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Which city economies did COVID-19 damage first?

Since the United States first witnessed significant community spread of the coronavirus in March, each week has brought a fresh round of devastating economic news. From skyrocketing unemployment claims to new estimates of contracting GDP in the first quarter of 2020, there has been little respite from the growing awareness that COVID-19 is exacting unprecedented…

       




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American workers’ safety net is broken. The COVID-19 crisis is a chance to fix it.

The COVID-19 pandemic is forcing some major adjustments to many aspects of our daily lives that will likely remain long after the crisis recedes: virtual learning, telework, and fewer hugs and handshakes, just to name a few. But in addition, let’s hope the crisis also drives a permanent overhaul of the nation’s woefully inadequate worker…

       




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As states reopen, COVID-19 is spreading into even more Trump counties

Even as the COVID-19 pandemic drags on, America has begun to open up for some business and limited social interaction, especially in parts of the country that did not bear the initial brunt of the coronavirus.  However, the number of counties where COVID-19 cases have reached “high-prevalence” status continues to expand. Our tracking of these…

       




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Critical in a public health crisis, COVID-19 has hit local newsrooms hard

While the coronavirus may be a global pandemic, the public health crisis has revealed the critical role of local news outlets currently working tirelessly to cover the impact of the coronavirus on their communities. These outlets have helped to disseminate essential information from state and local government actors, prevent the spread of misinformation, and report…

       




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Webinar: How federal job vacancies hinder the government’s response to COVID-19

Vacant positions and high turnover across the federal bureaucracy have been a perpetual problem since President Trump was sworn into office. Upper-level Trump administration officials (“the A Team”) have experienced a turnover rate of 85 percent — much higher than any other administration in the past 40 years. The struggle to recruit and retain qualified…

       




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Webinar: What role will the Army play in great power competition after COVID-19?

Two years after the National Defense Strategy was published, it’s time to take stock of where the Army stands. On an immediate level, the age of COVID-19 presents the Army with an unprecedented set of challenges. From ensuring high levels of readiness to keeping up recruitment, the pandemic has forced the Army to adapt quickly…

       




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Webinar: Policing in the era of COVID-19

The consequences of the novel coronavirus pandemic stretch across the entirety of government services. Major police agencies have reported absentee rates as high as 20% due to officers who are either themselves afflicted with the virus or in need of self-quarantine. Reported crimes are generally down in America’s cities as a result of the many…

       




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Two states, four paths for achieving them


The greatest tragedy of the Israeli-Palestinian gridlock, aside from the many lives lost, is that the parameters of any future agreement are already known to all sides involved. These are the common parameters of then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s proposal at Camp David II in 2000, the Clinton Parameters of December of that year, and former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s initiative in 2008.

Broadly speaking, Israel would be required to forfeit the dream of a Greater Israel, to agree to the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders with land swaps, and to accept some Palestinian presence in the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem and in the Holy Basin. The Palestinians would have to agree to an end of conflict and an end of claims, a solution for the Palestinian refugee problem only within the borders of a future Palestinian state (not Israel), and limitations on their sovereignty due to security concerns. Unfortunately, national narratives and aspirations, religious beliefs, perceptions of historic justice, and the practical lessons each side learned in the recent past have all prevented the leaders of both sides from convincing their publics of the need for such concessions—which are necessary for an agreement.

Plans A and B

Reaching an agreement is harder today than it was in either 2000 or 2008. Even the moderates among the Palestinians are unwilling to concede a right of return, to acknowledge an “end of conflict and end of claims,” to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, or to allow basic security arrangements that will ease Israel’s justified concerns. It appears that in 2016, the Palestinians do not view a two-state solution, along the Clinton Parameters, as a preferred outcome. Instead, their discourse is rooted in a "return of rights" in historic Palestine as a whole (including Israel), in accordance with both the Hamas and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) charters. Indeed, the Palestinian positions have not budged much since Camp David II in 2000.


Photo courtesy of REUTERS/Carlo Allegri

Instead, the Palestinians have an attractive (in their view) “Plan B,” which is to get the Israeli concessions in international decisions, without having to make their own concessions—all while denouncing Israel and delegitimizing it in international forums. Since 2008, there are strong indications that the international route was actually the Palestinian "Plan A"—hence their intransigence in entering the talks and in the negotiations themselves. 

A sustainable—but undesirable—status quo

The continuation of the status quo—which appears so problematic to many Israelis and Americans—represents for the Palestinians a favorable strategic avenue that would lead, eventually, to an Arab-majority, one-state outcome. When Americans, Europeans, and even elements of the Israeli public repeatedly warn that Israel will be “lost” if it allows the status quo to persist, it does not encourage Palestinian moderation or willingness to compromise. Instead, it strengthens the underlying Palestinian assumption that a failure of negotiations is a reasonable option from their perspective. For the Palestinian leadership, all paths lead to the same destination: either Israel accepts their conditions (which, through flooding Israel with refugees, will lead to the demise of Israel as a Jewish state) or the status quo persists and Israel is supposedly lost.


Photo courtesy of REUTERS/Amir Cohen

Moreover, any demand made of Israel that it alter the status quo must convince the Israelis that their situation will not deteriorate further. The days of the Second Intifada—a terror campaign initiated by Yasser Arafat after the failure of Camp David with dozens of dead each month—are still etched in the collective Israeli memory. Similarly, Israelis are unwilling to accept a West Bank that would be a base for rocket launching, tunnels, and a continuation of terrorism against Israel, as is Gaza, which Israel fully evacuated. Only a move that would provide Israel security and full legitimacy to act against future Palestinian terrorism will create public support in Israel to move toward a two-state solution. 

Yet, while the status quo is much more sustainable than the conventional wisdom claims—for reasons beyond the scope of this post—it is certainly not desirable, since it furthers Israel from its goal of a Jewish, democratic, safe, and just state of Israel. It is therefore important that Israel have a viable alternative plan that is not merely a continuation of the status quo. 

Four paths for an Israeli alternative

There are more than two options, muddling through in the status quo or accepting Palestinian demands in full. If Israelis cannot get peace in terms that secure an end of conflict, security, and no "right of return," we must look for another option—an Israeli Plan B. 

An Israeli Plan B would consist of a proactive effort to formulate the future borders of the state of Israel in one of four paths in order of preference: 1) a negotiation process resulting in a final status agreement, 2) a regional agreement, 3) an interim bilateral agreement, or 4) in the case a negotiated agreement cannot be realized, an independent Israeli determination of its own borders. 

First, Israel should present an initiative for a final agreement with the Palestinians, based on the Clinton Parameters: generous borders for a future Palestinian state, demilitarized Palestinian state and no compromises on Israeli security, a commitment to an end of conflict and end of claims, and a Palestinian relinquishment of implementing a “right of return.” This should be followed by a comprehensive effort to reach an agreement on the basis of the Israeli proposal. Such a move should be led by the leadership on both sides in order to foster genuine relations based on trust. 


Photo courtesy of REUTERS/Asmaa Waguih

Should the (preferable) bilateral track fail, Israel should move to a regional track, including the moderate Arab states—led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan—in an effort to reach a final status agreement. This effort could be grounded in an updated version of the Arab Peace Initiative—as a starting point rather than a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. Such a plan should be decoupled from the issue of the Golan Heights (given the situation in Syria today and in the foreseeable future) and should not be conditional on a solution to the refugee problem according to U.N. Security Council Resolution 194 from 1949. 

The pragmatic Arab states have the capacity to add much-needed value to the table in order to move the negotiations beyond a zero-sum game on the territorial, financial, security, and ideological levels. However, if the moderate Arab states are unwilling or unable to contribute, Israel can aim to secure interim agreements with the Palestinians. Interim agreements would necessitate abandoning the principle of “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” and shifting the paradigm to a principle of gradual implementation of any area of agreement, deferring talks on more contentious subjects to a later time. 

Only if all these paths fail, Israel should embark on a long-term independent strategy for shaping its borders. This strategy should be innovative and creative, removing the effective veto Palestinians have through negotiations on Israel future. It would require as much coordination as possible with the United States and the international community. It would leave open the option for a return to the negotiating table and to a negotiated settlement, and reinforces the agreed two-state solution paradigm. Likewise, this route undermines and prevents the most problematic outcomes, namely the continuation of the status quo or a final agreement without an end of conflict and security arrangements, and the flooding of Israel with refugees. 

An independent route suffers from a bad reputation within Israeli society, as a consequence of the perceived failure of the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. As discussed below however, the Gaza precedent can provide valuable lessons for the West Bank that can mitigate the potential pitfalls of such a move. 

Four lessons from the disengagement plan

Any independent move with unilateral elements suffers from strong negative connotations among Israelis because of the perceived failure of the "disengagement" from Gaza in 2005, though I know of no one in Israel who wants to regain control over the 1.7 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Still, while then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was right to initiate the disengagement plan, it was riddled with strategic errors. Four major miscalculations also offer lessons for a future independent move:

  1. The plan was initiated without securing a strong internal Israeli or international backing. Israel must show that it is ready for substantial concessions in certain areas in order to be able to put forward significant demands in others. Therefore, the first move in a future plan should begin with a genuine and generous peace proposal to the Palestinians. If the Palestinians again show intransigence, and if Israel demonstrates a willingness to accept compromise, then there will be a significantly increased likelihood for international acceptance of independent Israeli measures to work toward building a two-state reality.
  2. The Israelis left an open border between the Gaza Strip and Sinai, evacuating the “Philadelphi line” on the Gaza's Strips border with Egypt, which Hamas subsequently used to rearm with smuggled weapons from Iran and Libya. This mistake must not be repeated in the West Bank, and so the Jordan Valley—that separates the West Bank from Jordan—must stay under Israeli control, preventing arms smuggling into the West Bank. These moves therefore offer a clear separation between ending the occupation and expanding Palestinian self-rule on the one hand, and taking decisive action to prevent the buildup of terrorism in the West Bank, on the other.
  3. Sharon ordered the complete evacuation of all of the Gaza Strip in order to gain world recognition of an end of the occupation there. In reality, it did not achieve this outcome and left Israel without any bargaining chips for future negotiations. A future Israeli redeployment should only be to the security barrier, or close to it, leaving Israel in possession of the main settlement blocs and other strategic areas, some of which could be used as future bargaining chips.
  4. There was a complete lack of communication between the Israeli leadership and the evicted Israelis, as well as the lack of planning that botched their resettlement to this day. In order for any future plan to succeed, there is a need for an open and serious conversation within Israeli society—including through elections or a referendum—that would gradually build the societal trust needed for such a move. 


Photo courtesy of REUTERS/Amir Cohen

So, an independent Israeli strategy would therefore involve:

  • Israel’s willingness to hand over 80 to 85 percent of the West Bank—a willingness demonstrated by undertaking concrete steps on the ground. Israel would need to initiate further redeployments from the West Bank not including the Jordan Valley and East Jerusalem;
  • The transfer of Area B and much of Area C to a full Palestinian responsibility;
  • The full completion of the Security Barrier in areas that are currently lacking in order to provide Israel with a contiguous and defensible border;
  • A full cessation of Israeli settlement construction beyond the declared lines;
  • A plan, preferably under an agreement, to resettle Israelis living east of these lines into Israel-proper, preferably to the Galilee, the Negev, and the main settlements blocs; and 
  • The responsibility for the security of Israel remaining in the hands of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the proper Israeli authorities. Israel must preserve its capacity to conduct preventive action, hot pursuit, border control, and air security. However, the IDF must try to minimize such operations in the evacuated territories.

Drawbacks of an independent strategy

The proposed independent course of action is not ideal, and has elements that will be difficult to implement. Its main weaknesses are:

  • The difficulty of formulating a political plan that would be all-inclusive and that could feasibly garner wide acceptance within Israeli society. Today, the right wing in Israel would view such a plan as a capitulation to the Palestinians, a forfeiture of parts of the Land of Israel, and a withdrawal from territory without gaining anything in return. The left would also be appalled from the lack of agreement with the Palestinians. The Israeli public at large does not recognize the need to change the status quo.
  • The widespread unpopularity of evacuating Israelis from the settlements. Since the 2005 Disengagement Plan, no Israeli government has dared to directly address this topic. Israel’s leadership would need to oversee prolonged financial, social, and political preparations for such a strategy. Likewise, it would require coordination with the settler leadership to ensure the maximum possible cooperation from the settler population.
  • Obtaining international legitimacy—something that should not be taken for granted. Israel can mobilize the international community only if it shows that this course preserves the feasibility of a two-state solution. It must work to counter the perception in the international community that this two-state framework is rapidly becoming irrelevant. Halting settlement construction would provide a much-needed signal from Israel showing its sincere desire to end the conflict, and would promote international efforts to build a future Palestinian state.
  • The inherent tension between Israel’s need to ensure its future security and its desire to provide the Palestinians with the essential tools for self-government. Balancing these two requirements would continue to pose major challenges for the future.


Photo courtesy of REUTERS/Amir Cohen

Try, try, try again

This independent strategy would allow Israel to pursue a solution from a point of strength, rather than being dictated by outside forces or waves of terror. It represents a long-term, paradigm-changing option which would preserve the two-state solution while removing several of the most serious obstacles to such a solution. 

Zionism always yearned for a future that has seemed impossible at times. Generations of people have strived to achieve it, often overcoming great obstacles amid harsh realities. In our generation, we too can succeed.

Authors

  • Amos Yadlin
     
 
 




vi

A view from the West Bank: Three key takeaways


While much of the outside world has focused on the current wave of violence in Israel and the West Bank, far less attention is paid to the causes behind it and the context in which it is occurring. In meetings last month in Ramallah and Jerusalem with a range of Palestinian politicians, journalists, and analysts, as well as with senior U.S. officials, it was clear that the attacks reflect the deepening anger and despondency among Palestinians.

