year Visions of Europe in an Election Year By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 23 May 2012 13:30:00 -0400 Event Information May 23, 20121:30 PM - 6:00 PM EDTFalk AuditoriumBrookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.Washington, DC 20036 Register for the EventWith many national economies slipping back into recession and voters in Greece, France and the United Kingdom rejecting austerity measures in recent elections, the European political and economic landscape has shifted again. Europe now seems headed towards a revised social contract and a new round of negotiations to respond to the continuing financial crisis. The United States, while experiencing a mild recovery, also strives to find the right balance between fiscal consolidation and growth preservation—a mission made more challenging with the upcoming November elections. A new loss of confidence in Europe may well imperil the U.S. economy’s fragile recovery. Will similar anti-austerity political currents cross the Atlantic and bring "change" to the United States? Despite the crisis, transatlantic cooperation has increased during the Obama administration, but U.S.-EU relations will be subjected to critical examination during the election year. On May 23, the same day European leaders will gather for an extraordinary summit in Brussels, the Center on the United States at Brookings (CUSE) and the Heinrich Böll Foundation hosted a discussion featuring experts and top officials from both sides of the Atlantic for the 2012 CUSE Annual Conference. Panelists explored critical issues shaping the future of transatlantic relations in a year of elections and political transitions, from the euro crisis and the future of NATO to relations with Russia, Turkey and the Middle East. After each panel, participants took audience questions. The event is available in full on C-SPAN » Video NATO in Afghanistan: In Together, Out TogetherU.S. Has Enormous Stake in Euro CrisisU.S., European Allies United on IranU.S. Will Move Forward with Russia on Areas of Mutual Interest Audio Visions of Europe in an Election Year: Part 1Visions of Europe in an Election Year: Part 2Visions of Europe in an Election Year: Part 3 Transcript Intro And Remarks With Phillip Gordon (.pdf)Panel One Transcript (.pdf)Panel Two Transcript (.pdf)Complete Transcript (.pdf) Event Materials 20120523_europe_visions_gordon_transcript_corrected20120523_europe_visions_panel_one_corrected20120523_europe_visions_panel_two_corrected20120523_europe_visions_complete_corrected Full Article
year Experts assess the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 50 years after it went into effect By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 03 Mar 2020 20:51:09 +0000 March 5, 2020 marks the 50th anniversary of the entry into effect of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Five decades on, is the treaty achieving what was originally envisioned? Where is it succeeding in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, and where might it be falling short? Four Brookings experts on defense… Full Article
year Who is eligible to claim the new ACA premium tax credit this year? A look at data from 10 states By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 14 Apr 2015 15:51:00 -0400 Each year millions of low- to moderate-income Americans supplement their income by claiming the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) during tax season. Last year, 1 in 5 taxpayers claimed the credit and earned an average of nearly $2,400. This tax season, some of those eligible for the EITC may also be able to claim, for the first time, a new credit created by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to offset the cost of purchasing health insurance for lower-income Americans. It’s called the ACA premium tax credit. To qualify for the ACA premium tax credit, filers need first to have an annual income that falls between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty line (between $11,670 and $46,680 for a single-person household in 2014). Beyond the income requirements, however, filers must also be ineligible for other public or private insurance options like Medicaid or an employer-provided plan. Why the tax credit overlap matters Identifying the Americans eligible for both credits is important because it sheds light on how many still need help paying for health insurance even after the ACA extended coverage options. In a recent study of the EITC-eligible population, Elizabeth Kneebone, Jane R. Williams, and Natalie Holmes estimated what share of EITC-eligible filers might also qualify for the ACA premium tax credit this year. Below, see a list of the top 10 states with the largest overlap between filers eligible for the EITC and those estimated to qualify for the ACA premium tax credit.* Notably, none of these states has expanded Medicaid coverage to low-income families after the passage of the ACA. Nationally, an estimated 7.5 million people (4.2 million “tax units”) are likely eligible for both the ACA premium tax credit and the EITC. Nearly 1.3 million of those tax units are from the following ten states. 1. Florida Overlap: 22.5 percent / 405,924 tax units State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No 2. Texas Overlap: 21.4 percent / 513,061 tax units State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No 3. South Dakota Overlap: 20.5 percent / 15,124 tax units State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No 4. Georgia Overlap: 19.8 percent / 186,020 tax units State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No 5. Louisiana Overlap: 19.6 percent / 86,512 tax units State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No 6. Idaho Overlap: 19.3 percent / 28,855 tax units State-based exchange? Yes Expanded Medicaid coverage? No 7. Montana Overlap: 18.9 percent / 18,138 tax units State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No 8. Wyoming Overlap: 18.4 percent / 7,276 tax units State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No 9. Utah Overlap: 18.1 percent / 42,284 State-based exchange? No (Utah runs a small businesses marketplace, but it relies on the federal government for an individual marketplace) Expanded Medicaid coverage? No 10. Oklahoma Overlap: 18.0% / 63,045 tax units State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No * For the purposes of this list, we measured the overlap in “tax units,” not people. One tax unit equals a single tax return. If a family of four together qualifies for the ACA premium tax credit, they would be counted as one tax unit, not four, since they filed jointly with one tax return. Authors Delaney Parrish Image Source: © Rick Wilking / Reuters Full Article
year Building artists and leaders in Palestine: The Freedom Theater 10 years on By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 25 Apr 2016 00:00:00 -0400 “We are not buildings artists; we are buildings leaders in society.” These stirring words of Juliano Mer Khamis, the charismatic founder of The Freedom Theatre (TFT) in Jenin refugee camp in Palestine, are coming true, despite his assassination five years ago. Against all odds, The Freedom Theatre, a beacon of creativity, discipline, and vision located in the heart of Jenin refugee camp, recently celebrated its tenth anniversary. Known for its fierce fighters and its conservatism, Jenin refugee camp, where over 16,000 live on one square kilometer, increasingly is known as well for its art. Juliano Mer Khamis returned to Jenin during the second Intifada to find his mother’s Stone Theatre (Arna’s Children tells her story) reduced - like so much of the camp—to rubble by Israeli tanks, and many of his mother’s student actors killed. In 2005 he joined forces with Jonatan Stanczak, currently Managing Director of TFT and Zakaria Zbeidi, a “Stone Theatre child” turned head of the Al-Aqsa brigades in Jenin, who later renounced militancy for cultural resistance. Together they rebuilt a theater in the camp, which evolved into The Freedom Theatre. Mer Khamis urged his acting students to wage a cultural intifada, warning that the occupation of the mind was more dangerous than the occupation of the body. Unlike many charismatic leaders, Mer Khamis developed an institution, not a cult of personality (even though he was adored). Following Juliano’s untimely and unsolved murder in 2011 — he was shot sitting in his car just outside the theater, with his infant son in his lap - the devastated theater soldiered on, a living testament to the powerful impact of his teaching and vision. “When Juliano died he gave us the strength to continue and he showed us the strength we had in ourselves, so we kept going,” Ahmad Matahen, age 24, a typical “child of The Freedom Theatre”, explained to me. Matahen joined in 2006; first as an actor, then as Juliano encouraged him to discover and exploit his individual talents, he moved into technology, engineering and stage design. He now studies stage design in Bethlehem, with the support of TFT, where he hopes eventually to work. What a different future than Matahen might have had, if Mer Khamis had not invited in this street youth who had mocked the theater, and expressed his anger and frustration by throwing rocks at Israeli tanks. Matahen described the common attitude in Jenin: “When you go to the camp and ask people what they want, they say they want to die. They have no jobs, no hope.” When asked what he missed most after Juliano’s death, Matahen said “hugs”, something no one besides Juliano gave him. As a teenager, Ahmad, like so many of his contemporaries, saw his friends killed by the invading/occupying Israelis. Considered against the backdrop of trauma that pervades the camp, hugs are no small thing. They form the foundation for the self-confidence and sense of purpose that Matahen has gained from The Freedom Theatre. High school dropout Ameer Abu Alrob defied his family and left his village to live and work at The Freedom Theatre. He traveled to India last year with a TFT group that also included two female acting students, for a ground-breaking, three-month Palestinian-Indian collaboration and tour with Janam Theater. Ameer and half of the other Palestinian student actors had never previously traveled outside Palestine, much less flown in a plane. Through his experiences Ameer is not only broadening the horizons of his family and village, but, importantly, also introducing them to their own history through The Freedom Theatre productions such as The Siege. (One of the reasons Ameer dropped out was that school taught him nothing about his own environment and history). Performed to date in Palestine and Great Britain, The Siege brings to life on stage the incident in 2002 during the second Intifada when armed Palestinian fighters along with some two hundred Palestinian civilians escaped the onslaught of Israeli gunfire and tanks by taking refuge in Bethlehem’s renowned Church of the Nativity. The trapped Palestinians - without food, water, or medical supplies - struggled to remain “steadfast”. After thirty-nine days, they surrendered, responding to the plea of a young mother whose baby’s life was at risk because the siege prevented her taking the infant to the hospital. This decision, which reflected the fighters’ firm belief that the goal of their struggle was to help the Palestinian people, cost the insurgents dearly. In a European-brokered deal, they were exiled immediately upon exiting the Church — some to Europe and some to Gaza — with no hope of return (even though the European exile was supposed to last one year). Nabil Al-Raee, The Freedom Theatre’s artistic director, explained that he wanted to re-open this important incident to present the Palestinian side, absent in the media. “This is the first time that we speak about these freedom fighters and tell their stories.” One and a half years of research, with travel to Europe and skype conversations with Gaza to interview those in exile, including personal friends of Al-Raee’s, were distilled into a visually stunning and dramatically taut production. “The lesson of The Siege was putting weapons down,” according to one of the actors, Faisal Abu Alhayjaa, referring to the essential humanity of the Palestinian fighters, who would not harm a sick child for the sake of their cause. This powerful message apparently was lost on New York’s acclaimed Public Theater which cancelled the production scheduled for this May. This alarming trend of performances cancelled/censored (take your pick) for political reasons will be examined at a conference at Georgetown University this June, where Al-Raee will speak. Undeterred, The Freedom Theatre and its resolute supporters currently are seeking other American venues for The Siege. While some may see Palestinians on stage with machine guns, others, including sold-out audiences during The Siege‘s recent British tour, see, in the words of the Guardian review, “an unexpectedly compelling theatrical experience with a rough and ready energy, and in the very act of its telling, speaks for the voiceless and forgotten”. In the tinderbox that is Israel-Palestine, The Freedom Theatre defies its seemingly hopeless environment, and is making a tangible difference in Jenin camp and beyond. Another child of the Theatre, an actor in The Siege and in the forthcoming feature film The Idol, Ahmed Al Rokh, described the change. “We can feel the difference in the camp. Our audience is growing because the kids who first came now have families, and bring them. Now they understand that the theatre works for us and with us.” In contrast to the situation in the developed world, where art is often considered discretionary, Faisal Abu Alhayjaa described art and culture in Palestine as “essential like water and bread”. Inspiring as it is, The Freedom Theatre’s story is not unique. The Palestinian Performing Arts Network (PPAN) includes many ensembles and organizations striving for dignity and agency through art. Abu Alhayjaa sees the education and empowerment that comes through working in the arts generally, and The Freedom Theatre specifically, as vital to Palestine’s future. “If there will be a liberation for Palestine, it will come with a generation that knows what they want, and that knows to think critically.” That generation is being trained at The Freedom Theatre. This piece was originally published by The Huffington Post. Authors Cynthia P. Schneider Publication: The Huffington Post Image Source: © Mohamad Torokman / Reuters Full Article
