And it's important to focus on those, and rally South Africans behind that set of initiatives so that we could go wherever we can in terms improving the situation.”

He began by explaining the major growth problems facing South Africa, including first-level structural challenges—consistent electricity supply and labor relations—as well as deeper structural challenges, for instance, reforming the oligopolistic sectors of its economy. To address these issues, he expanded on what collaborative, multi-stakeholder efforts would be necessary. Watch:

Contending with infrastructure needs—particularly energy and logistical, but also social, such as water and sanitation, health care, and educational facilities—will play a significant role in overcoming these aforementioned challenges. Minister Gordhan explained how the government aims to fill existing infrastructure gaps through innovative financing mechanisms. Watch:

Later in the event, Sy pressed Minister Gordhan on plans for implementation for the country’s ambitious goals. As an example, Minister Gordhan underlined “Operation Phakisa,” a results-driven approach to fast-track the implementation of initiatives to achieve development objectives. The government intends to use this methodology to address a number of social priorities, including unlocking the potential of South Africa’s coastlines and oceans. Watch:

Urbanization in South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa as a whole is widespread and increasing, creating a demand for governments to both maintain their infrastructure as well as harness their energy and human capacity. Cities, especially those in South Africa’s Gauteng Province (Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Ekurhuleni), will continue to be crucial engines of economic development if municipal governance systems effectively manage the region’s expected rapid urbanization in the years to come. Minister Gordhan discusses some of the lessons learned from the Gauteng city region. Watch:

In sum, referring to the confluence of adverse global conditions and internal problems currently affecting South Africa, Minister Gordhan stated, “Whenever you are in the middle of a storm it looks like the worst thing possible—but storms don’t last forever.” He did not doubt the ability of the South African people to weather and emerge stronger from the storm, offering: “Ultimately South Africans are hopeful, are optimistic and resilient.”

You can watch the full event here. 

Video

• Pravin Gordhan notes the major growth challenges in South Africa
• Pravin Gordhan on addressing South Africa’s infrastructure gaps
• Pravin Gordhan on implementation of South Africa's development objectives
• Pravin Gordhan on the vital role of cities in economic development in South Africa

       

South African court rules President Zuma violated the constitution

Thursday, South Africa’s highest court found President Zuma guilty of violating the constitution as he refused to reimburse the large sum of money spent on improvements to his personal home. Between 2010 and 2014, the home located in the president’s rural hometown of Nkandla received improvement which cost an estimated $23 million. The improvements include a chicken coop, an amphitheater, a swimming pool, and a helipad. President Zuma has stated that the improvements were necessary to ensure his security and should consequently be paid for with taxpayers’ money. In 2014, public prosecutor Thuli Madonsela ruled that the president should repay part of the taxpayers’ money spent on the improvements of his personal home. In refusing to do so, he violated the country’s constitution “by not complying with a decision by the public protector, the national watchdog.” The court has given the National Treasury 60 days to determine the sum the president must repay. The opposition has stated that they will seek Zuma’s impeachment.

In other South African news, this week, the rand strengthen against the U.S. dollar and reached its highest value since December 8, 2015, the day before President Zuma fired former Finance Minister Nhlanla Nene. The strengthening of the rand was coupled with the strengthening of other Emerging Markets currencies. This hike follows the statement from Federal Reserve Chair Janey Yellen, reiterating the importance to raise U.S. interest rates cautiously, amid risks in the global economy. Investors—weighting prospects of higher U.S. borrowing costs—were holding off in acquiring emerging-market assets.

Seventeen Angolan activists are sentenced to jail time

This week, 17 Angolan activists were sentenced to jail time for rebellion against the government of Jose Eduardo dos Santos. The sentences ranged from two years to eight and a half years. Last June, the activists were arrested during a book club meeting focusing on Gene Sharp’s book titled From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation—a book on nonviolence and resistance to repressive regimes. Monday, the activists were charged and sentenced with acts of rebellion, planning mass action of civil disobedience, and producing fake passports, among other charges. Amnesty International has accused the Angolan court of wrongfully convicting the activists and using the judicial system to “silence dissenting views.”

Later in the week, in response to the jailing of the young activists, the Portuguese branch of hacking group Anonymous claimed the shutdown of 20 government websites, including that of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, among others. In a Facebook post claiming the attack, the group states, “The real criminals are outside, defended by the capitalist system that increasingly spreads in the minds of the weak.” The functionality of the websites has been restored.  

Aid cuts due to disputed election rerun hit Tanzania

On Monday, March 28, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) withdrew $472 million in aid from the government of Tanzania after the result of the last weekend’s disputed presidential election rerun in the semi-autonomous archipelago of Zanzibar was announced. Incumbent President Ali Mohamed Shein of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party was declared the winner with 91.4 percent of the vote. However, the rerun was boycotted by the opposition Civic United Front party over the cancellation of last October’s election by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission. The commission claimed the October poll was fraudulent, while the opposition says the allegations of fraud were fabricated to thwart a victory by their candidate.

The MCC was planning a number of power and infrastructure projects in Tanzania, but its development assistance programming is conditional upon beneficiaries meeting certain standards of good governance. The MCC’s board of directors held a vote on Monday, in which they determined that Tanzania was no longer eligible to partner with the MCC given the election outcome. Although the loss of the MCC partnership is a sizable blow to the Tanzanian government, the Tanzanian finance minister appeared optimistic that the power projects would continue despite the MCC’s decision, as he stated: “We weren’t surprised at all because we were prepared for whatever the outcome. We will implement those projects using local sources of fund and the support of from other development partners.” Meanwhile, 10 out of the country’s 14 key western donors withdrew general budget support to Tanzania over the contested election.

       

       

Most sub-Saharan African countries have long had to rely on foreign assistance or loans from international financial institutions to supply part of their foreign currency needs and finance part of their domestic investment, given their low levels of domestic saving. But now many of them, for the first time, are able to borrow in international financial markets, selling so-called eurobonds, which are usually denominated in dollars or euros. 

The sudden surge in the demand for international sovereign bonds issued by countries in a region that contains some of the world’s poorest countries is due to a variety of factors—including rapid growth and better economic policies in the region, high commodity prices, and low global interest rates. Increased global liquidity as well as investors’ diversification needs, at a time when the correlation between many global assets has increased, has also helped increase the attractiveness of the so-called “frontier” markets, including those in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, the issuance of international sovereign bonds is part of a number of African countries’ strategies to restructure their debt, finance infrastructure investments, and establish sovereign benchmarks to help develop the sub-sovereign and corporate bond market. The development of the domestic sovereign bond market in many countries has also help strengthen the technical capacity of finance ministries and debt management offices to issue international debt.