The current violence is largely despair-driven, but remains individualistic and politically directionless. Palestinians use different terms to describe the current violence. Popularly, and in most local media, it is known as the “Jerusalem Intifada.” But unlike previous Palestinian uprisings, this latest wave of violence lacks both political organization and clear political demands. 

The fact that so many young Palestinians are willing to risk almost certain death in order to carry out otherwise ineffective stabbing attacks on Israelis points to a deep sense of hopelessness and despair. It’s not only that Israeli settlement expansion, home demolitions, land confiscations, and movement restrictions continue to rob Palestinians of their land, livelihoods, and dignity; it’s that Palestinians now must endure Israel’s seemingly endless occupation without any of the “safety nets” they traditionally have fallen back on: the peace process is dead, Arab regional support and solidarity has evaporated, and their political leaders (both secular and Islamist) are ineffective and increasingly discredited. 

In short, Palestinians feel a deep sense of abandonment by the international community, their fellow Arabs, and even their own leaders. Although domestic political considerations as well as Abbas’ own waning credibility have constrained the leadership’s ability to disavow the violence outright, the Palestinian Authority (PA) continues to work quietly with the Israelis to keep the situation under control. The main question now, particularly for U.S. officials, is how long this PA security coordination with Israel can continue given mounting public opposition and the precipitous decline in international aid, which according to the World Bank is down by roughly 60 percent.

As confidence in Abbas’ leadership declines, Palestinian political stagnation and dysfunction is likely to continue. Since a public opinion poll published last September found that an unprecedented two-thirds of Palestinians wanted Abbas to resign, popular frustration with the Palestinian leader seems only to have grown. Many Palestinians lament what they see as the transformation of their national movement from groups and leaders dedicated to national liberation to a ruling class with special privileges (VIP status, travel, etc.) and a stake in the status quo. Even American officials seemed alarmed by the extent to which the PA is now perceived as a “collaborationist” government by ordinary Palestinians. 

At the same time, Abbas’ leadership style and decision-making are also alienating much of the political elite, including within his own Fatah movement. Several Palestinian officials were privately critical of Abbas. Others have been more open in their criticism, including former West Bank security chief Jibril Rajoub, who recently railed against Abbas and his inner clique in a lengthy interview on Palestinian TV

Much of the internal frustration with Abbas has to do with recent leadership appointments as well as what many see as his growing paranoia and personal vendettas against perceived rivals like Salam Fayyad, Yasser Abed-Rabbo, and his arch-nemesis, Mohamed Dahlan, the now-exiled former Gaza security chief. Both of these underscore the growing anxiety over the lack of clarity regarding a future succession process (on which I will have more to say in a subsequent post). Many also voiced skepticism about Abbas’ current diplomatic strategy, which is focused on building support for an international peace conference. While most Palestinians support internationalization, and virtually no one supports a return to U.S.-led peace negotiations, there are doubts as to whether Abbas’ international efforts are rooted in a broader strategy. 

The lack of strategic thinking is also fueling frustration over the ongoing stalemate with Hamas in Gaza. Indeed, many view Abbas as the primary obstacle to Gaza reconstruction and progress toward reconciliation with Hamas. Despite Hamas’ clear weakness since 2013, Abbas has been loath to give Hamas anything it could claim as a political concession and is equally reluctant to inherit responsibility for Gaza’s myriad social, economic, and security problems, for which he currently has no solutions. 

[T]here is a growing feeling, both within Fatah and beyond, that things are unlikely to change internally (and perhaps even diplomatically) until Abbas has left the scene.

Consequently, there is a growing feeling, both within Fatah and beyond, that things are unlikely to change internally (and perhaps even diplomatically) until Abbas has left the scene. At the same time, despite the growing frustration with Abbas, most are not eager to accelerate his departure. As I have written elsewhere, the absence of credible alternatives has given Abbas a sort of “legitimacy by default.” This may explain Abbas’ otherwise inexplicable complacency and his sense, as I was repeatedly told, that time is on his side.

Gaza’s Hamas rulers face their own set of equally daunting political, economic, and security challenges. Although I did not visit Gaza or meet with any Hamas representatives, both figured prominently in most of my discussions. Hamas continues to face serious financial problems as a result of the virtual elimination of its tunnels network and the closure of the Rafah border crossing. The scarcity of resources, a major factor in Hamas’ decision to pursue reconciliation with the PA in 2014, is also fueling tensions within the movement. Whereas Hamas’ military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, seeks to rebuild its military capabilities and restore its ties with Iran, its political leadership is equally keen to avoid another military confrontation with Israel and hopes to capitalize on diplomatic openings with Turkey and Saudi Arabia. 

The main security threat to Hamas rule comes from jihadi groups, most notably Jaysh al-Islam in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai-based Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, both of which have pledged allegiance to ISIS and regard Hamas (as well as its parent, the Muslim Brotherhood) as apostates. Despite occasional tit-for-tat attacks, at the moment neither Hamas nor the jihadis appear eager for a major fight. The potential for escalation remains, however, particularly if jihadi groups decide to exploit internal discontent within Hamas or force its hand militarily by launching rocket attacks on Israel. Such internal instability, along with the slow pace of reconstruction and already abysmal economic and humanitarian conditions in Gaza, highlights the ever-present danger of yet another devastating war between Israel and Hamas. 

In the end, while the outside world’s preoccupation with the current wave of violence is understandable, merely condemning ad hoc violence by Palestinians while failing to address the deeper, institutionalized violence of the Israeli occupation is both morally dishonest and politically untenable.

Authors

     
 
 




vi

Reviving the stalled reconstruction of Gaza


Event Information

April 19, 2016
5:30 PM - 7:00 PM AST

Al Diwan room
Intercontinental Doha
Intercontinental Doha, Al Isteqlal Road
Doha

The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on April 19, 2016, about the ongoing reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. The panelists included Omar Shaban, director of Pal-Think, a research institution based in Gaza; and Naglaa Elhag, head of rehabilitation and international development at the Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS). Sultan Barakat, the BDC’s director of research, moderated the event, which was attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, and media community.

Barakat opened by noting the slow progress of reconstruction in Gaza. Almost two years since the cessation of hostilities between Hamas and Israel, the rebuilding process has stalled for a number of reasons. First, the distribution of aid money pledged by donor countries during the October 2014 Cairo Conference has slowed. According to the World Bank, as of March 31, 2016, donor countries had dispersed only 40 percent of the pledged money. At the current rate, the fulfillment of all pledges will not occur until 2019, two years after the target date. Second, construction materials only enter Gaza from one border crossing. As a result of the sluggish rebuilding process, only 9 percent of totally damaged houses and 45 percent of partially damaged houses in Gaza have been repaired, leaving over 14,800 families internally displaced. Additionally, job opportunities promised by various construction projects have failed to materialize, leading to increased feelings of desperation and frustration among Gaza’s population.

Shaban expanded on these developments, expressing the notion that the people in Gaza feel neglected. Due to the high levels of frustration, he feels that a new round of hostilities between militants and Israel could happen at any moment. He explained further by highlighting the volatility of the area and mentioning how previous conflicts were easily ignited by an array of incidents: a kidnapping, a cross-border raid, an assassination, continuous rocket fire. Since frustration among Gazans continues to mount, arguably to its highest level, renewed conflict seems almost certain. Consequently, Shaban argued, fear of another round of conflict between Hamas and Israel has instilled a sentiment of donor fatigue. Donors do not want to see their support go to waste in another round of destruction, turning the delivery of assistance into an exercise of futility.

Shaban attributed this attitude among some donors to the lack of a political solution to the crisis in Gaza. Hamas, the de-facto governing authority in Gaza, does not work for the people, nor does the Palestinian Authority (PA), based in Ramallah. Neither body provides economic opportunities for Gazans, as those employed by either the PA or Hamas often do not receive their salaries. Reconciliation talks between both groups failed to establish a unity government. Egypt, Israel, and the United States would feel more comfortable negotiating with a unity government, presumably dominated by the PA, not Hamas, which each of the aforementioned countries designate as a terrorist organization. If the PA does reach an agreement with Hamas, Egypt has implied that it would open its border with Gaza at Rafah, as long as the PA stations a security presence at the crossing. This could enhance the slow trickle of construction materials into Gaza, allow for the increased export of commercial goods, and also enable Gazans to leave and return at a higher rate than currently permitted. According to Shaban, opening another access point for Gaza to the outside world would temporarily ease the burden faced by Gaza’s citizens, but the current crisis requires a solution to ameliorate the economic and political situation in the long term.

Elhag opened her remarks by reviewing the difficulties of implementing aid projects in Gaza. While working in Gaza for the QRCS, she noticed little progress from international agencies, as they do not address the main problems, typically taking short cuts, which she highlighted by stating, “We don’t treat the wounds, we cover it with a bandage.” To elaborate on this point she mentioned that lack of access in and out of Gaza and the Israeli naval blockade as two factors hindering reconstruction. Due to these restrictions, aid workers have difficulty entering Gaza. Elhag surmised that the lack of accountability on the part of international agencies and the Israelis and the fear of aid projects being destroyed again because of the political situation both contribute to the stalled reconstruction, producing grim realities in Gaza.

Furthermore, Elhag explained that a resolution to the Gaza crisis does not rest on the distribution of money. She believes that only solutions from both sides of the conflict will end the suffering in Gaza. To exemplify the frustrations felt by donors, Elhag noted that since 2008, QRCS invested $100 million in housing units and other aid projects in Gaza, but some of these projects were destroyed during the 2014 war. QRCS observed this and shifted their focus to securing food sources and enhancing the education and health sectors in Gaza.

At the conclusion of Elhag’s observations, Barakat asked the panel where the money donated for reconstruction goes and how the Gaza reconstruction mechanism (GRM) works. Shaban described how the money actually gets funneled through the PA’s ministry of finance in Ramallah, before it reaches Gaza. Hamas officials or members of Gaza’s civil society do not oversee any aspect of aid distribution. So from the start, the distribution of funds lacks transparency, as the PA gives the money to the U.N. office in Gaza, which administers the GRM. From there, the United Nations composes a list of people in Gaza that require construction materials. The Israeli administrative body in the ministry of defense, the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (Cogat), must approve the names on the list. Construction materials can then be distributed through the GRM. Shaban concluded his explanation of the GRM by noting the many levels of bureaucracy involved have created a slow distribution process for a populace in desperate need.

From the regional perspective, some Arab states’ past political differences with Hamas has stymied political progress in Gaza, but the panel agreed that some of these relationships, especially with Saudi Arabia, are on the mend. The work of regional actors like Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey could help push a reconciliation deal between Fatah and Hamas. Shaban proposed allowing some Hamas members to take part in any future coalition government, as some of their relationships in Sinai could help Egypt secure the troubled region. Cooperation on security matters between Egypt and Hamas could inspire enough confidence in the Egyptians for them to open the Rafah crossing.

Ending the discussion, Barakat clarified the proposals of the panel by reiterating the need for donors to fulfill aid pledges. The GRM needs reform, especially through the inclusion of Gaza’s civil society in the reconstruction process. Finally, reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, as well as Egypt and Hamas, would help foster security cooperation at the borders.


Video

Transcript

Event Materials

      
 
 




vi

How to revive the stalled reconstruction of Gaza


Two years after Hamas and Israel agreed to a cessation of hostilities, reconstruction in Gaza has been painfully slow. This was the focus of a panel discussion at the Brookings Doha Center on April 19. As Senior Fellow and Director of Research Sultan Barakat explained, rebuilding has stalled in part because the distribution of aid money pledged by donor countries during the October 2014 Cairo Conference has slowed; according to the World Bank, donor countries had dispersed only 40 percent of the pledged money as of the end of March. At this rate, the pledged funds will not be dispersed until 2019, two years after the target date.

Moreover, construction materials only enter Gaza through one border crossing and must be cleared by layers of bureaucracy. As Omar Shaban—director of Pal-Think, a research institution in Gaza—explained, money for Gaza reconstruction is funneled through the PA’s ministry of finance in Ramallah, which transfers it to the U.N. office in Gaza. The United Nations composes a list of people in Gaza that require construction materials, and the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (Cogat)—an Israeli administrative body in the ministry of defense—must approve the names on the list. The U.N. then distributes construction materials. Shaban emphasized that the bureaucratic nature of this process has slowed reconstruction considerably, adding that the process isn’t transparent enough, since neither Hamas officials nor members of Gaza’s civil society oversee any aspect of aid distribution.

As a result of the sluggish rebuilding process, Barakat said, only 9 percent of totally damaged houses and 45 percent of partially damaged houses in Gaza have been repaired, leaving over 14,800 families internally displaced. Meanwhile, promised job opportunities in construction projects have failed to materialize, exacerbating feelings of desperation and frustration among Gaza’s population.

[T]he process isn’t transparent enough [said Shaban], since neither Hamas officials nor members of Gaza’s civil society oversee any aspect of aid distribution.

Shaban agreed that people in Gaza feel neglected. With high levels of frustration, he expressed fear that a new round of hostilities between militants and Israel could begin at any time. Previous conflicts were easily ignited—by a kidnapping, a cross-border raid, an assassination, or continuous rocket fire. Shaban argued that the volatility of the situation may be heightening fatigue among donors, who do not want to see their support go to waste in another round of destruction.

Naglaa Elhag, head of rehabilitation and international development at the Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS), discussed the difficulties of implementing aid projects in Gaza. She argued that international agencies do not always address the main problems and typically take shortcuts, saying of her own organization and others: “We don’t treat the wounds, we cover it with a bandage.” She highlighted various factors slowing reconstruction, including the lack of accountability on the part of international agencies, fears of renewed conflict, and the Palestinian political stalemate. Since 2008, according to Elhag, QRCS invested $100 million in housing units and other aid projects in Gaza, but some were destroyed during the 2014 war. As a result, QRCS shifted its focus away from physical reconstruction and towards food security, education, and health. 

