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Reply: Clarifying the Utility of Myocardial Blood Flow and Myocardial Flow Reserve After Cardiac Transplantation




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Human Radiation Dosimetry for Orally and Intravenously Administered 18F-FDG

Intravenous access is difficult in some patients referred for 18F-FDG PET imaging. Extravasation at the injection site and accumulation in central catheters can lead to limited tumor 18F-FDG uptake, erroneous quantitation, and significant image artifacts. In this study, we compared the human biodistribution and dosimetry for 18F-FDG after oral and intravenous administrations sequentially in the same subjects to ascertain the dosimetry and potential suitability of orally administered 18F-FDG as an alternative to intravenous administration. We also compared our detailed intravenous 18F-FDG dosimetry with older dosimetry data. Methods: Nine healthy volunteers (6 male and 3 female; aged 19–32 y) underwent PET/CT imaging after oral and intravenous administration of 18F-FDG. Identical preparation and imaging protocols (except administration route) were used for oral and intravenous studies. During each imaging session, 9 whole-body PET scans were obtained at 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 120, and 240 min after 18F-FDG administration (370 ± 16 MBq). Source organ contours drawn using CT were overlaid onto registered PET images to extract time–activity curves. Time-integrated activity coefficients derived from time–activity curves were given as input to OLINDA/EXM for dose calculations. Results: Blood uptake after orally administered 18F-FDG peaked at 45–50 min after ingestion. The oral-to-intravenous ratios of 18F-FDG uptake for major organs at 45 min were 1.07 ± 0.24 for blood, 0.94 ± 0.39 for heart wall, 0.47 ± 0.12 for brain, 1.25 ± 0.18 for liver, and 0.84 ± 0.24 for kidneys. The highest organ-absorbed doses (μGy/MBq) after oral 18F-FDG administration were observed for urinary bladder (75.9 ± 17.2), stomach (48.4 ± 14.3), and brain (29.4 ± 5.1), and the effective dose was significantly higher (20%) than after intravenous administration (P = 0.002). Conclusion: 18F-FDG has excellent bioavailability after oral administration, but peak organ activities occur later than after intravenous injection. These data suggest PET at 2 h after oral 18F-FDG administration should yield images that are comparable in biodistribution to conventional clinical images acquired 1 h after injection. Oral 18F-FDG is a palatable alternative to intravenous 18F-FDG when venous access is problematic.




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Predictive Value of 18F-Florbetapir and 18F-FDG PET for Conversion from Mild Cognitive Impairment to Alzheimer Dementia

The present study examined the predictive values of amyloid PET, 18F-FDG PET, and nonimaging predictors (alone and in combination) for development of Alzheimer dementia (AD) in a large population of patients with mild cognitive impairment (MCI). Methods: The study included 319 patients with MCI from the Alzheimer Disease Neuroimaging Initiative database. In a derivation dataset (n = 159), the following Cox proportional-hazards models were constructed, each adjusted for age and sex: amyloid PET using 18F-florbetapir (pattern expression score of an amyloid-β AD conversion–related pattern, constructed by principle-components analysis); 18F-FDG PET (pattern expression score of a previously defined 18F-FDG–based AD conversion–related pattern, constructed by principle-components analysis); nonimaging (functional activities questionnaire, apolipoprotein E, and mini-mental state examination score); 18F-FDG PET + amyloid PET; amyloid PET + nonimaging; 18F-FDG PET + nonimaging; and amyloid PET + 18F-FDG PET + nonimaging. In a second step, the results of Cox regressions were applied to a validation dataset (n = 160) to stratify subjects according to the predicted conversion risk. Results: On the basis of the independent validation dataset, the 18F-FDG PET model yielded a significantly higher predictive value than the amyloid PET model. However, both were inferior to the nonimaging model and were significantly improved by the addition of nonimaging variables. The best prediction accuracy was reached by combining 18F-FDG PET, amyloid PET, and nonimaging variables. The combined model yielded 5-y free-of-conversion rates of 100%, 64%, and 24% for the low-, medium- and high-risk groups, respectively. Conclusion: 18F-FDG PET, amyloid PET, and nonimaging variables represent complementary predictors of conversion from MCI to AD. Especially in combination, they enable an accurate stratification of patients according to their conversion risks, which is of great interest for patient care and clinical trials.




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18F-Fluorocholine PET/CT in Primary Hyperparathyroidism: Superior Diagnostic Performance to Conventional Scintigraphic Imaging for Localization of Hyperfunctioning Parathyroid Glands

Primary hyperparathyroidism (PHPT) is a common endocrine disorder, definitive treatment usually requiring surgical removal of the offending parathyroid glands. To perform focused surgical approaches, it is necessary to localize all hyperfunctioning glands. The aim of the study was to compare the efficiency of established conventional scintigraphic imaging modalities with emerging 18F-fluorocholine PET/CT imaging in preoperative localization of hyperfunctioning parathyroid glands in a larger series of PHPT patients. Methods: In total, 103 patients with PHPT were imaged preoperatively with 18F-fluorocholine PET/CT and conventional scintigraphic imaging methods, consisting of 99mTc-sestamibi SPECT/CT, 99mTc-sestamibi/pertechnetate subtraction imaging, and 99mTc-sestamibi dual-phase imaging. The results of histologic analysis, as well as intact parathyroid hormone and serum calcium values obtained 1 d after surgery and on follow-up, served as the standard of truth for evaluation of imaging results. Results: Diagnostic performance of 18F-fluorocholine PET/CT surpassed conventional scintigraphic methods (separately or combined), with calculated sensitivity of 92% for PET/CT and 39%–56% for conventional imaging (65% for conventional methods combined) in the entire patient group. Subgroup analysis, differentiating single and multiple hyperfunctioning parathyroid glands, showed PET/CT to be most valuable in the group with multiple hyperfunctioning glands, with sensitivity of 88%, whereas conventional imaging was significantly inferior, with sensitivity of 22%–34% (44% combined). Conclusion: 18F-fluorocholine PET/CT is a diagnostic modality superior to conventional imaging methods in patients with PHPT, allowing for accurate preoperative localization.




