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Interleukin-12 electroporation may sensitize 'cold' melanomas to immunotherapies

(American Association for Cancer Research) Combining intratumoral electroporation of interleukin-12 (IL-12) DNA (tavokinogene telseplasmid, or TAVO) with the immune checkpoint inhibitor pembrolizumab (Keytruda) led to clinical responses in patients with immunologically quiescent advanced melanoma, according to results from a phase II trial.




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Plays exploring human drive and human touch win 2020 Neukom Honors

(Dartmouth College) Expanded Dartmouth awards program gives prizes for 'spec fic' playwriting on what it means to be human in a computerized world.




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The World’s Best MBA Programs For Entrepreneurship

Monday, October 28, 2019 - 00:45




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Study traces spread of early dairy farming across Western Europe

(University of York) An international team of scientists, led by researchers at the University of York, analysed the molecular remains of food left in pottery used by the first farmers who settled along the Atlantic Coast of Europe from 7,000 to 6,000 years ago.




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Window to another world: Life is bubbling up to seafloor with petroleum from deep below

(Marine Biological Laboratory) Microbial life is bubbling up to the ocean floor along with fluids from deeply buried petroleum reservoirs, reports a team of scientists from the University of Calgary and the Marine Biological Laboratory, Woods Hole.




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Can you reuse a disposable mask? Yes, if you follow these steps

Disposable masks can be used more than once, but it's important to make sure the mask isn't carrying coronavirus.





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Disease-carrying mosquitoes could be common in Europe by 2030

Climate change could mean mosquitoes that can carry diseases like dengue, zika and yellow fever become established in southern Europe within 10 years.




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Leading European computing society releases statement on COVID contact tracing

(Association for Computing Machinery) Today, the ACM Europe Technology Policy Committee (Europe TPC) of the world's largest society of computing professionals, the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), has released detailed principles and practices for the development and deployment of 'contact tracing' technology intended to track and arrest the spread of COVID-19.




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Alumni Food Entrepreneurs Team Up to Feed NYC Healthcare Workers

Fundraising efforts, along with a generous donation from Beyond Meat, founded by Ethan Brown ’08, helps restaurant P.S. Kitchen, owned by April Tam Smith ’10 and Graham Smith ’21, provide meals to healthcare workers.




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Certain ortho-hydroxylated brominated ethers are promiscuous kinase inhibitors that impair neuronal signaling and neurodevelopmental processes [Cell Biology]

The developing nervous system is remarkably sensitive to environmental signals, including disruptive toxins, such as polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs). PBDEs are an environmentally pervasive class of brominated flame retardants whose neurodevelopmental toxicity mechanisms remain largely unclear. Using dissociated cortical neurons from embryonic Rattus norvegicus, we found here that chronic exposure to 6-OH–BDE-47, one of the most prevalent hydroxylated PBDE metabolites, suppresses both spontaneous and evoked neuronal electrical activity. On the basis of our previous work on mitogen-activated protein kinase (MAPK)/extracellular signal-related kinase (ERK) (MEK) biology and our observation that 6-OH–BDE-47 is structurally similar to kinase inhibitors, we hypothesized that certain hydroxylated PBDEs mediate neurotoxicity, at least in part, by impairing the MEK–ERK axis of MAPK signal transduction. We tested this hypothesis on three experimental platforms: 1) in silico, where modeling ligand–protein docking suggested that 6-OH–BDE-47 is a promiscuous ATP-competitive kinase inhibitor; 2) in vitro in dissociated neurons, where 6-OH–BDE-47 and another specific hydroxylated BDE metabolite similarly impaired phosphorylation of MEK/ERK1/2 and activity-induced transcription of a neuronal immediate early gene; and 3) in vivo in Drosophila melanogaster, where developmental exposures to 6-OH–BDE-47 and a MAPK inhibitor resulted in offspring displaying similarly increased frequency of mushroom-body β–lobe midline crossing, a metric of axonal guidance. Taken together, our results support that certain ortho-hydroxylated PBDE metabolites are promiscuous kinase inhibitors and can cause disruptions of critical neurodevelopmental processes, including neuronal electrical activity, pre-synaptic functions, MEK–ERK signaling, and axonal guidance.




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Phenotypic Adaption of Pseudomonas aeruginosa by Hacking Siderophores Produced by Other Microorganisms

Quentin Perraud
Apr 1, 2020; 19:589-607
Research




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Integrative Metabolic Pathway Analysis Reveals Novel Therapeutic Targets in Osteoarthritis

Beatriz Rocha
Apr 1, 2020; 19:574-588
Research




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Dysregulation of Exosome Cargo by Mutant Tau Expressed in Human-Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell (iPSC) Neurons Revealed by Proteomics Analyses

Sonia Podvin
Apr 15, 2020; 0:RA120.002079v1-mcp.RA120.002079
Research




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Bank of REU/Grad Fair Questions

By Lucy Martinez and Eduardo Torres Davila We attended the Joint Math Meetings (JMM) conference in Denver to present our research from our work at the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute Undergraduate Program. At JMM, there was a fair of graduate … Continue reading




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Transparency and Accountability for Drone Use: European Approaches

Invitation Only Research Event

11 March 2019 - 9:30am to 12 March 2019 - 12:30pm

Chatham House

With increased use of military drones in recent years there have also been many calls for greater transparency and accountability with regards to drone operations.

This would allow for greater public understanding, particularly as the complex nature of military operations today intensifies difficulties in sustaining perceptions of the legitimate use of force.

For example, in Europe, leading states rely on the US for drone platforms and for the infrastructure - such as military communication networks - that enable those operations, while the US also relies on airbases in European states to operate its drone programme.

In addition, with reports that the US is loosening the rules on the use of drones, it is important to understand how European approaches to transparency and accountability may be affected by these developments.

This workshop focuses on how European states can facilitate transparency to ensure accountability for drone use, as well as what the limits might be, considering both the complexity of military operations today and the need for achieving operational goals.

With the US easing restrictions on export controls, the discussion also considers the role of regulation in ensuring accountability and prospects for developing common standards.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Nilza Amaral

Project Manager, International Security Programme




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European Approaches to Remote Warfare

Research Event

15 May 2019 - 9:00am to 6:00pm

Brussels, Belgium

With continuing instability at Europe's borders, along with uncertainty on future US support for NATO, many European countries are increasing their allocations to defence budgets and to collective European strategic defence. In addition, with non-state armed groups creating instability and threatening civilian lives and livelihoods in proximity to the EU’s borders, various operations have been carried out in conflict theatres in the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel under the auspices of NATO, the UN, the EU or by single EU member states.

Although European military personnel have been deployed in many regions, with countries becoming more reluctant to deploy ‘boots on the ground’, warfare has been increasingly conducted through remote means. This has led to criticism on the limited transparency and accountability mechanisms at work in these operations, while some have questioned the military effectiveness of such tactics or the capacity and willingness of states to ensure that targets are struck accurately and without impact on civilian populations.

Against this background, the EU has started allocating resources to military research and development projects with a focus on unmanned systems and related technologies. Under the auspices of the European Defence Fund such funding is set to increase, while potential bilateral programmes between some states have also been explored. Despite concerns raised by the European Parliament, the development of these policies and technologies has taken place without significant consideration of what the legal, ethical and military-strategic impact of these instruments might be.    

This event will bring together a range of experts, policymakers and civil society organizations to discuss the technology horizon of European defence investments and policy developments around remote warfare. Participants will discuss the implications of the new EU defence fund, legal, ethical, and transparency issues in military research and development and the position of the EU as a global actor. 

This event is being organized in partnership with PAX Netherlands.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Nilza Amaral

Project Manager, International Security Programme




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The Implications of Drone Proliferation in Europe

Invitation Only Research Event

20 May 2019 - 9:30am to 21 May 2019 - 12:30pm

Chatham House, London

Several countries in Europe are currently developing, increasing or arming their drone capabilities. This increase in drone capability is taking place through procurement by individual states, bilateral projects – such as the French-German Future Combat Air Systems – and multinational efforts that include the development of the Eurodrone – a project by Germany, France, Italy and Spain – and the nEUROn which involves France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. In addition, the EU has recently approved the European Defence Fund which, along with funds for joint development of defence equipment and technology and for defence research, also includes direct funding to support the development of the Eurodrone.
  
Other recent developments include the UK obtaining the MQ−9B SkyGuardian – an updated variant of the MQ-9 Reaper – and Germany signing a leasing agreement for the Israeli-made Heron TP. Also, in March 2019, the US State Department approved the sale of the MQ-9B SkyGuardian to Belgium and announced the provision of MQ-9 Reaper drones to the Netherlands. While the UK and France are the only countries in Europe so far to possess armed drones, Italy is on track to acquire armed drones in the near future. However, out of the European countries currently seeking to obtain unarmed drones – including Spain, Poland and Greece – only Switzerland has so far ruled out weaponizing its drones in the future.
 
This Chatham House workshop will examine key issues pertaining to drone proliferation in Europe including: 
  • The risks and challenges of the increasing number and arming of drones. 
  • The risks for countries of not doing so in terms of geostrategic interests and the future battlefield.
  • Opportunities for developing common standards on drone transfers and deployment across EU member states.
  • Sharing and cooperation on drone use.
  • What legal and policy implications might arise for European states as a result.

With Brexit on the horizon, participants will also consider what impact this may have on future drone developments in Europe.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Nilza Amaral

Project Manager, International Security Programme




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Human Control Is Essential to the Responsible Use of Military Neurotechnology

8 August 2019

Yasmin Afina

Research Assistant, International Security Programme
The military importance of AI-connected brain–machine interfaces is growing. Steps must be taken to ensure human control at all times over these technologies.

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A model of a human brain is displayed at an exhibition in Lisbon, Portugal. Photo: Getty Images.

