Pectins are a major dietary nutrient source for the human gut microbiota. The prominent gut microbe Bacteroides thetaiotaomicron was recently shown to encode the founding member (BT1017) of a new family of pectin methylesterases essential for the metabolism of the complex pectin rhamnogalacturonan-II (RG-II). However, biochemical and structural knowledge of this family is lacking. Here, we showed that BT1017 is critical for the metabolism of an RG-II–derived oligosaccharide ΔBT1017oligoB generated by a BT1017 deletion mutant (ΔBT1017) during growth on carbohydrate extract from apple juice. Structural analyses of ΔBT1017oligoB using a combination of enzymatic, mass spectrometric, and NMR approaches revealed that it is a bimethylated nonaoligosaccharide (GlcA-β1,4-(2-O-Me-Xyl-α1,3)-Fuc-α1,4-(GalA-β1,3)-Rha-α1,3-Api-β1,2-(Araf-α1,3)-(GalA-α1,4)-GalA) containing components of the RG-II backbone and its side chains. We showed that the catalytic module of BT1017 adopts an α/β-hydrolase fold, consisting of a central twisted 10-stranded β-sheet sandwiched by several α-helices. This constitutes a new fold for pectin methylesterases, which are predominantly right-handed β-helical proteins. Bioinformatic analyses revealed that the family is dominated by sequences from prominent genera of the human gut microbiota, including Bacteroides and Prevotella. Our re-sults not only highlight the critical role played by this family of enzymes in pectin metabolism but also provide new insights into the molecular basis of the adaptation of B. thetaiotaomicron to the human gut.

Methionine, through S-adenosylmethionine, activates a multifaceted growth program in which ribosome biogenesis, carbon metabolism, and amino acid and nucleotide biosynthesis are induced. This growth program requires the activity of the Gcn4 transcription factor (called ATF4 in mammals), which facilitates the supply of metabolic precursors that are essential for anabolism. However, how Gcn4 itself is regulated in the presence of methionine is unknown. Here, we discover that Gcn4 protein levels are increased by methionine, despite conditions of high cell growth and translation (in which the roles of Gcn4 are not well-studied). We demonstrate that this mechanism of Gcn4 induction is independent of transcription, as well as the conventional Gcn2/eIF2α-mediated increased translation of Gcn4. Instead, when methionine is abundant, Gcn4 phosphorylation is decreased, which reduces its ubiquitination and therefore degradation. Gcn4 is dephosphorylated by the protein phosphatase 2A (PP2A); our data show that when methionine is abundant, the conserved methyltransferase Ppm1 methylates and alters the activity of the catalytic subunit of PP2A, shifting the balance of Gcn4 toward a dephosphorylated, stable state. The absence of Ppm1 or the loss of the PP2A methylation destabilizes Gcn4 even when methionine is abundant, leading to collapse of the Gcn4-dependent anabolic program. These findings reveal a novel, methionine-dependent signaling and regulatory axis. Here methionine directs the conserved methyltransferase Ppm1 via its target phosphatase PP2A to selectively stabilize Gcn4. Through this, cells conditionally modify a major phosphatase to stabilize a metabolic master regulator and drive anabolism.

Pyrroline-5-carboxylate reductase 1 (PYCR1) catalyzes the biosynthetic half-reaction of the proline cycle by reducing Δ1-pyrroline-5-carboxylate (P5C) to proline through the oxidation of NAD(P)H. Many cancers alter their proline metabolism by up-regulating the proline cycle and proline biosynthesis, and knockdowns of PYCR1 lead to decreased cell proliferation. Thus, evidence is growing for PYCR1 as a potential cancer therapy target. Inhibitors of cancer targets are useful as chemical probes for studying cancer mechanisms and starting compounds for drug discovery; however, there is a notable lack of validated inhibitors for PYCR1. To fill this gap, we performed a small-scale focused screen of proline analogs using X-ray crystallography. Five inhibitors of human PYCR1 were discovered: l-tetrahydro-2-furoic acid, cyclopentanecarboxylate, l-thiazolidine-4-carboxylate, l-thiazolidine-2-carboxylate, and N-formyl l-proline (NFLP). The most potent inhibitor was NFLP, which had a competitive (with P5C) inhibition constant of 100 μm. The structure of PYCR1 complexed with NFLP shows that inhibitor binding is accompanied by conformational changes in the active site, including the translation of an α-helix by 1 Å. These changes are unique to NFLP and enable additional hydrogen bonds with the enzyme. NFLP was also shown to phenocopy the PYCR1 knockdown in MCF10A H-RASV12 breast cancer cells by inhibiting de novo proline biosynthesis and impairing spheroidal growth. In summary, we generated the first validated chemical probe of PYCR1 and demonstrated proof-of-concept for screening proline analogs to discover inhibitors of the proline cycle.

Peptidoglycan (PG) is an essential constituent of the bacterial cell wall. During cell division, the machinery responsible for PG synthesis localizes mid-cell, at the septum, under the control of a multiprotein complex called the divisome. In Escherichia coli, septal PG synthesis and cell constriction rely on the accumulation of FtsN at the division site. Interestingly, a short sequence of FtsN (Leu75–Gln93, known as EFtsN) was shown to be essential and sufficient for its functioning in vivo, but what exactly this sequence is doing remained unknown. Here, we show that EFtsN binds specifically to the major PG synthase PBP1b and is sufficient to stimulate its biosynthetic glycosyltransferase (GTase) activity. We also report the crystal structure of PBP1b in complex with EFtsN, which demonstrates that EFtsN binds at the junction between the GTase and UB2H domains of PBP1b. Interestingly, mutations to two residues (R141A/R397A) within the EFtsN-binding pocket reduced the activation of PBP1b by FtsN but not by the lipoprotein LpoB. This mutant was unable to rescue the ΔponB-ponAts strain, which lacks PBP1b and has a thermosensitive PBP1a, at nonpermissive temperature and induced a mild cell-chaining phenotype and cell lysis. Altogether, the results show that EFtsN interacts with PBP1b and that this interaction plays a role in the activation of its GTase activity by FtsN, which may contribute to the overall septal PG synthesis and regulation during cell division.

Environmental factors, such as viral infection, are proposed to play a role in the initiation of autoimmune diabetes. In response to encephalomyocarditis virus (EMCV) infection, resident islet macrophages release the pro-inflammatory cytokine IL-1β, to levels that are sufficient to stimulate inducible nitric oxide synthase (iNOS) expression and production of micromolar levels of the free radical nitric oxide in neighboring β-cells. We have recently shown that nitric oxide inhibits EMCV replication and EMCV-mediated β-cell lysis and that this protection is associated with an inhibition of mitochondrial oxidative metabolism. Here we show that the protective actions of nitric oxide against EMCV infection are selective for β-cells and associated with the metabolic coupling of glycolysis and mitochondrial oxidation that is necessary for insulin secretion. Inhibitors of mitochondrial respiration attenuate EMCV replication in β-cells, and this inhibition is associated with a decrease in ATP levels. In mouse embryonic fibroblasts (MEFs), inhibition of mitochondrial metabolism does not modify EMCV replication or decrease ATP levels. Like most cell types, MEFs have the capacity to uncouple the glycolytic utilization of glucose from mitochondrial respiration, allowing for the maintenance of ATP levels under conditions of impaired mitochondrial respiration. It is only when MEFs are forced to use mitochondrial oxidative metabolism for ATP generation that mitochondrial inhibitors attenuate viral replication. In a β-cell selective manner, these findings indicate that nitric oxide targets the same metabolic pathways necessary for glucose stimulated insulin secretion for protection from viral lysis.