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PET Imaging of Pancreatic Dopamine D2 and D3 Receptor Density with 11C-(+)-PHNO in Type 1 Diabetes

Type 1 diabetes mellitus (T1DM) has traditionally been characterized by a complete destruction of β-cell mass (BCM); however, there is growing evidence of possible residual BCM present in T1DM. Given the absence of in vivo tools to measure BCM, routine clinical measures of β-cell function (e.g., C-peptide release) may not reflect BCM. We previously demonstrated the potential utility of PET imaging with the dopamine D2 and D3 receptor agonist 3,4,4a,5,6,10b-hexahydro-2H-naphtho[1,2-b][1,4]oxazin-9-ol (11C-(+)-PHNO) to differentiate between healthy control (HC) and T1DM individuals. Methods: Sixteen individuals participated (10 men, 6 women; 9 HCs, 7 T1DMs). The average duration of diabetes was 18 ± 6 y (range, 14–30 y). Individuals underwent PET/CT scanning with a 120-min dynamic PET scan centered on the pancreas. One- and 2-tissue-compartment models were used to estimate pancreas and spleen distribution volume. Reference region approaches (spleen as reference) were also investigated. Quantitative PET measures were correlated with clinical outcome measures. Immunohistochemistry was performed to examine colocalization of dopamine receptors with endocrine hormones in HC and T1DM pancreatic tissue. Results: C-peptide release was not detectable in any T1DM individuals, whereas proinsulin was detectable in 3 of 5 T1DM individuals. Pancreas SUV ratio minus 1 (SUVR-1) (20–30 min; spleen as reference region) demonstrated a statistically significant reduction (–36.2%) in radioligand binding (HCs, 5.6; T1DMs, 3.6; P = 0.03). Age at diagnosis correlated significantly with pancreas SUVR-1 (20–30 min) (R2 = 0.67, P = 0.025). Duration of diabetes did not significantly correlate with pancreas SUVR-1 (20–30 min) (R2 = 0.36, P = 0.16). Mean acute C-peptide response to arginine at maximal glycemic potentiation did not significantly correlate with SUVR-1 (20–30 min) (R2 = 0.57, P = 0.05), nor did mean baseline proinsulin (R2 = 0.45, P = 0.10). Immunohistochemistry demonstrated colocalization of dopamine D3 receptor and dopamine D2 receptor in HCs. No colocalization of the dopamine D3 receptor or dopamine D2 receptor was seen with somatostatin, glucagon, or polypeptide Y. In a separate T1DM individual, no immunostaining was seen with dopamine D3 receptor, dopamine D2 receptor, or insulin antibodies, suggesting that loss of endocrine dopamine D3 receptor and dopamine D2 receptor expression accompanies loss of β-cell functional insulin secretory capacity. Conclusion: Thirty-minute scan durations and SUVR-1 provide quantitative outcome measures for 11C-(+)-PHNO, a dopamine D3 receptor–preferring agonist PET radioligand, to differentiate BCM in T1DM and HCs.




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Appropriate Use Criteria for Imaging Evaluation of Biochemical Recurrence of Prostate Cancer After Definitive Primary Treatment




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Comparison of 3 Interpretation Criteria for 68Ga-PSMA11 PET Based on Inter- and Intrareader Agreement

PET using radiolabeled prostate-specific membrane antigen (PSMA) is now being more widely adopted as a valuable tool to evaluate patients with prostate cancer (PC). Recently, 3 different criteria for interpretation of PSMA PET were published: the European Association of Nuclear Medicine (EANM) criteria, the Prostate Cancer Molecular Imaging Standardized Evaluation criteria, and the PSMA Reporting and Data System. We compared these 3 criteria in terms of interreader, intrareader, and intercriteria agreement. Methods: Data from 104 patients prospectively enrolled in research protocols at our institution were retrospectively reviewed. The cohort consisted of 2 groups: 47 patients (mean age, 64.2 y old) who underwent Glu-NH-CO-NH-Lys-(Ahx)-[68Ga(HBED-CC)] (68Ga-PSMA11) PET/MRI for initial staging of biopsy-proven intermediate- or high-risk PC, and 57 patients (mean age, 70.5 y old) who underwent 68Ga-PSMA11 PET/CT because of biochemically recurrent PC. Three nuclear medicine physicians independently evaluated all 68Ga-PSMA11 PET/MRI and PET/CT studies according to the 3 interpretation criteria. Two of them reevaluated all studies 6 mo later in the same manner and masked to the initial reading. The Gwet agreement coefficient was calculated to evaluate interreader, intrareader, and intercriteria agreement based on the following sites: local lesion (primary tumor or prostate bed after radical prostatectomy), lymph node metastases, and other metastases. Results: In the PET/MRI group, interreader, intrareader, and intercriteria agreement ranged from substantial to almost perfect for any site according to all 3 criteria. In the PET/CT group, interreader agreement ranged from substantial to almost perfect except for judgment of distant metastases based on the PSMA Reporting and Data System (Gwet agreement coefficient, 0.57; moderate agreement), in which the most frequent cause of disagreement was lung nodules. Intrareader agreement ranged from substantial to almost perfect for any site according to all 3 criteria. Intercriteria agreement for each site was also substantial to almost perfect. Conclusion: Although the 3 published criteria have good interreader and intrareader reproducibility in evaluating 68Ga-PSMA11 PET, there are some factors causing interreader disagreement. Further work is needed to address this issue.




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First-in-Humans Imaging with 89Zr-Df-IAB22M2C Anti-CD8 Minibody in Patients with Solid Malignancies: Preliminary Pharmacokinetics, Biodistribution, and Lesion Targeting

Immunotherapy is becoming the mainstay for treatment of a variety of malignancies, but only a subset of patients responds to treatment. Tumor-infiltrating CD8-positive (CD8+) T lymphocytes play a central role in antitumor immune responses. Noninvasive imaging of CD8+ T cells may provide new insights into the mechanisms of immunotherapy and potentially predict treatment response. We are studying the safety and utility of 89Zr-IAB22M2C, a radiolabeled minibody against CD8+ T cells, for targeted imaging of CD8+ T cells in patients with cancer. Methods: The initial dose escalation phase of this first-in-humans prospective study included 6 patients (melanoma, 1; lung, 4; hepatocellular carcinoma, 1). Patients received approximately 111 MBq (3 mCi) of 89Zr-IAB22M2C (at minibody mass doses of 0.2, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 5, or 10 mg) as a single dose, followed by PET/CT scans at approximately 1–2, 6–8, 24, 48, and 96–144 h after injection. Biodistribution in normal organs, lymph nodes, and lesions was evaluated. In addition, serum samples were obtained at approximately 5, 30, and 60 min and later at the times of imaging. Patients were monitored for safety during infusion and up to the last imaging time point. Results: 89Zr-IAB22M2C infusion was well tolerated, with no immediate or delayed side effects observed after injection. Serum clearance was typically biexponential and dependent on the mass of minibody administered. Areas under the serum time–activity curve, normalized to administered activity, ranged from 1.3 h/L for 0.2 mg to 8.9 h/L for 10 mg. Biodistribution was dependent on the minibody mass administered. The highest uptake was always in spleen, followed by bone marrow. Liver uptake was more pronounced with higher minibody masses. Kidney uptake was typically low. Prominent uptake was seen in multiple normal lymph nodes as early as 2 h after injection, peaking by 24–48 h after injection. Uptake in tumor lesions was seen on imaging as early as 2 h after injection, with most 89Zr-IAB22M2C–positive lesions detectable by 24 h. Lesions were visualized early in patients receiving treatment, with SUV ranging from 5.85 to 22.8 in 6 target lesions. Conclusion: 89Zr-IAB22M2C imaging is safe and has favorable kinetics for early imaging. Biodistribution suggests successful targeting of CD8+ T-cell–rich tissues. The observed targeting of tumor lesions suggests this may be informative for CD8+ T-cell accumulation within tumors. Further evaluation is under way.