Whether the rash of borrowing by sub-Saharan governments (as well as a handful of corporate entities in the region) is sustainable over the medium to long term, however, is open to question. The low interest rate environment is set to change at some point—both raising borrowing costs for the countries and reducing investor interest. In addition, oil prices are falling, which makes it harder for oil-producing countries to service or refinance their loans. In the medium term, heady economic growth may not continue if debt proceeds are only mostly used for current spending, and debt is not adequately managed.

Download the full paper (PDF) »

       

The Central African Republic (CAR), a landlocked country roughly the size of Texas, has endured a nearly constant state of political crisis since its independence from France in 1960. In fact, in the post-colonial era, the CAR has experienced only 10 years of rule under a democratically elected leader, Ange-Félix Patassé, from 1993 to 2003. Four of the CAR’s past five presidents have been removed from power through unconstitutional means, and each of these transitions has been marred by political instability and violence. Fragile attempts to build democratic political institutions and establish the rule of law have been undermined by coups, mutinies, and further lawlessness, making cycles of violence tragically the norm in the CAR.

The country’s current crisis (2012–present) stems from political tensions and competition for power between the predominantly Muslim Séléka rebel coalition and the government of President Francois Bozizé, as well as unresolved grievances from the CAR’s last conflict (2006–2007). Since the Séléka’s overthrow of the government in March 2013 and concurrent occupation of large areas of the country, the conflict has evolved to encompass an ethno-religious dimension: So-called Christian defense militias named the anti-balaka emerged to counter the Séléka alliance, but in effect sought revenge against the CAR’s Muslim minority (about 15 percent of the population), including civilians. During a March 2014 trip to the Central African Republic, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay remarked that “the inter-communal hatred remains at a terrifying level,” as reports of atrocities and pre-genocidal indicators continued to surface. Even today, horrific crimes against civilians are still being committed at a frightening frequency in one of the poorest countries in the world: The CAR has a per capita GNI of $588 and a ranking of 185 out of 187 on 2013’s United Nations Human Development Index.

Amid the escalating insecurity in 2013, African Union (AU), French, and European forces were deployed under the auspices of the African-led International Support Mission in Central Africa (MISCA) to disarm militant groups and protect civilians at a critical juncture in December, and their efforts contributed to the relative stabilization of the capital in early 2014. Meanwhile, in January 2014, Séléka leaders relinquished power to a transitional government led by former mayor of Bangui, Catherine Samba-Panza, who was then tasked with preparing for national elections and establishing security throughout the country. In September 2014, the United Nations incorporated the MISCA forces into the larger Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and then in 2015 extended and reinforced its presence through 2016, in response to the ongoing violence. Despite the international military intervention and efforts of the transitional authorities to address the pervasive insecurity, reprisal killings continue and mobile armed groups still freely attack particularly remote, rural areas in the central and western regions of the country. The unguarded, porous borders have also allowed rebel forces and criminal elements to flee into distant areas of neighboring countries, including Chad and South Sudan, in order to prepare their attacks and return to the CAR.

This paper will explore the origins of the complex emergency affecting the CAR, with a particular focus on the economic causes and potential economic strategies for its resolution. It will begin by providing an overview of the core issues at stake and enumerating the driving and sustaining factors perpetuating the violence. Then it will discuss the consequences of the conflict on the humanitarian, security, political, and economic landscape of the CAR. Finally, it will highlight strategies for addressing the underlying issues and persisting tensions in the CAR to begin building a durable peace, arguing that the national authorities and international partners adopt a holistic approach to peace building that prioritizes inclusive economic recovery given the economic roots of the crisis.

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While the South African labor market faces many large challenges, some more subtle trends might also be developing that undermine the country’s growth. Yes, the current level of unemployment stands at 24 percent. True, school dropout rates remain high: Only 50 percent of students will make it to the last year of high school, which means that the number of skilled workers in the country remains low. In addition, income inequality in South Africa is an overwhelming obstacle—with the country having one of the highest Gini coefficients (a statistical tool commonly used to measure inequality) in the world—and has been slowing its fight against poverty.

In their recent paper, Demographic, employment, and wage trends in South Africa, Haroon Bhorat, Karmen Naidoo, Morné Oosthuizen, and Kavisha Pillay examine important, perhaps precarious, trends in South African employment, such as the combination of South Africa’s weak educational system and labor demand biased toward skilled workers and the significant rise in temporary employment over full-time positions. However, the authors argue that perhaps the most interesting is the spike in public sector employment and the subsequent development of a new segment of the labor market, what they call a “new elite”: the unionized public sector employee.

The shift to services and the public sector

Like so many of sub-Saharan African countries, South Africa’s labor makeup (as well as contributions to GDP) has swiftly been shifting towards the services sector, especially since 2001. Table 1 clearly shows the dramatic shift in labor towards community, social, and personal (CSP) services and financial services: These two areas accounted for 73 percent of the shift in employment between 2001 and 2012 (Column 3). 

Employment Shares            Share of Change (ΔEi/ΔE) (a)
	2001	2012	(2001-2012)
Primary	0.15	0.07	-0.28
Agriculture	0.1	0.04	-0.2
Mining	0.05	0.02	-0.08
Secondary	0.2	0.21	0.21
Manufacturing	0.14	0.12	0.04
Utilities	0.008	0.008	0.004
Construction	0.05	0.07	0.16
Tertiary	0.63	0.71	1.08
Trade	0.21	0.21	0.2
Transport	0.04	0.6	0.11
Financial	0.09	0.13	0.31
CSPS	0.17	0.22	0.42
Private households	0.09	0.08	0.04
Total	1	1	1

Note: 1. CSPS stands for community, social, and personal services, which is predominantly made up of public sector employment.⁾

2.^(a) The ratio of the percentage change in the share of employment to the overall change in employment over the period (share of change in employment). This measure shows, within each broad sector, where the sources of employment growth are. For example, employment in the tertiary sector is 1.08 times (or 108 percent of) the level of employment in 2001, which is the sum of the changes for all the industries within this sub-sector. CSPS then is the greatest contributor to employment growth in the tertiary sector.

Source: Bhorat et al. (2014) using PALMS dataset (2012).

Importantly, the authors emphasize, the CSP sector, which accounted for 42 percent of this shift, is mostly made up of public sector jobs—hinting that expansion of the public sector has contributed to this trend. The share of public sector employment rose to 17.5 percent by the end of 2014 from 14.2 percent in 2004. In addition, they note that the largest expansion of the public sector came in 2009, just after the global financial crisis, showing that the public sector was more capable of absorbing” excess unskilled and medium-skilled labor at times of economic and labor market distress.”

Another important trend the authors point to within the shift to the public sector between 2008 and 2014 is that a great number of jobs in which employment grew quickly involve unskilled workers (such as sweepers, farmhands and laborers, helpers and cleaners, construction and maintenance laborers, and garbage collectors) and medium-skilled workers (such as police and traffic officers, institution and home-based care workers, prison guards, cooks, and childcare workers) (Figure 1). For a deeper analysis of South African labor market’s skill needs, see the full paper.