year Event recap: Lessons learned from two years of breakthrough therapy designation By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 14 May 2015 10:05:00 -0400 The breakthrough therapy designation (BTD) program was initiated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2012 to expedite the development of treatments for serious or life-threatening illness that demonstrate “substantial improvement” over existing therapies. The program has since become a widely supported mechanism for accelerating patient access to new drugs. As of March 2015, FDA has received a total of 293 requests for BTD. However, it has granted just 82 (28%), which indicates an ongoing lack of clarity over what exactly meets the criteria for the designation. On April 24, the Center for Health Policy at Brookings convened a public meeting to explore the designation’s qualifying criteria and how FDA applies those criteria across therapeutic areas. Panelists used real-world and hypothetical case studies to frame the discussion, and highlighted major considerations for the application process, the FDA’s evaluation of the evidence, and the key factors for acceptance or rejection. The discussion also identified strategies to ensure that qualifying criteria are well understood. Here are the five big takeaways: 1. The BTD program is viewed positively by drug companies, researchers, advocates, and others Across the board, participants expressed enthusiasm for the BTD program. Industry representatives noted that their experience had been extremely positive, and that the increased cooperation with and guidance from FDA were very helpful in streamlining their development programs. Receiving the designation can also raise a drug company’s profile, which can facilitate additional investment as well as clinical trial patient recruitment; this is particularly important for smaller companies with limited resources. Patient and disease advocates were likewise supportive, and expressed hope that the early lessons learned from successful breakthrough therapy approvals (which have been mostly concentrated in the oncology and antiviral fields) could be translated to other disease areas with less success. However, while BTD is an important tool in expediting the development of new drugs, it is just one piece of broader scientific and regulatory policy landscape. Accelerating the pace of discovery and development of truly innovative new drugs will depend on a range of other factors, such as developing and validating new biomarkers that can be used to measure treatment effects at an earlier stage, as well as establishing networks that can streamline the clinical trial process. It will also be important to develop effective new approaches to collecting, analyzing, and communicating information about these treatments once they are on the market, as this information can potentially be used by FDA, providers, and patients to further improve prescription drug policy and medical decision-making. 2. BTD requests far outnumber those that actually meet the qualifying criteria Since the program began, less than 30 percent of requests have received BTD designation. A substantial majority were denied at least in part due to either a lack of data or problems with the quality of the data, or some combination of the two. For example, some sponsors requested the designation before they had any clinical data, or submitted the request using clinical data that was incomplete or based on flawed study designs. Many requests also failed to meet the Agency’s bar for “substantial improvement” over existing therapies. One reason for the high denial rate may be a lack of a clear regulatory or statutory bar that could be used as a definitive guide for sponsors to know what is needed to qualify for the designation. BTD denials are also confidential, which means that sponsors effectively have nothing to lose by submitting a request. Going forward, manufacturers may need to exercise more discretion in deciding to request the designation, as the process can be resource- and time-intensive for both sides. 3. There is no single threshold for determining what defines a breakthrough therapy About 53 percent of the 109 total BTD denials were due at least in part to the fact that the drug did not represent a substantial improvement over existing therapies. During the day’s discussion, FDA and sponsors both noted that this is likely because the criteria for BTD are inherently subjective. In practice, this means there is no clear threshold for determining when a new therapy represents a “substantial improvement” over existing therapies. Designation decisions are complex and highly dependent on the context, including the disease or condition being targeted, the availability of other treatments, the patient population, the outcomes being studied, and the overall reliability of the data submitted. Given the multiple factors at play, it can be difficult in some cases to determine when a new product is potentially “transformational” as opposed to “better,” especially for conditions that are poorly understood or have few or no existing treatments. In making its determinations, FDA considers the totality of the evidence submitted, rather than focusing on specific evidentiary requirements. 4. Early communication with FDA is strongly recommended for BTD applicants Roughly 72 percent of the BTD denials related at least in part to trial design or analysis problems, which led several people to suggest that sponsors engage with FDA prior to submitting their request. Though there are several formal mechanisms for interacting with the agency, informal consultations with the relevant review division could help sponsors to get a better and much earlier sense of what kind of data FDA might need. This early communication could both strengthen viable BTD requests and reduce the number of frivolous requests. 5. FDA may need more resources for implementing the BTD program Drugs that receive breakthrough designation are subject to much more intensive FDA guidance and review. However, when the program was established in 2012, Congress did not allocate funding to cover its costs. There have been ongoing concerns that the program is exacting a significant toll on FDA’s already limited resources, and potentially affecting the timeline for other drug application reviews. These concerns were reiterated during the day’s discussion, and some suggested that Congress consider attaching a user fee to the BTD program when the Prescription Drug User Fee Act comes up for reauthorization in 2017. Authors Gregory W. DanielElizabeth RichardsonCraig Streit Full Article
year AMLO’s first year: Mexico’s political, economic, and security trends By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 03 Dec 2019 14:14:59 +0000 Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) assumed office in December 2018, promising to bring a fourth revolution to Mexico and to reduce Mexico’s inequality, corruption, and violent crime. Yet a year into his administration, homicides and violent criminality in Mexico have not diminished. While the new government has undertaken new security initiatives and adopted… Full Article
year 20 years after Clinton’s pathbreaking trip to India, Trump contemplates one of his own By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 22 Jan 2020 15:00:19 +0000 President Trump is planning on a trip to India — probably next month, depending on his impeachment trial in the Senate. That will be almost exactly 20 years after President Clinton’s pathbreaking trip to India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan in March 2000. There are some interesting lessons to be learned from looking back. Presidential travel to… Full Article
year 75 years after a historic meeting on the USS Quincy, US-Saudi relations are in need of a true re-think By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 10 Feb 2020 15:00:42 +0000 On Valentine’s Day 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Saudi King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud on an American cruiser, the USS Quincy, in the Suez Canal. It was the dawn of what is now the longest U.S. relationship with an Arab state. Today the relationship is in decline, perhaps terminally, and needs recasting. FDR… Full Article
year The Iran deal, one year out: What Brookings experts are saying By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 13:54:00 +0000 How has the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—signed between the P5+1 and Iran one year ago—played out in practice? Several Brookings scholars, many of whom participated prominently in debates last year as the deal was reaching its final stages, offered their views. Full Article Uncategorized
year Europe 1989-2019: Lessons learned 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 01 Nov 2019 20:19:23 +0000 The 30 years since the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 have been marked by incredible progress toward a Europe “whole and free.” The European Communities became the European Union, grew to 28 member states, and helped raise living standards across the continent. NATO survived the end of the Cold War and… Full Article
year Oil prices are tumbling. Volatility aside, expect them to stay low over the next 20 years. By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 14 Nov 2018 15:59:29 +0000 Crude oil prices have dropped over 20 percent the past two weeks, reminding observers of just how uncertain the oil market has become. That uncertainty started in 1973 when the OPEC cartel first drove prices sharply higher by constraining production. During the 1980s and 90s, new offshore oil fields kept non-OPEC supplies growing and moderated… Full Article
year Transfer season: Lowering the barrier between community college and four-year college By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 21 Jun 2016 12:14:00 -0400 Community colleges are a vital part of America’s opportunity structure, not least because they often provide a way into higher education for adults from less advantaged backgrounds. Each year there are around 10 million undergraduates enrolled at public, two-year colleges. Among first-generation students, nearly 38 percent attend community colleges, compared to 20 percent of students with college-educated parents. Credentials from community colleges—whether short vocational courses or two-year associate degrees—can be valuable in the labor market. In theory, community colleges also provide an on-ramp for those seeking a bachelor’s degree; in fact, four out of five students enrolling intend to get a 4-year degree. But the potential of community college is often unrealized. Many students are not ready. Quality varies. Pathways are often unclear and/or complex. Only about 40 percent of those enrolling earn a degree within six years. Just 15 percent acquire a 4-year degree, according to analyses by Doug Shapiro and Afet Dundar at the National Student Clearinghouse Research Center. Transfers rates from community college vary dramatically by state The degree of alignment and integration between community and four-year colleges is much greater in some states than others. Some use common course numbering for 2- and 4-year institutions, which helps students find the classes they need without racking up costly excess credits. In others, universities and community colleges have tried to align their curriculum to ensure that students’ transfer credits will be accepted. Individual institutions like Queensborough College (part of the CUNY system) and Miami-Dade College have streamlined course sequences to help their students stay on track to transfer into 4-year schools, as Thomas Bailey, Shanna Jaggers, and Davis Jenkins describe in their book, Redesigning America’s Community Colleges. There’s some indirect evidence that these initiatives increased retention and graduation rates. These policy differences help to explain the very different stories of transfer rates in different states, revealed in a recent study by Davis Jenkins and John Fink. One important measure is the proportion of students transferring out of community college with a certificate or associate degree already in hand: Florida tops the list, partly because of state legislation requiring that community colleges grant eligible transfer students degrees—but also because of concerted investments at the state and institutional levels to improve 2-year institutions. Another measure of success is the proportion of those who transfer ending up with a four-year degree. Again, there are significant variations between states: Since community colleges serve so many more students from poor backgrounds, the importance of the transfer pathway for social mobility is clear. Many who struggle at high school may begin to flourish in the first year or two of post-secondary education. As their skills are upgraded, so their opportunities should widen. But too often they become trapped in the silos of post-secondary education. We should continue to support efforts like pathway programs that explicitly attempt to build bridges between community colleges and high-quality four year institutions through the creation of clear and consistent major-specific program maps. Such programs allow students starting out at community colleges to easily chart out the specific, clear, and coherent set of steps needed to eventually finish their post-secondary education with a four-year degree. Tuning an American engine of social mobility The mission of community colleges since their inception a century ago has been to broaden access to education. Today that means providing a solid education to all students, but also providing opportunities to move on to other institutions. Authors Richard V. ReevesEdward Rodrigue Image Source: © Brian Snyder / Reuters Full Article
