In December 2009, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy conducted a day-long simulation of the diplomatic and military fallout that could result from an Israeli military strike against the Iranian nuclear program. In this Middle East Memo, Kenneth M. Pollack analyzes the critical decisions each side made during the wargame.

The simulation was conducted as a three-move game with three separate country teams. One team represented a hypothetical American National Security Council, a second team represented a hypothetical Israeli cabinet, and a third team represented a hypothetical Iranian Supreme National Security Council. The U.S. team consisted of approximately ten members, all of whom had served in senior positions in the U.S. government and U.S. military. The Israel team consisted of a half-dozen American experts on Israel with close ties to Israeli decision-makers, and who, in some cases, had spent considerable time in Israel. Some members of the Israel team had also served in the U.S. government. The Iran team consisted of a half-dozen American experts on Iran, some of whom had lived and/or traveled extensively in Iran, are of Iranian extraction, and/or had served in the U.S. government with responsibility for Iran.

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A months-long political crisis in Kiev came to an end on April 14, when Ukraine’s Rada (parliament) approved a new prime minister. Expectations that the government will move on needed reforms and anti-corruption measures, however, are low.

Kamikaze prime minister?

The previous prime minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, had served since the Maidan Revolution in February 2014. Early on, Yatsenyuk equated his tenure to a kamikaze mission, noting that the reforms the government would adopt would carry heavy political costs. He proved right. By early 2016, his National Front party, which won over 22 percent in the October 2014 party-list vote in the Rada elections, polled in the low single digits. 

Reports of a widening rift between Yatsenyuk and President Petro Poroshenko grew last autumn, though they still had reason to stay together. The National Front party and Poroshenko Bloc formed the core of the majority coalition in the Rada, and neither party could expect to fare well in early parliamentary elections.

Early on, Yatsenyuk equated his tenure to a kamikaze mission, noting that the reforms the government would adopt would carry heavy political costs.

The crisis took a twist in mid-February, when the Rada passed a resolution expressing disapproval of the work of Yatsenyuk and his cabinet…but then failed to pass a vote of no-confidence that would have led to Yatsenyuk’s dismissal.

Speculation nevertheless intensified over his looming replacement, with American-born Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko mooted as a possibility. Volodymyr Hroysman’s name also came into play. Hroysman, a member of the Poroshenko Bloc, is closely connected to the president. He had a reputation as a reformer and effective mayor of the city of Vinnytsia, though his performance as Rada speaker was mixed. For example, he opposed the finance ministry’s proposed tax reform, even though it was a requirement of Ukraine’s program with the International Monetary Fund. 

When Yatsenyuk announced his resignation on April 10, Hroysman appeared the front-runner to succeed him. His appointment took longer than expected, however, as he reportedly rejected some suggestions from the president’s camp for ministers, seeking to put in place his own people instead. Backroom negotiations and a fair amount of horse-trading as parties jockeyed for ministerial positions took place April 11 to 13. Finally, the Rada approved Hroysman on April 14.

Low reform expectations

At first glance, the composition of the new cabinet is a far more political group than its predecessor, which comprised many technocrats. It is devoid of names with established reputations for pressing reform or fighting corruption. My conversations on the margins of the Kiev Security Forum on April 14 to 15 turned up few expectations that the new cabinet will proceed with the kinds of reform actions and, in particular, measures to combat corruption that the country needs.

The International Monetary Fund will watch the cabinet’s actions before it considers releasing an additional tranche of funding for Ukraine. One unsettling sign: The incoming finance minister suggested that some adjustments might be sought in the IMF’s criteria. Historically, when Ukrainian finance ministers seek adjustments to IMF criteria and programs, they do not aim for changes that will accelerate reform.

At first glance, the composition of the new cabinet is a far more political group than its predecessor.

Some in Kiev worry about the close relationship between Hroysman and Poroshenko. But that relationship may have one upside: it ties Poroshenko more closely to the prime minister and his success or failure. Too often in the past, Ukrainian presidents have stood some distance from the prime minister, positioning themselves to escape responsibility for difficult government policies rather than throwing their full political weight behind the prime minister’s efforts.

Poroshenko did not fully back Yatsenyuk. As one Ukrainian observer put it, the president often seemed more interested in explaining or rationalizing the status quo rather than trying to change it. Now, if Hroysman and the new cabinet fail to deliver, it will reflect more directly on Poroshenko.

A friendly push

If my Ukrainian interlocutors are correct, the new government will pursue the needed reforms at best only half-heartedly. Among other things, that could leave in place the current system in which oligarchs exercise outsized and unhealthy political influence. That will impede Ukraine’s prospects of getting on the path to becoming a modern European state. 

The International Monetary Fund, United States, and European Union should help the Ukrainian president and prime minister make the right decisions: to press forward a program of genuine reform and, at long last, a real anti-corruption campaign. The West should make clear that further assistance will depend on such actions. 

       

An American drone strike that killed leader of the Afghan Taliban Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansour may seem like a fillip for the United States’ ally, the embattled government of Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani. But as Vanda Felbab-Brown writes in a new op-ed for The New York Times, it is unlikely to improve Kabul’s immediate national security problems—and may create more difficulties than it solves.

The White House has argued that because Mansour became opposed to peace talks with the Afghan government, removing him became necessary to facilitate new talks. Yet, as Vanda writes in the op-ed, “the notion that the United States can drone-strike its way through the leadership of the Afghan Taliban until it finds an acceptable interlocutor seems optimistic, at best.”

