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Doctors from Chiropractic Doctors Association of Hong Kong (China) have launched a prospective case study on Radiological Evaluation of SI Joint Dysfunction which has improved the SI joint management for the Beijing 2022 Olympic Winter Games.

By Jeffrey Norris UC Berkeley News China’s plans to curb Beijing’s health-damaging air pollution by focusing on restricting emissions from power plants and vehicles may have limited impact if household use of coal and other dirty fuels is not also … Continue reading →

Air China Is Chinas Exclusive National Flag Carrier For Civil Aviation A Member Of The Star Alliance The Worlds Largest Airl... Tang Xiaoping, Tianzhu, Beijing, China

1. Beijing and Washington stops provide clues for Indonesia's direction under Prabowo Subianto  ABC News
2. Prabowo pledges co-operation with Trump  The Australian Financial Review
3. Indonesian president meets Biden and speaks with Trump  The Canberra Times
4. At White House, Indonesia's new leader straddles US-China rivalry  VOA Asia
5. Will Prabowo Subianto cosy up to Donald Trump or to China?  The Economist

Beijing briefing: is the Belt and Road going nowhere? The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 July 2022

Scaling back infrastructure plans and investment in the Global South could cause China problems, says Yu Jie.

Over the past two decades, China specialists around the world have tried to analyze Beijing’s approach to developing countries in the Global South, including Africa, Latin America, parts of Asia and the Pacific islands.
 
China’s relationships with nations in these regions vary considerably. In some, ideology or geography are the biggest influencing factors; for others, economic and commercial gains matter most. However, many of Beijing’s recent engagements have attracted more criticism than praise. A domestic economic downturn means that Beijing has tightened its belt, spending less on overseas development.

When President Xi Jinping came to power, he was keen to highlight how China’s power could shape and dictate the global agenda across multilateral platforms. His vision was for China to project discursive power and become an agenda-setter rather than a rule-follower. The Global South is the route to fulfilling his proposal.

To this end, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the latest Global Development Initiative are the means to Beijing’s ends. The former, launched in 2013, focuses on building physical infrastructure linking Global South countries; the latter aims to allow development through grants and capacity-building in line with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.

China’s engagements with Africa and Latin America seem characterized by the rapid extension of Chinese finance to resource-rich African states, particularly oil producers, since the early 2000s. From 2003, for example, oil-backed infrastructure loans were made to the Angolan government for reconstruction after decades of civil conflict. By 2016, they totalled some $15 billion. 

However, Beijing’s appetite for offering cheap loans in exchange for natural resources has shrunk. It faces a dilemma between protecting the value of its investments while also defending its strategic interests and maintaining its self-image as a partner, not a predator, of Africa.

Beijing has historically preferred bilateral relationships for its development finance and investments over multilateral ones. This allows China control over the terms and conditions, while demonstrating its unwillingness to accept without question rules and frameworks devised years ago by western countries.

China has already realized that some elements of its engagements with the Global South are no longer the flavour of the day, partly because some of its programmes include serious climate and financial risks without proper third-party due diligence in place. 

Growth through gigantic infrastructure investments of the sort that drove China’s own economic miracle is not a panacea applicable everywhere. Nor is relentlessly seeking endorsements from its neighbours and other countries from afar.

China wants to be a ‘brother’ to the Global South

Ideologically, China wants to be seen and respected as a leader of the Global South. Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic has maintained a ‘brotherly’ relationship with developing countries, notably in the UN context, where it remains a member of the G77 group of developing nations. 

The West has responded to China’s development agenda with its own infrastructure programmes, such as Washington’s Build Back Better World and the European Union’s Global Gateway. 

Great power rivalry should not be ignored, but it shouldn’t blind world powers to the need for collaboration in tackling global poverty and sustainable development. Nor should Beijing’s efforts to adjust its diplomatic and aid programmes to become a likeable partner of choice in search of a better economic future, be disregarded.

Since launching BRI, China has poured hundreds of billions of dollars into building infrastructure in the Global South. And many developing countries hope that advanced economies and China can continue to act to alleviate poverty. But the brakes have been applied to Beijing’s spree as a result of China’s domestic economic slowdown. It has no wish to continue spending its foreign reserves.

To go forward, China must remain open to what others want – or fear – from Beijing’s development initiatives and infrastructure investments. Many developing countries, facing insurmountable costs and damage exacerbated by the Covid pandemic, crave meaningful assistance rather than diplomatic rhetoric. 