year Online webinar: Year-one results of the world’s first development impact bond for education By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 05 Jul 2016 10:00:00 -0400 Event Information July 5, 201610:00 AM - 11:00 AM EDTOnline OnlyLive Webcast On July 5, the Center for Universal Education at Brookings and the partners of the world’s first development impact bond for education held an online a discussion of the first year’s enrollment and learning results. The impact bond provides financing for Educate Girls, a non-profit that aims to increase enrollment for out-of-school girls and improve learning outcomes for girls and boys in Rajasthan, India. The UBS Optimus Foundation has provided upfront risk capital to Educate Girls and, contingent on program targets being met, will be paid back their principal plus a return by the Children's Investment Fund Foundation. Instiglio, a non-profit organization specializing in results-based financing mechanisms, serves as the program intermediary. The webinar explored the experiences so far, the factors affecting the initial results, the key learnings, and ways these will inform the development of the programs it moves forward. The partners shared both positive and negative learnings to start a transparent discussion of the model and where, and how, it can be most effective. Chaired by Emily Gustafsson-Wright, a fellow at the Center for Universal Education, the discussion featured Safeena Husain of Educate Girls, Phyllis Costanza of UBS Optimus Foundation, and Avnish Gungadurdoss of Instiglio. For further background on impact bonds as a financing mechanism for education and early childhood development in low- and middle-income countries, please see the Center for Universal Education’s report. Further information on the outcome metrics and evaluation design in the Educate Girls Development Impact Bond » (PDF) Watch a recording of the webinar via WebEx » Full Article
year U.N. International Year of Volunteers Ignites Colombia’s Youth to Volunteer By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 06 Dec 2011 12:31:00 -0500 Last October, 200 students from Colombia's Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (SENA) worked the floor of the campus coliseum at Universidad del Norte in Barranquilla. They were among 900 youth volunteer leaders from nearly 40 nations who had traveled the globe to join the second World Summit for Youth Volunteering, convened by Partners of the Americas and the International Association for Volunteer Effort (IAVE) on the 10th anniversary of the United Nations International Year of Volunteers.As a developing country, Colombia’s increased civil society participation through volunteering is focused on extending poverty-reduction efforts to levels that the government cannot achieve on its own. Volunteers represent a powerful demographic for a new "service generation" by providing a dual benefit. First, volunteering provides critical services in areas such as education and asset development, which are needed to reduce extreme poverty; second, it connects a new generation with like-minded individuals across the world, which provides young people the professional and leadership skills needed to further access to employment opportunities including entrepreneurship. For SENA, one of the world's largest educational institutions with more than four million students across Colombia, the opportunity was clear: engage talented and often under resourced youth in Colombia — one of the most economically unequal countries in the world– with innovative global volunteer leaders. According to research from Brookings and the Center for Social Development at Washington University, these types of global volunteering connections have the potential to enhance skills development while increasing social capital networks. Extreme poverty, along with armed conflict, is one of the highest priorities of the Colombian government. Coincidentally, during the same week as the World Summit, the Colombian armed forces eliminated the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) leader Alfonso Cano while President Santos created a new national superagency to combat extreme poverty. The strategic focus on poverty reduction includes a strong role for civil society as a partner with the government in meeting the U.N. Millennium Development Goals and other development commitments. Civil society plays an essential role in overcoming internal conflict. And the youth services generation is among some of the most effective in civil society in working to help their country tackle poverty. Colombia is certainly not the only country where youth have taken the lead through service to combat poverty. Attendees at the summit heard from Australian humanitarian Hugh Evans, who at 14 began his work to create the Global Poverty Project. In 2006, Evans became one of the pivotal leaders behind the successful Make Poverty History campaign, leading a team across Australia to lobby the country’s government to increase its foreign aid commitment to 0.7 percent of gross national income. Whether or not SENA’s youth will be able to capitalize on their new connections with global service leaders to combat extreme poverty in Colombia is left to be seen. But the SENA volunteers and their international counterparts are more motivated to do so after gaining access to resources and social capital networks with other inspiring young leaders. That is a cause for celebration as the United Nations releases its State of the World Volunteering report in New York in December at a special session of the U.N. General Assembly. Authors David L. CapraraMatt Clausen Image Source: © Fredy Builes / Reuters Full Article
year Appellate Court vacancies may be scarce in coming years, limiting Trump’s impact By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 06 Dec 2018 13:09:46 +0000 The Trump White House, with Senate Republicans and the Federalist Society, has been appointing courts of appeals judges with bulldozer efficiency. The 29 circuit appointments to date is the highest number of any president at this point in his tenure, facilitated partly by a large number of vacancies. How many more appointments will occur in… Full Article
year Judicial appointments in Trump’s first three years: Myths and realities By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 20:59:35 +0000 A December 24 presidential tweet boasted “187 new Federal Judges have been confirmed under the Trump Administration, including two great new United States Supreme Court Justices. We are shattering every record!” That boast has some truth but, to put it charitably, a lot of exaggeration. Compared to recent previous administrations at this same early-fourth-year point… Full Article
year 40 years later- The relevance of Okun’s "Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff" By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 04 May 2015 10:30:00 -0400 Event Information May 4, 201510:30 AM - 12:00 PM EDTFalk AuditoriumBrookings Falk Auditorium1775 Massachusetts Ave., NWWashington, DC 20036 Register for the EventForty years after its initial publication, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff remains an influential work from one of the most important macroeconomists over the last century, Arthur M. Okun (1928-1980). Okun’s theory on market economies reminds readers of an engaging dual theme: the market needs a place, and the market needs to be kept in its place. Articulated in a way that remains relevant even during today’s discussions on broadening gaps in income inequality, Okun emphasized that institutions in a capitalist democracy prod us to get ahead of our neighbors economically after telling us to stay in line socially. On May 4, The Brookings Institution Press re-released Okun’s classic work with a new foreword from Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers, in addition to “Further Thoughts on Equality and Efficiency,” a paper published by Okun in 1977. The event included opening remarks from Brookings Senior Fellow George Perry, with a keynote address from Larry Summers. Following these remarks, David Wessel moderated a panel discussion with former Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers Greg Mankiw, Economic Studies’ Melissa Kearney and Justin Wolfers, and Washington Center for Equitable Growth's Heather Boushey regarding the history and impact of Okun’s work. Download a copy of Lawrence Summers' opening remarks. Ted Gayer, Vice President and Director of Economic Studies and Joseph Pechman Senior Fellow, reads Lawrence Summers's opening remarks. David Wessel (right), Director of the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy, moderates a panel discussion with N. Gregory Mankiw, Melissa Kearney, and Heather Boushey. Janet Yellen, Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, listens to the discussion from the audience. To Yellen's right is former Congressional Budget Office director, Doug Elmendorf. Video 40 years later- The relevance of Okun’s "Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff" Audio 40 years later- The relevance of Okun’s "Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff" Transcript Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf) Event Materials 20150504_okun_equality_efficiency_transcript050415 Summers Okun Speech Full Article
year The Arab Spring five years later: Toward greater inclusiveness By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 10:15:00 -0500 Event Information January 15, 201610:15 AM - 11:45 AM ESTFalk AuditoriumBrookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC 20036 Register for the EventFive years have passed since the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia sparked revolts around the Arab world and the beginning of the Arab Spring. Despite high hopes that the Arab world was entering a new era of freedom, economic growth, and social justice, the transition turned out to be long and difficult, with the Arab world now in turmoil with revolutions, counter revolutions, wars, civil strife, and the worst refugee crisis of our times. The response to the Arab Spring and its aftermath has focused almost exclusively on political and security issues, and on the very divisive questions of national identity and political regimes. Economic and social questions have been put on the back burner. On January 15, Global Economy and Development at Brookings hosted a discussion on a new book, "The Arab Spring Five Years Later," which explores the critical economic and social issues driving the Arab Spring agenda and the real economic grievances that must be addressed in order to achieve peace, stability, and successful political transitions as well as provides an approach to addressing those grievances. Hafez Ghanem and Shinchi Yamanaka presented the key findings of the book, followed by a panel discussion. Audio The Arab Spring Five Years Later: Toward greater inclusiveness Transcript Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf) Event Materials 20160115_arab_spring_transcript Full Article
