House Republicans recently approved the “Death Tax Repeal Act of 2015.”  If we care about our debt obligations, social mobility, or equality of opportunity, we should consider doing just the opposite: raising the tax and applying it to more of the super-wealthy.

Currently, the estate tax doesn't touch the first $5.43 million of an individual’s assets and the first $10.86 million of couples’ assets. The tax kicks in after that amount, eventually rising to a top rate of 40 percent.  

Proponents of repeal make a number of claims to make their case. Let’s examine the most common.

1. The estate tax affects a significant portion of Americans. Only about 5,400 estates will pay any estate tax this year. That’s about 0.2% of all estates – that’s right, just two tenths of one percent.  That’s a fortieth of the 1970’s share. Americans worried about the Estate Tax have nothing to fear but fear itself. 
2. The estate tax hurts small farms and businesses. In fact, the estate tax touches virtually no small farms or businesses. The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy estimated how many farm and business estates worth under $5 million paid any tax in 2013. Twenty did. Twenty small farms and businesses paid any estate tax in 2013. And those 20 estates faced an average tax rate of 4.9%. Only 660 farm estates—of any size—paid the tax in 2013, and 100 of those farms had assets worth over $20 million. The USDA estimates that 0.6% of all farm estates owed federal estate tax in 2013. This is because families who farm for a living have access to generous deductions: up to $1 million for continuing to farm the land for the next 10 years and up to $500,000 for adopting conservation easements. They can also delay payment and lighten their tax liability by gifting their land to heirs. Small businesses have similarly generous carve-out.
3. Repealing the estate tax doesn't affect the budget, because it’s a small share of federal revenue. In 2014, the estate tax represented 0.6% of federal collections, or roughly $20 billion annually, according to the Joint Committee on Taxation. But part of the reason that’s so low is because Congress has increased the exemption and lowered the rate in recent years; in 2001, the top rate was 55% and the exemption was only $675,000. Still, even today, repealing the tax is costly. The JCT estimates that repeal would cost the government $269 billion over the next decade.
4. The estate tax represents double taxation. Well, maybe. It is true that people  pay taxes on their income when earned and then may have to pay again when they pass it on to their heirs.  However, because the super-wealthy keep much of their assets as unrealized capital gains (55% for those estates worth over $100 million), the estate tax is the only way, right now, to tax these capital gains. In that sense it can be viewed as a partial corrective within our funhouse of a tax system. Some capital gains, to be sure, are the fruits of hard work and entrepreneurial creativity but a lot are simply the result of gains among those wealthy enough to participate in speculative ventures. 

One thing is true: repeal would mean a large tax break for the wealthiest 0.2% of the population. The 1,336 families with estates worth more than $20 million would get almost three-fourths of the benefit from the repeal and enjoy an average windfall of $10 million each, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. The 318 families with estates worth more than $50 million would see an average windfall of $20 million each.

These facts are often obscured by our penchant for individual stories. One Washington Post story for example, acknowledges many of the statistics above, but then goes on to give two examples of farmers who had to sell land to meet their tax burden, one of which is several decades old, when the exemption was much lower. Elected officials love these kinds of stories and tell them often. Are they unaware of the generous special provisions for this group?  Do they truly believe that very wealthy families are the ones we should be helping? Or are they thinking about who is going to finance their next campaign?

The estate tax is one of the most progressive aspects of our tax system. In a time of increasing inequality, it provides a way to counteract the formation of a “permanent ownership class.” If anything, we should consider raising the rate and lowering the exemption to pay down debt and invest in opportunities for the unlucky children at the bottom of the wealth ladder. We could start by closing the stepped-up basis loophole and raising the estate tax to Clinton-era levels. We could do so in a way that protects real farmers and small business owners. Wealthy heirs, meanwhile, will still do very well, much better than the rest of America. A serious estate tax would allow us to come closer to our national ideal, in which no child is born a prince, and every child can become as rich as a king.

Note: An earlier version of this post said that the estate tax only applies to assets in excess of the exemption, which is incorrect. The estate tax is levied on the entire estate but is offset by a credit equal to the tax on the first $5.43 million. This version is corrected.

       

       

The long-term finances of Social Security are in bad shape. Its reserves are expected to run out in less than 20 years, and under current law that will force cuts in benefits.

Some experts argue that the best way to get the system’s finances back in shape would be to raise the full retirement age above the scheduled 67. That would bolster the program’s finances in two ways. First, by increasing payroll tax revenues, because people would work longer. And second, by reducing the period each American would collect benefits.

That approach might seem fair, since on average Americans are living longer. Life expectancy is more than 15 years higher than when Social Security began in 1937.

But we are not all average. Lower-income Americans have not seen much increase in life expectancy, while more affluent people have. Thus raising the retirement age would cut total lifetime benefits proportionately more for those on the bottom rungs of the income ladder.

But let’s think differently about Social Security. Right now, monthly checks are linked to a person’s earnings during their working years. So, better-paid workers get bigger checks. True, lower-paid workers pay much less in Social Security payroll taxes and usually get back much more than they paid in taxes – even counting in interest on their tax contributions. Upper-income workers typically get back a lot less than they paid in, despite larger checks.

But low-wage workers still get smaller Social Security checks to try to meet their monthly needs in retirement. Many end up falling below the poverty line and have to apply for means-tested assistance from Supplementary Security Income (SSI), another part of the Social Security system.

What if we were to recast regular Social Security as true insurance? Insurance is something that pays out only when things go wrong. If you don’t have a car crash, or your house doesn’t burn down, you don’t get your premiums back later in life. What you do get is protection and peace of mind.

So imagine Social Security as insurance protection against being financially insecure in retirement. If it were that, it would be very different from today.

For one thing, we would want the lowest-income retirees to get the largest regular check – assuming they had dutifully paid their payroll tax “premiums” when working – and also enough to keep them comfortably out of poverty without having to rely on SSI. Some retirees with a modest income from, say, an IRA, might still need a small Social Security “insurance payout” to maintain a reasonable standard of living.

In a true insurance model like this, retired Americans with healthy income from assets would get no Social Security check at all, rather than getting the largest checks as they do today. If Social Security is seen as insurance against financial insecurity then Warren Buffet clearly doesn’t need a check. Nor do other older Americans for whom a monthly Social Security check is just a little bit more icing on an already rich cake.

If we reformed Social Security to make it more like real insurance, we’d need to do it gradually so people could plan, with the changes only fully affecting workers who are perhaps in their early 40s today. There would be a significantly higher basic benefit check for the least well-off. For retired singles with retiree income over, say, $25,000 in today’s dollars, the check would be reduced according to income until for a retiree with, say, $100,000 in other income there would be no check at all.

