[Dabanga] Port Sudan -- Suliman Baldo, executive director of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker (STPT), warns in a recently published report that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is positioning itself to dominate the country's post-war economy, particularly through control over reconstruction efforts.

[SNA] Moscow -- Minister of Energy and Oil Dr. Mohi-Eddin Naeem Mohamed Saeed has arrived in Moscow heading a high-level delegation from the ministry in the fields of oil exploration and production, oil pipelines and oil companies.

Juba, South Sudan — The United Nations Mission in South Sudan has called for tangible evidence of progress toward democratic elections the country. Briefing the United Nations Security Council this week, special representative of the secretary-general and head of UNMISS, Nicholas Haysom, told government leaders “the clock on the extension is already ticking.” Since winning its independence in 2011, South Sudan is just beginning its fourth extension of the transitional period government, with elections now rescheduled for 2026. Speaking for Haysom, U.N. South Sudan acting spokesperson Rabindra Giri said, “The international community needs tangible evidence that this country’s leaders and political elite are genuinely committed to a democratic future.” As the country struggles with increasing internal conflict, the delay in democratic reform affects the hopes for peace, stability and development, even beyond South Sudan's borders, impacting the entire East African region. UNMISS officials stressed that time is running out for political leaders to fulfill their obligations under the peace agreement. “We must collectively seize the opportunity to make this extension the last and deliver the peace and democracy that the people of South Sudan deserve,” Giri said. On the streets of Juba, South Sudanese citizens were eager to talk about how the delays in implementing the peace agreement raise doubts about whether their leaders genuinely care about the nation’s well-being and are impacting their hopes for peace, stability and development.    Nunu Diana, a women’s rights advocate in South Sudan, is one of them. “I think because of the extension, personally, as a young person, I have lost morale in the governance system of the country,” Diana said. Data Gordon, an advocate for peace and gender equality, is another. “The time for political statements without tangible and time-bound action is over," Gorton said. "For elections to take place as scheduled, the government needs to walk the talk.” UNMISS said it is moving ahead with support to the National Elections Commission, while Haysom highlighted civic education, preparing for voter registration, a code of conduct between political parties, civil society, media and election security among the areas that the parties could immediately address. Haysom said time is a nonrenewable resource. He said this is South Sudan’s last chance to deliver on its promise of democracy, and there is a need for sustained international support while holding South Sudan's leaders accountable to their own commitments. “This cannot be business as usual for the parties to the peace agreement, the political elite, the guarantors of the peace agreement or the international community," Giri said. "We must collectively seize the opportunity to make this extension the last and deliver the peace and democracy that the people of South Sudan deserve.”

After 19 months of conflict, the ongoing Sudanese Civil War continues to deteriorate living conditions for millions of Sudanese people. Intensive conflicts between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have greatly exacerbated nationwide levels of famine. Numerous civilians have been caught in the crossfire, leading to a rising death toll. […]

[IPS] United Nations -- After 19 months of conflict, the ongoing Sudanese Civil War continues to deteriorate living conditions for millions of Sudanese people. Intensive conflicts between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have greatly exacerbated nationwide levels of famine. Numerous civilians have been caught in the crossfire, leading to a rising death toll. Sexual violence and rape have been used as weapons of war, with thousands of cases going unreported due to a pervasive state of fear. Sudan

[Dabanga] Adré / El Fasher -- The World Food Programme (WFP) has appealed to Sudan to keep the Adré border crossing open, as a convoy carrying crucial humanitarian aid heads toward the Zamzam camp for displaced people in North Darfur, where famine was confirmed earlier this year.

[VOA] Juba, South Sudan -- The United Nations Mission in South Sudan has called for tangible evidence of progress toward democratic elections the country.

[AI London] French-manufactured military technology incorporated into armoured personnel carriers made by the United Arab Emirates is being used on the battlefield in Sudan in what likely constitutes a violation of the UN arms embargo on Darfur, Amnesty International said in a new investigation.

Global crises provide unprecedented opportunities for OM workers to share truth with least-reached people from Syria, Somalia and Sudan.

American citizens should avoid all travel to Sudan. Terrorist threats continue to be aimed at Western and U.S. interests.