Poly(ADP-ribose) polymerase (PARP) superfamily members covalently link either a single ADP-ribose (ADPR) or a chain of ADPR units to proteins using NAD as the source of ADPR. Although the well-known poly(ADP-ribosylating) (PARylating) PARPs primarily function in the DNA damage response, many noncanonical mono(ADP-ribosylating) (MARylating) PARPs are associated with cellular antiviral responses. We recently demonstrated robust up-regulation of several PARPs following infection with murine hepatitis virus (MHV), a model coronavirus. Here we show that SARS-CoV-2 infection strikingly up-regulates MARylating PARPs and induces the expression of genes encoding enzymes for salvage NAD synthesis from nicotinamide (NAM) and nicotinamide riboside (NR), while down-regulating other NAD biosynthetic pathways. We show that overexpression of PARP10 is sufficient to depress cellular NAD and that the activities of the transcriptionally induced enzymes PARP7, PARP10, PARP12 and PARP14 are limited by cellular NAD and can be enhanced by pharmacological activation of NAD synthesis. We further demonstrate that infection with MHV induces a severe attack on host cell NAD+ and NADP+. Finally, we show that NAMPT activation, NAM, and NR dramatically decrease the replication of an MHV that is sensitive to PARP activity. These data suggest that the antiviral activities of noncanonical PARP isozyme activities are limited by the availability of NAD and that nutritional and pharmacological interventions to enhance NAD levels may boost innate immunity to coronaviruses.

Africa Aware: Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan Audio bhorton.drupal 9 April 2022

This episode of Africa Aware examines the relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Ahmed Soliman provides an overview of the Africa Programme’s work on cross-border conflict as part of the XCEPT project.

First, we speak to Kholood Khair on the steady deterioration in relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. Then Abel Abate Demissie discusses how recent political developments in Ethiopia and Sudan have impacted relations between the two countries.

This podcast was produced with support from the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) project, funded by UK Aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.

It is also part of a series of outputs on Ethiopia’s political transition.

Priorities for implementing Ethiopia's national dialogue 11 May 2022 — 1:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 May 2022 Online

Experts discuss challenges and priorities in shaping an inclusive and effective national dialogue in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is grappling with numerous contentious national issues – not least persistent conflict in several parts of the country – which underscore the need for large-scale dialogue and reconciliation efforts to address the country’s deep-rooted societal and political divisions. Ethiopia’s newly established National Dialogue Commission – whose 11 commissioners were appointed in February 2022 – has begun a four-phased process of preparations for a dialogue, with its initial stage focused on stakeholder engagement and local knowledge mobilization.

There are major challenges, however, in ensuring inclusivity amidst ongoing conflict and questions on how a country-wide process will sit alongside local dialogue initiatives and wider mediation and peacebuilding efforts. Linking the process to constitutional bodies will also be an important priority to ensure dialogue outcomes are effectively implemented.

At this public event, panellists will exchange perspectives on how to shape an effective national dialogue in Ethiopia, including priorities for building a credible National Dialogue Commission and the roles and responsibilities of other national, regional and local-level actors. They will also discuss key implementation mechanisms and long-term priorities for trust-building and cultivating a conducive environment for inclusive dialogue.

This webinar is part of a series of events and outputs on Ethiopia’s political transition.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.

Towards just transition in Africa: Green financing for urban energy solutions and job creation 9 June 2022 — 7:30AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 18 May 2022 Nairobi and online

This event explores the major openings and potential impediments to the development of a just transition policy in Africa.

Global climate policies towards a ‘just transition’ under the Paris Agreement should also align with and support African states’ national sustainable development priorities. In particular, the need for decent and fair job creation and the establishment of sufficient, resilient and sustainable power supply, accessible to all, and efficient energy use.

Achieving green growth requires innovative and more accessible financing models, especially as wealthy nations’ financial pledges have fallen short. Ahead of the ‘African COP27’ set to take place in Egypt in November 2022, there is a need for transformational strategic thinking and context-specific action from African governments, civil society, businesses and financiers in their green financing demands and national implementation plans.

Sustainable urban energy solutions represent a critical zone of opportunity for the development of new and more reliable green finance pathways. Africa’s rapidly expanding cities present a significant economic opportunity and source of growth. However, urban centres are also where income and energy inequalities are at their starkest. The acceleration of sustainable energy generation and use could have a transformative impact on SMEs and livelihoods across value chains.

At this event, participants will discuss the major openings and potential impediments to the development of a credible ‘just transition’ policy in Africa towards net zero goals, with a particular focus on establishing and enhancing links between green financing innovation, employment creation, sustainable power supply and generation, and sustainable energy usage and consumption in an urban environment.

This event is held in partnership with the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA). It is part of a series on Towards Just Transition: Connecting Green Financing and Sustainable Job Creation in Africa, supported by the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator.

This event will be held in English and French with simultaneous interpretation.

Climate migration: Ways ahead from the next generation The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 25 May 2022

Ella Dennis and Mike Higgins talk to young activists seeking solutions as global warming wreaks havoc in sub-Saharan Africa

Africa has the lowest carbon emissions per capita yet the highest rate of temperature increase in the world. Rising levels of desertification, drought and flooding are already forcing millions of Africans to relocate to find more stable livelihoods. 

The continent’s youth will bear the brunt of this climate migration problem. It is estimated that by 2050, Africa will be home to 86 million internal climate migrants.

How is climate migration already affecting sub-Saharan Africa and what frameworks could tackle it? To begin to answer those questions, five young activists from across the region, who are members of Chatham House’s Common Futures Conversations, took part in a panel discussion at the world’s first youth-led Conference on Climate Migration, convened in April by the Alliance for Citizen Engagement, a nonpartisan think tank based in the US. 

The conversation and follow-up discussions focused on a common problem – climate migration brings people into conflict and puts pressure on infrastructure. 

In Kenya, droughts have left 3.5 million people hungry and the chronic flooding of several lakes in the Rift Valley has displaced hundreds of thousands, said Gerald Muchiri, 29, a social scientist from Kenya. One result has been outbreaks of violence between pastoralists such as the Orma people and the farmers of the Pokomo community, said Laura Mukhwana, 33, a PhD student in Kenya. She believes this violence is likely to worsen. ‘Inter-group conflicts will pose even larger security concerns for surrounding communities as climate migration intensifies,’ she said.

Suleman Nuhu, 24, a farmer and veterinary student from Nigeria, said farmer-herder conflicts were his country’s most significant climate-migration issue. The movement of nomadic tribes from the north had affected him personally: ‘Nomads have trespassed on [my family’s] farms many times while moving with their livestock, destroying our crops.’ 

Changes in climate also force people to move from rural to urban areas. Nigeria, for instance, struggles with the so-called ‘Lagos problem’, said Temiloluwa Lawal, 25, a lawyer and researcher from Nigeria. An estimated 22 million people, a number that is rising fast, are crammed into a city smaller than Greater London. While not on the same scale, Zimbabwe experiences comparable challenges, said Tinotenda Dube, 29, a Zimbabwean finance director. Thanks to drought, unemployed rural migrants arriving in cities ‘put excessive pressure on service delivery against a low tax base,’ he said. ‘People, including close family members of mine, are crowded in dilapidated homes because they cannot afford to pay rent for decent housing.’ 