With this reform, regular Social Security would more efficiently protect the elderly against economic insecurity and from poverty without the stigma of applying for SSI “welfare.” And it would help put the program on a more secure footing. To be sure, some would say it’s not fair that many Americans would pay Social Security taxes and get nothing in return. But that misses the point that Social Security should be insurance. And what’s really not fair is that many today pay high payroll taxes for a check that doesn’t keep them out of poverty.

Some other critics might argue that without checks for all, the coalition needed to preserve Social Security would unravel. I doubt that very much. Social Security has an iconic status in America and there is no public support for ending it.

So let’s not allow Social Security’s deteriorating finances to make it a steadily worse deal for those who need it most. It’s time instead to look at a reform that refocuses its mission on insuring financial security for seniors.

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in Real Clear Markets.

       

       

Latin America is starting off 2015 with a clear economic slowdown. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) projects a modest recovery (2.2 per cent) with respect to last year (in 2014 growth was only 1.1 per cent, the lowest since the 2009 crisis), though these calculations may vary due to several factors.

The world economy is not helping. The downward trend in raw materials prices, scant dynamism in global demand, and the appreciation of the dollar are three factors that work against the region today.

Venezuela and Argentina, are facing very complex economic contexts. Venezuela is in the midst of stagflation (aggravated by plummeting oil prices); and Argentina is experiencing negative growth, high inflation, and the unresolved conflict with the “vulture funds.”

The two largest economies of the region, Brazil and Mexico, are facing their own demons. Brazil President Dilma Rousseff, with a weak mandate, is gambling the political capital of her second term (which just began on 1 January) on the new economic team led by Joaquim “Scissorhands” Levy. Levy is to make a fiscal adjustment that has been put off and is much needed; Rousseff hopes it will enable her to regain investor confidence, and thereby return to higher growth. The Petrobras scandal (in addition to the negative impact it has been having within the Workers Party) requires that she wage a head-on struggle against corruption and impunity (she just proposed a national anticorruption campaign), and that she implement a thoroughgoing political reform, which has been put off for too long.

In Mexico, falling oil prices, economic growth below official expectations, and the wave of protests in the wake of the murders of the 43 students in school to become teachers at Ayotzinapa, have eclipsed the so-called Mexico moment and have Enrique Peña Nieto against the ropes. He has sought to retake the initiative by announcing new reforms and proposals, and he hopes to recover citizen trust if the structural reforms yield the results promised.

The challenge of the polls

In the 2015 electoral agenda, of special note are three presidential elections (Argentina, Guatemala, and Haiti), three legislative elections (El Salvador, Mexico, and Venezuela), and several state, regional, and municipal elections, in Bolivia, El Salvador, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay, among others.

The three presidential elections continue to be very open races. In Guatemala (from the return of democracy to date) the party in power has never been returned to office. The three best-positioned presidential candidates are the government party candidate Alejandro Sinibaldi, and opposition candidates Manuel Baldizón (for now he’s leading the polls) and former first lady Sandra Torres.

In Argentina, kirchnerismo is pulling into the election period worn down and without any clear candidate for now. The three leading candidates based on polling data are Peronists Daniel Scioli (former vice president of Néstor Kirchner and current governor of the province of Buenos Aires) and Sergio Massa (former chief of staff of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, currently a federal legislator and opponent of the government), and on the center-right Mauricio Macri (current head of government of the city of Buenos Aires).

In Haiti, in a tense political environment, it is not clear who will succeed President Michel Martelly, or what the exact date will be for municipal, legislative, or presidential elections. It is rumored that presidential elections may be held in January 2016. Ultimately the electoral calendar will depend on how negotiations proceed between Martelly and the opposition.

The Salvadoran legislative and municipal elections are especially important. The Sánchez Cerén administration will seek to revalidate its triumph of early 2014, ensuring good legislative and municipal support for his efforts with a view to the next three years, while the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) will seek to turn things around at the polls.

In Mexico, the future of the administration of President Peña Nieto, beset by protests and scandals, turns on the midterm elections of June 2015. Whether Peña Nieto will have sufficient political capital to continue giving impetus to his agenda of structural reforms (“Pacto por México”) during the remaining three years of his term will hinge on the results of these elections.

In Venezuela, the legislative elections will increase political tension and repression by the regime. The opposition has a golden opportunity to win back the legislative majority from the chavistas or President Chavez followers, taking advantage of the profound economic crisis looming over the country and the fall in Nicolás Maduro’s popularity in the polls. The big question is whether the opposition will prove capable of taking advantage of this opportunity and whether the elections will be truly free and competitive. The other aspect to monitor is whether Vatican diplomacy, under the leadership of Pope Francis (and with the precedent of the re-establishment of relations between the United States and Cuba in his favor), will be able to facilitate an effective political dialogue between the government and the opposition to seek a negotiated solution to Venezuela’s complex situation.

Colombia, Cuba and Chile

In Colombia, in addition to the regional elections (in which the uribistas, or followers of former President Álvaro Uribe, will seek to come out on top this time), attention is focused on the final phase of the negotiations in Havana between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government of Juan Manuel Santos aimed at achieving peace. If the negotiations are successful, it will no doubt be the most important political event in the region in 2015. The fate of the peace process will be subject to a referendum, which will probably be held in the second half of 2015 or early 2016 (depending on the speed at which the negotiations proceed and their success).

The most important political event of 2014--the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba after more than 50 years of confrontation--will continue to capture considerable attention in 2015. This decision, which entails a 180-degree turnabout in U.S. policy to Cuba, will help improve relations between the United States and the region. It enables Cuba to fully assume its place in the hemisphere (its participation at the Seventh Summit of the Americas next April in Panama will make it a historic occasion), and at the same time it will also be able to diversify its trade relations and allow for new investment at a time when Venezuela (its main partner in recent years) is experiencing its own profound economic crisis. Full normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba (including the end of the embargo, a decision in the hands of Congress) will be a long and complex process, but the first step has already been taken, and in the right direction. In 2015 it will also be important to monitor the evolution and results of the economic reforms that Raúl Castro has been carrying out.

In addition, 2015 is a vital year in Chile for the government of Michelle Bachelet who, with markedly diminished popularity and mounting criticism of her presidency, must address two major challenges in the second year of her administration: bringing about the recovery of an economy that has clearly slowed down (1.7 per cent during 2014), and continuing to give impetus to an ambitious agenda of reforms.

This year the polemical education reform should be approved; it not only enjoys the backing of the opposition, but also provokes major tensions within the government coalition. In addition, the electoral reform should be unveiled (it will do away with the binomial system) and the labour reform, which is resulting in a new distancing of business from the government. Another point on the agenda is starting up the process aimed at amending the Constitution (one of Bachelet’s three main pledges during her campaign); the process promises to be the “mother of all reforms.”

