The second wave of Arab uprisings that started in Sudan in December last year and extended to Algeria, Lebanon and Iraq this year have built on past experiences of political transitions during the Arab Spring, both its mistakes and achievements. Protesters from this new wave have already learned five lessons from previous transitions.

The first lesson is that toppling the head of a regime does not mean that the political regime has fallen.  In Tahrir Square on 11 February 2011, Egyptian protesters celebrated the decision of Hosni Mubarak to step down and left the square, thinking his resignation was enough to allow a democratic transition to take place. In contrast, in Sudan and Algeria, protesters continued to demonstrate after the resignation of Abdelaziz Bouteflika and the military-led ousting of Omar al-Bashir.

Protesters understood the lesson that the regime is found not only in the head of the state, but rather in the rules that govern the political sphere. By extension, political change requires changing the rules, not just the names of those in charge of implementing them.

The second lesson is that resorting to violence is the fastest way to end any hope for democratic change. Protesters who decided to take up arms offered their regimes the chance to reframe the political uprisings as civil war, as was the case in Syria. Even when armed groups manage to bring down the regime, their presence endangers the transitional phase afterwards, as is the case in Libya.

Although protesters in Sudan and Iraq have been faced with government violence and repression, they have insisted on their non-violent approach. In Sudan, the protesters responded to the massacre outside of the General Command of the Armed Forces on 3 June by organizing a mass demonstration on 30 June, which put pressure on the military to resume talks with the revolutionary forces.

The third lesson is that once the old regime has fallen, the transition period must be a collective decision-making process in which the opposition has, at least, veto power. The example of Tunisia after 2011 is a case in point. The Higher Authority for Realization of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition, which formulated the planned course of the transition, included representatives from across the political spectrum and civil society.

Although the military forces in Algeria and Sudan will not cease to play a political role any time soon, this does not have to mean exerting complete control over the transitional period. Sudan could offer a positive example in this regard, if it succeeds in implementing a power-sharing deal according to which a joint civilian-military sovereign council will govern Sudan during the transitional period.

The fourth lesson is that political transitions should achieve agreement on the rules of the game before proceeding to elections. In Egypt after 2011, rushed elections served to divide the political opposition and dramatically increase polarization in society. In this second wave, protesters have perceived elections as a trap which enable old regimes to reproduce themselves with new names.

In both Algeria and Sudan, protesters have resisted attempts by the military to hold elections as soon as possible. In Sudan, the agreement between the revolutionary forces and the military council postponed the elections until after the end of a three-year transitional period of technocratic rule. In Algeria, protesters are taking to the streets every Friday to demonstrate against the authorities’ decision to hold presidential elections in December.

The fifth and final lesson is that the call for change in the region goes beyond electoral democracy and extends to deep socioeconomic reforms. Iraq and Lebanon show this clearly: relatively free and fair elections have already been held but have served only to reinforce corrupt sectarian regimes.

According to the fifth wave of the Arab Barometer, the economic situation and corruption are perceived as the main challenge for Algerians (62.2%), Sudanese (67.8%), Lebanese (57.9%), and Iraqis (50.2%), while democracy is perceived as the main challenge for only 2.3%, 3.9%, 5% and 1.4% respectively.  The experience of the Arab Spring has shown people that democratic measures are only a means to an end.

Unlike in 2011, when the Arab Spring revolts enjoyed broad international support, this second wave is taking place in a hostile environment, with stronger Russian and Iranian presences in the region and an indifferent international climate. But where protesters have the advantage is in experience, and across the region they are clearly adapting their tactics to lessons learned from the early part of the decade.

There has been a stark contrast between messaging coming from the international community and trends on the ground as Libya’s latest bout of civil war enters its eighth month.

Led by Germany, some states have been trying to build consensus for a ceasefire ahead of a summit that is expected to be held in Berlin in the next few months. Today marks the date of one of the final planning meetings for the summit.

The increasing use of drone technology, airstrikes and further influxes of fighters trend points in the opposite direction. Warring groups in Libya continue to receive support from external states, undermining international efforts to de-escalate the conflict. A UN arms embargo goes largely unenforced. As the Berlin process unfolds, there is little evidence to suggest that these external states will shift their positions.

The launch of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) offensive on Tripoli in April sunk a UN-planned ‘national conference’, intended to be held less than two weeks later, to negotiate a framework for transition out of Libya’s governance crisis. Yet, Haftar has so far failed in his objective of capturing Tripoli. While his offensive continues, had he the capacity to capture the city, he would have done so already.

This has created a conundrum for peace talks: there appears to be little chance of negotiating a deal with Haftar, while it is also hard to see how a deal could be reached without him.

The field marshal has little interest in accepting a withdrawal, even a partial one, of his forces. His opponents – who have found unity in their shared efforts to defeat Haftar’s forces – will not accept a ceasefire that leaves the LAAF on the hinterlands of the capital. Similarly, a deal apparently agreed in Abu Dhabi between Haftar and Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj in February is also dead in the water.

Amid this logjam, there has been an increasing interest in the economic content of the Berlin summit. Countries supportive of Haftar argue that his alliance has legitimate concerns over the management of Libya’s economy and, particularly, the dominant role of the Tripoli-based central bank and its governor in supporting armed groups.

For some within these countries, changing the leadership of the central bank and a finding means of limiting the dominance of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) over the state’s resources – thus reducing flows of funding to armed groups fighting Haftar – could present a point of agreement in Berlin.

But their focus on financial management in Tripoli is not mirrored by interest in holding the rival central bank in the eastern city of Bayda – an institution unrecognized by the international community – to account for its pursuit of its own monetary policy. This is built on approximately $23 billion of unsecured debt from commercial banks and $11 billion of currency supplied by Russia.

Indeed, very few of the conversations surrounding parameters for Berlin contain details of what would be asked of eastern-based actors beyond pursuit of an audit of the Tripoli and Bayda central banks (only the Tripoli bank is recognized by the international community).

Clearly, the GNA and its allies would have no incentive to accept provisions that limit their means to mobilize resources for the war while its opponents do not receive the same scrutiny. 

However, it is possible to capitalize on the broad interest in economic content to reach some points of agreement over the management of the economy and state institutions. Rather than seeking to replace individuals aligned with one faction for those aligned with another, or expecting asymmetrical concessions from the GNA and its allies, this effort must instead focus on structures and processes that exacerbate the conflict and represent major grievances for the warring parties.

Importantly, this would include the establishment of a system of transparency and accountability for the management of Libya’s finances.  The opacity of current processes enables the support of patronage-based networks with no effective oversight.

Linked to this, the development of effective processes for budgeting and allocating funds could help to reduce graft.

And, finally, rationalizing the role of state institutions to agree their roles and responsibilities, creating the room for reforms to Libya’s system of state employment and subsidies through provision of direct payments to Libyan citizens, is essential.  

An economic commission that comprises members from across political and institutional divides – receiving political support from international powers and technical support from international financial institutions – could be an effective approach. Such a commission could match an inclusive, Libyan-led process with international support to progressively harmonize economic and financial policy between rival authorities and develop consensus for a process of institutional reunification in Libya.

This would constitute a major element of an eventual political settlement and reduce the risk of a limited set of actors capturing the system at the expense of the others – an outcome which would likely result in future bouts of violence.

Such a commission would offer a means of addressing a key driver of the conflict by decentralizing aspects of Libya’s governance, moving away from the dominance of Tripoli and the current winner-take-all system. 

These issues cannot be put to one side, to follow progress on the security front. The remarkable resilience that Libya’s economy has shown over the last seven months should not be taken for granted. It has become increasingly difficult for Libya’s institutions to insulate themselves from the conflict as both sides seek to mobilize resources to sustain their war effort.

The LAAF is increasingly looking to sideline civilian authorities in eastern Libya. On the other side, the GNA has found means of routing funds to armed groups fighting Haftar.

In September, a dispute over the supply of jet fuel between the LAAF and the National Oil Corporation resulted in the establishment of a parallel Brega Petroleum Marketing Company, the state-owned company that possesses a monopoly over fuel distribution.

Meanwhile, other major problems lurk under the surface.  The banking sector is in an increasingly perilous state and debts continue to mount all around, with those in the east not accounted for by Tripoli’s official authorities.  

Through the establishment of an economic commission, the Berlin process provides an opportunity and – most importantly – a mechanism to address these problems while also helping to maintain the basic functionality of the state.  Even if a ceasefire deal does not materialize, initiating negotiations about the future shape of the state and its economy would be a significant step forward.

Over recent weeks, widespread popular protests have engulfed Iraq and Lebanon. What began as calls for reform in the context of high unemployment and endemic corruption have evolved into direct challenges to the existing political order in both countries. How have the ruling elites responded to the popular uprisings? What do these developments mean for the future of the two countries and the region more broadly?

Dr Lina Khatib and Dr Renad Mansour will discuss what is at stake for protesters and what are the obstacles to meaningful and sustainable reform in Iraq and Lebanon.

Please note this webinar is for Middle East and North Africa Programme supporters only and will be taking place online.

An unexpected bounty for Iran

Sanam Vakil

The assassination of Qassem Soleimani has been an unexpected bounty for the Islamic Republic at a time when Iran was balancing multiple economic, domestic and regional pressures stemming from the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.

Coming on the heels of anti-Iranian demonstrations in Iraq and Lebanon, and following Iran’s own November 2019 protests that resulted in a brutal government crackdown against its own people, the Soleimani killing has helped the Iranian government shift the narrative away from its perceived regional and domestic weaknesses to one of strength.  

The massive funeral scenes in multiple Iranian cities displaying unending waves of mourners chanting against the United States has provided the Islamic Republic with a unique opportunity to showcase its mobilizing potential. This potential is not limited to Iran but also extends to Iraq and Lebanon, where Tehran’s transnational summoning power has also been visible. The Iraqi parliamentary vote to end the American military presence is one early negative consequence. While the region awaits Iran’s response, further anti-American rallying cries will continue to reverberate.  

Domestically, Soleimani’s death and President Donald Trump’s continued provocations on Twitter, including threats to attack 52 Iranian cultural sites, are being used as a nationalist rallying cry. This sentiment should not be seen solely as Islamic or ideological, but rather an opportunity for the state to pivot to an Iranian-based nationalism that is more inclusive and empowering for much of the country’s disgruntled youth.

Iran’s notoriously divided political factions have also unified in the face of this crisis. With parliamentary elections looming in February and turnout previously expected to be low, the political establishment is likely to use this crisis to mobilize voters in favour of conservative candidates.  

How Tehran chooses to respond to Qassem Soleimani’s death will very much determine its ability to continue to control the narrative and manage its swell of domestic and regional support. For these benefits to continue to manifest, it is important for Tehran to balance the mix of public sympathy and international anxiety and not overplay its hand in its quest for revenge.

A reset for Iraqi politics

Renad Mansour

The US strike which killed Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis has grave implications for Iraq. The act jeopardizes Iraq’s recently stabilized security situation, and threatens to reshape the country’s political environment, moving backwards to the days of anti-Americanism and sect-based mobilization. If Baghdad loses relations with the US and other diplomatic representations, it risks turning into a pariah state. 

Over the past few years, and notably since October 2019, young Iraqis have taken to the streets demanding reform and the downfall of the political establishment, and its main external backer Iran. The political establishment, including political parties and militias close to Tehran, failed to appease or suppress these protests. Now, these political elites are using the deaths of Muhandis and Soleimani to (re)gain popularity from their own population, by drawing on the old tool of anti-Americanism. 

Following the attacks, Shia populist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr – who until recently had called for an end to Iranian and pro-Iranian militia influence in Iraq – has called to revamp the Mehdi Army that he led until 2008 and is calling for ‘Islamic resistance’ to the US. In seeking to regain control of his former movement, he is coming closer to former Shia foes.

For years, pro-Iranian groups attempted to push the US out of Iraq. Their calls often fell on deaf ears, as public opinion in Iraq did not consider the US as a threat and some even supported the US and international effort against ISIS. Following the attacks, however, anti-American voices have gained more ammunition.

A complete American withdrawal would not only have direct security implications but force other countries and organizations, from European states to NATO, to reconsider their positions and role.

Limited options for ‘revenge’ in the Levant

Lina Khatib

Iran’s use of Lebanon and Syria as spaces for revenge against the US is unlikely.

On Sunday, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah vowed revenge for Soleimani’s death by singling out American soldiers as a target. However, Hezbollah’s options are limited. Lebanon is in the middle of wide-ranging protests against the country’s ruling political class, of which Nasrallah is a key figure.

