Executive Summary ¹

The regional banks play an important role in the economy providing funding to consumers and small- and medium-sized businesses. Their model is simpler than that of the large Wall Street banks, with their business concentrated in the U.S.; they are less involved in trading and investment banking, and they are more reliant on deposits for their funding. We examined the balance sheets of 15 regional banks that had assets between $50 billion and $250 billion in 2003 and that remained in operation through 2014.

The regionals have undergone important changes in their financial structure as a result of the financial crisis and the subsequent regulatory changes:

• Total assets held by the regionals grew strongly since 2010. Their share of total bank assets has risen since 2010.

• Loans and leases make up by far the largest component of their assets. Since the crisis, however, they have substantially increased their holdings of securities and interest bearing balances, including government securities and reserves.

• The liabilities of the regionals were heavily concentrated in domestic deposits, a pattern that has intensified since the crisis. Deposits were 70 percent of liabilities in 2003, a number that fell through 2007 as they diversified their funding sources, but by 2014 deposits made up 82 percent of the total.

• Regulators are requiring large banks to increase their holdings of long term subordinated debt as a cushion against stress or failure. The regionals, as of 2014, had not increased their share of such liabilities.

• Like the largest banks, the regionals increased their loans and leases in line with their deposits prior to the crisis. And like the largest banks, this relation broke down after 2007, with loans growing much more slowly than deposits. Unlike the largest banks, the regionals have increased loans strongly since 2010, but there remains a significant gap between deposits and loans.

• The regional banks’ share of their net income from traditional sources (mostly loans) has been slowly declining over the period.

• The return on assets of the regionals was between 1.5 and 2.0 percent prior to the crisis. This turned sharply negative in the crisis before recovering after 2009. Between 2012 and 2014 return on assets for these banks was around 1.0 percent, well below the pre-crisis level.

As we saw with the largest banks, the structure and returns of the regional banks has changed as a result of the crisis and new regulation. Perhaps the most troubling change is that the volume of loans lags well behind the volume of deposits, a potential problem for economic growth. The asset and liability structure of the banks has also changed, but these banks have a simpler business model where deposits and loans still predominate.

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Earlier this summer, we examined how the Big Four banks – Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo – performed before, during, and after the 2007-09 financial crisis.  We also blogged about the lending trends within these large banks, expressing concern about the growing gap between deposits taken and loans made by the Big Four, and calling on policymakers to explore the issue further.  We have conducted a similar analysis on the regional banks - The regional banks: The evolution of the financial sector, Part II - and find that these smaller banks are actually faring somewhat better than their bigger counterparts.

Despite the mergers and acquisitions that happened during the crisis, the Big Four banks are a smaller share of banking today than they were in 2007.  The 15 regionals we evaluated, on the other hand, are thriving in the post-crisis environment and have a slightly larger share of total bank assets than they had in 2007.  The Big Four experienced rapid growth in the years leading up to the crisis but much slower growth in the years since.  The regionals, however, have been chugging along: with the exception of a small downward trend during the crisis, they have enjoyed slow but steady growth since 2003.

There is a gap between deposits and loans among the regionals, but it is smaller than the Big Four’s gap.  Tellingly, the regionals’ gap has remained basically constant in size during the recovery, unlike the Big Four’s gap, which is growing.  Bank loans are important to economic growth, and the regional banks are growing their loan portfolios faster than the biggest banks.  That may be a good sign for the future if the regional banks provide more competition for the big banks and a more competitive banking sector overall.

Mercutio: I am hurt. A plague a’ both your houses! I am sped. Is he gone and hath nothing? — Romeo and Juliet, Act 3, scene 1, 90–92

The eurozone crisis, which includes the Greek crisis but is not restricted to it, has undermined the credibility of the EU institutions and left millions of Europeans disillusioned with the European Project. The euro was either introduced too early, or it included countries that should never have been included, or both were true. High rates of inflation left countries in the periphery uncompetitive and the constraint of a single currency removed a key adjustment mechanism. Capital flows allowed this problem to be papered over until the global financial crisis hit.

The leaders of the international institutions, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, together with the governments of the stronger economies, were asked to figure out a solution and they emphasized fiscal consolidation, which they made a condition for assistance with heavy debt burdens. The eurozone as a whole has paid the price, with real GDP in the first quarter of 2015 being about 1.5 percent below its peak in the first quarter of 2008, seven years earlier, and with a current unemployment rate of 11 percent. By contrast, the sluggish U.S. recovery looks rocket-powered, with GDP 8.6 percent above its previous peak and an unemployment rate of 5.5 percent.

The burden of the euro crisis has been very unevenly distributed, with Greece facing unemployment of 25 percent and rising, Spain 23 percent, Italy 12 percent, and Ireland 9.7 percent, while German unemployment is 4.7 percent. It is not surprising that so many Europeans are unhappy with their policy leaders who moved too quickly into a currency union and then dealt with the crisis in a way that pushed countries into economic depression. The common currency has been a boon to Germany, with its $287 billion current account surplus, but the bane of the southern periphery. Greece bears considerable culpability for its own problems, having failed to collect taxes or open up an economy full of competitive restrictions, but that does not excuse the policy failures among Europe’s leaders. A plague on both sides in the Greek crisis!

During the Great Moderation, it seemed that the Bretton Woods institutions were losing their usefulness because private markets could provide needed funding. The financial crisis and the global recession that followed it shattered this belief. The IMF did not foresee the crisis, nor was it a central player in dealing with the period of greatest peril from 2007 to 2009. National treasuries, the Federal Reserve, and the European Central Bank were the only institutions that had the resources and the power to deal with the bank failures, the shortage of liquidity, and the freezing up of markets. Still, the IMF became relevant again and played an important role in the euro crisis, although at the cost of sharing the unpopularity of the policy response to that crisis.

China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is the result of China’s growing power and influence and the failure of the West, particularly the United States, to come to terms with this seismic shift. The Trans-Pacific Partnership trade negotiations have deliberately excluded China, the largest economy in Asia and largest trading partner in the world. Reform of the governance structure of the World Bank and the IMF has stalled with disproportionate power still held by the United States and Europe. Unsurprisingly, China has decided to exercise its influence in other ways, establishing the new Asian bank and increasing the role of the yuan in international transactions. U.S. policymakers underestimated China’s strength and the willingness of other countries to cooperate with it, and the result has been to reduce the role and influence of the Bretton Woods institutions.

Can the old institutions be reinvented and made more effective? In Europe, the biggest problem is that bad decisions were made by national governments and by the international institutions (although the ECB policies have been generally good). The World Bank and IMF do need to reform their governance, but it may be too late to bring China back into the fold.

Community banks play a key role in their local communities by offering traditional banking services to households and lending to nearby small businesses in the commercial, agriculture, and real estate sectors. Because of their close relationship with small businesses, they drive an important segment of economic growth. In fact, compared to all other banks (and to credit unions), small banks devote the greatest share of their assets to small business loans.

In this paper, titled "The community banks: The evolution of the financial sector, Part III," (PDF) Baily and Montalbano examine the evolution of community banks before, through, and after the financial crisis to assess their recovery.

The authors find that despite concerns about the long-term survival of community banks due a decline in the number of banks and increased Dodd-Frank regulations, they continue to recover from the financial crisis and are in fact out-performing the Big Four banks in several key measures.

