Carolyn S. Gordon and Michael R. Jablonski
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5673-5704.
Abstract, references and article information

Nathan Brownlowe, Alcides Buss, Daniel Gonçalves, Jeremy B. Hume, Aidan Sims and Michael F. Whittaker
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5513-5560.
Abstract, references and article information

Christian Weiss
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 199-209.
Abstract, references and article information

Bero Roos
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 137-151.
Abstract, references and article information

Olha Prykhodko and Kostiantyn Ralchenko
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 123-135.
Abstract, references and article information

Lutz Mattner
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 45-122.
Abstract, references and article information

Claudio Macci and Barbara Pacchiarotti
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 21-43.
Abstract, references and article information

Chris A.J. Klaassen
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 9-19.
Abstract, references and article information

Paweł Hitczenko and Nick Wormald
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5411-5427.
Abstract, references and article information

András Kroó
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5149-5162.
Abstract, references and article information

Donghyeok Lim and Christian Maire
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5013-5024.
Abstract, references and article information

E. P. Ushakova and K. E. Ushakova
St. Petersburg Math. J. 35 (), 571-595.
Abstract, references and article information

Mohammed Abouzaid and Nathaniel Bottman
Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 61 (), 525-608.
Abstract, references and article information

Cation diffusion facilitator (CDF) proteins are a conserved family of divalent transition metal cation transporters. CDF proteins are usually composed of two domains: the transmembrane domain, in which the metal cations are transported through, and a regulatory cytoplasmic C-terminal domain (CTD). Each CDF protein transports either one specific metal or multiple metals from the cytoplasm, and it is not known whether the CTD takes an active regulatory role in metal recognition and discrimination during cation transport. Here, the model CDF protein MamM, an iron transporter from magnetotactic bacteria, was used to probe the role of the CTD in metal recognition and selectivity. Using a combination of biophysical and structural approaches, the binding of different metals to MamM CTD was characterized. Results reveal that different metals bind distinctively to MamM CTD in terms of their binding sites, thermodynamics, and binding-dependent conformations, both in crystal form and in solution, which suggests a varying level of functional discrimination between CDF domains. Furthermore, these results provide the first direct evidence that CDF CTDs play a role in metal selectivity. We demonstrate that MamM's CTD can discriminate against Mn2+, supporting its postulated role in preventing magnetite formation poisoning in magnetotactic bacteria via Mn2+ incorporation.

Systemic antibody light chains (AL) amyloidosis is characterized by deposition of amyloid fibrils derived from a particular antibody light chain. Cardiac involvement is a major risk factor for mortality. Using MAS solid-state NMR, we studied the fibril structure of a recombinant light chain fragment corresponding to the fibril protein from patient FOR005, together with fibrils formed by protein sequence variants that are derived from the closest germline (GL) sequence. Both analyzed fibril structures were seeded with ex-vivo amyloid fibrils purified from the explanted heart of this patient. We find that residues 11-42 and 69-102 adopt β-sheet conformation in patient protein fibrils. We identify arginine-49 as a key residue that forms a salt bridge to aspartate-25 in the patient protein fibril structure. In the germline sequence, this residue is replaced by a glycine. Fibrils from the GL protein and from the patient protein harboring the single point mutation R49G can be both heterologously seeded using patient ex-vivo fibrils. Seeded R49G fibrils show an increased heterogeneity in the C-terminal residues 80-102, which is reflected by the disappearance of all resonances of these residues. By contrast, residues 11-42 and 69-77, which are visible in the MAS solid-state NMR spectra, show 13Cα chemical shifts that are highly like patient fibrils. The mutation R49G thus induces a conformational heterogeneity at the C terminus in the fibril state, whereas the overall fibril topology is retained. These findings imply that patient mutations in FOR005 can stabilize the fibril structure.

7 August 2020

20 August 2020

27 August 2020

4 September 2020

10 September 2020

Cancer cachexia is characterized by reductions in peripheral lean muscle mass. Prior studies have primarily focused on increased protein breakdown as the driver of cancer-associated muscle wasting. Therapeutic interventions targeting catabolic pathways have, however, largely failed to preserve muscle mass in cachexia, suggesting that other mechanisms might be involved. In pursuit of novel pathways, we used untargeted metabolomics to search for metabolite signatures that may be linked with muscle atrophy. We injected 7-week–old C57/BL6 mice with LLC1 tumor cells or vehicle. After 21 days, tumor-bearing mice exhibited reduced body and muscle mass and impaired grip strength compared with controls, which was accompanied by lower synthesis rates of mixed muscle protein and the myofibrillar and sarcoplasmic muscle fractions. Reductions in protein synthesis were accompanied by mitochondrial enlargement and reduced coupling efficiency in tumor-bearing mice. To generate mechanistic insights into impaired protein synthesis, we performed untargeted metabolomic analyses of plasma and muscle and found increased concentrations of two methylarginines, asymmetric dimethylarginine (ADMA) and NG-monomethyl-l-arginine, in tumor-bearing mice compared with control mice. Compared with healthy controls, human cancer patients were also found to have higher levels of ADMA in the skeletal muscle. Treatment of C2C12 myotubes with ADMA impaired protein synthesis and reduced mitochondrial protein quality. These results suggest that increased levels of ADMA and mitochondrial changes may contribute to impaired muscle protein synthesis in cancer cachexia and could point to novel therapeutic targets by which to mitigate cancer cachexia.

Enhancing the role of women in peacebuilding and politics in Ethiopia 29 June 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 June 2022 Online

Panellists discuss the priorities for promoting the agency of women in politics and peacebuilding in Ethiopia and approaches for combatting gender-based discrimination and violence.

The war in northern Ethiopia and conflicts elsewhere have disproportionately affected women and girls – including through the infliction of physical and sexual violence, the heightened impacts of displacement and disruptions to education, and the co-option of women’s experiences in narratives by aggressors of conflict.

Hard-won political gains in women’s rights have been undermined and deep-rooted gender inequalities exacerbated. Despite this, women remain central actors in politics, as well as in conflict resolution and mediation efforts. However, more needs to be done to promote the security and inclusion of women in finding sustainable solutions for Ethiopia’s long-term recovery and to institutionalize reforms for gender equity and development.