A related problem is the Palestinian political stalemate. According to Shaban, neither Hamas (the de-facto governing authority in Gaza) nor the Palestinian Authority (PA, based in Ramallah) provides economic opportunities for Gazans, and those nominally on Palestinian government payrolls often do not receive their salaries. Reconciliation talks have failed to establish a unity government, making Egypt, Israel, and the United States reticent to negotiate. Egypt has indicated that if the PA does reach an agreement with Hamas, it would open its border with Gaza at Rafah (presuming the PA has a security presence there). This could increase the flow of construction materials into Gaza, allow for the increased export of commercial goods, and enable Gazans to come and go more frequently. But while opening another crossing for Gaza would temporarily ease the burden faced by the people there, Shaban stressed that a long-term political and economic solution is needed. Elhag, too, emphasized that a resolution to the Gaza crisis isn’t about the distribution of money—rather, she believes a joint Israeli-Palestinian solution is needed to end the suffering in Gaza. 

In the past, tensions between some Arab states and Hamas have also hampered progress in Gaza, but the panelists agreed that some of these relationships—especially with Saudi Arabia—are on the mend. Regional actors like Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey could help push a reconciliation deal between Fatah and Hamas, which would help improve the situation in Gaza. And as Barakat stressed in conclusion, there is an urgent need for donors to fulfill aid pledges and for the Gaza reconstruction mechanism to become more inclusive, so that Gazans themselves can more fully participate in rebuilding their neighborhoods. 

Authors

  • Fraus Masri
      
 
 




vi

Earth Day: it is about equity as well as the environment

Growing gaps in family structure, educational investments, school readiness, test scores, and college entry and completion all make upward economic mobility a more difficult prospect for children born to poor families. Poor children in poor neighborhoods are at an even greater disadvantage. Growing up in an impoverished community doesn’t only affect your lifetime earnings –…

       




vi

The medical device tax: A primer


Quickly following on the heels of the midterm elections, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) indicated that the medical device tax was a key target for repeal in the 114th Congress. Today, the Senate Finance Health Care Subcommittee will hold a hearing about the effects of the 2.3 percent tax that was included in the Affordable Care Act. Many believe that a repeal is, in fact, possible. Below is a basic primer about the tax and its contentious history.

1. What is the medical device tax?

Included in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and launched in 2013, the medical device tax imposes a 2.3 percent sales tax on medical device supplies. The tax applies broadly to a range of products, including pacemakers, artificial joints, surgical gloves, and dental instruments. It does not apply to eyeglasses, contact lenses, hearing aids, wheelchairs, or any other device that the public generally buys for individual use. Further, the tax is applied equally to imported and domestically produced devices, and devices produced in the U.S. for export are tax-exempt.

2. Why was it included in the Affordable Care Act?

According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the tax is estimated to bring in $29 billion over the next decade. The tax was one of many revenue-raising provisions designed to offset the cost of providing coverage to more than 25 million Americans through the ACA, and these newly insured individuals would likewise increase demand for medical device manufacturers' products and services. Other industries were subject to levies as well, including health plans (an estimated $101 billion), and employers (an estimated $130 billion). It has been noted that then-Senator John Kerry from Massachusetts helped negotiate the tax from 4.6 percent to 2.3 percent.

3. How has the medical device industry responded?

The U.S. is home to more than 7,000 medical device companies with estimated annual sales of $106 to $116 billion per year. The largest concentrations of companies are located in California, Massachusetts, New York and Minnesota. Since 2010, the medical device industry has led a full court press effort to repeal the tax. Companies and trade groups argue that the tax would cost over 40,000 U.S. jobs, and undermine innovation by moving manufacturing offshore - conclusions that are heavily contested by the tax's supporters.

By some accounts this tax is coming at a particularly challenging time for medical device innovation. A recent analysis by Ernst & Young reported that venture capital investment in medical devices in 2013 fell 17% from the previous year, a downward trend that has been observed for the past seven years. In addition, investment funding is also shifting towards less risky later-stage medical device companies instead of smaller earlier stage ventures. These trends are worrisome since early-stage investment companies can promote innovative and disruptive medical device technologies that introduce new therapeutic benefits or quantum improvements in patient care.

It is unclear what impact the medical device tax will have on investment in early stage innovation. Key factors that have reduced the availability of venture capital for early-stage medical device companies pursuing pre-market approval include U.S. regulatory unpredictability and delays in approval, and an uncertain reimbursement environment. Additionally, efforts outside the U.S to attract medical device investment, such as offering tax havens and other incentives for device developers in Ireland and the Netherlands add to the attractiveness for device companies to move out of the U.S. Moving to a country that has lower tax rates and less stringent corporate governance requirements may save large device companies billions of dollars.

Recognizing that the "country of first choice by medical device developers is a key contributor to early patient access to high-quality, safe and effective devices," the Center for Devices and Radiological Health's (CDRH) at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration issued its 2014-2015 Strategic Priorities, which describe their efforts to improve regulatory predictability and device development efficiency in order to "help medical device developers choose the U.S. as the country of first choice for their technologies." While the FDA's efforts seem to focus on encouraging medical device innovation in the U.S., the medical device tax seems to be contradictory to this effort.

Some also argue that while expanding insurance coverage will help drug companies sell more products and bring in new patients for providers and hospitals, it will not help sell more devices because the majority of potential beneficiaries are much older and already covered by Medicare.

Hundreds of companies and trade groups have signed on to letters opposing the tax from industry associations, like the Medical Device Manufacturers Association (MDMA) and AdvaMed. Others have launched significant lobbying efforts to support the tax's repeal, an industry that accounts for $30 million in lobbying expenditures annually since the ACA was passed in 2010. The Center for Responsible Politics has also identified $5.7 million in political contributions on behalf of medical device companies to specific candidates during the 2013-2014 campaign cycle.

4. How are lawmakers responding?

The tax's repeal has been supported by Democrats and Republicans alike. Many opponents cite the Senate's fiscal 2014 budget resolution as an indicator of support - drumming up 79 supporters for repeal, including 33 Democrats. However, the resolution "was non-binding and viewed as a free vote to show displeasure with an unpopular aspect of the health law." The tax's repeal has garnered outspoken support from Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Mitch McConnell (R-KY), as well as Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Al Franken (D-MN), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) - Democrats with notably high concentrations of medical device companies in their states. The House has approved the repeal of the device tax three separate times in the past two years, including as recently as September 2014. The White House has historically opposed these efforts, but President Obama recently indicated he would entertain the idea.

A report from the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service, released last week, concluded that the tax is unlikely to hurt the profits of device companies, estimating that it will reduce industry output and employment by no more than .2 percent. CRS states, "The effect on the price of health care, however, will most likely be negligible because of the small size of the tax and small share of health care spending attributable to medical devices." A separate report from Ernst & Young last month finds that domestic revenues for medical technology firms grew 4 percent to $336 billion in 2013, the first year the tax went into effect - about the same rate from 2012, indicating that the industry seems financially stable for now.

Editor’s note: This post was originally featured in RealClear Markets on November 12, 2014. Click here for the original posting.

      




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Faster, more efficient innovation through better evidence on real-world safety and effectiveness


Many proposals to accelerate and improve medical product innovation and regulation focus on reforming the product development and regulatory review processes that occur before drugs and devices get to market. While important, such proposals alone do not fully recognize the broader opportunities that exist to learn more about the safety and effectiveness of drugs and devices after approval. As drugs and devices begin to be used in larger and more diverse populations and in more personalized clinical combinations, evidence from real-world use during routine patient care is increasingly important for accelerating innovation and improving regulation.

First, further evidence development from medical product use in large populations can allow providers to better target and treat individuals, precisely matching the right drug or device to the right patients. As genomic sequencing and other diagnostic technologies continue to improve, postmarket evidence development is critical to assessing the full range of genomic subtypes, comorbidities, patient characteristics and preferences, and other factors that may significantly affect the safety and effectiveness of drugs and devices. This information is often not available or population sizes are inadequate to characterize such subgroup differences in premarket randomized controlled trials.

Second, improved processes for generating postmarket data on medical products are necessary for fully realizing the intended effect of premarket reforms that expedite regulatory approval. The absence of a reliable postmarket system to follow up on potential safety or effectiveness issues means that potential signals or concerns must instead be addressed through additional premarket studies or through one-off postmarket evaluations that are more costly, slower, and likely to be less definitive than would be possible through a better-established infrastructure. As a result, the absence of better systems for generating postmarket evidence creates a barrier to more extensive use of premarket reforms to promote innovation.

These issues can be addressed through initiatives that combine targeted premarket reforms with postmarket steps to enhance innovation and improve evidence on safety and effectiveness throughout the life cycle of a drug or device. The ability to routinely capture clinically relevant electronic health data within our health care ecosystem is improving, increasingly allowing electronic health records, payer claims data, patient-reported data, and other relevant data to be leveraged for further research and innovation in care. Recent legislative proposals released by the House of Representatives’ 21st Century Cures effort acknowledge and seek to build on this progress in order to improve medical product research, development, and use. The initial Cures discussion draft included provisions for better, more systematic reporting of and access to clinical trials data; for increased access to Medicare claims data for research; and for FDA to promulgate guidance on the sources, analysis, and potential use of so-called Real World Evidence. These are potentially useful proposals that could contribute valuable data and methods to advancing the development of better treatments.

What remains a gap in the Cures proposals, however, is a more systematic approach to improving the availability of postmarket evidence. Such a systematic approach is possible now. Biomedical researchers and health care plans and providers are doing more to collect and analyze clinical and outcomes data. Multiple independent efforts – including the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Sentinel Initiative for active postmarket drug safety surveillance, the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute’s PCORnet for clinical effectiveness studies, the Medical Device Epidemiology Network (MDEpiNet) for developing better methods and medical device registries for medical device surveillance and a number of dedicated, product-specific outcomes registries – have demonstrated the potential for large-scale, systematic postmarket data collection. Building on these efforts could provide unprecedented evidence on how medical products perform in the real-world and on the course of underlying diseases that they are designed to treat, while still protecting patient privacy and confidentiality.

These and other postmarket data systems now hold the potential to contribute to public-private collaboration for improved population-based evidence on medical products on a wider scale. Action in the Cures initiative to unlock this potential will enable the legislation to achieve its intended effect of promoting quicker, more efficient development of effective, personalized treatments and cures.

What follows is a set of both short- and long-term proposals that would bolster the current systems for postmarket evidence development, create new mechanisms for generating postmarket data, and enable individual initiatives on evidence development to work together as part of a broad push toward a truly learning health care system.

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Why legislative proposals to improve drug and device development must look beyond FDA approvals


Legislative proposals to accelerate and improve the development of innovative drugs and medical devices generally focus on reforming the clinical development and regulatory review processes that occur before a product gets to market. Many of these proposals – such as boosting federal funding for basic science, streamlining the clinical trials process, improving incentives for development in areas of unmet medical need, or creating expedited FDA review pathways for promising treatments – are worthy pursuits and justifiably part of ongoing efforts to strengthen biomedical innovation in the United States, such as the 21st Century Cures initiative in the House and a parallel effort taking shape in the Senate.

What has largely been missing from these recent policy discussions, however, is an equal and concerted focus on the role that postmarket evidence can play in creating a more robust and efficient innovation process. Data on medical product safety, efficacy, and associated patient outcomes accrued through routine medical practice and through practical research involving a broad range of medical practices could not only bolster our understanding of how well novel treatments are achieving their intended effects, but reinforce many of the premarket reforms currently under consideration. Below and in a new paper, we highlight the importance of postmarket evidence development and present a number of immediately achievable proposals that could help lay the foundation for future cures.

Why is postmarket evidence development important?

There are a number of reasons why evidence developed after a medical product’s approval should be considered an integral part of legislative efforts to improve biomedical innovation. First and foremost, learning from clinical experiences with medical products in large patient populations can allow providers to better target and treat individuals, matching the right drug or device to the right patient based on real-world evidence. Such knowledge can in turn support changes in care that lead to better outcomes and thus higher value realized by any given medical product.

Similarly, data developed on outcomes, disease progression, and associated genetic and other characteristics that suggest differences in disease course or response to treatment can form the foundation of future breakthrough medical products. As we continue to move toward an era of increasingly-targeted treatments, this important of this type of real-world data cannot be discounted.

Finally, organized efforts to improve postmarket evidence development can further establish infrastructure and robust data sources for ensuring the safety and effectiveness of FDA-approved products, protecting patient lives. This is especially important as Congress, the Administration, and others continue to seek novel policies for further expediting the pre-market regulatory review process for high-priority treatments. Without a reliable postmarket evidence development infrastructure in place, attempts to further shorten the time it takes to move a product from clinical development to FDA approval may run up against the barrier of limited capabilities to gather the postmarket data needed to refine a product’s safety and effectiveness profile. While this is particularly important for medical devices – the “life cycle” of a medical device often involves many important revisions in the device itself and in how and by whom it is used after approval – it is also important for breakthrough drugs, which may increasingly be approved based on biomarkers that predict clinical response and in particular subpopulations of patients.

What can be done now?

The last decade has seen progress in the availability of postmarket data and the production of postmarket evidence. Biomedical researchers, product developers, health care plans, and providers are doing more to collect and analyze clinical and outcomes data. Multiple independent efforts – including the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Sentinel Initiative for active postmarket drug safety surveillance, the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute’s PCORnet for clinical effectiveness studies, the Medical Device Epidemiology Network (MDEpiNet) for developing better methods and medical device registries for medical device surveillance and a number of dedicated, product-specific outcomes registries – have demonstrated the powerful effects that rigorous, systematic postmarket data collection can have on our understanding of how medical products perform in the real-world and of the course of underlying diseases that they are designed to treat.