Although the number of community banks has been steadily declining since before 2003, most of the decline has come from the steep drop in the smallest banking organizations—those with total consolidated assets of less than $100 million. Community banks with total consolidated assets that exceed $300 million have in fact increased in number. Most of the decline in community banks can be attributed to the lack of entry into commercial banking.

In a previous paper, Baily and Montalbano showed that the gap in loans and leases among the Big Four has widened since the financial crisis, but the new research finds that community banks seem to be returning to their pre-crisis pattern, although slowly, with the gap between deposits and loans shrinking since 2011. While total deposits grew gradually after 2011, though at a pace slower than their pre-crisis rate, loans and leases bottomed out in 2011 at $1.219 trillion.

The authors also examine community banks' return on assets (ROA), finding it was lower overall than for the Big Four or for the regionals, and has come back to a level closer to the pre-crisis level than was the case for the larger banks. The level of profitability was slightly lower for community banks in 2003 than it was for the larger banks—about 1.1 percent compared to 1.7 percent for the regional banks—but it did not dip as low, reaching a bottom of about -0.1 percent compared to -0.8 percent for the regional banks.

Baily and Montalbano also find that total assets of the community banks increased 22.5 percent (adjusted for inflation, the increase was 7 percent); the average size of community banks has increased substantially; total bank liabilities grew steadily from 2003-2014; the composition of liabilities in post-crisis years looked largely similar to the composition in the pre-crisis years; and securitization—which plays a relatively small role in the community banking model—has been steadily increasing in the time period both before and after the crisis. 

To read more, download the full paper here.

The paper is the third in a series that examines how the financial sector has evolved over the periods both before and after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The first paper examines the Big Four banks, and the second takes a closer look at regional banks.

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• Download "The community banks: The evolution of the financial sector, Part III"

Neel Kashkari, the newly appointed President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, is super-smart with extensive experience in the financial industry at Goldman Sachs and then running the government’s TARP program, but his call to break up the big banks misses the mark.

Sure, big banks, medium-sized banks and small banks all contributed to the devastating financial crisis, but so did the rating agencies and the state-regulated institutions (mostly small) that originated many of the bad mortgages.  It was vital that regulation be strengthened to avoid a repetition of what happened – and it has been.  There should never again be a situation where policymakers are faced with either bailing out failing institutions or letting them fail and seeing financial panic spread.

That’s why the Dodd-Frank Act gave the authorities a new tool to avoid that dilemma titled “Orderly Liquidation Authority,” which gives them the ability to fail a firm but sustain the key parts whose failure might cause financial instability.  Kashkari thinks that the authorities will not want to exercise this option in a crisis because they will be fearful of the consequences of imposing heavy losses on the original owners of the largest banks.  It’s a legitimate concern, but he underestimates the progress that has been made in making the orderly liquidation authority workable in practice.  He also underestimates the determination of regulators not to bail out financial institutions from now on.

To make orderly liquidation operational, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) devised something called the “single point of entry” approach, or SPOE, which provides a way of dealing with large failing banks.  The bank holding company is separated from the operating subsidiaries and takes with it all of the losses, which are then imposed on the shareholders and unsecured bond holders of the original holding company, and not on the creditors of the critical operating subs and not on  taxpayers.  The operating subsidiaries of the failing institution are placed into a new bank entity, and they are kept open and operating so that customers can still go into their bank branch or ATM and get their money, and the bank can still make loans to support household and business spending or the investment bank can continue to help businesses and households raise funds in securities markets.  The largest banks also have foreign subsidiaries and these too would stay open to serve customers in Brazil or Mexico.

This innovative approach to failing banks is not magic, although it is hard for most people to understand.  However, the reason that Kashkari and other knowledgeable officials have not embraced SPOE is that they believe the authorities will be hesitant to use it and will try to find ways around it.  When a new crisis hits, the argument goes, government regulators will always bail out the big banks.

First, let’s get the facts straight about the recent crisis.  The government did step in to protect the customers of banks of all sizes as well as money market funds.  In the process, they also protected most bondholders, and people who had lent money to the troubled institutions, including the creditors of Bear Stearns, a broker dealer, and AIG, an insurance company.  This was done for a good reason because a collapse in the banking and financial system more broadly would have been even worse if markets stopped lending to them.  Shareholders of banks and other systemically important institutions lost a lot of money in the crisis, as they should have.  The CEOs lost their jobs, as they should have (although not their bonuses).  Most bondholders were protected because it was an unfortunate necessity.

As a result of Dodd-Frank rules the situation is different now from what it was in 2007.  Banks are required to hold much more capital, meaning that there is more shareholder equity in the banks.  In addition, banks must hold long-term unsecured debt, bonds that essentially become a form of equity in the event of a bank failure.  It is being made clear to markets that this form of lending to banks will be subject to losses in the event the bank fails—unlike in 2008.  Under the new rules, both the owners of the shares of big banks and the holders of their unsecured bonds have a lot to lose if the bank fails, providing market discipline and a buffer that makes it very unlikely indeed that taxpayers would be on the hook for losses.

The tricky part is to understand the situation facing the operating subsidiaries of the bank holding company — the parts that are placed into a new bank entity and remain open for business.  The subsidiaries may in fact be the part of the bank that caused it to fail in the first place, perhaps by making bad loans or speculating on bad risks.  Some of these subsidiaries may need to be broken off and allowed to fail along with the holding company—provided that can be done without risking spillover to the economy.  Other parts may be sold separately or wound down in an orderly way.  In fact the systemically important banks are required to submit “living wills” to the FDIC and the Federal Reserve that will enable the critical pieces of a failing bank to be separated from the rest.

It is possible that markets will be reluctant to lend money to the new entity but the key point is that this new entity will be solvent because the losses, wherever they originated, have been taken away and the new entities recapitalized by the creditors of the holding company that have been “bailed in.”   Even if it proves necessary for the government to lend money to the newly formed bank entity, this can be done with reasonable assurance that the loans will be repaid with interest.  Importantly, it can be done through the orderly liquidation authority and would not require Congress to pass another TARP, the very unpopular fund that was used to inject capital into failing institutions.

There are proposals to enhance the SPOE approach by creating a new chapter of the bankruptcy code, so that a judge would control the failure process for a big bank and this could ensure there is no government bailout.  I support these efforts to use bankruptcy proceedings where possible, although I am doubtful if the courts could handle a severe crisis with multiple failures of global financial institutions.  But regardless of whether failing financial institutions are resolved through judicial proceedings or through the intervention of the FDIC (as specified under Title II of Dodd-Frank) the new regulations guaranty that shareholders and unsecured bondholders bear the losses so that the parts of the firm that are essential for keeping financial services going in the economy are kept alive.  That should assure the authorities that bankruptcy or resolution can be undertaken while keeping the economy relatively safe.

The Federal Reserve regulates the largest banks and it is making sure that the bigger the bank, the greater is the loss-absorbing buffer it must hold—and it will be making sure that systemically important nonbanks also have extra capital and can be resolved in an orderly manner.  Once that process is complete, it can be left to the market to decide whether or not it pays to be a big bank.  Regulators do not have to break up the banks or figure out how that would be done without disrupting the financial system.

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in Bloomberg Government. 