At this public event, panellists will discuss the priorities for improving women’s participation and equality in public decision-making in Ethiopia and how to strengthen the implementation of legislation on women’s rights. They will also discuss what societal shifts and approaches are needed to combat gender-based discrimination and violence and to promote the agency of women in peacebuilding.

This webinar is part of a series of events and outputs on Ethiopia’s political transition.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.

Why Ethiopia must close its political gender gap The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 July 2022

Women urgently need to gain access to high office if the country hopes to survive, say Hilina Berhanu Degefa and Emebet Getachew.

At the end of 2021, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government announced the formation of a three-year national dialogue to address Ethiopia’s political crisis, looking at the ongoing civil war and conflict, inflation, unemployment, drought and other urgent domestic issues. 

But, while efforts have been made to ensure the participation of women in this dialogue, it must be more than symbolic otherwise gaps in meaningful gender inclusion could have significant implications on the very survival of the country.
 
One of the challenges for meaningful inclusion is that Ethiopia is a highly patriarchal society. Patriarchal norms and practices permeate all aspects of the country’s social, economic and political life. Women constitute over half of the Ethiopian population and represent 41 per cent of the national parliament.

Nevertheless, most political parties, including those with liberal credentials, are exclusively governed by men, with women taking almost no part in key decision-making processes. As a result, women are relegated to the margins of political and economic activities. 

Though there has been little systematic study of the structural challenges faced by Ethiopian women in politics, women members of political parties encounter many barriers, including political violence, male-coded norms and sexist discourses across Ethiopian society.
 
The nature and scale of political violence perpetrated against women is particularly disempowering and affects their ability to participate in political spaces.

While attitudes to gender equality, sexual violence and gender discrimination are often trivialized, they remain ever-present threats in women’s lives. As late as 2016, a significant minority of men still believed wife-beating to be justified in certain situations. Even when women overcome social pressure to pursue their political ambitions, patriarchal views and practices within political party structures about the role of women significantly undermine their active participation and engagement. 

The political space is even more inaccessible to women with disabilities and in conflict and climate-related crises such as among internally displaced people and in pastoral communities. Male-coded norms ingrained at both party and community levels remain a significant concern. Specifically, sex in exchange for candidacy, inconsiderate working schedules affecting women with children and denial of access to equal information and financial resources are frequently reported as major internal hurdles among political parties.

Closing the gender gap could offer Ethiopia a new beginning

Many political initiatives designed to tackle these gender imbalances often have been driven by short-term political considerations without proper gender-gap assessment and policy analysis. In most cases, the authorities have viewed gender-targeted reforms as acts of benevolence, dispensed by the government, without adopting the legal and financial measures necessary to ensure sustainability and impact.
 
Take, for example, Abiy’s appointment of a 50:50 gender-balanced cabinet in 2018. At the time, much was made about its transformative potential, with the prime minister attracting widespread global approval. Yet, a cabinet reshuffle in 2021 reduced female representation to 36.3 per cent, with far less scrutiny or accountability.

This indicates that gender equality in Ethiopia is not considered a priority but rather an endeavour for more opportune, ‘stable’ times. Without thorough measures that create the conditions for real change, the aspiration of having a gender-balanced cabinet will always be challenging to translate into lasting equal representation.
 
The proposed national dialogue presents an ideal opportunity for Ethiopian women to begin reshaping attitudes and closing the gender gap through their inclusion and participation in the political process. To do so, three issues must be addressed.
 
First, the varying rights of women need to be consolidated, including on identity, constitutional reform and economic issues .

Second, gender equality considerations must be absorbed into mainstream political discourse at all levels.

Third, the experiences of women in the recent war, other ongoing conflicts and past and lingering legacies of political violence targeting women from specific communities, must be acknowledged and remedied. 

If Ethiopia is indeed serious about addressing its asymmetric gender power dynamics, this national dialogue provides an excellent opportunity to begin the process. Genuine participation of women as independent actors, with their own agency, could offer Ethiopia a new beginning.

Africa in 2023: Continuing political and economic volatility Expert comment NCapeling 6 January 2023

Despite few African trade and financial links with Russia and Ukraine, the war in Ukraine will cause civil strife in Africa due to food and energy inflation.

Africa’s economy was recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic in 2022 when a range of internal and external shocks struck such as adverse weather conditions, a devastating locust invasion, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine – all of which worsened already rapidly-rising rates of inflation and borrowing costs.

Although the direct trade and financial linkages of Africa with Russia and Ukraine are small, the war has damaged the continent’s economies through higher commodity prices, higher food, fuel, and headline inflation.

The main impact is on the increasing likelihood of civil strife because of food and energy-fuelled inflation amid an environment of heightened political instability.

Key African economies such as South Africa and Nigeria were already stuck with low growth and many African governments have seen their debt burdens increase – some such as Ethiopia and Ghana now have dollar debt trading at distressed levels – and more countries will follow in 2023.

On average the public sector debt-to-GDP ratio of African countries stood at above 60 per cent in 2022. The era of Chinese state-backed big loans and mega-projects which started 20 years ago in Angola after the end of its civil war may be coming to an end but Chinese private sector investments on the continent will continue through its Belt and Road Initiative and dual circulation model of development.

Great and middle powers building influence

Geopolitical competition in Africa has intensified in 2022, particularly among great powers such as China, Russia, the US, and the EU but also by middle powers such as Turkey, Japan, and the Gulf states.

The sixth AU-EU summit held in Brussels in February 2022 agreed on the principles for a new partnership, although the Russian invasion of Ukraine which followed disrupted these ambitions. Japan’s pledge of $30 billion in aid for Africa at TICAD 8 in August 2022 was clearly made due to the $40 billion pledged at the China–Africa summit in November 2021.

The US also launched a new strategy to strengthen its partnership and held a second US-Africa Leaders’ summit in Washington in December, the first since 2014. Russia’s ambition has been curtailed by its invasion of Ukraine, postponing its second summit with African states to 2023.