Technological progress in neurotechnology and its military use is proceeding apace. As early as the 1970s, brain-machine interfaces have been the subject of study. By 2014, the UK’s Ministry of Defence was arguing that the development of artificial devices, such as artificial limbs, is ‘likely to see refinement of control to provide… new ways to connect the able-bodied to machines and computers.’ Today, brain-machine interface technology is being investigated around the world, including in Russia, China and South Korea.

Recent developments in the private sector are producing exciting new capabilities for people with disabilities and medical conditions. In early July, Elon Musk and Neuralink presented their ‘high-bandwidth’ brain-machine interface system, with small and flexible electrode threads packaged into a small device containing custom chips and to be inserted and implanted into the user’s brain for medical purposes.

In the military realm, in 2018, the United States’ Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) put out a call for proposals to investigate the potential of nonsurgical brain-machine interfaces to allow soldiers to ‘interact regularly and intuitively with artificially intelligent, semi-autonomous and autonomous systems in a manner currently not possible with conventional interfaces’. DARPA further highlighted the need for these interfaces to be bidirectional – where information is sent both from brain to machine (neural recording) and from machine to brain (neural stimulation) – which will eventually allow machines and humans to learn from each other.

This technology may provide soldiers and commanders with a superior level of sensory sensitivity and the ability to process a greater amount of data related to their environment at a faster pace, thus enhancing situational awareness. These capabilities will support military decision-making as well as targeting processes.

Neural recording will also enable the obtention of a tremendous amount of data from operations, including visuals, real-time thought processes and emotions. These sets of data may be used for feedback and training (including for virtual wargaming and for machine learning training), as well as for investigatory purposes. Collected data will also feed into research that may help researchers understand and predict human intent from brain signals – a tremendous advantage from a military standpoint.

Legal and ethical considerations

The flip side of these advancements is the responsibilities they will impose and the risks and vulnerabilities of the technology as well as legal and ethical considerations.

The primary risk would be for users to lose control over the technology, especially in a military context; hence a fail-safe feature is critical for humans to maintain ultimate control over decision-making. Despite the potential benefits of symbiosis between humans and AI, users must have the unconditional possibility to override these technologies should they believe it is appropriate and necessary for them to do so.

This is important given the significance of human control over targeting, as well as strategic and operational decision-making. An integrated fail-safe in brain-machine interfaces may in fact allow for a greater degree of human control over critical, time-sensitive decision-making. In other words, in the event of incoming missiles alert, while the AI may suggest a specific course of action, users must be able to decide in a timely manner whether to execute it or not.

Machines can learn from coded past experiences and decisions, but humans also use gut feelings to make life and death decisions. A gut feeling is a human characteristic that is not completely transferable, as it relies on both rational and emotional traits – and is part of the ‘second-brain’ and the gut-brain axis which is currently poorly understood. It is however risky to take decisions solely on gut feelings or solely on primary brain analysis—therefore, receiving a comprehensive set of data via an AI-connected brain-machine interface may help to verify and evaluate the information in a timely manner, and complement decision-making processes. However, these connections and interactions would have to be much better understood than the current state of knowledge. 

Fail-safe features are necessary to ensure compliance with the law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law. As a baseline, human control must be used to 1) define areas where technology may or may not be trusted and to what extent, and 2) ensure legal, political and ethical accountability, responsibility and explainability at all times. Legal and ethical considerations must be taken into account from as early as the design and conceptualizing stage of these technologies, and oversight must be ensured across the entirety of the manufacturing supply chain.  

The second point raises the need to further explore and clarify whether existing national, regional and international legal, political and ethical frameworks are sufficient to cover the development and use of these technologies. For instance, there is value in assessing to what extent AI-connected brain-machine interfaces will affect the assessment of the mental element in war crimes and their human rights implications.

In addition, these technologies need to be highly secure and invulnerable to cyber hacks. Neural recording and neural stimulation will be directly affecting brain processes in humans and if an adversary has the ability to connect to a human brain, steps need to be taken to ensure that memory and personality could not be damaged.

Future questions

Military applications of technological progress in neurotechnology is inevitable, and their implications cannot be ignored. There is an urgent need for policymakers to understand the fast-developing neurotechnical capabilities, develop international standards and best practices – and, if necessary, new and dedicated legal instruments – to frame the use of these technologies.

Considering the opportunities that brain-machine interfaces may present in the realms of security and defence, inclusive, multi-stakeholder discussions and negotiations leading to the development of standards must include the following considerations:

  • What degree of human control would be desirable, at what stage and by whom? To what extent could human users be trusted with their own judgment in decision-making processes?
  • How could algorithmic and human biases, the cyber security and vulnerabilities of these technologies and the quality of data be factored into these discussions?
  • How can ethical and legal considerations be incorporated into the design stage of these technologies?
  • How can it be ensured that humans cannot be harmed in the process, either inadvertently or deliberately?
  • Is there a need for a dedicated international forum to discuss the military applications of neurotechnology? How could these discussions be integrated to existing international processes related to emerging military applications of technological progress, such as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems?




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The Future of EU–US Cooperation in Space Traffic Management and Space Situational Awareness

29 August 2019

As more space activities develop, there is an increasing requirement for comprehensive space situational awareness (SSA). This paper provides an overview of the current landscape in SSA and space traffic management as well as possible scenarios for EU–US cooperation in this area. 

Alexandra Stickings

Research Fellow for Space Policy and Security, RUSI

2019-08-19-SpaceTrafficManagement.jpg

Deployment of the NanoRacks-Remove Debris Satellite from the International Space Station. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • Space situational awareness (SSA) and space traffic management (STM) are essential for sustainable near-Earth orbit. International cooperation in SSA and STM is vital with the growing number of satellite operators and the increasingly complex space environment.
  • The various definitions of SSA and STM are ambiguous. Understanding the activities that fall under each term can better assist in finding areas for cooperation and collaboration.
  • SSA has historically been a military activity, leading to an incomplete public catalogue of its use and barriers to sharing information with other states and the commercial sector. The rise in private space actors has increased the number of commercial STM providers and, with plans in the US to move responsibility for STM to civilian control, there will likely be more opportunities for international collaboration, particularly through the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) programme.
  • Individual EU member states possess developed STM capabilities, but overall these are still some way behind those of allies such as the US. Further investment in STM infrastructure and programmes is required for the EU and individual European states to be an essential partner to the US and add value to the global effort.
  • There are worldwide challenges, both political and technical, to providing STM coverage, which may lead to a lack of collaboration and gaps in understanding of activities in orbit. Existing sensors have limitations in terms of the size of objects that can be detected and the precision with which their movements can be predicted. These capability gaps represent opportunities for the EU to contribute.
  • The EU can build on its tradition of support for openness and civil society by creating a system that fosters an environment of cooperation and collaboration involving industry, commercial STM providers and the wider international community.
  • Although collaboration in STM is vital, the EU should also aim to tackle issues within the wider definition of SSA including space weather, intelligence and the security of ground stations.
  • The EU is well placed to become a global leader in SSA and STM. However, it needs to take into consideration the current political and technical landscape when making decisions regarding investment in capabilities and the pursuit of international partnerships.




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EU–US Cooperation on Tackling Disinformation

3 October 2019

Disinformation, as the latest iteration of propaganda suitable for a digitally interconnected world, shows no signs of abating. This paper provides a holistic overview of the current state of play and outlines how EU and US cooperation can mitigate disinformation in the future.

Sophia Ignatidou

Academy Associate, International Security Programme

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A congressional staff member displays print outs of social media posts during a hearing before the House Select Intelligence Committee 1 November 2017 in Washington, DC. Photo: Getty Images.
  • EU and US cooperation on tackling disinformation needs to be grounded in an international human rights framework in order to bridge the differences of both parties and include other countries facing this challenge.
  • The disinformation debate needs to be reformulated to cover systemic issues rather than merely technical or security concerns. A lag in regulatory development has led to systemic vulnerabilities. In this context, policymakers need to push for more evidence-based analysis, which is only attainable if technology companies engage in honest debate and allow meaningful access to data – as determined by government appointed researchers rather than the companies themselves – taking into account and respecting users’ privacy.
  • Data governance needs to be the focus of attempts to tackle disinformation. Data’s implications for information, market and power asymmetries, feed into and exacerbate the problem.
  • Policymakers should focus on regulating the distribution of online content rather than the subject matter itself, which may have implications for freedom of speech.
  • Disinformation is mainly the result of inefficient gatekeeping of highly extractive digital companies. The old gatekeepers, journalists and their respective regulators, need to be actively engaged in devising the new regulatory framework.
  • Legacy media need to urgently consider the issue of ‘strategic silence’ and avoid being co-opted by political actors aiming to manipulate the accelerated, reactive news cycle by engaging in divisive ‘clickbait’ rhetoric verging on disinformation and propaganda. When strategic silence is not an option, contextual analysis is fundamental.
  •  The EU delegation should assist the coordination of EU–US efforts to tackle disinformation by drawing on the work and expertise at the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity (TCEI), the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), the High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation, and work with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to foster a long-term interdisciplinary forum to harness technological innovation to protect and support democracy from threats such as disinformation.
  • The EU and US must avoid rushed regulation that may condone enhanced surveillance or vilify journalism that scrutinizes those in power in the name of security.




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EU–US Relations on Internet Governance

14 November 2019

As internet governance issues emerge in the wake of innovations such as the Internet of Things and advanced artificial intelligence, there is an urgent need for the EU and US to establish a common, positive multi-stakeholder vision for regulating and governing the internet.