Should the United States and NATO consider deploying their current airpower in Afghanistan more assertively? In a May 21 Wall Street Journal op-ed, that’s what retired general and former Afghanistan commander David Petraeus and I contend. Under current rules of engagement, their airpower is used only against al-Qaida or ISIS targets, or when NATO troops are in imminent danger—or, in extremis, when there is a strategic threat to the mission from Taliban attack. As a result of this and other factors, the employment of ordnance by U.S. airpower in Afghanistan is far less than in Iraq and Syria—perhaps by a factor of 20 less, in fact.

But the Taliban can and should be targeted more comprehensively in Afghanistan. An American drone strike over the weekend in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan killed the leader of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansour. That’s welcome news, since the organization he led is the group that allowed al-Qaida to use Afghan bases to prepare the 9/11 attacks; they continue to kill many innocent Afghan and NATO troops, including with horrific attacks in Kabul and elsewhere; they continue to favor draconian measures if they are ever able to regain power in Afghanistan in the future; and they remain a serious threat to the Afghan government and people. The fight against them is far from lost, but the Afghan military's airpower remains underdeveloped and in need of considerable help from the United States and NATO for at least a couple more years.

Editor's Note: The World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) recently published a self-evaluation of its activities. Besides representing current thinking among evaluation experts at the World Bank, it also more broadly reflects some of the strengths and gaps in the approaches that evaluators use to assess and learn from the performance of the international institutions with which they work. The old question “Quis custodet ipsos custodes?” – loosely translated as “Who evaluates the evaluators?” – remains as relevant as ever. Johannes Linn served as an external peer reviewer of the self-evaluation and provides a bird’s-eye view on the lessons learned.

An Overview of the World Bank’s IEG Self-Evaluation Report

In 2011 the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) carried out and published a self-evaluation of its activities. The self-evaluation team was led by an internal manager, but involved a respected external evaluation expert as the principal author and also an external peer reviewer.

The IEG self-evaluation follows best professional practices as codified by the Evaluation Cooperation Group (ECG). This group brings together the evaluation offices of seven major multilateral financial institutions in joint efforts designed to enhance evaluation performance and cooperation among their evaluators. One can therefore infer that the approach and focus of the IEG self-evaluation is representative of a broader set of practices that are currently used by the evaluation community of international financial organizations.

At the outset the IEG report states that “IEG is the largest evaluation department among Evaluation Capacity Group (ECG) members and is held in high regard by the international evaluation community. Independent assessments of IEG’s role as an independent evaluation function for the Bank and IFC rated it above the evaluation functions in most other ECG members, international nongovernmental organizations, and transnational corporations and found that IEG follows good practice evaluation principles.”

The self-evaluation report generally confirms this positive assessment. For four out of six areas of its mandate IEG gives itself the second highest rating (“good”) out of six possible rating categories. This includes (a) the professional quality of its evaluations, (b) its reports on how the World Bank’s management follows up on IEG recommendations, (c) cooperation with other evaluation offices, and (d) assistance to borrowing countries in improving their own evaluation capacity. In the area of appraising the World Bank’s self-evaluation and risk management practices, the report offers the third highest rating (“satisfactory”), while it gives the third lowest rating (“modest”) for IEG’s impact on the Bank’s policies, strategies and operations. In addition the self-evaluation concludes that overall the performance of IEG has been “good” and that it operates independently, effectively and efficiently.

The report makes a number of recommendations for improvement, which are likely to be helpful, but have limited impact on its activities. They cover measures to further enhance the independence of IEG and the consistency of evaluation practices as applied across the World Bank Group’s branches – the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) –; to improve the design of evaluations and the engagement with Bank management upstream for greater impact; and monitoring the impact of recent organizational changes in IEG in terms of results achieved. The report also recommends that more be done to evaluate the Bank’s analytical work and that evaluations draw on comparative evidence.

Assessment

In terms of the parameters of self-evaluation set by the prevailing practice among the evaluators on international financial agencies, the IEG self-evaluation is accurate and helpful. From my own experience as an operational manager in the Bank whose activities were evaluated by IEG in years past, and as a user of IEG evaluations (and of evaluations of other international aid organizations) for my research on aid effectiveness, I concur that IEG is independent and effective in meeting its mandate as defined. Moreover, the self-evaluation produces useful quantitative evidence (including survey results, budget analysis, etc.) to corroborate qualitative judgments.

However, the self-evaluation suffers from a number of limitations in approach and gaps in focus, which are broadly representative of the practices prevalent among many of the evaluation offices of international aid agencies.

Approach of the IEG self-evaluation

The core of the self-evaluation report is about the evaluation process followed by IEG, with very little said about the substance of IEG’s evaluations. The following questions could have usefully been raised, but were not: do evaluations cover the right issues with the right intensity, such as growth and poverty; environmental, governance, and gender impacts; regional dimensions versus exclusive country or project focus; effectiveness in addressing the problems of fragile and conflict states; effectiveness in dealing with global public goods; sustainability and scaling up; etc. Therefore the report does not deal with the question of whether IEG effectively responds in its evaluations to the many important strategic debates and issues with which the development community is grappling.

Related to this limitation is the fact that the report assessed the quality of IEG’s mostly in terms of (a) whether its approach and processes meet certain standards established by the Evaluation Cooperation Group; and (b) how it is judged by stakeholders in response to a survey commissioned for this evaluation. Both these approaches are useful, but they do not have any basis in professional assessments of the quality of individual products. This is equivalent to IEG evaluating the World Bank’s projects on the quality of its processes (e.g., appraisal and supervision processes) and on the basis of stakeholder surveys, without evaluating individual products and their impacts.

Gaps in the Self-Evaluation and in Evaluation Practice

Careful reading of the report reveals six important gaps in the IEG self-evaluation, in the prevailing evaluation practice in the World Bank, and more generally in the way international financial organizations evaluate their own performance. The first three gaps relate to aspects of the evaluation approach used and the second three gaps relate to lack of focus in the self-evaluation on key internal organizational issues:

1. Impact Evaluations: The report notes that IEG carries out two to three impact evaluations per year, but it sidesteps the debate in the current evaluation literature and practice as to what extent the “gold standard” of randomized impact evaluation should occupy a much more central role. Given the importance of this debate and divergence of views, it would have been appropriate for the self-evaluation to assess IEG’s current practice of very limited use of randomized evaluations.

2. Evaluation of Scaling Up: The report does not address the question of to what extent current IEG practice not only assesses the performance of individual projects in terms of their outcomes and sustainability, but also in terms of whether the Bank has systematically built on its experience in specific projects to help scale up their impact through support for expansion or replication in follow-up operations or through effective hand-off to the government or other partners. In fact, currently IEG does not explicitly and systematically consider scaling up in its project and program evaluations. For example, in a recent IEG evaluation of World Bank funded municipal development projects (MDPs) , IEG found that the Bank has supported multiple MDPs in many countries over the years, but the evaluation did not address the obvious question whether the Bank systematically planned for the project sequence or built on its experience from prior projects in subsequent operations. While most other evaluation offices like IEG do not consider scaling up, some (in particular those of the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the United Nations Development Program) have started doing so in recent years.

3. Drawing on the Experience of and Benchmarking Against Other Institutions: The self-evaluation report does a good job in benchmarking IEG performance in a number of respects against that of other multilateral institutions. In the main text of the report it states that “IEG plans to develop guidelines for approach papers to ensure greater quality, in particular in drawing on comparative information from other sources and benchmarking against other institutions.” This is a welcome intention, but it is inadequately motivated in the rest of the report and not reflected in the Executive Summary. The reality is that IEG, like most multilateral evaluation offices, so far has not systematically drawn on the evaluations and relevant experience of other aid agencies in its evaluations of World Bank performance. This has severely limited the learning impact of the evaluations.