Different scenarios in regional relations

In regional relations, seven events stand out for their importance and should be closely monitored:

1. The first ministerial meeting of China-Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños CELAC Forum in Beijing, China (January 8 and 9);
2. The third meeting of CELAC in Costa Rica (January 28 and 29), where Ecuador will assume the presidency;
3. The Seventh Summit of the Americas, which will take place in Panama (April 10 and 11), and whose focus of attention will be Cuba’s participation for the first time since the Summits process began in 1994;
4. The election of a new Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) with the capacity to strategically reposition this weakened regional organization affected by the political divisions among its member countries;
5. The evolution of the process of rapprochement between MERCOSUR and the Pacific Alliance;
6. The EU-Latin America Summit;
7. The recent re-launch of UNASUR (which took place in December in Quito), under the leadership of former President Ernesto Samper.

My opinion

Latin America finds itself in the doldrums, and must undertake a two-fold transition: from the model based on high raw materials prices and low financing costs, to one with low raw materials prices and higher financing costs. As the OECD rightly notes: “this abrupt economic slowdown is not a passing phenomenon, it has come to stay. It’s the end of a cycle.”

This requires the region to urgently set in motion profound structural reforms, aimed at changing its development model which can strategically adapt to this new global context.

Only by improving productivity and competitiveness, education and innovation, infrastructure, but also the quality of its institutions, will the region be able to achieve inclusive, equitable, and sustainable economic growth that makes it possible to continue reducing poverty and inequality. All this will enable the region to respond more effectively to the demands and expectations of citizens ever more aware and demanding of their rights and of quality public services.

This economic slowdown and the implementation of an agenda of structural reforms (including the structural adjustment policies that we’ll see in some countries) will surely affect certain interests, thereby paving the way for certain countries to suffer greater social discontent in 2015 and a more complex situation when it comes to governability.

Yet the region is not homogenous. On the contrary, there is a considerable degree of heterogeneity that will determine a wide diversity of national situations. In effect, while Central America grew 3.7 per cent in 2014, and will grow 4.1 per cent in 2015, in South America these percentages are 0.7 per cent and 1.8 per cent respectively. Yet there is also diversity among countries. Accordingly, for example, while Panama (7.0 per cent), Bolivia (5.5 per cent), Peru, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua (5.0 per cent) head up the list of economies with the best prospects for growth. Countries such as Brazil and Argentina – with more capacity for traction than the rest of the economies – have much more moderate projections. Mexico and Chile, predicted to experience 3 per cent annual growth, could help push the regional average up. Venezuela, similar to 2014 (with negative growth and inflation at about 64 per cent), will have a very complicated year economically speaking.

As Warren Buffet said, and rightly so, “when the tide goes out you can see who's been skinny dipping.” Something similar will happen with the countries of the region in 2015. Soon we’ll know which governments have been financially exposed.

This piece was originally published by International IDEA.

       

       

       

       

       

       

Spring has sprung and once again Publish What You Fund has issued its Aid Transparency Index (ATI). Once again most of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) receive high grades rated as very good. And once again I ask whether those grades are well deserved? At the heart of my question is whether aid agencies are disclosing sufficient information during the critical implementation stage of a project.

Last year we reviewed the practices of 8 aid agencies, 7 of which consistently receive the highest accolades in the ATI. What was evident from our review was the serious asymmetry of the type of aid data released to the public. A major target at Busan in 2011 when donors made commitments to aid transparency and in the establishment of the ATI has been the reporting of aid flows and the projects approved by each agency. There has been growing emphasis since then on reporting information on the results of those projects. But there has been very limited progress in the release of information during project implementation.

The importance of such information should be obvious. It is during project implementation that the various stakeholders need to monitor project progress, report on issues requiring attention, and make changes to ensure achievement of the desired results. It is insufficient to only disclose who wins a contract; consideration should be given to publishing the contracts, reporting on its execution, and disclosing amendments to the contracts. And it is not enough to simply publish the resettlement action plan for a project; how that plan is being implemented must be reported. Real time reporting is the key to being able to adapt and make changes as projects evolve.

Adapting the ATI

It is very evident that the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and the ATI have had a major positive impact on raising the level of transparency of aid agencies. Discussions with various agencies illustrate how they are keen to getting higher scores each year, carefully analyzing the indicators to guide their actions. However, with only a limited focus and weighting of reporting on project implementation in the ATI, there is no incentive to fill this important gap. 

In its 2016 report, Publish What You Fund has indicated that it will be reviewing its indicators later this year and intends to raise the bar. It would be timely to include information on project implementation in those revisions. One challenge is how to develop indicators that are similarly relevant across a wide variety of aid agencies. Implementation information is most critical for agencies that finance longer-term projects, especially infrastructure, such as the MDBs.  One option is to consider a set of indicators to better “incentivize” the relevant agencies and refer to these as ATI+.

Reviewing the use and abuse of protecting deliberative information

The MDB’s, in their major disclosure reforms since 2010, adopted a principle that “deliberative” information would not be disclosed in order to foster candid and open dialogue within the organization and between the organization and the client country. As per the World Bank’s policy, “The Bank, like any institution or group, needs space to consider and debate, away from public scrutiny.” This excludes emails, notes, and other exchanges either internally or with member countries.

As a result, the project supervision reports, which managements use to monitor projects under execution and are generally published twice a year, were divided between disclosed versus undisclosed sections. The undisclosed sections would offer space for reporting on confidential project concerns including potential corruption. Our review of the disclosed reports suggests that most aid agencies’ task managers tend to take a cautious approach, placing most information in the undisclosed sections. Stakeholders outside the MDB, such as local civil society groups, then, often only see truncated information.

While the adoption of the “deliberative” principle is understandable, its application places a serious responsibility on management to ensure that this is applied with considerable restraint. The MDBs should review the application of this principle and assess the type of information released during implementation.

It is indeed time to raise the bar on transparency and to focus on the most critical information required to ensure results. This is not the moment for complacency with high grades.

       

       

The gruesome theatrics of the Islamic State (IS) captivate the world’s attention, instilling fear in the public from Los Angeles to Paris to Beirut. Yet while arrests are made in Europe and airstrikes continue in Raqqa, Americans ignore developments on another worn-out battlefield: Afghanistan.

Afghanistan faces numerous crises in 2016 that could rock the country and threaten U.S. security investments. The United States still has 10,000 troops stationed in the country. It must take decisive action not to supply vast numbers of troops or massively increase spending, but instead abandon inadequate policies before something catastrophic occurs. These must be more than incremental policy changes that merely stave off disaster for the interim, as this would compound the seriousness of each crisis. After traveling to Afghanistan in October 2015, we have identified key security risks and steps the United States can take to forestall disaster.