But there is hope, say the activists. Dube believes that affordable housing is an ‘integral component of [tackling] the climate migration crisis’. 

In Zimbabwe, he has developed a low-cost home finance model that, he said, has helped more than 250 low-income households find good-quality accommodation. Alongside this initiative, Dube has co-founded a property and construction company, Solinfra Zimbabwe Private Ltd, to provide low-cost housing. 

Muchiri is taking action in Kenya, founding an NGO called Social Assistance Welfare to tackle public health issues, he said: ‘As climate migration becomes more intense, I expect preventable health issues to increase throughout the region, and thus see Social Assistance Welfare as an important mitigation.’

In Nigeria, Nuhu noted that to help reduce conflict between farmers and herders social-media campaigns are encouraging pastoralists to move from nomadic livestock farming to more efficient intensive systems, using ranching and grazing reserves. ‘As for food security problems, the best mitigation is to reduce reliance on rain-fed agriculture through irrigation schemes,’ he said. 

All five agreed that, in their experience, the youth of sub-Saharan Africa could be better informed about climate migration. But they took encouragement from the fact the young are passionate about tackling issues arising from the broader climate crisis. 

In Kenya, Mukhwana pointed to successful youth projects around agro-forestry and tree-planting. She added that there is ‘a growing movement of urban youth who are advocating for climate justice, such as the Kenyan Youth Environmental Network and Fridays for the Future Kenya’. It was pleasing too, she said, that when the Kenyan government revised its contributions to the Paris Climate Accords it staged a week-long youth conference to include their opinions.

‘Overall, I am quite hopeful about how the youth are mobilizing themselves in Kenya,’ she added.

Find out more about Chatham House’s Common Futures Conversations
 

Enhancing the role of women in peacebuilding and politics in Ethiopia 29 June 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 June 2022 Online

Panellists discuss the priorities for promoting the agency of women in politics and peacebuilding in Ethiopia and approaches for combatting gender-based discrimination and violence.

The war in northern Ethiopia and conflicts elsewhere have disproportionately affected women and girls – including through the infliction of physical and sexual violence, the heightened impacts of displacement and disruptions to education, and the co-option of women’s experiences in narratives by aggressors of conflict.

Hard-won political gains in women’s rights have been undermined and deep-rooted gender inequalities exacerbated. Despite this, women remain central actors in politics, as well as in conflict resolution and mediation efforts. However, more needs to be done to promote the security and inclusion of women in finding sustainable solutions for Ethiopia’s long-term recovery and to institutionalize reforms for gender equity and development.

At this public event, panellists will discuss the priorities for improving women’s participation and equality in public decision-making in Ethiopia and how to strengthen the implementation of legislation on women’s rights. They will also discuss what societal shifts and approaches are needed to combat gender-based discrimination and violence and to promote the agency of women in peacebuilding.

This webinar is part of a series of events and outputs on Ethiopia’s political transition.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.

What challenges does the new president of Somalia face? Explainer Video aboudiaf.drupal 28 June 2022

Ahmed Soliman examines the challenges the new president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud faces in his first 100 days as president.

Key issues for the new administration are a deteriorating situation with regards to drought as close to half the population are facing food insecurity due to a fourth failed rainy season.

Combined with an inflation rate above ten per cent, many Somalis are at risk of famine and starvation. Many areas of the country are affected from the pastoralist regions to those which house IDP camps around the capital city and other towns, all being exacerbated by the war in Ukraine as Somalia was importing much of its wheat imports from Ukraine and Russia.

Towards just transition in Africa: Green financing for nature-based solutions and rural resilience 21 July 2022 — 9:30AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 June 2022 Libreville and online

This hybrid event in Libreville explores just transition policy and green financing for nature-based solutions, with a particular focus on the integration of job creation priorities in conservation and rural resilience.

Global climate policies towards a ‘just transition’ under the Paris Agreement should align with and support African states’ national sustainable development priorities – in particular, the need for decent and fair job creation, as well as resilient and sustainable land, environment, and ecosystem management policies.

Achieving green growth requires innovative and more accessible financing models, especially as wealthy nations’ financial pledges have fallen short. Ahead of the ‘African COP27’ set to take place in Egypt in November 2022, there is a need for transformational strategic thinking and context-specific action from African governments, civil society, businesses and financiers, in their green financing demands and national implementation plans.

Preservation of biodiversity and nature is not only critical in the global fight against climate change but is also vital for conservation-based economic development. Natural capital stocks, such as terrestrial and marine ecosystems and biodiversity, produce benefits that support societal and individual well-being and economic prosperity, such as clean air, fresh water, regulation of water flows and pollination of crops – while also acting as important carbon sinks. Financing environmental protection must go beyond compensation and contribute to creating fair social and economic conditions for incentivizing conservation.

At this hybrid event in Libreville, participants will discuss green financing for nature-based solutions, particularly the integration of plans for job creation in conservation and rural resilience within just transition planning.

This event is part of a series on Towards Just Transition: Connecting Green Financing and Sustainable Job Creation in Africa, supported by the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator.

This event will be held in French and English with simultaneous interpretation.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.

Why Ethiopia must close its political gender gap The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 July 2022

Women urgently need to gain access to high office if the country hopes to survive, say Hilina Berhanu Degefa and Emebet Getachew.

At the end of 2021, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government announced the formation of a three-year national dialogue to address Ethiopia’s political crisis, looking at the ongoing civil war and conflict, inflation, unemployment, drought and other urgent domestic issues. 

But, while efforts have been made to ensure the participation of women in this dialogue, it must be more than symbolic otherwise gaps in meaningful gender inclusion could have significant implications on the very survival of the country.
 
One of the challenges for meaningful inclusion is that Ethiopia is a highly patriarchal society. Patriarchal norms and practices permeate all aspects of the country’s social, economic and political life. Women constitute over half of the Ethiopian population and represent 41 per cent of the national parliament.

Nevertheless, most political parties, including those with liberal credentials, are exclusively governed by men, with women taking almost no part in key decision-making processes. As a result, women are relegated to the margins of political and economic activities. 

Though there has been little systematic study of the structural challenges faced by Ethiopian women in politics, women members of political parties encounter many barriers, including political violence, male-coded norms and sexist discourses across Ethiopian society.
 
The nature and scale of political violence perpetrated against women is particularly disempowering and affects their ability to participate in political spaces.

While attitudes to gender equality, sexual violence and gender discrimination are often trivialized, they remain ever-present threats in women’s lives. As late as 2016, a significant minority of men still believed wife-beating to be justified in certain situations. Even when women overcome social pressure to pursue their political ambitions, patriarchal views and practices within political party structures about the role of women significantly undermine their active participation and engagement. 

The political space is even more inaccessible to women with disabilities and in conflict and climate-related crises such as among internally displaced people and in pastoral communities. Male-coded norms ingrained at both party and community levels remain a significant concern. Specifically, sex in exchange for candidacy, inconsiderate working schedules affecting women with children and denial of access to equal information and financial resources are frequently reported as major internal hurdles among political parties.