year The Iran deal, one year out: What Brookings experts are saying By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 09:54:00 -0400 How has the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—signed between the P5+1 and Iran one year ago—played out in practice? Several Brookings scholars, many of whom participated prominently in debates last year surrounding official congressional review, offered their views. Strobe Talbott, President, Brookings Institution: At the one-year mark, it’s clear that the nuclear agreement between Iran and the major powers has substantially restricted Tehran’s ability to produce the fissile material necessary to build a bomb. That’s a net positive—for the United States and the broader region. Robert Einhorn, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Senior Fellow, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, Foreign Policy program: One year after its conclusion, the JCPOA remains controversial in Tehran and Washington (as I describe in more detail here), with opponents unreconciled to the deal and determined to derail it. But opponents have had to scale back their criticism, in large part because the JCPOA, at least so far, has delivered on its principal goal—blocking Iran’s path to nuclear weapons for an extended period of time. Moreover, Iran’s positive compliance record has not given opponents much ammunition. The IAEA found Iran in compliance in its two quarterly reports issued in 2016. But challenges to the smooth operation and even the longevity of the deal are already apparent. A real threat to the JCPOA is that Iran will blame the slow recovery of its economy on U.S. failure to conscientiously fulfill its sanctions relief commitments and, using that as a pretext, will curtail or even end its own implementation of the deal. But international banks and businesses have been reluctant to engage Iran not because they have been discouraged by the United States but because they have their own business-related reasons to be cautious. Legislation proposed in Congress could also threaten the nuclear deal. For now, the administration is in a position to block new legislation that it believes would scuttle the deal. But developments outside the JCPOA, especially Iran’s regional behavior and its crackdown on dissent at home, could weaken support for the JCPOA within the United States and give proponents of deal-killing legislation a boost. A potential wildcard for the future of the JCPOA is coming governing transitions in both Washington and Tehran. Hillary Clinton would maintain the deal but perhaps a harder line than her predecessor. Donald Trump now says he will re-negotiate rather than scrap the deal, but a better deal will not prove negotiable. With President Hassan Rouhani up for re-election next year and the health of the Supreme Leader questionable, Iran’s future policy toward the JCPOA cannot be confidently predicted. A final verdict on the JCPOA is many years away. But it is off to a promising start, as even some of its early critics now concede. Still, it is already clear that the path ahead will not always be smooth, the longevity of the deal cannot be taken for granted, and keeping it on track will require constant focus in Washington and other interested capitals. Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director, Foreign Policy program and Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has fulfilled neither the worst fears of its detractors nor the most soaring ambitions of its proponents. All of the concerns that have shaped U.S. policy toward Tehran for more than a generation—terrorism, human rights abuses, weapons of mass destruction, regional destabilization—remain as relevant, and as alarming, as they have ever been. Notably, much the same is true on the Iranian side; the manifold grievances that Tehran has harbored toward Washington since the 1979 revolution continue to smolder. An important truth about the JCPOA, which has been wielded by both its defenders and its detractors in varying contexts, is that it was transactional, not transformational. As President Barack Obama repeatedly insisted, the accord addressed one specific problem, and in those narrow terms, it can be judged a relative success. The value of that relative success should not be underestimated; a nuclear-armed Iran would magnify risks in a turbulent region in a terrible way. But in the United States, in Iran, and across the Middle East, the agreement has always been viewed through a much broader lens—as a waystation toward Iranian-American rapprochement, as an instrument for addressing the vicious cycle of sectarian violence that threatens to consume the region, as a boost to the greater cause of moderation and democratization in Iran. And so the failure of the deal to catalyze greater cooperation from Iran on a range of other priorities—Syria, Yemen, Iraq, to name a few—or to jumpstart improvements in Iran’s domestic dynamics cannot be disregarded simply because it was not its original intent. For the “new normal” of regularized diplomatic contact between Washington and Tehran to yield dividends, the United States will need a serious strategy toward Tehran that transcends the JCPOA, building on the efficacy of the hard-won multilateral collaboration on the nuclear issue. Iranians, too, must begin to pivot the focus of their efforts away from endless litigation of the nuclear deal and toward a more constructive approach to addressing the deep challenges facing their country today. Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy and Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Director, Intelligence Project, Foreign Policy program: As I explain more fully here, one unintended but very important consequence of the Iran nuclear deal has been to aggravate and intensify Saudi Arabia's concerns about Iran's regional goals and intentions. This fueling of Saudi fears has in turn fanned sectarian tensions in the region to unprecedented levels, and the results are likely to haunt the region for years to come. Riyadh's concerns about Iran have never been primarily focused on the nuclear danger. Rather, the key Saudi concern is that Iran seeks regional hegemony and uses terrorism and subversion to achieve it. The deal deliberately does not deal with this issue. In Saudi eyes, it actually makes the situation worse because lifting sanctions removed Iran's isolation as a rogue state and gives it more income. Washington has tried hard to reassure the Saudis, and President Obama has wisely sought to build confidence with King Salman and his young son. The Iran deal is a good one, and I've supported it from its inception. But it has had consequences that are dangerous and alarming. In the end, Riyadh and Tehran are the only players who can deescalate the situation—the Saudis show no sign of interest in that road. Norman Eisen, Visiting Fellow, Governance Studies: The biggest disappointment of the post-deal year has been the failure of Congress to pass legislation complementing the JCPOA. There is a great deal that the legislative branch could do to support the pact. Above all, it could establish criteria putting teeth into U.S. enforcement of Preamble Section III, Iran's pledge never to seek nuclear weapons. Congress could and should make clear what the ramp to seeking nuclear weapons would look like, what the triggers would be for U.S. action, and what kinds of U.S. action would be on the table. If Iran knows that, it will modulate its behavior accordingly. If it does not, it will start to act out, and we have just kicked the can down the road. That delay is of course immensely valuable—but why not extend the road indefinitely? Congress can do that, and much more (e.g. by increasing funding for JCPOA oversight by the administration and the IAEA), with appropriate legislation. Richard Nephew, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, Foreign Policy program: Over the past year, much effort has gone into ensuring that the Iran deal is fully implemented. To date, the P5+1 has—not surprisingly—gotten the better end of the bargain, with significant security benefits accruing to them and their partners in the Middle East once the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified the required changes to Iran's nuclear program. Iran, for its part, has experienced a natural lag in its economic resurgence, held back by the collapse in oil prices in 2014, residual American and European sanctions, and reluctance among banks and businesses to re-engage. But, Iran's economy has stabilized and—if the deal holds for its full measure—the security benefits that the P5+1 and their partners have won may fall away while Iran's economy continues to grow. The most important challenge related to the deal for the next U.S. administration (and, presumably, the Rouhani administration in its second term) is therefore: how can it be taken forward, beyond the 10- to 15-year transition period? Iran will face internal pressure to expand its nuclear program, but it also will face pressure to refrain both externally and internally, should other countries in the region seek to create their own matching nuclear capabilities. The best next step for all sides is to negotiate a region-wide arrangement to manage nuclear programs –one that constrains all sides, though perhaps not equally. It must ensure—at a minimum—that nuclear developments in the region are predictable, understandable, and credibly civilian (something Bob Einhorn and I addressed in a recent report). The next White House will need to do the hard work of convincing countries in the region—and beyond—not to rest on the victory of the JCPOA. Rather, they must take it for what it is: another step towards a more stable and manageable region. Tamara Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program: This week, Washington is awash in events and policy papers taking stock of how the Iran nuclear deal has changed the Middle East in the past year. The narratives presented this week largely track the positions that the authors, speakers, or organizations articulated on the nuclear deal when it was first concluded last summer. Those who opposed the deal have marshaled evidence of how the deal has "emboldened" Iran's destabilizing behavior, while those who supported the deal cite evidence of "moderated" politics in the Islamic Republic. That polarized views on the deal last year produce polarized assessments of the deal's impact this year should surprise no one. In fact, no matter which side of the nuclear agreement’s worth it presents, much of the analysis out this week ascribes to the nuclear deal Iranian behavior and attitudes in the region that existed before the deal's conclusion and implementation. Iran has been a revisionist state, and a state sponsor of terrorism, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry predates the revolution; Iran's backing of Houthi militias against Saudi and its allies in Yemen well predates the nuclear agreement. Most notably, the upheavals in the Arab world since 2011 have given Iran wider opportunities than perhaps ever before to exploit the cracks within Arab societies—and to use cash, militias, and other tools to advance its interests and expand its influence. Iran has exploited those opportunities skillfully in the last five years and, as I wrote last summer, was likely to continue to do so regardless of diplomatic success or failure in Vienna. To argue that the nuclear deal somehow created these problems, or could solve them, is ahistorical. It is true that Iran's access to global markets might free even more cash for these endeavors, and that is a real issue worth tracking. But since severe sanctions did not prevent Iran from spending hundreds of millions of dollars to support and supply Hezbollah, or marshaling Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and militia fighters to sustain the faltering regime of Bashar Assad in Syria, it's not clear that additional cash will generate a meaningful difference in regional outcomes. Certainly, the nuclear deal's conclusion and implementation did not alter the trajectory of Iranian policy in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon to any noticeable degree—and that means that, no matter what the merits or dangers of the JCPOA, the United States must still confront and work to resolve enduring challenges to regional instability—including Iran's revisionist behavior. Kenneth M. Pollack, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program: When the JCPOA was being debated last year, I felt that the terms of the deal were far less consequential than how the United States responded to Iranian regional behavior after a deal was signed. I see the events of the past 12 months as largely having borne that out. While both sides have accused the other of "cheating," the deal has so far largely held. However, as many of my colleagues have noted, the real frictions have arisen from the U.S. geostrategic response to the deal. I continue to believe that signing the JCPOA was better than any of the realistic alternatives—though I also continue to believe that a better deal was possible, had the administration handled the negotiations differently. However, the administration’s regional approach since then has been problematic—with officials condemning Riyadh and excusing Tehran in circumstances where both were culpable and ignoring some major Iranian transgressions, for instance (and with President Obama gratuitously insulting the Saudis and other U.S. allies in interviews). America's traditional Sunni Arab allies (and to some extent Turkey and Israel) feared that either the United States would use the JCPOA as an excuse to further disengage from the region or to switch sides and join the Iranian coalition. Their reading of events has been that this is precisely what has happened, and it is causing the GCC states to act more aggressively. I think our traditional allies would enthusiastically welcome a Hillary Clinton presidency. She would likely do all that she could to reassure them that she plans to be more engaged and more willing to commit American resources and energy to Middle Eastern problems. But those allies will eventually look for her to turn words into action. I cannot imagine a Hillary Clinton administration abrogating the JCPOA, imposing significant new economic sanctions on Iran, or otherwise acting in ways that it would fear could provoke Tehran to break the deal. Our allies may see that as Washington trying to remain on the fence, which will infuriate them. So there are some important strategic differences between the United States and its regional allies. The second anniversary of the JCPOA could therefore prove even more fraught for America and the Middle East than the first. Authors Strobe TalbottRobert EinhornSuzanne MaloneyBruce RiedelNorman EisenRichard NephewTamara Cofman WittesKenneth M. Pollack Full Article