In 2015, Taliban violence resulted in more Afghan civilian, police, and military casualties than in any year since U.S. and NATO forces began fighting in Afghanistan. More fighters, better weapons, and new tactics made the 2015 Taliban offensive their most effective yet, with a recent attack in Parwan province that killed six U.S. soldiers serving as a terrible reminder of this grim reality. Next year, the Taliban will aim to take provincial cities, pounce on Kandahar, and spread fear through spectacular attacks. A major Taliban offensive following this year’s fierce assault is almost certain. Indeed, as a recent Department of Defense report describes, the security situation in Afghanistan has grown more precarious over the last year.

The Afghan army has done its best to counter the Taliban assault. Afghan forces retook Kunduz and pushed back serious Taliban offensives in other cities, including Ghazni. While attrition is high due to soldiers overstaying leaves, desertion, and Taliban threats to soldiers’ families, recruitment of new forces has exceeded losses. Yet, strong ground forces cannot compensate for inadequate air support, modern intelligence capabilities, well-functioning logistics (to maintain vehicles and keep essential supplies available), and higher-order assistance for Afghanistan’s still-nascent security institutions. The United States must help fill these critical gaps while maintaining its promises to complete these critical, but unfinished, programs. The United States must also amend the very restrictive rules of engagement that currently limit air support capabilities, and restore intelligence assets that have been withdrawn. Stronger battlefield intelligence capabilities are essential, as we learned after the tragic bombing of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital in Kunduz. More effective air attacks and improved intelligence could seriously disrupt Taliban operations in Afghanistan.

But the Taliban is no longer the only threat to stability in Afghanistan. The influence of the Islamic State is growing, as it recruits more extremist Taliban members and brings in fighters from non-Afghan communities, including Uzbeks and Pakistanis. These IS-inspired groups challenge the new Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who seeks to cement his leadership after the years-long deception over the death of his predecessor, Mullah Omar. The Taliban fragmentation and competition from IS, especially prominent in the provinces of Zabul and Nangarhar, have led to increased violence, including the recent beheadings of minority Hazaras. The renewed violence reduces already slim hopes for a negotiated peace in Afghanistan.

The United States and NATO must intensify actions against IS in Afghanistan. Like al Qaeda, the group must be a priority target for air and counter terrorist missions. Now is the time to destroy it. At a minimum, coalition forces must restrain the growth of this hostile force before it becomes a significantly larger threat.

Afghanistan is undertaking a unique experiment in elected government. Nearly 70 percent of the electorate voted in 2014, despite threats from the Taliban to kill or mutilate anyone who did so. However, the results were clouded by accusations of widespread fraud. After an extended political impasse, the United States brokered a peaceful settlement and a power-sharing agreement between the two contenders in the run off. The National Unity Government (NUG) was formed with Ashraf Ghani serving as president and his chief rival, Abdullah Abdullah, as chief executive officer.

Military solutions alone cannot solve all of the country’s woes, as the electorate’s participation and the elected officials’ ability to govern are as critical to a stable state as a strong security apparatus. Now, at a time when insurgent attacks need a strong response and the government needs to stop its internal wrangling and start delivering services to civilians, the NUG finds itself politically distracted. Ex-president Hamid Karzai and mujahedeen leaders continue to undermine the government in an attempt to spur its collapse. These attempts are little more than a naked power grab that, if successful, would usher in months of political paralysis while the victors squabble over the spoils of power. This would be disastrous, at a time when insurgent attacks need a strong response and the government needs to start delivering services. The United States and other coalition nations must voice strong opposition to all efforts to change the constitution through a Loya Jirga or the scheduling of early elections. Without first reforming the electoral system, another massively fraudulent election will surely follow. Quiet opposition will be taken as willingness to see the NUG undone.

Despite some positive developments, the Afghan government is losing popular support. More and more Afghans believe that the country is heading in the wrong direction. Thousands of Afghans are fleeing the country, and along with them goes the potential for economic growth. Crime and insecurity in the cities contribute to this brain and asset drain. Stakeholders in Afghanistan must demand governance improvements from the NUG – including opposition to vicious ethnic discrimination and power abuse, which the Taliban exploited in Kunduz – that the Afghan people crave. The government should focus on increasing effective anti-criminal and anti-corruption policing in the major cities, such as Kabul, Herat, and Jalalabad. This would require significant government action against some major power brokers. Additionally, a concerted foreign advisory effort with the police is needed to improve civilian security. These actions require vigorous U.S. and international backing.

Doubts are growing about the United States’ and NATO’s commitment to long-term support for Afghanistan. While President Barack Obama’s decision to retain major security hubs in Afghanistan was a step in the right direction, this progress was undercut by the planned force reductions at the end of 2016. In a worsening security environment, Afghans fear being abandoned by their international partners. To rebuild confidence, a U.S.-led NATO review of conditions on the ground and a demonstrated willingness to fill major gaps, such as air support, would counteract this sense of abandonment.

Not all is gloom. Unlike Karzai, who blamed the United States for most of Afghanistan’s problems and refused to move against massive corruption, Ghani remains committed to reform. There is progress in revenue collection, enforcement action against fraud in Kabul Bank, and some members of the new cabinet are making progress in less visible but important reforms like speeding business licensing and settling land titles. Unlike in Syria and Iraq, militias do not yet dominate either politics or the battlefield. Actions are still available to minimize the looming crises. But planning and decisions are needed now, not after the crises explode.

This piece was originally published by Foreign Policy. 

       

       

President Obama should be congratulated for highlighting the growing links between U.S. national security and climate change in his address before the U.S. Coast Guard Academy’s graduation ceremony earlier this week. The president’s speech drew upon earlier administration documents (the Third National Climate Assessment, the White House’s 2015 National Security Strategy, the Department of Defense’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the 2014 Department of Homeland Security’s Quadrennial Homeland Security Review) to highlight the numerous challenges posed to our nation and the world by climate change, including:

• Threats to the world’s coastal infrastructure
• Rising temperatures and extreme weather
• Creation of failed states
• Degradation to the marine environment and critical ecological regions around the globe
• Threats to our energy production and delivery systems
• The devastating impact on native Arctic inhabitants

While these issues are important and deserve attention, the president was singularly silent on how best to manage threats, posed to the Arctic and the global environment by the rush to develop or utilize its resources (including energy, minerals, fish, and tourism) as the region opens with the melting of sea ice. I raise none of these issues to disagree with the president’s policies, or to suggest we should not develop the region’s resources or allow enhanced international maritime trade through our waters. In fact, I have often called for the economic development of Alaska with high safety standards for oil and gas production. If we allow these activities to proceed, we must be willing to provide the resources for infrastructure of all kinds: pipelines, onshore and offshore, and including ports, airfields, housing, etc., in order to be prepared for all contingencies.

