Introduction: Despite the launch of indirect, “proximity” talks between Palestinians and Israelis, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas continues to resist a resumption of direct negotiations with Israel absent a full settlement freeze. As chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and president of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Abbas also insists that any new negotiations pick up where previous talks left off in December 2008 and that the parties spell out ahead of time a clear “endgame,” including a timetable for concluding negotiations. While these may seem like unreasonable preconditions, Palestinian reluctance to dive headfirst into yet another round of negotiations is rooted in some genuine, hard-learned lessons drawn from nearly two decades of repeated failures both at the negotiating table and on the ground.

Not only have negotiations failed to bring Palestinians closer to their national aspirations but the peace process itself has presided over (and in some ways facilitated) a deepening of Israel’s occupation and an unprecedented schism within the Palestinian polity. Such failures have cost the Palestinian leadership dearly in terms of both its domestic legitimacy and its international credibility. While it remains committed to a negotiated settlement with Israel based on a two-state solution, the PLO/PA leadership has been forced to rethink previous approaches to the peace process and to negotiations, as much for its own survival as out of a desire for peace.

Haunted by past failures, Palestinian negotiators are now guided, to varying degrees, by six overlapping and sometimes conflicting lessons:

1. Realities on the ground must move in parallel with negotiations at the table.

2. Don’t engage in negotiations for their own sake.

3. Agreements are meaningless without implementation.

4. Incrementalism does not work.

5. Avoid being blamed at all costs.

6. Don’t go it alone.

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Let’s take a moment for a thought experiment. I do this days after more Palestinian attacks on Israelis, including the horrific murder of a mother of six children; soon after Israel announced the expropriation of another 370 acres of land near Jericho; and after Majed Faraj, the Palestinian security chief, announced that Palestinian security forces had intercepted 200 potential terrorist attacks against Israel. The thought experiment focuses on whether the “Plan B” for the Israel-Palestine dispute should be Israel’s annexation of the territories it occupied in 1967 and the extension of full citizenship rights to the Palestinians in those areas.

To be sure, I still count myself among the dying breed of those who believe fervently in the two-state solution—two states living side by side in peace and security, each enjoying sovereignty and political independence in part of the land that both claim as their exclusive national homes. This is still the best, by far, of all possible outcomes of the dispute. This is not to say that the two-state solution is without faults. Thus far, the two sides have not been able to agree on critical details, and there is no guarantee that achieving two states would assure peaceful relations. But the two-state solution, based on partition of the land, appears to offer the best chance for long term peace. I would dump all Plan B’s and C’s in a heartbeat if leadership emerged in Israel and Palestine—and in the United States—that proved willing to move toward a two-state outcome. 

I still count myself among the dying breed of those who believe fervently in the two-state solution.

But hoping for better, stronger, more farsighted leadership is not a substitute for policy. The fact is that both Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are further today from bringing forth such leaders than at any time before. Even if Benjamin Netanyahu yields the prime minister’s office to another contender, no one in Israel is proposing the kind of far-reaching accommodation toward which Ehud Olmert was heading in 2008. None of Mahmoud Abbas’s likely successors has even articulated a reasonable peace plan. And none of the candidates for U.S. president is likely to be as committed to the search for peace as Barack Obama has been, and even his commitment has fallen far short of what is needed to move the recalcitrant parties toward peace. The sad reality is that politics—not policy, per se—is what blocks progress toward a two-state solution.

The sad reality is that politics—not policy, per se—is what blocks progress toward a two-state solution.

Regional solution?

In the absence of progress toward two states, are there better alternatives than throwing in the towel and looking at annexation as Plan B? The search for alternative Plan B’s is a fool’s errand. Some of those ideas are creative, but none of them will be accepted by both sides. For example, one Plan B variant du jour rests on the premise of a “regional solution”—that is, having Israel and the Arab world reach a comprehensive peace agreement that includes a resolution of the Palestinian issue. Sounds good, except it makes no sense. 

First, Israel has not accepted the Arab Peace Initiative (API) of 2002, the closest the Arab world has come to accepting Israel within the borders of the 1949 armistice line and agreeing to normalize relations with Israel once peace has been achieved. But no Israeli government has liked its terms, especially the paragraph on Palestinian refugees, the notion of a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem, and the API’s insistence on full Israeli withdrawal. Thus, the question to those who propose a regional solution today is whether there is a coalition in Israel ready to use the API as the basis for negotiating a comprehensive peace. I think not.

Second, the Arab world is in no position to deliver on what the API promises. The Arabs have never followed up the API by engaging Israel. And the premise of the API has been that the Arabs will recognize Israel and agree to normalize only after peace is concluded with the Palestinians (and the Syrians and Lebanese)– not a very attractive incentive for Israelis to enter a risky peace process.

