In Pennsylvania, the next major presidential primary state, concerns about the economy loom large as global competition, economic restructuring, and an aging workforce threaten the state’s ability to prosper. Thanks to these assets, the six metro areas generate 80 percent of the state’s economic output even though they house 68 percent of its population. A true economic agenda for the state must speak to the core assets of Pennsylvania’s economy and where these assets are located: the state’s many small and large metropolitan areas. In short, this brief finds that:

• To help Pennsylvania prosper, federal leaders must leverage four key assets that matter today—innovation, human capital, infrastructure, and quality places. These assets help increase the productivity of firms and workers, boost the incomes of families and workers, and can help the state and nation grow in more fiscally and environmentally responsible ways.
• These four assets are highly concentrated in the state’s economic engines, its metropolitan areas. There are 16 metro areas in the Commonwealth, ranging from Philadelphia, the most populous, to Williamsport, the smallest. The top six metropolitan areas alone generate the bulk of the state’s innovation (80 percent of all patenting), contain the majority of the state’s educated workforce (77 percent of all adults with a bachelors degree), and serve as the state’s transport hubs.
• Despite these assets, Pennsylvania’s metro areas have yet to achieve their full economic potential. For instance, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh enjoy strengths in innovation, but they both struggle to convert their research investments into commercial products and real jobs. The Scranton metro area is emerging as a satellite of the New York City region, but it’s hampered by the absence of frequent and reliable transportation connections and inadequate broadband coverage.
• Federal leaders must advance an economic agenda that empowers states and metro areas to leverage their assets and help the nation prosper. To that end, they should establish a single federal entity that works with industry, states, and metro areas to ensure that innovation results in jobs and helps businesses small and large modernize. The federal government should strengthen access and success through the entire education pipeline. They should overhaul and create a 21st century transportation system. And they should use housing policy to support quality, mixed-income communities rather than perpetuating distressed neighborhoods with few school and job options.

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Editor’s Note: This blog post is one in a series of posts in which guest bloggers respond to the Brookings paper, “The potential and limitations of impact bonds: Lessons from the first five years of experience worldwide.”

Social impact bonds (SIBs) are one of a number of new “Payment by Results” financing mechanisms available for social services. In a SIB, private investors provide upfront capital for a social service, and government pays investors based on the outcomes of the service. If the intervention does not achieve outcomes, the government does not pay investors at all. The provision of upfront capital differentiates SIBs from other Payment by Results contracts.

Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) are a variation of SIBs, where the outcome funder is a third party, such as a foundation or development assistance agency, rather than the government. To date, 47 SIBs and one DIB have been implemented in the sectors of social welfare (21), employment (17), criminal recidivism (4), education (4), and health (2).

In a recent Brookings study, drawing from interviews with stakeholders in each of the 38 SIBs contracted as of March 1, 2015, we evaluate 10 common claims of the impact bond literature to date, so far made up of published thought-pieces and interview-based reports.

Figure 1. Common claims about Social Impact Bonds

Source:  The Potential and Limitations of Impact Bonds: Lessons Learned from the First Five Years of Experience Worldwide, Brookings Institution, 2015.

Of the 10 common claims about impact bonds, we found five areas where the SIB mechanism had a demonstrable positive effect on service provision:

1. Focus on outcomes. We found a significant shift in the focus of both government and service providers when it came to contracting and providing social services. Outcomes became the primary consideration in these contracts in which the repayment of the investment depended on achievement of those outcomes. Given that outcomes are the pivotal and defining piece of a SIB contract, it is unsurprising that many of those interviewed in the course of our research emphasized their importance, though we did find that this represented a more significant transformation in culture than expected.
2. Build a culture of monitoring and evaluation. The outcome-based contract necessitates the collection of data on outcomes, which helps build a culture of monitoring and evaluation in provider organizations and government. We found that the SIB is beginning to help solve longstanding problems in systemic data collection in multiple instances. In turn, government evaluation of outcomes and obligation to pay only for successful outcomes provides transparency and value for taxpayers. However, it is too soon to tell whether the monitoring and evaluation systems will remain in place after the SIB contracts conclude.
3. Drive performance management. The involvement of the investors and intermediaries in management of the service performance is a key component of SIBs. These private sector organizations often have stronger background in performance management and bring a valuable perspective to the social service sector. However, on average we find limited evidence that the service providers in SIBs to date have been able to significantly adjust their programs mid-contract in the case of poor outcomes, despite SIB proponents claiming this is one of the mechanism’s greatest merits.
4. Foster collaboration. In addition to collaboration between the for-profit, nonprofit, and government sectors, we also find evidence of gridlock-breaking collaboration across government agencies, levels of government, and political parties due to SIB contracts. This was noted to be one of the most important aspects of SIBs but also one of the most challenging.
5. Invest in prevention. External, upfront capital for services allows government to invest in preventive programs that greatly reduce spending in the future, such as early childhood development programs that reduce remedial education, crime, and unemployment. We found that all but one of the 38 SIBs were issued for preventive programs. Going forward, SIBs will not necessarily need to be tied to cash savings for government, but could simply be used as a method to finance programs that achieve desired social outcomes. 

Where do SIBs currently fall short?

For the five remaining claims about SIBs, we found less evidence of impact.

1.  Achieve scale. Of the 38 impact bonds contracted as of March 1, 2015, 25 served less than 1,000 beneficiaries. The largest impact bond, the SIB to reduce criminal recidivism at Rikers Island Prison in New York City, aimed to reach up to 10,000 individuals, but was terminated a year early this July because it did not meet target outcomes. The smallest SIB supports 22 homeless children and their mothers in the city of Saskatoon in Canada. These numbers are nowhere near the scale of the toughest problems facing the globe, where, for example, 59 million children are out of school. However, since March of 2015, two larger SIBs have been contracted, which may be an indication of increasing confidence in the mechanism. The Ways to Wellness SIB in the U.K. aims to improve long-term health conditions of over 11,000 beneficiaries and the first DIB launched plans to improve enrollment and learning outcomes of nearly 20,000 schoolchildren in Rajasthan, India. Further, the impact bond fund model used in the U.K. for 21 SIBs—where teams of service providers, intermediaries, and investors bid for SIB contracts based on a rate card of maximum payments per outcome government is willing to make—could be used to reach greater scale by contracting multiple SIBs at once. The largest of the impact bond funds, the Innovation Fund, reaches over 16,000 beneficiaries across 10 SIBs.
2. Foster innovation in delivery, and 
3. Reduce risk for government. SIBs vary in the degree of innovation and risk to investors—SIBs based on more innovative programs pose a greater risk to investors and may have higher investment protection or greater potential returns to balance the risk. In our study we found that very few of the programs financed by SIBs were truly innovative in that they had never been tested before, but that many were innovative in that they applied interventions in new settings or in new combinations. The literature claims that SIBs reduce the risk to government of funding an innovative service (government pays nothing if outcomes aren’t achieved), but as of March of this year it did not seem that the programs were particularly risky. The SIB in Rikers Island Prison was one of the most innovative and risky, and the early termination of the deal was an important demonstration of the reduction in risk for government. The New York City Department of Correction did not pay anything in this case; instead the investor and foundation backing the investment paid for the program.
4. Crowd-in private funding. Our research also shows mixed evidence on the power of impact bonds to crowd-in private funding, the fourth claim with unclear results. The literature up until now has claimed that impact bonds crowd-in private funding for social services by increasing the amount of money from traditional funding sources and bringing in new money from nontraditional sources. There is some evidence that traditional service funders, such as foundations, are increasing their contributions because of the opportunity to earn back what would otherwise have been a donation. Many of the current investors in impact bonds, Goldman Sachs for example, are indeed new actors in the space and their increased awareness of social service provision may be a benefit in and of itself. However, if a program is successful, government ultimately pays for the program. In this case, investors are solving a liquidity problem for government by providing upfront capital and not actually providing new money. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that paying only for proven outcomes has motivated the public sector to spend more on social services and that the external upfront capital has allowed government to shift spending from curative to preventive programs. Further, most programs thus far have been designed such that savings to the public sector are greater than payments to investors, resulting in a net increase in available public sector funds.
5. Sustain impact. Finally, five years since the first impact bond, we have yet to see whether impact bonds will lead to sustained impact on the lives of beneficiaries beyond the impact bond contract duration. The existing literature states that impact bonds could lead to sustained impact by demonstrating to government that a sector or intervention type is worth funding or by improving the quality of programs by instilling a culture of outcome achievement, monitoring, and evaluation. However, the success of impact bonds depends on whether new efforts to streamline the contract development stage come to fruition and whether incentives for all parties are closely scrutinized.