Additionally, the president did not make any mention of the financial demands posed to the country to even meet the challenges in our own Arctic region of Alaska, let alone the many commitments we have already made in the Arctic Council, vis-à-vis instituting a true search and rescue capability and an oil spill prevention and response mechanism. The sad reality is that for all intents and purposes the United States has one heavy icebreaker to patrol our entire Arctic region. With cruise ships now sailing into very dangerous areas without adequate sea mapping, the prospect of a disaster occurring at least 800 miles from our nearest port in the Aleutians looms large. Were a cruise ship to run into ice, there is no logistical infrastructure in Northwest Alaska even to off lift passengers to on shore by helicopter. With icebreakers likely to cost at least $800 million to $1.5 billion each and take many years to build, where is the president's clarion call to the Congress on the need for more revenue for our Coast Guard to deal with the challenges highlighted in his speech?

Likewise, with many Asian nations interested in the fish resources of the Arctic, where are the funds both to determine what fish exist in Arctic waters including fish migrating from the Pacific as well as their volumes and assessments of how to insure their sustainability? If the president is serious about the threat of climate change on America’s front door to the Arctic, where are the U.S. Coast Guard and the State of Alaska as well as the myriad of federal agencies responsible for various activities in Alaska going to get the requisite resources to carry out their mandates?

Lacking preparedness and response

As a result of the administration’s commendable recent decision, Shell will be allowed to proceed with drilling several wells in the Chukchi Sea, allowing for development that benefits not only Alaskans but also the entire United States. While Shell will be subject to stringent regulatory oversight, Russia also plans to drill in its area of the Chukchi as well. What would happen if the Russians had an accident and the current brought oil into Alaskan waters? Would the United States, in concert with the Russians have the capability to contain it? Similarly, if there were a major maritime disaster in the Bering Strait where a South Korean ship literally disappeared several years ago, what response capability would we have if a ship containing hazardous cargo sank? While I applaud the decision of the administration to allow Shell to drill in the Chukchi, I am apprehensive of the U.S. commitment and ability to respond to any matter of national security in the Arctic, in part due to the severe lack of federal funds going to support this region.

Consequently, while recognizing that the American and broader Arctic is only a small part of the myriad of issues you identified in your Coast Guard address, I would urge that you begin to inform Congress and the American people of the large costs we may have to incur to protect ourselves against the forthcoming economic and social ravages of climate change.

Recommendations for Arctic funding

As a first step to begin to prepare for the direct “existential” challenges posed to Alaska and our broader responsibilities as chair of the Arctic Council, I would recommend the following:

1. A request to Congress for $1.2 billion dollars a year for 10 years to build a new fleet of ice worthy ships to deal with various contingencies in the Arctic (as defined by the Coast Guard) financed by an overall increase in the gasoline tax of $0.20/gallon of which $0.02 would go for Arctic infrastructure development;
2. As an interim step before these ships can be built, the appropriation of funds for the leasing of two Arctic worthy vessels per year;
3. An increase in alcohol and tobacco taxes (or perhaps a tax alongside the legalization of marijuana at the federal level) totaling $500 million dollars a year for 10 years for ancillary infrastructure development of ports, airfields, roads, etc. in Alaska to improve our ability to responds to climate contingencies both in  Alaska and throughout the circumpolar north;
4. A surcharge of one percent on all adjusted federal taxable incomes in excess of $200,000 and two percent on incomes above $500,000.

While there will be hews and cries by climate deniers and other opponents of any tax increase if as the president says the changing climate poses graves threat to our own and other nations security, these are modest proposals (particularly in comparison to an outright price on carbon) and should be passed with the greatest urgency.

       

       

ABSTRACT

The overall economic efficiency of a quantity-based approach to greenhouse gas mitigation depends strongly on the extent to which such a program provides opportunities for compliance flexibility, particularly with regard to the timing of emissions abatement. Here I consider a program in which annual targets are determined by choosing the optimal time path of reductions consistent with an exogenously prescribed cumulative reduction target and fixed technology set. I then show that if the availability of low-carbon technology is initially more constrained than anticipated, the optimal reduction path shifts abatement toward later compliance periods. For this reason, a rigid policy in which fixed annual targets are strictly enforced in every year yields a cumulative environmental outcome identical to the optimal policy but an economic outcome worse than the optimal policy. On the other hand, a policy that aligns actual prices (or equivalently, costs) with expected prices by simply imposing an explicit price ceiling (often referred to as a "safety valve") yields the opposite result. Comparison among these multiple scenarios implies that there are significant gains to realizing the optimal path but that further refinement of the actual regulatory instrument will be necessary to achieve that goal in a real cap-and-trade system.

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I want to begin by saying how grateful we were at Brookings to partner with the Federal Reserve System on this concentrated poverty project. We like to think that at Brookings we know a lot about this subject, but it was only through this partnership with the Fed that we were able to ground this understanding in the experiences of the 16 communities across the United States that were the focus of the report’s case studies.

The report demonstrates that in addition to managing the macroeconomy, the Fed also possesses a unique and powerful understanding of the U.S. economy from the ground up, which is absolutely necessary for designing smart policy in turbulent times like these.

I want to also give special thanks to my colleagues David Erickson and Carolina Reid at the San Francisco Fed. They played several roles in this project for me: intellectual partners, co-conspirators, mood lighteners, and Fed sherpas. It can be tough for foreigners like myself to navigate this system, and they lightened my load throughout the project. I also want to thank my Brookings colleague Elizabeth Kneebone, who performed a lot of the data analysis for this project.

I want to argue three points, largely policy points, in my remarks this morning.

First, the current economic climate makes the issue of concentrated poverty, and our response, more relevant, not less.

Second, major near-term investments our country makes to resolve the economic crisis can and should provide meaningful opportunities for the most disadvantaged families and communities.

And third, our longer-run efforts to assist high-poverty areas and their residents must take account of the economic challenges and opportunities that manifest at the regional, metropolitan level.

To begin, let’s review where we were when the Fed and Brookings joined forces on this effort in May 2006.

• The unemployment rate was 4.7 percent, a five-year low.
• Payrolls were expanding every month for the third consecutive year.
• The poverty rate, while still above its low in 2000, was dropping.
• The federal deficit was a relatively manageable 2% of GDP.
• The Dow was above 11,000, and on its way up.
• And the 2008 general election promised a storied matchup between party favorites Hillary Clinton and Rudy Giuliani.

A lot can happen in 30 months!

In the wake of record house-price declines and financial market fallout, the economic outlook today is grim. The unemployment rate is 6.5 percent and rising. One projection suggests that the downturn could eventually increase the ranks of the nation’s poor by anywhere from 7 to 10 million. And amid declining revenues and increased expenditure needs, the U.S. budget deficit is expected to top $1 trillion this year.

In short, the situation for the lowest-income communities and their residents is not encouraging.

And neither is our starting point.

As Paul Jargowsky’s research has shown, the incidence of concentrated poverty in America dropped markedly during the 1990s, after two decades of increase. Some combination of a tight labor market and policy changes to promote work and break up the deepest concentrations of poverty seemed responsible for that decline.