Figure 1: Share of change in public sector jobs by detailed occupation (2008 Q1-2014 Q4)

Notes: These occupations are the largest 42 public sector occupations, making up 80 percent of total employment in the public sector in 2014, and 97 percent of the change in the number of public sector jobs over the 2008-14 period.

Source: StatsSA QLFS 2008Q1; StatsSA QLFS 2014Q4; own calculations.

From these trends, the authors infer that the South African government’s Expanded Public Works Program (EPWP)—which “creates jobs through government-funded infrastructure projects, through its non-profit organization and community work program, as well as through its public environment and culture programs”—has played a major part in the expansion of the public sector.

Interestingly, though, the authors also find that overall the public sector has a bigger proportion of high-skilled employees than the private sector), though, between 2008 and 2013 the public sector barely saw a change in its proportion of high-skilled workers. Rather, it experienced its largest growth in the medium- and low-skilled jobs, as noted in Figure 1. They note that this phenomenon suggests that “the state [is] able to absorb excess unskilled and medium-skilled labor at times of economic and labor market distress.” The private sector’s proportion of high-skilled workers, on the other hand, grew by 25 percent. There is then, they say, a “mismatch” between the supply and demand of South Africa’s labor market when it comes to high-skilled workers.

After exploring this trend, the authors also delve into the demographic differences between public and private sector workers. For example, they find that the average public sector worker is older (41 versus 38) and likely to have a higher educational level on average. There are more women in the public sector—52 percent compared to 44 percent. There are also more Africans—77 percent in the public sector (up from 72 percent in 2008) and 66 percent in the private sector (unchanged). The authors argue that these two statistics demonstrate that public sector has “transformed” its labor force at a faster pace since both are groups that historically have been marginalized in the South African labor market.

The impact of unions in the South African labor market

The public sector in South Africa also has a higher unionization rate: 69.2 percent compared to the private sector’s 24.4 percent rate in 2013). As public sector employment has grown, the authors say, so has its proportion of workers in unions. Unions in South Africa are influential, as the authors note, “Powerful labor unions are often associated with creating a wage premium for their members, given their ability to mobilize industrial action and negotiate in favor of their members during times of wage negotiations.”

Indeed, this seems to be the case. Past studies have found that bargaining power—as part of a bargaining council or a union—presents a wage premium.  The authors have similar results: The average public sector worker makes 11,668 rand ($1,209) per month compared to an average private sector employee (7,822 rand per month). Most importantly, though, when the authors disaggregate based on participation in a union, they actually find that, among non-unionized workers, the private sector employee actually receives a higher wage than the public sector worker, by about 952 rand per month. This finding, they say, suggests that the public sector premium might be tied to public sector union membership.

The authors admit a caveat: Public sector union workers tend to be white, older, and better educated than their non-unionized public sector counterparts. In fact, non-union public sector workers are 80 percent African and 10 percent colored[1] (two groups more likely to be under the EPWP). In addition, non-union occupations are usually less skilled (elementary occupations, service and sales occupations, and technical and associate professional occupations). However, they emphasize, “Ultimately though, the wage distributions above suggest that, at least in terms of earnings, a dual labor market may indeed be prevalent in the South African labor market.”  (For the authors’ full quantitative analysis, including an examination of how this trend interacts with state-owned enterprises and temporary workers, see the full paper.)

Thus, they argue, a “new labor elite” is forming.

Note: The African Lions project is a collaboration among United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), the University of Cape Town’s Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU), and the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative, that provides an analytical basis for policy recommendations and value-added guidance to domestic policymakers in the fast-growing economies of Africa, as well as for the broader global community interested in the development of the region. The six papers, covering Mozambique, Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, explore the key constraints facing African economies as they attempt to maintain a long-run economic growth and development trajectory.

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[1] In this paper, “African” is used to refer to people classified by the apartheid state as “native,” “Bantu,” or “black.” “Colored” refers mainly to people in the Western Cape province, and is an ethnic label for people of mixed ethnic origin who possess ancestry from Europe, Asia, and various Khoisan and Bantu tribes of Southern Africa.

       

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Barack Obama’s presidency has witnessed widespread change throughout Africa. His four trips there, spanning seven countries, reflect his belief in the continent’s potential and importance. African countries face many challenges that span issues of trade, investment, and development, as well as security and stability. With President Obama’s second term coming to an end, it is important to begin to reflect on his legacy and how his administration has helped frame the future of Africa.

On July 19, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings hosted a discussion on Africa policy. Matthew Carotenuto, professor at St. Lawrence University and author of “Obama and Kenya: Contested Histories and the Politics of Belonging” (Ohio University Press, 2016) discussed his research in the region. He was joined by Sarah Margon, the Washington director of Human Rights Watch. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O'Hanlon partook in and moderated the discussion.

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• President Obama’s role in African security and development

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• President Obama’s role in African security and development

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160719_us_africa_transcript

       

In 2010, Africa’s leaders gathered at the African Union in Addis Ababa to celebrate 50 years of independence. In Washington, President Barack Obama marked the occasion by hosting a town hall meeting of young African leaders from nearly 50 countries.

What looked at the time to be a curious way to mark a significant moment in the continent’s history was in fact the genesis of what could become the most innovative Obama initiative in Africa. 

When asked during the session by a young woman from Mali why he had convened such a meeting, Obama said that he wanted “to communicate directly to people who may not assume that the old ways of doing business in Africa are the ways that Africa has to do business.” The president added that he wanted the young leaders to meet each other, to develop a network of like-minded people working for a better future, and to reinforce each other’s goals and aspirations.

That town hall marked the launch of the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI). Over the next two years, YALI engaged Africa’s youth, principally through events coordinated by U.S. embassies throughout the region. Then, during a speech in 2013 in South Africa, Obama announced the establishment of the Washington Fellowship. Subsequently renamed the Mandela Washington Fellowship (MWF), the program initially was designed to bring 500 young leaders to the U.S. for six weeks of executive leadership training at U.S. universities and four days in Washington to meet with each other, leaders in the administration, and to have a town hall with the president. In 2016, the program was increased to 1,000 fellows.

The fellows

When USAID put the application online for the first class of fellows in December 2013, the response was extraordinary. Nearly 50,000 applied for 500 slots. Similar numbers have applied for the two subsequent classes. Over the course of three classes of fellows, there have been 119,000 applications for 2,000 openings.

The U.S. government kept the qualifications relatively simple. Young men and women from each of sub-Saharan Africa’s 49 countries are eligible to participate, including from countries on which the U.S. has sanctions, such as Sudan, Eritrea, and Zimbabwe. Applicants generally have to be between 25 and 35, proficient in English, possess a proven record of leadership, and have a commitment to return to the continent. Fellows apply for one of three tracks: business and entrepreneurship, civic leadership, or public management.