These and other postmarket data systems now hold the potential to contribute to data analysis and improved population-based evidence development on a wider scale. Federal support for strengthening the processes and tools through which data on important health outcomes can be leveraged to improve evidence on the safety, effectiveness, and value of care; for creating transparent and timely access to such data; and for building on current evidence development activities will help to make the use of postmarket data more robust, routine, and reliable.

Toward that end, we put forward a number of targeted proposals that current legislative efforts should consider as the 2015 policy agenda continues to take shape:

Evaluate the potential use of postmarket evidence in regulatory decision-making. The initial Cures discussion draft mandated FDA to establish a process by which pharmaceutical manufacturers could submit real-world evidence to support Agency regulatory decisions. While this is an important part of further establishing methods and mechanisms for harnessing data developed in the postmarket space, the proposed timelines (roughly 12 months to first Guidance for Industry) and wide scope of the program do not allow for a thoughtfully-, collaboratively-considered approach to utilizing real-world evidence. Future proposals should allow FDA to take a longer, multi-stakeholder approach to identify the current sources of real-world data, gaps in such collection activities, standards and methodologies for collection, and priority areas where more work is needed to understand how real-world data could be used.

Expand the Sentinel System’s data collection activities to include data on effectiveness. Established by Congress in 2007, Sentinel is a robust surveillance system geared toward monitoring the safety of drugs and biologics. In parallel to the program for evaluating the use of RWE outlined above, FDA could work with stakeholders to identify and pursue targeted extensions of the Sentinel system that begin to pilot collection of such data. Demonstration projects could enable faster and more effective RWE development to characterize treatment utilization patterns, further refine a product’s efficacy profile, or address pressing public health concerns – all by testing strategic linkages to data elements outside of Sentinel’s safety focus.

Establish an active postmarket safety surveillance system for medical devices. Congress has already acted once to establish device surveillance, mandating in 2012 that Sentinel be expanded to include safety data on medical devices. To date, however, there has been no additional support for such surveillance or even the capability of individually tracking medical devices in-use. With the recently finalized Unique Device Identifier rule going effect and the ability to perform such tracking on the horizon, the time is now to adopt recent proposals from FDA’s National Medical Device Postmarket Surveillance System Planning Board. With Congressional authorization for FDA to establish an implementation plan and adequate appropriations, the true foundation for such a system could finally be put into place.

These next steps are practical, immediately achievable, and key to fully realizing the intended effect of other policy efforts aimed at both improving the biomedical innovation process and strengthening the move to value-based health care.

Authors

      




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Improving productivity in pharmaceutical research and development


Event Information

July 28, 2015
8:30 AM - 5:00 PM EDT

Ambassador Ball Room
Embassy Row Hotel
2015 Massachusetts Avenue
Washington, DC 20036

Register for the Event

The role of clinical pharmacology and experimental medicine



The high failure rate of investigational compounds during drug development, especially in late stages of the clinical development process, is widely seen as a key contributor to the outsize amount of time and resources necessary to develop new drugs. Advances in clinical pharmacology and experimental medicine have the potential to rebalance these trends by providing researchers with the tools to more efficiently and systematically identify promising targets and compounds, appropriate patient populations, and adequate doses for study much earlier in development. 

On July 28, the Center for Health Policy at Brookings, in collaboration with the International Consortium for Innovation & Quality in Pharmaceutical Development and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), hosted a public meeting to tackle these issues. Through presentations and case studies, leading experts from industry, academia, and government agencies explored the evolving role of clinical pharmacology tools in pre-clinical and clinical development, existing gaps in the application of those tools, and how emerging science could be better leveraged to improve the efficiency of drug development programs and better optimize treatments. Discussion at this event will potentially be harnessed to inform downstream guidance documents, to establish best practices for the application of emerging clinical pharmacology tools, or to support academic publications. Speakers will convene privately to discuss such downstream deliverables and key takeaways from the conference.

Click here to access the full event agenda.

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Beyond Consultation: Civil Society and the Governance of International Institutions


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the face of unprecedented global challenges, effective global cooperation increasingly requires a partnership between state and non-state actors. Many international institutions now involve non-state actors in arenas that were once the exclusive province of states. The paper analyzes the evolution of civil society participation in the governance of international institutions and highlights the shift from a model based on consultation toward a model of multistakeholder governance. The paper argues that consultation is a less effective approach to involving civil society in achieving the mission of these institutions and suggests that more robust forms of multi-stakeholder participation by civil society can foster greater accountability and better deliberation. It analyzes competing claims about the desirability of including civil society in the governance of international institutions and suggests that an emerging constituency model can promote more effective multi-stakeholder governance. Constituency structures are already central features of several global health institutions and are now being contemplated by institutions in other sectors, including by the Education for All—Fast Track Initiative.

Multi-stakeholder approaches to governance are likely to become more widespread in the years to come in order to harness the contributions of a plethora of private actors engaged in responding to a wide range of global challenges. Even with enhanced cooperation between states, it is increasingly clear that non-state actors are essential to responding to key challenges across a wide range of sectors. Although it is possible to imagine expanded cooperation between state and non-state actors without opening up the governance structures of international institutions, it is less likely that these institutions will be successful in the longrun without a shift toward greater multi-stakeholder involvement in the institutions themselves.

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Image Source: © Reuters Photographer / Reuters
      
 
 




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Financing for a Fairer, More Prosperous Kenya: A Review of the Public Spending Challenges and Options for Selected Arid and Semi-Arid Counties


INTRODUCTION

In August, 2010 the government of Kenya adopted a new constitution. This followed a referendum in which an overwhelming majority of Kenyans voted for change. The decisive impetus for reform came from the widespread violence and political crisis that followed the 2007 election. While claims of electoral fraud provided the immediate catalyst for violence, the deeper causes were to be found in the interaction of a highly centralized ‘winner-take-all’ political system with deep social disparities based in part on group identity (Hanson 2008).

Provisions for equity figure prominently in the new constitution. Backed by a bill of rights that opens the door to legal enforcement, citizenship rights have been strengthened in many areas,including access to basic services. ‘Equitable sharing’ has been introduced as a guiding principle for public spending. National and devolved governments are now constitutionally required to redress social disparities, target disadvantaged areas and provide affirmative action for marginalized groups.

Translating these provisions into tangible outcomes will not be straightforward. Equity is a principle that would be readily endorsed by most policymakers in Kenya and Kenya’s citizens have provided their own endorsement through the referendum. However, there is an ongoing debate over what the commitment to equity means in practice, as well as over the pace and direction of reform. Much of that debate has centered on the constitutional injunction requiring ‘equitable sharing’ in public spending.

On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared.

There are compelling grounds for a strengthened focus on equity in Kenya. In recent years, the country has maintained a respectable, if less than spectacular, record on economic growth. Social indicators are also on an upward trend. On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared. Some regions and social groups face levels of deprivation that rank alongside the worst in Africa. Moreover, the deep fault lines running through society are widely perceived as a source of injustice and potential political instability.

High levels of inequality in Kenya raise wider concerns. There has been a tendency in domestic debates to see ‘equitable sharing’ as a guiding principle for social justice, rather than as a condition for accelerated growth and enhanced economic efficiency. Yet international evidence strongly suggests that extreme inequality—especially in opportunities for education— is profoundly damaging for economic growth. It follows that redistributive public spending has the potential to support growth.

The current paper focuses on a group of 12 counties located in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs). They are among the most disadvantaged in the country. Most are characterized by high levels of income poverty, chronic food insecurity and acute deprivation across a wide range of social indicators.

Nowhere is the deprivation starker than in education. The ASAL counties account for a disproportionately large share of Kenya’s out-of-school children, pointing to problems in access and school retention. Gender disparities in education are among the widest in the country. Learning outcomes for the small number of children who get through primary school are for the most part abysmal, even by the generally low national average standards.

Unequal public spending patterns have played no small part in creating the disparities that separate the ASAL counties from the rest of Kenya—and ‘equitable sharing’ could play a role in closing the gap. But what would a more equitable approach to public spending look like in practice?

This paper addresses that question. It looks in some detail at education for two reasons. First, good quality education is itself a powerful motor of enhanced equity. It has the potential to equip children and youth with the skills and competencies that they need to break out of cycles of poverty and to participate more fully in national prosperity. If Kenya is to embark on a more equitable pattern of development, there are strong grounds for prioritizing the creation of more equal opportunities in education. Second, the education sector illustrates many of the wider challenges and debates that Kenya’s policymakers will have to address as they seek to translate constitutional provisions into public spending strategies. In particular, it highlights the importance of weighting for indicators that reflect need in designing formulae for budget allocations.

Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity.

The paper is organized as follows. Part 1 provides an overview of the approach to equity enshrined in the constitution. While the spirit of the constitution is unequivocal, the letter is open to a vast array of interpretations. We briefly explore the implications of a range of approaches. Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity. Although this paper focuses principally on basic services, we caution against approaches that treat equity as a matter of social sector financing to the exclusion of growth-oriented productive investment.

Part 2 provides an analysis of some key indicators on poverty, health and nutrition. Drawing on household expenditure data, the report locates the 12 ASAL counties in the national league table for the incidence and depth of poverty. Data on health outcomes and access to basic services provide another indicator of the state of human development. While there are some marked variations across counties and indicators, most of the 12 counties register levels of deprivation in poverty and basic health far in excess of those found in other areas.

Part 3 shifts the focus to education. Over the past decade, Kenya has made considerable progress in improving access to basic education. Enrollment rates in primary education have increased sharply since the elimination of school fees in 2003. Transition rates to secondary school are also rising. The record on learning achievement is less impressive. While Kenya lacks a comprehensive national learning assessment, survey evidence points to systemic problems in education quality. In both access and learning, children in the ASAL counties—especially female children—are at a considerable disadvantage. After setting out the national picture, the paper explores the distinctive problems facing these counties.

In Part 4 we look beyond Kenya to wider international experience. Many countries have grappled with the challenge of reducing disparities between less-favored and more-favored regions. There are no blueprints on offer. However, there are some useful lessons and guidelines that may be of some relevance to the policy debate in Kenya. The experience of South Africa may be particularly instructive given the weight attached to equity in the post-apartheid constitution.

Part 5 of the paper explores a range of approaches to financial allocations. Converting constitutional principle into operational practice will require the development of formulae-based approaches. From an equitable financing perspective there is no perfect model. Any formula that is adopted will involve trade-offs between different goals. Policymakers have to determine what weight to attach to different dimensions of equity (for example, gender, income, education and health), the time frame for achieving stated policy goals, and whether to frame targets in terms of outcomes or inputs. These questions go beyond devolved financing. The Kenyan constitution is unequivocal in stipulating that the ‘equitable sharing’ provision applies to all public spending. We therefore undertake a series of formula-based exercises illustrating the allocation patterns that would emerge under different formulae, with specific reference to the 12 ASAL focus counties and to education.

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Image Source: © Thomas Mukoya / Reuters
      
 
 




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Learning First: A Research Agenda for Improving Learning in Low-Income Countries


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Parents, educators, government ministers and policymakers in all contexts and countries around the world are concerned with learning and how to improve it. There are many reasons for this, but none is more important than the fact that learning is at the heart of success at the individual, community and global levels. Learning First is the title of this report, with the strong implication that learning should be the foremost goal of education policies worldwide.

The present review seeks not only to explain why this is the case but also focuses on what we need to know—that is, what research is needed—in order to improve learning in the decades to come, particularly among those children most in need. This question is addressed in the following six sections.

  1. Learning Goals and Research. The first section begins with a historical synopsis of international education goals put forward in 1990 at the World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien (Thailand), in 2000 at the Education for All conference in Dakar, and later in 2000 as a part of the UN Millennium Development Goals for 2015. In 2011, the Center for Universal Education at the Brookings Institution published A Global Compact on Learning: Taking Action on Education in Developing Countries, which stated that there is a “global learning crisis—which affects children and youth who are out of school with limited learning opportunities and those who are in school but not learning the skills they need for their futures.” The present review of learning research in low-income countries follows from that report. The overall purpose is to explore the most pressing learning issues today that require further research attention in the years to come.
     
  2. Learning Definitions and Contexts. This section reviews how the field of education has defined learning over the years. Here, learning is defined as a modification of behavior due to experience—such as in knowledge, skills, attitudes and values. Three main principles of effective learning are suggested: individual active involvement, social participation, and meaningful engagement. As a way to emphasize the importance of learning contexts, three individual stories—Illa, a four-year-old Quechua-speaking girl in Peru; Pawan, an eight-year-old primary school student in urban India; and Rachida, a young illiterate woman in rural Morocco—are provided in order to better explain the importance of learning as a culturally specific phenomenon. These stories help to illustrate a more general learning framework, encompassing the relationship between two dimensions of learning—its processes and contexts. A discussion follows concerning the need to disaggregate learners and their learning contexts—between countries and within countries—as a way to overcome frequent and simplistic generalizations about how the “average” child learns.
     
  3. Global Change and the Contexts of Learning. This section considers the issue of global change on how learning and learning contexts are being transformed around the world. For example, researchers need to pay more attention to the impact of migration on children’s learning and on educational systems more broadly. In each instance of translocation, children confront the challenges of adapting to a new environment that may include different languages, dialects or cultures within the nonformal learning contexts of daily life. Similarly, in formal education contexts, student migrants have to cope with contrasts in culture, lifestyle and language of schooling, and demonstrate skills and achievement that may vary dramatically with their culture of origin. Other changes due to globalization include increased multilingualism in schools, growing overcrowding in classrooms, inability to keep up with teacher training, changes in intergenerational learning, and the growing importance of 21st-century skills. Based on these observations, it is suggested that learning contexts and needs should be understood as a shifting target.