But as Elizabeth and I found in a recent Brookings report, we may have given back much of that progress during the first half of this decade. The population in what we termed “high working poverty” communities rose by 40 percent between 1999 and 2005. This suggests that America’s high-poverty areas may have never really recovered from the modest downturn we experienced at the beginning of the decade.

Now, with all the turmoil in our economy, it would be easy to lose sight of these places and their residents, who even seem to have missed out on the benefits of recent growth.

But if we are to meet the enormous challenges facing our country—economic, social, and environmental—we simply can’t afford to take a blind eye to the continuing problem of concentrated poverty.

As decades of research and this report have shown, concentrated poverty magnifies the problems faced by the poor, and exacts a significant toll on the lives of families in its midst.

This report greatly enhances our understanding of how high-poverty communities of all stripes bear these costs. Moreover, it suggests that the contemporary circumstances of these communities owe not just to long-term market dynamics, but also to policy choices made over several decades’ time—some deliberate in their intent, and some producing unfortunate unintended consequences.

Today we’re at an important inflection point for policy. With the economy souring, we don’t have the luxury of using an “auto-pilot” strategy of macroeconomic growth to reach the most disadvantaged places and their residents. Quite the opposite—just as these communities are often “last in” for economic opportunity during boom times, they seem to be “first out” when things shift into reverse.

But the specific nature of the current crisis also poses added challenges for high-poverty communities.

That is because many of these areas were ground zero for risky subprime lending over the last several years. In many of the case-study communities in the report, half or more of recent home mortgages were high-cost subprime loans.

Now, they are on the front lines of the fallout. Our calculations of HUD data show that census tracts where the poverty rate was at least 40 percent in 2000—the conventional definition behind concentrated poverty—have an estimated foreclosure rate over 9 percent, roughly double the nationwide average.

This poses both an immediate and a long-term threat to what little stability these communities possess.

Over the short term, these areas face problems associated with heightened property neglect, vacancy, and abandonment. Not only can those conditions breed crime and disorder, but also they can accelerate a process of further disinvestment from high-poverty neighborhoods, which are all too familiar with that cycle of decline.

Over the long run, the public sector will work to return foreclosed properties in these neighborhoods to productive use. But there is a danger that we may once again re-concentrate poverty in these neighborhoods if these assets are not managed and deployed strategically.

In sum, recent trends and a perilous road ahead merit a meaningful policy response to the challenges facing areas of concentrated poverty and their residents.

This brings me to my second point, which is that near-term policy choices can ameliorate the impacts of the current crisis on areas of concentrated poverty.

In less than 50 days, a new administration will take office in Washington, facing economic challenges of a scale not seen in decades.

The president-elect and his advisors have signaled that they are ready to “do what it takes” to stimulate the economy, create and protect jobs, and catalyze investment in new sectors to spur longer-term growth.

I believe that policies advanced by the new administration and Congress in the first few weeks of the new year, if designed and executed well, could matter greatly for the fortunes of the nation’s high-poverty communities.

First, a comprehensive strategy to deal with the foreclosure crisis is sorely needed. This would feature, first and foremost, a broad plan to forestall the rising tide of mortgages, including many in high-poverty communities, headed for default due to falling home prices, economic dislocation, and poor underwriting.

However, even a sweeping, generous approach will not prevent the inevitable. Especially in high-poverty areas, more loans will fall into foreclosure, more people will lose their homes, and fiscally-strapped local governments will be left to manage the consequences of increasing vacancy and abandonment.

The Neighborhood Stabilization Program enacted by Congress and the Bush administration during the summer of 2008 represents an initial effort to arm state and local leaders with the resources to tackle the neighborhood impacts of rising foreclosures.

But significant deterioration of the economy in the intervening months suggests that the problem may now be of a much larger scale than was originally anticipated. What’s more, many local governments lack the capacity, expertise, and legal authorities to use existing or additional resources strategically.

So the new administration, and HUD in particular, will need to consider a further round of response—using some mix of fiscal, regulatory, capacity-building, and bully pulpit powers—to help cash-strapped local governments mitigate the impacts of foreclosure on their most vulnerable communities.

Second, there seems to be wide agreement that the economic recovery package should include a series of measures that inject money into the economy right away.

So the package will provide immediate assistance to families, communities, and governments hit hard by the downturn, in the likely form of extended unemployment and increased food stamp benefits, increased state and local aid, and low- to middle-income tax cuts, spending designed to make a real economic impact in the next several months.

A couple of details here are of real consequence to communities of concentrated poverty.

• Income tax cuts included in the package should be refundable, like the Earned Income Tax Credit, or EITC. Boosting the EITC, for instance, would provide additional help to workers most likely to be hit hard by the downturn, and target resources to families most likely to spend the additional cash immediately. As the report shows, at least 30 percent, and as many as 60 percent, of families in the case-study communities today benefit from the EITC.
• Unemployment insurance benefits should be extended, but also modernized. As the case studies showed, work among residents of high-poverty communities is often seasonal or part-time, even in a good economy. As a result, many laid-off workers from poor areas in several states may not qualify for benefits due to outmoded eligibility rules. Therefore, in addition to extending weeks of eligibility for UI, Congress and the new administration might also consider providing incentives to states to expand the pool of workers who could benefit from the program during the downturn.

Third, infrastructure will clearly figure prominently among the spending priorities in the recovery package.

Yet there is a significant risk that focusing dollars primarily on projects that states deem “shovel-ready,” as has been discussed, will repeat mistakes of the past. It would primarily subsidize road-building at the metropolitan fringe, and do little to enhance long-run economic growth, or provide better opportunities for low-income people and the places they live.

Infrastructure investments of the magnitude under consideration must not only create jobs, but also promote inclusive and sustainable growth. That means setting strict criteria for federal investment, including a real assessment of costs and benefits that considers economic, environmental, and social impacts. As the report shows, poor infrastructure often acts as a barrier to the economic integration of high-poverty communities into their larger municipal and regional areas.

To that end, we should also consider providing direct support for large, cash-strapped municipal governments that they could use to modernize and preserve roads, bridges, transit, water, sewer, and perhaps even broadband infrastructure. At the same time, we should hold them and grantees at all other levels of government accountable for connecting younger, disadvantaged workers and communities to the jobs that result.

In short, what happens in the first several weeks of the new year here in Washington could, if structured properly, provide meaningful support and opportunity for low-income areas and their residents. At a minimum, this might avert the sort of backsliding these communities suffered during the much milder recession we experienced earlier this decade.

So that brings me to my third and final point, which is that, over the longer term, we must advance policies that actively link the fortunes of poor communities to those of their regional neighbors. As you probably heard or read, our division at Brookings is named the “Metropolitan Policy Program.”

Our mission is to provide decision makers with cutting-edge research and policy ideas for improving the health and prosperity of cities and metropolitan areas.