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18F-FET PET Imaging in Differentiating Glioma Progression from Treatment-Related Changes: A Single-Center Experience

In glioma patients, differentiation between tumor progression (TP) and treatment-related changes (TRCs) remains challenging. Difficulties in classifying imaging alterations may result in a delay or an unnecessary discontinuation of treatment. PET using O-(2-18F-fluoroethyl)-l-tyrosine (18F-FET) has been shown to be a useful tool for detecting TP and TRCs. Methods: We retrospectively evaluated 127 consecutive patients with World Health Organization grade II–IV glioma who underwent 18F-FET PET imaging to distinguish between TP and TRCs. 18F-FET PET findings were verified by neuropathology (40 patients) or clinicoradiologic follow-up (87 patients). Maximum tumor-to-brain ratios (TBRmax) of 18F-FET uptake and the slope of the time–activity curves (20–50 min after injection) were determined. The diagnostic accuracy of 18F-FET PET parameters was evaluated by receiver-operating-characteristic analysis and 2 testing. The prognostic value of 18F-FET PET was estimated using the Kaplan–Meier method. Results: TP was diagnosed in 94 patients (74%) and TRCs in 33 (26%). For differentiating TP from TRCs, receiver-operating-characteristic analysis yielded an optimal 18F-FET TBRmax cutoff of 1.95 (sensitivity, 70%; specificity, 71%; accuracy, 70%; area under the curve, 0.75 ± 0.05). The highest accuracy was achieved by a combination of TBRmax and slope (sensitivity, 86%; specificity, 67%; accuracy, 81%). However, accuracy was poorer when tumors harbored isocitrate dehydrogenase (IDH) mutations (91% in IDH-wild-type tumors, 67% in IDH-mutant tumors, P < 0.001). 18F-FET PET results correlated with overall survival (P < 0.001). Conclusion: In our neurooncology department, the diagnostic performance of 18F-FET PET was convincing but slightly inferior to that of previous reports.




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Diagnostic Accuracy of PET Tracers for the Differentiation of Tumor Progression from Treatment-Related Changes in High-Grade Glioma: A Systematic Review and Metaanalysis

Posttreatment high-grade gliomas are usually monitored with contrast-enhanced MRI, but its diagnostic accuracy is limited as it cannot adequately distinguish between true tumor progression and treatment-related changes. According to recent Response Assessment in Neuro-Oncology recommendations, PET overcomes this limitation. However, it is currently unknown which tracer yields the best results. Therefore, a systematic review and metaanalysis were performed to compare the diagnostic accuracy of the different PET tracers in differentiating tumor progression from treatment-related changes in high-grade glioma patients. Methods: PubMed, Web of Science, and Embase were searched systematically. Study selection, data extraction, and quality assessment were performed independently by 2 authors. Metaanalysis was performed using a bivariate random-effects model when at least 5 studies were included. Results: The systematic review included 39 studies (11 tracers). 18F-FDG (12 studies, 171 lesions) showed a pooled sensitivity and specificity of 84% (95% confidence interval, 72%–92%) and 84% (95% confidence interval, 69%–93%), respectively. O-(2-18F-fluoroethyl)-l-tyrosine (18F-FET) (7 studies, 172 lesions) demonstrated a sensitivity of 90% (95% confidence interval, 81%–95%) and specificity of 85% (95% confidence interval, 71%–93%). For S-11C-methyl)-l-methionine (11C-MET) (8 studies, 151 lesions), sensitivity was 93% (95% confidence interval, 80%–98%) and specificity was 82% (95% confidence interval, 68%–91%). The numbers of included studies for the other tracers were too low to combine, but sensitivity and specificity ranged between 93%–100% and 0%–100%, respectively, for 18F-FLT; 85%–100% and 72%–100%, respectively, for 3,4-dihydroxy-6-18F-fluoro-l-phenylalanine (18F-FDOPA); and 100% and 70%–88%, respectively, for 11C-choline. Conclusion: 18F-FET and 11C-MET, both amino-acid tracers, showed a comparably higher sensitivity than 18F-FDG in the differentiation between tumor progression and treatment-related changes in high-grade glioma patients. The evidence for other tracers is limited; thus, 18F-FET and 11C-MET are preferred when available. Our results support the incorporation of amino-acid PET tracers for the treatment evaluation of high-grade gliomas.




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Congressional Briefing: Diagnostic Imaging and Alzheimer Disease




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A Hybrid Insulin Epitope Maintains High 2D Affinity for Diabetogenic T Cells in the Periphery

β-Cell antigen recognition by autoreactive T cells is essential in type 1 diabetes (T1D) pathogenesis. Recently, insulin hybrid peptides (HIPs) were identified as strong agonists for CD4 diabetogenic T cells. Here, using BDC2.5 transgenic and NOD mice, we investigated T-cell recognition of the HIP2.5 epitope, which is a fusion of insulin C-peptide and chromogranin A (ChgA) fragments, and compared it with the WE14 and ChgA29–42 epitopes. We measured in situ two-dimensional affinity on individual live T cells from thymus, spleen, pancreatic lymph nodes, and islets before and after diabetes. Although preselection BDC2.5 thymocytes possess higher affinity than splenic BDC2.5 T cells for all three epitopes, peripheral splenic T cells maintained high affinity only to the HIP2.5 epitope. In polyclonal NOD mice, a high frequency (~40%) of HIP2.5-specific islet T cells were identified at both prediabetic and diabetic stages comprising two distinct high- and low-affinity populations that differed in affinity by 100-fold. This high frequency of high- and low-affinity HIP2.5 T cells in the islets potentially represents a major risk factor in diabetes pathogenesis.