The imposition of international sanctions complicated its trade and investments, and military support such as that provided by Russian paramilitary group Wagner focused on Mali, Libya and the Central African Republic (CAR) has been curtailed.

The strategic importance of Africa has resulted in all the UN P5 members calling on the G20 to make the African Union (AU) its 21st member in 2023 under India’s presidency.

International competition to secure Africa’s critical and strategic minerals and energy products intensified in 2022 and, in the energy sector, European countries are seeking to diversify away from Russian oil and gas with alternative supplies, such as those from Africa.

Western mining companies and commodity traders are also increasingly seeking alternative supplies from Africa. Decarbonization is becoming a driver of resource nationalism and geopolitical competition in certain African mining markets, home to large deposits of critical ‘transition minerals’ such as copper, cobalt, graphite, lithium, or nickel.

COP27 was hosted in Egypt in November and gave African leaders an opportunity to shape climate discussions by pushing priority areas such as loss and damage, stranded assets, access to climate finance, adaptation, and desertification. Climate adaptation in Africa is a key condition to preserving economic growth and maintaining social cohesion.

The Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia, is suffering from one of the worst droughts in memory. The geopolitical and geoeconomic ramifications of the war in Ukraine has directly impacted the African continent by contributing to food and cooking oil inflation and humanitarian aid delivery.

Thoughout 2022 the AU was undergoing intensive reform and it struggled to respond to the growing number of security crises across the continent. Hotspots in 2023 will be in the western Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, eastern DRC, and northern Mozambique, all of them crossing state borders.

In Mozambique, a 2019 peace deal assisted by the United Nations (UN) will see the last ex-guerrillas from Renamo demobilized in 2023 to reintegrate into civilian life – some having been recruited in 1978.

In eastern Congo, M23 – one of around 120 armed groups – resumed its conflict against the central government. After lying dormant for several years, it took up arms again in 2021 and has been leading an offensive in eastern DRC against the Congolese army.

According to the UN, Rwanda has been supporting M23, and Kenya’s parliament approved in November the deployment of about 900 soldiers to the DRC as part of a joint military force from the East African Community (EAC) bloc – DRC joined the EAC in March.

In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia saw an uneasy ceasefire agreed between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

Islamist militant groups in Africa further expanded their territorial reach in 2022, particularly in the western Sahel where al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates are competing for influence and continued to make inroads.

The drawdown and exit of western forces from Mali, both the French Operation Barkane and international contributions for the UN’s MINUSMA mission there, adds new dimensions to regional security challenges.

Mali’s decision in May to withdraw from the G5 Sahel has also eroded the regional security architecture. Jihadist activity may spread further into coastal states which has resulted in international partners such as France and the UK redesigning their security assistance strategies for the region.

Coups on the increase again

Since 2020, there have been successful military coups in Burkina Faso (twice), Chad, Guinea, Mali (twice), and Sudan, and failed ones in the CAR, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Niger, and possibly Gambia and São Tomé and Príncipe.

Three national elections illustrate the state of African democracy in 2022. In Angola’s August elections, the ruling MPLA lost its absolute majority with the opposition UNITA winning the majority in Luanda for the first time.

Visual Abstract

The Wnt/β-catenin pathway is one of the major pathways that regulates embryonic development, adult homeostasis, and stem cell self-renewal. In this pathway, transcription factors T-cell factor and lymphoid enhancer factor (TCF/LEF) serve as a key switch to repress or activate Wnt target gene transcription by recruiting repressor molecules or interacting with the β-catenin effector, respectively. It has become evident that the protein stability of the TCF/LEF family members may play a critical role in controlling the activity of the Wnt/β-catenin signaling pathway. However, factors that regulate the stability of TCF/LEFs remain largely unknown. Here, we report that pVHL binding protein 1 (VBP1) regulates the Wnt/β-catenin signaling pathway by controlling the stability of TCF/LEFs. Surprisingly, we found that either overexpression or knockdown of VBP1 decreased Wnt/β-catenin signaling activity in both cultured cells and zebrafish embryos. Mechanistically, VBP1 directly binds to all four TCF/LEF family members and von Hippel-Lindau tumor-suppressor protein (pVHL). Either overexpression or knockdown of VBP1 increases the association between TCF/LEFs and pVHL and then decreases the protein levels of TCF/LEFs via proteasomal degradation. Together, our results provide mechanistic insights into the roles of VBP1 in controlling TCF/LEFs protein stability and regulating Wnt/β-catenin signaling pathway activity.

The glucagon receptor (GCGR) activated by the peptide hormone glucagon is a seven-transmembrane G protein–coupled receptor (GPCR) that regulates blood glucose levels. Ubiquitination influences trafficking and signaling of many GPCRs, but its characterization for the GCGR is lacking. Using endocytic colocalization and ubiquitination assays, we have identified a correlation between the ubiquitination profile and recycling of the GCGR. Our experiments revealed that GCGRs are constitutively ubiquitinated at the cell surface. Glucagon stimulation not only promoted GCGR endocytic trafficking through Rab5a early endosomes and Rab4a recycling endosomes, but also induced rapid deubiquitination of GCGRs. Inhibiting GCGR internalization or disrupting endocytic trafficking prevented agonist-induced deubiquitination of the GCGR. Furthermore, a Rab4a dominant negative (DN) that blocks trafficking at recycling endosomes enabled GCGR deubiquitination, whereas a Rab5a DN that blocks trafficking at early endosomes eliminated agonist-induced GCGR deubiquitination. By down-regulating candidate deubiquitinases that are either linked with GPCR trafficking or localized on endosomes, we identified signal-transducing adaptor molecule–binding protein (STAMBP) and ubiquitin-specific protease 33 (USP33) as cognate deubiquitinases for the GCGR. Our data suggest that USP33 constitutively deubiquitinates the GCGR, whereas both STAMBP and USP33 deubiquitinate agonist-activated GCGRs at early endosomes. A mutant GCGR with all five intracellular lysines altered to arginines remains deubiquitinated and shows augmented trafficking to Rab4a recycling endosomes compared with the WT, thus affirming the role of deubiquitination in GCGR recycling. We conclude that the GCGRs are rapidly deubiquitinated after agonist-activation to facilitate Rab4a-dependent recycling and that USP33 and STAMBP activities are critical for the endocytic recycling of the GCGR.