Emily Taylor

Associate Fellow, International Security Programme

Stacie Hoffmann

Internet Policy and Cybersecurity Consultant, Oxford Information Labs

2019-11-14-EUUSInternet.jpg

Server room network cables in New York City, November 2014. Photo: Michael Bocchieri/Staff/Getty.
  • Political, economic, sociological and technological factors are poised to challenge EU and US ideological positions on internet governance, which will make it difficult to find consensus and common ground in the years to come.
  • The EU and US share core values and perspectives relating to internet governance, such as openness, freedom and interoperability, as well as a human rights framework for cybersecurity. There have been many examples of successful multi-stakeholder cooperation between the EU and US, including the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) transition and the European Dialogue on Internet Governance (EuroDIG).
  • There are also subtle differences between the EU and US, and each has different reasons to support multi-stakeholderism. Cases that highlight growing tensions in EU–US coordination on internet governance include the controversies surrounding the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the WHOIS system that governs domain name registration data, and the board of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which undermined an independent cybersecurity review.
  • Internet governance is becoming more complex, with a multiplicity of actors and no obvious authority for important emerging issues. Additionally, the rise of China and its authoritarian vision for the future of the internet is a threat to the current internet governance institutions that have been shaped by and reflect Western values.
  • To bridge ideological gaps the EU and US should build capacity between likeminded stakeholders, create a taskforce on effective multi-stakeholder internet governance, and work through non-governmental stakeholders to improve participation.




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PARP-1-targeted Auger emitters display high-LET cytotoxic properties in vitro but show limited therapeutic utility in solid tumor models of human neuroblastoma

The currently available therapeutic radiopharmaceutical for high-risk neuroblastoma, 131I-MIBG, is ineffective at targeting micrometastases due to the low linear energy transfer (LET) properties of high-energy beta particles. In contrast, Auger radiation has high-LET properties with nanometer ranges in tissue, efficiently causing DNA damage when emitted in close proximity to DNA. The aim of this study was to evaluate the cytotoxicity of targeted Auger therapy in pre-clinical models of high-risk neuroblastoma. Methods: Using a radiolabeled poly(ADP-ribose) polymerase (PARP) inhibitor, 125I-KX1, we delivered an Auger emitter iodine-125 to PARP-1: a chromatin-binding enzyme overexpressed in neuroblastoma. In vitro cytotoxicity of 125I-KX1 was assessed in nineteen neuroblastoma cell lines, followed by in-depth pharmacological analysis in a sensitive and resistant pair of cell lines. Immunofluorescence microscopy was used to characterize 125I-KX1-induced DNA damage. Finally, in vitro/in vivo microdosimetry was modeled from experimentally derived pharmacological variables. Results: 125I-KX1 was highly cytotoxic in vitro across a panel of neuroblastoma cell lines, directly causing double strand DNA breaks. Based on subcellular dosimetry, 125I-KX1 was approximately twice as effective compared to 131I-KX1, whereas cytoplasmic 125I-MIBG demonstrated low biological effectiveness. Despite the ability to deliver focused radiation dose to the cell nuclei, 125I-KX1 remained less effective than its alpha-emitting analog 211At-MM4, and required significantly higher activity for equivalent in vivo efficacy based on tumor microdosimetry. Conclusion: Chromatin-targeted Auger therapy is lethal to high-risk neuroblastoma cells with potential use in micrometastatic disease. This study provides the first evidence for cellular lethality from a PARP-1 targeted Auger emitter, calling for further investigation into targeted Auger therapy.




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Head-to-head comparison of 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 and 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT in patients with metastatic, well-differentiated neuroendocrine tumors: a prospective study

Purpose: 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 is an antagonist for somatostatin receptor used in neuroendocrine imaging. The purpose of this study is to compare 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 and 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT in patients with metastatic, well-differentiated neuroendocrine tumors. Methods: Patients with histologically-proven, metastatic and/or unresectable, well-differentiated neuroendocrine tumors were prospectively recruited in this study. They received an intravenous injection of 68Ga-DOTATATE (4.0 ± 1.3 mCi) on the first day and 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 (4.0 ± 1.4 mCi) on the second day. Whole-body PET/CT scans were performed at 40 to 60 minutes after injection on the same scanner. Physiologic uptake of normal organs, lesion numbers, and lesion uptake were compared. Results: Twenty-nine patients were prospectively enrolled in the study. The SUVmax of the spleen, renal cortex, adrenal glands, pituitary glands, stomach wall, normal liver parenchyma, small intestine, pancreas, and bone marrow were significantly lower on 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 than on 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT (P<0.001). 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 detected significantly more liver lesions (539 vs. 356, P = 0.002), but fewer bone lesions (156 vs. 374, P = 0.031, Figure 3) than 68Ga-DOTATATE. The tumor-to-background ratio of liver lesions was significantly higher on 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 (7.6 ± 5.1 vs. 3.4 ± 2.0, P<0.001). 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 and 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT showed comparable results for primary tumors and lymph node metastases based on either patient-based or lesion-based comparison. Conclusion: 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 performs better in the detection ability and TBR of liver metastases. However, 68Ga-DOTATATE outperforms 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 in the detection of bone metastases. The differential affinity of different metastatic sites provides key information for patient selection in imaging and peptide receptor radionuclide therapy.




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Differential expression of glucose transporters and hexokinases in prostate cancer with a neuroendocrine gene signature: a mechanistic perspective for FDG imaging of PSMA-suppressed tumors

Purpose: Although the incidence of de novo neuroendocrine prostate cancer (NEPC) is rare, recent data suggests that low expression of prostate-specific membrane antigen (PSMA) is associated with a spectrum of neuroendocrine (NE) hallmarks and androgen receptor (AR)-suppression in prostate cancer (PC). Previous clinical reports indicate that PCs with a phenotype similar to NE tumors can be more amenable to imaging by 18F-Fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) rather than PSMA-targeting radioligands. In this study, we evaluated the association between NE gene signature and FDG uptake-associated genes including glucose transporters (GLUTs) and hexokinases, with the goal of providing a genomic signature to explain the reported FDG-avidity of PSMA-suppressed tumors. Methods: Data mining approaches, cell lines and patient-derived xenograft (PDX) models were used to study the levels of 14 members of the SLC2A family (encoding GLUT proteins), 4 members of the hexokinase family (genes: HK1 to 3 and GCK) and PSMA (FOLH1 gene) following AR-inhibition and in correlation with NE hallmarks. Also, we characterize a NE-like PC (NELPC) subset among a cohort of primary and metastatic PC samples with no NE histopathology. We measured glucose uptake in a NE-induced in vitro model and a zebrafish model by non-radioactive imaging of glucose uptake using fluorescent glucose bioprobe, GB2-Cy3. Results: This work demonstrates that a NE gene signature associates with differential expression of genes encoding GLUT and hexokinase proteins. In NELPC, elevated expression of GCK (encoding glucokinase protein) and decreased expression of SLC2A12 correlated with earlier biochemical recurrence. In tumors treated with AR-inhibitors, high expression of GCK and low expression of SLC2A12 correlated with NE histopathology and PSMA gene suppression. GLUT12-suppression and amplification of glucokinase was observed in NE-induced PC cell lines and PDX models. A higher glucose uptake was confirmed in low-PSMA tumors using a GB2-Cy3 probe in a zebrafish model. Conclusion: NE gene signature in NEPC and NELPC associates with a distinct transcriptional profile of GLUTs and HKs. PSMA-suppression correlates with GLUT12-suppression and glucokinase-amplification. Alteration of FDG uptake-associated genes correlated positively with higher glucose uptake in AR and PSMA-suppressed tumors. Zebrafish xenograft tumor models are an accurate and efficient pre-clinical method for monitoring non-radioactive glucose uptake.




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Inflammation-based index and 68Ga-DOTATOC PET-derived uptake and volumetric parameters predict outcome in neuroendocrine tumor patients treated with 90Y-DOTATOC

We performed post-hoc analyses on the utility of pre-therapeutic and early interim 68Ga-DOTA-Tyr3-octreotide (68Ga-DOTATOC) positron emission tomography (PET) tumor uptake and volumetric parameters and a recently proposed biomarker, the inflammation-based index (IBI), for peptide receptor radionuclide therapy (PRRT) in neuroendocrine tumor (NET) patients treated with 90Y-DOTATOC in the setting of a prospective phase II trial. Methods: Forty-three NET patients received up to four cycles of 1.85 GBq/m²/cycle 90Y-DOTATOC with a maximal kidney biologic effective dose of 37 Gy. All patients underwent a 68Ga-DOTATOC PET/computed tomography (CT) at baseline and seven weeks after the first PRRT cycle. 68Ga-DOTATOC-avid tumor lesions were semi-automatically delineated using a customized standardized uptake value (SUV) threshold-based approach. PRRT response was assessed on CT using RECIST 1.1. Results: Median progression-free survival (PFS) and overall survival (OS) were 13.9 and 22.3 months, respectively. An SUVmean higher than 13.7 (75th percentile (P75)) was associated with better survival (hazard ratio (HR) 0.45; P = 0.024), whereas a 68Ga-DOTATOC-avid tumor volume higher than 578 ml (P75) was associated with worse OS (HR 2.18; P = 0.037). Elevated baseline IBI was associated with worse OS (HR 3.90; P = 0.001). Multivariate analysis corroborated independent associations between OS and SUVmean (P = 0.016) and IBI (P = 0.015). No significant correlations with PFS were found. A composite score based on SUVmean and IBI allowed to further stratify patients in three categories with significantly different survival. On early interim PET, a decrease in SUVmean of more than 17% (P75) was associated with worse survival (HR 2.29; P = 0.024). Conclusion: Normal baseline IBI and high 68Ga-DOTATOC tumor uptake predict better outcome in NET patients treated with 90Y-DOTATOC. This can be used for treatment personalization. Interim 68Ga-DOTATOC PET does not provide information for treatment personalization.