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Authors

  • Daniel A. Wagner
  • Katie M. Murphy
  • Haley De Korne
Image Source: © Soe Zeya Tun / Reuters
      
 
 




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What coronavirus teaches us about addressing climate change

On this episode, Andrea Risotto, the associate vice president of communications at Brookings, interviews William Burke-White and Todd Stern about the connection between the global coronavirus pandemic and the international response to climate change. Burke-White is the Richard Perry Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and a visiting fellow in foreign policy at Brookings. Stern is…

       




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What Americans think about President Trump’s response to the coronavirus pandemic

In this special edition of the podcast, with Brookings Senior Fellows Bill Galston and Elaine Kamarck discuss President Trump’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic, his administration's response, and public opinion on that response. Also, what effect will the crisis and response to it have on the election in November? Galston is the Ezra K. Zilkha…

       




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How US military services are responding to the coronavirus and the pandemic’s impact on military readiness

On this special edition of the podcast, four U.S. military officers who are participating in the 2019-2020 class of Federal Executive Fellows at Brookings share their expert insights about the effects that the coronavirus pandemic is having on the readiness of their respective services, and how their services are responding to the crisis. http://directory.libsyn.com/episode/index/id/14065544 Brookings…

       




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Addressing COVID-19 in resource-poor and fragile countries

Responding to the coronavirus as individuals, society, and governments is challenging enough in the United States and other developed countries with modern infrastructure and stable systems, but what happens when a pandemic strikes poor and unstable countries that have few hospitals, lack reliable electricity, water, and food supplies, don’t have refrigeration, and suffer from social…

       




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Improving youth summer jobs programs

Event Information

July 14, 2016
10:00 AM - 12:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium

1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Register for the Event



Youth summer jobs programs have experienced a resurgence of interest and investment since the Great Recession, driven by concerns about high unemployment rates among young people, particularly those who are low-income, black, or Hispanic. Recent research points to summer jobs programs as a positive lever for change by reducing violence, incarceration, and mortality and improving academic outcomes.They are often a jurisdiction’s most high-profile youth employment initiative.

But good intentions do not always lead to results. Research has not yet linked summer jobs programs to improved employment outcomes, evaluations to date are silent on effective program design, and in the absence of agreed-upon standards and best practices, there is no guarantee of quality.They are complicated and labor-intensive to operate, and many jurisdictions had to re-build their programs after a long hiatus following the end of dedicated federal funding in the late 1990s.

On Thursday, July 14, the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program hosted an event that explored core elements associated with high-performing programs and made recommendations to strengthen summer jobs programs. The event featured a presentation on the finding of a new paper by Brookings fellow Martha Ross and co-author Richard Kazis, titled, “Youth Summer Jobs Programs: Aligning Ends and Means,” followed by a response panel, comprised of leaders from metro areas across the country.  

Join the conversation on Twitter at #SummerJobs


Presentation by Martha Ross


Photo


From left to right: Richard Kazis, Nonresident Fellow, The Brookings Institution; Kerry Sullivan, President, Bank of America Charitable Foundation; Honorable Michael A. Nutter, Former Mayor, City of Philadelphia;  Ana Galeas, Summer Camp Counselor, DC Scores, and Participant, Mayor Marion S. Barry Summer Youth Employment Program; Michael Gritton, Executive Directlor, KentuckianaWorks


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Audio

Transcript

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Israel’s changing regional landscape in light of COVID-19

The novel coronavirus pandemic will shape the politics and economics of the Middle East in both the immediate and long term. As the pandemic’s repercussions will be felt far beyond public health, many of the dynamics that were set in motion before this crisis will be accelerated by its onset. While Israel closely watches the…

       




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Coronavirus is also a threat to democratic constitutions

It has become a truism to assert that the pandemic highlights the enduring importance of the nation-state. What is less clear, but as important, is what it does to nation-states’ operating systems: their constitutions. Constitutions provide the legal principles for the governance of states, and their relationships with civil society. They are the rule books…

       




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Can the US sue China for COVID-19 damages? Not really.

       




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Webinar: Policing in the era of COVID-19

The consequences of the novel coronavirus pandemic stretch across the entirety of government services. Major police agencies have reported absentee rates as high as 20% due to officers who are either themselves afflicted with the virus or in need of self-quarantine. Reported crimes are generally down in America’s cities as a result of the many…

       




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Going Partisan: Presidential Leadership in a Polarized Political Environment

Brandon Rottinghaus articulates and finds support for an alternative strategy to the “going public” presidential leadership tactic. With the United States currently experiencing a hyper-polarized political environment, he argues that the president’s goal in “going partisan” is to directly mobilize local partisans and leaning partisans and indirectly engender greater party support of the president’s party within Congress. Ultimately there is a tradeoff with this strategy: while big losses are avoided and presidents can maintain a defensive position by keeping a minimum amount of opposition unified around the White House’s agenda, the fact remains that fewer substantial policy innovations or major agenda items are likely to be initiated or maintained.  

      
 
 




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Book Review of Al From’s Reflections on the Creation and Rise of the DLC

Phillip Wallach reviews Al From’s new political memoir, The New Democrats and the Return to Power (2013). The book contains a wealth of historical material, including From’s time working in the Clinton transition team from 1992-1993 and his efforts to spread a progressive Third Way abroad during the late 1990s.  One lesson in particular stands out: institutional change is a long slog, requiring a combination of fertile political conditions and reformers well prepared to seize their moment. Yet From notes that a Democratic Leadership Council-style turnaround will be harder for Republicans today because today’s Republicans are more homogeneous and less inclusive than the Democrats of the 1980s.

      
 
 




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Turning Around Downtown: Twelve Steps to Revitalization

This paper lays out the fundamentals of a downtown turnaround plan and the unique "private/public" partnership required to succeed. Beginning with visioning and strategic planning to the reemergence of an office market at the end stages, these 12 steps form a template for returning "walkable urbanism" downtown.

Though every downtown is different there are still common revitalization lessons that can be applied anywhere. While any approach must be customized based on unique physical conditions, institutional assets, consumer demand, history, and civic intent, this paper lays out the fundamentals of a downtown turnaround plan and the unique "private/public" partnership required to succeed. Beginning with visioning and strategic planning to the reemergence of an office market at the end stages, these 12 steps form a template for returning "walkable urbanism" downtown.

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The National Trend of Downtown Revitalization

In this speech at the annual meeting of the Downtown Detroit Partnership, Chris Leinberger discussed the downtown Detroit strategic planning process Brookings has started in partnership with the University of Michigan.

The metro program hosts and participates in a variety of public forums. To view a complete list of these events, please visit the metro program's Speeches and Events page which provides copies of major speeches, PowerPoint presentations, event transcripts, and event summaries.

Selected Media Coverage
Expert Offers Tips to Give Downtown a Lift
UM Land-Use Strategist: Detroit Poised for Downtown Redevelopment

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Publication: Downtown Detroit Partnership
     
 
 




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Where the Next $30 Trillion Will Be Invested in the Built Environment Between Now and 2025

During his presentation at the University of Michigan/Urban Land Institute Real Estate Forum, Christopher B. Leinberger discusses the impact walkable urbane places has and will have on metropolitan development patterns, the market reasons for this change and how to strategically manage it.

This video is no longer available

Publication: University of Michigan/Urban Land Institute Real Estate Forum
     
 
 




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Africa in the News: John Kerry’s upcoming visit to Kenya and Djibouti, protests against Burundian President Nkurunziza’s bid for a third term, and Chinese investments in African infrastructure


John Kerry to travel to Kenya and Djibouti next week

Exactly one year after U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s last multi-country tour of sub-Saharan Africa, he is preparing for another visit to the continent—to Kenya and Djibouti from May 3 to 5, 2015. In Kenya, Kerry and a U.S. delegation including Linda Thomas-Greenfield, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, will engage in talks with senior Kenyan officials on U.S.-Kenya security cooperation, which the U.S. formalized through its Security Governance Initiative (SGI) at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit last August. Over the past several years, the U.S. has increased its military assistance to Kenya and African Union (AU) troops to combat the Somali extremist group al-Shabab and has conducted targeted drone strikes against the group’s top leaders.  In the wake of the attack on Kenya’s Garissa University by al-Shabab, President Obama pledged U.S. support for Kenya, and Foreign Minister Amina Mohamed has stated that Kenya is currently seeking additional assistance from the U.S. to strengthen its military and intelligence capabilities.

Kerry will also meet with a wide array of leaders from Kenya’s private sector, civil society, humanitarian organizations, and political opposition regarding the two countries’ “common goals, including accelerating economic growth, strengthening democratic institutions, and improving regional security,” according to a U.S. State Department spokesperson. These meetings are expected to build the foundation for President Obama’s trip to Kenya for the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in July of this year.

On Tuesday, May 5, Kerry will become the first sitting secretary of state to travel to Djibouti. There, he will meet with government officials regarding the evacuation of civilians from Yemen and also visit Camp Lemonnier, the U.S. military base from which it coordinates its counterterror operations in the Horn of Africa region.

Protests erupt as Burundian president seeks third term

This week saw the proliferation of anti-government street demonstrations as current President Pierre Nkurunziza declared his candidacy for a third term, after being in office for ten years.  The opposition has deemed this move as “unconstitutional” and in violation of the 2006 Arusha peace deal which ended the civil war. Since the announcement, hundreds of civilians took to the streets of Bujumbura, despite a strong military presence. At least six people have been killed in clashes between police forces and civilians. 

Since the protests erupted, leading human rights activist Pierre-Claver Mbonimpa has been arrested alongside more than 200 protesters. One of Burundi’s main independent radio stations was also suspended as they were covering the protests.  On Wednesday, the government blocked social media platforms, including Twitter and Facebook, declaring them important tools in implementing and organizing protests. Thursday, amid continuing political protests, Burundi closed its national university and students were sent home. 

Amid the recent protests, Burundi’s constitutional court will examine the president’s third term bid. Meanwhile, U.N. secretary general Ban Ki-moon has sent his special envoy for the Great Lakes Region to hold a dialogue with president Nkurunziza and other government authorities. Senior U.S. diplomat Tom Malinowski also arrived in Bujumbura on Thursday to help defuse the biggest crisis the country has seen in the last few years, expressing disappointment over Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term.

China invests billions in African infrastructure

Since the early 2000s, China has become an increasingly significant source of financing for African infrastructure projects, as noted in a recent Brookings paper, “Financing African infrastructure: Can the world deliver?” This week, observers have seen an additional spike in African infrastructure investments from Chinese firms, as three major railway, real estate, and other infrastructure deals were struck on the continent, totaling nearly $7.5 billion in investments.

On Monday, April 27, the state-owned China Railway Construction Corp announced that it will construct a $3.5 billion railway line in Nigeria, as well as a $1.9 billion real estate project in Zimbabwe. Then on Wednesday, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (one of the country’s largest lenders) signed a $2 billion deal with the government of Equatorial Guinea in order to carry out a number of infrastructure projects throughout the country. These deals align with China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy of building infrastructure in Africa and throughout the developing world in order to further integrate their economies, stimulate economic growth, and ultimately increase demand for Chinese exports. For more insight into China’s infrastructure lending in Africa and the implications of these investments for the region’s economies, please see the following piece by Africa Growth Initiative Nonresident Fellow Yun Sun: “Inserting Africa into China’s One Belt, One Road strategy: A new opportunity for jobs and infrastructure?”

Authors

  • Amy Copley
     
 
 




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Saving Somalia (Again)


In early May 2015, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry made a historic but little noticed visit to Somalia, a country no other U.S. secretary of state had ever visited. His trip symbolized both how far Somalia has come—from the blackest days of civil war, clan infighting, and famine in the 1990s; to the brutal rule of the jihadi group al Shabab in the late 2000s; to something getting closer to normal now—and how very far it still has to go.

The fact that a high U.S. official could enter the country at all speaks of real security improvements. During his visit, moreover, Kerry announced the reopening of a U.S. embassy in Somalia, which had been closed since 1991 when the government of long-term dictator Siad Barre collapsed. But the fact that Kerry’s visit was a brief few hours—during which he did not even leave the heavily-guarded Mogadishu airport—also points to deep and persistent security challenges. Moreover, his meeting with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud and Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke comes at a time when the relationship between international donors and the Somali government has soured and the Somali people have grown increasingly weary of their government. The early optimism that the 2012 election of Mohamoud by appointed members of the Somali parliament would usher in badly needed changes in Somali politics, toward inclusiveness, effectiveness, and accountability, dissipated long ago.

Indeed, an observer’s bullishness about Somalia very much depends on his or her baseline. Compared to the early 1990s or 2011, when al Shabab controlled most of Mogadishu and most of central and southern Somalia, with only the semi-autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland escaping its grasp, Somalia is in much better shape. However, when compared to the spring of 2013, when I took a previous research trip there, the 2015 spring (my latest trip), and summer hardly look peppy. Security is tenuous, with al Shabab and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces stuck in a draw, and politics has been regressing to many of the same old discouraging patterns.

The rest of 2015 and 2016 are important times for Somalia. They could either resurrect optimism about the country’s progress or reinforce disappointment. The current AMISOM mandate expires in November 2015. By 2016, as a compact between the international donors and Somalia government specifies, presidential elections are supposed to take place, a constitution redrafting is to be finished, and the transformation of a centralized state into a federal one with states formed is to be completed. From the perspective of the middle of 2015, this agenda looks daunting.

AL SHABAB’S BATTLEFIELD

After struggling against al Shabab for several years and hunkering down in a few blocks of Mogadishu, AMISOM forces, with the assistance of international private security companies and international funding, finally began to reverse the al Shabab tide in 2011. As clan militias defected from al Shabab, AMISOM succeeded in pushing the terrorist group out of Somalia’s major cities. U.S. air and Special Forces attacks against al Shabab leadership eliminated some key figures, such as the group’s amir, Ahmed Godane, in September 2014 and its previous leader, Aden Ayro, in May 2008.