Genetic mutations related to ALS, a progressive neurological disease, have been discovered in the gene encoding σ-1 receptor (σ1R). We previously reported that σ1RE102Q elicits toxicity in cells. The σ1R forms oligomeric states that are regulated by ligands. Nevertheless, little is known about the effect of ALS-related mutations on oligomer formation. Here, we transfected NSC-34 cells, a motor neuronal cell line, and HEK293T cells with σ1R-mCherry (mCh), σ1RE102Q-mCh, or nontagged forms to investigate detergent solubility and subcellular distribution using immunocytochemistry and fluorescence recovery after photobleaching. The oligomeric state was determined using crosslinking procedure. σ1Rs were soluble to detergents, whereas the mutants accumulated in the insoluble fraction. Within the soluble fraction, peak distribution of mutants appeared in higher sucrose density fractions. Mutants formed intracellular aggregates that were co-stained with p62, ubiquitin, and phosphorylated pancreatic eukaryotic translation initiation factor-2-α kinase in NSC-34 cells but not in HEK293T cells. The aggregates had significantly lower recovery in fluorescence recovery after photobleaching. Acute treatment with σ1R agonist SA4503 failed to improve recovery, whereas prolonged treatment for 48 h significantly decreased σ1RE102Q-mCh insolubility and inhibited apoptosis. Whereas σ1R-mCh formed monomers and dimers, σ1RE102Q-mCh also formed trimers and tetramers. SA4503 reduced accumulation of the four types in the insoluble fraction and increased monomers in the soluble fraction. The σ1RE102Q insolubility was diminished by σ1R-mCh co-expression. These results suggest that the agonist and WT σ1R modify the detergent insolubility, toxicity, and oligomeric state of σ1RE102Q, which may lead to promising new treatments for σ1R-related ALS.

Stephanie E. Hood
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1720-1732
Research Articles

Elisa Vidal
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1733-1746
Research Articles

Oktawia Nilsson
Nov 17, 2020; 0:jlr.RA120000920v1-jlr.RA120000920
Research Articles

Apolipoprotein A-I (ApoA-I) of high-density lipoprotein (HDL) is essential for the transportation of cholesterol between peripheral tissues and the liver. However, specific mutations in Apolipoprotein A-I (ApoA-I) of high-density lipoprotein (HDL) are responsible for a late-onset systemic amyloidosis, the pathological accumulation of protein fibrils in tissues and organs. Carriers of these mutations do not exhibit increased cardiovascular disease risk despite displaying reduced levels of ApoA-I/ HDL-cholesterol. To explain this paradox, we show that the HDL particle profile of patients carrying either L75P or L174S ApoA-I amyloidogenic variants a higher relative abundance of the 8.4 nm vs 9.6 nm particles, and that serum from patients, as well as reconstituted 8.4 and 9.6 nm HDL particles (rHDL), possess increased capacity to catalyze cholesterol efflux from macrophages. Synchrotron radiation circular dichroism and hydrogen-deuterium exchange revealed that the variants in 8.4 nm rHDL have altered secondary structure composition and display a more flexible binding to lipids compared to their native counterpart. The reduced HDL-cholesterol levels of patients carrying ApoA-I amyloidogenic variants are thus balanced by higher proportion of small, dense HDL particles and better cholesterol efflux due to altered, region-specific protein structure dynamics.

TG-rich lipoprotein (TRL)-related biomarkers, including TRL-cholesterol (TRL-C), remnant-like lipoprotein particle-cholesterol (RLP-C), and apoC-III have been associated with atherosclerosis. However, their prognostic values have not been fully determined, especially in patients with previous CAD. This study aimed to examine the associations of TRL-C, RLP-C, and apoC-III with incident cardiovascular events (CVEs) in the setting of secondary prevention of CAD. Plasma TRL-C, RLP-C, and total apoC-III were directly measured. A total of 4,355 participants with angiographically confirmed CAD were followed up for the occurrence of CVEs. During a median follow-up period of 5.1 years (interquartile range: 3.9–6.4 years), 543 (12.5%) events occurred. Patients with incident CVEs had significantly higher levels of TRL-C, RLP-C, and apoC-III than those without events. Multivariable Cox analysis indicated that a log unit increase in TRL-C, RLP-C, and apoC-III increased the risk of CVEs by 49% (95% CI: 1.16–1.93), 21% (95% CI: 1.09–1.35), and 40% (95% CI: 1.11–1.77), respectively. High TRL-C, RLP-C, and apoC-III were also independent predictors of CVEs in individuals with LDL-C levels ≤1.8 mmol/l (n = 1,068). The addition of RLP-C level to a prediction model resulted in a significant increase in discrimination, and all three TRL biomarkers improved risk reclassification. Thus, TRL-C, RLP-C, and apoC-III levels were independently associated with incident CVEs in Chinese CAD patients undergoing statin therapy.

Accompanied with nutrition transition, non-HDL-C levels of individuals in Asian countries has increased rapidly, which has caused the global epicenter of nonoptimal cholesterol to shift from Western countries to Asian countries. Thus, it is critical to underline major genetic and dietary determinants. In the current study of 2,330 Chinese individuals, genetic risk scores (GRSs) were calculated for total cholesterol (TC; GRS_TC, 57 SNPs), LDL-C (GRS_LDL-C, 45 SNPs), and HDL-C (GRS_HDL-C, 65 SNPs) based on SNPs from the Global Lipid Genetics Consortium study. Cholesterol intake was estimated by a 74-item food-frequency questionnaire. Associations of dietary cholesterol intake with plasma TC and LDL-C strengthened across quartiles of the GRS_TC (effect sizes: –0.29, 0.34, 2.45, and 6.47; P_interaction = 0.002) and GRS_LDL-C (effect sizes: –1.35, 0.17, 5.45, and 6.07; P_interaction = 0.001), respectively. Similar interactions with non-HDL-C were observed between dietary cholesterol and GRS_TC (P_interaction = 0.001) and GRS_LDL-C (P_interaction = 0.004). The adverse effects of GRS_TC on TC (effect sizes across dietary cholesterol quartiles: 0.51, 0.82, 1.21, and 1.31; P_interaction = 0.023) and GRS_LDL-C on LDL-C (effect sizes across dietary cholesterol quartiles: 0.66, 0.52, 1.12, and 1.56; P_interaction = 0.020) were more profound in those having higher cholesterol intake compared with those with lower intake. Our findings suggest significant interactions between genetic susceptibility and dietary cholesterol intake on plasma cholesterol profiles in a Chinese population.