You might ask, why metropolitan? After all, this is not a term that most Americans use, think about, or even recognize, even though 85 percent of us live in metropolitan areas. A friend of the program once told us that it sounded like a combination of “metrosexual” and “cosmopolitan.” Not exactly what we were going for.

More specifically, what relevance does “metropolitan” have for addressing the challenges of concentrated poverty?

Well, the report points to skills and employability problems that hold back residents of high-poverty communities. If the route to improving the lives of families affected by concentrated poverty runs in part through the labor market, then we must devise strategies and solutions that respect and respond to the geography of that market—which is metropolitan.

The report also points to housing problems, of various stripes, that segregate the poor in these communities and make their daily lives more difficult. Housing markets, too, are metropolitan—and housing dynamics in the wealthiest parts of each metro are inextricably linked to those in the poorest parts.

The fact is, our national economy—and that of most industrialized nations—is largely the aggregate of its individual metropolitan economies. In the United States, the 100 largest metro areas account for 12 percent of our land mass, hold 65 percent of our residents, and generate three-quarters of our Gross Domestic Product. They possess even greater shares of our innovative businesses, our most knowledgeable workers, the critical infrastructure that connects us to the global economy, and the quality places that attract, retain, and enhance the productivity of workers and firms.

And as the report shows, regions—both metropolitan and non-metropolitan—each retain distinctive clusters that shape their individual contributions to the national economic pie. Photonics in Rochester. Hospitality and tourism in Atlantic City and Miami. Manufacturing in Albany, Georgia. Agriculture and business services in Central California. These clusters do not possess equal strength or equal potential, but they define the starting point for thinking about the regional economic future of these areas, and economic opportunities for their residents.

Not only are the assets of our economy fundamentally metropolitan… increasingly, our challenges are, too. In 2006, we found that for the first time, more than half of the poor in metropolitan America lived in suburbs, not cities. While poor suburban families don’t yet concentrate at the levels seen in the communities in this report, they are trending in this direction. Between 1999 and 2005, the number of suburban tax filers living in “moderate” working poverty communities rose by nearly 50 percent.

So what does recognition of our metropolitan reality imply for longer-run policies to help the poorest communities and their residents?

Bruce has argued elsewhere that our nation must embrace a new, unified framework for addressing the needs of poor neighborhoods and their residents. He has termed this, Creating Neighborhoods of Choice and Connection. Neighborhoods of choice are communities in which lower-income people can both find a place to start, and as their incomes rise, a place to stay. They are also communities to which people of higher incomes can move, for their distinctiveness, amenities, or location. This requires an acceptance of economic integration as a goal of housing and neighborhood policy.

Neighborhoods of connection are communities that link families to opportunity, wherever in the metropolis that opportunity might be located. This requires a much more profound commitment to the “educational offer” in these communities and the larger areas of which they are a part. It also requires a pragmatic vision of the “geography of opportunity” with regard to jobs, housing, and other choices.

If we take this vision seriously, then our interventions must operate within, and relate to, the metro geography of our economy. This means viewing the conditions and prospects of poor areas through the lens of the broader economic regions of which they are a part, and explicitly gearing policy in that direction.

A simple example relates to the geography of work. In the Springfield, Massachusetts metro area, roughly 30 percent of the region’s jobs still cluster in the neighborhoods close to downtown, including Old Hill and Six Corners. In the Miami metro area, by contrast, only 9 percent of the region’s jobs lie close to its downtown, implying transportation needs of a quite different scale for Little Haiti’s residents. In response, we should empower metropolitan transportation planners to address the unique nature of these spatial divides, and measure their performance on creating inclusive systems that overcome them.

This metro lens applies to workforce development as well. Labor market intermediaries are some of the most promising mechanisms for bridging the information and skills divide between poor communities and regional economic opportunity. One of the highest performers, the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership, works in the home region of one of our case-study communities, Milwaukee. If workforce policies and funding at all levels of government were to emphasize employer partnerships, provide greater flexibility, and reward performance, we could grow more capable institutions like these that serve the needs of low-income communities and regional firms alike.

A metro perspective can apply to school reform as well. We have called for a new focus at the Department of Education on supporting proven, successful educational entrepreneurs—charter management organizations like KIPP, human capital providers like Teach for America, student support organizations like College Summit. The demand for these entrepreneurial solutions extends well beyond the highest-poverty neighborhoods. Federal education policy should consider investing in these entrepreneurs at the metropolitan scale, to aggregate a critical mass of those organizations, serve a significant percentage of the area’s children, and drive positive changes in the entire public education environment.

Finally, our housing policies must embrace metro-wide economic diversity, which is a hallmark of neighborhoods of choice and connection.

This means expanding housing opportunities for middle-income families in deprived neighborhoods. We simply cannot continue to cluster low-income housing in already low-income areas, perpetuating the sort of economic segregation evident in so many of the case-study communities, and thereby consign another generation to a childhood amid concentrated poverty. Likewise, we must guard against the possibility that the current foreclosure crisis leads to a re-concentration of poor households in neighborhoods that were just beginning to achieve greater economic diversity.

But this is a two-way street. It also means creating more high-quality housing opportunities for low-income families in growing suburban job centers. Requiring or providing incentives to metropolitan areas to engage in regional housing planning, alongside regional transportation planning, may be a necessary first step. Those plans could also apply a more rational screen to the development choices that have fueled sprawl, and thereby added to the social and economic isolation of the lowest-income communities.

Let me end where I began.

This is both an auspicious and a challenging moment at which to wrestle with the problem of concentrated poverty in America.

Auspicious in that we are approaching the dawn of a new government in Washington that has signaled concern for our nation’s low-income residents and communities, recognition that metropolitan economies are the engines of our prosperity, and a pragmatic commitment to doing what works.

Challenging in that making progress against concentrated poverty, and improving opportunity for those in its midst, is a tall order when the macroeconomy isn’t cooperating.

But the current economic climate is not an excuse to avoid this problem; rather, it’s an imperative to act, strategically and purposefully.

That means doing the big near-term things the right way, so that low-income communities and their residents do not bear an excessive brunt of the downturn, and so that they participate meaningfully in our eventual economic recovery.

And it means getting the long-term vision right, so that policy advances sustainable, metro-led solutions that connect poor neighborhoods and poor families to opportunity in the wider economy around them.

The Federal Reserve System has tremendous, well-earned credibility for understanding and advancing dialogue around the future of our nation’s economic regions. I look forward to continuing to work with the Fed to increase public understanding of concentrated poverty, and to make tackling it a crucial element of strategies to promote regional and national prosperity.