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Maternal Type 1 Diabetes Reduces Autoantigen-Responsive CD4+ T Cells in Offspring

Autoimmunity against pancreatic β-cell autoantigens is a characteristic of childhood type 1 diabetes (T1D). Autoimmunity usually appears in genetically susceptible children with the development of autoantibodies against (pro)insulin in early childhood. The offspring of mothers with T1D are protected from this process. The aim of this study was to determine whether the protection conferred by maternal T1D is associated with improved neonatal tolerance against (pro)insulin. Consistent with improved neonatal tolerance, the offspring of mothers with T1D had reduced cord blood CD4+ T-cell responses to proinsulin and insulin, a reduction in the inflammatory profile of their proinsulin-responsive CD4+ T cells, and improved regulation of CD4+ T cell responses to proinsulin at 9 months of age, as compared with offspring with a father or sibling with T1D. Maternal T1D was also associated with a modest reduction in CpG methylation of the INS gene in cord blood mononuclear cells from offspring with a susceptible INS genotype. Our findings support the concept that a maternal T1D environment improves neonatal immune tolerance against the autoantigen (pro)insulin.




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Artificial intelligence versus clinicians: systematic review of design, reporting standards, and claims of deep learning studies




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Manual acupuncture versus sham acupuncture and usual care for prophylaxis of episodic migraine without aura: multicentre, randomised clinical trial




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Comparison of dietary macronutrient patterns of 14 popular named dietary programmes for weight and cardiovascular risk factor reduction in adults: systematic review and network meta-analysis of randomised trials




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Prediction models for diagnosis and prognosis of covid-19 infection: systematic review and critical appraisal




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Association between maternal and paternal mental illness and risk of injuries in children and adolescents: nationwide register based cohort study in Sweden




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Prospective registration and reporting of trial number in randomised clinical trials: global cross sectional study of the adoption of ICMJE and Declaration of Helsinki recommendations




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Viral load dynamics and disease severity in patients infected with SARS-CoV-2 in Zhejiang province, China, January-March 2020: retrospective cohort study




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Prevalence of diabetes recorded in mainland China using 2018 diagnostic criteria from the American Diabetes Association: national cross sectional study




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Use of sodium-glucose co-transporter 2 inhibitors and risk of serious renal events: Scandinavian cohort study




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Association between tax on sugar sweetened beverages and soft drink consumption in adults in Mexico: open cohort longitudinal analysis of Health Workers Cohort Study




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Use of genetic variation to separate the effects of early and later life adiposity on disease risk: mendelian randomisation study




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Prognosis of unrecognised myocardial infarction determined by electrocardiography or cardiac magnetic resonance imaging: systematic review and meta-analysis




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Conrad George and André Sheckleford | Incorrect layoff procedures can lead to future liability

OP-CONTRIBUTION: EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS The COVID-19 pandemic is hitting businesses and the economy in a manner perhaps not seen since the Second World War. This, of course, has affected the ability of employers to pay their employees. The COVID-19...




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BCIC offers partial refund on April premiums

 British Caribbean Insurance Company Limited, BCIC, will refund a portion of April’s premium to holders of its public passenger vehicle, PPV, and Diamond Max private motor insurance next week. The move, which is expected to cost BCIC...




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Sagicor raises doubt about Scotia Life T&amp;T deal

Sagicor Finance Company has raised doubt about whether the deal to acquire the assets of Scotia Life Trinidad...




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Transatlantic Dialogue on China

A joint Chatham House-RUSI project that focuses on strengthening common understanding across the Atlantic and develop new ideas for how the US and Europe can better engage with and respond to China’s rise.

This will be done through examining transatlantic approaches and responses to China through the lens for four key themes (digital technology; trade and investment; governance of global commons; and climate change and the environment) that have been identified as crucial to developing effective policy responses and fostering collaboration.

The project will strengthen national, regional and international responses to the risks and opportunities posed by China’s changing role within the global economy and international rules-based order.

Department contact

Pepijn Bergsen

Research Fellow, Europe Programme
020 795 75748

More on Transatlantic Dialogue on China




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Britain’s Soft Power Potential: In Conversation with Penny Mordaunt

Members Event

5 February 2020 - 6:00pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Penny Mordaunt MP, Member of Parliament for Portsmouth North; Secretary of State for Defence (2019); Secretary of State for International Development (2017-2019)

Chair: Thomas Raines, Director, Europe Programme, Chatham House

Drawing on her experience as secretary of state for defence and secretary of state for international development, Penny Mordaunt discusses how soft power can protect, promote and project Britain’s international interests and foreign policy agenda.

Often defined as the capacity to influence others without coercion or force, soft power differs from traditional military capabilities in favour of more subtle forms of influence rooted in values, culture and civic institutions.

Consistently upholding democratic values and human rights can contribute to a nation’s soft power as much as its cultural icons and legacies.  However, utilising soft power – the power of attractiveness – is not straightforward: the government is only part of a broad mix of institutions and actors with a role to play.

Can the UK develop a long term approach that brings together all of the components of its soft power for a common purpose?

What are the key sources of Britain’s soft power? How has Brexit affected perceptions of Britain internationally? And with the UK’s departure from the European Union now confirmed, how should we think about its soft power in the future?

Members Events Team




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Belarusians Left Facing COVID-19 Alone

16 April 2020

Ryhor Astapenia

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Anaïs Marin

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
The way the epidemic is being mismanaged creates a risk of political destabilisation and leaves the country exposed to external influence.

2020-04-16-Belarus-COVID-Football

Playing accordion in front of dummy football fans in Brest, Belarus as the country's championship continues despite the COVID-19 outbreak. Photo by SERGEI GAPON/AFP via Getty Images.

Since the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic, few countries have chosen to ignore social distancing recommendations. But, even among those states which have, the Belarusian official response to its epidemic remains unique.

President Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s statements that vodka, sauna and tractors are protecting Belarusians from coronavirus attracted amused attention in international media. Lukashenka also described other societies’ response to COVID-19 as ‘a massive psychosis’.

Although Lukashenka is notorious for his awkward style of public communication, the fact that Belarus is refusing to impose comprehensive confinement measures is of concern. Belarusians continue to work, play football and socialise.

Lukashenka, himself playing ice hockey in front of state cameras, claims it is the best way to stay healthy. Belarusian authorities clearly appear to be in denial – and this could have dire humanitarian consequences.

From denial to half measures

Belarus actually has one of the largest numbers of hospital beds in the world per 1,000 of the population. But in the absence of quarantine measures its health system, already crippled by corruption and embezzlement, is likely to be overwhelmed.

Patients being treated for pneumonia in hospitals have suggested medical staff are uninformed and inadequately equipped. It is claimed doctors are not reporting COVID-19 as the suspected cause of death, either through a lack of testing or for fear of reprisals.