The ultimate test of Beijing’s economic statecraft is whether it can engage with the Global South beyond relationships built on financial resources and political capital. It must also become more self-aware of how its words and deeds are received – and then act accordingly. Showering dollars and renminbi is not always guaranteed to win hearts and minds. In this respect, Beijing has more bridges to build.

Beijing briefing: Party power remains a male preserve The World Today mhiggins.drupal 27 September 2022

Yu Jie explores why so few women have won leadership roles in Communist China.

UPDATE: Since this article was published at the end of September, the incoming members of the Politburo and the Standing Committee were announced at the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress on October 22. The party broke more than two decades of convention by not appointing any women to the Politburo or its Standing Committee. The sole woman among the outgoing 19th CCP Politburo, Sun Chunlan, will retire. Only 33 women rank among the 376 members of the 20th CPC Central Committee, which elects the Politburo - less than one in 10.

As the curtain of the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress gets ready to rise, the lack of female representation in Beijing’s corridors of power attracts international attention once again.

Female participation in Chinese finance, science, sports or other aspects of society is relatively healthy. Yet there has never been a single woman at the apex of power in the party nor any who has held a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee, the supreme decision-making body for the party and the state.

Historically, China has been run by a number of powerful women starting in 307BC during the first imperial era of the Middle Kingdom. In the Qin Dynasty the Queen Dowager Xuan held de facto power for 35 years during the Warring States period.

More than 2,000 years later, Empress Dowager Cixi wined and dined her European visitors at the Imperial Summer Palace. She was also responsible for the demise of the late Qing Dynasty. Their legacies continue to fascinate and inspire stories in contemporary China.

In modern times, Mao Zedong, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, proclaimed that ‘women hold up half of the sky’. While Chinese law states that women and men should have equal rights in all aspects of political life, the reality is that women remain marginalized in politics, even after the economic and social transformation seen in the past few decades. Chinese men continue to dominate political power.

The top three party, military or state leadership positions have never been filled by a woman and none of China’s 26 ministers is female. There is only one woman among the 31 party bosses that control China’s provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions and only one woman among the 25 members of the all-powerful Politburo, and she oversaw the government’s response to the Covid pandemic. She is Vice-Premier Sun Chunlan, a former party boss of Fujian Province. Among the 371 members of the Central Committee, which elects the Politburo, there are only 30 women, which is less than one in 10.

Women are less likely to join the Communist Party

It is difficult to explain why female participation in the Chinese elite politics is so low but social convention certainly plays its part. Despite increasing financial independence and much improved career prospects, Chinese women are still expected to run the household and look after the children while holding down a full-time job. This surely reduces opportunities to seek public offices.

Although unspoken, China’s experience of handing power to a woman may be another reason why the party is hesitant to put a female in charge. Jiang Qing, better known to the outside world as Madame Mao, was China’s de-facto First Lady until 1976. She was one of the architects of the ‘Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution’, which ushered in a decade of chaos and political upheaval and brought the country to a standstill.

Successive leaders have been determined to prevent a repeat of this misfortune so no woman has been chosen for a top leadership role. But perhaps the main reason for the absence of women in top positions is the way people move up the party ranks.

Women make up around 49 per cent of China’s 1.4 billion population, yet they account for only about 30 per cent of the Chinese Communist Party membership. Once inside the party they are often handed less competitive positions. Rising through the ranks requires party members to achieve certain career breakthroughs. Such success makes them eligible to participate in high politics.

The majority of China’s top leaders have served as a party chief of a province or municipality, a position women rarely achieve. Consequently, few female candidates are considered eligible for more senior roles.

By the time they qualify for Politburo membership, too often they are fast approaching the retirement age for Chinese women politicians: 55. As it is rare to secure a spot on the Politburo under that age, women are virtually ruled out from joining this exclusive group of 25 people.

The Iron Lady of China

There has been one exception since the early 2000s. Vice-Premier Wu Yi, who is known as the Iron Lady of China, was described by Forbes magazine as the third most powerful woman in the world. She led China into the World Trade Organization and successfully bid for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. However, her success has been an exception, not a rule.

While Chinese women have been given a nominal egalitarian status with female astronauts, female Olympic champions and female Nobel Prize laureates in place, beneath the surface older practices of patriarchy still hold firm. Liberated or not, the quest for a Chinese female leader under the Communist Party is a long way off.