[T]he notion that the United States can drone-strike its way through the leadership of the Afghan Taliban until it finds an acceptable interlocutor seems optimistic, at best.

Mullah Mansour's death does not inevitably translate into substantial weakening of the Taliban's operational capacity or a reprieve from what is shaping up to be a bloody summer in Afghanistan. Any fragmentation of the Taliban to come does not ipso facto imply stronger Afghan security forces or a reduction of violent conflict. Even if Mansour's demise eventually turns out to be an inflection point in the conflict and the Taliban does seriously fragment, such an outcome may only add complexity to the conflict. A lot of other factors, including crucially Afghan politics, influence the capacity of the Afghan security forces and their battlefield performance.

Nor will Mansour’s death motivate the Taliban to start negotiating. That did not happen when it was revealed last July’s the group’s previous leader and founder, Mullah Mohammad Omar, had died in 2013. To the contrary, the Taliban’s subsequent military push has been its strongest in a decade—with its most violent faction, the Haqqani network, striking the heart of Kabul. Mansour had empowered the violent Haqqanis following Omar’s death as a means to reconsolidate the Taliban, and their continued presence portends future violence. Mansour's successor, Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban’s former minister of justice who loved to issue execution orders, is unlikely to be in a position to negotiate (if he even wants to) for a considerable time as he seeks to gain control and create legitimacy within the movement.

The United States has sent a strong signal to Pakistan, which continues to deny the presence of the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network within its borders. Motivated by a fear of provoking the groups against itself, Pakistan continues to show no willingness to take them on, despite the conditions on U.S. aid.

Disrupting the group’s leadership by drone-strike decapitation is tempting militarily. But it can be too blunt an instrument, since negotiations and reconciliation ultimately depend on political processes. In decapitation targeting, the U.S. leadership must think critically about whether the likely successor will be better or worse for the counterinsurgency endgame.

      

Ninety-three years ago yesterday, the Boston police force went on strike, leaving the city unprotected while the state scrambled to find replacements. Governor Calvin Coolidge’s declaration of support for the city—he said that “There is no right to strike against the public safety, anywhere, anytime”—established his national reputation that ultimately led to the presidency.

Public outrage at labor actions that compromise public safety has historically been a bipartisan affair.  Coolidge was a Republican but his actions earned the respect of Democratic President Woodrow Wilson, who hailed his re-election as Massachusetts governor as “a victory for law and order.” Nearly 20 years later, President Franklin Roosevelt shared his view that a strike by public employees of any sort is “unthinkable and intolerable.”

The impacts of the Chicago teacher strike that began today may not be as immediately obvious as the looting and vandalism that descended on Boston in 1919, but they are just as serious. Research from a large, urban school district found that teacher absenteeism has a negative impact on student learning in math.

But a strike doesn't leave students with substitute teachers—it leaves them without any school at all. Research on summer learning loss shows that being out of school has a disproportionate effect on low-income students. One recent study found that “while all students lose some ground in mathematics over the summer, low-income students lose more ground in reading, while their higher-income peers may even gain.” In other words, the consequence of being out of school is to increase the already unacceptably large achievement gap between low-income students and their affluent peers.

The American labor movement has made important contributions in areas ranging from workplace safety to child labor to employment discrimination. There are good reasons to believe that the public ought to accept higher coal prices resulting from a strike to protect the lives of miners. But the public should not tolerate damage to the education of disadvantaged students resulting from a strike over disagreements about teachers’ salaries, benefits, job security, and method of evaluation.

The Chicago Teachers Union’s differences with the city over how the public schools ought to be run may well be legitimate. But those battles should be fought in the court of public opinion and ultimately at the ballot box, not through strikes that come largely at the expense of poor children.

       

       

The buzz these days is that American politics may be entering a “postpartisan” era, as a new generation finds the old ideological quarrels among baby boomers to be increasingly irrelevant. In reality, matters are not so simple. Far from being postpartisan, today’s young adults are significantly more likely to identify as Democrats than were their predecessors. Along with colleagues at the Brookings and Hoover institutions, we recently completed a comprehensive study of the nation’s polarization. Our research concludes not only that the ideological differences between the political parties are growing but also that they have become embedded in American society itself.

Large events made some increase in polarization inevitable. In the wake of the Vietnam War, the post-World War II foreign-policy consensus collapsed. Less than a decade after President Nixon declared that “we are all Keynesians now,” stagflation and soaring interest rates spawned the controversial tenets of supply-side economics. Social movements and the Supreme Court put long-suppressed, highly divisive cultural issues back on the public agenda.

But polarization has proceeded even further than these shifts made necessary. The great majority of voters now fuse their party identification, ideology and decisions in the voting booth. The share of Democrats who could be called conservative has shrunk, and so has the share of liberal Republicans. The American National Election Studies asks voters a series of issues-based questions and then arrays respondents along a 15-point scale from -7 (the most liberal) to +7 (the most conservative). These data indicate that 41 percent of the voters in 1984 were located at or near the midpoint of the ideological spectrum, compared with only 28 percent in 2004. Meanwhile, the percentage of voters clustering toward the left and right tails of the spectrum rose from 10 to 23 percent.