[T]he Arab world of 2002, however dysfunctional, was far more stable than the Arab world of 2016.

And third, the Arab world of 2002, however dysfunctional, was far more stable than the Arab world of 2016. The opponents of the two-state solution in Israel point to this when describing the security dangers that Israel would face were it to concede anything now to the Palestinians. Even if a comprehensive solution were to rest on the shoulders of Egypt and Jordan, Israel’s peace treaty partners, would Israeli skeptics truly be assuaged that these countries could assure Israel’s security in the face of continued instability (Egypt) or the impact of refugees and economic distress (Jordan)? Indeed, the idea of a regional or comprehensive solution based on Arab stability today is chimerical. 

Status quo?

The alternatives to the regional idea are equally unrealistic. The idea of confederation rests on the agreement of Jordan (and potentially Egypt) to join a political entity with the Palestinians. However, neither state has indicated any interest in doing so. 

“Maintaining the status quo” is a non-starter, because status quos are never static—as the events of recent years prove, they tend to get worse. How many Intifadas or stabbings will it take for the people of Israel to believe their own security chiefs, who recognize that these actions are born of frustration over the occupation and related grievances? Why should Israelis believe that the majority of Palestinians are interested in peace when Hamas—opposed to Israel’s very existence—still rules Gaza and commands significant popular support, and while the Palestinian Authority is crumbling and hardly represents anyone anymore? And how long will it take Palestinian supporters of armed and violent resistance to recognize that their abortive efforts to destroy Israel and indiscriminate attacks on Israeli civilians are repugnant: targeting civilians is a morally unacceptable tactic for any resistance movement. 

Thus, the idea of “conflict management” or even “conflict mitigation”—staple products of those who support maintaining the status quo until somehow things change—is pernicious, for it rests on an assumption that the rest of us simply don’t understand the conflict.

[T]he idea of a regional or comprehensive solution based on Arab stability today is chimerical.

A futile search for alternatives

And so it is for all other Plan B’s. Several years ago, my Princeton graduate students embarked on an effort to find a viable alternative to the two-state solution; and they told me at the outset that they intended to prove that such an alternative existed. In the end, they failed and returned to the idea that the only viable solution was to partition the land into two states. Others, too, have tried to find alternatives, and some retain the hope that their policy proposal might win the day. I wish them well—for I really do believe in peace, whether it’s via two states or otherwise. But I have no confidence they will succeed.

[T]he idea of “conflict management” or even “conflict mitigation”—staple products of those who support maintaining the status quo until somehow things change—is pernicious, for it rests on an assumption that the rest of us simply don’t understand the conflict.

And so we are back to the thought experiment. This would take as a starting point what Israeli Minister Uri Ariel told my students several years ago: we (Israel) have won, and the land of Israel is ours. Under this scenario, Israel would:

• Formally annex the territories it occupied in 1967, basing its legal argument on its belief that these are “disputed” rather than “occupied” territories. 
• In connection with this act of annexation, Israel would offer full citizenship rights to all the Palestinians living in the territories. While Israel would probably want to include only the West Bank in this arrangement, excluding Gaza would make it impossible to secure any support internationally, in that Gaza is as much a part of Resolution 242 as is the West Bank.
• Those Palestinians who accept citizenship would then enjoy equal rights with all other Israelis; those Palestinians who reject citizenship would be offered permanent residency, a status that would include certain rights and privileges but not full citizenship rights (for example, voting in national elections). 
• Israel would then approach the United Nations Security Council to argue that these measures constituted an act of self-determination, and that the outcome represented an end of the conflict in accordance with Resolution 242. I am not a lawyer and I assume that many—including Palestinians and Arabs—would dispute this Israeli argument. But the process would change the status quo fundamentally and offer a real alternative to the two-state solution.

Could this work, and is it a real Plan B for the conflict? This is but a thought experiment. I suppose most Israelis will hate this idea for it exposes the most significant weakness of the Israeli right wing and the settlements movement, namely that it undercuts fundamentally the idea of a permanent Jewish majority state. Similarly, most Palestinians will also hate this idea because it forecloses the possibility of a real act of self-determination culminating in an independent state and forces Palestinians to confront the emptiness of the slogans that their leaders have employed over the years in the context of the Arab-Israeli dispute. 

The thought experiment is thus not very sound. Perhaps, then, it will scare everyone enough for leaders to get serious about peace.