year One year after: Observations on the rise of innovation districts By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 24 Jun 2015 00:00:00 -0400 In the year since we released “The Rise of Innovation Districts: A New Geography of Innovation in America,” Brookings has visited or interacted with dozens of leaders in burgeoning innovation districts in the United States and Europe. In so doing, we’ve sharpened our knowledge of what’s happening on the ground and gained some important insights into how cities and metros are embracing this new paradigm of economy-shaping, place-making, and network-building. Innovation districts capture the remarkable spatial pattern underway in the innovation economy—the heightened clustering of anchor institutions, companies, and start-ups in small geographic areas of central cities across the United States, Europe, and other global-trading regions. The rise of innovation districts has been situated against the familiar backdrop of suburban corporate campuses and science parks. Accessible only by car, these spatially isolated corridors place little emphasis on the quality of life or on integrating work, housing, and recreation. By contrast, in our report we found the rise of urban innovation hubs to be the organic result of profound economic and demographic forces that are altering how we live and work. The growing application of “open innovation”—where companies work with other firms, inventors, and researchers to generate new ideas and bring them to market—has revalued proximity, density, and other attributes of cities. At the same time, the growing preference of young talented workers to congregate in vibrant neighborhoods that offer choices in housing, transportation, and amenities has made urban and urbanizing areas increasingly attractive. We also found that innovation districts uniformly contain a mix of economic, physical, and networking assets. Economic assets are the firms, institutions, and organizations that drive, cultivate, or support an innovation-rich environment. Physical assets are the public and privately owned spaces—buildings, open spaces, streets, and other infrastructure—designed and organized to stimulate new and higher levels of connectivity, collaboration, and innovation. Lastly, networking assets are the relationships between actors—such as between individuals, firms, and institutions—that have the potential to generate, sharpen, and/or accelerate the advancement of ideas. These assets, taken together, create an innovation ecosystem—the synergistic relationship between people, firms, and place that facilitates idea generation and advances commercialization. One year later, innovation districts continue to rise. What have we learned about how they are evolving? First, the model of innovation districts has been embraced, co-opted, and (in some cases) misappropriated, further reinforcing the need for grounding this work in empirically based evidence. A simple Google search will reveal the extent to which the language of “innovation districts” (or “innovation quarters,“ “innovation neighborhoods,” or “innovation corridors”) has rapidly permeated the field of urban and metropolitan economic development and place-making. In some places, this labeling is being accurately used by globally recognized research institutions (e.g., Carnegie Mellon in Pittsburgh, Drexel University in Philadelphia) that are both experiencing extraordinary growth near their campuses as well as designing intentional efforts to build on their distinctive assets. In communities as diverse as Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis in the United States and Manchester and Sheffield in England, local leaders are conducting deep empirical analysis to understand their competitive advantages and existing weaknesses within their innovation ecosystem. They are exploring what it means to encourage greater collaboration and cooperation across their institutions, firms, and entrepreneurs. And they are exploring ways to better create “place” so as to increase overall vitality, facilitate innovation, and spur the growth of new businesses and jobs. In other places, the nomenclature reflects an aspiration—and is spurring more deliberate efforts by local stakeholders to grow distinctive innovation ecosystems. In cities like Albuquerque, N.M., Chattanooga, Tenn., Chicago, Ill., Durham, N.C., and San Diego, Calif., local leaders are using the innovation district paradigm as a platform to measure their current conditions, develop strategies for addressing gaps and challenges, and build coalitions of stakeholders that can together help realize a unified vision for innovative growth. Some of these budding districts represent typologies not outlined in our report but that are ripe for future research, including “start-up” enclaves in or near downtowns of cities that lack a major anchor as well as “public markets” that blend locally produced food products and crafts with maker spaces, digital design, and other innovations in the creative arts. There is one unfortunate trend in the rising use of the "innovation district" lexicon. In a number of cities, local stakeholders have applied the label to a project or area that lacks the minimum threshold of innovation-oriented firms, start-ups, institutions, or clusters needed to create an innovation ecosystem. This appears to result either from the chase to jump on the latest economic development bandwagon, the desire to drive up demand and real estate prices, or sometimes a true lack of understanding of what an innovation district actually is. The motivation for real estate developers to adopt the moniker seems clear: to achieve a price premium for their commercial, residential, and retail rents. Yet these sites are typically a collection of service-sector activities with little focus on the innovation economy. The lesson: labeling something innovative does not make it so. From all these observations, it is clear that the field needs a routinized way to measure the starting assets of innovation districts—both to separate true districts from “in name only” ones as well as to give individual communities a platform for developing targeted strategies going forward. This means both running the numbers—conducting a quantitative audit—and undertaking a more qualitative assessment of strengths and weaknesses. Irrespective of their phase of development, innovation districts must evaluate the extent to which they have a critical mass of economic, physical, and networking assets to collectively generate the vitality that these districts demand. They need to evaluate the competitive advantages they have in certain economic sectors and learn how to cultivate them. And they need to ensure that they have the connectivity, diversity, and quality of place necessary to create a unique and vibrant environment in which innovation can thrive. To facilitate this process, we are working in close collaboration with Mass Economics and the Project for Public Spaces to develop an audit template and tool. Over the next year, we intend to sharpen this tool in a subset of innovation districts across the country and then encourage others to employ it in their own established or burgeoning districts. Second, the core economic assets of innovation districts are not fixed; in fact, many innovation districts are being created or enhanced by the relocation of major anchor facilities as institutions strive to achieve the highest return on investment. The conventional notion of an “anchor” institution is that it is solidly weighted in a particular place. Yet over the past decade a substantial number of innovative companies and advanced educational and research institutions have moved key facilities and units as a means of generating greater innovation output. Examples of new locations include the University of California-San Francisco’s biotechnology campus in Mission Bay (2003); the University of Washington’s medical research hub in Seattle’s South Lake Union (2005); Brown University’s medical school in downtown Providence, R.I. (2011); Duke’s Clinical Research Institute in downtown Durham (2013); Carnegie Mellon University’s Integrative Media Program in the Brooklyn Navy Yard (2013); and, most famously, the new Cornell Tech campus on Roosevelt Island in New York City (2015). These “first mover” relocations show how corporate and university leaders are departing from the tradition of building new facilities within their existing footprint and are willing to seek out new areas (and even new cities) to retain, or achieve, competitive advantage in their respective clusters and fields. As Cornell Professor Ronald Ehrenberg said about his school’s isolated Ithaca, N.Y. campus, “It is very, very difficult for us to do the kind of development through tech transfer that a place like Stanford or Berkeley can do in San Francisco or Harvard or MIT can do in Boston.” Our strong sense in talking with leaders around the country is that we are still at the early stage of corporate and university relocations given the extent to which urban areas have been revalued. The physical relocation of key innovation assets has now become a critical competitiveness strategy for companies, universities, and even states. In some cases, the “unanchoring of anchors” is also compelling local leaders to rethink the traditional borders and boundaries of the innovation economy. In Philadelphia, for example, University City has always been recognized as a settled innovation hub, given the co-location of such anchor institutions as Drexel University, the University of Pennsylvania, the University City Science Center, and others. The recent decision of Comcast to consolidate its corporate presence in the downtown area and build its major new Innovation and Technology Center less than 10 blocks from 30th Street Station and the Drexel Campus is convincing some leaders to “stretch” Philadelphia’s University City district to incorporate this new corporate giant. Third, almost all innovation districts have significant work ahead to understand the rising value of “place” in the innovation ecosystem and leverage or reconfigure their physical assets to create dense and dynamic communities. While our paper dissected various types of physical assets to help practitioners understand their individual roles and value, the more important message to convey now is the imperative to combine and activate physical assets in ways that create vibrant “places.” The Project for Public Spaces aptly describes place as “…environments in which people have invested meaning over time. A place has its own history—a unique cultural and social identity that is defined by the way it is used and the people who use it.”1 Our review of innovation districts, including those cited in our paper, reveals that many have not yet maximized the potential for creating lively communities in which their residents and workers feel invested, reducing the potential innovation output of these communities. When designed and programmed well, a district’s public spaces—whether within buildings or outside of them—facilitate open innovation by offering numerous opportunities to meet, network, and brainstorm. Strong places entice residents and workers to remain in the area off hours, extending the opportunities for collaboration. Strong places create a culturally and educationally enriched environment that strengthens human interaction, knowledge, and motivation. While some university-led districts have made some improvements over the years, districts anchored by medical campuses have significant work ahead. These spaces were designed as isolated fortresses that valued parking over walking (ironic given their health mission), with little or no attention paid to amenities, cultural activities, retail, or housing. Significantly, some medical campuses are often located in close proximity to downtowns, as part of universities, or near organic entrepreneurial communities (e.g., the proximity of Oklahoma City’s Health District to Automobile Alley). This raises the potential for smart (and related) place-making activities in a nearby area and reinforces the need to rethink traditional geographies and artificial boundaries when