Unlike in 2006, when Hezbollah’s military actions against Israel rallied the public around it, today there is no public appetite for dragging Lebanon into a war. Were Hezbollah to instigate one, it would incur public anger, if only for the economic repercussions that would exacerbate an already severe financial crisis in Lebanon. Lebanon also does not have any US military bases that could be a target for Hezbollah.

In theory, Hezbollah or other Iranian-backed groups could attack American bases in Syria. But these bases are staffed by multinational forces from the international anti-ISIS coalition. Attacking them would therefore put Iran in confrontation with other countries besides the US, which is not in Iran’s interest.

Attacking US soldiers in northeast Syria would also go against Kurdish interests because it would weaken the anti-ISIS coalition front of which Kurdish forces are part. It would, furthermore, anger Arab tribes in the area, opening up possibilities for ISIS to take advantage of public dissent to stage a comeback. Iran would then find itself fighting on several fronts at once, which it does not have the capacity to handle. 

More likely, Iran’s allies and proxies in the Levant are going to engage in strong rhetoric without taking hasty actions. When a key Hezbollah leader, Imad Mughniyeh, was assassinated in Damascus on 2008, there were strong words and public vows to seek revenge for his killing, but ultimately there was no response.    

Following the US strike on Qassem Solaimani and Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis, populist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has violently cracked down on youth-led protests in Iraq.

His paramilitaries and ‘blue hats’ –  supposedly created to protect protestors from state and allied parastatal security forces – sought to end the months-long demonstrations by attacking the places where protesters have camped since October. In Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, they successfully captured the famous Turkish restaurant which had become a symbol of Iraq’s ‘October revolution’. 

Once the champion of Iraq’s protest movement, Sadr has seemingly changed course and now leads the counter-protests. This reversal has mystified many, from Iraqis who saw Sadr as an ally in their struggle for reform against an impenetrable elite to foreign diplomats who hoped Sadr could help pushback against Iranian influence in Iraq. 

Yet this is not the first time that Sadr has drastically redefined his position. Since 2003, he has gone from Shia sectarian militia leader to pro-democracy reformist and Iraqi nationalist.

And in the past few months, he has given mixed signals, both supporting and criticising the protesters. The most recent incidents of Sadrist violence targeting demonstrators provoked a societal backlash, prompting Sadr to change tack once more and announce that he would disband the blue hats and investigate their crimes against protesters.

Sadr and the paramilitaries

Sadr’s latest change of course may seem to flow directly from the US assassination of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and the ensuing vacuum in the Shia paramilitary sphere. Prior to this move, the Sadrists were on the defensive, outflanked and outgunned by the growing coercive and political power of a constellation of Shia armed groups coalescing under Muhandis’s de facto leadership. Many of these groups competed for Sadr’s base, including Qais al-Khazali’s Asa’ib ahl al-Haq and Akram al-Kaabi’s Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba.  

With Muhandis out of the picture, Sadr could reclaim the space by pushing his own right hand, Kadhem al-Issawi (Abu Do’a), to be the new centre of the paramilitary field and forcing competitors, including Khaza’li and Kaabi, to rally around his leadership.

Iran, in the short term, appears to be going along with this solution to bring more coherence to its allied forces in Iraq as it seeks to counter what it regards as US aggression. Iran also hopes that bringing Sadr back in will help neutralize the protest movement which threatens its stake in Iraqi politics. 

The most visible sign of this Iran-brokered rapprochement was the 13 January meeting in Qom attended by Sadr, Issawi and several senior militia commanders including Laith al-Khazali (Qais al-Khazali’s brother). 

Following the Qom meeting, a pattern of tit-for-tat violence and assassinations between the Sadrists’ Saraya al-Salam and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq – ongoing since the start of the October protests in Iraq – ceased.

A fragmented movement?

However, while the US strikes certainly changed Sadr’s political calculations, there are more persistent fundamentals at work that help explain his change of course. The first of these relates to long-standing fragmentation within the movement. This exists not only within Sadrist paramilitaries, but within the movement’s clerical networks, and also applies to the ties that bind the Sadrist leadership to its popular base. This fragmentation makes it difficult for Sadr to impose a coherent politics on his followers from the top down.

There are signs that Sadr’s recent shift in position has exacerbated this fragmentation. His attempt to reposition the movement’s base within the ‘resistance axis’ that supports the Shia militias in Iraq has only been partially successful. On 24 January, responding to the US assassinations, Sadr called for a million-man march focused on expelling US forces from Iraq. However, turnout was poor, especially given the huge logistical support for the march, and it lasted only a few hours.

Equally revealing, when Sadr called on his supporters to vacate the squares, many refused. One Sadrist protester in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square told the authors: ‘We’ve been camping with our brothers and sisters for four months. Why should we leave them to die?’

Meanwhile, fissures have also opened up within the Sadrists’ clerical elite. One senior Sadrist cleric, for example, is openly defying Sadr’s authority and siding with the revolutionaries in Nasiriyah. 

Sadr’s attempt to dominate the paramilitary sphere is also unlikely to prove any more successful than his many previous failed attempts since 2003. He is neither trusted nor respected by the leaders of other groups. The Iran-brokered rapprochement is already showing signs of weakness. Two recent assassinations of Saraya al-Salam leaders in Basra and Maysan indicate a potential renewal of power struggles between the Sadrist militia and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.  

Sadr is not a revolutionary

Sadr has never been a revolutionary, but someone who seeks to leverage a role as both ‘spoiler’ and ‘stabilizer’ to maximise his political leverage. This strategy is ultimately oriented towards sustaining Iraq’s extant political system, not its overthrow. Forced to choose between the roles of revolutionary or maintainer of the status quo, he has opted for the latter. 

The protests that erupted in 2019 were not the same movement that Sadr led from 2015. The 2015 protests were an elite-driven phenomenon, integrated into the political field and carefully calibrated to exert pressure on the elite towards gradual reform. 

By contrast, the 2019 demonstrations spring from a youth-led, bottom-up mobilization that rejects politicization and seeks a more radical form of change. Chatham House surveys in a forthcoming paper reveal that the protesters are younger that those who protested in 2015-16. Fewer have permanent employment. Instead of demanding better services or jobs, they are focusing wholesale transformation of the post-2003 political system.

A Sadrist official told the authors that their movement initially joined the protests in October 2019 expecting a similar reform-orientation to the protests which Sadr had previously led. However, according to him, the protesters failed to come forward with reasonable demands or alternative names for prime minister. He believed the protests would fade, and many would regret the ‘wasted time and blood’. 

Sadr’s relations with Iran

A final long-term factor at play is Sadr’s receding autonomy from Iran. Ever since his movement’s electoral victory in May 2018, Sadr came under enormous pressure to reconcile with the political wing of the Iranian-allied parastatal armed groups in the formation of a new government acceptable to Iran.

Over the last year, Sadr has moved even closer to Iran, spending more time in Qom. Iran has offered Sadr security from his paramilitary rivals (such as Asa’ib ahl al-Haq), convincing Sadr that he is safer in Iran than Iraq. Moreover, Sadr is undertaking religious training in Qom, and may see this as a chance to enhance his standing in the Shia religious field as many look towards a future beyond the elderly Najaf-based marja Ali al-Sistani.

By keeping Sadr in Qom, Iran appears to be trying to isolate him from what they regard as negative influences. As tensions between the Sadrists and other protest groups intensified, efforts were made by some protest leaders and allied political groups to reach Sadr in Qom and try to persuade him to change course or restrain the worst abuses of his forces. However, this delegation was unable to make contact with Sadr. Those involved told the authors they have resorted to communicating with local Sadrist leaders in Najaf, Babil, Basra and Baghdad. 

Crossing a line

This is a transformative moment for the Sadrists. Sadr is now defying the popular sentiments driving protests across central and southern Iraq. The sense of betrayal among former allies and friends of the Sadrists is palpable. One senior activist involved in cooperation with the Sadrists wrote that, no matter what moves Sadr makes next, the cleric has ‘terminated all partnership with the protesters,’ and ‘shattered the framework for cooperation’. A line has thus been crossed that Sadr cannot reverse; he will not be able to recover what he has now lost. 

Iran, also, does not see Sadr as a dependable ally, and will look to isolate and side-line the cleric when the opportunity arises. Thus, in seeking to exploit a crisis for short-term gain, Sadr may well have sealed his fate – in the long term – as a declining force in Iraqi politics.

Water is a critical issue for Iraq’s future stability and prosperity. Only a few decades ago, the country was one of the most fertile in the region, with two major rivers flowing through it. Today, national and transboundary pollution, mismanagement, and debilitating cycles of conflict have contributed to a situation where only half of current water needs are being met, and where an 80% reduction in the flow of water down the Tigris and Euphrates rivers has led to the loss of millions of acres of formerly productive land and the displacement of rural communities.

Water scarcity can be a driver of violence and conflict. Tribal conflicts over water sources have erupted sporadically in the south and the contamination of municipal water which led to the hospitalization of some 118,000 citizens was a trigger for the large-scale protests in Basra in late 2018. Without concerted action by national and local governments, companies and international agencies, the situation will only worsen as higher temperatures and reduced rainfall drive rural-to-urban migration and increase the risk of drought, food insecurity and water-related diseases.

At this roundtable, part of the Chatham House Iraq Initiative, experts will discuss the domestic, regional and international factors that continue to exacerbate the water crisis in Iraq, and propose solutions, including technical innovation, public sector capacity-building and greater international cooperation, that might contribute to effective state-building, build resilience to the effects of climate change and reduce the risk of further conflict.

Summary

• China’s presence in the Maghreb has increased in recent years, raising concerns among Western powers. China has focused on bilateral relations with these countries while also working within the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF). However, this engagement has limited strategic value compared to relations China has with Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates.
• Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China has shown greater interest in the Maghreb as an entry point to European and African markets. China has pursued commercial relations over political influence in the region. Morocco and Tunisia are still dependent on France, their former colonial power, and the European Union, which exert great political, economic, security and cultural influence over the two countries.
• The Maghreb countries’ economic relations with China have grown exponentially, with Algeria forming the closest relationship. However, Morocco and Tunisia are keen to attract China’s investment and involvement in major construction and infrastructure projects to boost industrial and economic development. While China’s investments in Morocco and Tunisia remain at a low level, trade relations with both countries have grown steadily. Politically, China’s policy of noninterference in domestic affairs appeals to Maghreb states, which resent Western interference.
• China’s influence in the Maghreb remains minimal. Its soft power push has struggled to promote advantages of strong relations with China beyond economics. Furthermore, Morocco and Tunisia’s populations have generally scant knowledge about China’s politics and culture. China has tried to address this lack of familiarity through the establishment of Confucius Institutes and other cultural activities. However, language and cultural barriers still impede the development of close relations, compared to those China has with other countries in Africa.

Since the overthrow of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya’s multitude of armed groups have followed a range of paths. While many of these have gradually demobilized, others have remained active, and others have expanded their influence. In the west and south of the country,  armed groups have used their state affiliation to co-opt the state and professionals from the state security apparatus into their ranks.

In the east, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces projects a nationalist narrative yet is ultimately subservient to its leader, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Prevailing policy narratives presuppose that the interests of armed actors are distinct from those of the communities they claim to represent. Given the degree to which most armed groups are embedded in local society, however, successful engagement will need to address the fears, grievances and desires of the surrounding communities, even while the development of armed groups’ capacities dilutes their accountability to those communities.

This roundtable will discuss the findings of a forthcoming Chatham House research paper, ‘The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014: Community Dynamics and Economic Interests’, which presents insights from over 200 interviews of armed actors and members of local communities and posits how international policymakers might seek to curtail the continued expansion of the conflict economy.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Russia’s Middle East policy is driven by a complex mixture of traditional factors (such as the ongoing confrontation with the West) and new trends. The Kremlin is keen to maintain its position as an influential external broker. However, it is not confident Russia would be able to respond effectively if forced into a reactive mode by other regional players. The Kremlin therefore seeks to retain initiative and shape the agenda according to its needs and resources. This makes prediction of Moscow’s next moves in the region a challenging, but not impossible, task.

Nikolay Kozhanov will offer remarks on the changes that have taken place in Russia’s strategy since the publication of his research paper Russian Policy Across the Middle East: Motivations and Methods (2018).

