An unexpected bounty for Iran

Sanam Vakil

The assassination of Qassem Soleimani has been an unexpected bounty for the Islamic Republic at a time when Iran was balancing multiple economic, domestic and regional pressures stemming from the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.

Coming on the heels of anti-Iranian demonstrations in Iraq and Lebanon, and following Iran’s own November 2019 protests that resulted in a brutal government crackdown against its own people, the Soleimani killing has helped the Iranian government shift the narrative away from its perceived regional and domestic weaknesses to one of strength.  

The massive funeral scenes in multiple Iranian cities displaying unending waves of mourners chanting against the United States has provided the Islamic Republic with a unique opportunity to showcase its mobilizing potential. This potential is not limited to Iran but also extends to Iraq and Lebanon, where Tehran’s transnational summoning power has also been visible. The Iraqi parliamentary vote to end the American military presence is one early negative consequence. While the region awaits Iran’s response, further anti-American rallying cries will continue to reverberate.  

Domestically, Soleimani’s death and President Donald Trump’s continued provocations on Twitter, including threats to attack 52 Iranian cultural sites, are being used as a nationalist rallying cry. This sentiment should not be seen solely as Islamic or ideological, but rather an opportunity for the state to pivot to an Iranian-based nationalism that is more inclusive and empowering for much of the country’s disgruntled youth.

Iran’s notoriously divided political factions have also unified in the face of this crisis. With parliamentary elections looming in February and turnout previously expected to be low, the political establishment is likely to use this crisis to mobilize voters in favour of conservative candidates.  

How Tehran chooses to respond to Qassem Soleimani’s death will very much determine its ability to continue to control the narrative and manage its swell of domestic and regional support. For these benefits to continue to manifest, it is important for Tehran to balance the mix of public sympathy and international anxiety and not overplay its hand in its quest for revenge.

A reset for Iraqi politics

Renad Mansour

The US strike which killed Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis has grave implications for Iraq. The act jeopardizes Iraq’s recently stabilized security situation, and threatens to reshape the country’s political environment, moving backwards to the days of anti-Americanism and sect-based mobilization. If Baghdad loses relations with the US and other diplomatic representations, it risks turning into a pariah state. 

Over the past few years, and notably since October 2019, young Iraqis have taken to the streets demanding reform and the downfall of the political establishment, and its main external backer Iran. The political establishment, including political parties and militias close to Tehran, failed to appease or suppress these protests. Now, these political elites are using the deaths of Muhandis and Soleimani to (re)gain popularity from their own population, by drawing on the old tool of anti-Americanism. 

Following the attacks, Shia populist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr – who until recently had called for an end to Iranian and pro-Iranian militia influence in Iraq – has called to revamp the Mehdi Army that he led until 2008 and is calling for ‘Islamic resistance’ to the US. In seeking to regain control of his former movement, he is coming closer to former Shia foes.

For years, pro-Iranian groups attempted to push the US out of Iraq. Their calls often fell on deaf ears, as public opinion in Iraq did not consider the US as a threat and some even supported the US and international effort against ISIS. Following the attacks, however, anti-American voices have gained more ammunition.

A complete American withdrawal would not only have direct security implications but force other countries and organizations, from European states to NATO, to reconsider their positions and role.

Limited options for ‘revenge’ in the Levant

Lina Khatib

Iran’s use of Lebanon and Syria as spaces for revenge against the US is unlikely.

On Sunday, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah vowed revenge for Soleimani’s death by singling out American soldiers as a target. However, Hezbollah’s options are limited. Lebanon is in the middle of wide-ranging protests against the country’s ruling political class, of which Nasrallah is a key figure.

Unlike in 2006, when Hezbollah’s military actions against Israel rallied the public around it, today there is no public appetite for dragging Lebanon into a war. Were Hezbollah to instigate one, it would incur public anger, if only for the economic repercussions that would exacerbate an already severe financial crisis in Lebanon. Lebanon also does not have any US military bases that could be a target for Hezbollah.