Spatial changes of FAs in the retina in response to different dietary n-3 formulations have never been explored, although a diet rich in EPA and DHA is recommended to protect the retina against the effects of aging. In this study, Wistar rats were fed for 8 weeks with balanced diet including either EPA-containing phospholipids (PLs), EPA-containing TGs, DHA-containing PLs, or DHA-containing TGs. Qualitative changes in FA composition of plasma, erythrocytes, and retina were evaluated by gas chromatography-flame ionization detector. Following the different dietary intakes, changes to the quantity and spatial organization of PC and PE species in retina were determined by LC coupled to MS/MS and MALDI coupled to MS imaging. The omega-3 content in the lipids of plasma and erythrocytes suggests that PLs as well as TGs are good omega-3 carriers for retina. However, a significant increase in DHA content in retina was observed, especially molecular species as di-DHA-containing PC and PE, as well as an increase in very long chain PUFAs (more than 28 carbons) following PL-EPA and TG-DHA diets only. All supplemented diets triggered spatial organization changes of DHA in the photoreceptor layer around the optic nerve. Taken together, these findings suggest that dietary omega-3 supplementation can modify the content of FAs in the rat retina.

Lipins are eukaryotic proteins with functions in lipid synthesis and the homeostatic control of energy balance. They execute these functions by acting as phosphatidate phosphatase enzymes in the cytoplasm and by changing gene expression after translocation into the cell nucleus, in particular under fasting conditions. Here, we asked whether nuclear translocation and the enzymatic activity of Drosophila Lipin serve essential functions and how gene expression changes, under both fed and fasting conditions, when nuclear translocation is impaired. To address these questions, we created a Lipin null mutant, a mutant expressing Lipin lacking a nuclear localization signal (Lipin^NLS), and a mutant expressing enzymatically dead Lipin. Our data support the conclusion that the enzymatic but not nuclear gene regulatory activity of Lipin is essential for survival. Notably, adult Lipin^NLS flies were not only viable but also exhibited improved life expectancy. In contrast, they were highly susceptible to starvation. Both the improved life expectancy in the fed state and the decreased survival in the fasting state correlated with changes in metabolic gene expression. Moreover, increased life expectancy of fed flies was associated with a decreased metabolic rate. Interestingly, in addition to metabolic genes, genes involved in feeding behavior and the immune response were misregulated in Lipin^NLS flies. Altogether, our data suggest that the nuclear activity of Lipin influences the genomic response to nutrient availability with effects on life expectancy and starvation resistance. Thus, nutritional or therapeutic approaches that aim at lowering nuclear translocation of lipins in humans may be worth exploring.

The divalent anion sodium symporter (DASS) family (SLC13) plays critical roles in metabolic homeostasis, influencing many processes, including fatty acid synthesis, insulin resistance, and adiposity. DASS transporters catalyze the Na+-driven concentrative uptake of Krebs cycle intermediates and sulfate into cells; disrupting their function can protect against age-related metabolic diseases and can extend lifespan. An inward-facing crystal structure and an outward-facing model of a bacterial DASS family member, VcINDY from Vibrio cholerae, predict an elevator-like transport mechanism involving a large rigid body movement of the substrate-binding site. How substrate binding influences the conformational state of VcINDY is currently unknown. Here, we probe the interaction between substrate binding and protein conformation by monitoring substrate-induced solvent accessibility changes of broadly distributed positions in VcINDY using a site-specific alkylation strategy. Our findings reveal that accessibility to all positions tested is modulated by the presence of substrates, with the majority becoming less accessible in the presence of saturating concentrations of both Na+ and succinate. We also observe separable effects of Na+ and succinate binding at several positions suggesting distinct effects of the two substrates. Furthermore, accessibility changes to a solely succinate-sensitive position suggests that substrate binding is a low-affinity, ordered process. Mapping these accessibility changes onto the structures of VcINDY suggests that Na+ binding drives the transporter into an as-yet-unidentified conformational state, involving rearrangement of the substrate-binding site–associated re-entrant hairpin loops. These findings provide insight into the mechanism of VcINDY, which is currently the only structurally characterized representative of the entire DASS family.

α-Synuclein (α-Syn) is a protein implicated in the pathogenesis of Parkinson's disease (PD). It is an intrinsically disordered protein that binds acidic phospholipids. Growing evidence supports a role for α-Syn in membrane trafficking, including, mechanisms of endocytosis and exocytosis, although the exact role of α-Syn in these mechanisms is currently unclear. Here we investigate the associations of α-Syn with the acidic phosphoinositides (PIPs), phosphatidylinositol 4,5-bisphosphate (PI(4,5)P2) and phosphatidylinositol 3,4-bisphosphate (PI(3,4)P2). Our results show that α-Syn colocalizes with PIP2 and the phosphorylated active form of the clathrin adaptor protein 2 (AP2) at clathrin-coated pits. Using endocytosis of transferrin as an indicator for clathrin-mediated endocytosis (CME), we find that α-Syn involvement in endocytosis is specifically mediated through PI(4,5)P2 levels on the plasma membrane. In accord with their effects on PI(4,5)P2 levels, the PD associated A30P, E46K, and A53T mutations in α-Syn further enhance CME in neuronal and nonneuronal cells. However, lysine to glutamic acid substitutions at the KTKEGV repeat domain of α-Syn, which interfere with phospholipid binding, are ineffective in enhancing CME. We further show that the rate of synaptic vesicle (SV) endocytosis is differentially affected by the α-Syn mutations and associates with their effects on PI(4,5)P2 levels, however, with the exception of the A30P mutation. This study provides evidence for a critical involvement of PIPs in α-Syn–mediated membrane trafficking.