[Dabanga] Washington D.C. -- With Donald Trump set to return to the White House following his vistory in the US elections on November 5, questions are being raised about how his administration will guide relations with Sudan, especially in light of his "America First" policy that he has pledged to his constituents to adopt.

[State Department] Following the United Nations Security Council's designation of two Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commanders on November 8, the Treasury Department is today sanctioning Abdel Rahman Joma'a Barakallah (Barakallah), the RSF West Darfur Commander.

[Dabanga] This week, the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, hosts the main event commemorating the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists. This year's theme, "Journalists' Safety in Crises and Emergencies," resonates deeply in Sudan.

[Dabanga] Addis Ababa / Port Sudan -- The African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa is hosting a critical event today and tomorrow, November 6 and 7, commemorating the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists. This year's theme, "Safety of Journalists During Crises and Emergencies," resonates deeply in Sudan, where the ongoing conflict has created a perilous environment for those reporting on the war.

[The New Humanitarian] Malakal, South Sudan -- 'There is no house, no food, and no place to sleep for the children.'

[Dabanga] Nairobi -- More than 18 months into Sudan's war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the work of Sudanese journalists has grown increasingly perilous. Both sides of the conflict have threatened, detained, or otherwise repressed journalists attempting to report on the war.

[Dabanga] Amsterdam -- Since the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) began clashing on April 15, 2023, independent media--particularly those operating abroad--have become critical sources of information. However, the warring parties have escalated efforts to silence these channels, seeking to enforce a total media blackout.

Sudanese entrepreneur brings Sudan’s culinary traditions to Egypt, aiming to introduce Egyptian palates to Sudanese culture

CAIRO: Sudan has seen a surge in extreme violence in recent weeks as the warring military and paramilitary push for a decisive victory, with no political solution in sight.

Fighting between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has intensified since late October, with reports of attacks on civilians including sexual violence against women and girls raising alarm.

The war that erupted in April 2023 has created what the UN calls the world’s worst displacement crises, with more than 11 million people forced from their homes.

It has put the country on the brink of famine, and sparked warnings of intensifying violence in a war that has already killed tens of thousands.

“Over the last two weeks, the situation in the country has been marked by some of the most extreme violence since the start of the conflict,“ according to Rosemary DiCarlo, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.

“Let me stress that both warring parties bear responsibility for this violence,“ she said, adding that both sides “seem convinced they can prevail on the battlefield.”

Since October 20, at least 124 civilians have been killed in central Al-Jazira state and another 135,000 have fled to other states, according to the UN.

With global attention focused on other wars, chiefly in Ukraine and the Middle East, civilians in Sudan are paying a steep price for the escalation.

“All indicators so far show that both sides are committed to military solutions, with no genuine interest in political resolutions or even easing the suffering of civilians,“ according to Mohamed Osman of Human Rights Watch.

Amani al-Taweel, director of the Africa programme at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, agreed.

“There is no political solution on the horizon,“ she told AFP, adding that both sides were seeking a “decisive military solution”.

Split

The war in Sudan has pitted army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan against his erstwhile ally Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, leader of the RSF.

The country is split into zones of control, with the army holding the north and east, and the government based in Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast.

The RSF controls much of the capital Khartoum, the Darfur region in the west and parts of Kordofan in the south, while the centre is split.

With no mandatory military conscription, the Sudanese army includes Islamist-leaning forces as well as other factions.

The RSF is primarily made up of tribal militias from Darfur’s Arab communities.

According to local reports, the army has about 120,000 troops while the RSF has 100,000.

On the battlefield, Sudan’s air force gives the military an advantage.

Rights groups have accused both sides of committing atrocities.

The UN population agency published on Tuesday horrific accounts of women and girls fleeing the violence, including one who said she was urged to kill herself with a knife rather than be raped.

‘Deadlock’

Successive rounds of talks have been held in Saudi Arabia, but the negotiations have yet to produce a ceasefire.

In August, the Sudanese military opted out of US-brokered negotiations in Switzerland and an African Union-led mediation has also stalled.

“The deadlock in peaceful channels, whether regionally or internationally, is exacerbating the violence,“ said Mahmud Zakaria, a professor of political science at Cairo University’s Faculty of African Postgraduate Studies.

Since October, the RSF escalated its attacks in Al-Jazira state, south of Khartoum, following what the military said was the defection of one of its commanders to the army.

