[New Times] Achieving rapid private sector growth in Rwanda is unlikely without far-reaching reforms to economic policies, a new report released on November 13, by the World Bank has shown.

China’s economic policy pendulum has swung towards stimulus – but keep expectations low Expert comment jon.wallace 14 October 2024

Beijing historically swings between stimulus and frugality. But Xi Jinping’s ambition for self-reliance will constrain any new efforts to boost the economy.

Policymakers in Beijing have spent the past three weeks trying to convince the world that they are determined to deliver meaningful support to China’s sagging economy. 

Since late September statements have come from the central bank, which promised to cut interest rates, release liquidity, and provide funding to securities firms; from the politburo, which said it wanted to stabilize the real estate market, boost the capital market and shift towards looser fiscal and monetary policy; from the government’s main planning body, which promised a package of policies to support domestic demand; and from the finance minister himself, who at the weekend committed to issue more debt to recapitalize banks, support local governments and aid unhappy consumers.

Though details have been scant, the Chinese stock market has responded enthusiastically to this flurry of rhetoric. But the bigger question for the global economy is whether a boost in Chinese demand can return the country to its former status as a reliable destination for global exports and capital.

With that measure of success in mind, it is worth keeping expectations low. For the past 15 years, Chinese authorities have been wrestling with two conflicting objectives: to grow the economy, and to minimize the risk of financial instability. Those goals sit uneasily with each other because the effort to boost growth has relied on borrowing; and yet a rise in debt can increase the risk of a debt crisis.  

Chinese policymaking has responded to this dilemma by taking on a pendulum-like quality. Sometimes the authorities boost the economy by funding more investment spending. At other times that stimulus gets reined back as policymakers worry about the economy’s indebtedness.

In the aftermath of the great financial crisis of 2008, for example, Beijing’s over-riding priority was to protect the Chinese economy from the risk of recession by implementing a huge credit-financed stimulus to spur investment in infrastructure and real estate. 

By 2012, though, concerns about over-indebtedness began to dominate, and a withdrawal of stimulus saw the Chinese economy sag. In late 2015,a new round of stimulus measures emerged, only to be withdrawn again around 2018.

With that pendulum in mind, the optimistic take on what policymakers have said in recent weeks is that we are now back in stimulus mode. That’s true in part, but three factors suggest that this time is a little different.

Different times

First, China’s rising debt burden increases authorities’ worries about financial stability. Data from the BIS show that China’s private sector debt almost doubled in the past 15 years to 200 per cent of GDP at the end of 2023. The comparable debt stock for the US and the Eurozone was much lower, at 150 per cent each.

Second, ideology is playing a growing role in shaping Chinese economic policy. The most visible effect has been to prioritize Chinese state-owned enterprises, at the expense of the private sector. This became especially visible in 2021 with a campaign against the ‘unrestrained expansion of capital’ – Beijing’s way of expressing its anxiety that China’s corporate sector was behaving in a manner inconsistent with Chinese Communist Party goals. 

Although that phrase is no longer current, entrepreneurs’ animal spirits remain in the doldrums. They are likely to stay there as long as President Xi Jinping’s preference is for ‘bigger, better, stronger’ state-owned enterprises, which use capital much less efficiently than private firms.

Third, today Chinese policy is shaped by Beijing’s perception of geopolitical risks that it faces. Those risks became starkly apparent in February 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when essentially every country that prints a reserve currency joined to freeze Russia’s access to its foreign exchange reserves. That enveloped the Russian economy in a network of sanctions that sharply constrained its access to a whole range of imports.

It is not difficult to consider a similar scenario confronting China. Beijing’s approach to economic policy is therefore heavily influenced by the need to insulate itself from that kind of risk (though Chinese policy had in any case been tilting in this direction for years).

‘Asymmetric decoupling’

This policy can be described as ‘asymmetric decoupling’: a simultaneous effort on the one hand to reduce China’s reliance on the rest of the world by substituting imports with domestic production; and, on the other hand, to increase the rest of the world’s reliance on China by establishing itself as a ‘zhizao qiangguo’, or manufacturing powerhouse.

This is the right context in which to understand a central economic goal of the authorities, which is to reduce the economy’s dependence on real estate investment. 

The intention is to allow capital and credit resources to migrate to new sectors of the economy that will help to build that manufacturing powerhouse: high-tech and green energy, in particular. What that means in practice is that any forthcoming support for the real estate sector will be rather limited.

International Monetary Fund

National Bureau of Economic Research

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

17 December 2019

How is it possible for the directors of the Russian economy to pursue an orthodox stabilization policy with a great measure of success and yet to have achieved so little to stem the growth slowdown? This paper examines the reasons for the divergence in economic management.

17 December 2019

How is it possible for the directors of the Russian economy to pursue an orthodox stabilization policy with a great measure of success and yet to have achieved so little to stem the growth slowdown? This paper examines the reasons for the divergence in economic management.

The number of daily new cases of the COVID-19 coronavirus are finally declining in China. But the number is increasing in the rest of the world, from South Korea to Iran to Italy. However the epidemic unfolds—even if it is soon brought under control globally—it is likely to do much more economic damage than policymakers…

This week the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee raised short-term interest rates another notch, as expected, signaled they would likely raise rates twice more this year, and changed their “forward guidance” language to clarify their longer run intentions. Chairman Jerome Powell explained clearly why the Committee thought this policy would keep unemployment low and prices…

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.

This note is taken from Chapter 2 of Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2011.