A review of the program found that in the first cohort, the gender split was 50/50, nearly 40 percent owned a business, and a similar number ran a nonprofit organization. Eighty percent of the class had never traveled to the U.S., and more than half grew up outside capital cities.

The key element of the fellows’ program occurs during the specialized six weeks of leadership training that takes place at nearly 40 universities across the U.S. At the universities, the fellows, in cohorts of 20, are exposed not only to programs tailored specifically for their interests, but to other young Africans who share a passion for making a difference in their communities and countries. For most fellows, meeting other young Africans from different countries is one of YALI’s key benefits, as is forging genuine ties with Americans and U.S. institutions.

The narratives of the 2,000 Mandela Washington Fellows illustrate some of the most compelling stories and realities on the African continent today.

Importantly, the MWF program is cost-efficient, as the average cost of a fellow coming to the U.S. is $24,000. At least half is paid by the participating U.S. universities and a host of companies, including Coca-Cola, IBM, the MasterCard Foundation, AECOM, Microsoft, Intel, McKinsey & Company, GE, and Procter & Gamble, who have made grants or in-kind contributions to the fellowships and the YALI program.

YALI’s broader impact

YALI is having an impact on its participants. An initial assessment by IREX, USAID’s implementing partner, found that over 80 percent of male and female fellows who owned businesses reported an increase in earnings in the year following their fellowship in the U.S. Business fellows also leveraged more than $3 million in new sources of support through loans, grants, equity financing, and in-kind contributions.

Fellows who participated in the civic leadership training reported that the impact of their nonprofit organizations nearly tripled to over 1.6 million beneficiaries, with an average contact per fellow increasing from less than 3,000 to just fewer than 15,000 beneficiaries.

Over 80 percent of the fellows reported that they remained in contact with other fellows during the course of the year, and 70 percent indicated they continued to be involved with their host university. The ongoing connectivity is helped by the three regional conferences in Africa that USAID convenes for program alumni, more than 200 internships on the continent—most sponsored by corporate partners—as well as funding for fellows to attend conferences and other programs after they have returned to Africa.

As part of YALI’s broader reach, USAID created four Regional Leadership Centers (RLCs)—in South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, and Senegal—that offer distance and in-class leadership training to about 3,500 participants annually.

The YALI Network (Figure 1) was established in 2013 as a means to stay connected online to the tens of thousands of young Africans who applied for the fellowship but were not selected as well as others interested in the initiative. The network, which provides access to global leaders in relevant fields and opportunities for collaboration on a range of activities, has attracted nearly 250,000 members. Participants in the RLCs and the YALI Network can earn certificates in various courses, including climate change, women’s empowerment, and the election processs.

Figure 1.

Source: YALI Network

YALI, of course is not without its challenges. Recruiting from 49 countries can be exceedingly difficult, and the quality of Skype and telephone connectivity can vary significantly, which impacts the interview process. Due to the high volume of applicants, embassies have learned that they need more time to review applications. Extra efforts have been needed to accommodate fellows with disabilities. YALI’s biggest challenge, though, is winning the support of African leaders who generally have yet to embrace the program due to its unilateral launch.

What’s next?

YALI is a cost-efficient and effective way to invest in Africa’s future, especially as it concerns deepening trade and commerce with the region, strengthening democratic institutions and empowering civil society. If the next administration continues to invest in the program, YALI could become an enduring legacy program of the Obama administration much like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the President’s Emergency Program on AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) are, respectively, for the Clinton and Bush administrations. Over time, YALI inevitably would contribute to a new generation of transformative African leadership and deeper ties between the U.S. and Africa in a way that few other programs do.

       

Over the past two decades, Ghana’s economy experienced an average annual growth rate of 5.8 percent, and became a low-middle income country in 2007. Though Ghana’s average annual employment growth between 1993 and 2013 has been higher than sub-Saharan Africa’s—3.7 percent versus 3.0 percent—its overall employment growth has not kept up with its economic growth. Notably, Ghana’s impressive economic growth has largely stemmed from crude oil exports, mining, and financial intermediation—all sectors and subsectors in which labor absorption is low. Given these trends, Ghana’s ability to transform its growth gains into better livelihoods for its citizens is being challenged.

In their paper, Understanding Ghana’s growth success story and job creation challenges, Ernest Aryeetey and William Baah-Boateng examine the sustainability of the high growth Ghana has experienced over the last two decades and advise Ghanaian policymakers to rethink their growth strategy.

For a more in-depth look at these and related topics, such as labor productivity, you can read the full paper here.

Ghana’s labor trends

Like in many other sub-Saharan African countries, the agriculture sector is the largest employer in Ghana, though its employment share is decreasing from 61.1 percent in 1984 to 44.7 percent in 2013. In addition, while industry’s employment share has slightly grown from 13.7 percent to 14.6 percent over the same period (and the manufacturing subsector has decreased from 10.9 percent to 9.1 percent), services has grown from 25 percent to 40.9 percent—leading to what the authors refer as a “missing middle.”

As noted above, the authors emphasize that the sectors that have been driving Ghana’s growth are not labor-intensive, namely mining, oil extraction, and finance. While labor has been moving from agriculture to services, the authors note that the trend “may not reflect a structural and productive transformation,” largely because the jobs created in the services sector are mostly informal and have low productivity. Indeed, services sector maintained the lowest annual average growth of labor productivity between 1992 and 2013. As part of these shifts, informal employment—which represented 88 percent of Ghanaian employment in 2013—grew by 3.7 percent on average while formal employment grew by only 2.6 percent during this period.

Unemployment in Ghana remains low, at 5.2 percent, though has experienced significant swings from 2.8 percent in 1984 to 10.4 percent in 2000 to 3.1 percent in 2006. The authors note, though, that these numbers might be deceptive due to the high numbers of informal, vulnerable, and “discouraged workers” (those who are jobless and available for work but fail to make the effort to seek work for various reasons) in Ghana. In fact, they state that, in 2006, after accounting for discouraged workers the unemployment rate more than doubled from 3.1 percent to 6.5 percent.

Vulnerable employment and the working poor

Despite Ghana’s relatively low unemployment rate, many laborers still live in poverty: According to the authors, 22 percent of working people are poor. Many others work in “vulnerable employment”—which the authors define as “a measure of people employed under relatively precarious circumstances indicated by their status in employment. It consists of own account and contributing family work that are less likely to have formal work arrangements, access to benefit or social protection programs, and are more ‘at risk’ to economic cycles (ILO 2009).” This definition is opposed to “productive employment,” or “paid employment and self-employed with employees.” Vulnerable workers are usually found in the informal sector and tend to have lower earnings—a situation exacerbating the ever-widening earnings gap and growing income inequality.