Most strikingly, political polarization has become akin to political segregation. You are less likely to live near someone whose politics differ from your own. It’s well known that fewer states are competitive in presidential races than in decades past. We find similar results at the county level. In 1976, only 27 percent of voters lived in landslide counties where one candidate prevailed by 20 points or more. By 2004, 48 percent of voters lived in such counties.

What accounts for the decline of ideologically mixed localities? Bill Bishop, a journalist, and Robert Cushing, a sociologist, who have studied this issue, stress that the age of “white flight” to the suburbs is over. Instead, during the past two decades, many whites have moved to one group of cities and many blacks to another. Meanwhile, young people have deserted rural and older manufacturing areas for cities like Austin and Portland. Places with higher densities of college graduates attract even more, so that the gap between such communities and less-educated areas widens further. Zones of high education, in turn, produce more innovation and enjoy higher incomes, generating communities dominated by upper-middle-class tastes. Lower-educated regions, by contrast, tend to be more family-oriented and more faithful to traditional authority.

Not surprisingly, this demographic sorting correlates with a widening difference in political preferences. What’s more, according to Bishop and Cushing, once a tipping point is reached, majorities tend to become supermajorities. This is consistent with the findings of recent political science and social psychology: individuals in the minority of their group tend to shift their views toward the majority, while members of the majority become more extreme in their views. In such circumstances, discussions within groups often intensify, rather than moderate, the underlying polarization.

Our study shows that this geographical sorting worsens polarization in several ways. When counties become more homogeneous, it becomes harder to use redistricting to create more competitive Congressional districts. (Recent research indicates that gerrymandering accounts for, at the very most, one-third of noncompetitive districts in the House of Representatives.) When states become more homogeneous, presidential campaigns begin by conceding a large number of contests to the opposition, disheartening their supporters in those states and increasing the majority’s electoral advantage. Polarization feeds on itself.

Because politics is a contact sport, hard-hitting partisan competition is unavoidably part of the game. A party system that differentiates sharply between alternatives has virtues, not the least being that it engages more voters, offers clearer choices and enhances accountability. But hyperpartisan politics also do damage, not least to public trust and confidence in government — and many Americans understandably yearn for less polarization. Because the underlying structure of our politics remains so deeply divided, the 2008 election may not requite their wish.

      

In last summer’s congressional debate over the Iran nuclear deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—one of the more hotly debated issues was whether the deal would decrease or increase the likelihood that countries in the Middle East would pursue nuclear weapons.

Supporters of the JCPOA argued that, by removing the risk of a nuclear-armed Iran, it will reduce incentives for countries of the region to acquire nuclear arms. Opponents of the deal—not just in the United States but also abroad, especially Israel—claimed that the JCPOA would increase those incentives because it would legitimize enrichment in Iran, allow Iran to ramp up its nuclear capacity when key restrictions expire after 10 and 15 years, and boost the Iranian economy and the resources Iran could devote to a weapons program.

I strongly believe the JCPOA will significantly reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East (and as my colleague Richard Nephew explains in another post out today, there are things the United States and other powers can do to help reduce that prospect further). But uncertainties about the future of the JCPOA and the region will persist for quite some time—and these uncertainties could motivate regional countries to keep their nuclear options open. They may ask themselves a variety of questions in the years ahead: Will the JCPOA be sustainable over time? Will it unravel over concerns about compliance? Will it withstand challenges by opponents in Tehran and Washington? Will it survive leadership transitions in the United States and Iran? Will Iran ramp up its fissile material production capacities when key restrictions expire? Will it then break out of the JCPOA and seek to build nuclear weapons? Will Iran continue to threaten the security of its neighbors in the years ahead? And will the United States maintain a strong regional military presence and be seen by its partners as a reliable guarantor of their security?

I strongly believe the JCPOA will significantly reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East.

Richard and I studied how these and other questions might affect nuclear decision-making in the Middle East. In particular, we evaluated the likelihood that key states will pursue nuclear weapons, or at least enrichment or reprocessing programs that could give them a latent nuclear weapons capability. We focused on four states often regarded as potential candidates to join the nuclear club: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Turkey.

Saudi Arabia

Of the four, Saudi Arabia is the most highly motivated to pursue nuclear weapons. It sees Iran as an implacable foe that is intent on destabilizing its neighbors, achieving regional hegemony, and upending the Kingdom’s internal order. At the same time, the Saudis have lost much confidence in the U.S. commitment to the security of its regional partners. In part as a result, the new Saudi leadership has taken a more assertive, independent role in regional conflicts, especially in Yemen. But despite their reservations about the United States, the Saudis know they have no choice but to rely heavily on Washington for their security—and they know they would place that vital relationship in jeopardy if they pursued nuclear weapons.

The Saudis clearly have sufficient financial resources to make a run at nuclear weapons. But acquiring the necessary human and physical infrastructure to pursue an indigenous nuclear program would take many years.

Given the Kingdom’s difficulty in developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability, speculation has turned to the possibility that it would receive support from a foreign power, usually Pakistan, which received generous financial support from Saudi Arabia in acquiring its own nuclear arsenal. But while rumors abound about a Pakistani commitment to help Saudi Arabia acquire nuclear weapons, the truth is hard to pin down. If such a Saudi-Pakistani agreement was ever reached, it was probably a vague, unwritten assurance long ago between a Pakistani leader and Saudi king, without operational details or the circumstances in which it would be activated. In any event, the Saudis would find it hard to rely on such an assurance today, when Pakistanis are trying to put the legacy of A.Q. Khan behind them and join the international nonproliferation mainstream. 