Closing the gender gap could offer Ethiopia a new beginning

Many political initiatives designed to tackle these gender imbalances often have been driven by short-term political considerations without proper gender-gap assessment and policy analysis. In most cases, the authorities have viewed gender-targeted reforms as acts of benevolence, dispensed by the government, without adopting the legal and financial measures necessary to ensure sustainability and impact.
 
Take, for example, Abiy’s appointment of a 50:50 gender-balanced cabinet in 2018. At the time, much was made about its transformative potential, with the prime minister attracting widespread global approval. Yet, a cabinet reshuffle in 2021 reduced female representation to 36.3 per cent, with far less scrutiny or accountability.

This indicates that gender equality in Ethiopia is not considered a priority but rather an endeavour for more opportune, ‘stable’ times. Without thorough measures that create the conditions for real change, the aspiration of having a gender-balanced cabinet will always be challenging to translate into lasting equal representation.
 
The proposed national dialogue presents an ideal opportunity for Ethiopian women to begin reshaping attitudes and closing the gender gap through their inclusion and participation in the political process. To do so, three issues must be addressed.
 
First, the varying rights of women need to be consolidated, including on identity, constitutional reform and economic issues .

Second, gender equality considerations must be absorbed into mainstream political discourse at all levels.

Third, the experiences of women in the recent war, other ongoing conflicts and past and lingering legacies of political violence targeting women from specific communities, must be acknowledged and remedied. 

If Ethiopia is indeed serious about addressing its asymmetric gender power dynamics, this national dialogue provides an excellent opportunity to begin the process. Genuine participation of women as independent actors, with their own agency, could offer Ethiopia a new beginning.

Now is the moment to launch an African vaccine industry The World Today mhiggins.drupal 31 July 2022

The continent plans to make 60 per cent of its vaccines by 2040. After the failure of the world to help in the pandemic, it’s high time, says Ngozi Erondu.

The lack of an African vaccine industry has been a glaring concern for decades. Before the pandemic, 99 per cent of Africa’s vaccines were manufactured outside the continent. As well as endangering the lives of millions, this situation has inhibited social and economic progress on the continent.

In response, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) has undertaken an ambitious plan, outlined in the Partnerships for African Vaccine Manufacturing (PAVM) Framework for Action, to develop the nascent African vaccine manufacturing sector into an end-to-end industry by 2040. The framework aims to raise the share of African-manufactured vaccines used across the continent to 60 per cent by 2040, or the equivalent to up to 1.7 billion doses annually.

Seven of every 10 vaccines used in Africa are currently donated through Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. Most are administered within childhood immunization programmes and are largely manufactured either in India, or by  multinational vaccine manufacturers in North America or Japan.

Vaccine donations have inhibited the development in Africa of vaccines and other countermeasures against diseases.

Though the Ebola virus was discovered in Central Africa in 1976, vaccine development was not adequately funded until it emerged in Europe in 2014. Human monkeypox resurfaced in Nigeria in 2017, yet the global Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations only targeted it for vaccine development in July this year.

The pandemic highlighted Africa’s fatal dependency on imported vaccines. Only 20 per cent of Africans are fully vaccinated against Covid-19, due to the failure of countries in the Global North to ensure the equitable distribution of vaccines via the COVAX facility to 40 per cent of the world’s most vulnerable people. 

The pandemic also confirmed that Africa could not rely on fellow states of the Global South. At the height of the Delta variant outbreak in early 2021, India halted vaccine exports to Africa, where only 1.5 per cent of the population had at that time received any vaccine doses.

After decades of discussions, there are signs that Africa could soon succeed in creating its own vaccine industry. First, the 55-member African Union is in the process of establishing the African Medicines Agency, a regional regulatory body. 
 

‘The new public health order’

Additionally, the African Export-Import Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB) have established a foundation to provide financial and strategic support for the development of the pharmaceutical industry and the consolidation of regional vaccination programmes in Africa (the foundation would potentially negotiate intellectual property rights and licensing issues but that remains to be seen).

Second, studies show there is an emerging middle class in Africa. In a 2011 report by the AfDB, this was estimated at some 56 million households. Potentially, this means many people will be able to buy vaccines and medicines made in Africa.

About a third of African countries currently pay for their vaccine needs. According to PAVM forecasts, the value of the total African market could reach between $3 billion and $17 billion by 2040.

The recent entry into effect of the African Continental Free Trade Area should also prove conducive to African vaccine development. Through economic integration, free movement and harmonized regional standards, countries that invest in their biopharmaceutical and medical technology sectors may attract employees, regional and international businesses, and investment. Further, the pandemic has encouraged people to relocate to countries with, or planning for, universal healthcare.

Building an African pharmaceutical industry from the ground up could take much longer than two decades and cost tens of billions of dollars. Nevertheless, the moment seems ripe, and timely support has been forthcoming from influential regional actors, including Rwandan President Paul Kagame, South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, and private sector business executives, including the Zimbabwean-born billionaire Strive Masiyiwa.

With a pandemic treaty embedding equity in prevention, preparedness and response some way off, and given the limitations surrounding the recent World Trade Organization compromise on the TRIPS waiver – which temporarily waives Covid-19 vaccine patent protections for poorer countries – it is doubly important for Africa to build up its own pharmaceutical industry and emergency systems. 

In 2021, John Nkengasong, then director of Africa CDC, wrote of the necessity of a post-pandemic ‘new public health order’ for Africa. Such a change may threaten the global health organizations, industries and institutes who derive payment from ‘saving Africa’ during emergencies. Additionally, through strengthening Africa CDC, other actors such as the World Health Organization may find that they have a diminished strategic role on the continent.
 
While Africa should not dismiss these valuable and long-standing partnerships, it must take the opportunity to advance its interests and to assume leadership in this important area.

Review: Decolonization and its discontents The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

Jenna Marshall on a lively if flawed argument to find a way forward in a debate that has descended ‘into acrimony’.

Against Decolonization: Taking African Agency Seriously
Olufemi Taiwo, Hurst, £14.99

Decolonization was once heralded as a moment of potential and possibility for the formerly imperial world to chart a new way forward no longer tied to the apparatus of empire.

It marked a period of transition to nation states – and an expansion of a rights-based international community that would dispense with the morally bankrupt regime of racism, dispossession and subjugation that characterized colonialism.  
 

The descent of the decolonization debate

Half a century later, the debate surrounding decolonization has descended into acrimony. Some factions cast the issue of decolonization as a sustained attack on British and western culture writ large; other disparate voices coalesce around related social justice issues such as inequality, climate change and education. 

Decolonization has become ubiquitous in the public domain – and its ubiquity is the problem. In Against Decolonization, Olufemi Taiwo renounces a concept he conceives as having been emptied of serious study and analytical purchase; one incapable of addressing the complexities of modern global politics and more importantly, Africa’s place in it. 

Although the book attacks the inexhaustible ways in which the ‘trope of decolonization’ has been deployed, Taiwo is less bothered by the purported failures of scholars he deems ‘decolonizers’ and focuses his attention instead on the political landscape of African countries, past and present. 

Central to the book’s argument are two distinct scholarly strands on decolonization. The first, legal focus, centres on the political and economic forces of state-building. The second essays an ‘ideology’ of decolonization that rests on ‘forcing an ex-colony to forswear on pain of being forever under the yoke of colonization any and every cultural, political, intellectual, social and linguistic artefact, idea, process, institution and practice that retains even the slightest whiff of the colonial past’. 