Editors’ Note: To salvage his Middle East legacy, advance American interests in the Arab world, and align with the position of the international community on this conflict, Ibrahim Fraihat argues, President Obama must make the long overdue decision of recognizing a sovereign and independent Palestinian state before leaving office. This post originally appeared on Middle East Eye.

Driven by the search for his legacy in the Middle East, it seems President Barack Obama has decided to spend additional political capital on reviving Israeli-Palestinian talks before the end of his second term in office.

Last month, the Wall Street Journal reported that the White House is working on a renewed peace push, including a possible Security Council resolution or other initiatives such as “a presidential speech and a joint statement from the Middle East Quartet.”

While it is still unclear where President Obama is going with this renewed effort, he must understand that using the same old techniques of U.S. mediation will only exacerbate the crisis, consequently tarnishing his legacy in the Middle East. To salvage his Middle East legacy, advance American interests in the Arab world, and align with the position of the international community on this conflict, he must make the long overdue decision of recognizing a sovereign and independent Palestinian state before leaving office.

[U]sing the same old techniques of U.S. mediation will only exacerbate the crisis, consequently tarnishing [Obama's] legacy in the Middle East.

First, Obama should learn from the mistakes of his predecessors, George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, who also tried to reach a mutually acceptable agreement between the Palestinian and Israelis with only a few months left in office.

Reaching an agreement between the two parties under severe time pressure will not work. A party that is not interested in a peace agreement can easily maneuver by using delaying tactics until Obama’s term ends. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu already utilized this strategy when he publicly rejected an invitation from Obama to visit the White House to talk peace because he wanted to “avoid any perceived influence” in the forthcoming U.S. presidential election. These remarks came from the same person who meddled in domestic American affairs by aggressively lobbying against Obama during the last U.S. presidential election.

Obama has already put in the effort by working with the parties, but now he needs to make decisions. Unlike many American presidents, Obama made the resolution of this conflict a top priority. Despite the brutal civil wars engulfing the Middle East region in the past five years, Obama demonstrated a firm commitment and allocated the needed political capital to make a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During his time in office, Secretary of State John Kerry spent more time on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations than any other international conflict. However, the outcome of the Obama administration’s intensive diplomatic efforts has been a total failure. These negotiations ended without an accord or even a memorandum of understanding, agreements that could have built on Obama’s legacy in the Middle East.

Nonetheless, Obama knows very well who made him fail. Netanyahu repeatedly defied Obama: In Congress, he refused to engage in serious negotiations that could have led to an agreement, and he publicly lobbied against Obama’s election for a second term. Obama should not expect Netanyahu to change his position and cooperate on any renewed efforts that could save Obama’s failed legacy in the Middle East. This is the same Netanyahu whom Obama increasingly grew frustrated with throughout his presidency.

With the remaining few months in office, the time has come for Obama to shape his legacy in the Middle East the way he wants it, not the way that Netanyahu has lobbied to characterize it. Obama has an opportunity to take his place in history as the first American president to officially recognize an independent Palestinian state.

Obama has an opportunity to take his place in history as the first American president to officially recognize an independent Palestinian state.

Sooner or later, there will be a Palestinian state and the United States will recognize it. Obama knows that very well. So why should he miss this opportunity and let another president recognize it in the future? Obama should worry about his own legacy, not Netanyahu’s extremist views. Obama should never allow Netanyahu to shape his legacy in the Middle East and leave it stained with failure.

Obama’s Middle East legacy is equally bleak in other parts of the region. Syria could become Obama’s Rwanda; Benghazi and the late Ambassador Chris Stevens are witnesses to his legacy in Libya; al-Qaeda in Yemen is much stronger today than when Obama intensified his drone policy against the organization; only history will tell how the Iran nuclear deal turns out in the future. Unfortunately, Obama cannot change the facts in any of these countries with the limited time remaining for him in office. However, he can still restore his legacy in the Middle East by recognizing a Palestinian state.

By recognizing a Palestinian state now, Obama will have seized an historical opportunity to impact the future and establish a foundation for the next American administration in the Middle East. No matter who comes to the White House, they will have to deal with this new fact. Obama has the international community on his side in recognizing Palestine. France recently stated that it will recognize an independent Palestinian state if a final effort to bring about peace fails. Additionally, Sweden has officially recognized Palestine.

American diplomats have a tradition of balancing their views after they leave office as they become free from the pressure of the Israel lobby and domestic politics. President Jimmy Carter is a one example of this.

Obama should not fall into this trap. No matter how he adjusts his views after leaving office, he will never save his legacy in the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if he does not recognize a Palestinian state while he still has the power to do so. The time is now and he must act rather than regretting it later.