The optimal financing mechanism for a social service will differ across issue area and local context, and we look forward to conducting more research in the field on the suitable characteristics for each tool.

A curriculum controversy is roiling schools in the San Francisco Bay Area.  In the past few months, parents in the San Mateo-Foster City School District, located just south of San Francisco International Airport, voiced concerns over changes to the middle school math program. The changes were brought about by the Common Core State Standards (CCSS).  Under previous policies, most eighth graders in the district took algebra I.  Some very sharp math students, who had already completed algebra I in seventh grade, took geometry in eighth grade. The new CCSS-aligned math program will reduce eighth grade enrollments in algebra I and eliminate geometry altogether as a middle school course. 

A little background information will clarify the controversy.  Eighth grade mathematics may be the single grade-subject combination most profoundly affected by the CCSS.  In California, the push for most students to complete algebra I by the end of eighth grade has been a centerpiece of state policy, as it has been in several states influenced by the “Algebra for All” movement that began in the 1990s.  Nationwide, in 1990, about 16 percent of all eighth graders reported that they were taking an algebra or geometry course.  In 2013, the number was three times larger, and nearly half of all eighth graders (48 percent) were taking algebra or geometry.^[i]  When that percentage goes down, as it is sure to under the CCSS, what happens to high achieving math students?

The parents who are expressing the most concern have kids who excel at math.  One parent in San Mateo-Foster City told The San Mateo Daily Journal, “This is really holding the advanced kids back.”^[ii] The CCSS math standards recommend a single math course for seventh grade, integrating several math topics, followed by a similarly integrated math course in eighth grade.  Algebra I won’t be offered until ninth grade.  The San Mateo-Foster City School District decided to adopt a “three years into two” accelerated option.  This strategy is suggested on the Common Core website as an option that districts may consider for advanced students.  It combines the curriculum from grades seven through nine (including algebra I) into a two year offering that students can take in seventh and eighth grades.^[iii]  The district will also provide—at one school site—a sequence beginning in sixth grade that compacts four years of math into three.  Both accelerated options culminate in the completion of algebra I in eighth grade.

The San Mateo-Foster City School District is home to many well-educated, high-powered professionals who work in Silicon Valley.  They are unrelentingly liberal in their politics.  Equity is a value they hold dear.^[iv]  They also know that completing at least one high school math course in middle school is essential for students who wish to take AP Calculus in their senior year of high school.  As CCSS is implemented across the nation, administrators in districts with demographic profiles similar to San Mateo-Foster City will face parents of mathematically precocious kids asking whether the “common” in Common Core mandates that all students take the same math course.  Many of those districts will respond to their constituents and provide accelerated pathways (“pathway” is CCSS jargon for course sequence). 

But other districts will not.  Data show that urban schools, schools with large numbers of black and Hispanic students, and schools located in impoverished neighborhoods are reluctant to differentiate curriculum.  It is unlikely that gifted math students in those districts will be offered an accelerated option under CCSS.  The reason why can be summed up in one word: tracking.

Tracking in eighth grade math means providing different courses to students based on their prior math achievement.  The term “tracking” has been stigmatized, coming under fire for being inequitable.  Historically, where tracking existed, black, Hispanic, and disadvantaged students were often underrepresented in high-level math classes; white, Asian, and middle-class students were often over-represented.  An anti-tracking movement gained a full head of steam in the 1980s.  Tracking reformers knew that persuading high schools to de-track was hopeless.  Consequently, tracking’s critics focused reform efforts on middle schools, urging that they group students heterogeneously with all students studying a common curriculum.  That approach took hold in urban districts, but not in the suburbs.