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Quantitative 3D assessment of 68Ga-DOTATOC PET/MRI with diffusion-weighted imaging to assess imaging markers for gastroendopancreatic neuroendocrine tumors: Preliminary results

68Ga-DOTATOC-PET/MRI (68Gallium-DOTATOC-positron emission tomography/magnetic resonance imaging) combines the advantages of PET in the acquisition of metabolic-functional information with the high soft tissue contrast of MRI. Standardized uptake values (SUV) in tumors were suggested as a measure of somatostatin receptor expression. A challenge with receptor ligands is, that the distribution volume is confined to tissues with tracer-uptake, potentially limiting SUV quantification. In this study, different functional, three-dimensional (3D) SUV, apparent diffusion coefficient (ADC) parameters and arterial tumor enhancement were tested for the characterization of gastroendopancreatic neuroendocrine tumors (GEP-NET). Methods: For this single-center, cross-sectional study, 22 patients with 24 histologically confirmed GEP-NET lesions (15 men/7 women; median, 61 years, range, 43-81 years), who received hybrid 68Ga-DOTA-PET/MRI examinations at 3T between January 2017 and July 2019 met eligibility criteria. SUVs, tumor-to-background ratios (TBR), the total functional tumor volume (TFTV), ADCmean and ADCmin were measured based on volumes of interest (VOI) and examined with receiver operating characteristic analysis to determine cut-off values for differentiation between low and intermediate grade GEP-NET. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients were used to assess correlations between functional imaging parameters. Results: The ratio of PET-derived SUVmean and diffusion-weighted imaging (DWI)-derived ADCmin was introduced as a combined variable to predict tumor grade, outperforming single predictors. Based on a threshold ratio of 0.03 to be exceeded, tumors could be classified as grade 2 with a sensitivity of 86% and specificity of 100%. SUV and functional ADC values as well as arterial contrast enhancement parameters showed non-significant and mostly negligible correlations. Conclusion: As receptor density and tumor cellularity appear to be independent, potentially complementary phenomena, the combined PET/MRI ratio SUVmean/ADCmin may be used as a novel biomarker, allowing to differentiate between grade 1 and 2 GEP-NET.




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64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT for Imaging Patients with Known or Suspected Somatostatin Receptor-Positive Neuroendocrine Tumors: Results of the First US Prospective, Reader-Blinded Clinical Trial

Studies demonstrate that the investigational 64Cu-DOTATATE radiopharmaceutical may provide diagnostic and logistical benefits over available imaging agents for patients with somatostatin receptor (SSTR)-positive neuroendocrine tumors (NETs). Accordingly, we aimed to prospectively determine the lowest dose of 64Cu-DOTATATE that facilitates diagnostic quality scans and evaluated the diagnostic performance and safety in a phase III study of patients with SSTR-expressing NETs. Methods: A dose-ranging study was conducted in 12 patients divided into 3 dose groups (111 MBq [3.0 mCi], 148 MBq [4.0 mCi], and 185 MBq [5.0 mCi] ± 10%) to determine the lowest dose of 64Cu-DOTATATE that produced diagnostic quality PET/CT images. Using the 64Cu-DOTATATE dose identified in the dose-ranging study, 3 independent nuclear medicine physicians who were blinded to all clinical information read PET/CT scans from 21 healthy volunteers and 42 NET-positive patients to determine those with "Disease" and "No Disease," as well as "Localized" versus "Metastatic" status. Blinded-reader evaluations were compared to a patient-specific standard of truth (SOT), which was established by an independent oncologist who used all previously available pathology, clinical, and conventional imaging data. Diagnostic performance calculated for 64Cu-DOTATATE included sensitivity, specificity, negative predictive value, positive predictive value, and accuracy. Inter- and intra-reader reliability, as well as ability to differentiate between localized and metastatic disease, was also determined. Adverse events (AEs) were recorded from 64Cu-DOTATATE injection through 48 hours post-injection. Results: The dose-ranging study identified 148 MBq (4.0 mCi) as the optimal dose to obtain diagnostic quality PET/CT images. Following database lock, diagnostic performance from an initial majority read of the 3 independent readers showed a significant 90.9% sensitivity (P = 0.0042) and 96.6% specificity (P < 0.0001) for detecting NETs, which translated to a 100.0% sensitivity and 96.8% specificity after correcting for an initial SOT misread. Excellent inter- and intra-reader reliability, as well as ability to distinguish between localized and metastatic disease, was also noted. No AEs were related to 64Cu-DOTATATE, and no serious AEs were observed. Conclusion: 64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT is a safe imaging technique that provides high-quality and accurate images at a dose of 148 MBq (4.0 mCi) for the detection of somatostatin-expressing NETs.




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Efficacy of Peptide Receptor Radionuclide Therapy for Esthesioneuroblastoma

Objectives: Esthesioneuroblastoma (ENB) is rare with limited therapeutic options when unresectable or metastatic; however, expression of somatostatin receptors qualifies it for peptide receptor radionuclide therapy (PRRT). We report outcomes of PRRT in ENB from two referral centers. Methods: Using PRRT databases at two European Neuroendocrine Tumour Society Centers of Excellence, case finding was undertaken between 2004-2018 for patients who had PRRT with recurrent/metastatic ENB deemed unsuitable for further conventional therapies. Evaluations of response using a composite reference standard and for survival were performed. Results: Of seven patients, four had partial response, two had disease stabilization and one had early progression. Possible side effects include worsening CSF-leaks. Median progression-free survival was 17 months (range, 0-30), and median overall survival was 32 months (range, 4–53). Conclusion: PRRT shows promising efficacy and moderate survival duration in unresectable locally advanced or metastatic ENB warranting larger cohort studies incorporating measures of quality of life.




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Development and evaluation of interleukin-2 derived radiotracers for PET imaging of T-cells in mice

Recently, N-(4-18F-fluorobenzoyl)-interleukin-2 (18F-FB-IL2) was introduced as PET tracer for T-cell imaging. However, production is complex and time-consuming. Therefore, we developed two radiolabeled interleukin-2 (IL-2) variants, namely aluminum 18F-fluoride-(restrained complexing agent)-IL-2 (18F-AlF-RESCA-IL2) and 68Ga-gallium-(1,4,7-triazacyclononane-4,7-diacetic acid-1-glutaric acid)-IL-2 (68Ga-Ga-NODAGA-IL2) and compared their in-vitro and in-vivo characteristics with 18F-FB-IL2. Methods: Radiolabeling of 18F-AlF-RESCA-IL2 and 68Ga-Ga-NODAGA-IL2 was optimized and stability was evaluated in human serum. Receptor binding was studied with activated human peripheral blood mononuclear cells (hPBMCs). Ex-vivo tracer biodistribution in immunocompetent BALB/cOlaHsd (BALB/c) mice was performed at 15, 60 and 90 min after tracer injection. In-vivo binding characteristics were studied in severe combined immune-deficient (SCID) mice inoculated with activated hPBMCs in Matrigel. Tracer was injected 15 min after hPBMCs inoculation and a 60-min dynamic PET scan was acquired, followed by ex-vivo biodistribution studies. Specific uptake was determined by co-injection of tracer with unlabeled IL2 and by evaluating uptake in a control group inoculated with Matrigel only. Results: 68Ga-Ga-NODAGA-IL2 and 18F-AlF-RESCA-IL2 were produced with radiochemical purity >95% and radiochemical yield of 13.1±4.7% and 2.4±1.6% within 60 and 90 min, respectively. Both tracers were stable in serum, with >90% being intact tracer after 1h. In-vitro, both tracers displayed preferential binding to activated hPBMCs. Ex-vivo biodistribution studies in BALB/c mice showed higher uptake of 18F-AlF-RESCA-IL2 than 18F-FB-IL2 in liver, kidney, spleen, bone and bone marrow. 68Ga-Ga-NODAGA-IL2 uptake in liver and kidney was higher than 18F-FB-IL2 uptake. In-vivo, all tracers revealed uptake in activated hPBMCs in SCID mice. Low uptake was seen after a blocking dose of IL2 or in the Matrigel control group. In addition, 18F-AlF-RESCA-IL2 yielded highest contrast PET images of target lymph nodes. Conclusion: Production of 18F-AlF-RESCA-IL2 and 68Ga-Ga-NODAGA-IL2 is simpler and faster than 18F-FB-IL2. Both tracers showed good in-vitro and in-vivo characteristics with high uptake in lymphoid tissue and hPBMC xenografts.




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64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT and prediction of overall and progression-free survival in patients with neuroendocrine neoplasms

Overexpression of somatostatin receptors in patients with neuroendocrine neoplasms (NEN) is utilized for both diagnosis and treatment. Receptor density may reflect tumor differentiation and thus be associated with prognosis. Non-invasive visualization and quantification of somatostatin receptor density is possible by somatostatin receptor imaging (SRI) using positron emission tomography (PET). Recently, we introduced 64Cu-DOTATATE for SRI and we hypothesized that uptake of this tracer could be associated with overall (OS) and progression-free survival (PFS). Methods: We evaluated patients with NEN that had a 64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT SRI performed in two prospective studies. Tracer uptake was determined as the maximal standardized uptake value (SUVmax) for each patient. Kaplan-Meier analysis with log-rank was used to determine the predictive value of 64Cu-DOTATATE SUVmax for OS and PFS. Specificity, sensitivity and accuracy was calculated for prediction of outcome at 24 months after 64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT. Results: A total of 128 patients with NEN were included and followed for a median of 73 (1-112) months. During follow-up, 112 experienced disease progression and 69 patients died. The optimal cutoff for 64Cu-DOTATATE SUVmax was 43.3 for prediction of PFS with a hazard ratio of 0.56 (95% CI: 0.38-0.84) for patients with SUVmax > 43.3. However, no significant cutoff was found for prediction of OS. In multiple Cox regression adjusted for age, sex, primary tumor site and tumor grade, the SUVmax cutoff hazard ratio was 0.50 (0.32-0.77) for PFS. The accuracy was moderate for predicting PFS (57%) at 24 months after 64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT. Conclusion: In this first study to report the association of 64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT and outcome in patients with NEN, tumor somatostatin receptor density visualized with 64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT was prognostic for PFS but not OS. However, the accuracy of prediction of PFS at 24 months after 64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT SRI was moderate limiting the value on an individual patient basis.