Whether one should characterize the latter as simply a field of study or a potential set of policy arrangements remains unclear – yet what is certain is that it is too nebulous, too elastic, too open-ended to offer any substantive model or mechanism to understand postcolonial Africa. 
 

Correcting Eurocentric narcissism

 The decolonization research agenda in Africa came to prominence during the Cold War period of national liberation struggles.

The intellectual project that followed centred on dismantling Eurocentrism as colonial subjugation through its promotion of the West as the crucible of legitimate and scientific knowledge. Since then, scholars have argued that decolonization itself has become compromised by its enduringly Eurocentric gaze at the expense of the agency of African thinkers, creatives and statesmen and women. 

Taiwo seeks to correct this narcissism – and the omissions left in its wake – by introducing lesser-known Africans and pan-African scholars and cultural figures. These voices, he hopes, will illuminate issues often ignored by ‘decolonizers’ and spark a ‘renewed interest in an appreciation of the many different ways in which African thinkers have responded to the colonial experience’.
 

The decolonization of language

Taiwo challenges the decolonization of language as an oversold promise.

Romanticizing an imagined, pristine African pre-colonial past, he says, ultimately leads to nativism and atavism. As a case in point, Taiwo highlights bureaucratic instances of ‘language policy planning’ to deploy African languages in places such as Niger, Mali, Cameroon, Senegal and Nigeria that were hindered by multilingualism, education and high rates of illiteracy.

The author goes on to confront the abstract language of decolonization, which, he says, allows western scholars to unproblematically engage with the concept without any serious consideration of their own complicity in upholding systems of exclusion. It entrenches their own institutional power within the academy, amplifies their perspectives at the expense of others, and limits the possibilities for understanding the problems of world politics with deleterious effects on policy.

It is a serious claim, but there are issues to be addressed: Taiwo assumes there is coherence among scholars of decolonization, which is not the case. 

When Taiwo approaches how to foster political systems that cater to the needs of their citizens he dismantles the binary of ‘West as modern’ v ‘Africa as traditional’. Chieftaincies as traditional African governance, he points out, were the product of colonial anthropology, not Africans themselves. From the Fanti Confederation of 1871 to the Egba United Government in what is now Nigeria, Taiwo demonstrates that there has been a sustained tradition towards demands for democratic values. 

As he concedes an intellectual neglect of African philosophers that underlies the design and operations of Africa’s political institutions, Taiwo’s initial dismissal of the significance of cultural decolonization deserves another look. How should political and economic drives toward self-determination be advanced in the absence of knowledge shaped and mediated through African lived experiences?

In this respect, the tale of two decolonizations – the legal alongside the ideological – suggest an unhelpful, if not false, binary.
 

The problem of reconciling modernity and colonialism

What resonates throughout the book is the idea that Europe cannot profess to hold an exclusive intellectual claim to modernity. Its universal aspirations are open to all of humanity, allowing those who have historically been marginalized to be worldmakers. 

The idea that modernity and colonialism are irreconcilable is problematic. For instance, Taiwo argues that the curtailment of capitalism in Africa by restricting the growth of the middle classes while limiting competition between African capitalists and the metropole is the consequence of colonialism.

Yet the celebrated cultural anthropologist Sidney Mintz established an understanding that the matter for debate is not whether non-westerners were part of the modern system, but how and to what degree they were included and able to actualise its ideals. 

The emerging capitalist world economy needed non-western lands and labour, and so they were conscripted to this end. Recent abolitionist and black radical scholarship has built on this argument to maintain that capitalism not only requires inequality for it to function but that race – as a mechanism for producing ‘difference’ – enshrines it.

Acknowledging the unacknowledged

In the end, Taiwo communicates a palpable frustration at the state of academic discourses on contemporary Africa under the guise of emancipatory and radical scholarship. He offers an alternative approach whereby African students might rid themselves of a faddism that is ‘at best unsatisfactory’ and at worst produces ‘confusion, obscurantism, if not outright distortion and falsification’.

Yet out of this irritation, Taiwo’s greatest contribution in Against Decolonization might be to urge an acknowledgement of how and to what degree decolonization has become subdued and its political possibilities curtailed. He ultimately urges us to reconsider the purpose of the decolonization academic movement as an ethics to abide by rather than a social theory of the postcolonial world. 

This requires those ‘decolonizers’ on whose careers the term is built to adopt greater intellectual humility – to resist the posture of the anarchist radical scholar armed for the ‘good fight’. Instead, they should apply a scholarly curiosity to genuinely engage with those already on the battlefield, so to speak; those ‘doing the work’ in practice, but who have been unacknowledged until now.

Review: the rise of Africa’s superwomen The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

From foster care in England to colonialism’s legacy in Zimbabwe, this set of essays on race, feminism and identity is searingly honest, says Masiyaleti Mbewe.

Black and Female
Tsitsi Dangarembga, Faber, £9.99

The 1988 novel Nervous Conditions by the Zimbabwean author Tsitsi Dangarembga is considered one of Africa’s finest literary exports. It won the Commonwealth Writers’ Prize and alongside The Book of Not (2006) and This Mournable Body (2018), shortlisted for the 2020 Booker Prize, forms a trilogy of semi-autobiographical novels that grapple with the gendered colonial oppression of young black girls and women from Southern Rhodesia through to Zimbabwe. 

In Black and Female, Dangarembga continues the interrogation of these intersections in an unflinchingly honest and personal, if occasionally dense, collection of essays. Along the way, she examines the sheer magnitude of colonialism’s effects on African people, and how they ripple through her early childhood in England and her formative years as a writer, filmmaker and feminist activist in post-independence Zimbabwe.

‘Writing While Black and Female’

In 1961 Dangarembga’s parents relocated from Southern Rhodesia to the UK. While they worked and studied in London, they put their two-year-old daughter, her older brother and, later, her younger sister into private foster care in Dover, Kent (as many Africans did – a fact that was new to me). The first essay, ‘Writing While Black and Female’, takes a painful look at the four years she spent with her foster parents, Mummy-Gran and Daddy Henry. 

Blackness, she learned in those years, was a consequence of her non-whiteness. So Dangarembga writes of the momentary elation she felt when a stranger addressed her as a ‘lovely little piccaninny’, giving her ‘a category I could wield against the void of no longer being’. To cope with this sort of racialization and her abandonment, the young Dangarembga turned to disassociation and self-harm. 

As she writes: ‘Blackness is a condition imposed on me, rather than being an experienced identity.’ Instead of ‘black’ people, therefore, Dangarembga prefers the term ‘highly melanated people’. It is a resonant phrase, highlighting the inherently ridiculous nature of racism.

Dangarembga’s ‘Africanness’ shifts into focus upon her return to Rhodesia in 1965. At first, other children refused to play with her and her siblings, calling them ‘varungu’ (white people). As she describes it: ‘The dance of my identities … became frenetic’. 

In ‘Black, Female and the Superwoman Black Feminist’, the second essay, Dangarembga is adamant about the urgent necessity of a black feminist practice that is centred on action to provide real, material change. Along the way, she makes a distinction – a slightly uneasy one to my mind – between the patriarchy that western colonization imposed, based on private ownership, and the patriarchy of pre-colonial African society with its foundations in kinship that devolved power to an extent.