That said, al Shabab is hardly defeated—even if its membership is thought to be down to around 6,000, with the most potent and hardcore Amniyat branch down to perhaps 1,500. (Such estimates, given by Somali government officials and international military advisors, need to be taken with a grain of salt, since the capacity of insurgent groups to replenish their ranks often outpaces the capacity of counterinsurgent forces to kill or arrest the groups’ members.) The group’s spectacular terrorist attacks in Kenya and Uganda, such as the one on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall in September 2013 and on a teaching college in the city of Garissa in April 2015, don’t necessarily mean that al Shabab has lost the capacity to operate in Somalia. In fact, if anything, al Shabab’s operations have become more targeted and more effective, and generate more casualties with the militant group losing fewer fighters. The fact that the group has deeply infiltrated Somali military and police forces helps it in that regard.

Although AMISOM still holds the major cities that it won back from al Shabab as part of the 2014 Operation Eagle and Operation Indian Ocean, al Shabab’s presence in supposedly liberated cities is often robust. The group extorts shopkeepers and intimidates the local population with threatening night letters that regularly appear in public spaces. People routinely receive cell phone texts such as “You forgot to pay your zakat (religious tax); tomorrow we cannot guarantee your security.” Such intimidation is prevalent even in Kismayo, a strategic port in the southern region of Juba that used to be a key source of revenue for al Shabab from customs and smuggling items like charcoal. Kismayo, and the newly-formed state of Jubaland, are controlled by Ahmed Madobe, who defected from his role as al Shabab commander several years ago and, with the support of Kenyan forces, took control of the area and declared himself president of the state.

Over the past year, al Shabab attacks have also escalated in Mogadishu. Assassinations are a daily occurrence. Many government officials have to live and work (often in the same room) in hotels close to the Mogadishu airport, a palpable symptom of the decline in confidence and sense of security since 2013. The fact that some assassinations are actually perpetrated by rival politicians, warlords, and businessmen, with al Shabab happily taking the credit, does not lessen the sense of insecurity.

Al Shabab also controls roads and limits AMISOM’s movement. Attacks on AMISOM convoys and IEDs are frequent. In fact, despite its two much-touted offensive operations last year, AMISOM is mostly in defensive garrison mode. Rarely does it actually fight al Shabab; in advance of AMISOM’s clearing operations, al Shabab often disperses. Usually, by the time AMISOM arrives, it finds a ghost village (sometimes destroyed by al Shabab). AMISOM leaves, and al Shabab comes back from the bush. Often locals, at best, sit on the fence and, at worst, continue to support al Shabab because of their calculation that al Shabab will ultimately be the dominant force in their area.

That does not mean that Somalis actually like al Shabab: Its brutality is still shocking; memories of the militant group’s aggravation of the 2011 famine are still vivid; and al Shabab has hardly been a competent ruler enabling local economic growth. Instead, the group often tried to suppress or undermine vital economic markets, such as in qat. And, thanks to its control of the roads, ordinary Somalis fear traveling on them. Those who are willing have to be prepared to pay bribes of about $30 dollars to travel to Mogadishu from Merka and over a $100 to travel from there to Kismayo. Only the wealthy can absorb such costs, increasing Somalis’ frustration and sense of insecurity. Likewise, urban Somalis are quick to point out that inflation, including the cost of basic food items, has significantly increased since deliveries must now either come by air, be smuggled in, or are levied with substantial extortion fees and illegal taxes.

STUCK IN THE SAND WITH AMISOM

On the other side of the fighting, AMISOM nominally numbers 22,000 soldiers from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. It could and should be much more efficient in its fight against al Shabab. But it is not clear how many soldiers are actually on the ground at any one point. The capacity and training of the AMISOM deployments varies widely across the countries. Some of the forces, such as those from Burundi, do not speak English and have little training overall. Many of these militaries were built during their country’s own political revolutions and have had little deployment or battle experience since. Very few of the deployed troops have had any counterinsurgency training and they lack logistics, medevac, and intelligence and reconnaissance support. AMISOM was to be equipped with ten helicopters, with Uganda promising to provide four and the other United Nations member states the rest. Three, however, crashed into Mt. Kenya as they were flying from Uganda to Somalia, and Uganda is now in dispute with the international community over who will pay for the destroyed aircraft.

Moreover, the original expectation that a United Nations force would eventually replace AMISOM has long since died. Nor do the AMISOM forces necessarily want to get out of Somalia (or fully defeat al Shabab): The international funding they receive for their effort makes for good living for their soldiers and a substantial financial boost for their military institutions. Moreover, their presence in Somalia allows them to pursue their regional interests and enhance their importance with the broader international community.

AMISOM has weak headquarters to which few member countries pass on any information, let alone intelligence, or bother to coordinate. Some AMISOM commanders maintain highly personalized and sometimes outright subversive agendas: There are credible rumors that AMISOM units have sold fuel and arms to al Shabab or looted humanitarian convoys.

The fact that AMISOM is organized into five sectors operated mostly by one of the AMISOM member countries does not help with coordination and planning. The division of the sectors reflects the strategic interests of the intervening forces. Kenya and Ethiopia, although they have suspended some of their mutual rivalries, still mostly cultivate proxies in their sectors to create buffer areas, prevent the leakage of terrorism into their countries, disrupt support for separatists within their own countries, and project land and sea power. Offensive operations are decided mostly on a sector basis, with the forces in each area reporting and taking orders from their own capitals. Whether captured weapons are handed over to Somali forces varies by sector. So does how al Shabab terrorists are dealt with. There is little coordination among the sectors and little planning at AMISOM headquarters; in fact, they are generally only interested in working together when headquarters has something to offer to them, such as logistical support via the United Nations.

Not surprisingly, it has been hard for AMISOM to hold and build a “cleared” territory. At first, AMISOM forces exhibited little interest in providing any governance functions or even conducting stabilization operations, such as repairing bridges or providing clean water systems. They expected the Somali security forces and government to do so. But Somalia hasn’t been able to because local governance structures are frequently destroyed, blocked off by al Shabab, dominated by problematic powerbrokers, or lack resources. And so AMISOM has come under pressure from the United States and the international community to take over these stabilization functions.

Pushing AMISOM into stabilization operations is a difficult call. On the one hand, it should be the responsibility of the local and national government to administer its territory, and the credit for doing so should accrue to the Somali government, not to foreign forces. On the other hand, local communities are frustrated by the lack of security and services after AMISOM clears a territory. In either case, it isn’t clear that AMISOM militaries could do much better at governance, since they, too, lack resources and training. And the political sensitivities abound. Somalis do not see themselves as African, but rather as Arab; and al Shabab can easily label Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia as Christian invaders. Although Somalis are deeply divided along scores of clan divisions, they also identify as nationalists, opposing foreign intervention.

If AMISOM does take on a stabilization role, it should be limited, discreet, and concrete, including short-term support for building water and other infrastructure. One of the current ideas is to deliver quick-impact projects only when some, even interim, local authority has been created and is supported by local peace committees consisting of clan elders, imams, women’s groups, businessmen, and civil society members. Even though the projects could still become fronts for graft, any accountability is better than none.

SOMALI NATIONAL FORCES IN TATTERS

Another major official combatant in the war is Somalia’s own forces, consisting of the army, police, and militarized intelligence service. They have not been able to provide stabilization operations on their own because, as still mostly a collection of disparate militias, they lack the capacity. They remain beholden to clans and powerbrokers, and lack both a national ethos and training. When pressure rises, they mostly fall apart or return to militia behavior. Underpaid and often not paid for months, they frequently resort to selling their equipment to obtain some income. They are also notoriously infiltrated by al Shabab. The paramilitary intelligence service run by the National Intelligence and Security Agency, and the preferred partner of U.S. and Ethiopian counterterrorism efforts, is somewhat better, but also rather brutal and beholden to clan politics.

Not surprisingly, the Somali people do not trust their national forces. Although the federal government nominally controls the national forces (while explicitly not controlling regional militia forces), its presence beyond Mogadishu is limited and it depends on AMISOM and international support for protection from al Shabab and rival powerbrokers. In order to wean itself off AMISOM, defeat al Shabab, and suppress regional conflicts, Somalia’s national forces would need to be significantly bigger than they are now at about 10,000 fighters. But donors, aware that a large percentage of foreign military aid disappears into personal pockets of Somali politicians, are reluctant to commit more money for larger Somali security forces.

The security forces of the semi-autonomous state of Puntland are somewhat more capable, but insecurity in Puntland, too, has been increasing since al Shabab was pushed into the state from central Somalia. Numbering perhaps about 4,000, the forces include a state-armed militia/police force known as darawish as well as other police forces and custodial forces. Many other unofficial entities also operate in Puntland, including the Puntland Security Force, which is paid by the United States to fight al Shabab and presumably reports to the Puntland president, and the Puntland Maritime Police Force, which is paid for by the United Arab Emirates. The latter was originally created to fight pirates, although recently it has also apparently been dispatched to fight al Shabab in the Galgadud area. The Puntland government has little interest in integrating these forces into the Somali national armed forces.

Somaliland remains the most secure part of Somalia with the best functioning government­—although, of course, the local leadership there continues to want to secede from the country and establish independence. Mediation talks in Ankara facilitated by Turkey collapsed in the spring of 2015. Since then, Somaliland has been preoccupied by presidential and parliamentary elections for the state government, which were to be held on June 26, 2015. But despite popular demand and strong pressure from international donors, the elections were delayed by at least 17 months due to a lack of preparedness, (as they had previously been in Puntland). This delay undermines governance and accountability in the state.

THE VICIOUS CIRCLE

It is not just security that has been sliding in Somalia for the past year and half. Equally, the sense of political momentum has dissipated. In 2013, there was a great deal of optimism among the Somalis whom I interviewed that Somalia hit rock bottom in 2011 and that the pernicious clan politics that plagued the country for the past three decades have ended. They placed a great deal of hope in their President, Mohamoud. A Somali professor and member of the country’s civil society, he was not a former warlord nor a member of the diaspora parachuted in. And although he was elected by a parliament of appointed (or self-appointed) clan elders and former warlords, he was not seen as beholden to any particular clan. The international community, including the United Kingdom and the United States, also embraced him.

But that was then. With little control over the country’s armed forces and budget, and unable to tackle pervasive and extensive corruption, the president fell back on one source of support: his Hawiye clan. And so the cycle of exclusionary politics began again, privileging access to business deals for his supporters and promoting clan backers for government positions.

Mohamoud’s government was soon paralyzed by the infighting between him and his prime ministers (a familiar story in Somalia over the past decade), whom he would repeatedly seek to replace. The Somali constitution makes the president the symbol of authority, but his role and relationship with the prime minister is not clearly defined. Ultimately, the constitution is generally interpreted as mandating a Hawiye president and a Darod prime minister. That design is meant to encourage inclusiveness. In truth, however, it mostly led to a struggle between the president and prime minister, mimicking the power fights between the two main clans.

The constant turnover of government officials at the federal and subnational levels is another major problem: With appointments often lasting only a few weeks, officials have far more interest in quickly making money and placing allies in other public sector positions than in governing effectively and building equitable and accountable state institutions—or any institutions for that matter.

To give itself legitimacy, the government has embraced a brand of conservative Islam that is not as far from al Shabab’s teachings as many would like. The president is reputed to have admiration for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and is said to consider Mohamad Morsi, the imprisoned former Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated president of Egypt, a personal friend.

Indeed, the contest for political legitimacy in Somalia revolves around four elements: Who is more Islamic? Who is more nationalistic? Who delivers better security? And who is less corrupt and delivers better services? For years, the Somali federal government has struggled to win on any of these fronts. And it has exhibited little recognition of, or interest in, the problems of clan marginalization and poor governance, even though these grievances thrust Somalis into al Shabab’s hands.

To address some of these problems, under a 2013 compact between the international community and Somalia, Somalia was supposed to hit three milestones by 2016: hold presidential elections; adopt a new constitution; and form subnational states. All are important, and none is easy to do, much less do well, in the given timeframe. Yet international donors, not wanting to repeat their frequent sin of setting up conditions but still delivering aid after a Somali government fails to meet them, are loath to relax the 2016 timeline.

Pervasive insecurity makes holding national elections difficult. It also enables fraud and heightens feelings of purposeful exclusion. AMISOM has helped little when it comes to providing security for a vote. And the government has made few preparations itself. So far, there is not even a voter registry. In late May 2015, the Somali government launched a census effort (a step toward creating a voter registry). However, the census itself could lead to new conflict, particularly if the resulting counts of the Hawiye, Darod, and other clans and subclans make any one group unhappy—as is almost sure to happen. Meanwhile, the fact that the independent electoral commission is located within the presidential palace of Villa Somalia, even if for legitimate security reasons, makes it seem potentially biased and illegitimate.

But there is little alternative to holding a national election. Many Somalis want to see a change in government; and international donors are also increasingly frustrated with the current one. Perhaps the president could again be appointed by members of parliament, with all the legitimacy limits such a process brings. Ultimately, though, a vote and the creation of real political parties is important. It is the only way to realign Somali politics away from narrow clan parochialism and individual patronage networks and toward broader national representation and coalitions. But few Somali powerbrokers have an interest in allowing their formation; even under the best of circumstances, they will not materialize by the 2016 election.

It is also possible that the international community will agree to postpone the elections. It did so in Puntland, it now has to live with it in Somaliland; and it may do so again at the national level. Even if national elections do not take place, it is worth considering whether some subnational elections (such as for the mayor of Mogadishu) could be held to facilitate greater accountability.

The next task is revising the constitution in a way that increases inclusiveness. Donors do not want the redrafting process to drag on for years, as it has in Nepal for over a decade. Somalis are already disappointed with initial drafts, though: Quotas for women have disappeared from the constitution, and progressives have little faith that the current language—women should have a “meaningful representation” in all elected and appointed positions—will achieve progress. Moreover, the constitution drafters are still to tackle some of the most politically contentious issues, including how power (including arms, taxes, and other resources) will be distributed between the center and the newly forming states.