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Summary

• GCC states seek to be leaders in digital innovation, but this leaves them vulnerable to an increasing range of cyberthreats. Governments have invested significantly in cybersecurity but these measures have been unevenly implemented, makingit difficult for these states to be resilient against a large-scale cyber incident.
• Strategies, structures and processes (‘approaches’) for achieving cyber resilience can be conceptualized along a scale from centralized to distributed: centralized approaches maintain decision-making power in a single body, while distributed ones disperse power over many sites.
• Centralized approaches provide more resilience against unwanted influence, while distributed approaches provide more resilience against intrusions into infrastructure. The GCC states have so far prioritized centralized over distributed cyber resilience, seeking internet and social media control over sustainable network recovery.
• GCC governments should make a sustainable commitment to cyber resilience that provides clear guidance to organizations and makes best use of emerging cybersecurity structures. This may involve further engagement with international initiatives and partners to increase cyber resilience.
• Given limited resources, GCC governments should rebalance their efforts from centralized towards distributed approaches to resilience.
• GCC governments should examine the impact of relevant new technologies, discussing openly the risks of these technologies and appropriate solutions.

Summary

• Libya’s multitude of armed groups have followed a range of paths since the emergence of a national governance split in 2014. Many have gradually demobilized, others have remained active, and others have expanded their influence. However, the evolution of the Libyan security sector in this period remains relatively understudied. Prior to 2011, Libya’s internal sovereignty – including the monopoly on force and sole agency in international relations – had been personally vested in the figure of Muammar Gaddafi. After his death, these elements of sovereignty reverted to local communities, which created armed organizations to fill that central gap. National military and intelligence institutions that were intended to protect the Libyan state have remained weak, with their coherence undermined further by the post-2014 governance crisis and ongoing conflict. As a result, the most effective armed groups have remained localized in nature; the exception is the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), which has combined and amalgamated locally legitimate forces under a central command.
• In the west and south of the country, the result of these trends resembles a kind of inversion of security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR): the armed groups have used their state affiliation to co-opt the state and professionals from the state security apparatus into their ranks; and have continued to arm, mobilize and integrate themselves into the state’s security apparatus without becoming subservient to it. In the eastern region, the LAAF projects a nationalist narrative yet is ultimately subservient to its leader, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LAAF has co-opted social organizations to dominate political and economic decision-making.
• The LAAF has established a monopoly over the control of heavy weapons and the flow of arms in eastern Libya, and has built alliances with armed groups in the east. Armed groups in the south have been persuaded to join the LAAF’s newly established command structure. The LAAF’s offensive on the capital, which started in April 2019, represents a serious challenge to armed groups aligned with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). The fallout from the war will be a challenge to the GNA or any future government, as groups taking part in the war will expect to be rewarded. SSR is thus crucial in the short term: if the GNA offers financial and technical expertise and resources, plus legal cover, to armed groups under its leadership, it will increase the incentive for armed groups to be receptive to its plans for reform.
• Prevailing policy narratives presuppose that the interests of armed actors are distinct from those of the communities they claim to represent. Given the degree to which most armed groups are embedded in local society, however, successful engagement will necessarily rely on addressing the fears, grievances and desires of the surrounding communities. Yet the development of armed groups’ capacities, along with their increasing access to autonomous means of generating revenue, has steadily diluted their accountability to local communities. This process is likely to be accelerated by the ongoing violence around Tripoli.
• Communities’ relationship to armed groups varies across different areas of the country, reflecting the social, political, economic and security environment:
• Despite their clear preference for a more formal, state-controlled security sector, Tripoli’s residents broadly accept the need for    the presence of armed groups to provide security. The known engagement of the capital’s four main armed groups in criminal activity is a trade-off that many residents seem able to tolerate, providing that overt violence remains low. Nonetheless, there is a widespread view that the greed of Tripoli’s armed groups has played a role in stoking the current conflict.
• In the east, many residents appear to accept (or even welcome) the LAAF’s expansion beyond the security realm, provided that it undertakes these roles effectively. That said, such is the extent of LAAF control that opposition to the alliance comes at a high price.
• In the south, armed groups draw heavily on social legitimacy, acting as guardians of tribal zones of influence and defenders of their respective communities against outside threats, while also at times stoking local conflicts. Social protections continue to hold sway, meaning that accountability within communities is also limited.
• To varying extents since 2014, Libya’s armed groups have developed networks that enmesh political and business stakeholders in revenue-generation models:
• Armed groups in Tripoli have compensated for reduced financial receipts from state budgets by cultivating unofficial and illicit sources of income. They have also focused on infiltrating state institutions to ensure access to state budgets and contracts dispersed in the capital.
• In the east of the country, the LAAF has developed a long-term strategy to dominate the security, political and economic spheres through the establishment of a quasi-legal basis for receiving funds from Libya’s rival state authorities. It has supplemented this with extensive intervention in the private sector. External patronage supports military operations, but also helps to keep this financial system, based on unsecured debt, afloat.
• In the south, limited access to funds from the central state has spurred armed groups to become actively involved in the economy. This has translated into the taxation of movement and the imposition of protection fees, particularly on informal (and often illicit) activity.
• Without real commitment from international policymakers to enforcing the arms embargo and protecting the economy from being weaponized, Libya will be consigned to sustained conflict, further fragmentation and potential economic collapse. Given the likely absence of a political settlement in the short term, international policymakers should seek to curtail the continued expansion of the conflict economy by reducing armed groups’ engagement in economic life.
• In order to reduce illicit activities, international policymakers should develop their capacity to identify and target chokepoints along illicit supply chains, with a focus on restraining activities and actors in closest proximity to violence. Targeted sanctions against rent maximizers (both armed and unarmed) is likely to be the most effective strategy. More effective investigation and restraint of conflict economy actors will require systemic efforts to improve transparency and enhance the institutional capacity of anti-corruption authorities. International policymakers should also support the development of tailored alternative livelihoods that render conflict economy activities less attractive.

The event will be livestreamed on the MENA Programme Facebook page.

Climate and environmental issues have largely been marginalized in discussions about the Middle East and North Africa region and yet are critical to peace and security. In this webinar, experts will explore mounting pressures including those related to water (reduced, less reliable and more polluted sources), extreme temperatures, air pollution, land degradation and sea-level rise. Panelists will discuss the potential impact of worsening environmental conditions and what the region's governments can do to protect the health and livelihoods of their peoples.

This webinar is part of the Chatham House MENA Programme's Online Event Series and will be held on the record.

In Morocco, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased public trust in government, but people still have doubts about the effectiveness of the healthcare system. According to a recent study conducted by the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis (MIPA), the majority of Moroccans surveyed are generally satisfied with the measures taken by the government to battle the coronavirus. However, the same survey also shows that Moroccans do not have confidence in the healthcare sector’s ability to respond to this pandemic.

The positive perceptions of the government’s response can be explained by the swift and strict measures enacted. King Mohammed VI held a high-level meeting with the prime minister, the minister of health, and top security officials on 17 March and a few days later, on 20 March, the Moroccan government declared a state of health emergency and began to implement aggressive measures to contain the virus.

This has included closing airports, schools, mosques, cafés and shops – with the exception of food markets – preventing large gatherings, as well as strict guidelines to ensure social distancing. As of 2 April, nearly 5000 people have been arrested for violating the state of health emergency.

In order to address urgent medical needs and to mitigate the economic impact of the pandemic, the King ordered the creation of an emergency fund, raising more than 32.7 billion Moroccan Dirhams ($3.2 billion). The Ministry of Finance will begin to make cash transfers to vulnerable citizens, and especially those who have lost their jobs. However, the stipulations surrounding these cash transfers will be decided in the coming weeks.

Updates about the virus are communicated daily by the Ministry of Health, despite growing criticism of its communication strategy. As of 4 April, Moroccan authorities have confirmed 883 cases and 58 deaths.

Call for national unity

In times like these, there is a call for unity in the face of a national and global crisis, and opposition groups such as Adl wal Ihssan and Rif activists have expressed their support for government measures and have encouraged people to follow the new guidelines and restrictions. However, despite calls to release political prisoners, Moroccan authorities have not indicated that they will do so. This is a missed opportunity vis-à-vis the opposition because it could have served as a way to further strengthen national unity during the crisis.

These are all promising signs and point to what is likely to be a short-term burst in unity and institutional trust. However, the institutional weaknesses in governance and the healthcare system have not disappeared, which is why this increase in institutional trust should be taken with a grain of salt.

Public trust issues

This pandemic poses tremendous challenges for governments across the globe, and this holds especially true for states in the Middle East and North Africa region, where citizens do not approve of government performance and do not trust key state institutions. The 2019 Arab Barometer survey found that Moroccans do not trust most of the country’s political institutions (notably the parliament and the Council of Ministers) and the level of satisfaction with the government’s performance remains extremely low.

On the public health front, as shown in two of MIPA’s recent surveys, trust in the healthcare system is also very low. Around three-quarters of those surveyed do not trust Moroccan hospitals, highlighting the acute structural problems in the healthcare system. In fact, there is a stark divide between private and public healthcare, as well as a huge gap in access to healthcare facilities between urban and rural areas. Most of the country’s hospitals and doctors are located in major urban areas and the only three laboratories with capabilities for COVID-19 testing are located in Rabat and Casablanca, but even there, testing capacity is very limited.

Similar to other countries, there could be a major shortage of doctors and medical equipment throughout Morocco. So far, the Ministry of Finance has said that 2 billion dirhams of the emergency fund will go towards purchasing medical equipment such as beds, ventilators, tests, prevention kits and radiology equipment, but the timeline remains unclear.

A vulnerable economy

There is significant concern about the medium- and long-term economic impact of the virus. Two of the country’s key economic sectors have already been hit hard: agriculture and tourism. The agricultural sector was already struggling due to the impact of drought, while the coronavirus pandemic is likely to impact Morocco’s tourism industry not just this year, but well into 2021. In terms of government response, the emergency fund is a strong start, but questions surrounding the management of these funds have already been raised.

The most vulnerable parts of the population have been affected by the economic crisis because of the country’s bulging informal sector – in which most people work - and a very weak private sector. In fact, two-thirds of the workforce are not covered by a pension plan, almost half of the working population does not currently benefit from medical coverage and there is no social care system for vulnerable parts of the population. As of 1 April, more than 700,000 workers have lost their jobs.

Moving forward?

Even if public perceptions of the government’s response are positive at the moment, this is most likely a short-term surge that should not be taken for granted. Despite the efforts made by the government, Morocco’s health system is not equipped to handle this crisis. Even with the new measures that have been implemented, if the spread of the virus gets out of control, more funds, more doctors, and more equipment will be needed. Given the structural weaknesses of the healthcare system, this will be an uphill battle.

Moreover, even if the government manages to mitigate the public health impact, the economic consequences will be dire—especially in the tourism industry—and will severely hurt those workers in the informal sector who are living without a safety net. In Morocco, this category represents most of the working population.

This crisis highlights that the Moroccan government must urgently tackle its large portfolio of unfinished reforms, notably in healthcare, the economy, and labour rights. So far, the government is capitalizing on the spirit of unity, social solidarity and public support. The future trajectory of the pandemic and the effectiveness of governance will determine if this spirit of solidarity will last. If the government fails to effectively mitigate the public health and economic impacts of this pandemic, this solidarity and cooperation will not last long.

Iraq is a country already in turmoil, suffering fallout from the major military escalation between the US and Iran, mass protests calling for an end to the post-2003 political system, and a violent government crackdown killing more than 600 and wounding almost 30,000 - all presided over by a fragmented political elite unable to agree upon a new prime minister following Adil abd al-Mehdi’s resignation back in November.

COVID-19 introduces yet another threat to the fragile political order, as the virus exposes Iraq’s ineffective public health system dismantled through decades of conflict, corruption and poor governance.

Iraqi doctors are making every effort to prepare for the worst-case scenario, but they do so with huge structural challenges. The Ministry of Health lacks enough ICU beds, human resources, ventilators, and personal protective equipment (PPE). Bogged down in bureaucracy, the ministry is struggling to process procurements of equipment and medications, and some doctors have made purchases themselves.

But individual efforts can only go so far as many Iraqi doctors are concerned the official numbers of confirmed COVID-19 cases do not reflect the complexity of the situation on the ground.

The ministry relies predominately upon patients self-presenting at designated public hospitals and has only just begun community-based testing in areas of suspected clusters. Reliance on self-presentation requires a level of trust between citizens and state institutions, which is at a historic low. This gap in trust – 17 years in the making – puts Iraq’s COVID-19 response particularly at risk.

Iraq’s myriad vulnerabilities

Certain social and political factors leave Iraq uniquely exposed to the coronavirus. The country’s vulnerability is tied directly to its social, religious and economic interconnections with Iran, an epicenter of the pandemic.