According to the authors, working poverty is closely linked with vulnerable employment, for which seven of 10 jobs in Ghana qualify (Table 1).  Some policies, which could combat working poverty, have been somewhat ineffective in reducing poverty: For example, Ghana has been consistent in raising its minimum wage, keeping it largely above the rate of inflation, but this policy tends to only affect those in the formal sector, leaving out workers in the informal sector. This trend has also increased Ghana’s inequality: The Gini coefficient increased from 35.4 percent in 1987/88 to 42.3 percent in 2013.

Table 1: Quantity and quality of employment (percent of employed)

Economic sector	1984	1992	1999	2000	2006	2010	2013
Employment-to-population (ratio, SSA)	—	64.3	64.1	64.1	64.9	65.2	65.5
Employment-to-population (ratio, Ghana)	80.2	72.9	73.9	66.9	67.7	67.4	75.4
Economic sector
Agriculture	61.1	62.2	55.0	53.1	54.9	41.6	44.7
Industry	13.7	10.0	14.0	15.5	14.2	15.4	14.6
Manufacturing (part of industry)	10.9	8.2	11.7	10.7	11.4	10.7	9.1
Service	25.2	27.8	31.0	31.5	30.9	43.0	40.9
Institutional sector
Public	10.2	8.4	6.2	7.2	5.7	6.4	5.9
Private	6.0	6.1	7.5	8.9	7.0	7.4	6.1
Informal	83.8	85.5	86.1	83.9	87.3	86.2	88.0
Type of employment
Paid employees	16.2	16.8	13.8	16.0	17.5	18.2	22.5
Self-employment	69.6	81.3	68.7	73.4	59.5	60.8	52.6
Contributing family worker	12.5	1.9	17.2	6.8	20.4	11.6	22.3
Other	1.7	—	0.3	3.8	2.6	9.4	2.6
Quality of employment
Gainful/productive employment*	20.9	—	—	21.2	22.0	23.1	28.7
Vulnerable employment**	77.4	82.5	80.8	74.9	75.4	67.5	68.7
Working poverty	—	48.7	35.4	—	25.6	—	22.3

Notes: * Gainful/productive employment comprises paid employment and self-employed with employees.

** Vulnerable employment comprises own account and contribution family work.

Source: Computed from Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) 3, 4, 5, and 6; Population Census 1984, 2000, and 2010.

Overall, though, Ghana has made great strides. Vulnerable employment has been declining, and productive employment has risen, gains the author attributes to the drop in working poverty—down from 48.7 percent in 1992 to 22.3 percent two decades later (Table 1). However, they also hint that these improvements could have been even larger had job growth been concentrated in paid employment and self-employed with employees.

The skills gap

In their paper, the authors posit that job creation has occurred in less productive sectors due to a lack of skills and education in the workforce—and skill-intensive jobs/vacancies are instead getting filled by foreign laborers. While the proportion of the labor force with no formal education has significantly fallen from 44.1 percent in 1992 to 25.6 percent in 2013, post-primary education rates have barely risen—from 5.7 percent to 12.1 percent during that same period for secondary, vocational, and technical education. Tertiary is even less—from 2 percent to 5.4 percent. Ghanaian universities have not been training engineers, scientists, and technical workers that could increase the productivity and grow the industrial sector. A shortage of technical and vocational skills also limits this sector. Thus, the authors note, employers are forced to look outside of the country to find the workers with the skills required to do the job. The authors emphasize:

[P]roductive structural economic transformation hinges on the level and quality of education and labour skills. A highly skilled, innovative, and knowledgeable workforce constitutes a key ingredient in the process of structural economic transformation, and as productive sectors apply more complex production technologies and research and development activities increase the demand for education and skills. However, the observed weak human capital base does not provide a strong foundation for structural economic transformation of Ghana.

At the same time, the more educated in Ghana also tend to be more likely to be unemployed due to limited job creation for them in the formal sector. In 2013, the unemployment rates for those with secondary education and above (including tertiary) was over 6 percent. The unemployment rate for those with basic education or less was under 3.3 percent. The authors suggest that this trend is due to the fact that those with less education are more likely to take an informal job, while more educated laborers struggle to find jobs in the small formal sector.

Recommendations

Though Ghana has outperformed many of its sub-Saharan neighbors in terms of job creation and growth, its challenges with declining manufacturing, high informal employment, and low education attainment endanger its momentum. To tackle these obstacles, the authors recommend:

1. Adjust the priorities of the growth strategy to promote manufacturing, and reconsider the goal of economic growth for growth’s sake by acknowledging that sustainable growth must be coupled with generation of productive and high-earning jobs for all.
2. Create a manufacturing and business-friendly environment by addressing the country’s high interest rates, high taxes, and chronic energy problems, among others.
3. Enact policies to enhance the high-productivity, high-labor-absorbing agricultural sector, such as improving agricultural extension, develop irrigation plans, among others.
4. Develop policies to increase the number of secondary school graduates as well as students studying science, technology, engineering, and math.

For further discussion and recommendations, read the full paper here.

Note: The African Lions project is a collaboration among United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), the University of Cape Town’s Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU), and the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative, that provides an analytical basis for policy recommendations and value-added guidance to domestic policymakers in the fast-growing economies of Africa, as well as for the broader global community interested in the development of the region. The six papers, covering Mozambique, Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, explore the key constraints facing African economies as they attempt to maintain a long-run economic growth and development trajectory.

      

Event Information

Sub-Saharan Africa’s growth performance over the last decade has been astounding, though they mask underlying job creation challenges facing policymakers. The unemployment rate for sub-Saharan Africa remained fairly stable over the period. In 2015, it stood at a slightly high 7.4 percent, compared with over 9 percent in the European Union and 5.3 percent in the United States. However, the figures on vulnerable employment and the working poor[1] in Africa tell a different story—averaging 69.9 percent and 64.0 percent in 2015, respectively. Indeed, of those who are employed, four in five workers are not in the wage economy, but in the informal sector, with no access to workers’ benefits, social protection, and job reliability. In addition, many workers—both formal and informal—are underemployed or overqualified.

The conventional knowledge of structural transformation—labor migration from agriculture to high-productivity, labor-intensive industry—has been turned on its head in Africa. Instead, Africans are moving to jobs in the services sector, which some experts argue is a less productive path. Then again, unique opportunities in African digital jobs are opening up doors the world has never seen before.

The need for decent job creation in Africa also provides both threats and opportunities to the United States. For example, a lack of viable jobs could make the turn to crime, violence, and even extremism—with the promise of steady income from these activities—more appealing to economically marginalized individuals, especially among the youth. Furthermore, job creation boosts the growth of the middle class, expanding the base of consumers for American products, at the same time creating new, stronger trade partners able to supply goods to American consumers. Already, the United States and other countries are creating a myriad of programs to boost entrepreneurship on the continent.