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE believes Iran poses a severe threat to regional security and has become more aggressive since the completion of the JCPOA. And like the Saudis, the Emiratis have lost considerable confidence in the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor. But also like the Saudis, the Emiratis are reluctant to put their vital security ties to the United States in jeopardy.

[L]ike the Saudis, the Emiratis have lost considerable confidence in the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor.

Moreover, the Emiratis are heavily invested in their ambitious nuclear energy program—with efforts currently underway, with the help of a South Korean-led consortium, to construct four nuclear power reactors—and they know this project would be dead in the water if they opted for nuclear weapons.

The Emiratis have also been a leading regional supporter of nonproliferation. In their bilateral agreement for civil nuclear cooperation with the United States, they formally renounced the acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing capabilities (the so-called “gold standard”), effectively precluding the pursuit of nuclear weapons. After the JCPOA permitted Iran to retain its enrichment program, the UAE, faced with criticism domestically and from some Arab governments for having given up its nuclear “rights,” said it may reconsider its formal renunciation of enrichment. But subsequently, Emirati officials have made clear that their nuclear energy plans have not changed and that they have no intention to pursue enrichment or reprocessing.

Egypt

Egypt is on everyone’s short list of potential nuclear aspirants—in part because of its former role as leader of the Arab world and its flirtation with nuclear weapons in the Gamal Abdel Nasser years. But while Egypt and Iran have often been regional rivals, Egypt does not view Iran as a direct military threat. Instead, Egypt’s main concerns include extremist activities in the Sinai, the fragmentation of Iraq and Syria, disarray in Libya—and the adverse impact of these developments on Egypt’s internal security. The Egyptians recognize that none of these threats can be addressed by the possession of nuclear weapons.

Although Russia is committed to work with Egypt on its first nuclear power reactor, Cairo’s nuclear energy plans have experienced many false starts before, and there is little reason to believe the outcome will be different this time around, especially given the severe economic challenges the Egyptian government currently faces. Moreover, although Egypt trained a substantial number of nuclear scientists in the 1950s and 1960s, its human nuclear infrastructure atrophied when ambitious nuclear energy plans never materialized.

Turkey

Because of its emergence in the last decade as a rising power, its large and growing scientific and industrial basis, and its ambition to be an influential regional player, Turkey is also on everyone’s short list of potential nuclear-armed states. But Turkey has maintained reasonably good relations with Tehran, even during the height of the sanctions campaign against Iran. Although the two countries have taken opposing sides in the Syria civil war, Turkey, like Egypt, does not regard Iran as a direct military threat. Indeed, Ankara sees instability and terrorism emanating from the Syrian conflict as its main security concerns—and nuclear weapons are not viewed as relevant to dealing with those concerns.

Current tensions with Russia over Turkey’s November 2015 shoot-down of a Russian fighter jet are another source of concern in Ankara. But the best means of addressing that concern is to rely on the security guarantee Turkey enjoys as a member of NATO. While Turkish confidence in NATO has waxed and waned in recent decades, most Turks, especially in the military, believe they can count on NATO in a crisis, and they would be reluctant to put their relationship with NATO at risk by pursuing nuclear weapons.

Former nuclear aspirants

For the sake of completeness, our study also looked at regional countries that once actively pursued nuclear weapons but were forced to abandon their programs: Iraq, Libya, and Syria. But we concluded that, given the civil strife tearing those countries apart, none of them was in a position to pursue a sustained, disciplined nuclear weapons effort.

Bottom line

Our study found that the Iran nuclear deal has significantly reduced incentives for countries of the Middle East to reconsider their nuclear options. At least for the foreseeable future, none of them is likely to pursue nuclear weapons or even latent nuclear weapons capabilities—or to succeed if they do. 

Editors’ Note: Bob Einhorn and Richard Nephew spoke about their new report at a recent Brookings event. You can see the video from the event here.

      

For months, Europe has been dealing with the hectic, day-to-day struggles of managing a massive migrant crisis. While those challenges dominate in the short term, European leaders must also start thinking about medium- to long-term reforms to the European Union’s asylum and migration policies.

European governments have made clear that they want to reform the Common European Asylum System. The European Commission has proposed reforms of its own, which to become laws would need to be approved by both the Council and the European Parliament. But while these proposals are certainly steps in the right direction, they don’t go far enough in addressing structural weaknesses in Europe’s migration and asylum policies.

Positive momentum in a number of key areas

There are several areas where the Commission has already proposed good reforms:

1. The Commission is proposing to recast a directive aimed at standardizing the processing of asylum procedures across Europe into a fully-fledged regulation. This is good news. The persistent variation in the implementation of asylum procedures across the EU highlights this necessity. Unlike directives, which need to be transposed into national legislation, regulations are immediately and simultaneously enforceable across all member states. 
2. A directive specifying the grounds for granting international protection is to be replaced by a more stringent regulation, which is also a good thing. It’s problematic that asylum seekers from the same country of origin enjoy dramatically different acceptance rates across EU member states. Combined, these changes should force member states to comply with international standards on asylum procedures and increase opportunities for migrants to get asylum (particularly in countries that have applied more restrictive criteria).
3. The Eurodac system, which establishes a pan-European fingerprinting database, is now likely to be expanded as well. It would store data on third-country nationals who are not applicants for international protection. But implementation is again a challenge, since Croatia, Greece, Italy, and Malta already struggle to fingerprint new arrivals (something over which infringement proceedings are still ongoing). 
4. To attract highly skilled professionals, the Commission is working to make the EU Blue Card scheme more appealing. While member states will retain the right to set their own annual migrants quota, Blue Card procedures and rights will be harmonized across the EU. The minimum length of an initial contract offer will be lowered to six months, salary thresholds will be reduced, and the Blue Card will be offered to migrants granted asylum. Other measures—including a directive aimed at students and researchers and another facilitating intra-corporate transfers—are also steps in the right direction. 
5. Finally, the Commission has proposed making permanent a pan-European resettlement scheme that was launched during last summer’s migrant crisis. That’s also a good thing. The framework would harmonize resettlement procedures and financially incentivizes member states to favor the European framework over national ones. At the same time, it would allow asylum seekers to move to Europe without risking their lives trying to cross the Mediterranean. However, given that member states will still determine how many people to resettle annually, the long-term impact of the scheme remains to be seen. 

German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere watches as a migrant from Babel in Iraq has his fingerprints taken, during a visit to Patrick-Henry Village refugee centerin Heidelberg, Germany. Photo credit: Reuters/Kai Pfaffenbach.

Far more needed but little appetite among national capitals

There are several policy areas where far more should be done: 

1. There is at least one area where the EU is still planning reforms but of a far more limited nature, and that’s on the current directive on basic standards for housing, healthcare, and employment. In private conversations, EU officials stress that the sheer numbers of migrants make it hard for even the best-performing countries to implement this directive. Put simply, member states do not have the political will to do more than what they are already doing. The EU is therefore, understandably, proposing a more moderate reform: it aims to improve reception conditions throughout the EU without dictating to member states how to do so.
2. Less privileged migrants must be provided with safe avenues to contribute to Europe’s economy. Legislation allowing seasonal workers into the Union for a maximum of between five and nine months within any twelve-month period already goes in this direction. Forums connecting local industry associations and countries of origin to better match labor demand and supply would also be welcome. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cape Verde, Georgia, Morocco, Moldova, and Tunisia—which enjoy mobility partnerships with the EU—would benefit from such an approach. More can be done if the political will amongst European capitals is there.
3. Finally, Europeans must ensure that migrants feel welcome to stay. The EU is aware of the need to adequately integrate third-country nationals, but European capitals are in the driver’s seat when it comes to integration. Directives aimed at facilitating family reunifications, integrating long-term residents, and streamlining administrative processes do what they can in this respect. However, the paths to integration and to welcoming foreigners chosen by European countries are exceedingly different, and for the time being likely to remain so. Because of this and until policymakers put integration at the top of their national agendas, foreign nationals will likely continue to struggle. 

Dublin: Still the elephant in the room

The Dublin regulation, which outlines which member state should be responsible for handling asylum applications, still must be radically revised. This is the elephant in the room and the core of the current asylum refugee framework. Member states should consider the Commission’s proposals for a corrective mechanism in case of migrant surges, a new system for allocating applications across the EU based on a distribution key or, ideally, the centralization of competences to the European Asylum Support Office. 

Informal conversations with top national and European officials suggest that the corrective mechanism is the most likely proposal to be accepted by the member states and therefore adopted. Under such an agreement, Dublin would be maintained, but automatic relocations would start in case of exceptional migrant surges—with hefty fines imposed by the Commission on those member states refusing to play their part. Unfortunately, this is not good enough. Such an approach does not address the underlying structural unfairness and unsustainability of a system that leaves the burden of processing arrivals overwhelmingly on frontline states. 

The current situation exemplifies a significant failure of governance that harms the interests of migrants and member states alike. At present, the Dublin Convention largely ignores the needs of migrants in terms of family reunification, language skills, and cultural integration. Unfortunately, the corrective mechanism for the Dublin Convention does nothing more than provide some relief in case of acute emergencies. Meanwhile, it leaves frontline states to continue facing on their own a crisis that only Europe as a whole could solve. “European leaders” still think and act through national perspectives.

Moving along despite European governments

The European Commission faces both legal and political constraints that limit its scope of action. Whenever it can, it is pushing for a significant overhaul of European asylum and migration policies. However, once more, its initiatives are hampered by the so-called “interests” of the member states. For the time being, we are likely to see some degree of integration in the fields of asylum and migration policies. But because of national vetoes, progress is slow and proposals are often watered down. 

       

       

Editor's Note: This discussion with John Turnbull, director of asset management at the Pike Place Market Preservation and Development Authority, is the first in a series of Q&As with urban practitioners for the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Initiative on Innovation and Placemaking.

Pike Place Market in Seattle is a leading example of how intentional governance can help vibrant urban spaces reach their potential as platforms for innovation. John Turnbull, director of asset management at the Pike Place Market Preservation and Development Authority, sat down for an interview to tell us more about the market and the role of the Preservation and Development Authority (PDA) in its operation.

People outside Seattle tend to know Pike Place as a fish market, but it offers so much more. What makes the market special?

The Pike Place Market is a beloved part of Seattle and really unlike any other place. It’s open 363 days a year and provides space for local farmers, artisan vendors, and small businesses to thrive. It offers a wide range of social services, including a food bank, a health clinic, a senior center, child care and preschool, and assisted living for the elderly. It’s also home to nearly 500 residents who live in a mix of rent-subsidized apartments, market-rate units, and luxury condos as well as a boutique hotel and a bed-and-breakfast—all within the four-block district. Our sense of place depends on the permeability of private/commercial/public spaces, and we make a great effort to ensure that the corresponding mix of activity creates space for personal interactions.