Before the war, Al-Jazira was known as Sudan’s breadbasket, hosting Africa’s largest agricultural project, yielding 65 percent of the country’s cotton, according to Zakaria.

Proxy war?

Some areas have been scarred by conflict before.

Darfur saw a major war two decades ago, during which the then-government’s allies in the Janjaweed militia faced accusations of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

With roots in the Janjaweed, the RSF became a force in its own right in 2013.

Sudan’s conflict has increasingly drawn in regional powers, prompting the United States to urge all countries to stop arming rival generals.

Former Egyptian deputy foreign minister for African affairs Ali el-Hefny said progress will require global willpower.

Instead, foreign powers are “fuelling the violence, delaying Sudan’s return to stability”, he said.

The army has accused the United Arab Emirates of backing the RSF -- a charge it strongly denies.

In December, UN experts monitoring an arms embargo on Darfur described as “credible” allegations Abu Dhabi had funnelled weapons to Daglo’s forces on cargo planes.

The RSF has in turn alleged Egyptian support for the army, which Cairo has also denied.

Army chief Burhan has historically been close to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who pledged his “continued support” earlier this month.

Muslims in Sudan’s River Nile state drove 34 displaced Christians from their homes, sources said.

A Conversation with the Sudanese American Physicians Association & Physicians for Human Rights

موجز:

قدمة تستعرض هذه المذكرة المشهد السياسي المعاصر في السودان،وكيفية تأثيرهعلى جدوى الاستثماراتفي القطاع الزراعيالتي تشتد الحاجة إليها لتحقيق التحول الزراعي في البلاد. ت ركزالمذكرة بشكل خاص على سلاسل القيمة في قطاعي الثروة الحيوانية والبستنة فيولاية الخرطوم،وإدارة الموارد الطبيعية في ولايتي النيل الأزرق وجنوب كردفان. أهملت الحكومات المتعاقبة إلى حد كبير قطاع الزراعة على الرغم من أنه أكبر قطاع توظيف في السودان ويساهم بنحو 56في المئة من إجمالي الصادرات (بنك السودان المركزي، 2020).

وجز :

استمرت المواجهة في السودان بين القوات المسلحة السودانية وقوات الدعم السريع لعدة أشهر قبل أن تتصاعد إلى نزاع مسلح في 15 أبريل 2023. بالإضافة ة إلى جانب الكارثة الإنسانية، عطل النزاع العديد من الخدمات العامة مثل الكهرباء والمياه والخدمات الصحية والخدمات المصرفية، بينما تعطل أيضا الوصول إلى الأسواق، مما أدى إلى ندرة كبيرة في السلع والخدمات. وقد دمر الصراع البنية التحتية الرئيسية، وقيد التجارة المحلية والدولية وعطل أنشطة الإنتاج وسلاسل الموردين.

بنية القطاع الزراعي السوداني ومساهمته في الاقتصاد بين عامي 1990 و2021

دخل النزاع المسلح بين القوات المسلحة السودانية وقوات الدعم السريع في السودان شهره السادس منذ اندلاعه في 15 أبريل 2023، دون أي مؤشرات على انتهائه قريبا. تسببت الحرب في كارثة إنسانية حادة، دمرت البنية التحتية الرئيسية، وقيدت أنشطة التجارة والإنتاج. علاوة على ذلك، أدى ذلك إلى تعطيل الوصول إلى المرافق العامة والخدمات المالية والأسواق، مما أدى إلى ندرة كبيرة في السلع والخدمات. في هذه الورقة، نستخدم إطار نمذجة مضاعف مصفوفة المحاسبة الاجتماعية لتقييم الآثار الاقتصادية على مستوى الاقتصاد لهذه الاضطرابات في النشاط الاقتصادي والموارد الإنتاجية وسبل العيش.

The Socio-Economic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households

The ongoing conflict in Sudan has been concentrated in cities, with major impacts on urban households. Large numbers of families are displaced, employment is down dramatically, and most children are unable to go to school. A comprehensive survey conducted earlier this year by IFPRI’ Sudan Strategy Support Program and the United Nations Development Programme provides […]

The post The Socio-Economic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households appeared first on IFPRI.

More than 20 million face acute food insecurity.