President Obama, if not for your legacy, at least recognize Palestine for the Nobel Peace Prize that you received in advance. The committee trusted you and awarded you the prize before you achieved any real peace; do not disappoint them. Make sure you earn the prize, Mr. President. If not for your legacy or the prestigious prize, then please do something for your own personal pride and be the one who laughs last, not Benjamin Netanyahu.

Mr. President, recognize Palestine now.

“We are not buildings artists; we are buildings leaders in society.” 

These stirring words of Juliano Mer Khamis, the charismatic founder of The Freedom Theatre (TFT) in Jenin refugee camp in Palestine, are coming true, despite his assassination five years ago. 

Against all odds, The Freedom Theatre, a beacon of creativity, discipline, and vision located in the heart of Jenin refugee camp, recently celebrated its tenth anniversary. Known for its fierce fighters and its conservatism, Jenin refugee camp, where over 16,000 live on one square kilometer, increasingly is known as well for its art. 

Juliano Mer Khamis returned to Jenin during the second Intifada to find his mother’s Stone Theatre (Arna’s Children tells her story) reduced - like so much of the camp—to rubble by Israeli tanks, and many of his mother’s student actors killed. In 2005 he joined forces with Jonatan Stanczak, currently Managing Director of TFT and Zakaria Zbeidi, a “Stone Theatre child” turned head of the Al-Aqsa brigades in Jenin, who later renounced militancy for cultural resistance. Together they rebuilt a theater in the camp, which evolved into The Freedom Theatre. 

Mer Khamis urged his acting students to wage a cultural intifada, warning that the occupation of the mind was more dangerous than the occupation of the body. Unlike many charismatic leaders, Mer Khamis developed an institution, not a cult of personality (even though he was adored). Following Juliano’s untimely and unsolved murder in 2011 — he was shot sitting in his car just outside the theater, with his infant son in his lap - the devastated theater soldiered on, a living testament to the powerful impact of his teaching and vision.

“When Juliano died he gave us the strength to continue and he showed us the strength we had in ourselves, so we kept going,”

Ahmad Matahen, age 24, a typical “child of The Freedom Theatre”, explained to me. Matahen joined in 2006; first as an actor, then as Juliano encouraged him to discover and exploit his individual talents, he moved into technology, engineering and stage design. He now studies stage design in Bethlehem, with the support of TFT, where he hopes eventually to work.

What a different future than Matahen might have had, if Mer Khamis had not invited in this street youth who had mocked the theater, and expressed his anger and frustration by throwing rocks at Israeli tanks. Matahen described the common attitude in Jenin:

“When you go to the camp and ask people what they want, they say they want to die. They have no jobs, no hope.”

When asked what he missed most after Juliano’s death, Matahen said “hugs”, something no one besides Juliano gave him. As a teenager, Ahmad, like so many of his contemporaries, saw his friends killed by the invading/occupying Israelis. Considered against the backdrop of trauma that pervades the camp, hugs are no small thing. They form the foundation for the self-confidence and sense of purpose that Matahen has gained from The Freedom Theatre.

High school dropout Ameer Abu Alrob defied his family and left his village to live and work at The Freedom Theatre. He traveled to India last year with a TFT group that also included two female acting students, for a ground-breaking, three-month Palestinian-Indian collaboration and tour with Janam Theater. Ameer and half of the other Palestinian student actors had never previously traveled outside Palestine, much less flown in a plane.

Through his experiences Ameer is not only broadening the horizons of his family and village, but, importantly, also introducing them to their own history through The Freedom Theatre productions such as The Siege. (One of the reasons Ameer dropped out was that school taught him nothing about his own environment and history).

Performed to date in Palestine and Great Britain, The Siege brings to life on stage the incident in 2002 during the second Intifada when armed Palestinian fighters along with some two hundred Palestinian civilians escaped the onslaught of Israeli gunfire and tanks by taking refuge in Bethlehem’s renowned Church of the Nativity. The trapped Palestinians - without food, water, or medical supplies - struggled to remain “steadfast”. After thirty-nine days, they surrendered, responding to the plea of a young mother whose baby’s life was at risk because the siege prevented her taking the infant to the hospital.

This decision, which reflected the fighters’ firm belief that the goal of their struggle was to help the Palestinian people, cost the insurgents dearly. In a European-brokered deal, they were exiled immediately upon exiting the Church — some to Europe and some to Gaza — with no hope of return (even though the European exile was supposed to last one year).

Nabil Al-Raee, The Freedom Theatre’s artistic director, explained that he wanted to re-open this important incident to present the Palestinian side, absent in the media. “This is the first time that we speak about these freedom fighters and tell their stories.” One and a half years of research, with travel to Europe and skype conversations with Gaza to interview those in exile, including personal friends of Al-Raee’s, were distilled into a visually stunning and dramatically taut production.