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Prognostic Value of 18F-FDG PET/CT in a Large Cohort of 495 Patients with Advanced Metastatic Neuroendocrine Neoplasms (NEN) Treated with Peptide Receptor Radionuclide Therapy (PRRT)

The objective of this retrospective study was to determine the role of 18F-FDG PET/CT in a large cohort of 495 patients with metastatic neuroendocrine neoplasms (NENs) who were treated with peptide receptor radionuclide therapy (PRRT) with a long-term follow-up. Methods: The 495 patients were treated with 177Lu- and/or 90Y- DOTATOC/DOTATATE PRRT between 2/2002 and 7/2018. All subjects received both 68Ga-DOTATOC/TATE/NOC and 18F-FDG PET/CT prior to treatment and were followed 3-189 months. Kaplan-Meier analysis, log-rank test (Mantel-Cox), and Cox regression analysis were performed for overall survival (OS) and progression-free survival (PFS). Results: 199 patients (40.2%) presented with pancreatic NEN, 49 with CUP (cancer of unknown primary), 139 with midgut NEN, whereas the primary tumor was present in the rectum in 20, in the lung in 38, in the stomach in 8 and other locations in 42 patients. FDG-PET/CT was positive in 382 (77.2%) patients and 113 (22.8%) were FDG-negative before PRRT, while 100% were 68Ga-DOTATOC/TATE/NOC positive. For all patients, the median PFS and OS, defined from start of PRRT, were 19.6 mo and 58.7 mo, respectively. Positive FDG predicted shorter PFS (18.5 mo vs 24.1 mo; P = 0.0015) and OS (53.2 mo vs 83.1 mo; P < 0.001) than negative FDG. Amongst the pancreatic NEN, the median OS was 52.8 mo in FDG positive and 114.3 mo in FDG negative subjects (P = 0.0006). For all patients with positive 18F-FDG uptake, and a ratio of the highest SUVmax on 68Ga-SSTR PET to the most 18F-FDG-avid tumor lesions >2, the median OS was 53.0 mo, compared to 43.4 mo in those patients with a ratio <2 (P = 0.030). For patients with no 18F-FDG uptake (complete "mismatch" imaging pattern), the median OS was 108.3 mo vs 76.9 mo for SUVmax >15.0 and ≤15.0 on 68Ga-SSTR PET/CT, respectively. Conclusion: The presence of positive lesions on 18F-FDG PET is an independent prognostic factor in patients with NEN treated with PRRT. Metabolic imaging with 18F-FDG PET/CT compliments the molecular imaging aspect of 68Ga-SSTR PET/CT for the prognosis of survival after PRRT. High SSTR expression combined with negative 18F-FDG PET/CT imaging is associated with the most favorable long-term prognosis.




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Neuroendocrine Differentiation and Response toPSMA-Targeted Radioligand Therapy in Advanced Metastatic Castration-Resistant Prostate Cancer: a Single-Center Retrospective Study

Introduction: Neuroendocrine differentiation is associated with treatment failure and poor outcome in metastatic castration-resistant prostate cancer (mCRPC). We investigated the effect of circulating neuroendocrine biomarkers on the efficacy of PSMA-targeted radioligand therapy (RLT). Methods: Neuroendocrine biomarker profiles (progastrin-releasing peptide, neuron-specific enolase, and chromogranin-A) were analyzed in 50 patients commencing 177Lu-PSMA-617 RLT. The primary endpoint was PSA response in relation to baseline neuroendocrine marker profiles. Additional endpoints included progression-free survival. Tumor uptake on post-therapeutic scans, a known predictive marker for response, was used as control-variable. Results: Neuroendocrine biomarker profiles were abnormal in the majority of patients. Neuroendocrine biomarker levels did not predict treatment failure or early progression (P ≥ 0.13). By contrast, intense PSMA-ligand uptake in metastases predicted both treatment response (P = 0.0030) and reduced risk of early progression (P = 0.0111). Conclusion: Neuroendocrine marker profiles do not predict adverse outcome of RLT. By contrast, high ligand uptake was confirmed to be crucial for achieving tumor-response.




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Moving towards multicenter therapeutic trials in ALS: feasibility of data pooling using different TSPO positron emission tomography (PET) radioligands.

Rationale: Neuroinflammation has been implicated in Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) and can be visualized using translocator protein (TSPO) radioligands. To become a reliable pharmacodynamic biomarker for ALS multicenter trials, some challenges have to be overcome. We aimed to investigate whether multicenter data pooling of different TSPO tracers (11C-PBR28 and 18F-DPA714) is feasible, after validation of an established 11C-PBR28 PET pseudoreference analysis technique for 18F-DPA714. Methods: 7 ALS-Belgium (58.9±6.7 years,5M) and 8 HV-Belgium (52.1±15.2 years,3M); and 7 ALS-US (53.4±9.8 years,5M) and 7 HV-US (54.6±9.6 years,4M) from a previously published study (1) underwent dynamic 18F-DPA714 (Leuven, Belgium) or 11C-PBR28 (Boston, US) PET-MR scans. For 18F-DPA714, volume of distribution (VT) maps were compared to standardized uptake value ratios (SUVR)40-60 calculated using the pseudoreference regions (1)cerebellum, (2)occipital cortex, and (3)whole brain without ventricles (WB-ventricles). Also for 11C-PBR28, SUVR60-90 using WB-ventricles were calculated. Results: In line with previous studies, increased 18F-DPA714 uptake (17.0±5.6%) in primary motor cortices was observed in ALS, as measured by both VT and SUVR40-60 approaches. Highest sensitivity was found for SUVRWB-ventricles (average cluster 21.6±0.1%). 18F-DPA714 VT ratio and SUVR40-60 results were highly correlated (r>0.8, p<0.001). A similar pattern of increased uptake (average cluster 20.5±0.5%) in primary motor cortices was observed in ALS with 11C-PBR28 using the SUVRWB-ventricles. Analysis of the 18F-DPA714 and 11C-PBR28 data together, resulted in a more extensive pattern of significant increased glial activation in the bilateral primary motor cortices. Conclusion: The same pseudoreference region analysis technique for 11C-PBR28 PET imaging can be extended towards 18F-DPA714 PET. Therefore, in ALS, standardized analysis across these two tracers enables pooling of TSPO PET data across multiple centers and increase power of TSPO as biomarker for future therapeutic trials.




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FDG-PET assessment of malignant pleural mesothelioma: Total Lesion volume and Total Lesion Glycolysis; the central role of volume.

Cancer Survival is related to tumor volume. FDG PET measurement of tumor volume holds promise but is not yet a clinical tool. Measurements come in two forms: the total lesion volume (TLV) based on the number of voxels in the tumor and secondly the total lesion glycolysis (TLG) which is the TLV multiplied by the average SUL per voxel of the tumor (SUL is the standardize uptake value normalized for lean mass). In this study we measured tumor volume in patients with malignant pleural mesothelioma (MPM). METHODS: A threshold-based program in IDL was developed to measure tumor volume in FDG PET images. 19 patients with malignant pleural mesothelioma (MPM) were studied before and after two cycles (6 weeks) of chemo-immunotherapy. Measurements included the total lesion volume (TLV), Total Lesion Glycolysis (TLG), the sum of the SULs in the tumor (SUL- total), a measure of total FDG uptake, and the average SUL per voxel. RESULTS: Baseline MPM volumes (TLV) ranged from 11 to 2610 cc. TLG values ranged from 32 to 8552 SUL-cc and were strongly correlated with TLV. While tumor volumes ranged over 3 orders of magnitude, the average SUL per voxel, SUL-average, stayed within a narrow range of 2.4 to 5.3 units. Thus, TLV was the major component of TLG while SUL-average was a minor component and was essentially constant. Further evaluation of SUL-average showed that in this cohort it’s two components SUL-total and tumor volume changed in parallel and were strongly correlated, r= 0.99, p<.01. Thus, whether the tumors were large or small, the FDG uptake as measured by SUL-total was proportional to the total tumor volume. Conclusion: TLG equals TLV multiplied by the average SUL per voxel, essentially TLV multiplied by a constant. Thus TLG, commonly considered a measure of "metabolic activity" in tumors, is also in this cohort a measure of tumor volume. The constancy of SUL per voxel is due to FDG uptake being proportional to tumor volume. Thus, in this study, the FDG uptake was also a measure of volume.




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Integrity of neurocognitive networks in dementing disorders as measured with simultaneous PET/fMRI

Background: Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have reported altered integrity of large-scale neurocognitive networks (NCNs) in dementing disorders. However, findings on specificity of these alterations in patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) are still very limited. Recently, NCNs have been successfully captured using positron emission tomography (PET) with F18-fluordesoxyglucose (FDG). Methods: Network integrity was measured in 72 individuals (38 male) with mild AD, bvFTD, and healthy controls using a simultaneous resting state fMRI and FDG-PET. Indices of network integrity were calculated for each subject, network, and imaging modality. Results: In either modality, independent component analysis revealed four major NCNs: anterior default mode network (DMN), posterior DMN, salience network, and right central executive network (CEN). In fMRI data, integrity of posterior DMN was found to be significantly reduced in both patient groups relative to controls. In the AD group anterior DMN and CEN appeared to be additionally affected. In PET data, only integrity of posterior DMN in patients with AD was reduced, while three remaining networks appeared to be affected only in patients with bvFTD. In a logistic regression analysis, integrity of anterior DMN as measured with PET alone accurately differentiated between the patient groups. A correlation between indices of two imaging modalities was overall low. Conclusion: FMRI and FDG-PET capture partly different aspects of network integrity. A higher disease specificity of NCNs as derived from PET data supports metabolic connectivity imaging as a promising diagnostic tool.