On Monday, June 27, the Brookings Institution’s Africa Growth Initiative and the Congressional African Staff Association hosted an event to discuss why Africa is struggling to create the quantity and quality of jobs it needs and what policies—both African and U.S.—can turn that trend around. Ernest Danjuma Enebi, founder and managing partner of The Denda Group, moderated the discussion. Panelists included Dr. Eyerusalem Siba, research fellow at the Africa Growth Initiative; Hassanatu Blake, co-founding director and president of the non-profit Focal Point Global; and Nicolas Cook, a specialist in African Affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service.

The discussion touched on multiple key points, including what Africa’s unique structural transformation path means for the region’s employment landscape; how development partner efforts affect job growth on the continent; how Africa can avoid a potential “demographic timebomb” of youth unemployment and instead benefit from a “demographic dividend”; and how the United States is addressing the challenges these trends pose for both the continent and the U.S.

Enebi began the dialogue with a Q&A with Siba on an overview of African economic trends, youth unemployment, and formal sector jobs on the continent.

Blake argued that the high youth unemployment is due in part to the region’s struggling educational systems where Poor quality education leads to poor grades on periodic tests and thus students are being pushed out of school, she said. Once out of the formal schooling system, they enter the workforce underprepared without the skills they need to succeed in the job market.

Blake continued to argue this point through a description of Harambee, a private South African organization that works towards improving prospects of youth employment. The program has placed over 20,000 youth into jobs over the past 5 years by testing job applicants on literacy and mathematical ability and matching them with employers. Harambee addresses a broader skills mismatch that Blake argued is holding back job creation. More broadly, Blake argued, public-private partnerships must be created to help youth find jobs and employers find employees.

A major theme of the discussion was that a shift away from aid and towards the support of labor-intensive industries and enabling environments for business can spur job creation.

Of course, causes of unemployment are largely driven by the demand-side factors, acknowledged the panelists. A major theme of the discussion was that a shift away from aid and towards the support of labor-intensive industries and enabling environments for business can spur job creation. Indeed, Cook discussed the importance of the mantra “trade not aid” in addressing these issues, as there are many large American firms with an economic interest in expanding to Africa; however this interest is miniscule compared to Africa’s trade with the rest of the world. Increasing global investments in Africa is, thus, a key part of any job creation, he emphasized.

Cook also touched on global relationships with Africa. He noted that only 1 percent of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) goes to Africa, and only one percent of American trade is with Africa. Now, several economic development programs, like the U.S. Electrify Africa Act of 2015 and the USAID Power Africa Initiative, exist but are in need of continued funding. To boost trade, the United States has launched the Trade Africa program and has established trade hubs in western, eastern, and southern Africa.

Investments in infrastructure, greater participation in the export market, interventions on improving managerial and marketing skills and the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) to access global markets can help clear the way for greater job creation.

Siba agreed with the idea of a focus on trade and FDI as major factors in job creation. In fact, she shifted the discussion toward a focus on investments in supporting industry because, as she emphasized, the biggest predictor of business performance including job creation is export market participation. Investments in infrastructure, greater participation in the export market, interventions on improving managerial and marketing skills and the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) to access global markets can help clear the way for greater job creation, she said.

There are clearly many opportunities for foreign investors to support African industry, but challenges to development remain due to poor infrastructure and a lackluster environment for business.

Blake agreed that ICTs and infrastructure hold great potential for spurring job growth, but pointed out that ICT and infrastructure investment “look different” in different parts of the continent. In some countries in central Africa that she worked with and Cameroon, she suggested, ICTs are not always the best vehicle to drive job growth due to the prohibitive cost of ICT devices and emphasized that keeping local conditions in mind when exploring potential job-creating programs and investments is essential for success.

Cook then pivoted to a discussion on the importance of small enterprises and technology in boosting job growth. He pointed out the importance of WhatsApp as a new means of communication that has helped spur job growth and productivity, and the mobile money transfer platform m-Pesa as a key component of the increase in micro-lending in Kenya. Offered by Safaricom, Kenya’s largest mobile network, M-Pesa allows mobile phone users to transfer money, pay bills, and deposit money. The World Bank highlighted the service in 2009, concluding that “The affordability of the service has been key in opening the door to formal financial services for Kenya’s poor.” The service has also allowed financing of micro-enterprise to take off, but Cook acknowledged that ascertaining the precise impact of these technologies on job growth is very difficult due to the scarcity of data.

The small credit card market and rarely used banking services exclude a wide percentage of the population from the financial system. The widespread presence of mobile phones has now opened up this system.

Fifty to 80 percent of new jobs in Africa are created by small businesses that are not likely to survive more than five years.

Siba elaborated on Cook’s description of the vital role of small businesses in creating jobs on the continent. She argued that any job creation programs in Africa should focus on solving the challenges of small businesses in job creation because they dominate the market structure. Unfortunately, at the moment, small businesses there are not robust. Fifty to 80 percent of new jobs in Africa are created by small businesses that are not likely to survive more than five years. Since small and medium enterprises comprise over 90 percent of all firms in sub-Saharan Africa, this volatility affects the whole economy. As a result, any potential solutions must take this market structure into account. In addition, as Siba suggested, increased focus must be paid to the integration of African businesses into regional markets and domestic and global value chains so that small and medium enterprises have more opportunities to grow.

The discussion concluded with a focus on opportunities for growth: Governments should focus on processing raw commodities for local uses, like timber, coffee, and cocoa; small- and medium-sized enterprises should be scaled up with stronger access to financing and skill development; governments should pursue partnerships with private companies to address the skills mismatch; and education funding should be deliberately targeted to address missing skills, correctly processed, and carefully monitored. Continued job creation in Africa depends on it.

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Editor's Note: In this blog, Vera Songwe introduces the African Leadership Transitions Tracker, a new interactive that aims to start a broader conversation about leadership transitions and what they mean for the region and beyond.

On March 28, Nigerians voters will go to the polls to participate in their nation’s fifth election since the military handed over power to civilians in 1999. As Africa’s largest economy and an important oil exporter, this election comes at an important time for Nigeria and for the continent as a whole.

Events around this election have generated significant debate around electoral and voting processes on the continent such as the importance of a constitution, the cost, the frequency and level of contestability, and the power of incumbency in African elections. However, amid this dialogue, much less consideration has been devoted to where this election stands within the continuum of leader transitions Nigeria has experienced since it first gained independence in 1960. Nigerians have, in fact, gone through 18 leadership transitions in the last 55 years, including the untimely death of former President Umaru Masu Yar’Adua in May 2010, the multiparty elections that brought President Olusegun Obasanjo to power in 1999, and the first presidential elections that brought President Shegu Shagari to power in 1979. Nigeria’s high rate of leadership changeover should not, however, be considered illustrative of Africa’s overall story. On the contrary, a high level of diversity exists among countries in the region on this measure, with countries like Angola having had only one leadership transition since it achieved its independence in 1975, and Benin, on the other hand, undergoing an election, coup, or other type of leadership transition nearly every two years in the country’s 55-year post-independence history. However, overall in Africa today there are more peaceful and competitive leadership transitions than there have been over the last six decades. This contestability process is gaining ground across the continent, and while coups d’etat appear to be fading revolutions are gaining ground where competition has not taken hold.