“The lesson of The Siege was putting weapons down,” 

according to one of the actors, Faisal Abu Alhayjaa, referring to the essential humanity of the Palestinian fighters, who would not harm a sick child for the sake of their cause.

This powerful message apparently was lost on New York’s acclaimed Public Theater which cancelled the production scheduled for this May. This alarming trend of performances cancelled/censored (take your pick) for political reasons will be examined at a conference at Georgetown University this June, where Al-Raee will speak.

Undeterred, The Freedom Theatre and its resolute supporters currently are seeking other American venues for The Siege. While some may see Palestinians on stage with machine guns, others, including sold-out audiences during The Siege‘s recent British tour, see, in the words of the Guardian review, “an unexpectedly compelling theatrical experience with a rough and ready energy, and in the very act of its telling, speaks for the voiceless and forgotten”.

In the tinderbox that is Israel-Palestine, The Freedom Theatre defies its seemingly hopeless environment, and is making a tangible difference in Jenin camp and beyond. Another child of the Theatre, an actor in The Siege and in the forthcoming feature film The Idol, Ahmed Al Rokh, described the change.

“We can feel the difference in the camp. Our audience is growing because the kids who first came now have families, and bring them. Now they understand that the theatre works for us and with us.”

In contrast to the situation in the developed world, where art is often considered discretionary, Faisal Abu Alhayjaa described art and culture in Palestine as “essential like water and bread”. Inspiring as it is, The Freedom Theatre’s story is not unique. The Palestinian Performing Arts Network (PPAN) includes many ensembles and organizations striving for dignity and agency through art.

Abu Alhayjaa sees the education and empowerment that comes through working in the arts generally, and The Freedom Theatre specifically, as vital to Palestine’s future.

“If there will be a liberation for Palestine, it will come with a generation that knows what they want, and that knows to think critically.”

That generation is being trained at The Freedom Theatre.

This piece was originally published by The Huffington Post.

In a lively and wide-ranging debate that aired earlier this month on Al Jazeera English, Brookings Executive Vice President Martin Indyk sparred with Head to Head presenter Mehdi Hasan about American efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the United States’ relationship with Israel.

Indyk began by stressing that American support for Israel is what gives the United States an influential role in the peace process and the leverage to encourage Israel to move towards peace. Indyk added that this does not mean that the United States should act as “Israel’s attorney” in the negotiations, and cited a promise he made to Palestinian leaders during the 2013-2014 peace talks led by Secretary of State John Kerry that Washington would not coordinate positions with Israel in advance. 

Brookings Executive Vice President Martin Indyk in a Head to Head interview with Al Jazeera English's Mehdi Hassan.

He pointed out that the United States has traditionally relied on its close relationship with Israel to encourage its leaders to take steps for peace and make offers to the Palestinians, and that no other potential mediator has been able to produce serious offers from Israel. “[The United States is] not neutral, we don't claim to be neutral. We have an alliance with Israel,” Indyk said. “But in order to achieve another interest that we have, which is peace in the region…and a settlement that provides for the legitimate national rights of the Palestinians, we need to be able to influence Israel.”

In responding to questions from Hasan and the audience, Indyk explained that he believes that both Israelis and Palestinians had made important concessions for peace, citing Israel’s acceptance of the Clinton Parameters in 2000, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s historic recognition of Israel as part of the Oslo Accords. Indyk also described the dramatic shifts in the way the United States has addressed the Palestinian issue over the past few decades, “from treating it only as a refugee issue and insisting that it be dealt with through Jordan to recognizing Palestinian national rights.” 

When asked about U.S. support for Israel at the United Nations, Indyk responded that this support is definitely warranted given the history of hostility towards Israel at the UN. However, he added that he personally wouldn’t oppose a carefully-worded resolution condemning Israeli settlements “so that the settlers in Israel understand that [settlement expansion] isn’t cost free.” Indyk rejected the notion that Israel has turned from a U.S. strategic asset in the Middle East into a burden, but explained that “making progress on the Palestinian issue enhances America’s credibility in the region and failing to make progress…hurts America’s credibility in the region.” 

Indyk concluded the discussion by reiterating his commitment to achieving Israeli-Palestinian peace and emphasizing that he would “never give up on trying to resolve this conflict in a way that meets Palestinian legitimate national aspirations to an independent and viable contiguous state living alongside Israel, a Jewish state, in peace.” 