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Confirmation of 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT (ioflupane) quantification methods in dementia with Lewy body and other neurodegenerative disorders

Rationale: To conduct a retrospective study comparing three 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT quantitative methods in patients with neurodegenerative syndromes as referenced to neuropathological findings. Methods: 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT and neuropathological findings among patients with neurodegenerative syndromes from the Mayo Alzheimer's Disease Research Center and Mayo Clinic Study of Aging were examined. Three 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT quantitative assessment Methods: MIMneuro (MIM Software Inc.), DaTQUANT (GE Healthcare), and manual region of interest (ROI) creation on an Advantage Workstation (GE Healthcare) were compared to neuropathological findings describing the presence or absence of Lewy body disease (LBD). Striatum to background ratios (SBRs) generated by DaTQUANT were compared to the calculated SBRs of the manual method and MIMneuro. The left and right SBRs for caudate, putamen and striatum were evaluated with the manual method. For DaTQUANT and MIMneuro the left, right, total and average SBRs and z-scores for whole striatum, caudate, putamen, anterior putamen, and posterior putamen were calculated. Results: The cohort included 24 patients [20 (83%) male, aged 75.4 +/- 10.0 at death]. The antemortem clinical diagnoses were Alzheimer’s disease dementia (ADem, N = 6), probable dementia with Lewy bodies (pDLB, N = 12), mixed ADem/pDLB (N = 1), Parkinson’s disease with mild cognitive impairment (N = 2), corticobasal syndrome (N = 1), idiopathic rapid eye movement sleep behavior disorder (iRBD) (N = 1) and behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (N = 1). Seventeen (71%) had LBD pathology. All three 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT quantitative methods had area under the receiver operating characteristics (AUROC) values above 0.93 and up to 1.000 (p<0.001) and showed excellent discrimination between LBD and non-LBD patients in each region assessed, p<.001. There was no significant difference between the accuracy of the regions in discriminating the two groups, with good discrimination for both caudate and putamen. Conclusion: All three 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT quantitative methods showed excellent discrimination between LBD and non-LBD patients in each region assessed, using both SBRs and z-scores.




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Central and Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa: The Potential of Investment Partnerships for Mutual Benefit

31 October 2019

Trade between Central and Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa has increased significantly in the last decade and a half. There is a strong case to be made for greater economic re-engagement, especially in terms of investment, that has the potential to support inclusive growth in both regions.

Damir Kurtagic

Former Academy Robert Bosch Fellow, Africa Programme

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Recycled containerboard warehouse, Mondi Group, Poland. Photo: Mondi Group.

Summary

  • There are growing economic links between the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa in terms of both trade and investment. However, while trade has picked up significantly from pre-EU accession levels, investment has not increased to the same extent.
  • Contrary to common assumption, investment flows are not solely from Central and Eastern Europe to sub-Saharan Africa. In reality, the largest investment flow between the two blocs occurs in the opposite direction – from South Africa into Central and Eastern Europe.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa can benefit from a greater commercial relationship focused on attracting sustainable investment from Central and Eastern Europe. For this to happen, commercial strategies towards Central and Eastern European countries need to be put in place before strategy can be reinforced by greater diplomatic and informational support.
  • For many sub-Saharan African governments, there is no overall targeted approach to attracting Central and Eastern European investors. A notable exception is South Africa, where departments have been established at provincial government level to specifically target investment from Central and Eastern Europe.
  • Sub-Saharan African governments expect Central and Eastern European private-sector investment to result not only in job creation, but also to bring spillover benefits such as the transfer of skills and knowledge to domestic industries.
  • Each sub-Saharan African country, in accordance with its individual circumstances, will need to adopt a discrete mix of administrative reform (particularly aimed at cutting red tape), as well as infrastructural and other policies that improve the business environment and generate investor confidence.
  • Much of the private sector in Central and Eastern Europe is somewhat hesitant to invest in sub-Saharan Africa on a greater scale. Many companies are most comfortable operating within their domestic environment; when they invest abroad, it tends to be in the ‘neighbourhood’ with which they are already familiar. Perceptions of risk are often compounded by popular misperceptions and generalizations about sub-Saharan Africa.
  • Central and Eastern European countries stand to gain from a deeper investment relationship. While greater engagement with sub-Saharan Africa has already been pursued by some countries, most of them focus on trade. Institutional support to companies from Central and Eastern Europe (both public and private) has evolved to a degree, but is still not comprehensive. Information for companies interested in investing is either lacking or not shared in an efficient way. And the greatest challenge is ensuring top-level political engagement.
  • EU membership offers clear opportunities for Central and Eastern European countries to invest sustainably and responsibly in sub-Saharan Africa. Not only is financial support forthcoming, through innovative EU financial instruments, but the availability of information relevant to business and the EU’s extensive diplomatic presence in Africa should help to alleviate some of the concerns of Central and Eastern European investors.




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Can the New European Commission Deliver on Its Promises to Africa?

4 December 2019

Fergus Kell

Projects Assistant, Africa Programme

Damir Kurtagic

Former Academy Robert Bosch Fellow, Africa Programme
Familiar promises of equal partnership must be backed by bolder action, including an expanded budget, internal reform and a rethink of its approach to trade negotiations.

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Jutta Urpilainen, new EU commissioner for international partnerships, at the European Parliament in Brussels in October. Photo: Getty Images.

The new European Commission, headed by Ursula von der Leyen, assumed office on 1 December, and there are early signs that Africa will begin near the top of their foreign policy priorities. Policy towards Africa under the new EU administration is yet to be fully defined, but its contours are already visible in the selection of commissioners and assignment of portfolios.  

Although rumours of a dedicated commissioner for Africa were unfounded, the appointment of Jutta Urpilainen to the new role of commissioner for international partnerships – replacing the former post of development commissioner – is a strong signal of ongoing change in EU development thinking, away from bilateral aid towards trade and investment, including by the private sector. 

This may have significant consequences for the EU’s relationship with Africa. In her mission letter to Urpilainen in September, von der Leyen listed the first objective as a new ‘comprehensive strategy for Africa’. Urpilainen, Finland’s finance minister before being posted to Ethiopia as special representative on mediation, has also described her appointment as an opportunity to move on from traditional measures of aid delivery. 

Ambition or incoherence? 

However, this ambition may be at odds with other EU priorities and practices, notably managing migration and institutions and instruments for governing EU–Africa relations that remain rooted in a ‘traditional’ model of North–South development cooperation rather than equitable partnership.

Another newly created post will see Margaritis Schinas assume the role of vice-president for promoting the European way of life – formerly ‘protecting our European way of life’ before a backlash saw it changed – a reminder that migration will remain high on the EU’s foreign policy agenda. The new high representative for foreign and security policy and chief EU diplomat, Josep Borrell, has highlighted the need for bilateral partnership with countries of origin and transit, mainly in Africa. 

Negotiations also continue to stall on a replacement to the Cotonou Agreement, the 20-year partnership framework between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states, which now looks certain to be extended for at least 12 months beyond its expiry in February 2020.

Ambiguities in the EU’s negotiating approach have certainly contributed to the delay: having pushed initially for a separate regional pillar for Africa that would be opened to the North African countries (who are not ACP members) and include a loosely defined role for the African Union, this would later be abandoned in favour of a dual-track process on separate new agreements with the AU and ACP respectively.

The EU also continues to pursue controversial economic partnership agreements under the aegis of Cotonou, despite their increasing appearance of incompatibility with the pathbreaking African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) – one of the clearest expressions to date of African agency.

The EU has so far attempted to gloss over this incoherence, claiming that EPAs can somehow act as the ‘building blocks’ for Africa-wide economic integration. But tensions are appearing between EU departments and within the commission, with the European External Action Service inclined to prioritize a more strategic continental relationship with the AU, while the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development remains committed to the ACP as the conduit for financial support and aid delivery.

And it is unlikely to get away with such incoherence for much longer. Change is now urgent, as numerous countries in sub-Saharan Africa continue to attract the strategic and commercial interests of the EU’s competitors: from established players such as China and potentially in future the UK, which is intent on remodelling its Africa ties post-Brexit, to emerging actors such as Turkey or Russia, which held its first Africa summit in October. 

The need for delivery

If the EU is serious about its rhetoric on equal partnership, it must therefore move beyond convoluted hybrid proposals. Delivering on the Juncker administration’s proposal to increase funding for external action by 30 per cent for 2021–27 would mark an important first step, particularly as this involves streamlining that would see the European Development Fund – the financial instrument for EU-ACP relations – incorporated into the main EU budget.

The new commission should therefore continue to exert pressure on the European Council and European Parliament to adopt this proposal, as negotiations on this financial framework have been repeatedly subject to delay and may not be resolved before the end of the year. 

Beyond this, proactive support for the AfCFTA and for structural transformation more broadly must be prioritized ahead of vague promises for a continent-to-continent free trade agreement, as held out by Juncker in his final State of the Union address in 2018. 

The significance of internal EU reforms for Africa should also not be discounted. The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, for instance, has placed the African sector at a particular disadvantage and has made it harder to compete even in domestic markets, let alone in the distant EU export markets. EU efforts to stimulate inflows of private investments into the African agricultural sector, abolish import tariffs and offer technical support for African producers to satisfy EU health and safety regulations will be of little use if they are undermined by heavy subsidies across Europe.