The recent passing of Singapore’s 30 year-long leader Lee Kwan Yew credited with having taken Singapore from a third world country to a fully developed country in less than a generation, has brought the question of leadership and leadership transitions back to the fore. A 2010 report by Michael Spence’s Growth Commission heralds Lee Kuan Yew as the hero of Singapore’s growth story. The African Leadership Transition Tracker hopes to launch a dialogue on what the frequency, nature, and scope of leadership transitions mean for African countries’ growth, stability, and development trajectory overall. Moreover, how have transition trends in the region changed from the time of the African founding fathers and the tumultuous years of the 1960s to the present day?

As an initial step towards thinking this question through, Brookings’s African Growth Initiative is today launching the African Leadership Transitions Tracker as a resource both to inform readers about African political history and a tool to initiate analysis on what leadership changeover might mean (or not mean) for development. The Transitions Tracker specifically records all changes that have occurred at the head-of-state level in every African country between the end of the colonial period and the present day. We are hoping that recording this information and presenting it visually (and as a downloadable data set) will help start a broader conversation and support additional work on these issues. Brookings will update this data on a regular basis, and we welcome your feedback as we further refine this interactive. Moreover, the information we present today is by no means the full story—key variables are needed to complement this study, including, for example, the various political party affiliations of leaders within a country or cross tabulations with resources that seek to measure the level of citizen participation and engagement in these transitions. However, as further analysis takes place, we are hoping that the African Leadership Transitions Tracker will enrich dialogue about developments occurring in the region and place current news on elections or other types of changeover events within the broader context of the continent’s leadership story overall.  Over the next few months, we will be running a series of articles based on this data.  

Special thanks to Ehui Adovor, graduate student at George Washington University and the many AGI research assistants, analysts, and program staff that have supported this project, including Jessica Pugliese, Brandon Routman, Christina Golubski, Andrew Westbury, and Amy Copley.

      

John Kerry to travel to Kenya and Djibouti next week

Exactly one year after U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s last multi-country tour of sub-Saharan Africa, he is preparing for another visit to the continent—to Kenya and Djibouti from May 3 to 5, 2015. In Kenya, Kerry and a U.S. delegation including Linda Thomas-Greenfield, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, will engage in talks with senior Kenyan officials on U.S.-Kenya security cooperation, which the U.S. formalized through its Security Governance Initiative (SGI) at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit last August. Over the past several years, the U.S. has increased its military assistance to Kenya and African Union (AU) troops to combat the Somali extremist group al-Shabab and has conducted targeted drone strikes against the group’s top leaders.  In the wake of the attack on Kenya’s Garissa University by al-Shabab, President Obama pledged U.S. support for Kenya, and Foreign Minister Amina Mohamed has stated that Kenya is currently seeking additional assistance from the U.S. to strengthen its military and intelligence capabilities.

Kerry will also meet with a wide array of leaders from Kenya’s private sector, civil society, humanitarian organizations, and political opposition regarding the two countries’ “common goals, including accelerating economic growth, strengthening democratic institutions, and improving regional security,” according to a U.S. State Department spokesperson. These meetings are expected to build the foundation for President Obama’s trip to Kenya for the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in July of this year.

On Tuesday, May 5, Kerry will become the first sitting secretary of state to travel to Djibouti. There, he will meet with government officials regarding the evacuation of civilians from Yemen and also visit Camp Lemonnier, the U.S. military base from which it coordinates its counterterror operations in the Horn of Africa region.

Protests erupt as Burundian president seeks third term

This week saw the proliferation of anti-government street demonstrations as current President Pierre Nkurunziza declared his candidacy for a third term, after being in office for ten years.  The opposition has deemed this move as “unconstitutional” and in violation of the 2006 Arusha peace deal which ended the civil war. Since the announcement, hundreds of civilians took to the streets of Bujumbura, despite a strong military presence. At least six people have been killed in clashes between police forces and civilians. 

Since the protests erupted, leading human rights activist Pierre-Claver Mbonimpa has been arrested alongside more than 200 protesters. One of Burundi’s main independent radio stations was also suspended as they were covering the protests.  On Wednesday, the government blocked social media platforms, including Twitter and Facebook, declaring them important tools in implementing and organizing protests. Thursday, amid continuing political protests, Burundi closed its national university and students were sent home. 

Amid the recent protests, Burundi’s constitutional court will examine the president’s third term bid. Meanwhile, U.N. secretary general Ban Ki-moon has sent his special envoy for the Great Lakes Region to hold a dialogue with president Nkurunziza and other government authorities. Senior U.S. diplomat Tom Malinowski also arrived in Bujumbura on Thursday to help defuse the biggest crisis the country has seen in the last few years, expressing disappointment over Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term.

China invests billions in African infrastructure

Since the early 2000s, China has become an increasingly significant source of financing for African infrastructure projects, as noted in a recent Brookings paper, “Financing African infrastructure: Can the world deliver?” This week, observers have seen an additional spike in African infrastructure investments from Chinese firms, as three major railway, real estate, and other infrastructure deals were struck on the continent, totaling nearly $7.5 billion in investments.

On Monday, April 27, the state-owned China Railway Construction Corp announced that it will construct a $3.5 billion railway line in Nigeria, as well as a $1.9 billion real estate project in Zimbabwe. Then on Wednesday, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (one of the country’s largest lenders) signed a $2 billion deal with the government of Equatorial Guinea in order to carry out a number of infrastructure projects throughout the country. These deals align with China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy of building infrastructure in Africa and throughout the developing world in order to further integrate their economies, stimulate economic growth, and ultimately increase demand for Chinese exports. For more insight into China’s infrastructure lending in Africa and the implications of these investments for the region’s economies, please see the following piece by Africa Growth Initiative Nonresident Fellow Yun Sun: “Inserting Africa into China’s One Belt, One Road strategy: A new opportunity for jobs and infrastructure?”

      

       

In many African countries, women still cannot own land or resources, a significant barrier to their ability to start businesses and take advantage of the continent’s economic potential.  Fellow Anne Kamau explores their plight.

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• Challenges for Women in the African Economy

      

       

       

       

       

       

INTRODUCTION

In December 2011, the United Nations State of the World’s Volunteering Report was released at the U.N. headquarters in New York along with a General Assembly resolution championing the role of volunteer action in peacebuilding and development. The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) Program report states that:

The contribution of volunteerism to development is particularly striking in the context of sustainable livelihoods and value-based notions of wellbeing. Contrary to common perceptions, the income poor are as likely to volunteer as those who are not poor. In doing so, they realize their assets, which include knowledge, skills and social networks, for the benefit of themselves, their families and their communities…Moreover, volunteering can reduce the social exclusion that is often the result of poverty, marginalization and other forms of inequality…There is mounting evidence that volunteer engagement promotes the civic values and social cohesion which mitigate violent conflict at all stages and that it even fosters reconciliation in post-conflict situations...