In theory, Hezbollah or other Iranian-backed groups could attack American bases in Syria. But these bases are staffed by multinational forces from the international anti-ISIS coalition. Attacking them would therefore put Iran in confrontation with other countries besides the US, which is not in Iran’s interest.

Attacking US soldiers in northeast Syria would also go against Kurdish interests because it would weaken the anti-ISIS coalition front of which Kurdish forces are part. It would, furthermore, anger Arab tribes in the area, opening up possibilities for ISIS to take advantage of public dissent to stage a comeback. Iran would then find itself fighting on several fronts at once, which it does not have the capacity to handle. 

More likely, Iran’s allies and proxies in the Levant are going to engage in strong rhetoric without taking hasty actions. When a key Hezbollah leader, Imad Mughniyeh, was assassinated in Damascus on 2008, there were strong words and public vows to seek revenge for his killing, but ultimately there was no response.    

2019 was a turbulent year for the Middle East and North Africa. The region was swept by a wave of anti-government protests with popular unrest erupting across Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran. Tensions in the Gulf escalated following clashes between Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States. Nearly a decade after the Arab Spring, civil wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen continue to rage with little hope for political solutions to the crises.

At this breakfast briefing, Chatham House's Middle East and North Africa Programme researchers will discuss possible scenarios for the region in the year ahead. The experts will explore key trends relevant to the business community and will share insights from recent research trips and discussions with key stakeholders in the MENA region. 

Please note that participation in this event is only open to supporters of the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme and selected guests.

Dr Lina Khatib takes up her role at Chatham House as of 3 May 2016. She joins Chatham House from her position as a senior research associate with the Arab Reform Initiative. Previously, she was director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut and, prior to that, the co-founding head of the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, said: ‘I take great pleasure in welcoming Dr Lina Khatib to Chatham House. Dr Khatib joins our team at a critical time of prolonged turmoil and upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa. Her significant international experience of analysing developments in the region will be a great asset to Chatham House as it assesses the core political, economic, societal and security issues affecting peace and prosperity across this region. I would also like to thank Dr Neil Quilliam for his strong leadership of the Middle East and North Africa Programme since 2014.’

Dr Lina Khatib, said: ‘At a time when countries in the Middle East and North Africa face critical challenges, from continuing conflicts in Syria, Libya, and elsewhere, to increasing socio-economic pressures, it is essential for policy decisions to be informed by rigorous and forward-thinking research and debate. I look forward to working with the team at Chatham House to assist decision-makers and the public in understanding the complexities of an important region at this turbulent moment and seeking creative ways of alleviating its challenges.’ 

Dr Neil Quilliam, who has been acting head of the programme since December 2015, will continue with his role as senior research fellow and Syria project director. 

With the Middle East in chaos and the future of many states increasingly uncertain, there is a large amount of attention as to how policy-makers in Europe and the US should respond. In particular, many in Europe are unsure of long-term US policy in light of competing American priorities, budgetary constraints and a public adverse to committing further resources abroad. In this context, it is important that European and American policy-makers understand each other’s positions.

At this all-day event, a group of experts will discuss how US policy towards the Middle East is changing, what this means for Europe and, subsequently, how Europe should respond. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The workshop is held as part of the Transatlantic Strategy Group on the Future of US Global Leadership run jointly with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Over the course of a year, this group will discuss how US policy is changing on key issues and the implications for Europe. This project is supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, with support for this event provided by the Delegation of Strategic Affairs of the French Ministry of Defence and the British Embassy in Paris.

This event is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum and will take place virtually only.

International trade has a crucial role to play in tackling climate change. The production and transport of goods is a major contributor to green-house gas emissions, as is the delivery of certain cross-border services. At the same time, it looks inevitable that the COVID-19 pandemic will lead to a radical re-think of global supply chains as companies and governments seek to build in greater resilience while at the same time preserving as far as possible the efficiency gains and lower costs that global supply chains generate when operating normally.