Beijing briefing: China’s wish for 2023? An end to lockdown The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 November 2022

Xi Jinping will try to beef up Global South relations in 2023, but weary Chinese and the business sector need pandemic restrictions to end, says Yu Jie.

This past year in Chinese politics was capped by a highly anticipated 20th Party Congress in Beijing in October which marked the beginning of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s unprecedented third term. Xi stacked the all-powerful Politburo with male loyalists and left the rest of the world to sift through the implications of his leadership reshuffle.

Meanwhile, Xi made headlines at the G20 summit in Indonesia, maintaining a largely positive tone with President Joe Biden and being caught on camera chiding Canada’s Justin Trudeau for leaks after their talks. So, what can we expect Xi to pull out of the hat in 2023, the Chinese Year of the Rabbit? 

In February and March, the conversations around Beijing dinner tables will focus on the composition of the new central government – the important seats within the Chinese State Council. This body must deliver Xi’s ‘security-oriented’ economic agenda as well as his much-promoted ‘Common Prosperity’ initiative.

Pundits will be paying particular attention to who is put in charge of economic planning, who the new foreign minister might be and who will govern the central bank. I will offer my reading of these tea leaves as the year unfolds.

In April and May, speculation may turn to whether China will finally open its borders to foreign visitors and those compatriots who want to be reunited with loved ones after enduring the pandemic lockdown. While some loosening of restrictions began in November 2022, China is still balancing its twin aims of containing the spread of Covid and re-engineering its economy along similar lines to Europe.

Beijing’s controversial ‘Zero-Covid’ strategy has intensified economic pressures, exacerbated rising levels of youth unemployment and tested the patience of China’s middle class, which has led to unprecedented civil disobedience. Those not employed by the state have been hit particularly hard. It is difficult to see how China’s economy can crank up again until Beijing reduces its internal restrictions and reconnects with the world.

A pivot to the Global South

June and July will be prime season for Beijing’s diplomacy with the Global South. Xi recently announced that China would host the third Belt and Road Forum in 2023 – a meeting of heads of states from predominantly developing countries to discuss his flagship foreign affairs initiative. As seen in the Political Report of the 20th Party Congress, Xi has abandoned the ‘new type of great power relations’ language he previously used to describe relations with the US-led western world. 

In its place, Xi is stressing that China should develop its ties with the Global South through his Global Development and Global Security initiatives which were announced in 2021 and 2022 respectively. These aim to reshape the global governance agenda in multilateral forums and project Beijing’s influence on to the developing world.

Sport will dominate throughout August and September. While Beijing’s spending spree on football promotion might have failed to see the national side qualify for the World Cup, its table tennis team has proved invincible and continues to cheer up the nation. I will offer my own verdict on why there is such a stark contrast between the success of the two men’s teams and explain the meaning of sports in modern Chinese society.

In October and November, young graduates will begin their careers while new university students start to arrive on campus. Chinese students are constantly subjected to strenuous testing. And like their western peers, they face the inevitable pressures of finding a job, repaying the mortgage and other everyday facts of life.

The burnout of China’s Generation Z 

The term ‘involution’ – neijuan – has been adopted by China’s Generation Z to describe their feelings of burnout at the ever-increasing expectations associated with high performance. Equally, they have strong opinions about their own government as well as western liberal democracies. China’s leaders of the future will come from their ranks so it will be worthwhile spending some time trying to understand what makes them tick.

Whatever the Year of the Rabbit holds for China, billions of its people will want to have their life return to normal without the fear of having the wrong colour – yellow or red – on their Covid health QR code. Only a green code shows a person is healthy and free to move around. The Covid threat has hovered over people for three years and as borders reopen, they may be holding their breath. 

A slowing economy dimming consumer confidence and a precarious international environment make it look even harder for President Xi to pursue the agenda outlined in October 2022. As the Year of the Rabbit dawns, China doesn’t need a Mad Hatter or a March Hare, instead it urgently needs a sound path to economic recovery and a plan to reopen its borders that works for everyone. 

Beijing briefing: China bets on warmer EU relations The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

With the Sino-US Xi relationship cooling, Xi Jinping is sending a new diplomatic team to Europe – but his ties to Putin may mean slow progress, writes Yu Jie.

