(United States Third Circuit) - Affirmed convictions of several individuals who were charged with crimes in connection with a ticket-fixing scheme in the Philadelphia Traffic Court. Some of the individuals pleaded guilty while others proceeded to trial and were acquitted of fraud and conspiracy counts but convicted of perjury for statements they made before the grand jury. The Third Circuit consolidated their appeals for efficiency and ultimately affirmed all of the convictions.

(United States Third Circuit) - Dismissed an appeal filed in a civil rights case by the estate of a man who was shot and killed by police officers. As the administrator of the estate, the man's mother filed suit alleging that the officers had used excessive force. When the jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers, she appealed pro se. Dismissing her appeal on grounds that she had filed it without counsel, the Third Circuit held that a non-attorney who is not a beneficiary of an estate may not conduct a case pro se on behalf of the estate.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that an automobile insurance company that settled claims against a driver arising out of a car crash could bring a contribution suit against a restaurant that allegedly over-served alcoholic beverages to the driver. The restaurant insisted that Pennsylvania's Dram Shop Law subjected it to liability only to injured individuals themselves. However, the Third Circuit concluded that the Dram Shop Law did not prevent the insurance company from bringing a suit against the restaurant under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. The panel therefore reversed dismissal of the insurer's complaint.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that a police officer did not have qualified immunity to a suit alleging that he inappropriately touched a woman who reported a sexual assault and that he used his personal cellphone to photograph her intimate areas. The officer argued that he was immune from suit because the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of his alleged conduct. Rejecting his argument, the Third Circuit reversed the entry of summary judgment for the officer and remanded for further proceedings in this suit alleging infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity.

(United States Third Circuit) - Reinstated a claim that a debt collector violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by leaving telephone voice messages that did not use its true name. The plaintiffs filed a class-action complaint alleging that the debt collector left pre-recorded messages on their phone that did not state the caller's correct name. Reversing the district court, the Third Circuit held that they stated a plausible claim for relief under the statute's true-name provision, though the panel affirmed the dismissal of their other causes of action.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that a prisoner was entitled to habeas relief in the wake of the Supreme Court's 2015 decision invalidating a provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The defendant, who was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, argued that his previous crimes were not violent felonies in light of Johnson v. U.S. and therefore his enhanced sentence was now unconstitutional. On appeal, the Third Circuit agreed that at least one of the predicate offenses (Pennsylvania aggravated assault) was not a violent felony, and therefore vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for resentencing.

(United States Third Circuit) - Affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner who claimed that his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were infringed. The prisoner objected to the fact that jailhouse informants testified at trial about their conversations with his co-defendant, and he could not cross-examine his co-defendant regarding the statements. Rejecting his argument, the Third Circuit concluded that there was no violation of his Confrontation Clause rights that would justify habeas relief, regardless of differences between the law in effect at the time of his trial and current law.

(United States Third Circuit) - Reinstated a medical device seller's claim that certain Blue Cross Blue Shield health insurance companies violated antitrust law by unreasonably restraining trade in the national market for outpatient cardiac monitors. The seller of a cardiac monitoring device contended that it was shut out of the market because the defendants conspired to deny insurance coverage for its product to shield themselves from patient demand for it. Holding that the seller stated a claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Third Circuit reversed dismissal of the complaint and remanded for further proceedings.

(United States Third Circuit) - Affirmed the dismissal of a TV producer's complaint alleging that the popular Fox Television series Empire infringed his copyright in a television pilot he had created a decade earlier. Moving to dismiss, the defendants contended that there was no substantial similarity between the two television shows. Agreeing, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that a man with mental retardation who was detained for nearly a decade awaiting trial could amend his civil rights complaint against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Reversing the district court, the Third Circuit held that the man, who was charged with a crime that may not have occurred, was entitled to amend his complaint to reinstitute his due process and Americans with Disabilities Act claims. The panel affirmed dismissal of his Section 1983 claims, however.