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"Out of ammo?" The Economist recently asked of monetary policymakers. Stephen Roach has called the move by major central banks – including the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Sweden – to negative real (and, in some cases, even nominal) interest rates a “futile” effort that merely sets “the stage for the next crisis.” And, at the February G-20 finance ministers meeting, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney reportedly called these policies “ultimately a zero-sum game.” Have the major advanced economies’ central banks – which have borne the burden of sustaining anemic post-2008 recoveries – really run out of options?

It certainly seems so. Central-bank balance sheets have swelled, and policy rates have reached their “near zero” lower bounds. There is plenty of cheap water, it seems, but the horse refuses to drink. With no signs of inflation, and growth still tepid and fragile, many anticipate chronic slow growth, with some even fearing another global recession.

But policymakers have one more option: a shift to “purer” fiscal policy, in which they directly finance government spending by printing money – a so-called “helicopter drop.” The new money would bypass the financial and corporate sectors and go straight to the thirstiest horses: middle- and lower-income consumers. The money could go to them directly, and through investment in job-creating, productivity-increasing infrastructure. By placing purchasing power in the hands of those who need it most, direct monetary financing of public spending would also help to improve inclusiveness in economies where inequality is rising fast.

Helicopter drops are currently proposed by both leftist and centrist economists. In a sense, even some “conservatives” – who support more public infrastructure spending, but also want tax cuts and oppose more borrowing – de facto support helicopter drops.

Recently, more radical proposals have surfaced, reflecting a sense of urgency and widespread disappointment with the impact of current monetary policy. Beyond advocating higher minimum wages, some are calling for “reverse income policies,” with governments imposing across-the-board wage increases on private employers – a move that would drive up prices and defeat deflationary expectations. The fact that economists whose views typically fall nowhere near those of the far left are even thinking about such interventionism shows just how extreme circumstances have become.

I favor all of these proposals, in some form. The details of their implementation would obviously have to vary, depending on each economy’s circumstances. Germany, for example, is in a strong position to implement a reverse income policy, given its huge current-account surplus, though there would undoubtedly be major political barriers. More spending on education, skills upgrading, and infrastructure, however, is a no-brainer almost everywhere, and is politically more feasible.

But there is another dimension of the challenge that has so far not been emphasized nearly enough, despite the warnings of Carney, Roach, and others. Zero or negative real interest rates, when they become quasi-permanent, undermine the efficient allocation of capital and set the stage for bubbles, busts, and crises. They also contribute to further income concentration at the top by hurting small savers, while creating opportunities for large financial players to benefit from access to savings at negative real cost. As unorthodox as it may sound, it is likely that the world economy would benefit from somewhat higher interest rates.

Raising interest rates cannot, however, be a stand-alone policy. Instead, small policy-rate increases must be incorporated into a broader fiscal and distributional strategy, implemented alongside more public spending on infrastructure and skills upgrading, as well as some gentle forms of income policies, employing, for example, “moral suasion.”

Even with such an approach, however, major central banks would have to coordinate their policies. If a single major central bank attempted to introduce higher interest rates, its economy would immediately be “punished” through currency appreciation, declining competitiveness, and falling exports, all of which would undermine aggregate demand and employment.

If the major central banks decided to increase their policy rates simultaneously, these spillover effects would cancel one another out. A coordinated move, perhaps raising rates in two modest 25 or 30 basis-point increments, would be neutral in terms of exchange rates and short-term competitiveness, even as it moved real interest rates back into positive territory. If successful, this effort could eventually be followed by further small increases, creating space for more traditional monetary-policy “ammunition” to be deployed in the future.

Success also hinges on the simultaneous pursuit of fiscal expansion worldwide, with each country’s efforts calibrated according to its fiscal space and current-account position. The expansion should finance a global program of investment in physical and human infrastructure, focusing on the two key challenges of our time: cleaner energy and skills for the digital age.

A coordinated and well-timed policy package could boost global growth, improve capital allocation, support a more equitable income distribution, and reduce the danger of speculative bubbles. The various meetings in the run-up to the G-20 summit in China, including the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, would be ideal forums for designing such a package, and advancing its implementation.

Economic orthodoxy and independent actions have clearly failed. It is time for policymakers to recognize that innovative international policy cooperation is not a luxury; sometimes – like today – it is a necessity.

       

       

       

       

       

       

April 15 is tax day, but not many Americans will be lining up at the post office or logging onto TurboTax as midnight approaches. Taxpayers who receive refunds often file well ahead of the April 15 deadline. And according to new research, many of those refund dollars are already spent or spoken for.

Early filing is particularly common among taxpayers who claim the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which supplements earnings for low-income workers and their families. EITC recipients often receive substantial refunds, especially in relation to their income. According to new data available through our EITC Interactive, nationwide 26.8 million taxpayers benefited from the EITC for the 2013 tax year, and they claimed a total of $64.7 billion from the credit. Combined with other credits and over-withholding these families received, the average refund for EITC filers topped $4,100 that year. As the accompanying map shows, that amount approached $4,500 or more in many southern states.

I thought of those large refunds while reading a fascinating new book by sociologist Kathryn Edin and her colleagues, titled, It’s Not Like I’m Poor: How Working Families Make Ends Meet in a Post-Welfare World. The book provides insights from in-depth interviews with 115 families with children in the Boston area who claimed the EITC. It examines their household budgets and how the families view and use the credit. The authors find that these families rely greatly on their tax refunds to close the gap between the wages they earn and the daily costs of living in an expensive region like Greater Boston. For some, a large tax refund also enabled them to purchase something normally confined to middle-class families, such as a special birthday present for a child or dinner out at a restaurant.

One of the authors’ central findings, however, was that EITC recipients bear a considerable amount of debt—95 percent of the families studied had debt of some kind. The most common (66%) was credit card debt, with the typical family owing nearly $2,000. Considerable shares of families also had utility, car, or student loan debt.

Their indebtedness was not surprising given that wages covered on average only about two-thirds of monthly expenditures. The authors classified one-quarter of families’ refund spending as dedicated to debt/bills, but other ways families  spend the money—such as repairing a car or paying ahead on bills—point to the lack of financial cushion EITC recipients endure throughout the year.

For the families Edin and colleagues studied, the average tax refund represented a staggering three months of earnings. Despite that, the authors report that many families expressed that they preferred the "windfall" versus receipt of payments over several months, partly because the lump sum held out the prospect of helping them save. But one has to wonder if the EITC, now routinely referred to as the nation's most effective anti-poverty policy, best supports families' financial security in this form, as its recipients fall further behind each month.

We should experiment with new ways of delivering EITC recipients' tax refunds that preserve some of its windfall aspect while also periodically delivering portions of the credit throughout the year. A small periodic payment pilot is underway in Chicago, and early findings suggest that advance payments of taxpayers' anticipated EITC helped them meet basic needs, pay off debt, and reduce financial stress relative to similar families not receiving such payments. It’s time to try making the EITC more than an annual boom in a bust-filled financial cycle for low-income families.