Satellite images show devastation in Sudan 1 year since conflict began (ABC News)

"Satellite imagery shows the reduction in green vegetation cover, the increased aridity points to the neglect or destruction of previously irrigated fields” Oliver Kirui told ABC News.

The post Satellite images show devastation in Sudan 1 year since conflict began (ABC News) appeared first on IFPRI.

Sudan is now confronting its most severe food security crisis on record (The Conversation Africa)

An op-ed by IFPRI’s Khalid Siddig and Rob Vos analyses Sudan’s ongoing severe food crisis: “After 14 months of escalating internal conflict, Sudan is now confronting its most severe food security crisis on record. The latest situation report, released on 27 June, reveals a grim picture: more than half the population of 47.2 million is […]

The post Sudan is now confronting its most severe food security crisis on record (The Conversation Africa) appeared first on IFPRI.

Sudan’s catastrophe: farmers could offer quick post-war recovery, if peace is found

Despite the stark reality, there is a potential path forward for Sudan, believe IFPRI experts.

The post Sudan’s catastrophe: farmers could offer quick post-war recovery, if peace is found appeared first on IFPRI.

Two Sudanese nationals have been indicted for allegedly leading Anonymous Sudan, a cybercriminal group responsible for over 35,000 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks targeting critical infrastructure worldwide.

One of the worst famines in decades could be underway in Sudan, aid workers warn.

Civilian priorities for ending the war in Sudan 31 October 2024 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Dr Abdalla Hamdok, former prime minister of Sudan and chairperson of the Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Tagadum), will discuss the prospects for conflict resolution in Sudan.

The intensification of fighting across Sudan demonstrates that both warring parties and their allies are continuing to pursue an outright military victory in the war, with little regard for the human cost. Diplomatic efforts, including the US-led Geneva talks in August, have produced little progress towards a ceasefire.  Meanwhile, the conflict has resulted in widespread devastation, mass displacement, and an escalating hunger crisis.

Civilian perspectives on ending the war, their vital efforts in providing lifesaving humanitarian assistance, and the aspiration of many Sudanese for a more inclusive and democratic Sudan, have been sidelined by the interests and actions of the belligerent parties.

At this event, Dr Abdalla Hamdok will discuss options for reaching a ceasefire and seeking a peaceful political resolution to the conflict. He will also address the urgent need for an international response to what has become the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.

Please note that in-person attendance for this event will be balloted. Guests looking to join in-person must ‘register interest’ in joining. Full confirmations to successful applicants will be sent on Monday 28 October at 15:00.

14 September 2020

Africa Aware: Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan Audio bhorton.drupal 9 April 2022

This episode of Africa Aware examines the relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Ahmed Soliman provides an overview of the Africa Programme’s work on cross-border conflict as part of the XCEPT project.

First, we speak to Kholood Khair on the steady deterioration in relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. Then Abel Abate Demissie discusses how recent political developments in Ethiopia and Sudan have impacted relations between the two countries.

This podcast was produced with support from the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) project, funded by UK Aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.

It is also part of a series of outputs on Ethiopia’s political transition.

Towards democracy in Sudan: Reflections on the transitional period 20 September 2022 — 2:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 August 2022 Online

In this webinar, panellists discuss the key outcomes of the evaluation workshop and reflect on how the experience of the transition to date should inform the realization of Sudan’s democratic aspirations going forward.

The military coup on 25 October 2021 halted Sudan’s transition to democracy and prospects for sustainable peace. Since then, members of the former regime have regained political influence, with many reinstated to senior positions.

The coup has provoked a strong reaction from the country’s pro-democracy movement and youth-led resistance committees who have led continuous peaceful protests demanding civilian democratic transition, despite a brutal crackdown by state security forces.

Those supportive of the coup have blamed the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), a wide coalition of pro-democracy political and civilian groups, for the mistakes of the transitional government.

However, the country’s political, security and economic situation has sharply deteriorated since the military’s action, and the progress achieved by the transitional government has been reversed, leading to an accelerating economic crisis, increased food insecurity and political instability.

The FFC, which played a key role in appointing the transitional government, has acknowledged its errors. In July 2022, it held a workshop in Khartoum, which was broadcast on social media, to evaluate its performance and identify lessons learned, in discussion with civil society actors and activists.