4. Bank Internal Policies, Management Processes and Incentives: IEG evaluations traditionally do not focus on how the Bank’s internal policies, management and incentives affect the quality of Bank engagement in countries. Therefore evaluations cannot offer any insights into whether and how Bank-internal operating modalities contribute to results. Two recent exceptions are notable exceptions. First, the IEG evaluation of the Bank’s approach to harmonization with other donors and alignment with country priorities assesses the incentives for staff to support harmonization and alignment. The evaluation concludes that there are insufficient incentives, a finding disputed by management. Second, is the evaluation of the Bank’s internal matrix management arrangements, which is currently under way. The self-evaluation notes that Bank management tried to quash the matrix evaluation on the grounds that it did not fall under the mandate of IEG. This is an unfortunate argument, since an assessment of the institutional reasons for the Bank’s performance is an essential component of any meaningful evaluation of Bank-supported programs. While making a good case for the specific instance of the matrix evaluation, the self-evaluation report shies away from a more general statement in support of engaging IEG on issues of Bank-internal policies, management processes and incentives. It is notable that IFAD’s Independent Office of Evaluation appears to be more aggressive in this regard: It currently is carrying out a full evaluation of IFAD’s internal efficiency and previous evaluations (e.g., an evaluation of innovation and scaling up) did not shy away from assessing internal institutional dimensions.

5. World Bank Governance: The IEG self-evaluation is even more restrictive in how it interprets its mandate regarding the evaluation of the World Bank’s governance structures and processes (including its approach to members’ voice and vote, the functioning of its board of directors, the selection of its senior management, etc.). It considers these topics beyond IEG’s mandate. This is unfortunate, since the way the Bank’s governance evolves will substantially affect its long-term legitimacy, effectiveness and viability as an international financial institution. Since IEG reports to the Bank’s board of directors, and many of the governance issues involve questions of the board’s composition, role and functioning, there is a valid question of how effectively IEG could carry out such an evaluation. However, it is notable that the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office, which similarly reports to the IMF board of directors, published a full evaluation of the IMF’s governance in 2008, which effectively addressed many of the right questions.

6. Synergies between World Bank, IFC and MIGA: The self-evaluation report points out that the recent internal reorganization of IEG aimed to assure more effective and consistent evaluations across the three member branches of the World Bank Group. This is welcome, but the report does not assess how past evaluations addressed the question of whether the World Bank, IFC and MIGA effectively capitalized on the potential synergies among the three organizations. The recent evaluation of the World Bank Group’s response to the global economic crisis of 2008/9 provided parallel assessments of each agency’s performance, but did not address whether they work together effectively in maximizing their synergies. The reality is that the three organizations have deeply engrained institutional cultures and generally go their own ways rather than closely coordinating their activities on the ground. Future evaluations should explicitly consider whether the three effectively cooperate or not. While the World Bank is unique in the way it has organizationally separated its private sector and guarantee operations, other aid organizations also have problems of a lack of cooperation, coordination and synergy among different units within the agency. Therefore, the same comment also applies to their evaluation approaches.

Conclusions

Self-evaluations are valuable tools for performance assessment and IEG is to be congratulated for carrying out and publishing such an evaluation of its own activities. As for all self-evaluations, it should be seen as an input to an independent external evaluation, a decision that, for now, has apparently been postponed by the Bank’s board of directors.

IEG’s self-evaluation has many strengths and provides an overall positive assessment of IEG’s work. However, it does reflect some important limitations of analysis and of certain gaps in approach and coverage, which an independent external review should consider explicitly, and which IEG’s management should address. Since many of these issues also likely apply to most of the other evaluation approaches by other evaluation offices, the lessons have relevance beyond IEG and the World Bank.

Key lessons include:

• An evaluation of evaluations should focus not only on process, but also on the substantive issues that the institution is grappling with.
• An evaluation of the effectiveness of evaluations should include a professional assessment of the quality of evaluation products.
• An evaluation of evaluations should assess:
  o How effectively impact evaluations are used;
  o How scaling up of successful interventions is treated;
  o How the experience of other comparable institutions is utilized;
  o Whether and how the internal policies, management practices and incentives of the institution are effectively assessed;
  o Whether and how the governance of the institution is evaluated; and
  o Whether and how internal coordination, cooperation and synergy among units within the organizations are assessed.

Evaluations play an essential role in the accountability and learning of international aid organizations. Hence it is critical that evaluations address the right issues and use appropriate techniques. If the lessons above were reflected in the evaluation practices of the aid institutions, this would represent a significant step forward in the quality, relevance and likely impact of evaluations.

Since its 50th anniversary in 1994, the World Bank has been led by four presidents: Lewis Preston until his untimely death in 1995; then James Wolfensohn, who gave the institution new energy, purpose and legitimacy; followed by Paul Wolfowitz, whose fractious management tossed the World Bank into deep crisis; and most recently, Robert Zoellick, who will be remembered for having stabilized the bank and provided effective leadership during its remarkably swift and strong response to the global financial crisis.

Throughout these years of ups and downs in the bank’s leadership, standing and lending, the overall trend of its global role was downhill. While it remains one of the world’s largest multilateral development finance institutions, its position relative to other multilateral financing mechanisms is now much less prominent. Other multilateral institutions have taken over key roles. For example, the European Union agencies and the regional development banks have rapidly expanded their portfolios, and new “vertical funds” such as the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria have become major funding vehicles. At the same time, according to a 2011 OECD Development Assistance Committee report multilateral aid has declined as a share of total aid. Meanwhile, non-governmental aid flows have dramatically increased, including those from major foundations like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, but also from new internet-based channels bundling small individual donations, such as Global Giving. The World Bank— which 20 years ago was still the biggest and most powerful global development agency and hence a ready target for criticism— today is just one of the many institutions that offer for development to the poor and emerging market economies.

Against this backdrop, the World Bank, its members and Dr. Kim face three options in its long-term trajectory over the next 10 to 20 years: 1) the bank can continue on its current path of gradual decline; 2) it might be radically scaled back and eventually eliminated, as other aid channels take over; or 3) it can dramatically reinvent itself as a global finance institution that bundles resources for growing global needs.

There is no doubt in this author’s mind that the World Bank should remain a key part of the global governance architecture, but that requires that the new president forge an ambitious long-term vision for the bank – something that has been lacking for the last 30 years – and then reform the institution and build the authorizing environment that will make it possible to achieve the vision.

Option 1: “Business as Usual” = Continued Gradual Decline

The first option, reflecting the business-as-usual approach that characterized most of the Zoellick years of leadership will mean that the bank will gradually continue to lose in scope, funding and relevance. Its scope will be reduced since the emerging market economies find the institution insufficiently responsive to their needs. They have seen the regional development banks take on increasing importance, as reflected in the substantially greater capital increases in recent years for some of these institutions than for the World Bank in relative terms (and in the case of the Asian Development Bank, even in absolute terms). And emerging market economies have set up their own thriving regional development banks without participation of the industrial countries, such as the Caja Andina de Fomento (CAF) in Latin America and the Eurasian Development Bank in the former Soviet Union. This trend will be reinforced with the creation of a “South Bank” or “BRIC Bank”, an initiative that is currently well underway.