Exchanges between Iran and Iraq are concentrated in two regions, with strong cross-border links between Iraqi and Iranian Kurds in the north-east, and Iraqi and Iranian Shia pilgrims in the south. Cross-border circulation of religious pilgrims is particularly concerning, as they can result in mass ritual gatherings.

The high number of confirmed cases in the southern and northern peripheries of the country puts a spotlight on Iraq's failure in managing healthcare. The post-2003 government has failed to either rebuild a robust centralized healthcare system, or to pave the way for a federalized model.

Caught in an ambiguous middle between a centralized and federalized model, coordination across provinces and hospitals during the coronavirus crisis has neither reflected strong management from Baghdad nor robust ownership at the governorate level.

This problem is part of a wider challenge of managing centre-periphery relations and federalism, which since 2003 has not worked effectively. Baghdad has provided all 18 provinces with instructions on testing and treatment, but only a handful have enough resources to put them into practice. Advanced testing capacity is limited to the five provinces with WHO-approved centers, with the remaining 13 sending swabs to Baghdad.

But the greatest challenge to Iraq’s COVID-19 response is the dramatic deterioration of state-society relations. Studies reveal a profound societal distrust of Iraq’s public healthcare institutions, due to corruption and militarization of medical institutions. Numerous videos have recently circulated of families refusing to turn over sick members - particularly women - to medical teams visiting households with confirmed or suspected cases.

As medical anthropologist Omar Dewachi notes, the ‘moral economy of quarantine’ in Iraq is heavily shaped by a history of war and its impact on the relationship between people and the state. Although local and international media often interpret this reluctance to undergo quarantine as a matter of social or tribal norms, distrusting the state leads many families to refuse quarantine because they believe it resembles a form of arrest.

The management of coronavirus relies upon an overt convergence between medical institutions and security forces as the federal police collaborate with the Ministry of Health to impose curfews and enforce quarantine. This means that, troublingly, the same security establishment which violently cracked down on protesters and civil society activists is now the teeth behind Iraq’s COVID-19 response.

Without trust between society and the political class, civil society organizations and protest movements have directed their organizational structure towards awareness-raising across Iraq. Key religious authorities such as Grand Ayatollah Sistani have called for compliance to the curfew and mobilized charitable institutions.

However, such efforts will not be enough to make up for the lack of governance at the level of the state. In the short-term, Iraq’s medical professionals and institutions are in dire need of technical and financial support. In the long-term, COVID-19 is a lesson that Iraq’s once robust public healthcare system needs serious investment and reform.

COVID-19 may prove to be another catalyst challenging the ‘muddle through’ logic of the Iraqi political elite. International actors have largely been complicit in this logic, directing aid and technical support towards security forces and political allies in the interest of short-term stability, and neglecting institutions which Iraqis rely on for health, education, and well-being.

The response to the crisis requires cooperation and buy-in of a population neglected by 17 years of failed governance. This is a seminal event that may push the country to the brink, exposing and stirring underlying tensions in state-society relations.

This analysis was produced as part of the Iraq Initiative.

Historically, Iraq lay claim to one of the most abundant water supplies in the Middle East. But the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers has reduced by up to 40% since the 1970s, due in part to the actions of neighbouring countries, in particular Turkey, upstream.

Rising temperatures and reduced rainfall due to climate change are also negatively impacting Iraq’s water reserves. Evaporation from dams and reservoirs is estimated to lose the country up to 8 billion cubic metres of water every year.

A threat to peace and stability

Shortages have dried up previously fertile land, increasing poverty in agricultural areas. Shortages have also served to fuel conflict: communities faced with successive droughts and government inertia proved to be easy targets for ISIS recruiters, who lured farmers into joining them by offering money and food to feed their families. Economic hardship for those whose livelihoods relied upon river water has also driven rural to urban migration, putting significant strain on already over-populated towns and cities, exacerbating housing, job and electricity shortages, and widening the gap between haves and have-nots.

But scarcity isn’t the most crucial element of Iraq’s water crisis – contamination is. Decades of local government mismanagement, corrupt practices and a lack of regulation of dumping (it is estimated up to 70% of Iraq’s industrial waste is dumped directly into water) has left approximately three in every five citizens without a reliable source of potable water.

In 2018, 118,000 residents of Basra province were hospitalised with symptoms brought on by drinking contaminated water, which not only put a spotlight on the inadequacies of a crumbling healthcare system but sparked mass protests and a subsequent violent crackdown.

The water crisis is also undermining the stability of the country’s federal governance model, by occasionally sparking disputes between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well as between governorates in the south.

The crisis is both a symptom and a cause of poor governance. Iraq is stuck in a cycle whereby government inaction causes shortages and contamination, which result in economic losses, reduced food supply, increased prices and widespread poor health. This in turn leads to increasing levels of poverty, higher demand on services and civil unrest, increasing the pressure on a weak, dysfunctional system of government.

What can be done?

The first priority should be modernising existing water-management infrastructure - a relic of a time when the problem was an excess rather than a shortage of water (the last time Iraq’s flood defences were required was 1968). Bureaucratic hurdles, widespread corruption and an endless cycle of other crises taking precedent prevent good initiatives from being implemented or scaled up.

Diversifying energy sources to improve provision is crucial. Baghdad has a sewage treatment plant that originally ran on its own electricity source, but this capacity was destroyed in 1991 and was never replaced. The city continues to suffer from dangerous levels of water pollution because the electricity supply from the grid is insufficient to power the plant. Solar energy has great potential in sun-drenched Iraq to bridge the gaping hole in energy provision, but successive governments have chosen to focus on fossil fuels rather than promoting investment to grow the renewables sector.

Heightened tension with upstream Turkey could turn water into another cause of regional conflict. But, if approached differently, collaboration between Iraq and its neighbour could foster regional harmony.

Turkey’s elevated geography and cooler climate mean its water reserves suffer 75% less evaporation than Iraq’s. Given that Turkey’s top energy priority is the diversification of its supply of imported hydrocarbons, a win-win deal could see Turkey exchange access to its water-management infrastructure for delivery of reduced cost energy supplies from Iraq.

German-French cooperation on coal and steel in the 1950s and the evolution of economic integration that followed might provide a model for how bilateral cooperation over one issue could result in cooperation with other regional players (in this case Iran and Syria) on a range of other issues. This kind of model would need to consider the future of energy, whereby oil and gas would be replaced by solar-power exports.

These solutions have been open to policymakers for years and yet they have taken little tangible action. While there are leaders and bureaucrats with the will to act, effective action is invariably blocked by a complex and opaque political system replete with vested interests in maintaining power and wealth via a weak state and limited services from central government.

Breaking the cycle

To break this cycle, Iraq needs a group of professional and able actors outside of government to work with willing elements of the state bureaucracy as a taskforce to pressure for action and accountability. Publishing the recommendations from a hitherto withheld report produced in the aftermath of Basra’s 2018 heath crisis would be a great start.

In time, this taskforce could champion the prioritisation of water on the national agenda, the implementation of infrastructure upgrades, and hold more productive conversations with neighbour states.

With such a high degree of state fragmentation and dysfunction in Iraq, looking to the central government to provide leadership will not yield results. Engagement with a coalition of non-state actors can begin to address the water crisis and also open a dialogue around new models of governance for other critical issues. This might even be a starting point for rewriting the tattered social contract in Iraq.

This piece is based on insights and discussion at a roundtable event, Conflict and the Water Crisis in Iraq, held at Chatham House on March 9 as part of the Iraq Initiative.

Summary

• Following the territorial defeat of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in northeastern Syria, the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in the region is now grappling with the task of quickly dealing with thousands of the group’s detained members while bringing justice to their victims. To that end, local authorities are focusing on the use of counterterrorism laws and courts to charge captured ISIS members and determine their guilt accordingly.
• The piecemeal approach to justice is deeply flawed, and raises particular concerns about due process. No precise instruments exist to determine the personal responsibility of ISIS individuals for specific crimes, or for their role in war crimes committed by the group. In any event, the scale of the crimes and the number of victims – as well as severe shortages of resources and workers – make dispensation of justice extremely difficult through the traditional legal system.
• Not all detained ISIS members receive prison sentences. Individuals who did not hold senior roles in the group’s apparatus and are not accused of ‘major’ crimes (in practice, largely defined as fighting for ISIS and murder) are being released under limited reconciliation deals with tribal leaders. But the involvement of local community leaders in those efforts is not enough to ensure positive results. Many victims are upset at seeing ISIS members walk free without even admitting their guilt publicly or apologizing for the pain they caused.
• To overcome the limitations of the current, counterterrorism-focused framework, a ‘transitional justice’ approach could provide judicial and non-judicial instruments to establish accountability for ISIS crimes and reduce community resistance to the reintegration of group members. A combination of non-judicial mechanisms such as truth commissions, missing persons’ committees, and reparations and victim-healing programmes could play a vital role in providing ISIS victims with a sense of justice while contributing to peacebuilding and stability.
• Ignoring the urgency of developing a long-term plan to serve justice and contribute to community healing will almost certainly allow ISIS to continue to prevent the recovery and development of northeastern Syria. This, in turn, risks undermining the stability of the country and the region at large.

In August 2012, when the UN released its report Gaza in 2020: A liveable place?, they could not have imagined what the world would look like in 2020: cities under lockdown, restrictions on movement, border closures, widespread unemployment, economic collapse, fear and anxiety and, above all, uncertainty about what the future holds.

For Gaza’s population of 2 million people this reality is nothing new. The conditions that the rest of the world are currently experiencing as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic is similar to the tight blockade Gaza has been living under ever since Hamas took over in 2007. Israel has imposed severe restrictions on the movement of people and goods, youth unemployment has reached 60 per cent, and over 80 per cent of Gaza’s population are now dependent on international aid.

The people of Gaza are having to face the COVID-19 crisis already at a disadvantage, with poor infrastructure, limited resources and a shortage of the most basic services, such as water and power supply. It also has a fragile health system, with hospitals lacking essential medical supplies and equipment, as well as the capacity to deal with the outbreak as there are only 84 ICU beds and ventilators available.

Meanwhile, intra-Palestinian divisions have persisted and were evident in the initial reaction to the pandemic. When President Mahmoud Abbas announced a state of emergency, it took two days for the Hamas-led government in Gaza to follow suit and shut down schools and universities. They later made a separate emergency appeal to address the crisis and prepare for a COVID-19 response in Gaza. This lack of coordination is typical of the way the Palestinian Authority and Hamas approach crisis situations.

After the initial uncoordinated response, Hamas, as the de-facto ruler of Gaza, has asserted its ability to control Gaza’s borders by putting in place quarantine measures for everyone who enters the strip, whether through the Erez checkpoint with Israel or the Rafah border with Egypt. They have also assigned 21 hospitals, hotels, and schools as compulsory quarantine centres for all arrivals from abroad, who have to stay in quarantine for 21 days. In comparison, there are 20 quarantine centres in the West Bank.  These strict measures have prevented the spread of the virus in the community and confined it to the quarantine centres, with only 20 confirmed cases of COVID-19 as of 6 May. Gaza’s de-facto authorities have also been able to monitor markets and prices to ensure the availability of essential goods.

Faced with a major crisis, Al-Qassam Brigades – the armed wing of Hamas – have tried to play the role of a national army by participating in efforts to fight the pandemic. They have relatively good logistical capacity and have contributed to the construction of two quarantine facilities with a total capacity of 1,000 units to prepare for more arrivals into Gaza. At the local level, municipalities have been disinfecting public spaces and facilities in addition to disseminating information about the virus and related preventative and protective measures. Other precautionary measures put in place include closing the weekly open markets, and restricting social gatherings like weddings and funerals.

Despite COVID-19, it’s business as usual when it comes to international dealings with Gaza. The key parties in the conflict – Israel, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority – along with the main external actors – Egypt, the United Nations and Qatar – have continued to stick to their policies aimed at keeping the security situation under control and preventing further escalation. Although Israel has allowed entry of pharmaceutical supplies and medical equipment into Gaza during the pandemic, it has kept its restrictions on the movement of goods and people in place, while keeping a close eye on the development of the COVID-19 outbreak in Gaza – a major outbreak here would be a nightmare scenario for Israel.

Meanwhile, Qatar has continued to address the humanitarian and economic needs of Gaza in an attempt to ease the pressure and prevent further escalation. It has pledged $150 million over the next six months to help families in Gaza from poorer backgrounds. Gaza has also been discussed by the Middle East Quartet, as Nickolay Mladenov, the UN special coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, expressed his concern about the risk of a disease outbreak in Gaza during a call with the members of the Quartet.