Ankylosing Spondylitis (AS) is a common, inflammatory rheumatic disease, which primarily affects the axial skeleton and is associated with sacroiliitis, uveitis and enthesitis. Unlike other autoimmune rheumatic diseases, such as rheumatoid arthritis or systemic lupus erythematosus, autoantibodies have not yet been reported to be a feature of AS. We therefore wished to determine if plasma from patients with AS contained autoantibodies and if so, characterize and quantify this response in comparison to patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA) and healthy controls. Two high-density nucleic acid programmable protein arrays expressing a total of 3498 proteins were screened with plasma from 25 patients with AS, 17 with RA and 25 healthy controls. Autoantigens identified were subjected to Ingenuity Pathway Analysis in order to determine patterns of signalling cascades or tissue origin. 44% of patients with Ankylosing Spondylitis demonstrated a broad autoantibody response, as compared to 33% of patients with RA and only 8% of healthy controls. Individuals with AS demonstrated autoantibody responses to shared autoantigens, and 60% of autoantigens identified in the AS cohort were restricted to that group. The AS patients autoantibody responses were targeted towards connective, skeletal and muscular tissue, unlike those of RA patients or healthy controls. Thus, patients with AS show evidence of systemic humoral autoimmunity and multispecific autoantibody production. Nucleic Acid Programmable Protein Arrays constitute a powerful tool to study autoimmune diseases.

Proportionality in the Conduct of Hostilities: The Incidental Harm Side of the Assessment Research paper sysadmin 6 December 2018

Clarification of international humanitarian law is important in ensuring compliance with the rule of proportionality, but a culture of compliance within armed forces and groups is also crucial.

Summary

• Military operations are taking place with increasing frequency in densely populated areas. Such operations result in loss of life and harm to civilians, as well as damage to civilian objects, (including infrastructure providing essential services). In order to protect civilians, it is imperative that armed forces and groups comply with the rules of international humanitarian law on the conduct of hostilities, including the rule of proportionality.
• The rule of proportionality prohibits attacks which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This research paper analyses the key steps that belligerents must take to give effect to the rule, with a particular focus on one side of proportionality assessments – the expected incidental harm.
• Those undertaking proportionality assessments before or during an attack must consider whether the expected harm will be caused by the attack, and whether that harm could be expected (that is, was it reasonably foreseeable).
• For the purpose of proportionality assessments, injury to civilians includes disease, and there is no reason in principle to exclude mental harm, even though it is currently challenging to identify and quantify it. Damage to civilian objects includes damage to elements of the natural environment.
• Once the incidental harm to be considered has been identified, a value or weight must be assigned to it. This is then balanced against the value or weight of the military advantage anticipated from the attack to determine whether the harm would be excessive.
• In the determination of whether the expected incidental harm would be excessive compared to the anticipated military advantage, ‘excessive’ is a wide but not indeterminate standard.
• Belligerents should develop methodologies so that those planning and deciding attacks are provided with all necessary information on expected incidental harm, and to assist them in assigning weight to the incidental harm to be considered.
• If it becomes apparent that the rule of proportionality will be contravened, the attack in question must be cancelled or suspended.
• Clarification of the law is important in ensuring compliance with the rule of proportionality, but a culture of compliance within armed forces and groups, inculcated by their leaders, is also crucial.

Tectonic Politics: Global Political Risk in an Age of Transformation Book sysadmin 7 May 2019

Political risk now affects more markets and countries than ever before and that risk will continue to rise. But traditional methods of managing political risk are no longer legitimate or effective.

In Tectonic Politics, Nigel Gould-Davies explores the complex, shifting landscape of political risk and how to navigate it. He analyses trends in each form of political risk: the power to destroy, seize, regulate, and tax.

He shows how each of these forms reflects a deeper transformation of the global political economy that is reordering the relationship between power, wealth, and values. In a world where everything is political, the craft of engagement is as important as the science of production and the art of the deal.

The successful company must integrate that craft—the engager’s way of seeing and doing—into strategy and culture.

Drawing on a career in academia, business, and diplomacy, Gould-Davies provides corporate leaders, scholars, and engaged citizens with a groundbreaking study of the fastest-rising political risk today. ‘As tectonic plates shape the earth,’ he writes, ‘so tectonic politics forges its governance.’

The book is published as part of the Insights series.

Praise for Tectonic Politics

About the author

Nigel Gould-Davies was an associate fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House.

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Online Disinformation and Political Discourse: Applying a Human Rights Framework Research paper sysadmin 5 November 2019

Although some digital platforms now have an impact on more people’s lives than does any one state authority, the international community has been slow to hold to account these platforms’ activities by reference to human rights law.

This paper examines how human rights frameworks should guide digital technology.