In this webinar, leading pro-democracy movement figures and independent experts discuss the key outcomes of the evaluation workshop and reflect on how the experience of the transition to date should inform the realization of Sudan’s democratic aspirations going forward.

This event is part of a Chatham House Africa programme project on supporting Sudan’s civilian-led democratic transition.

Sudan’s gold boom: Connections to conflict and transnational impacts 7 December 2022 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 24 November 2022 Online

At this event, experts will discuss Sudan’s gold sector, its connections to conflict, and transnational impacts. 

At this webinar panellists will discuss Sudan’s gold sector, its connections to conflict, and transnational impacts.

Sudan is one of the largest gold producers on the continent, with the industry constituting Sudan’s foremost source of hard currency since the secession of South Sudan in 2011 and resulting loss of oilfields.

The gold rush that has ensued has had important implications for domestic and transnational conflict dynamics. Military actors and armed groups have sought control of gold-producing areas in the peripheries and to capitalize on the flow of labour migrants, against a wider backdrop of conflict partly stemming from contestation for control between central and local actors.

International interests are prominent, including increased Russian involvement in the sector, while gold smuggling has also interlaced with mercenary activity in neighbouring CAR, Chad and Libya.
 
At this event, panellists will discuss Sudan’s gold trade, its connections to conflict, and transnational impacts, including the international politics of Sudan’s gold extraction and role of armed groups. It will also explore the environmental and socio-economic dimensions of gold in Sudan’s border areas. 
 
This roundtable is an output of the Cross-Border Conflict: Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) research programme, funded by UK Aid from the UK government.
 

A critical juncture for Sudan’s democratic transition Expert comment LJefferson 28 March 2023

International pressure is essential to reach an agreement that establishes a credible civilian government.

The signing of the Framework Agreement (FA) on 5 December 2022 between Sudan’s military leaders and its leading pro-democracy parties is a major step to reversing the damage done by the disastrous military coup in October 2021.

The FA removes any formal role for the military in Sudan’s politics. A civilian head of state and prime minister will select the cabinet and chair the Defence and Security Council. The armed forces will be prohibited from non-military business activities and security sector reform will lead to a unified, professional and non-partisan national army. Elections are due to take place at the end of a two-year transitional period. 

Signatories included General Abdel Fatah Al Burhan, chair of the Sovereign Council and head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti), his deputy and Commander of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and more than 40 civilian entities, including the Forces of Freedom and Change- Central Council (FFC-CC), a few other political parties, former armed movements, civil society organizations and professional associations. However, the agreement has faced criticism from the street for not being sufficiently radical, has been overshadowed at times by heightened tension between the two military leaders, and has seen sabotage attempts by supporters of the Bashir regime.

Building consensus on the Framework Agreement

The agreement meets most of the demands of the anti-coup camp, at least on paper. Yet doubts persist as to whether the military are genuine about handing over power, particularly among the neighbourhood-based resistance committees – the heart of the youth-led mobilization that forced the military to recognize the failure of their power grab. Peaceful protests against the coup have seen 125 killed and over 8,000 injured by government security forces. Many want to see Burhan and Hemedti held accountable.

Recognizing the need to expand popular support, FFC-CC leaders have been reaching out to other pro-democracy forces to build a united civilian front. They report increased buy-in from some resistance committees in the last few months, recognizing that street protests alone were not sufficient to overthrow the coup, and that engagement with the military is necessary to find a way out of the impasse.

The FA offers the only currently available path to embedding civilian politics in Sudan and has received active diplomatic support from UNITAMS, AU and IGAD (who form the Tripartite Mechanism), the Troika of the US, UK and Norway, alongside the EU, as well as Saudi Arabia and the UAE (who are members of ‘the Quad’ with the US and UK).

Broader public participation has also been developed through a series of conferences, facilitated by the Tripartite Mechanism, on five contentious issues – dismantling the old regime, the Juba Peace Agreement, Eastern Sudan, Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform. Recommendations will be incorporated in a final political agreement. 