Amid the pandemic, threats are still being exchanged between Israel and Hamas. The Israeli defence minister, Naftali Bennett, requested that in return for providing humanitarian aid to Gaza, Hamas agrees to return the remains of two Israeli soldiers killed in the 2014 war. While openly rejecting Bennett's statement, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, has offered to move forward with a prisoner swap deal if Israel agrees to release elderly prisoners and detainees in addition to detained women and children. Though dealing with its own COVID-19 outbreak, Egypt has started to mediate between the two parties in an attempt to stabilize the situation and reach a prisoner swap deal.

In the wake of this pandemic, lessons should be learned and policies should be examined, by all parties. Firstly, Israel should re-evaluate its security measures towards Gaza by easing restrictions on movement and trade which would have a positive impact on living conditions for Gaza’s population. The current measures have proven to be unsustainable and have contributed to the endless cycle of violence. Secondly, the intra-Palestinian division should end, to save Palestinians from contradictory policies and insufficient capacity on both sides. In fact, all previous attempts have failed to end this self-destructive division and this is due to the absence of political will on both sides. Elections seem to be the only viable path towards unity. Finally, efforts by the international community should go beyond stabilizing the security situation and ongoing crisis inside Gaza, where disruption of normal life is the norm.

While the world has reacted to this pandemic with a whole host of new policies and emergency measures, it has remained business as usual when dealing with Gaza. Should COVID-19 spread in Gaza, its people – who have already paid the price of a continuous blockade and intra-Palestinian division for 13 years – will pay a heavy price yet again. However, this time it is not a crisis that they alone will have to face.

Neither Cameroon nor Malaysia has made progress in tackling illegal logging since 2010, according to new reports from Chatham House. Corruption, lack of political will and a lack of transparency pose problems in both countries. 

Illegal logging is much more widespread in Cameroon, where entrenched corruption, weak institutions and unclear and inappropriate laws are all impeding reform. Although Malaysia does not have such high levels of illegality, problems remain, particularly in the state of Sarawak.

Alison Hoare, Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House, said: 'Illegal logging has a devastating impact on some of the world’s most valuable remaining forests and on the people who live in them and rely on the resources they provide.'

'It is disappointing how little progress Cameroon and Malaysia have made in tackling illegal logging, which exacerbates deforestation, climate change, and poverty. In both countries corruption is a major issue, and the governments need to do much more to address the problem and its underlying drivers.' 

In Cameroon, the principle of transparency has not been accepted within the government, enforcement is weak and information management systems are inadequate. The misuse of  small permits, often granted to allow clearance of forests for infrastructure projects or agricultural expansion, is particularly problematic and could be increasing.

Meanwhile, a huge amount of illegal production takes place in the informal artisanal sector – accounting for around half of all timber produced in the country. Artisanal loggers mainly supply the domestic market, but their timber is also exported.

In Malaysia, governance varies significantly from region to region but there are high levels of deforestation across the country. Expansion of timber, pulp and agricultural plantations is the primary cause of forest loss, with the area of plantations expected to double by 2020. 

Adequate recognition of indigenous peoples’ land rights is also a serious challenge in Malaysia and has held up the negotiation of a Voluntary Partnership Agreement with the European Union. Recent enhanced efforts to tackle corruption, including in Sarawak, could mark a turning point. 

Alison Hoare: 'In both countries, more concerted efforts are needed to tackle corruption, increase consultation, and improve transparency and availability of information. The Cameroonian government also needs to pay more attention to the informal sector and the domestic market.'

Significant political change is coming to the Gulf monarchies, often seen in the West as bastions of stability, argues a new Chatham House report entitled Future Trends in the Gulf.

The Gulf states are already undergoing dramatic demographic and economic changes – changes which are being accelerated by lower oil prices.

The current political systems in the Gulf have been defined by the oil era, enabling governments to provide extensive economic benefits and no taxation, while maintaining a monopoly over political power. As the economic role of the state changes, its political role will change too.

Even at a time of plenty, pressures for political change have been rising. Significant changes in the availability of information, the surge in social media and women’s education are driving new demands for transparency.

Political protests have been most visible in Bahrain, but calls for change and reform have been growing in all of the Gulf countries. Raif Badawi, the blogger recently flogged in Saudi Arabia, is hardly an isolated case: campaigners for constitutional monarchies and elected parliaments have been facing severe punishments for years. 

The report author, Jane Kinninmont, says:

'The US and UK underestimate the significant leverage that they still have in the Gulf compared with most other countries, even if it is less than in the 20th century. As much as Asian countries are strengthening their trade links with the Gulf, they are reluctant to step forward as the security allies that the Gulf countries need.' 

Combating instability, extremism and sectarianism in the wider region requires looking hard at the pressures for change and insecurities inside the Gulf states. These help explain, for instance, why Qatar and the UAE have backed different sides in the intensifying civil conflict in Egypt.

The report, based on three years of research, argues that:      

• It is time for the GCC countries to seize the opportunity to carry out gradual and consensual political and social reforms towards more constitutional forms of monarchy. 

• Western countries, especially the US and UK, need to diversify the base of relations with the Gulf beyond the existing elite – and reach out to a broader base among the increasingly well-educated and aspirational new generation.

• Defence cooperation with the Gulf needs to be placed in a wider political context, where respect for human rights is not seen as being at odds with security imperatives, but as part of ensuring sustainable security. The UK and US policy of expanding their military bases in Bahrain has sent a strong signal that political reform is not their priority. 

• A fresh discourse on Gulf security needs to take account of the need for people to feel secure vis-à-vis their own governments, for instance by ensuring the police are held accountable by independent judiciaries, and ending lengthy detention without trial.

• In partnering with Gulf countries against extremism, Western allies need to broach sensitive issues such as religious education in Saudi Arabia, or the impact on Western publics and Muslim communities outside the region of flogging a blogger for insulting Islam.

The Russian annexation of Crimea was one of the great strategic shocks of the past twenty-five years. For many in the West, Moscow’s actions in early 2014 marked the end of illusions about cooperation, and the return to geopolitical and ideological confrontation. Russia, for so long a peripheral presence, had become the central actor in a new global drama. In this groundbreaking book, renowned scholar Bobo Lo analyses the broader context of the crisis by examining the interplay between Russian foreign policy and an increasingly anarchic international environment. He argues that Moscow’s approach to regional and global affairs reflects the tension between two very different worlds—the perceptual and the actual.

The Kremlin highlights the decline of the West, a resurgent Russia, and the emergence of a new multipolar order. But this idealized view is contradicted by a world disorder that challenges core assumptions about the dominance of great powers and the utility of military might. Its lesson is that only those states that embrace change will prosper in the twenty-first century.

A Russia able to redefine itself as a modern power would exert a critical influence in many areas of international politics. But a Russia that rests on an outdated sense of entitlement may end up instead as one of the principal casualties of global transformation.

Praise for Russia and the New World Disorder

'Once again, Bobo Lo has written an illuminating book on Russia's foreign policy. He has achieved a real 'tour de force' in both conceptual and descriptive terms. With elegance and precision, Lo has explained why Russia, as a declining power, is still so important for international stability, crisis management, and global issues. A must-read for now, and certainly a classic book for the next decade.'
—Dr Thomas Gomart, Director of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris

'Bobo Lo offers a trenchant analysis of the challenges and choices that confront Russia in today's rapidly changing global environment. In his compelling discussion of the Kremlin's Hobbesian view of the international system, he asks whether Russia is capable of jettisoning its imperial mindset and becoming a modern nation-state capable of interacting more effectively both with its neighbors and the wider world. His answer is sobering--and sometimes surprising.'
—Angela Stent, Director, Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies (CERES), Georgetown University, and author of The Limits of Partnership: US-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century.

'Bobo Lo's new book is elegantly written and has a masterful grasp of the pressures and temptations that have acted on Putin in foreign and security policy. He puts us all in his debt.'
—Robert Service, Fellow of the British Academy, and Emeritus Fellow, St Antony's College, University of Oxford

It is now clear that President Putin’s ‘new model Russia’ cannot be constructively accommodated into the international system. The war in Ukraine, in part the result of the West's laissez-faire approach to Russia, demonstrates the need for a new Western strategy towards Russia.

The Russian Challenge - a major new report by six authors from the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House - argues that a new strategy must recognise that:                  

• The decline of the Russian economy, the costs of confrontation and the rise of China mean that the Putin regime is now facing the most serious challenge of its 15 years in power.  The West has neither the wish nor the means to promote regime change in Russia. But Western countries need to consider the possible consequences of a chaotic end to the Putin system.             
• A critical element in the new geo-economic competition between the West and Russia is the extent of Western support for Ukraine, whose reconstruction as an effective sovereign state, capable of standing up for itself, is crucial. This will require much greater resources than have been invested up until now.                  
• Russia has rapidly developed its armed forces and information warfare capabilities since the war in Georgia in 2008. The West must invest in defensive strategic communications and media support to counter the Kremlin’s false narratives and restore its conventional deterrent capabilities as a matter of urgency. In particular, NATO needs to demonstrate that the response to ‘ambiguous’ or ‘hybrid’ war will be robust.                  
• Sanctions are exerting economic pressure on the Russian leadership and should remain in place until Ukraine’s territorial integrity is properly restored. In particular, it is self-defeating to link the lifting of sanctions solely to implementation of the poorly crafted and inherently fragile Minsk accords.                  
• While deterrence and constraint are essential in the short term, the West must also prepare for an eventual change of leadership in Russia. There is a reasonable chance that current pressures will incline a future Russian leadership to want to re-engage with the West.

James Nixey, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, said:  

'Pursuing these goals and achieving these objectives will ensure that the West is better prepared for any further deterioration in relations with Russia. The events of the last 18 months have demonstrated conclusively that when dealing with Russia, optimism is not a strategy.'

Eliza Manningham-Buller is confirmed as a president of Chatham House replacing Paddy Ashdown who steps down after 10 years.

The appointment of Baroness Manningham-Buller as a president of Chatham House was confirmed at the institute’s annual general meeting on Tuesday 21 July. Baroness Manningham-Buller joins Sir John Major and Baroness Scotland of Asthal as a co-president and succeeds Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon who has stepped down from the role after two terms.

Eliza Manningham-Buller was director-general of the UK Security Service (MI5) between 2002 and 2007 and became an independent life peer in 2008. She served as Chairman of Imperial College London from 2011 to 2015. She brings to Chatham House an extensive knowledge of and experience in international security as well as a deep interest in medical research and global health, having served as a member of the Board of Governors of the Wellcome Trust since 2008. In October 2015, Baroness Mannigham-Buller will become Chairman of the Trust’s Board of Governors.

Paddy Ashdown steps down after serving as a president for 10 years alongside Sir John Major, Patricia Scotland and their predecessors Lord Hurd of Westwell and Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, respectively. Over that period, the institute benefitted enormously from his extensive experience in international politics and conflict resolution, including as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2002 to 2006.

Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, said:

'I am delighted to welcome Elizabeth Manningham-Buller as a president of Chatham House. Throughout her career, she has brought deep knowledge, careful analysis and sound judgement to bear upon some of the most difficult dimensions of public policy. The institute will benefit greatly from these qualities as it draws on her engagement with Chatham House over the coming years.

I would like to pay tribute to Paddy Ashdown for his long-standing support of Chatham House. His contributions to our substantive debates, both internally and externally, have been invaluable on numerous occasions, and we look forward to his continued involvement with the institute as a member of our Panel of Senior Advisers.'

Baroness Manningham-Buller said:

“I am delighted to be elected as a Chatham House president at this important time in the institute’s history, as it grapples with a complex and inter-connected agenda of policy challenges. I look forward to working with John Major and Patricia Scotland in supporting Chatham House and its valuable and necessary work.

Seeing geo-strategic rivalry between the US and China as the sole variable in Asia-Pacific security risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, according to a forthcoming Chatham House paper.            

As Xi Jinping’s visit to the US approaches, The Asia-Pacific Power Balance: Beyond the US–China Narrative, warns against deploying Cold War-type narratives that pit the two countries against each other. Such narratives not only misunderstand the complexity of the region and the growing influence of India, Japan and Indonesia, but also risk increasing the likelihood of conflict and of missing vital opportunities for future cooperation.                

The paper, by John Nilsson-Wright, Tim Summers and Xenia Wickett argues that by focusing too heavily on the US and China, policymakers risk narrowing the aperture through which they evaluate policy choices regarding major regional challenges. Some of the key findings include the following:

Military

• Despite rapidly rising defence spending across Asia, the relative importance of traditional military means is declining relative to instruments such as development assistance and cyber offence.
• The militaries of Japan and India are becoming – in very different ways – more versatile and potentially expanding their remits. In the future, there will be a larger number of more capable military powers in the region, including South Korea and Vietnam.
• Current perceptions that the main dynamic is China’s rising military capabilities outstripping others in the region, therefore, need to be tempered. India’s defence spending, for example, as a percentage of GDP has surpassed China’s for the past several decades.