Last month’s decision by the Palestinian Authority to schedule municipal elections in early October hardly registered in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, much less here in Washington. In light of Hamas’ recent decision to take part in the process, however, those elections have suddenly taken on new meaning. While the election of some 414 village, town, and city councils across the West Bank and Gaza Strip will not change the face of the Palestinian leadership or alter the diplomatic impasse with Israel, local elections have the potential to unlock the current paralysis within Palestinian politics.

Although Palestinian law calls for local elections to take place every four years, they have only been held twice since the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1993, only one of which could be deemed genuinely competitive. The first and only local elections to take place in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip were held in 2004-05, in which Hamas—in its first foray into electoral politics—made major gains. Local elections were again held in 2012, although this time Hamas boycotted the process, preventing the vote from taking place in Gaza and allowing Fatah to declare a sweeping, if somewhat hollow, victory. 

Hamas’ decision to take part in this year’s local elections was therefore something of a surprise. Indeed, Hamas initially expressed dismay at the announcement, accusing the leadership in Ramallah of acting without consulting the other parties. Moreover, should the elections proceed as planned on October 8, they would be the first competitive electoral contest in the occupied territories since Hamas defeated Mahmoud Abbas’s ruling Fatah faction in the 2006 legislative election. Those elections triggered an international boycott of the PA which eventually led to the split between Fatah and Hamas and the current political paralysis.

If nothing else, Hamas’ entry into the elections averts another needless internal crisis in Palestinian politics. A boycott by Hamas would likely have further entrenched the political and geographic division between the Fatah-dominated West Bank and Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, while dealing yet another blow to the beleaguered National Consensus Government, which despite being accepted by both factions in April 2014 has yet to physically return to Gaza. Movement on the reconciliation track could also help push the long-stalled reconstruction of Gaza, which has yet to recover from the devastating war of 2014.

Hamas has little to lose from participating in an election that is unlikely to significantly alter the political landscape one way or the other...[and Fatah] has little to gain from “winning” another electoral process that is largely uncontested.

What explains Hamas’ apparent change of heart? For one, Hamas may believe it has an advantage over Fatah, which continues to suffer from widespread perceptions of corruption and incompetence—a perception reinforced by the collapse of the peace process as well as the unprecedented unpopularity of President Abbas. Hamas may also view the upcoming vote as a way to gauge its current standing and future prospects in anticipation of long-awaited legislative and presidential elections. Either way, Hamas has little to lose from participating in an election that is unlikely to significantly alter the political landscape one way or the other. 

Hamas’ decision to participate in the elections is welcome news for Palestinian voters eager to see the return of competitive elections and a revival of political life after years of stagnation. It even helps Fatah, which has little to gain from “winning” another electoral process that is largely uncontested. More important, as the party that lost both parliamentary elections and a civil war in 2006-07 and that remains the chief proponent of a failed process, Fatah desperately needs a political victory of some kind as well as a basis on which to stake its claim to legitimacy and continued grip on power.

That said, it is important not to overstate the significance of local elections, which in the end will do nothing to address the deeper problems facing Palestinians in the occupied territories, whether from Israel’s continued occupation and its ever-expanding settlement enterprise or the ongoing political dysfunction within their own ranks. On the other hand, the prospect of the first competitive Palestinian elections in a decade represents a small but significant ripple in the otherwise stagnant waters of Palestinian politics.

Last month’s decision by the Palestinian Authority to schedule municipal elections in early October hardly registered in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, much less here in Washington. In light of Hamas’ recent decision to take part in the process, however, those elections have suddenly taken on new meaning. While the election of some 414 village, town, and city councils across the West Bank and Gaza Strip will not change the face of the Palestinian leadership or alter the diplomatic impasse with Israel, local elections have the potential to unlock the current paralysis within Palestinian politics.

Although Palestinian law calls for local elections to take place every four years, they have only been held twice since the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1993, only one of which could be deemed genuinely competitive. The first and only local elections to take place in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip were held in 2004-05, in which Hamas—in its first foray into electoral politics—made major gains. Local elections were again held in 2012, although this time Hamas boycotted the process, preventing the vote from taking place in Gaza and allowing Fatah to declare a sweeping, if somewhat hollow, victory. 

Hamas’ decision to take part in this year’s local elections was therefore something of a surprise. Indeed, Hamas initially expressed dismay at the announcement, accusing the leadership in Ramallah of acting without consulting the other parties. Moreover, should the elections proceed as planned on October 8, they would be the first competitive electoral contest in the occupied territories since Hamas defeated Mahmoud Abbas’s ruling Fatah faction in the 2006 legislative election. Those elections triggered an international boycott of the PA which eventually led to the split between Fatah and Hamas and the current political paralysis.