Ultimately, changes to job titles alone will be insufficient. The new commission’s rhetoric, while ambitious, differs little from that of the previous decade – Africa has heard the promise of a ‘partnership of equals’ and of ‘shared ownership’ since before the advent of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy in 2007. Now is the time for truly bold steps to implement this vision.




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Central & Eastern Europe and Africa Engagement: Labour Mobility and Policy in East Africa

Research Event

15 January 2020 - 10:00am to 12:30pm

Nairobi, Kenya

Strengthened links between the states of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are emerging marked by growth in diplomatic representation, trade and economic ties and supporting networks.

Against this backdrop, labour migration within and from the CEE and East Africa sub-regions are a key policy area with significant potential for shared learning and cooperation. For both regions, migration trends in recent years have evolved as a result of a diverse range of interactions among public, private and civil society actors and at local, national, regional and international levels. Unpacking such interactions and their political and geographical specificities is essential to effective engagement and cooperation within and between the regions on issues of labour migration and their management.

This roundtable brainstorming workshop will provide a platform for stakeholders based in East Africa to discuss the way in which different actors and agencies in the region influence and shape labour migration processes and policy responses.

This event is supported by the Robert Bosch Stiftung.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Fergus Kell

Projects Assistant, Africa Programme
+ 44 (0) 20 7314 3671




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Profiling the Surfaceome Identifies Therapeutic Targets for Cells with Hyperactive mTORC1 Signaling [Research]

Aberrantly high mTORC1 signaling is a known driver of many cancers and human disorders, yet pharmacological inhibition of mTORC1 rarely confers durable clinical responses. To explore alternative therapeutic strategies, herein we conducted a proteomics survey to identify cell surface proteins upregulated by mTORC1. A comparison of the surfaceome from Tsc1–/– versus Tsc1+/+ mouse embryonic fibroblasts revealed 59 proteins predicted to be significantly overexpressed in Tsc1–/– cells. Further validation of the data in multiple mouse and human cell lines showed that mTORC1 signaling most dramatically induced the expression of the proteases neprilysin (NEP/CD10) and aminopeptidase N (APN/CD13). Functional studies showed that constitutive mTORC1 signaling sensitized cells to genetic ablation of NEP and APN, as well as the biochemical inhibition of APN. In summary, these data show that mTORC1 signaling plays a significant role in the constitution of the surfaceome, which in turn may present novel therapeutic strategies.




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Guidance Document: Validation of a High-Performance Liquid Chromatography-Tandem Mass Spectrometry Immunopeptidomics Assay for the Identification of HLA Class I Ligands Suitable for Pharmaceutical Therapies [Commentary]

For more than two decades naturally presented, human leukocyte antigen (HLA)-restricted peptides (immunopeptidome) have been eluted and sequenced using liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS). Since, identified disease-associated HLA ligands have been characterized and evaluated as potential active substances. Treatments based on HLA-presented peptides have shown promising results in clinical application as personalized T cell-based immunotherapy. Peptide vaccination cocktails are produced as investigational medicinal products under GMP conditions. To support clinical trials based on HLA-presented tumor-associated antigens, in this study the sensitive LC-MS/MS HLA class I antigen identification pipeline was fully validated for our technical equipment according to the current US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and European Medicines Agency (EMA) guidelines.

The immunopeptidomes of JY cells with or without spiked-in, isotope labeled peptides, of peripheral blood mononuclear cells of healthy volunteers as well as a chronic lymphocytic leukemia and a bladder cancer sample were reliably identified using a data-dependent acquisition method. As the LC-MS/MS pipeline is used for identification purposes, the validation parameters include accuracy, precision, specificity, limit of detection and robustness.




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Phenotypic Adaption of Pseudomonas aeruginosa by Hacking Siderophores Produced by Other Microorganisms [Research]

Bacteria secrete siderophores to access iron, a key nutrient poorly bioavailable and the source of strong competition between microorganisms in most biotopes. Many bacteria also use siderophores produced by other microorganisms (exosiderophores) in a piracy strategy. Pseudomonas aeruginosa, an opportunistic pathogen, produces two siderophores, pyoverdine and pyochelin, and is also able to use a panel of exosiderophores. We first investigated expression of the various iron-uptake pathways of P. aeruginosa in three different growth media using proteomic and RT-qPCR approaches and observed three different phenotypic patterns, indicating complex phenotypic plasticity in the expression of the various iron-uptake pathways. We then investigated the phenotypic plasticity of iron-uptake pathway expression in the presence of various exosiderophores (present individually or as a mixture) under planktonic growth conditions, as well as in an epithelial cell infection assay. In all growth conditions tested, catechol-type exosiderophores were clearly more efficient in inducing the expression of their corresponding transporters than the others, showing that bacteria opt for the use of catechol siderophores to access iron when they are present in the environment. In parallel, expression of the proteins of the pyochelin pathway was significantly repressed under most conditions tested, as well as that of proteins of the pyoverdine pathway, but to a lesser extent. There was no effect on the expression of the heme and ferrous uptake pathways. Overall, these data provide precise insights on how P. aeruginosa adjusts the expression of its various iron-uptake pathways (phenotypic plasticity and switching) to match varying levels of iron and competition.




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Integrative Metabolic Pathway Analysis Reveals Novel Therapeutic Targets in Osteoarthritis [Research]

In osteoarthritis (OA), impairment of cartilage regeneration can be related to a defective chondrogenic differentiation of mesenchymal stromal cells (MSCs). Therefore, understanding the proteomic- and metabolomic-associated molecular events during the chondrogenesis of MSCs could provide alternative targets for therapeutic intervention. Here, a SILAC-based proteomic analysis identified 43 proteins related with metabolic pathways whose abundance was significantly altered during the chondrogenesis of OA human bone marrow MSCs (hBMSCs). Then, the level and distribution of metabolites was analyzed in these cells and healthy controls by matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization mass spectrometry imaging (MALDI-MSI), leading to the recognition of characteristic metabolomic profiles at the early stages of differentiation. Finally, integrative pathway analysis showed that UDP-glucuronic acid synthesis and amino sugar metabolism were downregulated in OA hBMSCs during chondrogenesis compared with healthy cells. Alterations in these metabolic pathways may disturb the production of hyaluronic acid (HA) and other relevant cartilage extracellular matrix (ECM) components. This work provides a novel integrative insight into the molecular alterations of osteoarthritic MSCs and potential therapeutic targets for OA drug development through the enhancement of chondrogenesis.




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Repression of sphingosine kinase (SK)-interacting protein (SKIP) in acute myeloid leukemia diminishes SK activity and its re-expression restores SK function [Molecular Bases of Disease]

Previous studies have shown that sphingosine kinase interacting protein (SKIP) inhibits sphingosine kinase (SK) function in fibroblasts. SK phosphorylates sphingosine producing the potent signaling molecule sphingosine-1-phosphate (S1P). SKIP gene (SPHKAP) expression is silenced by hypermethylation of its promoter in acute myeloid leukemia (AML). However, why SKIP activity is silenced in primary AML cells is unclear. Here, we investigated the consequences of SKIP down-regulation in AML primary cells and the effects of SKIP re-expression in leukemic cell lines. Using targeted ultra-HPLC-tandem MS (UPLC-MS/MS), we measured sphingolipids (including S1P and ceramides) in AML and control cells. Primary AML cells had significantly lower SK activity and intracellular S1P concentrations than control cells, and SKIP-transfected leukemia cell lines exhibited increased SK activity. These findings show that SKIP re-expression enhances SK activity in leukemia cells. Furthermore, other bioactive sphingolipids such as ceramide were also down-regulated in primary AML cells. Of note, SKIP re-expression in leukemia cells increased ceramide levels 2-fold, inactivated the key signaling protein extracellular signal-regulated kinase, and increased apoptosis following serum deprivation or chemotherapy. These results indicate that SKIP down-regulation in AML reduces SK activity and ceramide levels, an effect that ultimately inhibits apoptosis in leukemia cells. The findings of our study contrast with previous results indicating that SKIP inhibits SK function in fibroblasts and therefore challenge the notion that SKIP always inhibits SK activity.




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A peroxisome deficiency-induced reductive cytosol state up-regulates the brain-derived neurotrophic factor pathway [Metabolism]

The peroxisome is a subcellular organelle that functions in essential metabolic pathways, including biosynthesis of plasmalogens, fatty acid β-oxidation of very-long-chain fatty acids, and degradation of hydrogen peroxide. Peroxisome biogenesis disorders (PBDs) manifest as severe dysfunction in multiple organs, including the central nervous system (CNS), but the pathogenic mechanisms in PBDs are largely unknown. Because CNS integrity is coordinately established and maintained by neural cell interactions, we here investigated whether cell-cell communication is impaired and responsible for the neurological defects associated with PBDs. Results from a noncontact co-culture system consisting of primary hippocampal neurons with glial cells revealed that a peroxisome-deficient astrocytic cell line secretes increased levels of brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF), resulting in axonal branching of the neurons. Of note, the BDNF expression in astrocytes was not affected by defects in plasmalogen biosynthesis and peroxisomal fatty acid β-oxidation in the astrocytes. Instead, we found that cytosolic reductive states caused by a mislocalized catalase in the peroxisome-deficient cells induce the elevation in BDNF secretion. Our results suggest that peroxisome deficiency dysregulates neuronal axogenesis by causing a cytosolic reductive state in astrocytes. We conclude that astrocytic peroxisomes regulate BDNF expression and thereby support neuronal integrity and function.




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The EU Cannot Build a Foreign Policy on Regulatory Power Alone

11 February 2020

Alan Beattie

Associate Fellow, Global Economy and Finance Programme and Europe Programme
Brussels will find its much-vaunted heft in setting standards cannot help it advance its geopolitical interests.