The “South Africa Conference on Volunteer Action for Development” convened in Johannesburg in October 2011, and the July 2012 “Africa Conference on Volunteer Action for Peace and Development” co-hosted with the Kenya’s Ministry of East African Community, the United Nations and partners in Nairobi give further evidence to the rise of and potential for volunteer service to impact development and conflict. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring, youth volunteer service and empowerment have emerged as a pivotal idea in deliberations aimed at fostering greater regional cohesion and development.

In “Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2012,” Mwangi S. Kimenyi and Stephen N. Karingi note that: “One of the most important pillars in determining whether the positive prospects for Africa will be realized is success in regional integration… This year is a crucial one for Africa’s regional integration project and actions by governments, regional organizations and the international community will be critical in determining the course of the continent’s development for many years to come.”

The authors note the expected completion of a tripartite regional free trade agreement by 2014 and the expected boost to intra-African trade, resulting in an expanded market of 26 African countries (representing more than half of the region’s economic output and population). At the same time, the declaration from the “South Africa Conference on Volunteer Action for Development” calls on “Governments of Southern African member states and other stakeholders to incorporate volunteering in their deliberations from Rio +20 and to recognize the transformational power as well as economic and social value of volunteering in achieving national development goals and regional priorities, which can be achieved by facilitating the creation of an enabling environment for volunteering to support, protect and empower volunteers.” This speaks directly to the urgent need to factor the social dimension into the regional integration agenda in the different African subregions.

This paper includes examples of the growth of volunteer service as a form of social capital that enhances cohesion and integration across three regions: southern, western, and eastern Africa. It further highlights civil society best practices and policy recommendations for increased volunteering in efforts to ensure positive peace, health, youth skills, assets and employment outcomes.

The importance of volunteering to development has been noted in recent United Nations consultations on the Rio+20 convening on sustainable development and the post-2015 development framework. As the U.N. reviews its Millennium Development Goals (MDG) process, Africa’s regional service initiatives offer vital lessons and strategies to further achieve the MDGs by December 2015, and to chart the way forward on the post-2015 development framework.

But how does volunteerism and civic service play out in sub-Saharan Africa? What are its institutional and non-institutional expressions? What are the benefits or impacts of volunteerism and civic service in society? Our specific purpose here is to provide evidence of the different manifestations and models of service, impact areas and range of issues in three African regions. In responding to these questions, this analysis incorporates data and observations from southern, western and eastern Africa.

In conclusion, we provide further collective insights and recommendations for the roles of the Africa Union and regional economic communities (RECs), youth, the international community, the private sector and civil society aimed at ensuring that volunteerism delivers on its promise and potential for impact on regional integration, youth development and peace.

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As the world pays its tributes to the critically ailing former South African President Nelson Mandela, youth across Africa are stepping up their own tributes to Madiba in the form of civic service on Mandela Day. The United Nations and the African Union have called on citizens across Africa and the world to volunteer 67 minutes— representing the 67 years of Mandela’s public service—to community projects on his birthday, July 18.

The Africa Peace Service Corps (APSC) has launched volunteering projects in Nairobi, Kenya; Cape Town and rural Limpopo, South Africa; Lusaka, Zambia; Abuja, Nigeria; villages in Uganda and other countries.  Four hundred youths and 35 partners assembled last July at the United Nations conference in Nairobi to launch the Pan-African service project, spurring civic action in health, climate change, youth entrepreneurship and positive peace. 

A 2012 Brookings report, “Volunteering and Civic Service in Three African Regions,” released at the Nairobi conference and co-authored by three African scholars notes the benefits of volunteering (“Ubuntu”) in South, West and East Africa in addressing youth livelihoods, health and peace-building.  The report further documents policy recommendations and strategies linking youth service and entrepreneurship in addressing the daunting task of youth unemployment across the region.  Dr. Manu Chandaria  (Comcraft CEO and Global Peace Foundation Africa chairman) and Les Baillie (chairman of Kenya mobile phone giant Safaricom Foundation, which created Africa’s M-Pesa mobile banking microfinance success) have assembled corporate leaders to back APSC youth social enterprises in tree planting and waste management to generate green jobs and reach Kenya’s goal of ten percent tree coverage.

Nelson Mandela’s life of struggle and triumph, in particular his time and insights during his time unjustly incarcerated on Robben Island, provides a rich textbook for these young social entrepreneurs.  During my recent Harris Wofford Global Service Fellowship with the University of Cape Town Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU) and Cross Cultural Solutions, while teaching an entrepreneurship class in the townships I was able to see the teeming spirit of youth enterprise first-hand alive in the poorest communities.  A South African national assets demonstration has been launched this year to tap the power of service and entrepreneurship in generating savings among township youths from these deliberations with the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund, Ford Foundation, University of Johannesburg Center for Social Development and Washington University Center for Social Development and Brookings’ Africa Growth Initiative partner DPRU, among others.

Along with addressing Mandela’s dream of ending poverty, a recent Brookings report, “Impacts of Malaria Interventions and their Potential Additional Humanitarian Benefits in Sub-Saharan Africa,” outlines the potential significant peace-building effects of service in sub-Saharan Africa by highlighting the joint efforts of the Muslim Sultan and Catholic Cardinal of Nigeria in tackling malaria along with those of the Africa Malaria Leaders Alliance with PEPFAR support.  The contributions of volunteering to both peace and development outcomes are further underscored in the draft of a United Nations post-2015 “sustainable development goals” report.

Amidst inevitable political debates over the Mandela legacy, his generous spirit and legacy of reconciliation rises high above Cape Town’s Table Mountain and across the Pan-African youth landscape.  The challenge of applying his vision and spiritual values in addressing poverty through emerging demonstrations of youth service, assets and entrepreneurship will test the commitment of Africa’s next generation of young freedom pioneers, guided by this humble giant’s profound legacy now spanning the globe.

       

       

       

       

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Barack Obama’s presidency has witnessed widespread change throughout Africa. His four trips there, spanning seven countries, reflect his belief in the continent’s potential and importance. African countries face many challenges that span issues of trade, investment, and development, as well as security and stability. With President Obama’s second term coming to an end, it is important to begin to reflect on his legacy and how his administration has helped frame the future of Africa.

On July 19, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings hosted a discussion on Africa policy. Matthew Carotenuto, professor at St. Lawrence University and author of “Obama and Kenya: Contested Histories and the Politics of Belonging” (Ohio University Press, 2016) discussed his research in the region. He was joined by Sarah Margon, the Washington director of Human Rights Watch. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O'Hanlon partook in and moderated the discussion.

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• President Obama’s role in African security and development

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• President Obama’s role in African security and development

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20160719_us_africa_transcript