Observers believe the real mortality rate is already well above official figures (40 deaths as of 16 April). Based on an Imperial College London model, between 15,000 and 32,000 people could die under the current mild confinement regime – and such a high death toll would hugely impact the country’s political stability. Citing personal data protection, the Ministry of Health has imposed a total news blackout; the only cluster officially acknowledged so far is the city of Vitsebsk.

Although specific Belarusian cities and some individuals started changing their approach – by extending school vacations or cancelling weddings – such measures remain half-hearted.

Clearly a major reason for such an apparently irresponsible reaction is that Belarus cannot afford a massive lockdown that would freeze its already underdeveloped economy and drive it deeper into recession. Unlike many other nations, Belarus lacks budgetary resources for a sizable stimulus package. But a delayed response might backfire on the economy.

Economic recession has been forecast to amount to at least 10% of GDP. For Lukashenka, who openly challenged conventional wisdom regarding the need for quarantine and isolation, such an economic downturn would harm his confidence rating in the eyes of Belarusian voters, mindful of the state’s mismanagement of the crisis. And it could create doubt within the ruling elite itself, with Lukashenka seeking re-election for a sixth mandate in late August.

Against this backdrop, a radicalization of the opposition-minded part of society is also to be expected, with greater reliance on social networks in the face of official secrecy and disinformation. The expected response of the regime is then likely to be pre-emptive repression. Evidence is emerging that law enforcement agencies have already stepped up judicial and paralegal harassment of dissenters, notably independent journalists and bloggers.

Russia’s initial reluctance to address the coronavirus crisis may also have influenced Belarus. Lukashenka and his administration often react to public health challenges by the Soviet rulebook, reminiscent of the Soviet authorities’ mismanagement of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.

Russia has unilaterally closed its borders with Belarus and, as bilateral relations continue to deteriorate, this casts further doubt on the viability of the Union State of Belarus and Russia. Pro-Russian media forecast Moscow will be unwilling to alleviate the expected socio-economic crisis, as it continues to reject Minsk’s demands regarding subsidised oil deliveries. Yet the Kremlin might use the crisis as an opportunity to resume its integrationist pressure on Belarus.

China, with which Belarus engaged in a seemingly privileged strategic partnership in the 2010s, was actually the first country to dispatch humanitarian aid to beef up Belarusian capacity to fight the virus.

But Minsk should not expect Beijing to rescue its economy and, unless it commits to more internal reforms, Belarus is not likely to receive much from the EU either. The regime has already applied to the IMF for emergency financial support, but conditions are attached and, even if successful, the funds would amount to no more than $900m.

The government’s decision to take only half measures so far is rooted in the hope COVID-19 is not as bad as foreign experts fear. But, unless the leadership acknowledges the public health crisis and mitigates its economic impact, COVID-19 will accelerate Belarus’s slide back into international self-isolation. If combined with a humanitarian crisis, this will put the Belarusian regime under considerable stress.

This crisis does risk a new ‘Chernobyl moment’ for the authorities, but the population could react more vocally this time. As volunteers self-organise to fight the epidemic, it might become more difficult for the authorities to say that it is efficient in running the country. But the bottom line is Belarus desperately needs money. Whoever steps up to support Belarus financially will also be able to heavily influence its politics.




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Chile’s Social Unrest: Why It’s Time to Get Serious about a ‘Just’ Transition

4 November 2019

Patrick Schröder

Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
President Sebastián Piñera’s decision to cancel the COP25 climate negotiations, which Chile was due to host in early December, shows the importance of ensuring the transition to a sustainable world is just.

2019-11-04-Chile-Protests.jpg

Demonstrators march in Santiago, Chile during street protests which erupted over a now suspended hike in metro ticket prices. Photo: Getty Images.

One year ago, during the last annual Conference of Parties (COP) held in Katowice, the Polish government launched a Solidarity and Just Transition Declaration, signed by 56 governments including the UK, making the case for why the green transition must be just.

Three years earlier in 2015, the landmark Paris Agreement also included provisions for a just transition where it stated that the decarbonization process should be ‘Taking into account the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities’. In practice, however, the concept of a just transition has not yet been implemented and has not been sufficiently considered by governments or corporations around the world.

The social unrest that has erupted in Chile’s capital Santiago over the past month, which has forced the Chilean government to ask to move this year’s COP to Madrid, is a case in point. This discontent clearly shows that climate action cannot be separated from social justice concerns. There has not been a real commitment by governments to ensure a just transition based on social dialogue from the local to the national level. This was seen in France with the gilets jaunes protests in November 2018 – one month after President Emmanuel Macron ended the so-called ‘fortune tax’ and instead introduced taxes on diesel fuel as part of an effort to transition to green energy – and the current situation in Chile has some striking parallels. 

Sustainability transitions are a complex web of political choices and investment decisions which affect countries and societies in many different ways. Questions of social justice are everywhere, but in most cases, poorly understood by decision-makers. For example, although poverty has been reduced significantly over the last decade, Chile has one of the worst rates of inequality in Latin America and the highest Gini index in the OECD. The decisions taken in 2017 to power Metro de Santiago with solar photovoltaics and wind energy are commendable from a climate perspective, however, it led to students and young people protesting against rises in subway fares in October 2019.

They were joined by Chileans who are frustrated with rising living costs and by workers and trade unions struggling with low wages. As reported by the Chilean Human Rights Commission (INDH), so far more than 4,200 people have been arrested and more than 1,300 injured and hospitalized.

Climate negotiations beyond technicalities

This time there is also another important dimension to the protests: social unrest as a reaction to worsening inequality has the potential to derail multilateral cooperation on climate change and other global issues. Since tackling climate change is a race against the clock, the world faces the challenge of addressing both urgency and equity. The world cannot afford delays and needs to move fast but decision-makers need to take time for deliberation and civic participation to avoid rapid and ill-conceived transitions which eventually meet public resistance.

Many technical experts and negotiators, who often unintentionally divorce climate policy and technical discussions about emission reductions from social justice concerns, have been caught by surprise by the cancellation of the negotiations. For this year’s COP, one important focus of the official negotiations are the so-called 'Article 6 Rules' – the accounting mechanisms and modalities for a new form of international interaction on carbon markets and off-setting to ensure carbon markets can support countries in enhancing the ambitions of their stated climate action, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). 

What is becoming much more obvious now is that just transitions are at least equally important for achieving NDCs and other long-term mitigation strategies.