It has been a momentous year for Beijing. Twelve months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its relations with the West have become more strained than ever. And after President Xi Jinping secured an unprecedented third term in office at the 20th Party Congress, the country has embarked on a chaotic exit from the Covid lockdown amid hopes the economy will rebound quickly.

Some are already asking if Beijing will set a course correction in its diplomatic priorities to spare itself some of the setbacks it incurred in 2022. But when it comes to foreign affairs, China’s priorities rarely change. 

The Chinese leadership seeks to create a stable external environment to allow its domestic economic development. This conservative maxim was adopted in the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping, and President Xi is likely to follow it as a time-honoured recipe for diplomatic reconciliation.

China’s awkward position

Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow and its failure to oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have put China in an awkward position. Xi and his colleagues have begun to realize that cooperation with Russia comes with substantial limits to avoid undermining China’s own political priorities and longer-term economic interests.

Interestingly, pundits interpreted the omission of ‘pursuing new types of great power relations’ in the 20th Party Congress report as an acceptance by the party leadership that its fraught relationship with advanced developed nations is likely to remain, with little prospect of improvement in the short term.

Chinese diplomatic literature has always presented Russia as a great power, but the abandonment of such terms signals that Beijing is keen to put clear daylight between itself and Vladimir Putin, although international commentators may argue this is not enough and nothing has changed.

There has been little sign of China using its influence to help resolve the Ukraine conflict. Facing, as it feels it now does, a ‘collective West’ and not the Americans alone, Beijing has concluded there are few reasons not to move closer to Russia.

But a reset would appear necessary if China is to tackle its domestic economic woes. So far, Beijing’s main political tactic has been to reassure European countries that it is willing to use its ties with Russia to restrain Putin from entertaining the deployment of nuclear weapons. That was the message conveyed during the visit of Olaf Scholz, the German Chancellor, and it will be said again when both President Emmanuel Macron of France and Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, each visit later this year.

Economically, China has traditionally relied on its relationships with the European Union and the United States to support innovation and growth. So, a perceived isolation from ‘a collective West’ is not an attractive option given Xi’s hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after dropping the country’s ‘zero-covid’ policy. A precarious bilateral tie with the US has already reduced Beijing’s choice of partners and consumers. Worsening Sino-US relations and a tightening of access to overseas markets for Chinese companies have prompted Beijing not only to reconsider the country’s sources of economic growth but to reconfigure its approach to foreign affairs.

China is making a renewed push to strengthen ties with the Global South, which does not see the war in Ukraine as black and white as the West does. Such a move is only possible because five decades of engagement with the ‘collective West’ has allowed China to emerge from poverty and become a global economic powerhouse.

A new diplomatic team

In an attempt to reset the tone of China’s relations with the EU, its largest trading partner, Xi has formed a new diplomatic team headed by Qin Gang, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is returning from his post in Washington as ambassador to the US and who has a background in European affairs. Achieving warmer relations will be easier said than done, however, as China has maintained its ‘neutrality’ at Russia’s aggression since February 2022.

Beijing briefing: China aims for tech self-reliance The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

Xi Jinping’s new appointments are tasked with a technology led recovery, but they face a daunting task to restore growth, writes Yu Jie.

The three-day state visit to Moscow by President Xi Jinping in March may have eclipsed the National People’s Congress in Beijing a fortnight earlier, but as Xi seeks to establish a new global order with China at its centre, the political events in the Great Hall of People provide an important insight into the country’s longer-term economic plans.

While a new cohort of cabinet members was appointed to sit on the State Council for the next five years, much of the attention remains on China’s economic stimulus plan to enable a rapid post-Covid recovery, as well as proposals to restructure central government.

Mountainous task

Three aspects of this year’s Congress deserve deeper scrutiny: Li Qiang’s confirmation as premier to succeed Li Keqiang’s decade-long subdued tenure under Xi; the extent to which Xi’s new cabinet sheds light on China’s economic and scientific self-reliance; and the unveiling of a major restructuring of central government administration in sectors such as finance and science.

China’s new premier initially faces the mountainous task of restoring growth and market confidence. During a press conference much shorter than his predecessor would hold, Li Qiang praised China’s private business sector and repeated the words ‘China remains open to foreign business’ to address the growing anxieties among foreigners and Chinese private entrepreneurs.