considering interventions. Fourth, the rapid growth and impact of national intermediaries (what we call innovation cultivators) shows real promise in helping innovation districts grow and steward their networking assets and stimulating new innovation opportunities. The past year has seen substantial growth in multicity intermediaries along with scores of locally grown accelerators and incubators. It appears more than ever that intermediaries are increasingly the catalyst to growing innovation and entrepreneurial energy within local districts and across start-ups, small and medium-sized enterprises, and, even to some extent, large companies and research institutions. They are designed to think and act horizontally, encouraging people and firms to interact and work together in ways and at a scale previously unseen. A growing and increasingly important role for intermediaries is helping innovation districts evolve from the traditional “research and development” model to a “search and development” one, where crucial answers to their innovation questions and technological challenges are discovered by finding and collaborating with other firms. Some districts immediately recognized this potential and have gone to great lengths to grow, lure, and fund the development of multiple intermediaries across their districts. The Cortex Innovation Community in St. Louis has, in a short period, clustered new buildings owned and/or supported by a number of well-respected intermediaries. These development and programmatic moves are effectively creating a new focal point for Cortex innovation activities. The new Cambridge Innovation Center, which offers space for start-ups combined with access to venture capital firms, professional services, and a plug-and-play physical environment, is already at 85 percent occupancy. A newly constructed Tech Shop—a do-it-yourself “maker space” equipped with industrial tools, machinery, and technology to support entrepreneurs—is under construction nearby. The near complete renovation of the Center for Emerging Technologies, which provides training, specialized facilities, and technical support, adds yet another layer of support for entrepreneurs and start-ups. Adding more to this mix is a soon-to-be-constructed space for tech-commercial activities combined with new housing, which will exponentially increase the number of people in a very small radius.2 As one can imagine, this clustering was deeply intentional and viewed as a way to stimulate new relationships, new networks, and the cross-fertilization of ideas; Cortex refers to this deliberate process as “innovation engineering.” We anticipate more innovation districts to follow suit, pursuing, if not cultivating, such intermediaries in their own innovation ecosystems. Finally, the rise of innovation districts takes place in a national and urban political environment that demands inclusive growth and equitable outcomes. The past year has seen the elevation of income inequality and social mobility as issues of national and urban significance. With the federal government mired in partisan gridlock, cities have become the vanguard of efforts to raise the minimum wage, expand affordable housing, and extend pre-K education, among other initiatives. These efforts come at a time when the civil unrest in Baltimore and Ferguson has refocused national attention on neighborhoods of high poverty. Because of their location in the cores of central cities, many established and emerging innovation districts are located several blocks away from distressed communities. This proximity creates an enormous opportunity to show the positive impact that innovative growth can have on inclusive outcomes. Innovation districts create employment opportunities that can be filled by local residents and procurement and construction opportunities that can be fulfilled by local vendors and contractors. The districts generate tax revenues that can be used to fund neighborhood services and neighborhood regeneration. And they offer the potential to link the ample expertise and talent in anchor educational institutions with the needs of neighborhood schools and children. Recognizing these benefits, local leaders are demonstrating a genuine commitment to growing more inclusive districts. In our work, we’ve seen several early models that could be built on and replicated. In the Barcelona 22@ district, for example, leaders are trying to quantify the growth in service jobs accessible to local and regional residents while, at the same time, connecting those residents to training that increases their skills in more innovation-oriented sectors. Last year, Drexel University opened a new “urban extension center” that offers career-building workshops, legal clinics, and other services to residents of the adjacent Mantua Promise Zone. The Evergreen Cooperative in Cleveland’s University Circle district has been working for several years to leverage local purchasing power to create business ownership and employment opportunities for low-income residents. And in Baltimore, the University of Maryland partnered with surrounding neighborhood organizations, residents, and institutions to develop a detailed new plan for building what the Baltimore Southwest Partnership envisions as a “diverse, cohesive community of choice built on mutual respect and shared responsibility.” These examples represent concrete initiatives to ensure that nearby neighborhoods and their residents connect to and benefit from new growth opportunities in innovation districts and beyond. Scaling such efforts will be critical in the years to come, as the success of these districts will be defined in large part by their broader city and regional impacts. As Brookings works this year to help unleash more innovation districts across the U.S. and Europe, we will continue to hone our observations and knowledge about trends, challenges, and strategies. We will compile and publish what we have learned for anchor leaders, policymakers, scholars, and practitioners, focusing on many of the issues—accelerating commercialization to improving inclusion—noted above. We will do this work in close collaboration with proven organizations like Mass Economics and Project for Public Spaces. We look forward to contributing to this rapidly changing space via empirical and on-the-ground research, strategy and policy development, convenings, and network building. Stay tuned. Read The Rise of Innovation Districts: A New Geography of Innovation in America 1. Project for Public Spaces, “Placemaking and Place-Led Development: A New Paradigm for Cities of the Future, available at http://www.pps.org/reference/placemaking-and-place-led-development-a-new-paradigm-for-cities-of-the-future/ (June 15, 2015). 2. Email exchange with Dennis Lower, President and CEO, Cortex Innovation Community, May 8, 2015. Authors Bruce KatzJennifer S. VeyJulie Wagner Image Source: © Charles Mostoller / Reuters Full Article
year The Arab Spring Five Years Later By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: The dilemma felt by Arab youth was captured in Tunisia by the self-immolation in 2010 of Mohamed Bouazizi, who was frustrated by restrictions on his small street-vending business. His death became the catalyst that seemed to light up revolts throughout the Middle East. The frustration had been building for some time: large segments of society… Full Article
year The Arab Spring Five Years Later: Vol 2 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Volume 1 of The Arab Spring Five Years Later is based on extensive research conducted by scholars from a variety of backgrounds, including many associated with the Japan International Cooperation Agency. Now the original research papers are gathered in volume 2 and are available for readers who wish to go even further in understanding the… Full Article
year The Arab Spring Five Years Later: Vol. 1 & Vol. 2 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 29 Sep 2016 18:10:44 +0000 This two-volume set explores in-depth the economic origins and repercussions of the Arab Spring revolts. Volume 1 of The Arab Spring Five Years Later is based on extensive research conducted by scholars from a variety of backgrounds, including many associated with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The original research papers are gathered in volume… Full Article
year The Arab Spring five years later: Toward greater inclusiveness By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Five years have passed since the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia sparked revolts around the Arab world and the beginning of the Arab Spring. Despite high hopes that the Arab world was entering a new era of freedom, economic growth, and social justice, the transition turned out to be long and difficult, with the… Full Article
year The Council of Economic Advisers: 70 years of advising the president By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 14:00:00 -0500 Event Information February 11, 20162:00 PM - 5:00 PM ESTFalk AuditoriumBrookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC 20036 The White House Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) was created by Congress in 1946 to advise the president on ways “to foster and promote free competitive enterprise” and “to promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power.” President Truman, who signed the Employment Act of 1946 into law, was unenthusiastic about the Council and didn’t nominate members for nearly six months. Yet the CEA, comprised of three individuals whom Congress says are to be “exceptionally qualified,” has not only survived but also prospered for 70 years and remains an important part of the president’s economic policy decisionmaking. On February 11, the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at Brookings marked this anniversary by examining the ways the CEA and other economists succeed and fail when they set out to advise elected politicians and tap the expertise of some of the “exceptionally qualified” economists who have chaired the Council over the past four decades. You can join the conversation and tweet questions for the panelists at #CEAat70. Video Panel 1: The CEA in Moments of CrisisPanel 2: The CEA and PolicymakingPanel 3: Current Economic Policy Issues Audio The Council of Economic Advisers: 70 years of advising the president Transcript Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf) Event Materials 20160211_economic_advisers_transcript Full Article
year 17 years after 9/11, people are finally forgetting about terrorism By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 11 Sep 2018 18:38:38 +0000 Full Article
year Party Fundraising Success Continues Through Mid-Year By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 02 Aug 2004 00:00:00 -0400 With only a few months remaining before the 2004 elections, national party committees continue to demonstrate financial strength and noteworthy success in adapting to the more stringent fundraising rules imposed by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). A number of factors, including the deep partisan divide in the electorate, the expectations of a close presidential race, and the growing competition in key Senate and House races, have combined with recent party investments in new technology and the emergence of the Internet as a major fundraising tool to produce what one party chairman has described as a "perfect storm" for party fundraising.1 Consequently, both national parties have exceeded the mid-year fundraising totals achieved in 2000, and both approach the general election with substantial amounts of money in the bank.After eighteen months of experience under the new rules, the national parties are still outpacing their fundraising efforts of four years ago. As of June 30, the national parties have raised $611.1 million in federally regulated hard money alone, as compared to $535.6 million in hard and soft money combined at a similar point in the 2000 election cycle. The Republicans lead the way, taking in more than $381 million as compared to about $309 million in hard and soft money by the end of June in 2000. The Democrats have also raised more, bringing in $230 million as compared to about $227 million in hard and soft money four years ago. Furthermore, with six months remaining in the election cycle, both national parties have already raised more hard money than they did in the 2000 election cycle.2 In fact, by the end of June, every one of the Democratic and Republican national party committees had already exceeded its hard money total for the entire 2000 campaign.3 This surge in hard money fundraising has allowed the national party committees to replace a substantial portion of the revenues they previously received through unlimited soft money contributions. Through June, these committees have already taken in enough additional hard money to compensate for the $254 million of soft money that they had garnered by this point in 2000, which represented a little more than half of their $495 million in total soft money receipts in the 2000 election cycle.View the accompanying data tables (PDF - 11.4 KB) 1Terrence McAuliffe, Democratic National Committee Chairman, quoted in Paul Fahri, "Small Donors Grow Into Big Political Force," Washington Post, May 3, 2004, p. A11.2In 2000, the Republican national party committees raised $361.6 million in hard money, while the Democratic national committees raised $212.9 million. These figures are based on unadjusted data and do not take into account any transfers of funds that may have taken place among the national party committees.3The election cycle totals for 2000 can be found in Federal Election Commission, "FEC Reports Increase in Party Fundraising for 2000," press release, May 15, 2001. Available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2001/051501partyfund/051501partyfund.html (viewed July 28, 2004). Downloads DownloadData Tables Authors Anthony Corrado Full Article