At the same time, the World Bank’s soft loan window, the International Development Association (IDA), will face less support from industrial countries going through deep fiscal crises, heightened competition from other concessional funds, and a perception of reduced need, as many of the large and formerly poor developing countries graduate to middle-income status. It is significant that for the last IDA replenishment much of the increase in resources was due to its growing reliance on advance repayments made by some of its members and commitments against future repayments, thus in effect mortgaging its future financial capacity. The World Bank’s status as a knowledge leader in development will also continue to be challenged with the rise of research from developing countries and growing think tank capacity, as well as a proliferation of private and official agencies doling out advice and technical assistance.

As a result, under this option, over the next 10 to 20 years the World Bank will likely become no more than a shadow of the preeminent global institution it once was. It will linger on but will not be able to contribute substantially to address any of the major global financial, economic or social challenges in the future.
 
Option 2: “The Perfect Storm” = Breaking Up the World Bank

In 1998, the U.S. Congress established a commission to review and advise on the role of the international financial institutions. In 2000, the commission, led by Professor Allan Meltzer, released its recommendations, which included far-reaching changes for the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, most of them designed to reduce the scope and financial capacities of these institutions in line with the conservative leanings of the majority of the commission’s members. For the World Bank, the “Meltzer Report” called for much of its loan business and financial assets to be devolved to the regional development banks, in effect ending the life of the institution as we know it. The report garnered some attention when it was first issued, but did not have much impact in the way the institution was run in the following 10 years.

In 2010, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a report on the international financial institutions, which called on them to aim toward “succeeding in their development and economic missions and thereby putting them out of business”. However, it did not recommend a drastic restructuring of the multilateral development banks, and instead argued strongly against any dilution of the U.S. veto right, its lock on leadership selection, and its voting share at the IMF and World Bank. While not dramatic in its short-term impact, these recommendations were likely a strong factor in the subsequent decisions made by the Obama administration to oppose a substantial increase in contributions by emerging markets during the latest round of capital increase at the World Bank to push for an American to replace Robert Zoellick as World Bank president. These actions reinforced for emerging market countries that the World Bank would not change sufficiently and quickly enough to serve their interests, and thus helped create the momentum for setting up a new “South Bank.”

While there seems to be no imminent risk of a break-up of the World Bank along the lines recommended by the Meltzer Report, the combination of fiscal austerity and conservative governments in key industrial countries, compounded by a declining interest of the emerging market countries in sustaining the institution’s future, could create the perfect storm for the bank. Specifically, as governments face constrained fiscal resources, confront the increasing fragmentation of the multilateral aid architecture, and take steps to consolidate their own aid agencies, they might conclude that it would be more efficient and fiscally prudent to rationalize the international development system. There is a obvious overlap on the ground in the day-to-day business of the World Bank and that of the regional development banks. This is a reality which is being fostered by the growing decentralization of the World Bank into regional hubs; in fact, a recent evaluation by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group concluded that “[r]ather than functioning as a global institution, the bank is at risk of evolving into six regional banks”. With the growing financial strength, institutional capacity and dynamism, and the apparently greater legitimacy of regional development banks among their regional members, shareholders might eventually decide that consolidation of the World Bank’s operations with those of the regional development banks, in favor of the latter, is the preferred approach.

There are lots of reasons to think that this drastic step would be difficult to take politically, financially and administratively, and therefore the inertia common to the international governance architecture will also prevail in this case. However, the new World Bank president would be well advised to be prepared for the possibility of a “perfect storm” under which the idea of eviscerating the World Bank could gain some traction,. The more the bank is seen to fade away, as postulated under Option 1 above, the greater is the likelihood that Option 2 would be given serious consideration.

Option 3: “A Different World Bank” = Creating a Stronger Global Institution for the Coming Decades

Despite all the criticism and the decline in its relative role as a development finance institution in recent decades, the World Bank is still one of the strongest and most effective development institutions in a world. According to a recent independent ranking of the principal multilateral and bilateral aid institutions by the Brookings Institution and the Center for Global Development “IDA consistently ranks among the best aid agencies in each dimension of quality”.

A third, radically different option from the first two, would build on this strength and ensure that the world has an institution 10 to 20 years from now which helps the global community and individual countries to respond effectively to the many global challenges which the world will undoubtedly face: continued poverty, hunger, conflict and fragility, major infrastructure and energy needs, education and health challenges, and global warming and environmental challenges. On top of this, global financial crises will likely recur and require institutions like the World Bank to help countries provide safety nets and the structural foundations of long-term growth, as the bank has amply demonstrated since 2008. With this as a broad mandate, how could the World Bank respond under new dynamic?

First, it would change its organizational and operating modalities to take a leaf out of the book of the vertical funds, which have been so successful in tackling major development challenges in a focused and scaled-up manner. This means substantially rebalancing the internal matrix between the regional and country departments on the one hand and the technical departments on the other hand. According to the same evaluation cited above, the World Bank has tipped too far toward short-term country priorities and has failed to adequately reflect the need for long-term, dedicated sectoral engagement. The World Bank needs to fortify its reputation as an institution that can muster the strongest technical expertise, fielding team with broad global experience and with first rate regional and country perspective. This does not imply that the World Bank would abandon its engagement at the country level, but it means that it would systematically support the pursuit of long-term sectoral and sub-sectoral strategies at the country level, linked to regional and global initiatives, and involving private-public partnership to assure that development challenges are addressed at scale and in a sustained manner.

Second, recognizing that all countries have unmet needs for which they need long-term finance and best practice in areas such as infrastructure, energy, climate change and environment, the World Bank could become a truly global development institution by opening up its funding windows to all countries, not just an arbitrarily defined subset of developing countries. This would require substantially revising the current graduation rules and possibly the financial instruments. This would mean that the World Bank becomes the global equivalent of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and of the German Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW)—development banks that have successfully supported the infrastructure development of the more advanced countries.

Third, the World Bank would focus its own knowledge management activities and support for research and development in developing countries much more on a search for effective and scalable solutions, linked closely to its operational engagement which would be specifically designed to support the scaling up of tested innovations, along the lines pioneered by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

Fourth, for those countries with strong project management capacities, the World Bank would dramatically simplify its lending processes, following the example of the EIB. This would make it a much more efficient operational institution, making it a more attractive partner to its borrowing member countries, especially the emerging market economies.

Fifth, the membership of the World Bank would fix some fundamental problems with its financial structure and governance. It would invite the emerging market economies to make significantly larger contributions to its capital base in line with their much-enhanced economic and financial capacities. It would revamp the bank’s voting and voice rules to reflect the changed global economic weights and financial contributions of emerging markets. The bank would also explore, based on the experience of the vertical funds, tapping the resources of non-official partners, such as foundations and the private sector as part of its capital and contribution base. Of course, this would bring with it further significant changes in the governance of the World Bank. And the bank would move swiftly to a transparent selection of its leadership on the basis of merit without reference to nationality.

Conclusion: The New World Bank President Needs to Work with the G-20 Leaders to Chart a Course Forward
 
The new president will have to make a choice between these three options. Undoubtedly, the easiest choice is “business-as-usual”, perhaps embellished with some marginal changes that reflect the perspective and new insights that an outsider will bring. There is no doubt that the forces of institutional and political inertia tend to prevent dramatic change. However, it is also possible that Dr. Kim, with his background in a relatively narrow sectoral area may recognize the need for a more vertical approach in the bank’s organizational and operational model. Therefore, he may be more inclined than others to explore Option 3.