Beside the daunting task of economic recovery, Li Qiang faces another big challenge. Unlike his predecessors, he has never worked as a vice premier and overseen ministries under the State Council. The test for him will be to pursue a sound economic recovery plan while coordinating numerous central government agencies. He will also need to regulate relations among provincial heads who have a tendency to argue endlessly over the distribution of public finances.

Even though Xi is secure in his third term, his involvement in shaping and implementing macro-economic policies is keenly felt. Li Qiang made explicit the State Council under his leadership will be the chief implementor of all policies approved by the president. This is a less equal working partnership with Xi than his predecessors on the State Council enjoyed in the past.

Beijing published its official plan to restructure its central government administration announcing planned cuts of 5 per cent of its civil service. The newly established Central Commission on Finance intends to deal with systemic financial risks and to coordinate the financial regulatory bodies, central bank and Ministry of Finance. This is seen to reflect the Chinese leadership’s growing concern with the poor performance of local government loans and debt as well of the volatility of the property market, all of which threaten huge uncertainty for the economy.

As well as reorganizing the financial sector, Xi’s intention to pursue an integrated national strategy combining economic and scientific self-reliance has led to significant appointments following the Congress. As a starter, a new Central Commission for Science under the party leadership has been established. This commission will focus on providing a renewed impetus to accelerate China’s drive to achieve ‘scientific reliance’ and to ease the choke points in the economy, such as the supply chain for semiconductors.

It remains unclear who will head this new commission or who will be on it, however, as scant detail has been made public. It is seen as a direct response to the tough measures adopted by the United States designed to dent China’s ambitions of technology supremacy.

Departure from the past

New appointees to the Politburo come with substantial backgrounds in science as well as a solid track record of running state-owned enterprises. This is a departure from the past.

Instead of inserting financial specialists, Xi appointed two scientists, Liu Guozhong and Zhang Guoqing, as the vice premiers overseeing science, education and industrial policies. This signals that Xi intends to prioritize science and innovation during his third term. The appointment of technocrats to the State Council is seen as a move to strengthen innovation and prepare the Chinese economy, political system and society for potential external shocks.

How Beijing is closing surveillance gaps in the South China Sea The World Today iallan.drupal 15 October 2024

The discovery of a new radar system on China’s Triton Island military base shows that Beijing is rapidly developing its intelligence capacities in contested waters, write John Pollock and Damien Symon.

New satellite images reveal how the Chinese military is dramatically expanding its capabilities on Triton Island, which looks set to become a one of Beijing’s key signal intelligence bases in the South China Sea.

Once completed, the radar system would significantly increase China’s signals intercept and electronic warfare capabilities across the disputed Paracel Islands archipelago and add to a wider surveillance network spanning much of the South China Sea.

The enhanced facility on Triton is likely to offer a challenge to China’s competitors in the region and internationally.

China seized control of the Paracels from Vietnam in a 1974 naval battle, and competition for access to it waters has intensified since the recent discovery of oil and gas reserves. Chinese and Vietnamese maritime militia clashed off the coast of Triton in 2014.

In addition, American, British and Australian naval forces have for the past decade patrolled the waters to collectively challenge China’s contested ‘nine-dash-line’ claim to large stretches of the South China Sea. 

Overlapping anti-stealth network

A year after work was first identified on Triton, satellite images from Maxar have helped build a clearer picture of Beijing’s efforts to defend this strategic waterway.

The most striking development is the construction of a new radar system, known as SIAR – synthetic impulse and aperture radar – which purportedly detects stealth aircraft. The counter-stealth radar on Triton is characterized by its distinctive octagonal structure, which resembles another SIAR system built by China on Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands, south of the Paracels, in 2017. A half-completed tower also sits near the SIAR radar on Triton, which is likely to be the operations centre.

Once completed, the radar on Triton will form what is believed to be a wider network of at least three overlapping counter-stealth radars built across Chinese bases in the South China Sea over the past decade, including on Hainan Island, home to several Chinese naval bases. 

The positioning of the radar on Triton, 320km south of Hainan, is telling, says J. Michael Dahm, Senior Resident Fellow for Aerospace and China Studies at the Mitchell Institute. 

‘SIAR radars cannot see over the curve of the Earth, which means there is a gap in China’s air surveillance coverage between Subi Reef and Hainan Island. The Triton Island site will help close that gap’, said Dahm.

The aim, he suggests, is to give China contiguous counter-stealth radar coverage of the South China Sea.