‘Hence women could and did become rulers and warriors, and royal spirit mediums called mhondoro,’ Dangarembga writes approvingly. She is making a nuanced point; but the idea of a more accommodating sort of patriarchy jars a little nonetheless.

While independence may have arrived for Zimbabwe more than 40 years ago, Dangarembga argues strongly that the subjugation of women and feminists at the hands of the ruling Zanu-PF government continues as an extension of colonial rule. Indeed, beyond Zimbabwe, black feminists remain ‘a small, often embattled group’ across Africa, believes Dangarembga. 

As a young black feminist who is part of this ‘small, embattled group’, I should say we have been able to foster large communities digitally and otherwise to work around the hostility we are often faced with. Despite internet shutdowns and restrictions, we resist – an act Dangarembga encourages.  

Resistance, she says, starts with establishing community despite these difficulties. At the nucleus of Dangarembga’s argument is the ‘superwoman’ of the essay’s title, the African woman who doesn’t require external factors to be inspired to action but who continuously draws on what Dangarembga calls ‘internal agency’ that derives from ‘an unrelenting fight for survival and dignity’.

Pointedly, she criticizes global feminism’s greater focus on optics than activism in the practical sense. One only has to observe the performative allyship and ‘Instagram activism’ rampant on the internet today to see her point.
 

The complexities of decolonization

In the final essay, ‘Decolonization as Revolutionary Imagining’, Dangarembga turns her gaze upon the ‘highly stratified’ European societies that outsourced their violent inequality to their empires and ‘the work of decolonization’. However, decolonial discourse is complex, and it is here that the writing occasionally gets bogged down. Fewer recommendations with more elaboration perhaps would have helped.

She herself acknowledges the difficulties of decolonization. Centuries of the Enlightenment and its logic of ‘racism, slavery, genocide and colonization’ are hard to uproot ‘whatever one’s melanin concentration’, she writes.

Nevertheless, Dangarembga concludes with the radical determination to dismantle that is evident throughout this searing yet hopeful collection: ‘The trajectory of current and future generations depends on that uprooting.’

Culture notes: Europe's broken promises to Africa The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

Europe’s ‘gas grab’ in Africa is just the latest abuse of its relationship with the continent, says Catherine Fieschi.

When Emmanuel Macron made one of his first visits to Africa as France’s recently elected young president in 2017, his speech at Ouagadougou University in Burkina Faso was designed to set the tone for a new relationship between his country and African countries. 

‘There no longer is a French policy for Africa,’ he said.

This was a signal away from ‘la Françafrique’, with its post-colonial accents and the propping up of regimes friendly to France, to something that was more strategic, equitable and transparent – more partnership and less tutelage. 

And Europe seemed to be following suit. In March 2020 the European Union and Africa decided that they would redefine their relationship. The European Commission unveiled its vision for a ‘comprehensive strategy with Africa’. The roadmap would give Africa significantly more say over the nature and extent of the relationship, more choice and more political agency.

But what, today, is left of these aspirations? Despite repeated statements, Europe seems to be saying one thing and doing another. 

Earlier this year, after the long-awaited 6th annual EU-African Union summit in Brussels, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa was frank when he summed up the gap between stated ambitions and the current relationship. The pandemic-weary Global South had reason to be wary. Ramaphosa laid out missed opportunities, disappointment and the low expectations that act as self-fulfilling prophecies. 

Europe’s changing focus in Africa 

From the apparent high point of the Ouagadougou speech, Macron has now turned to the Organization Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) in Africa for geopolitical purposes. His primary aim is to combat the rise of Islamist militants and terrorism in the Sahel as well as to tackle the growing influence of China and Russia in the region. 

Russian inroads – via the security firm Wagner in Mali, for instance – have given France further cause to use the OIF to counter destabilization activities. Both the United Kingdom and France train African military in the Sahel, but now, with the end of France’s anti-insurgent Operation Barkhane in Mali, the subsequent withdrawal of French troops and the increasingly established presence of the Wagner group, the security situation in the region is expected to deteriorate dramatically and become increasingly impermeable to European interests and forces.

As for development aid, Britain’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy makes no bones about the fact that Asia is now a priority over Africa.

The relationship between Africa and Britain is being transformed as a result, most obviously through the cuts in development aid, with African aid cut by 66 per cent in 2021. But the nature of the relationship, which has become both more conditional and more transactional, has also changed. 

The UK is emphasizing human rights and ‘free societies’, but also pushing for free market principles rather than the kind of state involvement that some African countries often prefer as a road to accelerated and more autonomous development. 

The future of energy exports and COP27

The issue of energy exports points to what will most likely trigger the greatest disappointment in the next few years – climate and climate finance. 

Green energy deals, like the $8.5 billion COP26 package from the EU, United States and UK to South Africa, look far more problematic now in the light of Europe’s African gas-grab. Indeed, Europe is importing as much African gas as it can after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia reduced supplies. Yet African countries are still being told to curb their own use of ‘dirty’ energy. 

As an illustration, Nigeria holds 3 per cent of the world’s gas reserves, but has barely tapped them, while 40 per cent of its output is exported to Europe. In April, Italy closed deals to buy gas from Angola and the Republic of Congo, while Germany did the same with Senegal.
 

At COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries pledged an annual $100 billion in climate finance to developing countries for both adaptation and mitigation. But pledges have never really materialized. The aid agency Oxfam estimates that only about a third of the money has been delivered. Climate finance was again the main focus of COP26 – and dismissed by Greta Thunberg as more ‘blah, blah, blah’.

This series of repeated resets, pledges and disappointments tells a story – indeed, several stories. First and foremost, it is one of arrogance and betrayal. That much is obvious. But it is also a story about stories – about how the narratives elaborated by various European countries and leaders never amount to more than a sum of transactions. 

Climate change places Europe, and other rich nations, at a crossroads in its relationship with Africa: the former holds the wealth, but also some of the keys and threats to the transition. COP27, to be held in Egypt in November, will be the next chapter in the story. 

Towards just transition in Africa: Continental coordination on green financing and job creation 6 October 2022 — 7:00AM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 September 2022 Addis Ababa and online

At this hybrid conference in Addis Ababa, speakers take stock of preparations ahead of the ‘African COP27’ in November and discuss the key priorities for streamlining continental cooperation on policy approaches to just transition.

At this hybrid conference in Addis Ababa, speakers will take stock of policy efforts and preparations ahead of the ‘African COP27’ in November and discuss the key priorities for streamlining continental cooperation on policy approaches to just transition.

Global climate policies towards a ‘just transition’ under the Paris Agreement should align with and support African states’ national sustainable development priorities – in particular, the need for decent and fair job creation, as well as resilient and sustainable land, environment and ecosystem management policies.

They must also be cognizant of African nations’ urgent requirements for sustainable and accessible energy to underpin economic development. Achieving green growth requires innovative and more accessible financing models, especially as wealthy nations’ financial pledges have fallen short. It also requires clarity and cooperation to unlock investment in both renewable and transitional energy.

African countries face collective climate and employment-related challenges. However, policymaking often remains regionally siloed according to differing political, energy sector and ecological realities. There is a need for transformational strategic thinking and context-specific action from African governments, civil society, businesses and financiers, in their green financing demands and national implementation plans.