Public support has always been a key component of the market’s success. It was first established in 1907 in response to public demand for fresh produce at fair prices. Seattleites kept the market from the wrecking ball in the 1960s and 1970s and have consistently provided public funds for capital investments—even in the midst of the Great Recession.

The market’s focus on supporting local independent business and one-to-one relationships is unique enough to create both a community sense of identity—Seattle’s “soul”—and an attraction for tourists and visitors. This has been part of the market’s identity for more than a century and has continued under the PDA’s stewardship these last 40 years.

How does the market operate? Who’s in charge?

The market’s been around since the early 1900s but its current governance structure dates back to the 1970s, when the market was almost leveled in the name of urban renewal. A group called Friends of the Market formed to fight the city’s redevelopment plans and in 1971 ran a successful ballot measure campaign to save the market. That ballot measure established the Market Historic District and created the Pike Place Market Historical Commission to make decisions about future construction and capital investments.

Commissioners are appointed by the mayor, half from a list drawn up by community organizations and half from people who live, conduct business, and own property in the market district. The commission was created to keep city government from dismantling the market, so its decisions on use, design, and business management are final, not just advisory. Overturning a commission decision requires a court appeal—and even then, appeals can be based only on questions of fair process and/or failure to follow commission guidelines.

The commission reworked the urban renewal plan to preserve the architectural and social fabric of the market. To support these goals, the city created an independent Preservation and Development Authority to oversee financial operations, development, and day-to-day management of the market. The charter [document download] that established the PDA in 1973 continues to be a guiding force for us—we refer to it all the time. It defines the PDA’s specific powers and responsibilities, which include managing the properties in the Market Historic District, supporting local farmers and small-business owners, and providing social services for low-income residents and others in the market community. Funding for social services and programs is coordinated by the Pike Place Market Foundation, which is separate from the PDA. 

How are decisions made?

The PDA executive director and staff handle day-to-day business operations, but most decisions concerning contracts, tenant relations, budgets, and the like are finalized by the PDA Council, a group of 12 volunteers who are appointed for four-year terms by either the mayor, the Pike Place Market Constituency, or the PDA Council itself (each appoints four councilmembers).

The charter created the PDA as a public steward for the market that’s much more nimble than a governmental agency and much more accountable to the surrounding community. The charter requires unusual transparency, including public meetings to approve any expenditures over $10,000; bond issues; donations made by the PDA; and adoption of the annual budget and capital budget. Meanwhile, new businesses, changes in business ownership, and modifications to buildings require approval from the Market Historic Commission, which has regular biweekly meetings that include time for public comment. Nothing happens behind closed doors.

How does the PDA get its funds and how is that funding deployed?

Over 60 percent of our revenue comes from commercial tenants, with residential rents, daystall rents and fees, parking fees, and incomes from various programs and investments making up the rest. This year we expect total revenues over $18 million, which is more than $1 million more than we projected for 2015.

About three-quarters of budgeted expenses come from tenant services, which include everything from maintenance and security to insurance, utilities, and property management. Another 14 percent goes to PDA management and administration, and the last 10 percent goes toward marketing and other programmatic expenses.

The charter also gives the PDA bonding authority, which we used for the first time this past year. The $26 million in bonds will pay down existing debt and finance the new MarketFront expansion that’s slated to open next year.

The PDA Council operates the market as a business, but it doesn’t make decisions strictly based on profit. We think about return on investment in terms of social benefit to the community. The council looks at a whole host of qualitative measures that aren’t easily captured by quantitative metrics. For instance, how do you measure “local pride”? That’s why we end up referring to our charter so often—and also why we encourage our constituents to use the charter guidelines to measure our results. 

So through the council and the charter, we’ve created a form of community-oriented economics that keeps us accountable to our constituents and lets us reinvest earnings to provide social services and keep residential and commercial rents low.

Lots of places are looking to innovation as a way to drive sustainable economic growth. Do you see Pike Place Market as a place for innovation?

Innovation is an important aspect of what happens in the market, though it looks different from what you might see in other more tech-oriented innovation districts. We offer highly localized small business incubation that’s focused on building a strong local economy. By providing a supportive environment for new businesses and strictly limiting opportunities to new ventures that haven’t yet built a customer base, we’ve created an active laboratory for experimentation.

We have a history of providing a solid base for new businesses—especially ones that are food-related. Starbucks, Sur La Table, and a large number of specialty food businesses got their start in the market. And there are an equally large number of culinary ventures whose lead chefs look to the market as a central source of inspiration and community. We support economic growth by helping new ventures get established—which for many involves developing an international presence—while also attracting customers to spend money in our community.

Seattle has grown by leaps and bounds in recent years, thanks in large part to a vibrant tech sector. How has this affected Pike Place Market?

Over the last few years, we’ve seen some significant changes in shopping patterns. Lots of neighborhoods now have weekly farmers’ markets, and grocery stores have been moving toward a more market-like shopping experience, which has meant fewer people shopping for groceries at the market. We’re also seeing more millennials and a lot more tourists, especially in the summer.

These changes got us thinking about what the market needs to do to stay relevant. Bringing in new businesses and younger entrepreneurs is part of this strategy, as are initiatives like our pop-up Express Markets, which bring fresh produce to different locations throughout the city mid-June through September. This summer we’re starting a weekly evening market at Pike Place so that local customers can shop without having to wade through the weekend tourist crowds.