More construction underway

The satellite images reveal other building projects on Triton. One is a large pad at the end of the road network which will probably be used as a launching point for a mobile anti-ship missile battery. The building at the northeast end of the road is probably a storage building for missile transport vehicles. 

Diminishing Vietnam’s options

The development of a new counter-stealth radar system and other suspected signals intercept structures on Triton represents a notable increase in China’s intelligence capabilities in the Paracels. The Chinese Communist Party has not disclosed the purpose of the building work on Triton, but its effects on regional and global competitors are likely to be wide ranging.

For Vietnam, which is rapidly expanding its own bases in the South China Sea, the intelligence structures on Triton would significantly diminish its capacity to operate undetected in the area. Alongside existing radar on Triton which can detect sea-going vessels, Beijing now has the potential to track Vietnamese air movements and gain forewarning of Hanoi’s manoeuvres in the area, including efforts to access oil and gas deposits.

The desire to strengthen control over these resources may explain why China is fortifying Triton Island, says Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House. ‘The developments might be a warning that China is planning to mount another drilling expedition’, he suggests.

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The Jerusalem Post Podcast - Travel Edition, Episode E94.

Beijing is pushing Pakistan to allow its own security staff to provide protection to thousands of Chinese citizens working in Pakistan during talks, after a car bombing near Karachi’s airport that was seen as a major security breach, sources said.

Last month’s airport bombing that killed two Chinese engineers returning to work on a project after a holiday in Thailand was the latest in a string of attacks on Beijing’s interests in Pakistan.

The attacks have angered China, which has pushed Pakistan to begin formal negotiations for a joint security management system.

Reuters spoke to five Pakistani security and government sources with direct knowledge of the previously unreported negotiations and demands on condition of anonymity, as the talks are sensitive, and reviewed a written proposal sent by Beijing to Islamabad.

“They (Chinese) want to bring in their own security,” said one official, who sat in on a recent meeting, adding that Pakistan had not so far agreed to such a step.

According to the official, a written proposal sent to Islamabad by Beijing, and forwarded to Pakistani agencies for review, mentioned a clause allowing the dispatching of security agencies and military forces into each others’ territory to assist in counter-terrorism missions and conduct joint strikes.

The dispatching would be done after discussions, but Pakistan was averse to the proposal, one official said.

Neither Beijing nor Islamabad confirmed the talks officially.

Dawn.com has also reached out to the Foreign Office for a comment.

The source, and two other officials, said there was a consensus on setting up a joint security management system, and that Pakistan was amenable to Chinese officials sitting in on security meetings and co-ordination.

But there was no agreement on their participating in security arrangements on the ground.

The first official said Pakistan had asked China for help in improving its intelligence and surveillance capabilities instead of direct involvement.

A spokesman for China’s foreign ministry told Reuters it was not familiar with talks on a joint security scheme, but added, “China will continue to strengthen co-operation with Pakistan and make joint efforts to do its utmost to maintain the security of Chinese personnel, projects and institutions.”

Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the military’s media wing, declined to comment to Reuters while the interior and planning ministries did not respond to repeated requests for comment.

In a statement last week, Pakistan’s interior ministry said both sides agreed to develop a joint strategy to prevent similar incidents in the future.

‘Grave security breach’

The nature of the Karachi bombing has angered Beijing, which is now pushing harder to achieve a long-standing demand to control security arrangements for its citizens.

A pick-up truck rigged with nearly 100 kilogrammes of explosives waited unchecked for about 40 minutes near the outermost security cordon of the heavily guarded airport before its driver rammed it into a vehicle carrying Chinese engineers, officials said.

“It was a grave security breach,” admitted one of the officials investigating the bombing, which came just a week before Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Islamabad, the first such trip in a decade.

The official said investigators believe the attackers had “inside help” in securing details of the itinerary and route of the engineers, who had returned from a month off in Thailand.

They were to be escorted back to a power plant set up as part of plans for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Longtime Pakistan ally China has thousands of nationals working on projects grouped under the CPEC, a $65-billion investment in President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, which seeks to expand China’s global reach by road, rail and sea.

‘Chinese frustrations’

Publicly, China has mostly backed Pakistan’s arrangements, even as it calls for enhanced security.

Privately, Beijing has expressed frustration. At one recent meeting, the Chinese side provided evidence that Pakistan had failed to follow security protocols agreed on twice in recent months, three officials said. Such protocols usually feature high standards for the deployment and movement of Chinese officials.