(United States Third Circuit) - Reinstated a former 911 dispatcher's claim that her former supervisors gave false, defamatory job references to her prospective employers to retaliate against her for her previous employment complaints, in violation of her constitutional rights. The dispatcher claimed that undeserved negative references had prevented her from obtaining other employment. Reversing the dismissal of her complaint, the Third Circuit held that she adequately pleaded a First Amendment retaliation claim.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that a company could not be compelled to arbitrate a dispute over retiree healthcare benefits. The manufacturing company argued that the dispute over retiree benefits was not arbitrable because there was no provision in the collective-bargaining agreement regarding such benefits, and the memorandum of agreement discussing the matter did not provide for arbitration. Agreeing with the company, the Third Circuit concluded that the district court erred in ordering that the dispute be arbitrated under the Labor Management Relations Act.

(United States Third Circuit) - Affirmed the suppression of evidence on the ground that a police officer impermissibly extended a traffic stop. The defendant vehicle passenger, who was discovered to have a handgun and later indicted for unlawful possession of it, argued that the traffic stop was unlawfully extended beyond the time when it should have ended. Agreeing, the Third Circuit affirmed the granting of his motion to suppress the handgun evidence.

(United States Third Circuit) - Reinstated a lawsuit brought by a family receiving governmental housing assistance seeking to enjoin their landlord from evicting them. The landlord argued that he was permitted to evict a family that received enhanced vouchers from the federal government once their lease expired. Rejecting the landlord's position, the Third Circuit held en banc that enhanced voucher holders may not be evicted absent good cause, even at the end of a lease term. The panel reversed summary judgment for the landlord and remanded.

(United States Third Circuit) - Reinstated a False Claims Act lawsuit alleging fraud in connection with the sale of pharmaceutical drugs to nursing homes. The defendant company, which owns and operates institutional pharmacies, argued for dismissal of the qui tam action on the ground that the allegation was already known to the public, and the district court agreed. Reversing and remanding, the Third Circuit held that the relator's allegation had not previously been publicly disclosed.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that two investors could proceed with their proposed class action lawsuit alleging that an investment services company breached a contract with them by overcharging for commissions. The company moved to dismiss the relevant claims under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA). On interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit held that the SLUSA bar did not apply here, affirming the district court's ruling that the investors' claims could move forward.

(United States Third Circuit) - Denied a petition for review of a Pennsylvania state regulators' decision to grant a Clean Water Act certification to a natural gas pipeline project. An environmental organization raised various procedural and substantive arguments against the environmental regulators' issuance of a water quality certification. On judicial review, the Third Circuit held that the environmentalists' challenge failed on the merits. Prior to reaching the merits, the panel discussed in detail questions regarding its jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act.

(United States Third Circuit) - Rejected challenges to a natural gas pipeline project but remanded on one issue. Local governments and an environmental organization argued that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving a proposed interstate pipeline expansion, but the Third Circuit rejected this argument. However, on a separate issue, the panel remanded to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection with instructions to reconsider the petitioners' request for an adjudicatory hearing.

(United States Third Circuit) - Affirmed the dismissal of a disabled tenant's lawsuit under the Fair Housing Amendments Act. The tenant, who needs ready access to her rolling walker, brought suit when the building managers refused to allow her to leave it in the building's lobby. Unpersuaded by her arguments, the Third Circuit concluded she did not plausibly plead that her preferred accommodation of leaving the walker in the lobby was necessary, given that she was offered four other ways to store and access her walker.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that the bankruptcy court correctly disallowed a claim brought by the debtor's former employee. A former television station employee argued that the station, whose owner was now in bankruptcy, was liable for unlawful racial discrimination. Affirming summary judgment against his claim, the Third Circuit concluded that he failed to raise a triable issue and, further, that it was too late for him to challenge the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to hear his discrimination claim, since he never objected to this during bankruptcy proceedings.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that a pastor could not sue his church for breach of an employment contract. The church contended that adjudication of the pastor's contract claim would impermissibly entangle the court in religious doctrine in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Agreeing, the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the church.

(United States Third Circuit) - Affirmed the denial of habeas relief to a defendant who alleged violation of his Confrontation Clause rights. The defendant, who was convicted of third-degree murder, challenged the use of prior statements of a witness who refused to answer any substantive questions on cross-examination. While agreeing that the defendant's rights were violated, the Third Circuit concluded that his Confrontation Clause claim was procedurally defaulted and there was no cause to excuse the default here.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that a consumer who purchased baby powder without being informed that it increased the risk of ovarian cancer (as she alleged it did) had no standing to pursue claims for economic injury. The plaintiff argued that she and other consumers would not have purchased the baby powder in the first place had they been properly informed about its alleged risks. Emphasizing that she was asserting only economic harm, the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of her class-action complaint, explaining that the product had functioned for her as expected.