We’ll always be hyper-local and focused on building a strong community of market patrons and vendors. That emphasis on personal connection sets the market apart—it’s something you just can’t replicate with e-commerce. 

       

       

       

Today, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings hosted Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Alasania for an address on Georgia's vision for Euro-Atlantic integration during a period of increased insecurity in the region. In his remarks, Minister Alasania shared his insights on the upcoming NATO summit and Georgia's approach to enhancing its relations with the West while attempting to normalize relations with Russia to lower tensions still simmering from the war six years ago.

Minister Alasania said that his country's "path toward NATO and European integration is unchanged" and offered next steps on "how we're going to make sure that the credibility of the west, the credibility of NATO as an organization will continue to be relevant to safeguard the values that we all cherish: freedom, democracy, and a Europe whole and free."

"We are acting like a NATO country," he said. Continuing:

We are acting like a European country, because we believe that our future is within Europe. And we regard ourselves as a future member. And this is why we are preparing ourselves institution-wise, in terms of freedom, in terms of democracy, and the military capabilities when ... the historical opportunity will open up to Georgia to join NATO and the EU.

The defense minister added that "We are looking at the future." We:

cannot be dragged back to the confrontation of the early 1990s. And we want to make sure that our policies, our economic policies, our foreign policy, [are] specifically working to make sure that the Georgian people who elected us are now moving closer and closer to the European way of living standards. And this only can be done if the efforts that Georgia is making will be validated, will be appreciated by the NATO and the European countries.

One of the things we are looking forward to is the signing of the association agreement. The next step obviously is the NATO summit. And what the NATO summit will decide is how effectively they can assure the allies, but also the partners, like Georgia.

On Russia, Minister Alasania spoke in both hopeful and realistic terms, saying that:

We are now approaching foreign policy and specifically the issue with Russia with a rather mature approach. We don't have any illusions that Russia will change its behavior or policies toward Georgia's territorial integrity or NATO aspirations. But we do hope the diffusion of tensions, the decrease of the military rhetoric between the two countries, will serve Georgia's interests best.

And it will give us more space to develop ourselves, to develop our relationship with the Abkhazia and South Ossetian areas. This is the cornerstone of our policy actually. Be uncompromising on the territorial integrity. Be uncompromising on NATO aspiration, membership in NATO and the EU. But at the same time be sure that we are not going give a pretext to anybody in the region, specifically to Russians, to attack us politically or otherwise.

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Listen to audio of the event below or on the event's web page to get the full conversation, which was moderated by CUSE Director Fiona Hill.

Audio

• Georgia's Euro-Atlantic Aspirations and Regional Security

       

       

       

       

Editors’ Note: Organized crime actors have increasingly adopted advanced technologies, with law enforcement agencies adapting accordingly. However, the use of ever fancier-technology is only a part of the story. The future lies as much behind as ahead, writes Vanda Felbab-Brown, with criminal groups now using primitive technologies and methods to counter the advanced technologies used by law enforcement. This post was originally published by the Remote Control Project, a project hosted by the Oxford Research Group.

The history of drug trafficking and crime more broadly is a history of adaptation on the part of criminal groups in response to advances in methods and technology on the part of law enforcement agencies, and vice versa. Sometimes, technology trumps crime: The spread of anti-theft devices in cars radically reduced car theft. The adoption of citadels (essentially saferooms) aboard ships, combined with intense naval patrolling, radically reduced the incidence of piracy off Somalia. Often, however, certainly in the case of many transactional crimes such as drug trafficking, law enforcement efforts have tended to weed out the least competent traffickers, and to leave behind the toughest, meanest, leanest, and most adaptable organized crime groups. Increasingly, organized crime actors have adopted advanced technologies, such as semi-submersible and fully-submersible vehicles to carry drugs and other contraband, and cybercrime and virtual currencies for money-laundering. Adaptations in the technology of smuggling by criminal groups in turn lead to further evolution and improvement of methods by law enforcement agencies. However, the use of ever fancier-technology is only a part of the story. The future lies as much behind as ahead (to paraphrase J.P. Wodehouse), with the asymmetric use of primitive technologies and methods by criminal groups to counter the advanced technologies used by law enforcement.

The seduction of SIGINT and HVT

The improvements in signal intelligence (SIGINT) and big-data mining over the past two decades have dramatically increased tactical intelligence flows to law enforcement agencies and military actors, creating a more transparent anti-crime, anti-terrorism, and counterinsurgency battlefield than before. The bonanza of communications intercepts of targeted criminals and militants that SIGINT has come to provide over the past decades in Colombia, Mexico, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other parts of the world has also strongly privileged high-value targeting (HVT) and decapitation policies-i.e., principally targeting the presumed leaders of criminal and militant organizations.

The proliferation of SIGINT and advances in big-data trawling, combined with some highly visible successes of HVT, has come with significant downsides. First, high-value targeting has proven effective only under certain circumstances. In many contexts, such as in Mexico, HVT has been counterproductive, fragmenting criminal groups without reducing their proclivity to violence; in fact, exacerbating violence in the market. Other interdiction patterns and postures, such as middle-level targeting and focused-deterrence, would be more effective policy choices. 