Summary

• Online political campaigning techniques are distorting our democratic political processes. These techniques include the creation of disinformation and divisive content; exploiting digital platforms’ algorithms, and using bots, cyborgs and fake accounts to distribute this content; maximizing influence through harnessing emotional responses such as anger and disgust; and micro-targeting on the basis of collated personal data and sophisticated psychological profiling techniques. Some state authorities distort political debate by restricting, filtering, shutting down or censoring online networks.
• Such techniques have outpaced regulatory initiatives and, save in egregious cases such as shutdown of networks, there is no international consensus on how they should be tackled. Digital platforms, driven by their commercial impetus to encourage users to spend as long as possible on them and to attract advertisers, may provide an environment conducive to manipulative techniques.
• International human rights law, with its careful calibrations designed to protect individuals from abuse of power by authority, provides a normative framework that should underpin responses to online disinformation and distortion of political debate. Contrary to popular view, it does not entail that there should be no control of the online environment; rather, controls should balance the interests at stake appropriately.
• The rights to freedom of thought and opinion are critical to delimiting the appropriate boundary between legitimate influence and illegitimate manipulation. When digital platforms exploit decision-making biases in prioritizing bad news and divisive, emotion-arousing information, they may be breaching these rights. States and digital platforms should consider structural changes to digital platforms to ensure that methods of online political discourse respect personal agency and prevent the use of sophisticated manipulative techniques.
• The right to privacy includes a right to choose not to divulge your personal information, and a right to opt out of trading in and profiling on the basis of your personal data. Current practices in collecting, trading and using extensive personal data to ‘micro-target’ voters without their knowledge are not consistent with this right. Significant changes are needed.
• Data protection laws should be implemented robustly, and should not legitimate extensive harvesting of personal data on the basis of either notional ‘consent’ or the data handler’s commercial interests. The right to privacy should be embedded in technological design (such as by allowing the user to access all information held on them at the click of a button); and political parties should be transparent in their collection and use of personal data, and in their targeting of messages. Arguably, the value of personal data should be shared with the individuals from whom it derives.
• The rules on the boundaries of permissible content online should be set by states, and should be consistent with the right to freedom of expression. Digital platforms have had to rapidly develop policies on retention or removal of content, but those policies do not necessarily reflect the right to freedom of expression, and platforms are currently not well placed to take account of the public interest. Platforms should be far more transparent in their content regulation policies and decision-making, and should develop frameworks enabling efficient, fair, consistent internal complaints and content monitoring processes. Expertise on international human rights law should be integral to their systems.
• The right to participate in public affairs and to vote includes the right to engage in public debate. States and digital platforms should ensure an environment in which all can participate in debate online and are not discouraged from standing for election, from participating or from voting by online threats or abuse.

AI-driven Personalization in Digital Media: Political and Societal Implications Research paper sysadmin 2 December 2019

The fallout from disinformation and online manipulation strategies have alerted Western democracies to the novel, nuanced vulnerabilities of our information society. This paper outlines the implications of the adoption of AI by the the legacy media, as well as by the new media, focusing on personalization.

Summary

• Machine learning (ML)-driven personalization is fast expanding from social media to the wider information space, encompassing legacy media, multinational conglomerates and digital-native publishers: however, this is happening within a regulatory and oversight vacuum that needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency.
• Mass-scale adoption of personalization in communication has serious implications for human rights, societal resilience and political security. Data protection, privacy and wrongful discrimination, as well as freedom of opinion and of expression, are some of the areas impacted by this technological transformation.
• Artificial intelligence (AI) and its ML subset are novel technologies that demand novel ways of approaching oversight, monitoring and analysis. Policymakers, regulators, media professionals and engineers need to be able to conceptualize issues in an interdisciplinary way that is appropriate for sociotechnical systems.
• Funding needs to be allocated to research into human–computer interaction in information environments, data infrastructure, technology market trends, and the broader impact of ML systems within the communication sector.
• Although global, high-level ethical frameworks for AI are welcome, they are no substitute for domain- and context-specific codes of ethics. Legacy media and digital-native publishers need to overhaul their editorial codes to make them fit for purpose in a digital ecosystem transformed by ML. Journalistic principles need to be reformulated and refined in the current informational context in order to efficiently inform the ML models built for personalized communication.
• Codes of ethics will not by themselves be enough, so current regulatory and legislative frameworks as they relate to media need to be reassessed. Media regulators need to develop their in-house capacity for thorough research and monitoring into ML systems, and – when appropriate –proportionate sanctions for actors found to be employing such systems towards malign ends. Collaboration with data protection authorities, competition authorities and national electoral commissions is paramount for preserving the integrity of elections and of a political discourse grounded on democratic principles.
• Upskilling senior managers and editorial teams is fundamental if media professionals are to be able to engage meaningfully and effectively with data scientists and AI engineers.

Secrets and Spies: UK Intelligence Accountability After Iraq and Snowden Book sysadmin 15 January 2020

How can democratic governments hold intelligence and security agencies to account when what they do is largely secret? Jamie Gaskarth explores how intelligence professionals view accountability in the context of 21st century politics.

Using the UK as a case study, this book provides the first systematic exploration of how accountability is understood inside the secret world. It is based on new interviews with current and former UK intelligence practitioners, as well as extensive research into the performance and scrutiny of the UK intelligence machinery.

The result is the first detailed analysis of how intelligence professionals view their role, what they feel keeps them honest, and how far external overseers impact on their work.

The UK gathers material that helps inform global decisions on such issues as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, and breaches of international humanitarian law. On the flip side, the UK was a major contributor to the intelligence failures leading to the Iraq war in 2003, and its agencies were complicit in the widely discredited U.S. practices of torture and ‘rendition’ of terrorism suspects. UK agencies have come under greater scrutiny since those actions, but it is clear that problems remain.

Secrets and Spies is the result of a British Academy funded project (SG151249) on intelligence accountability. The book is published as part of the Insights series.

Praise for Secrets and Spies

About the author

Jamie Gaskarth is Professor of Foreign Policy and International Relations at The Open University. He was previously senior lecturer at the University of Birmingham where he taught strategy and decision-making. His research focused on the ethical dilemmas of leadership and accountability in intelligence, foreign policy, and defence. He is author/editor or co-editor of six books and served on the Academic Advisory panel for the 2015 UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review.

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War Time: Temporality and the Decline of Western Military Power Book dora.popova 22 February 2021

In War Time the Western way of war, its pace and timing, are discussed and analysed by experts who question the West’s ability to maintain its military superiority given the political and strategic failures of interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In War Time, war studies experts examine the trajectory of Western military power. They discuss conflicting perceptions of time anchored within Western political and military institutions, and the Western attachment to fast-paced warfare at the expense of longer-term political solutions.

Divided into three sections, the book covers ‘civic militarism’ and the trajectory of Western power, Western perceptions of time and the international normative order, and military operations and temporality. War Time explains why the West has been overwhelmingly powerful on the battlefield and yet strategically and politically weak as exemplified by the return of the Taliban and the hasty evacuation of troops and personnel from Afghanistan.

The book identifies policies that decision-makers must adopt to stave off the decline of Western military dominance.

This book is part of the Insights series.

Watch the event

A special event was held in March 2021 to mark the launch of the book. View the event here.