In order to meet the 1.5 degree target, stated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the world will have to invest an average of around $3 trillion a year over the next three decades in transforming its energy supply systems. But how can we ensure that these investments benefit low-income communities? Will they further increase everyday living costs? The climate finance related discussions focussing on commercially-oriented investments for low-carbon energy systems in most cases only consider the aspect of affordability, but not the other important principles of alternative ‘just’ energy finance, such as good governance, due process, intra-generational equity, spatial equity and financial resilience. Investments to support just transitions need to ensure investments, not only for large energy infrastructure, but also in the jobs, skills and work vital to both adaptation and mitigation.

Just transitions for a circular economy

The just transition concept is also the entry point to broader discussions about inclusive economic transformations, questioning the dominant paradigm of consumerism and ending the wasteful use of critical resources. The current linear economic model of take-make-throw away – in Chile epitomized by the linear extractive model of the mining sector that has contributed to widening inequality – the linear extractive model is not only destructive on the natural environment but also destructive for social cohesion.

In Chile, the commodity boom in copper production – the country accounts for about 30 per cent of the world’s output – and more recently lithium – which is used in batteries for mobile phones, laptops and electric cars – have generated enormous prosperity in Chile. But the wealth has been unequally distributed and has not been used to lay the foundation for raising the overall level of incomes.

A socially embedded and inclusive circular economy can, therefore, be a way forward from the current situation the Latin American country finds itself in. The circular economy was intended to feature prominently during the 25th COP and Chile’s policies – from the Ministry of Environment and Chile's Production Development Corporation (CORFO) – have played an important role in supporting the development of a circular economy, launching in 2018, the first public circular economy programme in Latin America

The government’s support for start-up companies and entrepreneurs to develop inclusive circular economy business models is the right approach to addressing the issues of waste, employment, services for low-income communities and local economic development. These are solutions that need to be scaled up having the potential to reduce Chile’s economic reliance on the dominant extractive model.

As a global community, it is necessary to address the environmental and social objectives equally as not addressing social objectives will become an obstacle in achieving climate mitigation and solving other environmental issues. 

The Chilean protests are a wake-up call and present an opportunity for the global climate change community – which includes governments – to ensure just transitions are implemented in practice.




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Sino-Russian Gas Cooperation: Power of Siberia I and II and Implications for Global LNG Supplies

Invitation Only Research Event

27 November 2019 - 8:30am to 9:30am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Professor Keun-Wook Paik, Associate Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Department, Chatham House
Chair: John Lough, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

In a new event in the Sustainable Transitions series, the speaker will present an update of Sino-Russian gas cooperation.

To give a comprehensive account of their impact on global liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies, he will discuss the following points:

  • Gas is scheduled to start flowing from the Power of Siberia I (POS) on 2 December 2019. But what is the background of development of POS 1 and what is its current status and prospects? 
  • What are the chances of exporting gas through the proposed Altai pipeline? Why is the Mongolia export route so significant? And how will it affect the Central Asian Republics and in particular Turkmenistan’s gas export to China? 
  • What are the implications of both POS I and Altai gas via Mongolia route in the context of global LNG supply?
  • What are the prospects for multilateral pipeline gas cooperation in northeast Asia?
  • What are the implications for other Arctic onshore LNG supply, in particular, for Novatek's Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 1 and 2 to China on top of POS 1 and Altai gas?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Chloé Prendleloup




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Climate Change, Energy Transition, and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)

Invitation Only Research Event

17 January 2020 - 9:30am to 5:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Climate change and energy transition are re-shaping the extractive sectors, and the opportunities and risks they present for governments, companies and civil society. As the central governance standard in the extractives sector, the EITI has a critical role in supporting transparency in producer countries.

This workshop will bring together experts from the energy and extractives sectors, governance and transparency, and climate risk and financial disclosure initiatives to discuss the role of governance and transparency through the transition. It will consider the appropriate role for the EITI and potential entry points for policy and practice, and the potential for coordination with related transparency and disclosure initiatives. 

Please note attendance is by invitation only.




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Will a Devastating Bushfire Season Change Australia’s Climate Stance?

23 January 2020

Madeleine Forster

Richard and Susan Hayden Academy Fellow, International Law Programme

Professor Tim Benton

Research Director, Emerging Risks; Director, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
With Australians experiencing first-hand the risks of climate change, Madeleine Forster and Tim Benton examine the influencers, at home or abroad, that could push the government towards more action.

2020-01-23-FireNSW.jpg

Residents look on as flames burn through bush on 4 January 2020 in Lake Tabourie, NSW. Photo: Getty Images.

The 2019–20 fire season in Australia has been unprecedented. To date, an estimated 18 million hectares of fire has cut swathes through the bush – an area greater than that of the average European country and over five times the size of blazes in the Amazon.

This reflects previous predictions of Australian science. Since 2008 and as recently as 2018, scientific bodies have warned that climate change will exacerbate existing conditions for fires and other climatic disasters in Australia. What used to be once-in-a-generation fires now re-appear within 10–15 years with increased ferocity, over longer seasons.

In a country known for climate denial and division, debate has erupted around bushfire management and climate change. One of these is whether controlled burns are the answer to Australia’s climate-affected fire conditions.

There is no single risk reduction strategy. Controlled burning remains key, if adapted to the environment and climate

But when three out of four seasons in a year can support destructive bushfires, there are clear limits to what controlled burning and other fire management techniques can achieve. Other ‘adaptation’ measures are also likely to provoke intense debate – including bush clearance. As one Australian expert offered to highlight where Australia has got to, families should probably not go on holiday to bush and beach during the height of summer when temperatures and fire risk peaks. 

So, unless Australia is prepared to debate radical changes to where people live and how land is used, the limits to adaptation imply the need for mitigation. This means supporting ambitious global greenhouse emissions reductions targets. As research from Victoria, one fire-prone state in Australia, highlights, ‘the emissions pathway we follow is the largest determinant of change to many variables [such as temperature] beyond the next few decades.’

Can Australia become a more active global partner on emissions?

Australia accounts for just over one per cent of global emissions, so reducing domestic emissions – even though on a per capita basis they are the highest in the world – will not reduce Australia’s climate risk. Showing international leadership and supporting a powerful coalition of the willing to tackle climate change is the only way ahead. By showing a willingness to adopt climate ambition, Australia can help more constructive worldwide action, and thereby reduce its own risk exposure. 

Leading by example is a politically difficult issue for Australia. Prime Minister Scott Morrison was re-elected in May 2019 on an economic stability platform, and a promise not to imperil employment growth through climate action. Australia has contested UN estimates that it will not meet its existing modest goals for domestic emissions, by seeking to rely on carryover credits from action under the Kyoto Protocol as proof of progress.