However, earlier this month, China’s Ambassador to Pakistan, Jiang Zaidong, while speaking at an event, had expressed frustration over the attacks, stating it was “unacceptable” and urging Islamabad to strengthen security measures for Chinese nationals and crack down on anti-China elements.

In response, Foreign Office Spokes­person Mumtaz Zahra Baloch had called the statement “perplexing” and a stark departure from the longstanding diplomatic norms between the two nations.

Chinese nationals have been in the crosshairs of banned outfits who accuse Beijing and Pakistan of exploiting minerals in Balochistan, where China has a strategic port and mining interests.

Thousands of Pakistani security officers from the army, police and a dedicated force called the Special Protection Unit are posted to guard Chinese nationals.

Only China’s embassy in Islamabad and its consulates are allowed Chinese official security personnel, the Pakistani officials said.

ISLAMABAD — Beijing is pushing Pakistan to allow its own security staff to provide protection to thousands of Chinese citizens working in the South Asian nation, during talks after a car bombing in Karachi that was seen as a major security breach, sources said. Last month's airport bombing in the southern port city that killed two Chinese engineers returning to work on a project after a holiday in Thailand was the latest in a string of attacks on Beijing's interests in Pakistan. The attacks, and Islamabad's failure to deter them, have angered China, which has pushed Pakistan to begin formal negotiations for a joint security management system. Reuters spoke to five Pakistani security and government sources with direct knowledge of the previously unreported negotiations and demands on condition of anonymity, as the talks are sensitive, and reviewed a written proposal sent by Beijing to Islamabad. "They (Chinese) want to bring in their own security," said one official, who sat in on a recent meeting, adding that Pakistan had not so far agreed to such a step.

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The post Vaping startup SNOWPLUS says unfazed by COVID-19, Beijing crackdown appeared first on DealStreetAsia.

Beijing, where pollution averaged more than twice China’s national standard last year, will close the last of its four major coal-fired power plants next year.

Beijing, where pollution averaged more than twice China’s national standard last year, will close the last of its four major coal-fired power plants next year.

This year marks the 30th anniversary of the enactment of the Basic Law. Forget about organising webinars to celebrate the anniversary, a debate about the core constitutional issues underlying the implementation of the Basic Law – China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong and the extent of Hong Kong’s autonomy – is unfolding right before us. The debate was triggered by statements made by the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO) of the State Council, and the central government’s liaison office on…

The paper summarises views expressed by practitioners at a workshop in Beijing on 13-14 April 2016 with respect to contemporary challenges in international co-operation in corruption cases and possible solutions to mitigate these challenges. It has a practical orientation and is intended to contribute to ongoing dialogue at national and multilateral levels on enhancing international co-operation.

Deeply worried about Beijing's insatiable desire for land and the way its military has occupied areas by stealth, Washington has sent three warships to the region.

The airline launched the service to China for the third time in 35 years in 2017 before decreasing the number of weekly flights from seven to five a year later.

Jessica Ennis-Hill said it would be among her greatest feats if she can win a medal at the World Championships in Beijing, barely a year after giving birth to her first baby.

Jessica Ennis-Hill will compete in the Bird's Nest stadium for the first time on Friday having missed the 2008 Beijing Olympics with a broken ankle. She was tipped for at least a silver medal seven years ago.

Deeply worried about Beijing's insatiable desire for land and the way its military has occupied areas by stealth, Washington has sent three warships to the region.

In Beijing, a city lousy with haunted spots, one historic mansion in need of some TLC just can't seem to catch a break due to its ghostly reputation.

Can a vacuum suck up China's smog? Daan Roosegaarde will test his new technology soon in Beijing's parks.

Tokyo, which cleaned up its act in the 1970s, is a role model as the Chinese capital starts to address some of the world's worst air pollution.

Five of the best 7 months for Beijing air quality have occurred since last summer.

What has China been protecting? Read this article to find out more.

A student critical of the University of Queensland's ties to Chinese Government organisations says he is facing expulsion over his activism, but authorities say it's a matter of policy.

Victoria's new deal with Beijing has angered some in the Morrison Government who worry about Chinese influence in Australia, but Premier Daniel Andrews says it will boost the state's economy and jobs.

The Official Launch Will Be On May 26 At Magnet Theater With A Performance Supporting Its First Vinyl Release: Píng Zè