Economics

• Although China has the world’s second-largest economy and – despite recent problems – is growing faster than most major economies, its growth rate is in secular decline. China has gone from near-constant double-digit growth over the past four decades to 7.4 per cent in 2014 and could dip below 7 per cent this year.
• Whilst India’s economy remains notably smaller than those of China, the US and Japan, it will surpass China’s growth rate this year and has a lot of potential.
• If the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is successfully negotiated, the potential for integration and growth between the United States, Japan and the other 10 TPP members may reduce their current trade dependence on China.

Demography

• The demography of Asia is another reason to look beyond the US-China nexus, as China faces the challenge of an aging society, while countries such as India have the advantage of a younger population and decades of demographic dividend ahead of them.
• Likewise populations across much of Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines and Indonesia are growing rapidly and expanding their middle classes. 

Revenues for pharmaceutical companies need to be 'delinked' from sales of antibiotics to avoid their over-use and avert a public health crisis, says a new report from the think-tank Chatham House.

Over-use of antibiotics is contributing to the growing resistance of potentially deadly bacteria to existing drugs, threatening a public health crisis in the near future. The report notes that, by 2050, failing to tackle antibiotic resistance could result in 10 million premature deaths per year.                                       

Novel antibiotics to combat resistant pathogens are thus desperately needed, but market incentives are exacerbating the problem. Towards a New Global Business Model for Antibiotics: Delinking Revenues from Sales states that,                                       

'The current business model requires high levels of antibiotic use in order to recover the costs of R&D. But mitigating the spread of resistance demands just the opposite: restrictions on the use of antibiotics.'

To tackle this catch-22 problem, the Centre on Global Health Security at Chatham House recommends the establishment of a global body to implement a radical new business model for the industry, which would encourage investment and promote global access to - and conservation of - antibiotics.      

The current business model has several perverse effects. As R&D is an inherently risky and costly endeavour, the industry is chronically under-investing in new treatments. Today, few large pharmaceutical companies retain active antibacterial drug discovery programmes. Re-stoking the industry's interest in antibiotics would be one of the primary roles of the new body.   

Secondly, the need to recover sunk cost under the current business model encourages both high prices and over-marketing of successful drugs, making potentially life-saving treatments unaffordable to many in developing countries, while simultaneously encouraging over-use in developed markets and increasing resistance.   

The new global body would address these challenges by ‘delinking’ pharmaceutical revenues from sales of antibiotics. It would do this by directly financing the research and development of new drugs, which it would then acquire at a price based on production costs rather than the recovery of R&D expenses. Acquisition could take the form of procurement contracts with companies, the purchase of full IP rights or other licensing mechanisms.                                       

This would enable it to promote global access to antibiotics while simultaneously restricting over-use. Conservation would be promoted through education, regulation and good clinical practice, with the report recommending that 'proven conservation methods such as antibiotic stewardship programmes… be incentivized and implemented immediately.'

Priorities for R&D financing would be based on a comprehensive assessment of  threats arising from resistance. Antibiotics would qualify for the highest level of financial incentives if they combat resistant pathogens posing a serious threat to human health.                                       

Finance for the new body would come from individual nation states, with the report noting that this could 'begin with a core group of countries with significant research activity and large antibiotic markets, (though) it is envisaged that all high income countries should make an appropriate financial contribution.'                                 

It is not yet clear exactly how much funding would be necessary to combat resistance, but with inaction expected to cost $100 trillion in cumulative economic damage, the report argues that 'an additional global investment of up to $3.5 billion a year (about 10 per cent of the current value of global sales of antibiotics) would be a bargain.'

Given the international context, it is in Britain’s best interests to treat Europe as the ‘inner circle’ of its foreign, security and international economic policy, argues Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, in a new paper.

The British government’s approach since 2010 of seeking to enhance the UK's relations with the world’s emerging powers while balancing these with relationships with the United States and Europe has had only limited success. With constrained resources, and in the face of intense global economic competition, mounting security challenges and decaying international institutions, trying to commit the UK equally on all three fronts will not succeed in the future.

Britain, Europe and the World: Rethinking the UK’s Circles of Influence calls for a different mindset and strategy towards the UK’s place in the world – one in which Britain is surrounded by three concentric circles of influence:

• The first or ‘inner circle’ is the EU, the region with which the UK’s relationships need to be strongest and most active.
• The ‘second circle’ consists of the protective and enabling set of economic and security relationships with the US.
• Finally, an ‘outer circle’ comprises the UK’s other key bilateral and institutional relationships.

Should the UK vote to remain in the EU, policy-makers should commit to placing the EU at the centre of Britain's foreign policy, using the country’s economic weight, diplomatic skills and networks to play a leading role in leveraging more effective EU-wide policies.
 
Should the country vote to leave, the UK and the EU would enter an extended period of dislocation before arriving at a new, mutually diminished settlement. British policy-makers would be forced to deal and negotiate with the EU on critical policy issues from the outside. It is hard to see, argues Dr Niblett, how that could lead to EU policies or an international context more in line with British interests.                          

Despite its structural flaws and competing national interests, the EU offers the best prospects for managing the rapidly changing global context, for three main reasons:

First, it allows the UK to leverage the EU’s global economic weight to enhance the UK’s economic interests internationally, including securing beneficial trade agreements and contributing to EU and global standard-setting and rule-writing. Conversely, leaving would require the UK to renegotiate over 100 trade agreements, and would disadvantage UK interests in EU markets, including making EU governments less likely to liberalize services.                          

Second, it gives the UK a say in designing new EU initiatives to strengthen both British and European security in the face of diverse threats, whether managing the flow of refugees and other emigrants; combatting terrorism; or managing a more assertive Russia and the fallout from a disintegrating Middle East.                          

Third, cooperating with other EU members offers a way of maximizing opportunities to find joint solutions to shared problems, whether in terms of responding to climate change; managing growing cyber insecurity; reversing the decay of governance in failing states; or combating the rise of dangerous non-state actors.

Dr Robin Niblett said:

‘Britain is likely to be richer, safer and more influential in the coming decades if it treats Europe as the ‘inner circle’ of its foreign policy. For a mid-sized country like the UK, being a major player in a strong regional institution can offer a critical lever for international influence. In the UK’s case, this means choosing to be a leading player in the world’s principal civilian power, the European Union.’

About 90 per cent of refugees living in camps have no access to electricity and many lack any form of lighting at night, says a Chatham House report for the Moving Energy Initiative. Energy poverty in refugee settlements is not on the radar of international initiatives and humanitarian agencies are ill-equipped to deal with the scale of need. 

Heat Light and Power for Refugees: Saving Lives, Reducing Costs zooms in on the energy needs of refugees and displaced people worldwide, and presents the first ever estimates of the volume and costs of what they use.

'The problem goes beyond electricity. 80 per cent of those in camps rely on firewood for cooking and, as a result, we estimate that some 20,000 people die prematurely each year due to the pollution from indoor fires. Exposure to extremes of cold and heat are also killers for people living in flimsy, temporary shelter,' says Glada Lahn, senior research fellow at Chatham House. 'The current lack of provision for energy undermines the fundamental aims of humanitarian assistance,' she adds.

There are nearly 60 million forcibly displaced people in the world, and they pay staggering costs for energy. The 83,277 households living in Dadaab in Kenya, the world’s largest refugee settlement, spent an estimated $6.2 million on firewood last year, which accounts for approximately 24 per cent of their overall household income. (The average UK household spent 4 per cent of its income on energy in 2011.) In Uganda, almost half of refugee households surveyed by the UNHCR skip meals because they do not have enough fuel to cook with.

'The imperative is to find humane, creative and cost-effective ways to respond to the needs of so many individuals, most of whom are women and children.  Improving access to clean, safe and sustainable energy offers a promising way forward,' says Kofi Annan in the report’s foreword.

The report calls for an overhaul in the way that heat, light and power are delivered in humanitarian crises. It makes the case for new partnerships between humanitarian agencies and private providers to increase clean energy access in refugee settlements. Investment in energy infrastructure will also benefit host communities in some of the world’s poorest countries.

'As refugee households spend approximately $2.1 billion on energy each year, developing local markets for energy services could be part of a mix of solutions,' adds Lahn. 'Using green, culturally appropriate technologies could save lives, reduce CO2 emissions by 11 million tonnes per year and radically improve living standards. Introducing even the most basic solutions, such as improved cookstoves and basic solar lanterns, could save $323 million a year in fuel costs.' 

Other findings include:

• Rape and violence against women is common in many unlit camps. Only 4 per cent of women and girls in households in the Goudoubo camp in Burkina Faso would go out after dark due to the lack of streetlights.
• Wood equalling around 49,000 football pitches worth of forest (64,700 acres) is burned by displaced families living in camps each year, mainly in countries suffering severe deforestation, because they have no alternative sources of energy.
• Firewood consumption emits nearly twice as much CO2 as liquid petroleum gas and produces little energy in comparison to its carbon intensity.

International Development Minister Grant Shapps said:

‘Across sub-Saharan Africa, hundreds of millions of people still do not have access to electricity. Women and girls are at risk of violence after dark, families are forced to inhale toxic kerosene fumes, and energy remains unaffordable for many.

‘With the technology in place and investors coming on board, the time to act is now. The UK's Energy Africa campaign is already kick-starting a solar revolution across the continent.

‘Supporting the Moving Energy Initiative is another way Britain can help boost access to clean, reliable and affordable energy. This will transform people’s lives and help achieve the UN’s goal of universal energy access by 2030.’

Following the institute’s purchase of the ground floor of the adjoining building (Ames House) in 2013, this generous grant from SNF will enable Chatham House to occupy this space and undertake a significant renovation project to create the ‘Stavros Niarchos Foundation Floor’ at Chatham House.

This will help the institute meet the growing demand for its research and analysis and take full advantage of its location in central London, given the city’s exceptional international connectivity and status as a global hub.

The SNF Floor will contain state-of-the-art meeting facilities for the institute’s research staff and fellows of the Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs, and will significantly enhance the institute’s convening and communication capacities. To this end, the renovated space will include a ‘simulation room’, the Asfari Centre and a media room, as well as new breakout and meeting areas. The SNF Floor will be directly accessible from the ground floor of 10 St James’s Square, the institute’s main building.

The SNF grant is an important step forward for the institute’s Second Century Initiative which aims to ensure the institute’s long-term financial independence. The initiative has three principal targets:

● to endow a number of Research Fellowships and interdisciplinary Research Centres;

● to secure endowments to support the Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs in order to nurture independent thinking on international policy among a new generation from around the world; and

● to secure the necessary physical space and infrastructure here in London to meet the growing demand for and scope of the institute’s work.

Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House said: ‘We are enormously grateful to the Stavros Niarchos Foundation for this transformational grant which will significantly enhance Chatham House’s capacity to serve as a trusted and creative space for addressing the most important challenges in international affairs.’

Andreas Dracopoulos, co-president of SNF’s board of directors, said: ‘We are delighted to support the growth of Chatham House, one of Europe’s leading independent, non partisan policy institutes, at a time when the risks to global prosperity and stability are expanding. Chatham House’s reputation for providing world-leading analysis needs to remain as strong as ever and I am confident that this grant will help the institute take its research and convening activities in new interactive and interdisciplinary directions.’

International Affairs, the institute’s peer-reviewed journal, has published high-quality, policy relevant articles for over 90 years and its global readership includes many of the world’s pre-eminent academic thinkers, policy-makers and practitioners. From January, when its current contract to publish with Wiley-Blackwell ends, OUP will assume responsibility to publish, distribute and market the journal to new and existing readers and audiences.

Vanessa Lacey, senior publisher for Oxford Journals, commented on the acquisition: 'We are thrilled to have been chosen by Chatham House to publish their prestigious journal International Affairs from 2017. International Affairs is a critically important, ‘must read’ journal of relevance to international relations academics and policy-makers alike. We look forward to partnering with Chatham House and International Affairs’ exceptional editorial team to reinforce its position as a global leader in its field.'

Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, said: 'Chatham House is delighted to have teamed up with OUP, the world’s leading university press, to publish International Affairs. In terms of shared values, reputation and vision, OUP is an ideal partner for International Affairs and Chatham House. This is an exciting opportunity to develop further the journal’s digital outreach and its engagement with new audiences around the world.'