But the fact that Mogadishu has accepted federalism and power decentralization is perhaps the greatest political accomplishment in years. Competition over who controls Mogadishu and crucial resources has, for years, been a major source of conflict and corruption. Few outside of the capital, including Hawiye clans who dominate business there, want to be ruled by it.

However, there is as yet little agreement about the relative balance of power between the center and subnational states, including whether they will be allowed to retain their militia forces as some sort of paramilitary police. In the Jubaland State, Madobe, whose self-declared presidency was accepted by Mogadishu on an interim basis in 2013 for two years, has so far shown no inclination to give up control of any of his forces. In the Southwest State that has also been formed, local state officials decry the absence, incompetence, and untrustworthiness of national forces and clamor for their own armed services.

In both Jubaland and Southwest States, the state formation process was unable to avoid fighting between warlord and clan forces over which areas would be included in which state and under whose control. In Jubaland, the process ended with Madobe’s victory over the forces of Barre Hirale’s (who are still mostly hiding in the bush). In the Southwest State, the two local rivals created a coalition government, with over 60 ministers and plenty of built-in political dysfunction, nepotism, and paralysis. State formation still needs to be completed in other areas, such as the Shabelle. In April 2015, a state-formation conference was launched for the Central Regions State. Some representatives continue to question whether six states are enough and others are debating which state their territory should belong to.

How to generate revenues is another major challenge in the federalization process. Neither the state governments nor the national one trusts the other to share revenues: The states do not want to give up land taxes to the federal state; but the federal government strongly dislikes the idea of having to rely only on the tax revenues from fisheries and maritime routes. And the promise of potentially huge mineral resources under the Somali sand only makes the federal versus state competition more intense.

How control is devolved matters a lot. The biggest danger is that the exclusionary politics over spoils and war rents that have dominated Mogadishu for so long will be replicated at the local level. And given how the state formation processes have been going, there are reasons to fear that the clientalistic patronage networks that systematically discriminate against rivals will be reestablished at the state level. In some areas, especially in the Juba Valley, that is already underway, creating a significant number of internally displaced people and potentially allowing al Shabab to insert itself into the area on the side of the oppressed.

IT’S GOOD GOVERNANCE, STUPID

Over the past few decades, international actors have not paid enough attention to subnational governance in Somalia, and they are running that risk again. Many, including the United States, focus predominantly on the problem of al Shabab, even though al Shabab is merely the latest result of poor governance. Many of the crucial donors lack presence outside of Mogadishu, which limits their understanding of life at the regional, town, and village levels. Local peace committees of clan elders, imams, and representatives of civil society and the business community can be an important mechanism of better governance. But the international donors need to work with them, and to be aware of the politics behind the peace committees—such as, for example, of who is selected for them and who is excluded. Other international actors, such as Kenya and Ethiopia, often embrace problematic powerbrokers for the sake of their strategic and counterterrorism interests, even though these powerbrokers ultimately undermine stability.

Fundamentally, whether Somalia succeeds in breaking out of decades of conflict, famine, misery, corruption, and misgovernance depends on the Somali people. It depends on whether a sufficient constituency for better governance and less conflict eventually emerges or whether Somali businessmen and politicians continue to find the way to work around conflict or make money from it while the Somali people eke out survival amidst the harshest conditions without mobilizing for change. Since 2012, Somalia has had one of the best chances to pull off such transformation in years. It should not waste it.

This article was originally published by Foreign Affairs.

Publication: Foreign Affairs
Image Source: © Feisal Omar / Reuters
     
 
 




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Bolivian re-elections: Slaves of the people or the institutions


Recently, Bolivian President Evo Morales declared himself a “slave of the people” and said he is backing the proposed constitutional reform that would enable him to seek re-election in 2019 if that’s what the citizens want. Last Saturday, September 26, the Legislative Assembly partially amended the Constitution (by a two-thirds majority), authorizing Morales to run for the presidency once again in 2019. February 21, 2016 is set as the date of the popular referendum to validate or reject the amendment.

This amendment allows presidential re-election for two consecutive terms, rather than just one re-election, as dictated by the previous constitutional provision. The change takes into account the current presidential term (2015-2020) and clarifies that Evo and his vice president are authorized to run only one more time, that is, to seek re-election only for the 2020 to 2025 period. The opposition immediately denounced the amendment as “tailoring the law to the needs of one person”.

It should be noted that Morales and García ran and won in the 2005, 2009, and 2014 elections. The current term is the second consecutive term under the new Bolivian Constitution (adopted in 2009) and the third since they were first elected, in 2005. If he wins the elections scheduled for 2019, Evo would become one of the leaders to hold power the longest in Bolivia and throughout Latin America.

Re-election fever

This constitutional amendment, recently adopted in Bolivia, is not an isolated event. Rather, it fits within a regional trend toward re-election that has been gaining ground in Latin America over the past 20 years.

While the region ushered in democracy in the late 1970s and many clearly opposing re-election, this situation changed dramatically a few years later. The first wave of reforms favorable to immediate or consecutive re-election came in the first half of the 1990s with the impetus of Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1993), Carlos Menem in Argentina (1994), and Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil (1997). From then on, several more presidents introduced reforms during their administrations to keep themselves in power. A second wave of reforms, led by Hugo Chávez, took place in the middle of the last decade, with a view to moving from immediate re-election to indefinite re-election. Chávez secured this objective via referendum in 2009.

Chávez’s example was reproduced by Daniel Ortega in 2014 in Nicaragua (the second country to allow indefinite re-election). Currently one more president, Rafael Correa (Ecuador), is promoting a reform along similar lines.

Recent reforms and trends

The years 2014 and 2015 have been full of news a about re-election. In the last 20 years the Dominican Republic has led in the number of re-election related reforms, with four from 1994 to 2015. The most recent, in July 2015, has re-established immediate re-election, enabling President Danilo Medina to run once again in May 2016 elections to aspire to a second consecutive term.

Two more countries have moved in what some might call extreme directions in 2014 and 2015. Nicaragua eliminated any impediment to re-election from the constitution in January of 2014, while Colombia moved in the opposite direction when they approved a reform prohibiting presidential re-election, in June 2015, a decade after re-election was first adopted.

On April 22, 2015, the Honduran Supreme Court declared the articles of the constitution that prohibited presidential re-election inapplicable. These articles also punished public officials and any other citizen who proposed or supported amending them, as these articles were considered not subject to reform. In 2009 the effort to call a National Constitutional Assembly after a non-binding consultation to amend the constitution and do away with this provision, led to the coup d’état that removed former President Zelaya from office.

In Brazil, the Chamber of Deputies cast an initial vote in 2015 in favor of eliminating re-elections, which is now being examined in the Senate. Most analysts consider it likely that the senate will adopt a similar position as the lower house, i.e. in favor of doing away with re-election.

Finally, one should note the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, countries in which efforts are under way to amend the constitutions in relation to elections, in the terms analyzed above.

As a result of the reforms of the last few years, at this time 14 of the 18 countries in the region allow re-election, albeit with different specific rules. Venezuela (since 2009) and Nicaragua (since 2014) are the only countries so far that allow indefinite re-election. In five countries – Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic – consecutive re-election is allowed, but not indefinitely (only one re-election is permitted). Nonetheless, presidents who re-founded the institutional order through constitutional assemblies have been able to benefit from a third term, leaving out the first term on the argument that it pre-dated the constitutional reforms (Bolivia and Ecuador). To these five countries we should added the above-mentioned case of Honduras.

In six other countries one can return to the presidency after an interval of one or two presidential terms. These are Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. As we have observed, only four countries have an absolute prohibition on any type of re-election, namely Mexico, Guatemala, Paraguay, and, since last July, Colombia.

My opinion

This re-election fever is bad news for a region like ours given the institutional weaknesses, the crisis of the political parties, the growing personalization of politics, and, in several countries, hyper-presidentialism.

Something is very wrong when a president of a democracy considers himself or herself as indispensable as to change the constitution in order to stay in power. As Pope Francis noted recently; “a good leader is one who is capable of bringing up other leaders. If a leader wants to lead alone, he is a tyrant. True leadership is fruitful.”

“The leaders of today will not be here tomorrow. If they do not plant the seed of leadership in others, they are worthless. They are dictators,” he concluded.

I agree with Pope Francis. The health of a democracy depends essentially on its ability to limit the power of those in government so they cannot reshape the law to fit their personal ambitions. In other words, democracy in Latin America does not need leaders who are slaves of the people, but who are slaves to the law and the institutions.

This piece was originally published by International IDEA.

Authors

Publication: International IDEA
Image Source: © David Mercado / Reuters
      
 
 




vi

The case for reinvigorating U.S. efforts in Afghanistan


President Obama is right to keep at it in Afghanistan, argues a new policy brief by Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow and director of research for the Brookings Foreign Policy program.

Some have criticized the president’s decision to maintain a significant troop presence there (5,500 troops), instead of following through on the planned military withdrawal. But Afghanistan remains very important to American security, O’Hanlon contends, and the situation in the country is far from hopeless in spite of recent setbacks. We should reinvigorate American efforts in Afghanistan, he argues—not returning to levels seen in previous years, but ramping up somewhat from our current posture.

O’Hanlon calls Obama’s resolve in Afghanistan commendable, but writes that he and his administration are still making mistakes on U.S. policy toward the war-torn country. He advises that Washington make two specific changes to its military strategy in Afghanistan:

  1. Allow U.S. and NATO airpower to target the Islamic State and the Taliban (currently, they can only fight those groups if directly attacked). The narrow rules of engagement constraining foreign forces were intended to push Afghan armed forces to defend their territory themselves. While a worthy goal, O’Hanlon says, these rules often prevent us from attacking ISIS (though the targeting strategy towards the group may be changing) as well as the Taliban. They also impose unrealistically high demands on Afghan forces and make too fine a distinction between an array of aligned extremist groups operating in the country.
  2. Expand U.S. force presence from the current 5,500 troops to around 12,000 for a few years. In O’Hanlon’s opinion, our current numbers are not enough to work with fielded Afghan forces, and skimping on ground forces has contributed to security challenges in places like Helmand, for instance, which experienced new setbacks in 2015. More broadly, leaders in Washington and Brussels should stress the value of a long-term NATO-Afghanistan partnership, rather than emphasizing an exit strategy. This will signal Western resolve to the Taliban and other groups. While the next commander in chief should set the United States on a gradual path toward downsizing American troops in Afghanistan, he believes it would be a mistake for Obama to do so in the short term.

The long haul

O’Hanlon also argues that the United States needs to take a longer-term perspective on key political and economic issues in Afghanistan. On the economic front, there seems to be little thinking about an agricultural development plan for Afghanistan, associated infrastructure support, and land reform, among other challenges. On the political front, conversations often tend to focus on shorter-term issues like organizing parliamentary elections, reforming the Independent Election Commission, or modifying the current power-sharing arrangement. In the process, conversations about foundational political strategy focusing on Afghan institutions and the health of its democracy get short-changed. The parliament is in need of reforms, for instance, as is the political party system (which should encourage Afghans to group around ideas and policy platforms, rather than tribes and patronage networks).

O’Hanlon concludes that the situation in Afghanistan today, while fraught, is understandable given the Taliban’s resilience and NATO’s gradual withdrawal of 125,000 troops. We should not be despondent, he writes—rather, we should identify specific strategies that can help improve the situation. At the end of the day, Afghans must make the big decisions about the future of their country. But as long as the United States and its partners are still providing tremendous resources—and as long as security threats emanating from South Asia continue to threaten the United States—leaders in Washington should use their influence wisely.

Authors

  • Anna Newby
      
 
 




vi

What macroprudential policies are countries using to help their economies through the COVID-19 crisis?

Countries around the world are reeling from the health threat and economic and financial fallout from COVID-19. Legislatures are responding with massive relief programs. Central banks have lowered interest rates and opened lender-of-last-resort spigots to support the flow of credit and maintain financial market functioning. Authorities are also deploying macroprudential policies, many of them developed…

       




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Africa needs debt relief to fight COVID-19

After a slow start, COVID-19 has spread increasingly rapidly throughout Africa, with more than 7,000 confirmed cases and 294 deaths across 45 countries and two territories as of April 7. Unless the continent urgently receives more assistance, the virus will continue to cut a deadly and remorseless path across it, with ever grimmer health and economic consequences.…

       




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Africa in the news: COVID-19 impacts African economies and daily lives; clashes in the Sahel

African governments begin borrowing from IMF, World Bank to soften hit from COVID-19 This week, several countries and multilateral organizations announced additional measures to combat the economic fallout from COVID-19 in Africa. Among the actions taken by countries, Uganda’s central bank cut its benchmark interest rate by 1 percentage point to 8 percent and directed…

       




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COVID-19 and debt standstill for Africa: The G-20’s action is an important first step that must be complemented, scaled up, and broadened

African countries, like others around the world, are contending with an unprecedented shock, which merits substantial and unconditional financial assistance in the spirit of Draghi’s “whatever it takes.” The region is already facing an unprecedented synchronized and deep crisis. At all levels—health, economic, social—institutions are already overstretched. Africa was almost at a sudden stop economically…

       




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Africa in the news: South Africa looks to open up; COVID-19 complicates food security, malaria response

South Africa announces stimulus plan and a pathway for opening up As of this writing, the African continent has registered over 27,800 COVID-19 cases, with over 1,300 confirmed deaths, according to the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Countries around the continent continue to instate various forms of social distancing restrictions: For example, in…

       




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From rescue to recovery, to transformation and growth: Building a better world after COVID-19

       




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How to ensure Africa has the financial resources to address COVID-19

As countries around the world fall into a recession due to the coronavirus, what effects will this economic downturn have on Africa? Brahima S. Coulibaly joins David Dollar to explain the economic strain from falling commodity prices, remittances, and tourism, and also the consequences of a recent G-20 decision to temporarily suspend debt service payments…

       




vi

Moving beyond the Arab Spring


Five years have passed since several Arab countries revolted against their repressive regimes, and peace and stability are nowhere in sight. The unraveling of their political systems pushed these countries into challenging transition processes where violence is always a serious possibility. Yemen and Libya’s civil wars present blunt examples of failed transitions, raising concerns about protracted political instability, not only in those two countries, but potentially in neighboring ones as well. Tunisia theoretically managed to complete its transition successfully. It ratified a new constitution, addressing the need for a new social contract, and held two rounds of elections. Tunisia also passed a transitional justice law to provide a framework for adjudicating both victims’ grievances and perpetrators’ crimes of the past political era. Nonetheless, Tunisia finds its stability challenged by increasing levels of polarization between its various societal segments.