It has also distanced itself from concerns over global supply and demand in fossil fuels. Australia remains a global supplier for fossil fuels, including coal – the nation’s coal exports accounted for $67 billion in revenues in 2019 in an expanding but changing Asian market, supplying ‘some of the cheapest electricity in the world’.

Possible influencers of change

With Australians experiencing first-hand the risks of climate change, there is already pressure to do more. Many are sceptical this will translate into domestic targets or export policies that give Australia the moral authority to ask for more action on the global stage.

Here, diverse groups who share a common interest in seeing Australia recover from the bushfires and address future climate risks could be key.

Importantly this includes rural and urban-fringe communities affected by the bushfires. They were part of Morrison’s traditional supporter-base but are angry at the government’s handling of the crisis and increasingly see how tiptoeing around emissions (including exports) has also ‘buried’ open discussion at home on climate-readiness.

Australian states could also find themselves taking a lead role. Virtually all jurisdictions have now committed to their own goals, most based on zero-carbon goals by 2050 (as has New Zealand). These can support modelling for Australia’s energy transition from coal, through gas, to market competitive renewables, while also help to ensure this reflects community expectations on jobs, electricity prices and other costs. 

Other emerging voices include the insurance and banking sectors (the Reserve Bank of Australia warned of the long-term financial stability risks of climate change before the fires) and indigenous Australians (one group of Torres Strait Islanders have filed a complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee which, if heard, will place Australia’s emissions record under the spotlight again). Their challenge now is finding a common language on what a cohesive approach to addressing climate change risk looks like. 

The international picture is mixed. The United States’ poor federal climate policy is a buffer for Australia. French President Emmanuel Macron has tried to raise the cost of inaction for Australia in current EU–Australia trade negotiations, but many large emitters in the Indo-Pacific region remain key Australian trading partners, investors and buyers of Australian coal. 

In the meantime, the United Kingdom is preparing for the meeting of parties to the Paris Agreement in Glasgow in November. A key global event following Brexit, the UK will no doubt be hoping to encourage a leadership circle with national commitments that meet global need to make the Glasgow meeting a success.

The UK public has expressed enormous sympathy for Australia in the bushfires and outrage over ‘climate denialism.’ Australia’s experience will be a cautionary tale of the effects of climate change at the meeting. Could the UK also support Australia to become a less reluctant partner in global climate action?




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COP26 Diplomatic Briefing: Climate Ambition in Europe and its Potential Global Impact

17 February 2020 - 8:30am to 10:00am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Jacob Werksman, Principal Adviser to Directorate General for Climate Action, European Commission
Imke Lübbeke, Head of EU Climate and Energy Policy, WWF European Policy Office 
Simon Petrie, Head of International Climate Strategy - Europe, UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
Jen Austin, Policy Director, We Mean Business Coalition
Chair: Jill Duggan, Associate Fellow, Chatham House

The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has declared that she wants Europe to become ‘the first climate-neutral continent by 2050’, and in December 2019, the Commission presented the European Green Deal in order to achieve this objective. However, even though greenhouse gas emissions from the EU have fallen by more than 20 per cent since 1990, the Union remains the third largest emitter in the world, after the United States and China.

What are the opportunities and challenges for raising climate ambition in Europe?  Will the EU increase its Nationally Determined Contribution and what impact might this have globally? How might Brexit affect climate action in the EU and the UK?  The second event in the Chatham House COP26 Diplomatic Briefing Series will address these critical questions.

Anna Aberg

Research Analyst, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
020 7314 3629




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Jiangwen Guo

Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment, and Resources Programme




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Thiago H. K. Uehara

Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme

Biography

Thiago Uehara, political ecologist, is a research fellow at Chatham House. Before joining its Energy, Environment and Resources programme in 2019, Thiago served as technical adviser to the Brazilian Presidency, consultant to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and senior consultant to Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), to name a few.

Thiago is a policy analyst and environmental social scientist working with public policy, rural development and sustainability since 2006. He holds degrees in Geographical Research (University of Cambridge), Public Administration (FGV), Environmental Science (University of São Paulo Institute of Energy), Environmental Management (University of São Paulo School of Agriculture), and Music (Villa-Lobos Institute).

He also studied at the Institute of Development Studies/STEPS Centre, at AgroParistech-Engref, and is completing his PhD at Imperial College London’s Centre for Environmental Policy on the politics of retrenchment and the impacts of austerity for peasant livelihoods in the Amazon and in São Paulo.

He is a founder member of the Brazilian Research Network on Food Sovereignty, Nutrition and Food Security, and advises students at Imperial College London. Languages: PT, EN, FR, ES.

Areas of expertise

  • Sustainable livelihoods, rural development, food sovereignty
  • Environmental policy and management; nature-base solutions; forest restoration
  • Public procurement; sustainable procurement
  • Wellbeing economies and just transformations to sustainability
  • International development; Global South; Brazil

Past experience

2016-2019Consultant, IPCC WG3 Supervisor and research postgraduate, Imperial College London
2012-2019Technical adviser, Presidency of Brazil
2012-2019Lecturer, National School of Public Administration
2012-2019Environmental specialist, Ministry of the Environment, Brazil
2010-2012Researcher, FGV Centre for Sustainability Studies
2010-2012Senior consultant, FGV Centre for Public Administration
2007-2010Environmental manager, São Paulo Environmental Agency




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RCP warns over shortage of stroke physicians




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Overdiagnosis of thyroid cancer




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Single-molecule level structural dynamics of DNA unwinding by human mitochondrial Twinkle helicase [Molecular Biophysics]

Knowledge of the molecular events in mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) replication is crucial to understanding the origins of human disorders arising from mitochondrial dysfunction. Twinkle helicase is an essential component of mtDNA replication. Here, we employed atomic force microscopy imaging in air and liquids to visualize ring assembly, DNA binding, and unwinding activity of individual Twinkle hexamers at the single-molecule level. We observed that the Twinkle subunits self-assemble into hexamers and higher-order complexes that can switch between open and closed-ring configurations in the absence of DNA. Our analyses helped visualize Twinkle loading onto and unloading from DNA in an open-ringed configuration. They also revealed that closed-ring conformers bind and unwind several hundred base pairs of duplex DNA at an average rate of ∼240 bp/min. We found that the addition of mitochondrial single-stranded (ss) DNA–binding protein both influences the ways Twinkle loads onto defined DNA substrates and stabilizes the unwound ssDNA product, resulting in a ∼5-fold stimulation of the apparent DNA-unwinding rate. Mitochondrial ssDNA-binding protein also increased the estimated translocation processivity from 1750 to >9000 bp before helicase disassociation, suggesting that more than half of the mitochondrial genome could be unwound by Twinkle during a single DNA-binding event. The strategies used in this work provide a new platform to examine Twinkle disease variants and the core mtDNA replication machinery. They also offer an enhanced framework to investigate molecular mechanisms underlying deletion and depletion of the mitochondrial genome as observed in mitochondrial diseases.