If nothing else, Hamas’ entry into the elections averts another needless internal crisis in Palestinian politics. A boycott by Hamas would likely have further entrenched the political and geographic division between the Fatah-dominated West Bank and Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, while dealing yet another blow to the beleaguered National Consensus Government, which despite being accepted by both factions in April 2014 has yet to physically return to Gaza. Movement on the reconciliation track could also help push the long-stalled reconstruction of Gaza, which has yet to recover from the devastating war of 2014.

Hamas has little to lose from participating in an election that is unlikely to significantly alter the political landscape one way or the other...[and Fatah] has little to gain from “winning” another electoral process that is largely uncontested.

What explains Hamas’ apparent change of heart? For one, Hamas may believe it has an advantage over Fatah, which continues to suffer from widespread perceptions of corruption and incompetence—a perception reinforced by the collapse of the peace process as well as the unprecedented unpopularity of President Abbas. Hamas may also view the upcoming vote as a way to gauge its current standing and future prospects in anticipation of long-awaited legislative and presidential elections. Either way, Hamas has little to lose from participating in an election that is unlikely to significantly alter the political landscape one way or the other. 

Hamas’ decision to participate in the elections is welcome news for Palestinian voters eager to see the return of competitive elections and a revival of political life after years of stagnation. It even helps Fatah, which has little to gain from “winning” another electoral process that is largely uncontested. More important, as the party that lost both parliamentary elections and a civil war in 2006-07 and that remains the chief proponent of a failed process, Fatah desperately needs a political victory of some kind as well as a basis on which to stake its claim to legitimacy and continued grip on power.

That said, it is important not to overstate the significance of local elections, which in the end will do nothing to address the deeper problems facing Palestinians in the occupied territories, whether from Israel’s continued occupation and its ever-expanding settlement enterprise or the ongoing political dysfunction within their own ranks. On the other hand, the prospect of the first competitive Palestinian elections in a decade represents a small but significant ripple in the otherwise stagnant waters of Palestinian politics.

Editors' Note: U.S.-Israeli relations have taken a hit in recent years as the United States has become increasingly frustrated with the Netanyahu government's lack of initiative on advancing a peace process with the Palestinians. Tamara Wittes examines the domestic Israeli and American trends poised to further strain relations if the countries' leaders do not address these challenges head on. This article originally appeared in Haaretz on December 3, 2015—before the annual Saban Forum.

The past year brought unprecedented tensions in the U.S.-Israeli relationship, with many arguments and counterarguments about who is to blame. Beyond the tactical debates—about personality clashes, or the propriety of Israel parachuting into arguments between Congress and the U.S. president—are deeper challenges facing these two close allies. Last weekend, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings convened the Saban Forum in Washington to address these issues and to understand the future trajectory of the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

The first question that needs to be asked is why a bilateral relationship that for so long was kept above politics has now become a subject of bitter partisanship—in Israel, as well as in the United States. How did distasteful personal rhetoric become politically acceptable in a relationship that used to be carefully protected? Why did politicians lose their self-restraint about using the U.S.-Israel relationship as a wedge issue against their opponents? Why were opponents of the Iran nuclear deal, in Israel and in the United States, prepared to drag the American Jewish community and Democratic friends of Israel into the fray and force them to choose between supporting Israel and supporting their president?

Some argue that these trends result from differing levels of public support for Israel among Democratic and Republican voters. Polls show that Democratic voters are less supportive of the current Israeli government’s policies than Republican voters. If voters in the United States are splitting on partisan lines, the theory goes, then their elected representatives should follow. But polls that ask simplistic questions produce crude results.

A more detailed survey by my colleague Shibley Telhami shows us something deeper: the lenses Americans use to evaluate Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians have changed over time. Today, Americans increasingly look at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the lens of human rights—and this is especially true for younger Americans, African Americans and Hispanic Americans. This makes them sensitive to the suffering of Palestinian civilians, and to heavy handed Israeli counter-terrorism policies. These groups form a larger proportion of the voting public than they have in past, and a growing proportion of the Democratic Party’s core constituency. Likewise, American Evangelical Christians look at Israel through a lens of prophetic fulfillment, which combined with their conservative political preferences puts them squarely on the side of more hawkish Israeli policies. And Evangelicals are a core constituency for the Republican Party. These underlying changes in attitudes have shifted the calculus for American politicians. But that doesn’t mean a partisan split on “support for Israel” is inevitable. It does point to specific aspects of Israeli policy that affect how Israel is viewed. As American society becomes “majority-minority,” where no group, including Americans of European origin, constitutes a majority of the population, Israelis should keep these underlying lenses in mind.