(United States Third Circuit) - Denied an alien's petition for review of a decision ordering him removed from the United States. The Board of Immigration Appeals had ruled that the citizen of Cameroon, who entered the U.S. on a student visa in 1989, was ineligible for waiver of removal because his felony conviction of making false statements about a sham marriage constituted a crime involving moral turpitude. On appeal, the Third Circuit agreed that the man was not eligible for a fraud waiver, and thus denied his petition for review.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that a federal prisoner could proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) with a lawsuit alleging that prison employees violated his constitutional rights. The district court had denied the prisoner's IFP request, applying the so-called three strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Reversing, the Third Circuit held that the prisoner had not accrued three strikes. The panel used its own precedent to evaluate whether his prior lawsuits were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim, rather than that of the circuit from which the potential strikes emanated.

(United States Third Circuit) - Affirmed a brother's and sister's convictions and life sentences for conspiracy to commit interstate stalking and cyberstalking resulting in death. The two siblings were indicted after their father shot and killed the brother's ex-wife and himself. On appeal, the siblings both disputed the constitutionality of the statutes under which they were convicted and also brought numerous other challenges to their convictions and sentences. However, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in all respects, in a case that the appellate panel said involved numerous issues of first impression.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that a real estate title insurer had a duty to defend the insured party (here the successor to a lender) against certain claims of the borrower/mortgagor. The title insurer disputed that it had a duty to defend. Applying Pennsylvania law, the Third Circuit held that a duty to defend existed under the facts, but only as to certain of the borrower's claims.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that job applicants had legal standing to pursue claims that a prospective employer violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by failing to send them copies of their background checks. The employer argued that the job applicants lacked standing because they alleged a bare procedural violation of the statute but no concrete injury in fact. Disagreeing, the Third Circuit reversed the district court in relevant part and remanded.

(United States Third Circuit) - Affirmed a conviction on drug-trafficking charges. Raising a venue challenge, the defendant argued that he could not reasonably have foreseen that conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy would have occurred in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Rejecting his argument, the Third Circuit declined to adopt a reasonable foreseeability test for venue.

(United States Third Circuit) - Remanded with instructions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The defendant, who was convicted of first-degree murder, contended that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by advising him incorrectly that he could not be convicted of murder, which led the defendant to reject a plea deal. Agreeing that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, the Third Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief and remanded.

(United States Third Circuit) - Vacated a ruling allocating the costs of cleaning up a contaminated manufacturing site. A successor company brought a contribution action against its predecessor company seeking to recover the costs it had incurred when government regulators forced it to remediate the site. The district court arrived at a percentage method of splitting the costs between the two companies, but on appeal the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that a motorist who was kicked in the face during his arrest, breaking his eye socket, could pursue conspiracy claims against the four police officers at the scene, all of whom denied kicking him or seeing who did. The motorist did not know which of the officers had kicked him. The Third Circuit held that this doomed his excessive-force claim. However, the panel allowed him to continue litigating his claim of an unconstitutional after-the-fact conspiracy to cover up misconduct, reversing summary judgment in relevant part.  

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a fee petition in its entirety when the amount requested was outrageously excessive. The Third Circuit formally endorsed the view that where a fee-shifting statute provides a court discretion to award attorney fees, such discretion includes the ability to deny a fee request altogether when, under the circumstances, the amount requested is outrageously excessive. The panel thus affirmed the denial of a fee award to a prevailing plaintiff in an insurance bad faith case.

(United States Third Circuit) - Reinstated a federal prison inmate's lawsuit alleging that prison officials unconstitutionally retaliated against him by forcing him to cell with an inmate who had threatened to kill him. The case required the Third Circuit to resolve several matters of first impression in the circuit concerning the Prison Litigation Reform Act's procedural requirements and other matters. The panel ultimately vacated dismissal of the inmate's suit in part and remanded.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that a company that entered into an unconsummated merger agreement was not entitled to payment of a $275 million termination fee. The proposed merger had been approved by a bankruptcy court because one of the parties was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Third Circuit held that the bankruptcy court did not err in narrowing the circumstances under which the termination fee would be triggered, resulting ultimately in no fee being paid.