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Atomic force microscopy-based characterization of the interaction of PriA helicase with stalled DNA replication forks [DNA and Chromosomes]

In bacteria, the restart of stalled DNA replication forks requires the DNA helicase PriA. PriA can recognize and remodel abandoned DNA replication forks, unwind DNA in the 3'-to-5' direction, and facilitate the loading of the helicase DnaB onto the DNA to restart replication. Single-stranded DNA–binding protein (SSB) is typically present at the abandoned forks, but it is unclear how SSB and PriA interact, although it has been shown that the two proteins interact both physically and functionally. Here, we used atomic force microscopy to visualize the interaction of PriA with DNA substrates with or without SSB. These experiments were done in the absence of ATP to delineate the substrate recognition pattern of PriA before its ATP-catalyzed DNA-unwinding reaction. These analyses revealed that in the absence of SSB, PriA binds preferentially to a fork substrate with a gap in the leading strand. Such a preference has not been observed for 5'- and 3'-tailed duplexes, suggesting that it is the fork structure that plays an essential role in PriA's selection of DNA substrates. Furthermore, we found that in the absence of SSB, PriA binds exclusively to the fork regions of the DNA substrates. In contrast, fork-bound SSB loads PriA onto the duplex DNA arms of forks, suggesting a remodeling of PriA by SSB. We also demonstrate that the remodeling of PriA requires a functional C-terminal domain of SSB. In summary, our atomic force microscopy analyses reveal key details in the interactions between PriA and stalled DNA replication forks with or without SSB.




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The histone H4 basic patch regulates SAGA-mediated H2B deubiquitination and histone acetylation [DNA and Chromosomes]

Histone H2B monoubiquitylation (H2Bub1) has central functions in multiple DNA-templated processes, including gene transcription, DNA repair, and replication. H2Bub1 also is required for the trans-histone regulation of H3K4 and H3K79 methylation. Although previous studies have elucidated the basic mechanisms that establish and remove H2Bub1, we have only an incomplete understanding of how H2Bub1 is regulated. We report here that the histone H4 basic patch regulates H2Bub1. Yeast cells with arginine-to-alanine mutations in the H4 basic patch (H42RA) exhibited a significant loss of global H2Bub1. H42RA mutant yeast strains also displayed chemotoxin sensitivities similar to, but less severe than, strains containing a complete loss of H2Bub1. We found that the H4 basic patch regulates H2Bub1 levels independently of interactions with chromatin remodelers and separately from its regulation of H3K79 methylation. To measure H2B ubiquitylation and deubiquitination kinetics in vivo, we used a rapid and reversible optogenetic tool, the light-inducible nuclear exporter, to control the subcellular location of the H2Bub1 E3 ligase, Bre1. The ability of Bre1 to ubiquitylate H2B was unaffected in the H42RA mutant. In contrast, H2Bub1 deubiquitination by SAGA-associated Ubp8, but not by Ubp10, increased in the H42RA mutant. Consistent with a function for the H4 basic patch in regulating SAGA deubiquitinase activity, we also detected increased SAGA-mediated histone acetylation in H4 basic patch mutants. Our findings uncover that the H4 basic patch has a regulatory function in SAGA-mediated histone modifications.




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The Essential Role of Immigrants in the U.S. Food Supply Chain

About 2.1 million immigrants work in jobs growing, harvesting, processing, and selling food in the United States, serving an essential role in feeding America. While immigrants accounted for 17 percent of all civilian employed workers in the United States between 2014-18, they played an outsized role in food production, making up 22 percent of workers in the U.S. food supply chain. They represent far larger shares in certain food-related occupations, and in particular states, as this infographic shows.




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Indian Immigrants in the United States

Immigrants from India are the second-largest foreign-born group in the United States, after Mexicans. Indian immigrants tend to be far more highly educated and have greater English proficiency than the foreign-born population overall. This Spotlight article offers the latest data on Indian immigrants, focusing on population size, state- and city-level distribution, occupation, educational attainment, and more.




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Canadian Immigrants in the United States

Though small, the population of Canadians in the United States is quite diverse, and includes students, highly skilled professionals on H-1B or NAFTA visas, family migrants, and retirees. Canadian immigrants have much higher educational attainment and incomes than the native- and overall foreign-born populations. This article offers an interesting data snapshot of Canadians in the United States.




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2010 E Pluribus Unum Prizes: Honoring Exceptional Immigrant Integration Initiatives

Award winners were honored at the second annual awards ceremony in Washington, DC, on May 18, 2010.




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2010 E Pluribus Unum Prizes: Honoring Exceptional Immigrant Integration Initiatives

Winners of the 2nd annual E Pluribus Unum Prizes awarded to exceptional immigrant integration initiatives by MPI's National Center on Immigrant Integration Policy are the Illinois New Americans Integration Initiative; the Latino Community Credit Union in Durham, NC; Tacoma Community House in Tacoma, WA; and Upwardly Global in San Francisco, CA. McDonald's Corp. of Oak Brook, IL, received the sole honorable mention. The Prizes seek to reward exemplary efforts that uphold and update the ideal of "out of many, one" and inspire others to take on the important work of helping immigrants and their children join the mainstream of U.S. society as well as build stronger ties between immigrants and the native-born. Award winners were honored at the second annual awards ceremony in Washington, DC, on May 18, 2010. Watch highlights of the ceremony here.




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Lack of Opportunities and Family Pressures Drive Unaccompanied Minor Migration from Albania to Italy

Faced with a lack of employment opportunities and recurrent poverty, Albanian youth migrate to Italy alone in the hopes of improving their educational prospects or making money for their families. Yet upon arrival, they face many vulnerabilities. While some protections for unaccompanied minors exist in the Italy, the system is greatly fragmented and challenges, including how to return them to Albania, remain persistent.




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Remain in Mexico Plan Echoes Earlier U.S. Policy to Deter Haitian Migration

Remain in Mexico—the Trump administration policy aimed at deterring the rising numbers of migrants from Central America by requiring them to stay in Mexico through most of their U.S. asylum adjudication process—bears striking similarities to U.S. policy in the 1980s and 1990s that sought to discourage Haitians from making the sea journey to the United States. This article explores the parallels and differences between Remain in Mexico and the earlier narrowing of asylum for Haitians.