The political process has been overshadowed by increasingly visible tension between Burhan and Hemedti, seen in parallel foreign visits, conflicting public statements, and a heavy military presence in Khartoum. But concerns that SAF and the RSF were heading towards confrontation appear to have been assuaged thanks to international pressure and preliminary agreements reached between military and civilian signatories of the FA on security sector reform and integration. In a significant breakthrough, both sides have now agreed to draft the final agreement and transitional constitution, with the aim of forming a civilian government by 11 April.  

Potential spoilers and interests from Sudan’s regions

Progress has been made, but significant challenges remain, notably from supporters of the former Bashir regime in ‘the deep state’ and from Sudan’s historically marginalized peripheries. Old regime elements have been intensifying social media campaigns to derail the agreement and drive a wedge between the SAF and RSF, and have been accused of deliberately inciting instability in the peripheries to undermine the democratic transition. 

The Popular Defence Forces, established by the National Islamic Front in the 1990s, have been reactivated under different names in several parts of the country and there are reports of mobilization and recruitment of armed militias in Darfur. The recent public appearance of Ali Karti, the Secretary-General of the Islamic Movement, who has close relations with Islamists in SAF, has also caused renewed concern.

Two Darfuri armed movement leaders who signed the October 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) and are members of the current military-led government, have not signed the FA, allegedly due to concerns about their representation in the next government.

Despite intensive efforts to bring them on board, there is continuing disagreement over the inclusion of other members of ‘the Democratic Bloc’, a political alliance backed by Sudan’s influential neighbour Egypt, which is reportedly angry at being excluded from the Quad. The FFC-CC say that the door is open for the two Darfuri leaders and some other political parties, but they will not allow the agreement to be ‘diluted’ with political forces who intend to torpedo the transition, including by imposing a weak prime minister.

Both Burhan and Hemedti have courted support from the regions. Burhan used the 2020 SAF takeover of Al Fashaga in the contested eastern border region with Ethiopia to boost his national standing and secure backing from local tribal leaders; while Hemedti has sought to position himself as a champion of the peripheries, particularly in his Darfur heartlands, while simultaneously advancing his business interests.

Competition between them in building domestic powerbases, as well as alliances with neighbouring states, risks reigniting tensions, particularly given deep grievances and contrasting ambitions between and among Sudan’s diverse regional leaders and communities.

Fighting over ‘white gold’: Sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan Expert comment LJefferson 3 April 2023

The supply chain of a seemingly innocuous cash crop – sesame – has intersected with transnational conflict dynamics, exacerbating tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Late 2020 saw the beginning of the devastating war in Tigray and the occupation of a disputed region on the Ethiopia–Sudan border – Al Fashaga – by the Sudanese army. These shocks disrupted settled patterns of land ownership and control in both Ethiopia’s volatile north and Sudan’s borderlands, historically the heart of the sesame and oilseed production that is economically vital to both countries.

These seemingly harmless cash crops are now embedded in local, subnational and national political contestations in both countries. Sesame value chains are being reshaped, with power and profits being used to entrench the grip of political and armed actors who are reinforcing new patterns of land control and driving informal and illicit trade – impacting the coping mechanisms of local communities and threatening to fuel further conflict.

Regional rivalries drive contestation over the Ethiopia supply chain

Internal borders between most of Ethiopia’s regions are marked by boundary disputes, which often degenerate into violent conflict. The most important is between the Tigray and Amhara regions. Since the war began in 2020, the Amhara region has annexed vast areas of western and southern Tigray, which the Amhara region claims were taken from them by Tigray 30 years ago, after the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) dominated ethnic coalition came to power.

Ethiopia’s exports of spices, oilseeds and pulses brought in over half a billion dollars in 2021, roughly a quarter of the country’s total export revenues and second only to coffee. The sector has been rocked by the war in the north, which accounted for much of Ethiopia’s sesame production, with an estimated 500,000 hectares of sesame fields taken out of cultivation during the 2021 growing season. Conflict has exacerbated a steady decline in formal revenues from sesame exports, dropping over $115 million from 2016 to 2021.

Alongside falling production, the previously integrated value chain has been disrupted and decentralized by political fragmentation and land competition between Amharas and Tigrayans. Before the war, the agricultural sector in Western Tigray/Welkait was dominated by Tigrayan business interests, through the TPLF’s regional endowment fund EFFORT, a business conglomerate including subsidiaries such as Guna Trading House, and Hiwot Agricultural Mechanization.