Andrew Dorman, commissioning editor of International Affairs also commented: 'The IA team is really pleased to be working in partnership with OUP to produce the journal. We share a common vision to publish cutting edge articles from across the discipline, which influence both the academic and practitioner communities in all parts of the world.'

OUP adds International Affairs, the foremost UK international relations journal and one of the top ten internationally, to a growing portfolio of respected international relations-related journals. 

European leaders need to implement common European solutions to the refugee crisis. Only joint solutions can credibly and effectively reduce the growing human suffering and social and political turmoil.

The refugee crisis poses a serious challenge, both to the welfare of refugees and to European societies. In 2015, more than 1.5 million migrants crossed into the European Union. From Italy to Poland, and from Greece to Germany, countries face immense challenges in responding to requests for humanitarian aid, asylum, and integration. The associated integration challenges in housing, language, work and welfare are already formidable. Failing to manage them properly poses serious threats to social cohesion and political stability.

European countries have had sufficient time to analyse and assess the long-standing challenges which created the current crisis. Now it is time to act – not individually and at the expense of others, but jointly and in a spirit of European solidarity. This is why Vision Europe – a partnership between seven leading think tanks and foundations in Europe – will in 2016 focus its efforts on providing practical solutions to the current refugee crisis, and its root causes. We, the seven signatories, writing in an individual capacity, see an urgent need for a common European approach, to compliment local and national efforts.

At present, there is no consensus among member states on how to respond to the crisis, neither on the objectives to be achieved or the methods to be used.  But disagreements on substance must be overcome now. Building on current discussions, we propose a comprehensive agenda at the EU level, with five major dimensions.

First, it is important to control the EU’s external borders so that only refugees fleeing war and persecution, who have a legitimate right to seek asylum, can enter and potentially remain in the EU. The porous nature of the EU’s external borders has meant an unacceptable loss of control in the eyes of many EU citizens and has raised false hopes for irregular migrants trying to enter the Union. The control of the borders of the Schengen Area should be a collective effort of the EU and all Member States, coordinated by European Institutions with professional staff and with financial support provided to Member States at the EU’s periphery. Regaining control of the EU’s external borders is essential to preserve open internal borders.

Second, beyond implementing the already agreed upon relocation of 160,000 refugees from Greece and Italy, the EU should develop a system which distributes a much larger number of refugees across the Union, directly from the hotspots in the EU and the neighbouring counties such as Turkey, Jordan or Lebanon. Member States not willing to host refugees themselves could choose to make a primarily financial contribution to the system. A Migration Solidarity Fund should be created to manage this compensatory system. Turkey’s efforts to reduce the crossings in the Aegean Sea should be matched by a willingness among EU Member States to take in refugees in an orderly manner. The Conclusions from the European Council seem to move in the right direction in this regard.

The third measure should be to improve, standardize and speed up the processes to determine asylum applications. The sooner refugees know whether they can stay, the more energy can be invested in their integration into host countries’ societies and in family reunions. The sooner a decision is taken, the fairer and more feasible it is to send back those whose requests are refused in full respect of international law and human rights. And EU members cannot afford to have vastly different standards in granting asylum status.  Under international law, there can be no limit set on the number of those eligible to request asylum.

As a fourth measure, we recommend expanding efforts at the EU level to improve the living conditions of refugees staying in countries close to their countries of origin. Many refugees want to return to their homes as soon as the situation becomes safe again. They should not be driven to start the hazardous journey to the European Union only because of unbearable conditions in the countries where they are currently sheltering.

Last but not least, the EU and its Member States should work vigorously towards ending the violent conflicts that are the principal causes of the crisis. Europe must invest heavily in the Syria peace process, in particular. The EU must also raise the ambition and resources of its Neighbourhood Policy, with a focus on helping to stabilise the region and on improving the living conditions and economic opportunities in the Southern neighbourhood.

But action is also required at the national level, especially in the EU countries where significant numbers of refugees have received or are expected to receive asylum. The distribution of refugees across municipalities and regions should be fair and should come with adequate support and resources from the national level, emphasising education and language training. The recognition of professional competences and support to enter the labour market should be available at a very early stage. Within our societies, we need a dialogue between refugees and the host society. It should be made clear that respect for human rights, democratic values and cultural norms is indispensable for a prolonged stay in the respective European host country.

Coming from seven European countries, with different national policies and approaches to the refugee crisis, the foundations and think tanks of Vision Europe are working together to advance new ideas, to frame an informed debate and to emphasize the benefits of common European solutions to Europe-wide problems. Europe is strong enough to manage the migration challenges, but only if political leaders act now, act responsibly and use the resources at their disposal, including support for civil society working in this area. We must not leave the public space to populists and nationalists offering false promises. Only a European solution will be workable and sustainable.

Aart de Geus
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Germany

Artur Santos Silva
President, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Portugal

Guntram Wolff
Director, Bruegel, Belgium

Mikko Kosonen
President, Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra, Finland

Piero Gastaldo
Secretary General, Compagnia di San Paolo, Italy

Robin Niblett
Director, Chatham House, United Kingdom

Yves Bertoncini
Director, Jacques Delors Institute, France

Professor Tim Benton has joined Chatham House’s Energy, Environment and Resources department to help develop the institute’s work on the critical challenges of climate change, resilience and sustainable development. He brings renowned expertise on food security and environmental change, and will focus on establishing new initiatives at the intersection of research and policymaking.

Previously Tim has been UK champion for global food security, acting as an ambassador and spokesperson as well as coordinating work between research councils and government departments in this increasingly important area or research. Tim is also the dean for strategic research initiatives at the University of Leeds and a global agenda steward for the World Economic Forum.

Rob Bailey, director of the Energy, Environment and Resources department, said: 'I am delighted to welcome Tim to Chatham House. He has distinguished himself as a leading thinker on climate change and food security and we are all excited at the prospect of working with him.'

Tim Benton said: 'It is an honour to join Chatham House, with its great international reputation for independent thinking. I am looking forward to making a contribution to meeting the challenges implicit in managing the world’s resources sustainably whilst the global population and economy grows.'

The Chatham House Prize is presented annually to the person, persons or organization deemed by members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs to have made the most significant contribution to the improvement of international relations in the previous year.

This year, members of the institute voted for President Juan Manuel Santos in recognition of his role in formally ratifying a peace agreement with the FARC rebel group and bringing an end to the armed conflict in Colombia.

In 2016, after four years of negotiation, Juan Manuel Santos led the Colombian government in ratifying a peace agreement with the FARC. Success was by no means certain: after coming to a ceasefire and disarmament agreement in June, followed by a peace accord in September, Santos was forced to return to the drawing board with FARC negotiators after a referendum in October rejected the initial deal. But Santos persevered, drafting and signing a new deal that incorporated changes suggested by the No camp and was ratified by the Colombian congress on 24 November 2016.

The deal ended one of the world’s longest running armed conflicts, during which 220,000 people were killed and 6 million displaced. This was a complex, sensitive and intense process which required exceptional political diplomacy and perseverance. Ultimately, his determination and commitment to peace guided the main parties and international partners to one of the biggest successes in brokering peace in modern history.

Nominees

The nominees for the Chatham House Prize 2017 were:

• Charlotte Osei, Chairperson of the Electoral Commission of Ghana
• Juan Manuel Santos, President of Colombia
• Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary-General of NATO

Event

President Santos will be presented the award at an event in London on Thursday 9 November.

About the Chatham House Prize

The Chatham House Prize is presented to the person, persons or organization deemed by members of Chatham House to have made the most significant contribution to the improvement of international relations in the previous year.

The selection process is independent, democratic and draws on the deep knowledge of Chatham House's research teams, making the Prize a distinctive and unique award in the field of international affairs.

A short-list of nominees is selected by the institute's three presidents from a longer list submitted by the research programmes and departments in their areas of expertise. The recipient is then determined by Chatham House's broad membership base on a one-member, one-vote basis. The award is presented on behalf of the institute's patron, Her Majesty the Queen, representing the non-partisan and authoritative character of the Prize.

The Chatham House Prize was launched in 2005. Previous recipients of the Prize include Burmese democracy campaigner Aung San Suu Kyi, Médecins Sans Frontières, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Melinda Gates, co-founder of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

For more information, please contact: 
Jenny Williams, Head of Media
Email: jwilliams@chathamhouse.org
Phone:  +44 (0) 207 314 3687 

In recognition of Chatham House’s continued dedication to workplace diversity, the institute has been listed in the Inclusive Top 50 UK Employers List – a definitive ranking of UK-based organizations that promote inclusion across all protected characteristics, throughout each level of employment within an organization.

Powered by the Excellence in Diversity Awards, the Inclusive Top 50 UK Employers recognizes the organizations that demonstrate the promotion of all strands of diversity including age, disability, gender, LGBT, race, faith and religion.

Complied by a dedicated panel of judges, the list has been collated based on each organization’s performance in a range of areas within the diversity arena. Organizations featured have provided sufficient evidence on an amalgam of topics including recruitment procedures, training and a host of diversity related initiatives.

The Inclusive Top 50 UK Employers List, in partnership with recruitment specialists Rullion, recognizes the outstanding efforts of organizations that have begun their journey to attracting and retaining a truly diverse workforce, achieving equality, diversity and inclusion in its purest form.

Lisa O’Daly, Director of Human Resources, Chatham House, said: ‘I am delighted that Chatham House has been included in the Inclusive Top 50 UK Employers List. This is just really the beginning of our journey to diversity and inclusion and is a recognition of the collective efforts of our staff which is changing Chatham House for the better.’

‘The UK companies on the list are showing by their actions that they are integrating what they believe into how they operate creating an inclusive culture, which begins at the very top of the organization,’ said Donna Herdsman, EMEA Partnership Manager, Rullion. 

For the past few months, users have been sharing their thoughts on our website on the future of democracy and the role of technology in it. Many have shared concerns about the effects of technological change:  

• Social media may be undermining the historic role of politicians to speak on behalf of their constituencies.
• Twitter favours brief writing and hence brief thinking, which may be leading to a deterioriation in democratic debates.
• The risk that the so-called 'echo chamber effect' undermines balanced and reasoned public debate.

But there have also been lots of ideas about how technology can help European democracies become more responsive and dynamic such as:

• The use of technology to better inform citizens and include civil society in decision-making.
• Sybil-proof identity verification for social network accounts operated by local municipalities.
• The development of non-profit personal data cooperatives as a response to the domination of Big Tech.

Now we want users help in shaping the final report. What do you think should be included?

We are opening up the report writing process and inviting you to take part and feed in your views. Work with us on a collaborative draft in Google Docs – comment, edit and get an insight into the black box of think tank research.

We’ll also be incorporating the most interesting submissions from the previous phase. If you'd like to make a submission, you can still do so here.

How To Join

To access the documents, you will need a Gmail account and to be registered as a user on demtech.chathamhouse.org. Each research question has its own working document, accessed via the Research Questions page.

The process is open to everyone. We look forward to working with you!

Join the project now

The Chatham House Prize is awarded to the person, persons or organization who is deemed to have made the most significant contribution to the improvement of international relations in the previous year. The presentation ceremony and panel discussion with the winners will be livestreamed on Wednesday.

The Blue Planet II series highlighted the damage caused by discarded plastics to the world’s oceans and marine wildlife. It is estimated that there are more than 150 million tonnes of plastic in the world’s oceans; resulting in the deaths of 1 million birds and 100,000 sea mammals each year. 

Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House said: ‘Plastic pollution is one of the gravest challenges facing the world’s oceans, and undoubtedly an international issue. Sir David and the BBC Studios Natural History Unit played an instrumental role in helping to put this issue at the forefront of the public agenda. Blue Planet II spurred a passionate global response and generated clear behavioural and policy change.’

This year the G20 agreed on an international framework to address marine plastic litter, acknowledging the increasing urgency of the issue and the need for an international solution. This follows action from the UK government, including a plan to ban common plastic items and investment in global research.

See full award citation

Read more about Chatham House's research work in this area

Other nominees

Dr Niblett thanked Chatham House members for voting and acknowledged the outstanding achievements of the 2019 nominees:

Abiy Ahmed, prime minister of Ethiopia, nominated for his efforts to transform civic leadership and promote plural politics, free speech and peace in Ethiopia 

Katrín Jakobsdóttir, prime minister of Iceland, nominated for her commitment to gender equality and women’s financial inclusion in Iceland 

Event

The Prize was presented to Sir David and Julian Hector by Her Majesty The Queen at Chatham House on Wednesday 20 November.