year Desert Storm after 25 years: Confronting the exposures of modern warfare By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 16 Jun 2016 15:00:00 -0400 Event Information June 16, 20163:00 PM - 5:00 PM EDTSEIU Building1800 Massachusetts Ave. NWWashington, DC Register for the EventBy most metrics, the 1991 Gulf War, also known as Operation Desert Storm, was a huge and rapid success for the United States and its allies. The mission of defeating Iraq's army, which invaded Kuwait the year prior, was done swiftly and decisively. However, the war's impact on soldiers who fought in it was lasting. Over 650,000 American men and women served in the conflict, and many came home with symptoms including insomnia, respiratory disorders, memory issues and others attributed to a variety of exposures – “Gulf War Illness." On June 16, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings and Georgetown University Medical Center co-hosted a discussion on Desert Storm, its veterans, and how they are faring today. Representative Mike Coffman (R-Col.), the only member of Congress to serve in both Gulf wars, delivered an opening address before joining Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at Brookings, for a moderated discussion. Joel Kupersmith, former head of the Office of Research and Development of the Department of Veterans Affairs, convened a follow-on panel with Carolyn Clancy, deputy under secretary for health for organizational excellence at the Department of Veterans Affairs; Adrian Atizado, deputy national legislative director at Disabled American Veterans; and James Baraniuk, professor of medicine at Georgetown University Medical Center. Audio Desert Storm after 25 years: Confronting the exposures of modern warfare Transcript Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf) Event Materials 20160616_desert_storm_transcript Full Article
year The state of tech policy, one year into the Trump administration By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 20:06:15 +0000 Donald Trump’s first State of the Union address offers the president an opportunity to list his achievements over the past year and outline his policy agenda for the year to come. In the realm of technology policy, the past year has seen an emptying out of key science advisory positions, the repeal of existing net… Full Article
year The Iran deal, one year out: What Brookings experts are saying By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 09:54:00 -0400 How has the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—signed between the P5+1 and Iran one year ago—played out in practice? Several Brookings scholars, many of whom participated prominently in debates last year surrounding official congressional review, offered their views. Strobe Talbott, President, Brookings Institution: At the one-year mark, it’s clear that the nuclear agreement between Iran and the major powers has substantially restricted Tehran’s ability to produce the fissile material necessary to build a bomb. That’s a net positive—for the United States and the broader region. Robert Einhorn, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Senior Fellow, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, Foreign Policy program: One year after its conclusion, the JCPOA remains controversial in Tehran and Washington (as I describe in more detail here), with opponents unreconciled to the deal and determined to derail it. But opponents have had to scale back their criticism, in large part because the JCPOA, at least so far, has delivered on its principal goal—blocking Iran’s path to nuclear weapons for an extended period of time. Moreover, Iran’s positive compliance record has not given opponents much ammunition. The IAEA found Iran in compliance in its two quarterly reports issued in 2016. But challenges to the smooth operation and even the longevity of the deal are already apparent. A real threat to the JCPOA is that Iran will blame the slow recovery of its economy on U.S. failure to conscientiously fulfill its sanctions relief commitments and, using that as a pretext, will curtail or even end its own implementation of the deal. But international banks and businesses have been reluctant to engage Iran not because they have been discouraged by the United States but because they have their own business-related reasons to be cautious. Legislation proposed in Congress could also threaten the nuclear deal. For now, the administration is in a position to block new legislation that it believes would scuttle the deal. But developments outside the JCPOA, especially Iran’s regional behavior and its crackdown on dissent at home, could weaken support for the JCPOA within the United States and give proponents of deal-killing legislation a boost. A potential wildcard for the future of the JCPOA is coming governing transitions in both Washington and Tehran. Hillary Clinton would maintain the deal but perhaps a harder line than her predecessor. Donald Trump now says he will re-negotiate rather than scrap the deal, but a better deal will not prove negotiable. With President Hassan Rouhani up for re-election next year and the health of the Supreme Leader questionable, Iran’s future policy toward the JCPOA cannot be confidently predicted. A final verdict on the JCPOA is many years away. But it is off to a promising start, as even some of its early critics now concede. Still, it is already clear that the path ahead will not always be smooth, the longevity of the deal cannot be taken for granted, and keeping it on track will require constant focus in Washington and other interested capitals. Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director, Foreign Policy program and Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has fulfilled neither the worst fears of its detractors nor the most soaring ambitions of its proponents. All of the concerns that have shaped U.S. policy toward Tehran for more than a generation—terrorism, human rights abuses, weapons of mass destruction, regional destabilization—remain as relevant, and as alarming, as they have ever been. Notably, much the same is true on the Iranian side; the manifold grievances that Tehran has harbored toward Washington since the 1979 revolution continue to smolder. An important truth about the JCPOA, which has been wielded by both its defenders and its detractors in varying contexts, is that it was transactional, not transformational. As President Barack Obama repeatedly insisted, the accord addressed one specific problem, and in those narrow terms, it can be judged a relative success. The value of that relative success should not be underestimated; a nuclear-armed Iran would magnify risks in a turbulent region in a terrible way. But in the United States, in Iran, and across the Middle East, the agreement has always been viewed through a much broader lens—as a waystation toward Iranian-American rapprochement, as an instrument for addressing the vicious cycle of sectarian violence that threatens to consume the region, as a boost to the greater cause of moderation and democratization in Iran. And so the failure of the deal to catalyze greater cooperation from Iran on a range of other priorities—Syria, Yemen, Iraq, to name a few—or to jumpstart improvements in Iran’s domestic dynamics cannot be disregarded simply because it was not its original intent. For the “new normal” of regularized diplomatic contact between Washington and Tehran to yield dividends, the United States will need a serious strategy toward Tehran that transcends the JCPOA, building on the efficacy of the hard-won multilateral collaboration on the nuclear issue. Iranians, too, must begin to pivot the focus of their efforts away from endless litigation of the nuclear deal and toward a more constructive approach to addressing the deep challenges facing their country today. Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy and Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Director, Intelligence Project, Foreign Policy program: As I explain more fully here, one unintended but very important consequence of the Iran nuclear deal has been to aggravate and intensify Saudi Arabia's concerns about Iran's regional goals and intentions. This fueling of Saudi fears has in turn fanned sectarian tensions in the region to unprecedented levels, and the results are likely to haunt the region for years to come. Riyadh's concerns about Iran have never been primarily focused on the nuclear danger. Rather, the key Saudi concern is that Iran seeks regional hegemony and uses terrorism and subversion to achieve it. The deal deliberately does not deal with this issue. In Saudi eyes, it actually makes the situation worse because lifting sanctions removed Iran's isolation as a rogue state and gives it more income. Washington has tried hard to reassure the Saudis, and President Obama has wisely sought to build confidence with King Salman and his young son. The Iran deal is a good one, and I've supported it from its inception. But it has had consequences that are dangerous and alarming. In the end, Riyadh and Tehran are the only players who can deescalate the situation—the Saudis show no sign of interest in that road. Norman Eisen, Visiting Fellow, Governance Studies: The biggest disappointment of the post-deal year has been the failure of Congress to pass legislation complementing the JCPOA. There is a great deal that the legislative branch could do to support the pact. Above all, it could establish criteria putting teeth into U.S. enforcement of Preamble Section III, Iran's pledge never to seek nuclear weapons. Congress could and should make clear what the ramp to seeking nuclear weapons would look like, what the triggers would be for U.S. action, and what kinds of U.S. action would be on the table. If Iran knows that, it will modulate its behavior accordingly. If it does not, it will start to act out, and we have just kicked the can down the road. That delay is of course immensely valuable—but why not extend the road indefinitely? Congress can do that, and much more (e.g. by increasing funding for JCPOA oversight by the administration and the IAEA), with appropriate legislation. Richard Nephew, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, Foreign Policy program: Over the past year, much effort has gone into ensuring that the Iran deal is fully implemented. To date, the P5+1 has—not surprisingly—gotten the better end of the bargain, with significant security benefits accruing to them and their partners in the Middle East once the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified the required changes to Iran's nuclear program. Iran, for its part, has experienced a natural lag in its economic resurgence, held back by the collapse in oil prices in 2014, residual American and European sanctions, and reluctance among banks and businesses to re-engage. But, Iran's economy has stabilized and—if the deal holds for its full measure—the security benefits that the P5+1 and their partners have won may fall away while Iran's economy continues to grow. The most important challenge related to the deal for the next U.S. administration (and, presumably, the Rouhani administration in its second term) is therefore: how can it be taken forward, beyond the 10- to 15-year transition period? Iran will face internal pressure to expand its nuclear program, but it also will face pressure to refrain both externally and internally, should other countries in the region seek to create their own matching nuclear capabilities. The best next step for all sides is to negotiate a region-wide arrangement to manage nuclear programs –one that constrains all sides, though perhaps not equally. It must ensure—at a minimum—that nuclear developments in the region are predictable, understandable, and credibly civilian (something Bob Einhorn and I addressed in a recent report). The next White House will need to do the hard work of convincing countries in the region—and beyond—not to rest on the victory of the JCPOA. Rather, they must take it for what it is: another step towards a more stable and manageable region. Tamara Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program: This week, Washington is awash in events and policy papers taking stock of how the Iran nuclear deal has changed the Middle East in the past year. The narratives presented this week largely track the positions that the authors, speakers, or organizations articulated on the nuclear deal when it was first concluded last summer. Those who opposed the deal have marshaled evidence of how the deal has "emboldened" Iran's destabilizing behavior, while those