If he pursues Option 3, Dr. Kim will need a lot of help. The best place to look for help might be the G-20 leadership. One could hope that at least some of the leaders of the G-20 understand that Options 1 and 2 are not in the interest of their countries and the international community. Hopefully, they would be willing to push their peers to contemplate some radical changes in the multilateral development architecture. This might involve the setting up of a high-level commission as recently recommended by this author, which would review the future of the World Bank as part of a broader approach to rationalize the multilateral system in the interest of greater efficiency and effectiveness. But in setting up such a commission, the G-20 should state a clear objective, namely that the World Bank, perhaps the strongest existing global development institution, should not be gutted or gradually starved out of existence. Instead, it needs to be remade into a focused, effective and truly global institution. If Dr. Kim embraces this vision and develops actionable ideas for the commission and the G-20 leaders to consider and support, then he may bring the right medicine for an ailing giant.

Editor's Note: Johannes Linn discusses the potential of multilateral development banks in the latest G-20 Research Group briefing book on the St. Petersburg G-20 Summit. Read the full collection here.

The origins of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) lie with the creation of the World Bank at Bretton Woods in 1944. Its initial purpose, as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, was the reconstruction of wartorn countries after the Second World War. 

As Europe and Japan recovered in the 1950s, the World Bank turned to providing financial assistance to the developing world. Then came the foundation of the InterAmerican Development Bank (IADB) in 1959, of the African Development Bank (AfDB) in 1964 and of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1966, each to assist the development of countries in their respective regions. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was set up in 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, to assist with the transition of countries in the former Soviet sphere. 

The MDBs are thus rooted in two key aspects of the geopolitical reality of the postwar 20th century: the Cold War between capitalist ‘West’ and communist ‘East’, and the division of the world into the industrial ‘North’ and the developing ‘South’. The former aspect was mirrored in the MDBs for many years by the absence of countries from the Eastern Bloc. This was only remedied after the fall of the Bamboo and Iron curtains. The latter aspect remains deeply embedded even today in the mandate, financing pattern and governance structures of the MDBs. 

Changing global financial architecture 

From the 1950s to the 1990s, the international financial architecture consisted of only three pillars: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the MDBs represented the multilateral official pillar; the aid agencies of the industrial countries represented bilateral official pillar; and the commercial banks and investors from industrial countries made up the private pillar. 

Today, the picture is dramatically different. Private commercial flows vastly exceed official flows, except during global financial crises. New channels of development assistance have multiplied, as foundations and religious and non-governmental organisations rival the official assistance flows in size. 

The multilateral assistance architecture, previously dominated by the MDBs, is now a maze of multilateral development agencies, with a slew of sub-regional development banks, some exceeding the traditional MDBs in size. For example, the European Investment Bank lends more than the World Bank, and the Caja Andina de Fomento (CAF, the Latin American Development Bank) more than the IADB. There are also a number of large ‘vertical funds’ for specific purposes, such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. There are  specialized trust funds, attached to MDBs, but often with their own governance structures.

End of the North-South divide 

Finally, the traditional North-South divide is breaking down, as emerging markets have started to close the development gap, as global poverty has dropped and as many developing countries have large domestic capacities. This means that the new power houses in the South need little financial and technical assistance and are now providing official financial and technical support to their less fortunate neighbors. China’s assistance to Africa outstrips that of the World Bank.

The future for MDBs 

In this changed environment is there a future for MDBs? Three options might be considered: 

1. Do away with the MDBs as a relic of the past. Some more radical market ideologues might argue that, if there ever was a justification for the MDBs, that time is now well past. In 2000, a US congressional commission recommended the less radical solution of shifting the World Bank’s loan business to the regional MDBs. Even if shutting down MDBs were the right option, it is highly unlikely to happen. No multilateral financial institution created after the Second World War has ever been closed. Indeed, recently the Nordic Development Fund was to be shut down, but its owners reversed their decision and it will carry on, albeit with a focus on climate change. 

2. Carry on with business as usual. Currently, MDBs are on a track that, if continued, would mean a weakened mandate, loss of clients, hollowed-out financial strength and diluted technical capacity. Given their tight focus on the fight against poverty, the MDBs will work themselves out of a job as global poverty, according to traditional metrics, is on a dramatic downward trend. 

Many middle-income country borrowers are drifting away from the MDBs, since they find other sources of finance and technical advice more attractive. These include the sub-regional development banks, which are more nimble in disbursing their loans and whose governance is not dominated by the industrial countries. These countries, now facing major long-term budget constraints, will be unable to continue supporting the growth of the MDBs’ capital base. But they are also unwilling to let the emerging market economies provide relatively more funding and acquire a greater voice in these institutions.

Finally, while the MDBs retain professional staff that represents a valuable global asset, their technical strength relative to other sources of advice – and by some measures, even their absolute strength – has been waning. 

If left unattended, this would mean that MDBs 10 years from now, while still limping along, are likely to have lost their ability to provide effective financial and technical services on a scale and with a quality that matter globally or regionally. 

3. Give the MDBs a new mandate, new governance and new financing. If one starts from the proposition that a globalised 21st-century world needs capable global institutions that can provide long-term finance to meet critical physical and social infrastructure needs regionally and globally, and that can serve as critical knowledge hubs in an increasingly interconnected world, then it would be folly to let the currently still considerable institutional and financial strengths of the MDBs wither away.

• The mandate of the MDBs should be adapted to move beyond preoccupation with poverty eradication to focus explicitly on global and regional public goods as a way to help sustain global economic growth and human welfare. Moreover, the MDBs should be able to provide assistance to all their members, not only developing country members. 

• The governance of the MDBs should be changed to give the South a voice commensurate with the greater global role it now plays in economic and political terms. MDB leaders should be selected on merit without consideration of nationality. 

• The financing structure should be matched to give more space to capital contributions from the South and to significantly expand the MDBs’ capital resources in the face of the current severe capital constraints.

In addition, MDB management should be guided by banks’ membership to streamline their operational practices in line with those widely used by sub-regional development banks, and they should be supported in preserving and, where possible, strengthening their professional capacity so that they can serve as international knowledge hubs. 

A new MDB agenda for the G20 

The G20 has taken on a vast development agenda. This is fine, but it risks getting bogged down in the minutiae of development policy design and implementation that go far beyond what global leaders can and should deal with. What is missing is a serious preoccupation of the G20 with that issue on which it is uniquely well equipped to lead: reform of the global financial institutional architecture. 

What better place than to start with than the MDBs? The G20 should review the trends, strengths and weaknesses of MDBs in recent decades and endeavour to create new mandates, governance and financing structures that make them serve as effective pillars of the global institutional system in the 21st century. If done correctly, this would also mean no more need for new institutions, such as the BRICS development bank currently being created by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. It would be far better to fix the existing institutions than to create new ones that mostly add to the already overwhelming fragmentation of the global institutional system.

Event Information

The year 2015 will be a milestone year, with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the post-2015 development agenda by world leaders in September; the Addis Ababa Accord on financing for development in July; and the conclusion of climate negotiations at COP21 in Paris in December. The draft Addis Ababa Accord, which focuses on the actions needed to attain the SDGs, highlights the key role envisaged for the multilateral development banks (MDBs) in the post-2015 agenda. Paragraph 65 of the draft accord notes: “We call on the international finance institutions to establish a process to examine the role, scale, and functioning of the multilateral and regional development finance institutions to make them more responsive to the sustainable development agenda.”          