Now the Common Core and de-tracking are linked.  Providing an accelerated math track for high achievers has become a flashpoint throughout the San Francisco Bay Area.  An October 2014 article in The San Jose Mercury News named Palo Alto, Saratoga, Cupertino, Pleasanton, and Los Gatos as districts that have announced, in response to parent pressure, that they are maintaining an accelerated math track in middle schools.  These are high-achieving, suburban districts.  Los Gatos parents took to the internet with a petition drive when a rumor spread that advanced courses would end.  Ed Source reports that 900 parents signed a petition opposing the move and board meetings on the issue were packed with opponents. The accelerated track was kept.  Piedmont established a single track for everyone, but allowed parents to apply for an accelerated option.  About twenty five percent did so.  The Mercury News story underscores the demographic pattern that is unfolding and asks whether CCSS “could cement a two-tier system, with accelerated math being the norm in wealthy areas and the exception elsewhere.”

What is CCSS’s real role here?  Does the Common Core take an explicit stand on tracking?  Not really.  But de-tracking advocates can interpret the “common” in Common Core as license to eliminate accelerated tracks for high achievers.  As a noted CCSS supporter (and tracking critic), William H. Schmidt, has stated, “By insisting on common content for all students at each grade level and in every community, the Common Core mathematics standards are in direct conflict with the concept of tracking.”^[v]  Thus, tracking joins other controversial curricular ideas—e.g., integrated math courses instead of courses organized by content domains such as algebra and geometry; an emphasis on “deep,” conceptual mathematics over learning procedures and basic skills—as “dog whistles” embedded in the Common Core.  Controversial positions aren’t explicitly stated, but they can be heard by those who want to hear them.    

CCSS doesn’t have to take an outright stand on these debates in order to have an effect on policy.  For the practical questions that local grouping policies resolve—who takes what courses and when do they take them—CCSS wipes the slate clean.  There are plenty of people ready to write on that blank slate, particularly administrators frustrated by unsuccessful efforts to de-track in the past

Suburban parents are mobilized in defense of accelerated options for advantaged students.  What about kids who are outstanding math students but also happen to be poor, black, or Hispanic?  What happens to them, especially if they attend schools in which the top institutional concern is meeting the needs of kids functioning several years below grade level?  I presented a paper on this question at a December 2014 conference held by the Fordham Institute in Washington, DC.  I proposed a pilot program of “tracking for equity.”  By that term, I mean offering black, Hispanic, and poor high achievers the same opportunity that the suburban districts in the Bay Area are offering.  High achieving middle school students in poor neighborhoods would be able to take three years of math in two years and proceed on a path toward AP Calculus as high school seniors.

It is true that tracking must be done carefully.  Tracking can be conducted unfairly and has been used unjustly in the past.  One of the worst consequences of earlier forms of tracking was that low-skilled students were tracked into dead end courses that did nothing to help them academically.  These low-skilled students were disproportionately from disadvantaged communities or communities of color.  That’s not a danger in the proposal I am making.  The default curriculum, the one every student would take if not taking the advanced track, would be the Common Core.  If that’s a dead end for low achievers, Common Core supporters need to start being more honest in how they are selling the CCSS.  Moreover, to ensure that the policy gets to the students for whom it is intended, I have proposed running the pilot program in schools predominantly populated by poor, black, or Hispanic students.  The pilot won’t promote segregation within schools because the sad reality is that participating schools are already segregated.

Since I presented the paper, I have privately received negative feedback from both Algebra for All advocates and Common Core supporters.  That’s disappointing.  Because of their animus toward tracking, some critics seem to support a severe policy swing from Algebra for All, which was pursued for equity, to Algebra for None, which will be pursued for equity.  It’s as if either everyone or no one should be allowed to take algebra in eighth grade.  The argument is that allowing only some eighth graders to enroll in algebra is elitist, even if the students in question are poor students of color who are prepared for the course and likely to benefit from taking it.

The controversy raises crucial questions about the Common Core.  What’s common in the common core?  Is it the curriculum?  And does that mean the same curriculum for all?  Will CCSS serve as a curricular floor, ensuring all students are exposed to a common body of knowledge and skills?  Or will it serve as a ceiling, limiting the progress of bright students so that their achievement looks more like that of their peers?  These questions will be answered differently in different communities, and as they are, the inequities that Common Core supporters think they’re addressing may surface again in a profound form.