Praise for War Time

About the editors

Sten Rynning is professor of war studies at the University of Southern Denmark.

Olivier Schmitt is professor with special responsibilities at the Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, and currently director of research and studies at the French Institute for Higher National Defence Studies.

Amelie Theussen is assistant professor at the Center for War Studies, University of 
Southern Denmark.

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Belarusians’ views on the political crisis - April 2021 Other resource NCapeling 11 June 2021

Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 20 and 30 April 2021.

Chatham House surveyed a total of 937 respondents between 20 and 30 April 2021. Our survey sample corresponds to the general structure of Belarus’s urban population and is corrected and weighted by gender, age, size of respondents’ town of residence and education level.

Summary

• After Lukashenka, the most known political figures in Belarus are pro-protest politicians: Tsikhanouskaya, Babaryka, Tsikhanouski, Kalesnikava, Tsapkala and Latushka. Viktar Babaryka is the most popular presidential candidate among Belarusian urban citizens, and Lukashenka comes second to him.
• State organizations and bodies are still mistrusted by more than half the population, while the army is slightly more popular than other bodies. Independent media, labour unions and human rights organizations are trusted far more than state ones.
• Russia leads when it comes to positive attitudes to foreign states: one in three Belarusians feel very positive about their neighbour and 79 per cent feel positive in general. 71 per cent Belarusians feel positive about China, which is the next highest indicator. Despite propaganda efforts, Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland and EU states in general are still perceived positively by more than 60 per cent of Belarusians, with fewer than 20 per cent feeling negative about them.
• The position on Russian interference in the Belarusian political crisis is consolidated enough: 58 per cent think that Russia should remain neutral. The rest are almost equally divided between those who think Russia should support the protest movement (19 per cent) and those who think Russia should support Lukashenka (23 per cent).
• 40 per cent have changed their attitude to the Russian government since it supported Lukashenka in the crisis, and 73 per cent are sure that Russia is his sole support.
• While 32 per cent of Belarusians see union with Russia as the most appropriate foreign policy, 46 per cent would like to be in a union with both Russia and the EU simultaneously.
• Almost half the population thinks that Belarusian foreign policy in the event of a pro-protest government coming to power would be oriented toward friendship and cooperation with both Russia and the West, which correlates with how the majority thinks it should be. Although 42 per cent expect foreign policy would lean toward the EU in that situation, which is less acceptable: only 25 per cent think it ‘should’.
• The proportion of respondents who think Belarus should remain in the Collective Security Treaty Organization is 58 per cent, while 35 per cent would like to see Belarus not belonging to any military bloc and a small share (seven per cent) would prefer Belarus to join NATO.
• Almost half of the population considers Lukashenka to be the major obstacle for political stability and economic development and is sure he does not care about, and in fact is a threat to, independence.
• In general, most Belarusians have a consolidated opinion that the authorities should start negotiating with opponents and free all political prisoners.
• More than half of Belarusians think that Lukashenka must leave immediately or before the end of 2021, while 27 per cent think he should leave when his term ends in 2025. The opinion that Lukashenka should rule for another term beginning in 2025 is marginal – only ten per cent support this.
• Expectations are not so optimistic though: only 26 per cent believe he will leave office this year. One in three thinks he will leave in 2025; a further 19 per cent say that he will stay on for further terms in office.
• If Lukashenka doesn’t leave, people expect an increase in emigration and unemployment, the continuation of repression in all areas of life, falling exchange rates and the tightening of dependency on Russia.
• Opinion on abortions is still consolidated, with only 19 per cent thinking they should be banned in most or all cases. The same applies to Lukashenka’s infamous statement that society in Belarus is not ready to have a female president: only 20 per cent agree with the opinion.
• 52 per cent don’t think there is a problem of wage inequality between men and women in Belarus, while 37 per cent do see an issue.

Download a presentation of the survey’s main findings

Belarusians’ views on the political crisis - Nov 2021 Other resource NCapeling 20 January 2022

Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 1 and 10 November 2021.

Chatham House surveyed a total of 767 respondents between 1 and 10 November 2021. Our survey sample corresponds to the general structure of Belarus’s urban population and is adjusted by gender, age, education level and the size of respondents’ place of residence.

Summary

• After Aliaksandr Lukashenka, the most well-known political figures in Belarus are the protest leaders: Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Viktar Babaryka, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Valery Tsapkala, Marya Kalesnikava and Pavel Latushka.
• Lukashenka and Babaryka have the highest popularity ratings among Belarus’s urban population. At the same time, Lukashenka has a high negative rating: half of the city residents surveyed say that they would never vote for him. Babaryka has one of the lowest negative ratings in the country.
• The popularity ratings of pro-government politicians are low, and their negative ratings remain extremely high, although the latter have decreased slightly in comparison with July 2021. The popularity ratings of protest leaders are significantly higher than those of politicians who support the current government.
• Trust in state and independent organizations is polarized along political lines. Thus, respondents classed as hardcore protesters do not trust state structures and do trust independent ones, while Lukashenka’s supporters hold the opposite positions.
• Belarusians’ geopolitical orientations remain stable. The most widely preferred option for a geopolitical union is simultaneous integration with the EU and Russia.
• Belarusians have become increasingly negative about the possibility that Russian airbases could be established on Belarusian territory (48 per cent in November 2021, compared to 39 per cent in July 2021).
• Belarusians are now feeling more strongly that the situation concerning the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened: in November, more than half were beginning to respond that Belarus is unable to cope with the spread of coronavirus.
• Sanctions against Lukashenka and those around him are supported more widely than sanctions against state enterprises.
• Belarusians feel there is acute social tension in their country: almost everyone surveyed states that social tension exists, while one in every five respondents considers the situation catastrophic. A perception that there is social tension is closely related to many factors, with the strongest of all being a sense of a lack of personal safety.
• Only one-third of Belarusians are prepared to call the state built under Lukashenka their own. Most of the survey respondents do not trust this state to some degree, and do not believe that the state protects the interests of Belarusian citizens.

Download a presentation of the survey’s main findings

• Belarusians’ views on the political crisis (PDF)

• Взгляды белорусов на политический кризис (PDF)