A large part of the problem is that the seductive bonanza of signal intelligence has lead to counterproductive discounting of the need to:

1. develop a strategic understanding of criminal groups’ decisionmaking—knowledge crucial for anticipating the responses of targeted non-state actors to law enforcement actions; Mexico provides a disturbing example;
2. cultivate intelligence human intelligence assets, sorely lacking in Somalia, for example;
3. obtain a broad and comprehensive understanding of the motivations and interests of local populations that interact with criminal and insurgent groups, notably deficient in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; and 
4. establish good relationships with local populations to advance anti-crime and counterinsurgency policies, such as in Colombia where drug eradication policy antagonized local populations from national government and strengthened the bonds between them and rebel groups. 

In other words, the tactical tool, technology—in the form of signal intelligence and big-data mining—has trumped strategic analysis. The correction needed is to bring back strategic intelligence analysis to drive interdiction targeting patterns, instead of letting the seduction of signal data drive intelligence analysis and targeting action. The political effects, anticipated responses by criminal and militant groups, and other outcomes of targeting patterns need be incorporated into the strategic analysis. Questions to be assessed need to include: Can interdiction hope to incapacitate—arrest and kill—all of the enemy or should it seek to shape the enemy? What kind of criminals and militants, such as how fractured or unified, how radicalized or restrained in their ambitions, and how closely aligned with local populations against the state, does interdiction want to produce? 

Dogs fights or drone fights: Remote lethal action by criminals

Criminal groups have used technology not merely to foil law enforcement actions, but also to fight each other and dominate the criminal markets and control local populations. In response to the so-called Pacification (UPP) policy in Rio de Janeiro through which the Rio government has sought to wrestle control over slums from violent criminal gangs, the Comando Vermelho (one of such gangs), for example, claimed to deploy remote-sensor cameras in the Complexo do Alemão slum to identify police collaborators, defined as those who went into newly-established police stations. Whether this specific threat was credible or not, the UPP police units have struggled to establish a good working relationship with the locals in Alemão.

The new radical remote-warfare development on the horizon is for criminal groups to start using drones and other remote platforms not merely to smuggle and distribute contraband, as they are starting to do already, but to deliver lethal action against their enemies—whether government officials, law enforcement forces, or rival crime groups. Eventually, both law enforcement and rival groups will develop defenses against such remote lethal action, perhaps also employing remote platforms: drones to attack the drones. Even so, the proliferation of lethal remote warfare capabilities among criminal groups will undermine deterrence, including deterrence among criminal groups themselves over the division of the criminal market and its turfs. Remotely delivered hits will complicate the attribution problem— i.e., who authorized the lethal action—and hence the certainty of sufficiently painful retaliation against the source and thus a stable equilibrium. More than before, criminal groups will be tempted to instigate wars over the criminal market with the hope that they will emerge as the most powerful criminal actors and able to exercise even greater power over the criminal market—the way the Sinaloa Cartel has attempted to do in Mexico even without the use of fancy technology. Stabilizing a highly violent and contested—dysfunctional—criminal market will become all the more difficult the more remote lethal platforms have proliferated among criminal groups.

Back to the past: The Ewoks of crime and anti-crime

In addition to adopting ever-advancing technologies, criminal and militant groups also adapt to the technological superiority of law enforcement-military actors by the very opposite tactic—resorting asymmetrically to highly primitive deception and smuggling measures. Thus, both militant and criminal groups have adapted to signal intelligence not just by using better encryption, but also by not using cell phones and electronic communications at all, relying on personal couriers, for example, or by flooding the e-waves with a lot of white noise. Similarly, in addition to loading drugs on drones, airplanes, and submersibles, drug trafficking groups are going back to very old-methods such as smuggling by boats, including through the Gulf of Mexico, by human couriers, or through tunnels. 

Conversely, society sometimes adapts to the presence of criminal groups and intense, particularly highly violent, criminality by adopting its own back-to-the-past response—i.e., by standing up militias (which in a developed state should have been supplanted by state law enforcement forces). The rise of anti-crime militias in Mexico, in places such as Michoacán and Guerrero, provides a vivid and rich example of such populist responses and the profound collapse of official law enforcement. The inability of law enforcement there to stop violent criminality—and in fact, the inadvertent exacerbation of violence by criminal groups as a result of HVT—and the distrust of citizens toward highly corrupt law enforcement agencies and state administrations led to the emergence of citizens’ anti-crime militias. The militias originally sought to fight extortion, robberies, theft, kidnapping, and homicides by criminal groups and provide public safety to communities. Rapidly, however, most of the militias resorted to the very same criminal behavior they purported to fight—including extortion, kidnapping, robberies, and homicides. The militias were also appropriated by criminal groups themselves: the criminal groups stood up their own militias claiming to fight crime, where in fact, they were merely fighting the rival criminals. Just as when external or internal military forces resort to using extralegal militias, citizens’ militias fundamentally weaken the rule of law and the authority and legitimacy of the state. They may be the ewoks’ response to the crime empire, but they represent a dangerous and slippery slope to greater breakdown of order.

In short, technology, including remote warfare, and innovations in smuggling and enforcement methods are malleable and can be appropriated by both criminal and militant groups as well as law enforcement actors. Often, however, such adoption and adaptation produces outcomes that neither criminal groups nor law enforcement actors have anticipated and can fully control. The criminal landscape and military battlefields will resemble the Star Wars moon of Endor: drone and remote platforms battling it out with sticks, stones, and ropes.