who supported the deal cite evidence of "moderated" politics in the Islamic Republic. That polarized views on the deal last year produce polarized assessments of the deal's impact this year should surprise no one. In fact, no matter which side of the nuclear agreement’s worth it presents, much of the analysis out this week ascribes to the nuclear deal Iranian behavior and attitudes in the region that existed before the deal's conclusion and implementation. Iran has been a revisionist state, and a state sponsor of terrorism, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry predates the revolution; Iran's backing of Houthi militias against Saudi and its allies in Yemen well predates the nuclear agreement. Most notably, the upheavals in the Arab world since 2011 have given Iran wider opportunities than perhaps ever before to exploit the cracks within Arab societies—and to use cash, militias, and other tools to advance its interests and expand its influence. Iran has exploited those opportunities skillfully in the last five years and, as I wrote last summer, was likely to continue to do so regardless of diplomatic success or failure in Vienna. To argue that the nuclear deal somehow created these problems, or could solve them, is ahistorical. It is true that Iran's access to global markets might free even more cash for these endeavors, and that is a real issue worth tracking. But since severe sanctions did not prevent Iran from spending hundreds of millions of dollars to support and supply Hezbollah, or marshaling Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and militia fighters to sustain the faltering regime of Bashar Assad in Syria, it's not clear that additional cash will generate a meaningful difference in regional outcomes. Certainly, the nuclear deal's conclusion and implementation did not alter the trajectory of Iranian policy in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon to any noticeable degree—and that means that, no matter what the merits or dangers of the JCPOA, the United States must still confront and work to resolve enduring challenges to regional instability—including Iran's revisionist behavior. Kenneth M. Pollack, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program: When the JCPOA was being debated last year, I felt that the terms of the deal were far less consequential than how the United States responded to Iranian regional behavior after a deal was signed. I see the events of the past 12 months as largely having borne that out. While both sides have accused the other of "cheating," the deal has so far largely held. However, as many of my colleagues have noted, the real frictions have arisen from the U.S. geostrategic response to the deal. I continue to believe that signing the JCPOA was better than any of the realistic alternatives—though I also continue to believe that a better deal was possible, had the administration handled the negotiations differently. However, the administration’s regional approach since then has been problematic—with officials condemning Riyadh and excusing Tehran in circumstances where both were culpable and ignoring some major Iranian transgressions, for instance (and with President Obama gratuitously insulting the Saudis and other U.S. allies in interviews). America's traditional Sunni Arab allies (and to some extent Turkey and Israel) feared that either the United States would use the JCPOA as an excuse to further disengage from the region or to switch sides and join the Iranian coalition. Their reading of events has been that this is precisely what has happened, and it is causing the GCC states to act more aggressively. I think our traditional allies would enthusiastically welcome a Hillary Clinton presidency. She would likely do all that she could to reassure them that she plans to be more engaged and more willing to commit American resources and energy to Middle Eastern problems. But those allies will eventually look for her to turn words into action. I cannot imagine a Hillary Clinton administration abrogating the JCPOA, imposing significant new economic sanctions on Iran, or otherwise acting in ways that it would fear could provoke Tehran to break the deal. Our allies may see that as Washington trying to remain on the fence, which will infuriate them. So there are some important strategic differences between the United States and its regional allies. The second anniversary of the JCPOA could therefore prove even more fraught for America and the Middle East than the first. Authors Strobe TalbottRobert EinhornSuzanne MaloneyBruce RiedelNorman EisenRichard NephewTamara Cofman WittesKenneth M. Pollack Full Article
year 6 years from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill: What we’ve learned, and what we shouldn’t misunderstand By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Six years ago today, the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico with devastating effects on the local environment and on public perception of offshore oil and gas drilling. The blowout sent toxic fluids and gas shooting up the well, leading to an explosion on board the rig that killed… Full Article Uncategorized
year 40 years later: America’s energy path and the road ahead By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 31 Oct 2016 18:58:42 +0000 In a 1976 Foreign Affairs article, Amory Lovins offered a novel—and controversial—vision for America’s energy strategy. With U.S. security and energy independence threatened by oil market instability, Lovins urged policymakers to move away from fossil fuels and nuclear and towards efficiency and renewable energy. This “soft energy path,” he argued, offered a myriad of clear… Full Article
year Timeline: A tumultuous year in Israeli politics By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Israelis voted in two Knesset elections in 2019, and a third will now follow in early 2020. Meanwhile, Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit announced the indictment of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, escalating the legal drama surrounding the prime minister. The task of forming a new coalition may be just as difficult after the third election as… Full Article
year Experts assess the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 50 years after it went into effect By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 03 Mar 2020 20:51:09 +0000 March 5, 2020 marks the 50th anniversary of the entry into effect of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Five decades on, is the treaty achieving what was originally envisioned? Where is it succeeding in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, and where might it be falling short? Four Brookings experts on defense… Full Article
year Presidential leadership in the first year By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 02 Dec 2016 19:12:23 +0000 The first year in office presents a unique window of opportunity for a new president to advance his agenda and pass signature legislation. President Obama’s first year for instance saw the passage of the economic stimulus, Dodd-Frank, and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, along with new ethics guidelines designed to curtail the influence of… Full Article
year After 50 years, the U.S. and Cuba will finally have embassies to call home By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 01 Jul 2015 11:15:00 -0400 Today’s announcement of the restoration of diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana replaces over five decades of mutual hostility and aggressive name-calling with a new atmosphere of diplomatic civility. The re-opening of embassies in both capitals establishes platforms upon which to build more normal working relations. Now, the hard work begins, as the two nations gradually dismantle the comprehensive wall of restrictions separating them for two generations. Expectations are running high, especially in Cuba, that diplomatic engagement will catalyze economic betterment on the island. To stimulate more travel and trade, the U.S. government needs to clarify rules for engaging with the emerging Cuban private sector, and make it clear to U.S. banks that they are permitted to support the use of credit cards by U.S. visitors in Cuba. The administration should also begin to consider another round of liberalizing initiatives, some under consideration in the U.S. Congress, to further relax travel restrictions, and to enable more U.S. firms—beyond agriculture and medicines—to assist the Cuban people. For its part, the Cuban government should open efficient channels to facilitate the commercial exchanges now authorized by the Obama administration. Cuban entrepreneurs should be permitted ready access to U.S. firms wishing to sell building equipment for construction cooperatives, restaurant supplies for private-owned restaurants, and automotive spare parts for private taxis. Micro-enterprise lending should be authorized to support these emerging non-state enterprises. If both nations build upon today’s welcome announcement by further opening these channels to travel and commerce, Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro can help to safeguard their joint legacy. By fortifying and expanding constituencies on both sides of the Florida Straits, immersed in daily exchanges to mutual benefit, the two governments can render their diplomatic accomplishment politically irreversible in both capitals. Authors Richard E. Feinberg Full Article
year Iran’s economy 40 years after the Islamic Revolution By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 18:01:37 +0000 Unlike the socialist revolutions of the last century, the Islamic Revolution of Iran did not identify itself with the working class or the peasantry, and did not bring a well-defined economic strategy to reorganize the economy. Apart from eliminating the interest rate from the banking system, which was achieved in name only, the revolution put… Full Article
year Jacques Tati's film Playtime was released 50 years ago, but has lessons for us today By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Tue, 19 Dec 2017 13:37:14 -0500 We are still befuddled by technology but bumble along. Full Article Design
year 100 years ago a flu pandemic started, killing as many as 100 million By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Thu, 03 May 2018 09:47:58 -0400 And things feel eerily familiar today. Full Article Living
year 100 years ago, food helped win the war By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Sun, 11 Nov 2018 12:57:33 -0500 100 years later, there are still lessons to be learned: Eat less, eat better, don't waste, and share. Full Article Living
year 21-year-old activist wins World Environment Day video competition By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Thu, 08 May 2014 11:44:25 -0400 The United Nations Environment Programme and goodwill ambassador Don Cheadle have selected a winner. See the video here. Full Article Science
year The weirdest trash found on beaches last year By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Tue, 29 May 2018 13:47:00 -0400 This series of infographics reveals the bizarre discoveries made by volunteers during the 2017 International Coastal Cleanup. Full Article Science
year 30 Biggest Stories of the Year in Animal Conservation and Extinctions By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Wed, 12 Dec 2012 07:00:00 -0500 The good, the bad, and the we-can-fix-its of the year all gathered up in one place. Full Article Science
year The Year In Strange Design: 20 of the Oddest, Ugliest and Most Useless By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Thu, 13 Dec 2012 14:14:00 -0500 I really didn't know where to start, there is so much terrible stuff around Full Article Design
year The top 10 gadget stories of the year By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Thu, 31 Dec 2015 10:16:49 -0500 Hydroponics systems, electricity-free appliances and more caught your attention in 2015. Full Article Technology
year 2018: The year in healthy homes By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Mon, 24 Dec 2018 11:31:13 -0500 Or why you shouldn't barbecue indoors. Full Article Design
year 2018: The year wood construction took some steps forward, steps back By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Thu, 27 Dec 2018 14:31:02 -0500 Some dramatic changes this year will have a big impact on the future of wood construction. Full Article Design
year After 139 years, General Electric stops making light bulbs By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Tue, 14 Nov 2017 10:08:05 -0500 There will be indignation, but this is the result of one of the most successful transformations of a market in our lifetime. Full Article Business
year 80-year-old wooden escalators repurposed into impressive sculpture By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Thu, 07 Dec 2017 16:38:48 -0500 Instead of trashing these old treads, they have been made into a inter-looping work of art in the same station. Full Article Living
year Best of 2007: Greenwashers of the Year By www.treehugger.com Published On :: Fri, 28 Dec 2007 14:53:27 -0500 1)The ultimate in greenwashing chutzpah for the year goes to the Fur Council of Canada for their Full Article Business