Future international trade rules will have a crucial role to play in addressing both challenges; they represent both an opportunity and a risk. If designed well, they could play a very important role in re-enforcing moves towards a more sustainable use of resources, greater overall alignment of economies with the Paris Agreement, and greater economic resilience. But they could also, if poorly designed and implemented, or overly influenced by strategic political considerations, have significant unintended and negative implications. These include: reduced economic efficiency, increased poverty, unnecessary economic decoupling and reduced consensus on the broader mitigation and adaptation measures required to meet the challenge of climate change.

Against this background, a number of key questions arise: In what areas, if any, do we need to modify or adapt key principles underlying the system of global trade rules in order to respond to the twin challenges of responding to climate change and building greater economic resilience?  Which are the most promising/practical areas on which trade policy experts should focus now to re-launch/re-energize discussions on WTO reform, including, for example, dispute settlement? What national economic policies will be needed to complement the development of new/reformed trade disciplines in these areas? How might future political changes, such as a change in the US administration, affect the prospects for and political momentum behind such deliberations? What in any eventuality is the best way to build the required political momentum?
 
This roundtable is convened by the Global Economy and Finance Programme and the US and the Americas Programme and it is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. The event will take place virtually only.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank founding partner AIG and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo plc, and EY for their generous support of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.

Please note this event is taking place between 2pm to 3pm BST.

In the run-up to the 2016 US presidential election, then-candidate Donald Trump made a series of campaign promises concerning US foreign policy towards the Middle East. Since assuming office, President Trump has withdrawn the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, withdrawn troops from Syria, relocated the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem and orchestrated the strike against ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Against a backdrop of Trump's inclination towards withdrawing from the region, countries across the Middle East are being rocked by protests, Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile has threatened to undermine cohesion within NATO and the much hoped for ceasefire in Libya between UN-backed government leader, Fayez al-Sarraj, and opposition leader, Khalifa Haftar, failed to materialize.

In light of the upcoming US elections in November 2020, the future of US national security policy promises to be a prominent issue for the next administration. In this vein, the US and Americas Programme at Chatham House plans a yearlong focus on the pivotal US 2020 elections.

At this event, Dr Kori Schake, director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute will discuss the future of US foreign policy towards the Middle East. How have domestic and party politics in the US – and the unfolding presidential campaign – shaped recent policy decisions by the Trump administration? Should we expect policy objectives in the Middle East to remain consistent or shift under a second Trump term? And what direction could US foreign policy towards the region take under a Democratic administration?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

This event is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum and will take place virtually only.

International trade has a crucial role to play in tackling climate change. The production and transport of goods is a major contributor to green-house gas emissions, as is the delivery of certain cross-border services. At the same time, it looks inevitable that the COVID-19 pandemic will lead to a radical re-think of global supply chains as companies and governments seek to build in greater resilience while at the same time preserving as far as possible the efficiency gains and lower costs that global supply chains generate when operating normally.

Future international trade rules will have a crucial role to play in addressing both challenges; they represent both an opportunity and a risk. If designed well, they could play a very important role in re-enforcing moves towards a more sustainable use of resources, greater overall alignment of economies with the Paris Agreement, and greater economic resilience. But they could also, if poorly designed and implemented, or overly influenced by strategic political considerations, have significant unintended and negative implications. These include: reduced economic efficiency, increased poverty, unnecessary economic decoupling and reduced consensus on the broader mitigation and adaptation measures required to meet the challenge of climate change.

Against this background, a number of key questions arise: In what areas, if any, do we need to modify or adapt key principles underlying the system of global trade rules in order to respond to the twin challenges of responding to climate change and building greater economic resilience?  Which are the most promising/practical areas on which trade policy experts should focus now to re-launch/re-energize discussions on WTO reform, including, for example, dispute settlement? What national economic policies will be needed to complement the development of new/reformed trade disciplines in these areas? How might future political changes, such as a change in the US administration, affect the prospects for and political momentum behind such deliberations? What in any eventuality is the best way to build the required political momentum?
 
This roundtable is convened by the Global Economy and Finance Programme and the US and the Americas Programme and it is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. The event will take place virtually only.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank founding partner AIG and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo plc, and EY for their generous support of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.

Please note this event is taking place between 2pm to 3pm BST.