Against this backdrop, on April 18, 2015, the Global Economy and Development program at Brookings held a private roundtable with the leaders of the MDBs and other key stakeholders to discuss the role of the MDBs in supporting the post-2015 development agenda.

The meeting focused on four questions:

1. What does the post-2015 development agenda and the ambitions of the Addis and Paris conferences imply for the MDBs?


Given the ability of the MDBs to leverage shareholder resources, they can be efficient and effective mechanisms for scaling up development cooperation, particularly with respect to the agenda on investing in people and to the financing of sustainable infrastructure. New roles, instruments and partnerships might be needed.

2. How can MDBs best take advantage of the political attention that is being paid to the various conferences in 2015?   


The World Bank and selected regional development banks have launched a series of initiatives to optimize their balance sheets, address other constraints and enhance their catalytic role in crowding in private finance. And new institutions and mechanisms are coming to the fore. But the responses are not coordinated to best take advantage of each MDB’s comparative advantage.

3. What are the key impediments to scaling up the role and engagement of the MDBs?


Views on constraints are likely to differ but discussions should cover policy dialogue, capacity building, capital, leverage, shareholder backing on volume, instruments on leverage and risk mitigation, safeguards, and governance. 

4. How should the MDBs respond to the proposal to establish a process to examine the role, scale and functioning of the multilateral and regional development finance institutions to make them more responsive to the sustainable development agenda?   


A proactive response and engagement on the part of the MDBs would facilitate a better understanding of the contribution that the MDBs can make and greater support among shareholders for a coherent and stepped-up role.

Event Materials

• Participant List
• MDB PostEvent Summary

The replenishment process for concessional resources of the multilateral development banks is broken. We have come to this conclusion after a review of the experience with recent replenishments of multilateral development funds. We also base it on first-hand observation, since one of us was responsible for the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) replenishment consultations 20 years ago and recently served as the external chair for the last two replenishment consultations of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), which closely follow the common multilateral development bank (MDB) practice. As many of the banks and their donors are preparing for midterm reviews as a first step toward the next round of replenishment consultations, this is a good time to take stock and consider what needs to be done to fix the replenishment process.

So what’s the problem?

Most of all, the replenishment process does not serve its key intended function of setting overall operational strategy for the development funds and holding the institutions accountable for effectively implementing the strategy. Instead, the replenishment consultations have turned into a time-consuming and costly process in which donor representatives from their capitals get bogged down in the minutiae of institutional management that are better left to the boards of directors and the managements of the MDBs. There are other problems, including lack of adequate engagement of recipient countries in donors’ deliberations, the lack of full participation of the donors’ representatives on the boards of the institutions in the process, and inflexible governance structures that serve as a disincentive for non-traditional donors (from emerging countries and from private foundations) to contribute.

But let’s focus on the consultation process. What does it look like? Typically, donor representatives from capitals assemble every three years (or four, in the case of the Asian Development Bank) for a year-long consultation round, consisting of four two-day meetings (including the meeting devoted to the midterm review of the ongoing replenishment and to setting the agenda for the next consultation process). For these meetings, MDB staff prepare, per consultation round, some 20 substantive documents that are intended to delve into operational and institutional performance in great detail. Each consultation round produces a long list of specific commitments (around 40 commitments is not uncommon), which management is required to implement and monitor, and report on in the midterm review. In effect, however, this review covers only half the replenishment cycle, which leads to the reporting, monitoring, and accountability being limited to the delivery of committed outputs (e.g., a specific sector strategy) with little attention paid to implementation, let alone outcomes.

The process is eerily reminiscent of the much maligned “Christmas tree” approach of the World Bank’s structural adjustment loans in the 1980s and 1990s, with their detailed matrixes of conditionality; lack of strategic selectivity and country ownership; focus on inputs rather than outcomes; and lack of consideration of the borrowers’ capacity and costs of implementing the Bank-imposed measures. Ironically, the donors successfully pushed the MDBs to give up on such conditionality (without ownership of the recipient countries) in their loans, but they impose the same kind of conditionality (without full ownership of the recipient countries and institutions) on the MDBs themselves—replenishment after replenishment.

Aside from lack of selectivity, strategic focus, and ownership of the commitments, the consultation process is also burdensome and costly in terms of the MDBs’ senior management and staff time as well as time spent by ministerial staff in donor capitals, with literally thousands of management and staff hours spent on producing and reviewing documentation. And the recent innovation of having donor representatives meet between consultation rounds as working groups dealing with long-term strategic issues, while welcome in principle, has imposed further costs on the MDBs and capitals in terms of preparing documentation and meetings.

It doesn’t have to be that way. Twenty years ago the process was much simpler and less costly. Even today, recent MDB capital increases, which mobilized resources for the non-concessional windows of the MDBs, were achieved with much simpler processes, and the replenishment consultations for special purpose funds, such as the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria and for the GAVI Alliance, are more streamlined than those of the MDBs.

So what’s to be done?

We recommend the following measures to fix the replenishment consultation process:

1. Focus on a few strategic issues and reduce the number of commitments with an explicit consideration of the costs and capacity requirements they imply. Shift the balance of monitoring and accountability from delivery of outputs to implementation and outcomes.
2. Prepare no more than five documents for the consultation process: (i) a midterm review on the implementation of the previous replenishment and key issues for the future; (ii) a corporate strategy or strategy update; (iii) the substantive report on how the replenishment resources will contribute to achieve the strategy; (iv) a financial outlook and strategy document; and (v) the legal document of the replenishment resolution.
3. Reduce the number of meetings for each replenishment round to no more than three and lengthen the replenishment period from three to four years or more.
4. Use the newly established working group meetings between replenishment consultation rounds to focus on one or two long-term, strategic issues, including how to fix the replenishment process.

The initiative for such changes lies with the donor representatives in the capitals, and from our interviews with donor representatives we understand that many of them broadly share our concerns. So this is a good time—indeed it is high time!—for them to act.

Executive Summary

Two-thirds of Americans have broadband Internet access in their homes.[1] But because of poor infrastructure or high prices, the remaining third of Americans do not. In some areas, broadband Internet is plainly unavailable because of inadequate infrastructure: More than 14 million Americans – approximately 5 percent of the total population – live in areas where terrestrial (as opposed to mobile) fixed broadband connectivity is unavailable.[2] The effects of insufficient infrastructure development have contributed to racial and cultural disparities in broadband access; for example, terrestrial broadband is available to only 10 percent of residents on tribal lands.[3]

Even where terrestrial broadband connectivity is available, however, the high price of broadband service can be prohibitive, especially to lower income Americans. While 93 percent of adults earning more than $75,000 per year are wired for broadband at home, the terrestrial broadband adoption rate is only 40 percent among adults earning less than $20,000 annually.[4] These costs also contribute to racial disparities; almost 70 percent of whites have adopted terrestrial broadband at home,   but only 59 percent of blacks and 49 percent of Hispanics have done the same.[5]

America's wireless infrastructure is better developed, but many Americans still lack wireless broadband coverage. According to a recent study, 3G wireless networks cover a good portion of the country, including 98 percent of the United States population,[6] but certain states have dramatically lower coverage rates than others. For example, only 71 percent of West Virginia's population is covered by a 3G network.[7] Wireless providers will likely use existing 3G infrastructure to enable the impending transition to 4G networks.[8] Unless wireless infrastructure expands quickly, those Americans that remain unconnected may be left behind.