(United States Third Circuit) - Affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by investors of a bankrupt company who claimed they were entitled to dividend payments. The investors, who purchased their shares with notice of the bankruptcy, claimed that the company and several of its officers were liable for failing to pay them a dividend they were owed. Rejecting their arguments, the Third Circuit held that the investors were bound by the reorganization plan, including its releases of liability.

(United States Ninth Circuit) - Held that former board members of a corporation lacked corporate authority when they filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The board members argued that they had the proper authority to file the bankruptcy petition even though a receiver appointed by a state court already had removed them from the board of directors. Rejecting their argument, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the bankruptcy petition.

(United States Ninth Circuit) - Held that the Internal Revenue Service could be liable for emotional-distress damages for willfully violating an automatic stay by sending collection notices to a couple who had filed for bankruptcy. The government argued that it was protected from liability by sovereign immunity. Disagreeing, the Ninth Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code unambiguously waived sovereign immunity. The panel therefore reversed and remanded with instructions to consider the government's challenge to the merits of the debtors' claims.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that the bankruptcy court correctly disallowed a claim brought by the debtor's former employee. A former television station employee argued that the station, whose owner was now in bankruptcy, was liable for unlawful racial discrimination. Affirming summary judgment against his claim, the Third Circuit concluded that he failed to raise a triable issue and, further, that it was too late for him to challenge the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to hear his discrimination claim, since he never objected to this during bankruptcy proceedings.

(United States Third Circuit) - Held that a company that entered into an unconsummated merger agreement was not entitled to payment of a $275 million termination fee. The proposed merger had been approved by a bankruptcy court because one of the parties was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Third Circuit held that the bankruptcy court did not err in narrowing the circumstances under which the termination fee would be triggered, resulting ultimately in no fee being paid.

(United States Ninth Circuit) - Affirmed that Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code did not permit the co-founders of several real-estate management companies to discharge a debt arising from a state-court judgment for fraud and misrepresentation. The central issue in this case was whether the individuals continued to engage in business after consummation of the Chapter 11 plan. Concluding that they did not, the Ninth Circuit held that they could not discharge the debt.

(United States Ninth Circuit) - Held that the time period in which a creditor could execute on an Order for Appearance and Examination (ORAP) lien was tolled during the automatic stay. Affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's decision and remanded for further proceedings.

(United States Seventh Circuit) - Held that the receiver for a failed bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, did not have to honor a benefits agreement with a bank executive, because the benefit he sought was a golden-parachute payment prohibited by federal law. Affirmed summary judgment for the FDIC.

(California Court of Appeal) - In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, held that when the nature of a debt is such that its discharge will directly and adversely impact the finances of the debtor's spouse or former spouse, it is nondischargeable in bankruptcy, even if it is not directly payable to the spouse. Affirmed the district court.

(United States Ninth Circuit) - Held that a Chapter 7 debtor was not allowed to amend a bankruptcy schedule to reflect a post-petition increase in the value of property that was the subject of a homestead exemption under Washington law. Affirmed.

(United States Ninth Circuit) - In a case involving the City of Stockton's municipal bankruptcy, dismissed an appeal filed by a person who objected to confirmation of the city's Chapter 9 plan. Held that his appeal was equitably moot. Also held that his claims failed on the merits.

(United States Ninth Circuit) - Held that a bankruptcy debtor who sought damages for willful violation of the automatic stay was entitled to attorney fees on appeal. When an appeal is necessary to secure such damages, appellate attorney fees and costs should also be granted to a successful debtor, regardless of which party brings the appeal. Reversed the district court's order.

(United States Fifth Circuit) - Held that a fired chief executive officer could sue the company's secured creditor in state court. Affirmed that his tortious interference claim belonged in state court rather than in the company's bankruptcy proceeding.

(United States Second Circuit) - Affirmed a judgment in a dispute between two creditors of an agricultural produce company that filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. One of the creditors was another produce company that did business with the debtor. Because the goods were perishable agricultural commodities, the case involved the federal Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act.

(United States Fifth Circuit) - Held that energy companies emerging from bankruptcy did not have to pay certain creditors a contractual make-whole amount, even though the companies were now solvent due to a rise in commodity prices. Vacated and remanded.