The fact of the matter is that political transitions take a long time—years if not decades—and transitioning countries face the risk of violence. Arab Spring societies are unlikely to transition to sustainable peace and stability as long as they are wracked by deep divisions. Therefore, national reconciliation is paramount to reducing the societal polarization that currently cripples Libya and Yemen and threatens Tunisia’s progress. To attain enduring peace and stability, post-revolution states must engage in inclusive national reconciliation processes, including a national dialogue, a truth-seeking effort, the reparation of victims’ past injuries, dealing with the former regime, and institutional reform. Women, civil society, and tribes, among other social forces, can support the transition process. Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia have each taken specific approaches to trying to reconcile their post-revolution societies, raising or diminishing the chances of civil war or a healthy transition.

An inclusive national dialogue is the starting point of a comprehensive national reconciliation process. It gives transitioning societies an opportunity to develop a vision and theoretical framework for their futures, gives legitimacy to transition processes, and encourages negotiation and compromise. Tunisia held a homegrown national dialogue driven mainly by civil society organizations and Yemen completed an eight-month, U.N.-assisted national dialogue conference. Libya’s engagement in U.N.-led negotiations raised questions over whether all parties had representation.

As each society suffered decades of repression and has a number of unanswered questions, investigating—and dealing with—the truth about the past is also essential. Relatedly, determining how to handle former regime elements has profound implications for post-revolution transitions. While Libya opted to purge all those who served in Muammar Qaddafi’s regime through adopting its “Political Isolation Law,” Yemen chose to grant President Ali Abdullah Saleh immunity from prosecution in return for his abdication—sacrificing justice to preserve peace. However, Saleh later returned to politics, allying with the Houthis to take over the state, meaning Yemen ultimately achieved neither justice nor peace. Tunisia, on the other hand, has adopted a transitional justice law that mandates, among other measures, the investigation and prosecution of the state’s crimes since 1955. While the resulting Truth and Dignity Commission has received thousands of complaints from victims of past abuses, progress has otherwise been slow, as the body has struggled to establish an effective organizational structure or execute a clearly defined work plan. Controversy over the selection of commissioners and an overall lack of publicity has also hindered the truth-seeking process.

Reparations are another important part of the pursuit of justice and healing. Done correctly, they can bring previously marginalized and abused segments of society back into the mainstream, where they can make positive contributions to the development of the country. Yemen and Tunisia experienced extensive human rights violations during the decades-long reigns of Saleh and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, while lacking the resources to engage in meaningful and comprehensive rehabilitation of victims of past abuses. This left the two countries’ transition processes struggling with a major component—the victims—feeling further marginalization added to their past traumas. Libya, however, who has the resources to fund a process of thorough rehabilitation of victims of its dictatorship, slid into civil war that prevented the proper addressing of past wounds.

Even if these societies overcome their polarization at the personal level, however, they will not accomplish successful transitions unless their healing is accompanied by institutional reforms. “Regime renovation” rather than “regime change” in Yemen presented a serious obstacle to deep reforms of state institutions, eventually leading to some segments of security units taking part in Saleh-Houthi coup against the transitional government. After the collapse of the Qaddafi regime, revolutionaries and militias demanded a purge as a method of institutional reform—similar to de-Baathification in Iraq. The purge contributed to the outbreak of a civil war. Tunisia, on the other hand, approached institutional reform from a different angle and succeeded in putting together a sound formula, but it is facing serious challenges to implementation.

Ultimately, a variety of actors have played key roles in Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia’s national reconciliation processes. In all three countries, women have been integral to bringing about change, and must continue to be involved in reshaping their countries. As agents of change, women helped to initiate the uprisings in Yemen and Libya, and have already proven to be effective agents of reconciliation. In Yemen and Libya, tribes are key stakeholders that must be incorporated after decades of manipulation and marginalization. Depending on the way they become involved, tribes could play key role in either stabilizing or destabilizing transitions. Domestic civil society groups have been essential to Tunisia’s progress so far, and are fast developing in Yemen and Libya. Their continued involvement—and assistance from international groups—will go a long way toward consolidating new states that honor human and civil rights.

The processes of national dialogue, truth seeking, reparation, accountability, and institutional reform, especially if supported by key agents of reconciliation, including women, civil society, and tribes, can combine to create the momentum needed to bridge divides and help post-Arab Spring societies move toward sustainable peace, stability, and development.

This piece was originally published on the Yale Press Blog.

For more of Ibrahim Fraihat’s analysis on Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia after the Arab Spring, read his new book “Unfinished Revolutions” (Yale University Press).  

Publication: Yale Press Blog
Image Source: © Khaled Abdullah Ali Al Mahdi
      
 
 




vi

Civil wars and U.S. engagement in the Middle East


"At the end of the day, we need to remember that Daesh is more a product of the civil wars than it is a cause of them. And the way that we’re behaving is we’re treating it as the cause.  And the problem is that in places like Syria, in Iraq, potentially in Libya, we are mounting these military campaigns to destroy Daesh and we’re not doing anything about the underlying civil wars.  And the real danger there is—we have a brilliant military and they may very well succeed in destroying Daesh—but if we haven’t dealt with the underlying civil wars, we’ll have Son of Daesh a year later." – Ken Pollack

“Part of the problem is how we want the U.S. to be more engaged and more involved and what that requires in practice. We have to be honest about a different kind of American role in the Middle East. It means committing considerable economic and political resources to this region of the world that a lot of Americans are quite frankly sick of… There is this aspect of nation-building that is in part what we have to do in the Middle East, help these countries rebuild, but we can’t do that on the cheap. We can’t do that with this relatively hands off approach.” – Shadi Hamid

In this episode of “Intersections,” Kenneth Pollack, senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy and Shadi Hamid, senior fellow in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World and author of "Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle over Islam is Reshaping the World," discuss the current state of upheaval in the Middle East, the Arab Spring, and the political durability of Islamist movements in the region. They also explain their ideas on how and why the United States should change its approach to the Middle East and areas of potential improvement for U.S. foreign policy in the region. 

Show Notes

Fight or flight: America’s choice in the Middle East

Security and public order

Islamists on Islamism today

Temptations of Power: Islamists & Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East

Ending the Middle East’s civil wars

A Rage for Order: The Middle East in turmoil, from Tahrir Square to ISIS

Building a better Syrian opposition army: How and why

With thanks to audio engineer and producer Zack Kulzer, Mark Hoelscher, Carisa Nietsche, Sara Abdel-Rahim, Eric Abalahin, Fred Dews and Richard Fawal.

Subscribe to the Intersections on iTunes, and send feedback email to intersections@brookings.edu.

Authors

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters
      
 
 




vi

How the Spread of Smartphones will Open up New Ways of Improving Financial Inclusion


It’s easy to imagine a future in a decade or less when most people will have a smartphone. In our recent paper Pathways to Smarter Digital Financial Inclusion, we explore the benefits of extending financial services to the mass of lower-income people in developing countries who are currently dubious of the value that financial services can bring to them, distrustful of formal financial institutions, or uncomfortable with the treatment they expect to receive.

The report analyzes six inherent characteristics of smartphones that have the potential to change market dynamics relative to the status quo of simple mobile phones and cards. 

Customer-Facing Changes:

1. The graphical user interface.
2. The ability to attach a variety of peripheral devices to it (such as a card reader or a small printer issuing receipts).
3. The lower marginal cost of mobile data communications relative to traditional mobile channels (such as SMS or USSD).

Service Provider Changes:

4. Greater freedom to program services without requiring the acquiescence or active participation of the telco.
5. Greater flexibility to distribute service logic between the handset (apps) and the network (servers).
6. More opportunities to capture more customer data with which to enhance customer value and stickiness.

Taken together, these changes may lower the costs of designing for lower-income people dramatically, and the designs ought to take advantage of continuous feedback from users. This should give low-end customers a stronger sense of choice over the services that are relevant to them, and voice over how they wish to be served and treated.

Traditionally poor people have been invisible to service providers because so little was known about their preferences that it was not possible build a service proposition or business case around them. The paper describes three pathways that will allow providers to design services on smartphones that will enable an increasingly granular understanding of their customers. Each of the three pathways offers providers a different approach to discover what they need to know about prospective customers in order to begin engaging with them. 

Pathway One: Through Big Data

Providers will piece together information on potential low-income customers directly, by assembling available data from disparate sources (e.g. history of airtime top-ups and bill payment, activity on online social networks, neighborhood or village-level socio-demographic data, etc.) and by accelerating data acquisition cycles (e.g. inferring behavior from granting of small loans in rapid succession, administering selected psychometric questions, or conducting A/B tests with special offers). There is a growing number of data analytics companies that are applying big data in this way to benefit the poor.

Pathway Two: Through local Businesses

Smartphones will have a special impact on micro and small enterprises, which will see increasing business benefits from recording and transacting more of their business digitally. As their business data becomes more visible to financial institutions, local firms will increasingly channel financial services, and particularly credit, to their customers, employees, and suppliers. Financial institutions will backstop their credit, which in effect turns smaller businesses into front-line distribution partners into local communities.

Pathway Three: Through Socio-Financial Networks

Firms view individuals primarily as managers of a web of socio-financial relationships that may or may not allow them access to formal financial services. Beyond providing loans to “creditworthy” people, financial institutions can provide transactional engines, similar to the crowdfunding platforms that enable all people to locate potential funding sources within their existing social networks. A provider equipped with appropriate network analysis tools could then promote rather than displace people´s own funding relationships and activities. This would provide financial service firms valuable insight into how people manage their financial needs.

The pathways are intended as an exploration of how smartphones could support the development of a healthier and more inclusive digital financial service ecosystem, by addressing the two critical deficiencies of the current mass-market digital finance systems. Smartphones could enable stronger customer value propositions, leading to much higher levels of customer engagement, leading to more revelation of customer data and more robust business cases for the providers involved. Mobile technology could also lead to a broader diversity of players coming into the space, each playing to their specific interests and contributing their specific set of skills, but together delivering customer value through the right combination of collaboration and competition.

Authors

  • Ignacio Mas
  • David Porteous
Image Source: © CHRIS KEANE / Reuters
      




vi

Financial inclusion panel highlights expanding services for the world’s unbanked


On August 26, the Brookings Institution hosted a panel discussion of the findings of the 2015 Financial and Digital Inclusion Project Report and Scorecard. Chief among the report’s findings was the rapid growth of financial products and services targeted at the world’s unbanked population.  Much of the growth stems from innovations in digital payments systems and non-bank financial services.  For example, systems like M-Pesa in Kenya allow customers to store money on their mobile phones and easily transfer it to other M-Pesa users.  Advancing financial inclusion will greatly benefit the two billion people worldwide that still lack access to any financial services.

The report itself ranks a set of 21 countries on four continents chosen for their efforts to promote financial inclusion.  The criteria used to score each country include country commitment, mobile capacity, regulatory environment, and adoption.  The results show that several pathways to financial inclusion exist, from mobile payments systems to so-called “branchless” banking services.  Places that lack traditional banks have seen financial inclusion driven by mobile operators, while others have experimented with third-party agent banking in areas that lack bank branches.   

The panel drew financial inclusion and mobile payments experts from the government, industry, and non-profit groups.  Each panelist touted the benefits of financial inclusion from their own perspective.  Women especially have much to gain from financial inclusion since they have historically faced the most obstacles to opening financial accounts.  In developing countries, a mobile payments system grants women greater privacy, control, and safety compared to cash payments.  Traceable digital payments also make it easier to combat corruption and money laundering.  Salaries paid to government employees and transfer payments to low-income households can be sent straight to a mobile payment account, eliminating opportunities for bribe seeking and theft. 

According to the panelists, financial inclusion can also drive economic growth in developing countries.  As financial services expand, they will also increase in sophistication, allowing customers to do more with their money.  For example, a payments record can be used to establish a credit history for loan applications, and digital savings accounts with interest can help customers protect their wealth against inflation.  These same systems can also be used to provide insurance coverage, reducing financial uncertainty for low-income populations.

The proliferation of financial services has many benefits, but it will also create policy challenges if regulations do not keep up with financial innovation.  Requiring several forms of identification to purchase a mobile phone or open a bank account presents an obstacle to low income and rural customers that live far away from government offices that issue identification. Broad coordination between telecom regulators, ID issuers, banking authorities, and other government agencies is often necessary for lowering barriers to accessing financial services.

It is telling that many countries included in the report are looking to other developing countries for policies to promote financial inclusion.  The scarcity of traditional banks combined with new methods of accessing financial services opens avenues to financial inclusion not seen in most developed countries. Established banking industries and the accompanying regulations leave fewer opportunities for financial innovation, but countries with large unbanked populations can start with a clean slate. Over the next two years, FDIP will continue to monitor and report on developments in financial inclusion around the world.

Send comments on the 2015 FDIP Report and Scorecard and suggestions for future reporting to FDIPComments@brookings.edu.

Authors

       




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