Though America is responsible for the invention and development of Internet technology, the United States has fallen behind competing nations on a variety of important indicators, including broadband adoption rate and price. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's survey of 31 developed nations, the United States is ranked fourteenth in broadband penetration rate (i.e. the number of subscribers per 100 inhabitants); only 27.1 percent of Americans have adopted wired broadband subscriptions, compared to 37.8 percent of residents of the Netherlands.[9]

America also trails in ensuring the affordability of broadband service. The average price for a medium-speed (2.5Mbps-10Mbps) Internet plan in America is the seventeenth lowest among its competitor nations. For a medium-speed plan, the average American must pay $38 per month, while an average subscriber in Japan (ranked first) pays only $22 for a connection of the same quality.[10]

The National Broadband Plan (NBP), drafted by the Federal Communication Commission and released in 2010, seeks to provide all Americans with affordable broadband Internet access.[11] Doing so will not be cheap; analysts project that developing the infrastructure necessary for full broadband penetration will require $24 billion in subsidies and spending.[12] President Obama’s stimulus package has already set aside $4.9 billion to develop broadband infrastructure,[13] and some small ongoing federal programs receive an annual appropriation to promote broadband penetration.[14] However, these funding streams will only account for one-third of the $24 billion necessary to achieve the FCC's goal of full broadband penetration.[15] Moreover, developing infrastructure alone is not enough; many low-income Americans are unable to afford Internet access, even if it is offered in their locality.

To close this funding gap and to make broadband more accessible, the National Broadband Plan proposes to transform the Universal Service Fund – a subsidy program that spends $8.7 billion every year to develop infrastructure and improve affordability for telephone service – into a program that would do the same for broadband Internet.

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• Download the Full Paper

Event Information

For Cubans, “D17”—December 17, 2014—changed everything. On that day, the United States and Cuba announced that the two countries would renew diplomatic relations nearly 60 years after Fidel Castro came to power. For both countries, a new transformation has begun—but this time, it is the promise of Cuba’s insertion in the globalized economy and the crumbling U.S. embargo that is catalyzing change on the island.

On May 31, the Brookings Book Club hosted Nonresident Senior Fellow Richard E. Feinberg and NPR Correspondent Tom Gjelten for a discussion of Feinberg’s new book, “Open for Business: Building the New Cuban Economy” (Brookings Institution Press, 2016). The discussion focused on the factors that guided this monumental decision: international diplomacy; changes already underway in Cuba; successful Cuban entrepreneurs and foreign investments; and scenarios for Cuba’s future development path.

Three young Cuban leaders, including two whose vignettes appear in the book, “Open for Business,” joined the discussion and shared their personal experiences with the economic realities in Cuba today, as well as the opportunities created by the shift in Cuban-American relations.

Video

• Open for business: Building the new Cuban economy

Audio

• Open for business: Building the new Cuban economy

Transcript

• Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160531_cuba_economy_transcript

The narratives on U.S. development aid to Pakistan—as well as Pakistan’s own development policy discussion—frequently invoke the conventional wisdom that more education and better economic opportunities result in lower extremism. In the debate surrounding the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill in 2009, for instance, the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke urged Congress to “target the economic and social roots of extremism in western Pakistan with more economic aid.”

But evidence across various contexts, including in Pakistan, has not supported this notion (see Alan Kreuger’s What Makes a Terrorist for a good overview of this evidence). We know that many terrorists are educated. And lack of education and economic opportunities do not appear to drive support for terrorism and terrorist groups. I have argued that we need to focus on the quality and content of the educational curricula—in Pakistan’s case, they are rife with biases and intolerance, and designed to foster an exclusionary identity—to understand the relationship between education and attitudes toward extremism.

My latest analysis with data from the March 2013 Pew Global Attitudes poll conducted in Pakistan sheds new light on the relationship between years of education and Pakistanis’ views of the Taliban, and lends supports to the conventional wisdom. The survey sampled 1,201 respondents throughout Pakistan, except the most insecure areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. This was a time of mounting terror attacks by the Pakistani Taliban (a few months after their attack on Malala), and came at the tail end of the Pakistan People's Party’s term in power, before the May 2013 general elections.

On attitudes toward the Pakistani Taliban, or Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), 3 percent of respondents to the Pew poll said they had a very favorable view, 13 percent reported somewhat favorable views, while nearly 17 percent and 39 percent answered that they had somewhat unfavorable and very unfavorable views, respectively. A large percentage of respondents (28 percent) chose not to answer the question or said they did not know their views. This is typical with a sensitive survey question such as this one, in a context as insecure as Pakistan.

So overall levels of support for the TTP are low, and the majority of respondents report having unfavorable views. The non-responses could reflect those who have unfavorable views but choose not to respond because of fear, or those who may simply not have an opinion on the Pakistani Taliban.

The first part of my analysis cross-tabulates attitudes toward the TTP with education and income respectively. I look at the distribution of attitudes for each education and income category (with very and somewhat favorable views lumped together as favorable; similarly for unfavorable attitudes).

Figure 1. Pakistani views on the Pakistani Taliban, by education level, 2013

Figure 1 shows that an increasing percentage of respondents report unfavorable views of the Taliban as education levels rise; and there is a decreasing percentage of non-responses at higher education levels (suggesting that more educated people have more confidence in their views, stronger views, or less fear). However, the percentage of respondents with favorable views of the Taliban, hovering between 10-20 percent, is not that different across education levels, and does not vary monotonically with education. 

Figure 2. Pakistani views on the Pakistani Taliban, by income level, 2013

Figure 2 shows views on the Pakistani Taliban by income level. While the percentage of non-responses is highest for the lowest income category, the percentages responding favorably and unfavorably do not change monotonically with income. We see broadly similar distributions of attitudes across the four income levels.

But these cross-tabulations do not account for other factors that may affect attitudes: age, gender, and geographical location. Regressions (not shown here) accounting for these factors in addition to income and education show interesting results: relative to no education, higher education levels are associated with less favorable opinions of the Pakistani Taliban; these results are strongest for those with some university education, which is heartening. This confirms findings from focus groups I conducted with university students in Pakistan in May 2015. Students at public universities engaged in wide ranging political and social debates with each other on Pakistan and its identity, quoted Rousseau and Chomsky, and had more nuanced views on terrorism and the rest of the world relative to high school students I interviewed. This must at least partly be a result of the superior curriculum and variety of materials to which they are exposed at the college level.

My regressions also show that older people have more unfavorable opinions toward the Taliban, relative to younger people; this is concerning and is consistent with the trend toward rising extremist views in Pakistan’s younger population. The problems in Pakistan’s curriculum that began in the 1980s are likely to be at least partly responsible for this trend. Urban respondents seem to have more favorable opinions toward the Taliban than rural respondents; respondents from Punjab and Baluchistan have more favorable opinions toward the Taliban relative to those from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which as a province has had a closer and more direct experience with terror. The regression shows no relationship of income with attitudes, as was suggested by Figure 2.

Overall, the Pew 2013 data show evidence of a positive relationship between more education and lack of support for the Taliban, suggesting that the persisting but increasingly discredited conventional wisdom on these issues may hold some truth after all. These results should be complemented with additional years of data. That is what I will work on next.