At this hybrid conference in Addis Ababa, speakers will take stock of policy efforts and preparations ahead of the ‘African COP27’ in November and discuss the key priorities for streamlining continental cooperation on policy approaches to just transition, job creation and green financing.

This event is the third in a series on Towards just transition: Connecting green financing and sustainable job creation in Africa, supported by the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator.

A new vision for African agency in sustainable development Expert comment LJefferson 18 October 2022

Change is necessary not only in global economic structures and attitudes – but in African governance too.

The conventional notion that Africa is mostly a consumer of norms and practices designed by the Global North has been repeatedly challenged and is increasingly being debunked. Increased African agency in international affairs is today a well-established and documented reality. But Africa’s influence still does not match the scale of the challenges that it faces on its pathway to sustainable development. 

Pushing for African agency in sustainable development also warrants a critical assessment of how ‘sustainable development’ should be defined, and how it can be achieved in terms of actual poverty reduction and real improvement in the lives of local poor Africans. Sustainable development has been a political catchphrase for over 30 years – but a genuine transition towards sustainability has yet to begin.

African agency today

Historically, there have been structural limitations on the agency of African stakeholders to shape development pathways. Chief among them, donor-recipient power dynamics have persistently promoted dependency and sustained institutional corruption. Many African countries are also challenged by economic incentives and infrastructure that have favoured the market demands and supply chains of former colonial powers, which largely remain reliant on natural resource extraction, and are marked by limited investment in value-addition activities and technology development.

Today, however, African agency is being exerted in a more assertive fashion. The African Union (AU), individual African states, civil society, the private sector and eminent and ordinary persons are all displaying Africa’s agency in steering global sustainable development priorities, namely by proposing their own development agenda, The African Union Agenda 2063, adopted in 2013. This was followed by the UN Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda 2030), which in many ways mirror Agenda 2063 – a clear demonstration of the influence of Africa in the global arena. 

Agenda 2063 is a strategic roadmap for Africa ‘to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven and managed by its own citizens and development goals representing a dynamic force in the international arena’. Prepared following a broad-based participatory consultation, it advocates for inclusion and empowerment and provides an excellent vision for African countries and African people. The SDGs address several of the key shortcomings of their predecessor – the MDGs – and incorporate a broader and more transformative agenda that more adequately reflects the complex challenges of the 21st century and the need for structural reforms in the global economy and governance norms.

In international forums on sustainable development, African countries are increasingly using their collective voice to change the discourse on how development can and should be done. For instance, by championing innovative solutions for carbon markets, African policy leaders are enabling access to climate finance for development while preserving Africa’s natural wealth.

In the post-COVID era, championing investments in and leadership of Africa’s global health architecture demonstrates a desire that in the next pandemic, Africa CDC, AMA and continental manufacturers will play leading roles in determining Africa’s public health strategy and implementation.

In trade, building on the groundwork led by the regional economic commissions, the AfCFTA will catalyse and scale regional integration, trade and cooperation, leading to promising new modes of supply chain and self-sufficiency.

Encouraging signs, but persistent shortcomings

Encouraging signs that African agency is gaining momentum cannot disguise the fact that Africa has yet to move from rhetoric to implementation in the realm of sustainable development. Continental visions often fail to go beyond declarations of intent, and have only limited influence on governance systems or national structural transformation, and African states remain vulnerable to economic shocks emanating from the global system.

Change will require governance systems that are coordinated, transparent, efficient, and inclusive, as well as tools, processes, and means (material, technical, and human) for successful implementation. There is an urgent need for a new governance paradigm in Africa and internationally, dealing with long-term social change.

Notably, African agency should not be only seen as emanating from government, but also as being exerted by independent civil society organizations and committed ordinary individuals. Effective agency needs to be multi-faceted and multi-actor, and depends on the inclusiveness of African governments and their willingness to work with civil society in their strategic engagements with external partners.

Both Agenda 2063 and the SDGs hold the potential for transformation, but implementation will depend on continued advocacy to hold authorities to account and change the dominant discourse, logic and rules of engagement at global, regional, national, and local levels. There is a need for a dynamic new model of African ‘development’.

Time for a new vision

Africa’s economic landscape is changing rapidly, with new regional and local value chains, and integrated regional economic corridors to link countries, minimize the burden of high-cost production and logistics, and boost real incomes and international competitiveness. But Africa continues to face structural challenges, including the need for large investment projects – at a time when Africa remains a net exporter of capital.

Donors and development partners must reflect upon their prior modes of engagement and commit to genuine and equitable relationships with African states. Such partnerships must reflect mutual respect of ideas and accountability, and commit to making space in international forums and multi-lateral arrangements for African people and countries to realize their own visions for progress.

But African leaders and actors must also recognize that with the advent of resources and agency comes responsibility for results and outcomes, notably the need to improve governance. Gaps in accountability, widespread corruption, and lack of successful implementation and sustainability of projects must be addressed.

Africa’s maritime agency cannot be overlooked Expert comment LJefferson 3 November 2022

Increasing maritime awareness has already delivered impact, but consistency and continental leadership are needed to realize the sector’s full potential.

Africa’s 48,000 kilometres of coastline, shared among 38 coastal states, are resource rich and hold some of the world’s most strategic sea lanes, including the approaches to the Suez Canal, which carries 12 per cent of worldwide trade, and the Gulf of Guinea, a critical route for global energy. But despite the vast potential this represents, piracy and maritime insecurity have dominated the narrative of Africa’s coasts, and further propagated the image of African states as beholden to external intervention.

Yet African agency is established and evolving in the sector, with African littoral states enhancing their capacity to face collective security threats and exercising increasing autonomy in responding to the recent rush of external actors looking for port facilities and military bases. Enhanced continental coordination, consistency and leadership can help Africa’s maritime endowment become a resource that can bring sustainable benefit across the continent.  

Agency beyond piracy: the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean

Piracy became the dominant frame of reference for the East African maritime space as a result of the crisis off the coast of Somalia, which peaked between 2008 and 2012. In 2008, the UN Security Council (UNSC) took the unprecedented step of authorizing international naval operations in Somali territorial waters, contributing to a gradual reduction in attacks. There have been no successful hijackings reported since 2017.

But progress has not just been down to international assistance. Somalia is prioritizing increased domestic enforcement capacity – as demonstrated in the establishment of  a new specialized maritime unit and the wider region enhanced collaboration and information sharing through the Djibouti Code of Conduct of 2009, amended in 2017.

South Africa’s recent admission as a new signatory demonstrates its continued relevance. In March 2022, the UNSC authorization lapsed, following pressure from the Somali government. Although it is not yet clear whether Somali efforts will be sufficient to repress piracy in the long term, this reverse was a clear statement of Somalia’s agency at a level unthinkable during the outset of the crisis.

As the immediate threat of piracy has quietened, broader geopolitical dynamics have come to the fore, notably in a surge by external actors to establish strategic ports and military bases. Here too, African states have demonstrated enhanced agency, for better or worse. Consider Djibouti’s unilateral seizure of a container terminal from an Emirati firm, Sudan’s review of Russian and Turkish deals for maritime facilities, Tanzania’s rejection of a Chinese-led port investment, or the Seychelles withdrawing agreement for an Indian naval base.