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EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen speaks at the European Parliament in Strasbourg in February. Photo: Getty Images.

There are two well-established ideas in trade. Individually, they are correct. Combined, they can lead to a conclusion that is unfortunately wrong.

The first idea is that, across a range of economic sectors, the EU and the US have been engaged in a battle to have their model of regulation accepted as the global one, and that the EU is generally winning.

The second is that governments can use their regulatory power to extend strategic and foreign policy influence.

The conclusion would seem to be that the EU, which has for decades tried to develop a foreign policy, should be able to use its superpower status in regulation and trade to project its interests and its values abroad.

That’s the theory. It’s a proposition much welcomed by EU policymakers, who know they are highly unlikely any time soon to acquire any of the tools usually required to run an effective foreign policy.

The EU doesn’t have an army it can send into a shooting war, enough military or political aid to prop up or dispense of governments abroad, or a centralized intelligence service. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has declared her outfit to be a ‘geopolitical commission’, and is casting about for any means of making that real.

Through the ‘Brussels effect’ whereby European rules and standards are exported via both companies and governments, the EU has indeed won many regulatory battles with the US.

Its cars, chemicals and product safety regulations are more widely adopted round the world than their American counterparts. In the absence of any coherent US offering, bar some varied state-level systems, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the closest thing the world has to a single model for data privacy, and variants of it are being adopted by dozens of countries.

The problem is this. Those parts of global economic governance where the US is dominant – particularly the dollar payments system – are highly conducive to projecting US power abroad. The extraterritorial reach of secondary sanctions, plus the widespread reliance of banks and companies worldwide on dollar funding – and hence the American financial system – means that the US can precisely target its influence.

The EU can enforce trade sanctions, but not in such a powerful and discriminatory way, and it will always be outgunned by the US. Donald Trump could in effect force European companies to join in his sanctions on Iran when he pulled out of the nuclear deal, despite EU legislation designed to prevent their businesses being bullied. He can go after the chief financial officer of Huawei for allegedly breaching those sanctions.

By contrast, the widespread adoption of GDPR or data protection regimes inspired by it may give the EU a warm glow of satisfaction, but it cannot be turned into a geopolitical tool in the same way.

Nor, necessarily, does it particularly benefit the EU economy. Europe’s undersized tech sector seems unlikely to unduly benefit from the fact that data protection rules were written in the EU. Indeed, one common criticism of the regulations is that they entrench the power of incumbent tech giants like Google.

There is a similar pattern at work in the adoption of new technologies such as artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things. In that field, the EU and its member states are also facing determined competition from China, which has been pushing its technologies and standards through forums such as the International Telecommunication Union.

The EU has been attempting to write international rules for the use of AI which it hopes to be widely adopted. But again, these are a constraint on the use of new technologies largely developed by others, not the control of innovation.

By contrast, China has created a vast domestic market in technologies like facial recognition and unleashed its own companies on it. The resulting surveillance kit can then be marketed to emerging market governments as part of China’s enduring foreign policy campaign to build up supporters in the developing world.

If it genuinely wants to turn its economic power into geopolitical influence – and it’s not entirely clear what it would do with it if it did – the EU needs to recognize that not all forms of regulatory and trading dominance are the same.

Providing public goods to the world economy is all very well. But unless they are so particular in nature that they project uniquely European values and interests, that makes the EU a supplier of useful plumbing but not a global architect of power.

On the other hand, it could content itself with its position for the moment. It could recognize that not until enough hard power – guns, intelligence, money – is transferred from the member states to the centre, or until the member states start acting collectively, will the EU genuinely become a geopolitical force. Speaking loudly and carrying a stick of foam rubber is rarely a way to gain credibility in international relations.

This article is part of a series of publications and roundtable discussions in the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.




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Coronavirus: Why The EU Needs to Unleash The ECB

18 March 2020

Pepijn Bergsen

Research Fellow, Europe Programme
COVID-19 presents the eurozone with an unprecedented economic challenge. So far, the response has been necessary, but not enough.

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EU President of Council Charles Michel chairs the coronavirus meeting with the leaders of EU member countries via teleconference on March 17, 2020. Photo by EU Council / Pool/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images.

The measures taken to limit the spread of the coronavirus - in particular social distancing -  come with significant economic costs, as the drop both in demand for goods and services and in supply due to workers being at home sick will create a short-term economic shock not seen in modern times.

Sectors that are usually less affected by regular economic swings such as transport and tourism are being confronted with an almost total collapse in demand. In the airline sector, companies are warning they might only be able to hold out for a few months more.

Building on the calls to provide income support to all citizens and shore up businesses, European leaders should now be giving explicit permission to the European Central Bank (ECB) to provide whatever financial support is needed.

Although political leaders have responded to the economic threat, the measures announced across the continent have mainly been to support businesses. The crisis is broader and deeper than the current response.

Support for weaker governments

The ECB already reacted to COVID-19 by announcing measures to support the banking system, which is important to guarantee the continuity of the European financial system and to ensure financially weaker European governments do not have to confront a failing banking system as well.

Although government-subsidised reduced working hours and sick pay are a solution for many businesses and workers, crucially they are not for those working on temporary contracts or the self-employed. They need direct income support.

This might come down to instituting something that looks like a universal basic income (UBI), and ensuring money keeps flowing through the economy as much as possible to help avoid a cascade of defaults and significant long-term damage.

But while this is likely to be the most effective remedy to limit the medium-term impact on the economy, it is particularly costly. Just as an indication, total compensation of employees was on average around €470bn per month in the eurozone last year.

Attempting to target payments using existing welfare payment channels would reduce costs, but is difficult to implement and runs the risk of many households and businesses in need missing out.

The increase in spending and lost revenue associated with these support measures dwarf the fiscal response to the 2008-09 financial crisis. The eurozone economy could contract by close to 10% this year and budget deficits are likely be in double digits throughout the bloc.

The European Commission has already stated member states are free to spend whatever is necessary to combat the crisis, which is not surprising given the Stability and Growth Pact - which includes the fiscal rules - allows for such eventualities.

Several eurozone countries do probably have the fiscal space to deal with this. Countries such as Germany and the Netherlands have run several years of balanced budgets recently and significantly decreased their debt levels. For countries such as Italy, and even France, it is a different story and the combination of much higher spending and a collapse in tax revenue is more likely to lead to questions in the market over the sustainability of their debt levels. In order to avoid this, the Covid-19 response must be financed collectively.

The Eurogroup could decide to use the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to provide states with the funds, while suitably ditching the political conditionality that came with previous bailout. But the ESM currently has €410bn in remaining lending capacity, which is unlikely to be enough and difficult to rapidly increase.

So this leaves the ECB to pick up the tab of national governments’ increase in spending, as the only institution with effectively unlimited monetary firepower. But a collective EU response is complicated by the common currency, and particularly by the role of the ECB.

The ECB can’t just do whatever it likes and is limited more than other major central banks in its room for manoeuvre. It does have a programme to buy government bonds but this relies on countries agreeing to a rescue programme within the context of the ESM, with all the resulting political difficulties.

There are two main ways that the ECB could finance the response to the crisis. First, it could buy up more or all bonds issued by the member states. A first step in this direction would be to scrap the limits on the bonds it can buy. Through self-imposed rules, the ECB can only buy up to a third of every country’s outstanding public debt. There are good reasons for this in normal times, but these are not normal times. With the political blessing of the European Council, the Eurosystem of central banks could then start buying bonds issued by governments to finance whatever expenditure they deem necessary to combat the crisis.

Secondly, essentially give governments an overdraft with the ECB or the national central banks. Although a central bank lending directly to governments is outlawed by the European treaties, the COVID-19 crisis means these rules should be temporarily suspended by the European Council.

Back in 2012, the then president of the ECB, Mario Draghi, proclaimed the ECB would do whatever it takes, within its mandate, to save the euro, which was widely seen as a crucial step towards solving the eurozone crisis. The time is now right for eurozone political leaders to explicitly tell the ECB that together they can do whatever it takes to save the eurozone economy through direct support for businesses and households.




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Webinar: European Democracy in the Last 100 Years: Economic Crises and Political Upheaval

Members Event Webinar

6 May 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Event participants

Pepijn Bergsen, Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House

Dr Sheri Berman, Professor of Political Science, Barnard College

Chair: Hans Kundnani, Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House

 

In the last 100 years, global economic crises from the Great Depression of the 1930s to the 2008 financial crash have contributed to significant political changes in Europe, often leading to a rise in popularity for extremist parties and politics. As Europe contends with a perceived crisis of democracy - now compounded by the varied responses to the coronavirus outbreak - how should we understand the relationship between externally-driven economic crises, political upheaval and democracy?

The panellists will consider the parallels between the political responses to some of the greatest economic crises Europe has experienced in the last century. Given that economic crises often transcend borders, why does political disruption vary between democracies? What can history tell us about the potential political impact of the unfolding COVID-19-related economic crisis? And will the unprecedented financial interventions by governments across Europe fundamentally change the expectations citizens have of the role government should play in their lives?

This event is based on a recent article in The World Today by Hans Kundnani and Pepijn Bergsen who are both researchers in Chatham House's Europe Programme. 'Crawling from the Wreckage' is the first in a series of articles that look at key themes in European political discourse from the last century. You can read the article here

This event is open to Chatham House Members. Not a member? Find out more.




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Comparative profiling and comprehensive quantification of stratum corneum ceramides in humans and mice by LC-MS/MS

Momoko Kawana
Apr 7, 2020; 0:jlr.RA120000671v1-jlr.RA120000671
Research Articles




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Lipid rafts as a therapeutic target

Dmitri Sviridov
May 1, 2020; 61:687-695
Thematic Reviews