[T]he lenses Americans use to evaluate Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians have changed over time.

A second issue to examine is Israelis’ combination of vulnerability and national pride. Even in a post-9/11 era, Americans have a hard time appreciating the sense of vulnerability and fear that Israelis face from ongoing terrorism and rocket fire. The Gaza War last year brought this vulnerability into sharp focus—the war went on longer than any in Israel’s history other than War of Independence, and the rocket threat affected most of the country’s civilian population. The large numbers of Palestinians killed and wounded led some in America to question Israeli tactics.  U.S.-Israeli cooperation on Iron Dome produced impressive results and was trumpeted in the American media—but when you are walking outside and an air raid siren goes off, your faith in Iron Dome does not erase your sharp sense of fear.

Israelis’ sense of vulnerability is compounded by the asymmetric nature of the threats Israel is facing, and by the sense among many Israelis that their effort to reach a resolution of their conflict with the Palestinians has reached a dead end. The fear of another war and a sense that the neighborhood has turned deeply hostile, weigh heavily, in a way Americans have trouble understanding. Israelis become all the more anxious when they sense that their most important international ally might not see their security threats the same way they do.

Paradoxically, though, this sense of vulnerability coexists for Israelis with a sense of greater self-confidence about Israel’s military strength, its economic dynamism, and its wider relationships with the world. Particularly on the Israeli political right, there is today a stronger strain of nationalism and national pride (as evidenced in the “No Apologies” slogan of the Jewish Home Party in the last elections). In many countries around the world, including U.S. allies, the rise of right-wing nationalism is marked in part by politicians thumbing their nose at the global superpower: the United States. Israel, it appears, is no longer an exception to that rule.

Israelis become all the more anxious when they sense that their most important international ally might not see their security threats the same way they do.

These issues—Americans’ perceptions of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians, and Israelis’ combination of fear and self-confidence—go beyond the personalities of leaders or the choices of politicians. To bridge these gaps, the U.S.-Israel dialogue must reach beyond government meetings and Israel-Diaspora engagement— instead, Israelis and Americans must commit to understanding one another’s societies better than we do today.

Finally, and unavoidably, there is a policy problem driving U.S.-Israeli tensions—but it’s not what you might think. The Israeli and American governments are both struggling to deal with the disintegration of a twenty-year-old framework for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After the Oslo Declaration was signed in September, 1993, Americans, Israelis and Palestinians shared an approach to settling the conflict: direct bilateral negotiations mediated by the United States. But after the failure of the Kerry talks last spring, the two leaders in Jerusalem and Ramallah have no inclination to return to direct bilateral talks, and each of them in their own way emerged from the latest effort with questions about the role of the United States.

In the international community and the region, meanwhile, the loss of faith in the U.S.-led bilateral process has led to experiments with other modes of shaping the conflict, from economic pressure on Israel to new proposals for action by the UN Security Council. Netanyahu’s controversial words before Election Day last spring— that there would be no Palestinian state under his watch—were less of a unilateral declaration than a recognition of reality. The White House now more-or-less agrees, with Obama aides telling reporters that they did not expect peace on Obama’s watch. The longstanding, bilateral negotiating process was Washington’s main leverage in pushing back against other international efforts—and now that the negotiating process has ended, these efforts will inevitably escalate. Without U.S.-Israeli agreement on a way forward, further policy gaps are likely.

The Israeli and American governments are both struggling to deal with the disintegration of a twenty-year-old framework for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This begs a question many American officials and analysts are asking: If there is no prospect for renewed bilateral talks toward a two-state solution, what is Israel’s Plan B? Does the Israeli government have a clear vision for its future relationship with the Palestinians? Israel expects American understanding as it takes steps it deems necessary to protect its citizens and ensure their future security. But American patience with Israel’s control over the West Bank is predicated on that control being temporary. There is impatience in Washington that Israel’s leadership has not tried to articulate a path forward beyond the immediate crisis—indeed, my colleague Natan Sachs argues that the current Israeli leadership has embraced “anti-solutionism” as a strategy. That's a very difficult position for any American administration to support.

If their modern history is any guide, Israelis will not remain passive before the forces now reshaping the Middle East; instead, they will insist on charting their own path into the future. When Israelis finally do develop a clear view of their chosen road, their first stop to explain it and seek support will inevitably be Washington. But Washington may not wait forever—especially as the stalemate is generating sustained violence. The time is now to lay the foundations for that crucial policy discussion, by updating American and Israeli understandings of one another’s dynamic societies, and by building on the Saban Forum and similar platforms to enrich our bilateral dialogue.