Watch video from the event

For more information please contact

Chatham House Press Office
pressoffice@chathamhouse.org
+44 (0)207 957 5739

BBC Studios Natural History Unit Communications Manager
Lynn.li@bbc.co.uk
+44 (0) 7513 137893

About the Chatham House Prize

The Chatham House Prize is voted for by Chatham House members, following nominations from the institute’s staff. The award is presented on behalf of the institute's patron, Her Majesty the Queen, representing the non-partisan and authoritative character of the Prize.

The Chatham House Prize was launched in 2005. Previous recipients of the Prize include the Committee to Protect Journalists, Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos, president of Ghana John Kufuor, Médecins Sans Frontières and Melinda Gates, co-founder of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

Chatham House is a world-leading policy institute based in London. Our mission is to help governments and societies build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world. We engage governments, the private sector, civil society and our members in open debate and private discussions about the most significant developments in international affairs.  Our research and policy ideas involve rigorous analysis of critical global, regional and country-specific challenges and opportunities.

About BBC Studios Natural History Unit 

BBC Studios Natural History Unit produces the world’s most iconic natural history programmes, such as Blue Planet II and Planet Earth II, which have been watched by more than a billion people globally. Ranging from technically challenging live shows and super-landmarks to long-running series and children’s content, The Natural History Unit programmes include Dynasties, Blue Planet Live, Springwatch, Animal Babies: First Year On Earth, Andy’s Dinosaur Adventures as well as the currently on air Seven Worlds, One Planet presented by Sir David Attenborough and third-party commissions for Discovery, Apple, Quibi, National Geographic and BBC America. 

The Natural History Unit is part of BBC Studios, a subsidiary of the BBC, which develops, produces and distributes bold, British content, making over 2,500 hours of content each year, operating in 22 markets globally and generating revenue of around £1.4bn. In the year to March 2019, it returned £243m to the BBC Group, complementing the BBC’s licence fee and enhancing programmes for UK audiences.

The speaker will outline a number of foreign policy challenges facing transatlantic business, such as China’s increasing economic power, turmoil in the Middle East, and Russia’s recent actions in eastern Europe. He will examine how these issues can provide obstacles to cooperation and development, and restrict access to markets, and how they can be addressed. 

The event is part of our series on US and European Perspectives on Common Economic Challenges. Conducted with the support of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, this series examines some of the principal global challenges that we face today and the potentially differing perspectives from the US and across Europe. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The situation in Ukraine remains in flux and despite Europe and the US toughening sanctions on Russia, President Putin continues to increase the scope of Russia’s involvement in the conflict between the Ukrainian government and the separatists. It remains unclear how far Putin is willing to go, what his broader regional ambitions are, and what he will do if forced further into a corner by Western actions. In this time of uncertainty and instability it is therefore vital to assess how the transatlantic partners should respond to this increasingly precarious situation. 

At this all-day event, the group will discuss how US policy towards Russia is changing, what this means for Europe and, subsequently, how Europe should respond. 

Attencance at this event is by invitation only.

The event is part of the Transatlantic Strategy Group on the Future of US Global Leadership run jointly with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Over the course of a year, this group will come together to discuss how US policy is changing on key issues and the implications for Europe. This project is supported by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.

In the wake of the Paris attacks and the destruction of a Russian plane by a bomb in Sinai, Russia had been once more calling for a new level of engagement with Western partners over operations in Syria. Even an ‘anti-terrorism coalition’ appeared to gain traction after the terrorist attacks in Paris. But Russian attacks on Western-backed opposition groups in Syria and continuing violation of Turkish airspace narrowed the window of opportunity for engagement between NATO member states and Russia in Syria, and Tuesday’s incident – where Turkey shot down a Russian bomber − fundamentally challenged this option. NATO allies and Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg were quick to call for ‘calm and de-escalation’ of the situation. But they face a problem: in the absence of a strategy, NATO lacks a mechanism—a form of transparent process for crisis resolution—between member states and partner nations when and if a dispute or disagreement arises.

NATO has three essential core tasks—collective defence (Article 5), crisis management and cooperative security; it does not prioritize one task over the other. Whereas collective defence applies to member states like Turkey, cooperative security involves engagement with partner nations, such as Russia, to assure Euro-Atlantic security. NATO’s role, in this sense, goes beyond protecting a member’s state’s sovereignty. This aspiration to provide enduring cooperation and cooperative security beyond members lies behind the now-obsolete NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, signed in 1997.

NATO’s balance between these tasks and its role vis-à-vis partner states is ill-defined, and among the core issues the Alliance must consider at or before its next summit in Warsaw in July 2016. These discussions must include prioritizing and grouping partner nations—Russia and Sweden, for instance, are clearly not partners in equal terms – and clarifying the role of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The NRC is a venue for political dialogue that includes consultation, cooperation and joint action, but does not have a crisis resolution mechanism. From 2014 onwards, the NRC has not functioned, yet it is the only venue where NATO and Russia could have discussions regarding the future of Syria, focusing on ISIS as a major threat both to the Alliance and to the partner nations. Neither Russia nor the Alliance will benefit from escalation; thus, both sides should bear in mind that a troubling partnership is better than an adversarial relationship.

This is even more important because NATO member states do not have a cohesive strategy regarding Syria’s future. For some countries, like Germany, the efforts lie on refugee relief policies, while for others, such as France, the focus is the military fight against ISIS. Russia is clearly testing NATO’s response mechanisms through hybrid warfare techniques. Yet, NATO also does not have a coherent policy regarding Russia’s assertiveness in Ukraine, involvement in Syria and its annexation of Crimea.  NATO officials are in general agreement that there can be ‘no grand bargain with Russia’ as long as it continues to violate international treaties and norms. Russian aggression and assertiveness is a long-term problem for the Alliance to tackle. So far, though, NATO benefits from ‘avoid[ing] that situations, incidents and accidents spiral out of control’, as the NATO secretary general noted in his speech after the extraordinary North Atlantic Council meeting. Solidarity among allies and protecting Turkish territorial integrity is a clear role for NATO, but the Alliance’s response mechanism in crisis situations should not be exhausted and undermined with small-scale, bilateral disagreements and disputes.

NATO could move to incorporate a crisis resolution mechanism, in specified non-escalatory terms and processes, between member states and partner states, where NATO member states and Russia meet together as equals in case of a crisis. This could re-establish a communication channel between NATO and Russia in particular, especially when the NRC is not functioning. If such a mechanism were in existence today, Turkey could have taken the issue to NATO’s crisis management system and pointed out its concerns over airspace violations, rather than shooting down the Russian bomber. This could have enabled the Alliance and Russia to participate in a dialogue that has been silent for more than a year. Instead, this incident demonstrates the delicate strategy of balancing deterrence policies with engagement between a member state and a rather troubling partner nation.

When Syria’s future is discussed, as it will be, at the Warsaw summit, Russia will be an unavoidable part of the discussion. But until there is a way to de-escalate these small-scale incidents, it will be increasingly difficult for Russia and NATO to determine whether they do in fact have any scope for cooperation, or at the least collaboration, on shared challenges and threats.

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Summary

• Chatham House brought together European, Asian and American policy-makers and experts over the course of a two-day scenario workshop in November 2015. The participants were asked to take part in a structured role-playing exercise imagining a potential near-future conflict between China and Japan over disputed islands.
• The findings of the workshop, and the actions of participants in the simulation, suggested significant differences between how the United States and Europe prioritize their interests in the Asia-Pacific. In particular, the perception was that the European Union and its member states consider challenges from their ‘near abroad’ as more tangible than those emanating from Asia, and that they focus on commercial opportunities in the region. In contrast, US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific is seen as emphasizing strategic and geopolitical challenges.
• In terms of military capabilities, Europeans view themselves as having few assets to bring to bear in Asia. European, American and Asian observers are largely unaware of French and British military capabilities in or near the region.
• Beyond the military, Europe’s other tools of leverage – diplomatic, development, economic and other soft-power instruments – are also ignored. Europeans are often unaware of the activities of their own governments in the region. This is equally true in reverse – Japan’s engagement vis-à-vis European interests (such as with respect to Russia or Syria) is little recognized by Europeans.
• European nations prefer to engage unilaterally with Asia on trade and multilaterally, through the EU, on security and geopolitical issues. However, no ideal forum for multilateral coordination exists (given the fact that the EU is not a member of most Asian regional organizations).
• The US’s greater engagement in Asia reflects the fact that the US, unlike its European counterparts, is a Pacific nation. But it can also be explained by greater domestic public support for such engagement. This reflects the presence of significant numbers of US troops in Asia and the relatively high proportion of ethnic Asians in the US compared with the EU.

The British vote to leave the EU is (and should be) seen as a wakeup call for political elites on both sides of the Atlantic. Under normal circumstances, the institutional support that crossed party lines for the Remain campaign should have ensured it a comfortable victory; instead, it lost by a not-insignificant 52−48 per cent margin. Similarly, Donald Trump has alienated the establishment of both American parties – while Democratic dislike is predictable, the extent of the Republican elite’s discomfort with Trump, clearly on display at the party’s convention in Cleveland this week, is extremely unusual at this point in an election campaign which is more typically a display of ‘rally around the candidate’. But as Brexit demonstrated, the conventional logic may not apply in 2016.

There are significant differences between the UK referendum and the US elections. Some of this is structural – a national referendum operates along very different lines than a US presidential election, after all, and the US electorate is much larger and more diverse than its British equivalent. Furthermore, American voters will be making a choice between individuals as well as ideas. This does not necessarily work to the advantage of either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton (both of whom have the highest unfavourability ratings for presidential candidates seen in decades), but highly individualized questions of personality and temperament will impact voter behaviour in a way that they did not for British referendum voters. Finally, who wins the US election will depend in very large part on state politics and electoral college math – as the 2000 election showed, the candidate who wins the popular vote does not necessarily end up as president.

But there is a far more important message that politicians in the US, UK and, more broadly, Europe, should take away from the Brexit result. Regardless of what happens in the US elections, elites no longer necessarily hold the preponderance of power. The disenfranchised who have historically either not had the mass or the coherence to communicate it now do - at least on occasion.

This is not an ideological split – Brexit voters came together from all parts of the political spectrum. Equally, in the US, Sanders and Trump voters are bucking the system in both the Democratic and Republican parties.

There is a significant backlash under way in both countries towards aspects of globalization, going beyond the traditional right/left divide. Allowing for some differences in specifics, the American and British political establishments have, over the past few decades, broadly eased restrictions on the free movement of capital, goods and people across national borders. There have been notable benefits associated with this approach that have mostly been distributed inclusively, but the costs have typically hit those already less advantaged and without opportunities or skills to mitigate them. Those who have been left out or left behind from these changes are discovering their own political power.

Politicians are going to have to find ways not just to appeal to these voters who feel disenfranchised by existing structures, but also address their legitimate concerns. There will of course be partisan policy solutions put forward on both sides. But inevitably the political leadership is going to have to find ways to bridge party lines to realize solutions to those social and economic inequalities. Ignoring them, as many have in the past, is increasingly a quick path to losing power.

Unless the world wants to turn back to more isolationist and protectionist times, with the slower growth and inequalities that this includes, politicians are also going to have to do a better job of explaining the benefits of globalization. And, more importantly, they will have to ensure that these benefits reach their broader population more equitably and that the costs are better mitigated. 

So the Brexit vote does not necessarily presage a Trump victory on 8 November, but it shows in stark terms that the world has fundamentally changed – the time when elites alone could call the shots is gone. Politicians, including Hillary Clinton, will need to respond proactively to the causes of the dissatisfaction rather than waiting until the next time they need the public vote.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Summary

• Chatham House brought together 22 participants over a two-day period in May 2016 to discuss US and European responses to a potential conflict between Turkey and Russia. This was the third of four scenario roundtables (the first two involved a conflict between China and Japan and a potential breakdown in the Iran nuclear deal, respectively).
• The scenario was designed and the roundtable took place before a number of crucial subsequent developments, including the partial restoration of Turkish/Russian relations, the British vote to leave the European Union (EU), and the attempted coup against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This paper should be read and understood in that context.
• In our simulation, the United States and Europe worked closely together, with cooperation particularly in evidence between the US and Germany. While the US was slightly more willing than Europe to threaten sanctions against Russia, transatlantic unity was not seriously threatened by a Turkey/Russia conflict.
• Western states were wary of bringing NATO into the picture for fear that this would be perceived as militarizing an already tense situation. The EU was also sidelined in favour of more ad hoc negotiating strategies.
• Russia was effective in using international law to defend its position, even as it took steadily more aggressive action in Syria. Neither the West nor Turkey deployed an effective countermeasure to this tactic.