Such examples point to a growing awareness of the value of maritime resources within African states, alongside a willingness and ability to push back against external imposition – and indeed to innovate in finding solutions beyond infrastructure and ‘hard’ security. In 2018, the Seychelles launched the world’s first sovereign blue bond to fund sustainable marine projects. That other countries are seeking to replicate this model points to the potentially global impact of African leadership on maritime issues.

Regional cooperation or competition in the Gulf of Guinea?

The Gulf of Guinea is likewise resource rich and geographically strategic, and has faced diverse maritime security threats including piracy, smuggling, illegal fishing, oil theft and pollution. Gulf of Guinea states put in place several initiatives to promote security, including the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCoC), signed by 25 states in 2013, that led to information-sharing and cooperation on interdiction, investigation and prosecution. But crime in the Gulf of Guinea nonetheless reached an all-time high in 2020, suffering 130 of the 135 maritime kidnappings recorded worldwide, due to the non-binding nature of the YCoC and gaps in capacity and finance.

Though external actors have become increasingly engaged, including the EU, US, France, Denmark, and the G7++ Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (FOGG), states within the region, especially those most affected by piracy and armed robbery, have nonetheless demonstrated leadership. Nigeria, Ghana, and Cote D’Ivoire have all developed maritime security strategies; Nigeria launched its Deep Blue Project to secure Nigerian waters; Ghana has strengthened its navy; and Togo has changed its laws and judicial system to allow the arrest and prosecution of ships and persons. Maritime security incidents have consequently reduced in 2022.

Independent Thinking: War in Tigray, Zaporizhzhia under fire Audio NCapeling 24 November 2022

Episode six of our new weekly podcast examines the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia and the international response to further attacks on Europe’s largest nuclear plant in Ukraine.

In Tigray, the world’s largest armed conflict rages between Ethiopian federal government troops and the Tigray Defence Forces. With estimates placing those killed in the fighting at 600,000, how did Ethiopia, one of Africa’s great success stories, descend into civil war, and what hopes are there for recent peace initiatives?

Meanwhile in Ukraine, all eyes are on Zaporizhzhia, as Europe’s largest nuclear plant continues to be occupied by Russian forces. With fresh reports of explosions near the reactors, how is the international community responding?

Finally, what role does Turkey, a middle power country with great power ambitions, play in both conflicts?

Joining guest host John Kampfner on the podcast this week are Dr Patricia Lewis, director of the International Security programme at Chatham House, Ahmed Soliman, senior research fellow with our Africa programme, and Galip Dalay, associate fellow with our Middle East and North Africa programme.

Independent Thinking: China in Africa, conflicts in 2023 Audio NCapeling 13 January 2023

Episode ten discusses Africa and the complex role China plays on the continent, and how the world should be responding to the major conflicts of 2023.

The first episode of 2023 examines Africa and the complex role China plays on the continent as a new Chatham House report highlights 22 African countries suffering from debt distress with Beijing a key creditor to many of them.

China’s new foreign minister Qin Gang is also touring several African states this week and next, with visits planned to Ethiopia, Angola, Gabon, and the headquarters of the African Union (AU).

This week Chatham House also hosted Dr Comfort Ero, president of the International Crisis Group, to discuss ten conflicts to watch in 2023. The panel examines some of the key conflicts mentioned and how the world is responding to them.

Joining Bronwen Maddox on the podcast this week from Chatham House are Dr Alex Vines, director of the Africa programme, Creon Butler, director of the Global Economy and Finance programme, Dr Yu Jie, senior fellow on the Asia-Pacific programme, and Armida van Rij, research fellow with the International Security programme.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2030: Lessons from Mozambique 17 February 2023 — 7:00AM TO 9:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 7 February 2023 Addis Ababa and online

A hybrid event in Addis Ababa reflecting on Mozambique’s 2019 peace agreement and the lessons it offers for the African Union’s ‘Silencing the Guns’ agenda by 2030.

This event will explore opportunities for furthering the AU’s Silencing the Guns agenda by 2030 to assist Africa’s transformative development, highlighting lessons learnt from Mozambique’s experience.

The ‘Silencing the Guns in Africa’ agenda, a flagship initiative of the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063, aspires to end all wars and conflict, prevent genocide, and stop gender-based violence.

The 2019 peace agreement in Mozambique and the subsequent disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process supported by the United Nations (UN) but implemented by Mozambique’s government and institutions, provides experience and learning for other continental conflicts that have recently ended or resumed.

Mozambique is seeking to break from the cyclical ‘conflict trap’ where once a country experiences one civil war, it is significantly more likely to experience additional episodes of violence.

Since the end of Mozambique’s civil war in 1992, targeted armed conflict by RENAMO resumed in 2013 and ended through the new agreement in August 2019. The final reintegration into civilian life of former Mozambican combatants of opposition RENAMO will be completed in 2023.

Mozambique and Switzerland – a key supporter of successive Mozambican peace processes – have become non-permanent members of the UN Security Council for the first time in their respective histories.

At a moment when old vulnerabilities and new threats are apparent on the African continent, this seminar, held by Chatham House in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), explores opportunities to furthering the AU’s Silencing the Guns agenda by 2030 to assist Africa’s transformative development, as outlined by the UNDP in a report published in February 2022.

This hybrid event is held in partnership with the African Union Commission and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

This event will also be broadcast live via the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Purpose: The ⁶⁸Ga-PSMA PET/CT is a commonly used imaging modality in prostate cancers. However, few studies have compared the diagnostic efficiency between ⁶⁸Ga-PSMA and ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT and evaluated whether a heterogeneous metabolic phenotype (especially PSMA-FDG+ lesions) exists in patients with castration-resistant prostate cancer (CRPC). We determined the added value of ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT compared to ⁶⁸Ga-PSMA PET/CT in CRPC patients and identified CRPC patients who may benefit from additional ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT. Methods: Data of 56 patients with CRPC who underwent both ⁶⁸Ga-PSMA and ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT from May 2018 to February 2021 were retrospectively analysed. Patients were classified into two groups with or without PSMA-FDG+ lesions. The differences in patient characteristics between the two groups and predictors of patients who having at least one PSMA-FDG+ lesion were analysed. Results: Although both the detection rate (75.0% vs. 51.8%, P = 0.004) and positive lesion number (135 vs. 95) of ⁶⁸Ga-PSMA PET/CT were higher than ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT, there were still 13/56 (23.2%) patients with at least one PSMA-FDG+ lesion. The prostate-specific antigen (PSA) and Gleason score were both higher in the patients with PSMA-FDG+ lesions than in those without PSMA-FDG+ lesions (P = 0.04 and P<0.001, respectively). Multivariate regression analysis showed that the Gleason score (≥8) and PSA (≥7.9 ng/mL) were associated with the detection rate of patients who had PSMA-FDG+ lesions (P = 0.01 and P = 0.04, respectively). The incidences of having PSMA-FDG+ lesions in low-probability (Gleason score<8 and PSA<7.9 ng/mL), medium-probability (Gleason score≥8 and PSA<7.9 ng/mL or Gleason score<8 and PSA≥7.9 ng/mL), and high-probability (Gleason score≥8 and PSA≥7.9 ng/mL) groups were 0%, 21.7%, and 61.5%, respectively (P<0.001). Conclusion: Gleason score and PSA are significant predictors for PSMA-FDG+ lesions, and CRPC patients with high Gleason score and PSA may benefit from additional ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT.

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract