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NIH invests in rapid innovation and development for COVID-19 testing

(University of Massachusetts Lowell) UMass Medical School and UMass Lowell will perform a key role in a new National Institutes of Health initiative aimed at speeding innovation, development and commercialization of COVID-19 testing technologies via their Center for Advancing Point of Care Technologies collaboration.




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Genetic tests being done on dog

(To watch the whole press briefing with sign language interpretation, click here.)

 

The Agriculture, Fisheries & Conservation Department today said genetic sequencing tests are being carried out on the pet dog of a confirmed COVID-19 patient which could reveal if the virus has mutated or not.

 

The department's Assistant Director (Inspection & Quarantine) Dr Thomas Sit told a press briefing this afternoon that the coronavirus is what is known as an RNA virus which eventually mutates.

 

“That is why the University of Hong Kong School of Public Health needs to do a genetic analysis to compare this dog’s genetic sequencing to the virus isolated from the patient so that they can compare. So if it is totally identical, then there is no mutation. The testing is still ongoing.”

 

Dr Sit reiterated that international experts agreed that the dog has a low level of infection, despite its blood tests not being ready yet.

 

“From the first sample to our last sample tested, it has already (been) six days. The dog’s nasal or oral mechanism, their secretion they should have - if contaminated - they should have a way to clean the virus, it would not stay for that long if it was just a contamination.

 

“I think it will take at least five or seven days for the blood results because it is not an easy test, it is not a quick test. We need to grow a virus and then neutralise the serum, so it takes some time.”

 

He added that it was too early to say whether animal-to-animal transmission was a possibility.

 

“At this stage, we do not have enough data to have a 100% answer as to whether it is infectious to other dogs or not. But if the dog’s owner is positive, it is better to take precautionary measures to prevent onward transmission.”

 

Dr Sit also advised dog owners to wash their hands, wear gloves and try to stop their dogs from licking their surroundings to prevent the virus from spreading further.




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Dog tests positive for COVID-19

The Agriculture, Fisheries & Conservation Department (AFCD) today said a pet dog has tested positive for the COVID-19 virus. 

The case involves a German Shepherd dog whose owners live in Pok Fu Lam. This follows an earlier case in which a 17-year-old Pomeranian dog tested weak positive during repeated tests for the virus.

  

When the German Shepherd's owner was confirmed with COVID-19, it was sent for quarantine with another mixed breed dog from the same residence to the animal keeping facility at the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge's Hong Kong Port yesterday.

 

No positive results were obtained from the mixed breed dog and neither dog has shown any signs of the disease.

 

The department will continue to closely monitor both dogs and conduct repeated tests on them.

 

It strongly advises that mammalian pet animals including dogs and cats from households with people confirmed as infected with COVID-19, or close contacts of COVID-19 infected people, should be put under quarantine in AFCD facilities.

 

The department emphasised that there is currently no evidence pet animals can be a source of COVID-19 for humans or that this virus can cause the disease in dogs.

 

Pet owners are reminded to maintain good hygiene practices and under no circumstances should they abandon their pets.




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Quality Over Quantity: In A Financial Crisis, Innovation Is A Survival of the Fittest

Wednesday, May 6, 2020 - 11:45

NEW YORK – Innovation is at an all-time high, but the economic damage from the COVID-19 outbreak has the potential to stifle inventions and patents. But new research shows that financial crises are both destructive and creative forces for innovation.




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NIH clinical trial tests remdesivir plus anti-inflammatory drug baricitinib for COVID-19

(NIH/National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases) A randomized, controlled clinical trial evaluating the safety and efficacy of a treatment regimen of the investigational antiviral remdesivir plus the anti-inflammatory drug baricitinib for COVID-19 has begun. The trial is now enrolling hospitalized adults with COVID-19 in the United States. The trial is expected to open at approximately 100 US and international sites. Investigators currently anticipate enrolling more than 1,000 participants. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases is sponsoring the trial.




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NJIT physics team provides novel swab design, free of charge, to augment COVID-19 testing

(New Jersey Institute of Technology) A team of NJIT physicists has developed a novel test swab that can be 3D printed using inexpensive, widely available materials and speedily assembled in a range of fabrication settings. To augment the nation's testing capabilities, the inventors are making the swab's design publicly available, free of licensing fees, during the COVID-19 emergency.




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Ukraine must drain corruption swamp, Saakashvili says in latest comeback

Mikheil Saakashvili, the former president of Georgia, vowed on Friday to help his new boss, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, clean out a political "swamp" of oligarchs' interests that he said were preventing Ukraine prospering. Twice president of Georgia, Saakashvili had a brief but stormy spell in Ukrainian politics five years ago under Zelenskiy's predecessor Petro Poroshenko in which he once clambered onto a roof to avoid law enforcement.





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FDA approves first at-home saliva collection test for coronavirus

(Rutgers University) Rutgers' RUCDR Infinite Biologics received an amended emergency use authorization from the FDA late Thursday for the first SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus test that will allow people to collect their own saliva at home and send to a lab for results. The decision follows the FDA's recent emergency approval to RUCDR Infinite Biologics for the first saliva-based test, which involves health care workers collecting saliva from individuals at testing sites.




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Rapid coronavirus test receives major funding

A coronavirus test – which aims to deliver rapid results – has received major funding.




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The testis-specific LINC component SUN3 is essential for sperm head shaping during mouse spermiogenesis [Cell Biology]

Sperm head shaping is a key event in spermiogenesis and is tightly controlled via the acrosome–manchette network. Linker of nucleoskeleton and cytoskeleton (LINC) complexes consist of Sad1 and UNC84 domain–containing (SUN) and Klarsicht/ANC-1/Syne-1 homology (KASH) domain proteins and form conserved nuclear envelope bridges implicated in transducing mechanical forces from the manchette to sculpt sperm nuclei into a hook-like shape. However, the role of LINC complexes in sperm head shaping is still poorly understood. Here we assessed the role of SUN3, a testis-specific LINC component harboring a conserved SUN domain, in spermiogenesis. We show that CRISPR/Cas9-generated Sun3 knockout male mice are infertile, displaying drastically reduced sperm counts and a globozoospermia-like phenotype, including a missing, mislocalized, or fragmented acrosome, as well as multiple defects in sperm flagella. Further examination revealed that the sperm head abnormalities are apparent at step 9 and that the sperm nuclei fail to elongate because of the absence of manchette microtubules and perinuclear rings. These observations indicate that Sun3 deletion likely impairs the ability of the LINC complex to transduce the cytoskeletal force to the nuclear envelope, required for sperm head elongation. We also found that SUN3 interacts with SUN4 in mouse testes and that the level of SUN4 proteins is drastically reduced in Sun3-null mice. Altogether, our results indicate that SUN3 is essential for sperm head shaping and male fertility, providing molecular clues regarding the underlying pathology of the globozoospermia-like phenotype.




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Can Protest Movements in the MENA Region Turn COVID-19 Into an Opportunity for Change?

29 April 2020

Dr Georges Fahmi

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme
The COVID-19 pandemic will not in itself result in political change in the MENA region, that depends on the ability of both governments and protest movements to capitalize on this moment. After all, crises do not change the world - people do.

2020-04-28-covid-19-protest-movement-mena.jpg

An aerial view shows the Lebanese capital Beirut's Martyrs Square that was until recent months the gathering place of anti-government demonstrators, almost deserted during the novel coronavirus crisis, on 26 March 2020. Photo by -/AFP via Getty Images.

COVID-19 has offered regimes in the region the opportunity to end popular protest. The squares of Algiers, Baghdad, and Beirut – all packed with protesters over the past few months – are now empty due to the pandemic, and political gatherings have also been suspended. In Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon, COVID-19 has achieved what snipers, pro-regime propaganda, and even the economic crisis, could not.

Moreover, political regimes have taken advantage of the crisis to expand their control over the political sphere by arresting their opponents, such as in Algeria where the authorities have cracked down on a number of active voices of the Hirak movement. Similarly, in Lebanon, security forces have used the pandemic as an excuse to crush sit-ins held in Martyr’s Square in Beirut and Nour Square in Tripoli.

However, despite the challenges that the pandemic has brought, it also offers opportunities for protest movements in the region. While the crisis has put an end to popular mobilization in the streets, it has  created new forms of activism in the shape of solidarity initiatives to help those affected by its consequences.

In Iraq, for example, protest groups have directed their work towards awareness-raising and sharing essential food to help mitigate the problem of food shortages and rising prices across the country. In Algeria, Hirak activists have run online campaigns to raise awareness about the virus and have encouraged people to stay at home. Others have been cleaning and disinfecting public spaces. These initiatives increase the legitimacy of the protest movement, and if coupled with political messages, could offer these movements an important chance to expand their base of popular support.

Exposes economic vulnerability

Economic grievances, corruption and poor provision of public services have been among the main concerns of this recent wave of protests. This pandemic only further exposes the levels of economic vulnerability in the region. COVID-19 is laying bare the socio-economic inequalities in MENA countries; this is particularly evident in the numbers of people engaged in the informal economy with no access to social security, including health insurance and pensions.

Informal employment, approximately calculated by the share of the labour force not contributing to social security, is estimated to amount to 65.5% of total employment in Lebanon, 64.4% in Iraq, and 63.3% in Algeria. The crisis has underscored the vulnerability of this large percentage of the labour force who have been unable to afford the economic repercussions of following state orders to stay at home.

The situation has also called attention to the vital need for efficient public services and healthcare systems. According to the fifth wave of the Arab Barometer, 74.4% of people in Lebanon are dissatisfied with their country’s healthcare services, as are 67.8% of people in Algeria and 66.5% in Iraq.

Meanwhile, 66.2% of people in Lebanon believe it is necessary to pay a bribe in order to receive better healthcare, as do 56.2% of people in Iraq and 55.9% in Algeria. The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the need for more government investment in public healthcare systems to render them more efficient and less corrupt, strengthening the protesters’ case for the need for radical socio-economic reforms.

On the geopolitical level, the crisis puts into question the stability-focused approach of Western powers towards the region. For years, Western powers have directed their aid towards security forces in the interests of combating terrorism but COVID-19 has proved itself to be a much more lethal challenge to both the region and the West.

Facing this new challenge requires international actors to reconsider their approach to include supporting health and education initiatives, as well as freedom of expression and transparency. As argued by Western policymakers themselves, it was China’s lack of transparency and slow response that enabled the proliferation of the virus, when it could have been contained in Wuhan back in December 2019.

This crisis therefore offers regional protest movements the opportunity to capitalize on this moment and push back against the policies of Western powers that have invested in regional stability only to the extent of combating Islamic jihad. 

But crises do not change the world, people do. The COVID-19 pandemic will not in itself result in political change in the MENA region. Rather, it brings opportunities and risks that, when exploited, will allow political actors to advance their own agendas. While the crisis has put an end to popular mobilization and allowed regimes to tighten their grip over the political sphere, behind these challenges lie real opportunities for protest movements.

The current situation represents a possibility for them to expand their popular base through solidarity initiatives and has exposed more widely the importance of addressing socio-economic inequalities. Finally, it offers the chance to challenge the stability-focused approach of Western powers towards the region which until now has predominantly focused on combating terrorism.




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Evaluation of dosimetry, quantitative methods and test-retest variability of 18F-PI-2620 PET for the assessment of tau deposits in the human brain

18F-PI-2620 is a next generation tau positron emission tomography (PET)-tracer that has demonstrated ability to image the spatial distribution of suspected tau pathology. The objective of this study was to assess the tracer biodistribution, dosimetry and quantitative methods of 18F-PI-2620 in the human brain. Full kinetic modelling approaches to quantify tau load were investigated. Non-invasive kinetic modeling approaches and semi-quantitative methods were evaluated against the full tracer kinetics. Finally, the reproducibility of PET measurements from test and retest scans was assessed. Methods: Three healthy controls (HC) and 4 Alzheimer disease (AD) subjects underwent two dynamic PET scans including arterial sampling. Distribution volume ratio (DVR) was estimated using full tracer kinetics (2 Tissue Compartment (2TC) models, Logan Graphical Analysis (LGA)) and non-invasive kinetic models (Non-Invasive Logan Graphical Analysis (NI-LGA) and the multilinear reference tissue model (MRTM2)). Standardized uptake value ratio (SUVR) was determined at different imaging windows after injection. Correlation between DVR and SUVR, effect size (Cohen’s d) and test-retest variability (TRV) were evaluated. Additionally, 6 HC subjects received one tracer administration and underwent whole-body PET for dosimetry calculation. Organ doses and the whole-body effective dose were calculated using OLINDA 2.0. Results: Strong correlation was found across different kinetic models (R2 >0.97) and between DVR(2TC) and SUVRs between 30 to 90 min with R2>0.95. Secular equilibrium was reached around 40 min post injection (p.i.) in most regions and subjects. The TRV and effect size for the SUVR across different regions was similar at 30-60 min (TRV=3.8%, d=3.80), 45-75 min (TRV=4.3%, d=3.77) and 60-90 min (TRV=4.9%, d=3.73) and increased at later time points. Elimination was via the hepatobiliary and urinary system. The whole-body effective dose was determined to be 33.3±2.1 μSv/MBq for an adult female and 33.1±1.4 μSv/MBq for an adult male with a 1.5 hour urinary bladder voiding interval. Conclusion: 18F-PI-2620 exhibits fast kinetics, suitable dosimetry and low TRV. DVR measured using the 2TC model with arterial sampling correlated strongly with DVR measured by NI-LGA, MRTM2 and SUVR. SUVR can be used for 18F-PI-2620 PET quantification of tau deposits avoiding arterial blood sampling. Static 18F-PI-2620 PET scans between 45-75min p.i. provide excellent quantification accuracy, large effect size and low TRV.




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Quantitative test-retest measurement of 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC (PSMA-11) in tumor and normal tissue

The PET radiotracer 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC (68Ga-PSMA-11) shows potential as an imaging biomarker for recurrent and metastatic prostate cancer. The purpose of this study was to determine repeatability of 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC in a test-retest trial in subjects with metastatic prostate adenocarcinoma. Methods: Subjects with metastatic prostate cancer underwent two PET/CT scans with 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC within 14 days (mean 6 ± 4 d). Lesions in bone, nodes, prostate/bed, and visceral organs as well as representative normal tissues (salivary glands and spleen) were segmented separately by two readers. Absolute and percent differences in SUVmax and SUVmean were calculated for all test-retest regions. Repeatability was assessed using percentage difference, within-subject coefficient of variation (wCV), repeatability coefficient (RC), and Bland-Altman analysis. Results: 18 subjects were evaluated, 16 of which demonstrated local or metastatic disease on 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC PET/CT. A total of 136 lesions were segmented in bone (n = 99), nodes (n = 27), prostate/bed (n = 7), and viscera (n = 3). The wCV for SUVmax was 11.7% for bone lesions and 13.7% for nodes. The RC was ±32.5% SUVmax for bone lesions and ±37.9% SUVmax for nodal lesions, meaning 95% of the normal variability between two measurements will be within these numbers, so larger differences are likely attributable to true biological changes in tumor rather than normal physiologic or measurement variability. wCV in the salivary glands and spleen was 8.9% and 10.7% SUVmean, respectively. Conclusion: Repeatability measurements for PET/CT test-retest with 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC show a wCV 12-14% SUVmax and RC ±33-38% SUVmax in bone and nodal lesions. These estimates are an important aspect of 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC as a quantitative imaging biomarker. These estimates are similar to those reported for 18F-FDG, suggesting that 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC PET/CT may be useful in monitoring response to therapy.




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The role of FAPI-PET/CT for patients with malignancies of the lower gastrointestinal tract - first clinical experience

For oncological management or radiotherapy planning, reliable staging tools are essential. Recent development of quinoline-based ligands targeting cancer-associated fibroblasts demonstrated promising preclinical and clinical results. The current study aimed to evaluate the role of fibroblast activation protein inhibitors (FAPI)-positron-emission tomography (PET)/computed tomography (CT) for primary malignancies located within the lower gastrointestinal tract (LGT) as a very first clinical analysis. Methods: 68Ga-FAPI-PET/CT was performed in a cohort of 22 patients with LGT including 15 patients with metastatic disease, 1 patient with suspected local relapse and 6 treatment-naïve patients. 68Ga-FAPI-04 and 68Ga-FAPI-46 uptake was quantified by standardized uptake values (SUV)max and (SUV)mean. After comparison with standard imaging, changes in tumor stage/ localization and (radio)oncological management were recorded. Results: The highest uptake of FAPI tracer was observed in liver metastases and anal cancer with a SUVmax of 9.1 and 13.9, respectively. Due to a low background activity in normal tissue, there was a high tumor-to-background ratio of more than 3 in most lesions. In treatment-naïve patients, TNM was changed in 50% while for patients with metastases new findings occurred in 47%. In total, FAPI-imaging caused a high, medium and low change of (radio)oncological management in 19%, 33% and 29%, respectively. For almost every patient undergoing irradiation, target volume delineation was improved by 68Ga-FAPI-PET/CT. Conclusion: The present study demonstrated that both primary and metastatic LGT were reliably detected by 68Ga-FAPI-PET/CT leading to relevant changes in TNM status and (radio)oncological management. 68Ga-FAPI-PET/CT seems to be a highly promising imaging agent for the diagnosis and management of LGT, potentially opening new applications for tumor (re-)staging.




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Kinetic modeling and test-retest reproducibility of 11C-EKAP and 11C-FEKAP, novel agonist radiotracers for PET imaging of the kappa opioid receptor in humans

The kappa opioid receptor (KOR) is implicated in various neuropsychiatric disorders. We previously evaluated an agonist tracer, 11C-GR103545, for PET imaging of KOR in humans. Although 11C-GR103545 showed high brain uptake, good binding specificity, and selectivity to KOR, it displayed slow kinetics and relatively large test-retest variability (TRV) of distribution volume (VT) estimates (15%). Therefore we set out to develop two novel KOR agonist radiotracers, 11C-EKAP and 11C-FEKAP, and in nonhuman primates, both tracers exhibited faster kinetics and comparable binding parameters to 11C-GR103545. The aim of this study was to assess their kinetic and binding properties in humans. Methods: Six healthy subjects underwent 120-min test-retest PET scans with both 11C-EKAP and 11C-FEKAP. Metabolite-corrected arterial input functions were measured. Regional time-activity curves (TACs) were generated for 14 regions of interest. One- and two-tissue compartment models (1TC, 2TC) and the multilinear analysis-1 (MA1) method were applied to the regional TACs to calculate VT. Time-stability of VT values and test-retest reproducibility were evaluated. Levels of specific binding, as measured by the non-displaceable binding potential (BPND) for the three tracers (11C-EKAP, 11C-FEKAP and 11C-GR103545), were compared using a graphical method. Results: For both tracers, regional TACs were fitted well with the 2TC model and MA1 method (t*=20min), but not with the 1TC model. Given unreliably estimated parameters in several fits with the 2TC model and a good match between VT values from MA1 and 2TC, MA1 was chosen as the appropriate model for both tracers. Mean MA1 VT values were highest for 11C-GR103545, followed by 11C-EKAP, then 11C-FEKAP. Minimum scan time for stable VT measurement was 90 and 110min for 11C-EKAP and 11C-FEKAP, respectively, compared with 140min for 11C-GR103545. The mean absolute TRV in MA1 VT estimates was 7% and 18% for 11C-EKAP and 11C-FEKAP, respectively. BPND levels were similar for 11C-FEKAP and 11C-GR103545, but ~25% lower for 11C-EKAP. Conclusion: The two novel KOR agonist tracers showed faster tissue kinetics than 11C-GR103545. Even with slightly lower BPND, 11C-EKAP is judged to be a better tracer for imaging and quantification of KOR in humans, based on the shorter minimum scan time and excellent test-retest.




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Côte d'Ivoire’s 2020 Elections: Contestation and Change

Invitation Only Research Event

8 November 2019 - 12:00pm to 1:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Hon Guillaume Soro, Chairman, Rassemblement Pour la Côte d’Ivoire (RACI)
Chair: Paul Melly, Consulting Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House

As Côte d'Ivoire enters a critical final 12 months before presidential elections scheduled for October 2020, the political atmosphere remains highly uncertain, stoked by the fracturing of the RDR-PDCI alliance and the potential candidacy of a range of high-profile political names. While President Ouattara’s two terms in office have ushered in an improved business environment, with annual economic growth averaging 8 per cent since 2012, political instability over the next 12 months may pose a threat to recent progress and raises wider security concerns in light of the major post-election violence witnessed a decade previously.

At this event, Ivorian presidential contender, and former prime minister and parliamentary speaker, Guillaume Soro, will assess the prime-election context in Côte d'Ivoire and the policies required to deliver inclusive growth and future stability for its citizens.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Sahar Eljack

Programme Administrator, Africa Programme
+ 44 (0) 20 7314 3660




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Test live article

This is a test




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Slack's secret sauce: how it became the fastest growing business app ever

Slack has launched its Asia-Pacific headquarters in Melbourne. We caught up with Ali Rayl, head of customer experience.




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Latest ATO online system failure hits at peak tax time

Outages have hit the Tax Office's IT system on Wednesday.




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Can Protest Movements in the MENA Region Turn COVID-19 Into an Opportunity for Change?

29 April 2020

Dr Georges Fahmi

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme
The COVID-19 pandemic will not in itself result in political change in the MENA region, that depends on the ability of both governments and protest movements to capitalize on this moment. After all, crises do not change the world - people do.

2020-04-28-covid-19-protest-movement-mena.jpg

An aerial view shows the Lebanese capital Beirut's Martyrs Square that was until recent months the gathering place of anti-government demonstrators, almost deserted during the novel coronavirus crisis, on 26 March 2020. Photo by -/AFP via Getty Images.

COVID-19 has offered regimes in the region the opportunity to end popular protest. The squares of Algiers, Baghdad, and Beirut – all packed with protesters over the past few months – are now empty due to the pandemic, and political gatherings have also been suspended. In Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon, COVID-19 has achieved what snipers, pro-regime propaganda, and even the economic crisis, could not.

Moreover, political regimes have taken advantage of the crisis to expand their control over the political sphere by arresting their opponents, such as in Algeria where the authorities have cracked down on a number of active voices of the Hirak movement. Similarly, in Lebanon, security forces have used the pandemic as an excuse to crush sit-ins held in Martyr’s Square in Beirut and Nour Square in Tripoli.

However, despite the challenges that the pandemic has brought, it also offers opportunities for protest movements in the region. While the crisis has put an end to popular mobilization in the streets, it has  created new forms of activism in the shape of solidarity initiatives to help those affected by its consequences.

In Iraq, for example, protest groups have directed their work towards awareness-raising and sharing essential food to help mitigate the problem of food shortages and rising prices across the country. In Algeria, Hirak activists have run online campaigns to raise awareness about the virus and have encouraged people to stay at home. Others have been cleaning and disinfecting public spaces. These initiatives increase the legitimacy of the protest movement, and if coupled with political messages, could offer these movements an important chance to expand their base of popular support.

Exposes economic vulnerability

Economic grievances, corruption and poor provision of public services have been among the main concerns of this recent wave of protests. This pandemic only further exposes the levels of economic vulnerability in the region. COVID-19 is laying bare the socio-economic inequalities in MENA countries; this is particularly evident in the numbers of people engaged in the informal economy with no access to social security, including health insurance and pensions.

Informal employment, approximately calculated by the share of the labour force not contributing to social security, is estimated to amount to 65.5% of total employment in Lebanon, 64.4% in Iraq, and 63.3% in Algeria. The crisis has underscored the vulnerability of this large percentage of the labour force who have been unable to afford the economic repercussions of following state orders to stay at home.

The situation has also called attention to the vital need for efficient public services and healthcare systems. According to the fifth wave of the Arab Barometer, 74.4% of people in Lebanon are dissatisfied with their country’s healthcare services, as are 67.8% of people in Algeria and 66.5% in Iraq.

Meanwhile, 66.2% of people in Lebanon believe it is necessary to pay a bribe in order to receive better healthcare, as do 56.2% of people in Iraq and 55.9% in Algeria. The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the need for more government investment in public healthcare systems to render them more efficient and less corrupt, strengthening the protesters’ case for the need for radical socio-economic reforms.

On the geopolitical level, the crisis puts into question the stability-focused approach of Western powers towards the region. For years, Western powers have directed their aid towards security forces in the interests of combating terrorism but COVID-19 has proved itself to be a much more lethal challenge to both the region and the West.

Facing this new challenge requires international actors to reconsider their approach to include supporting health and education initiatives, as well as freedom of expression and transparency. As argued by Western policymakers themselves, it was China’s lack of transparency and slow response that enabled the proliferation of the virus, when it could have been contained in Wuhan back in December 2019.

This crisis therefore offers regional protest movements the opportunity to capitalize on this moment and push back against the policies of Western powers that have invested in regional stability only to the extent of combating Islamic jihad. 

But crises do not change the world, people do. The COVID-19 pandemic will not in itself result in political change in the MENA region. Rather, it brings opportunities and risks that, when exploited, will allow political actors to advance their own agendas. While the crisis has put an end to popular mobilization and allowed regimes to tighten their grip over the political sphere, behind these challenges lie real opportunities for protest movements.

The current situation represents a possibility for them to expand their popular base through solidarity initiatives and has exposed more widely the importance of addressing socio-economic inequalities. Finally, it offers the chance to challenge the stability-focused approach of Western powers towards the region which until now has predominantly focused on combating terrorism.




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Multiple hypothesis testing in proteomics: A strategy for experimental work [Invited]

In quantitative proteomics work, the differences in expression of many separate proteins are routinely examined to test for significant differences between treatments. This leads to the multiple hypothesis testing problem: when many separate tests are performed many will be significant by chance and be false positive results. Statistical methods such as the false discovery rate (FDR) method that deal with this problem have been disseminated for more than one decade. However a survey of proteomics journals shows that such tests are not widely implemented in one commonly used technique, quantitative proteomics using two-dimensional electrophoresis (2-DE). We outline a selection of multiple hypothesis testing methods, including some that are well known and some lesser known, and present a simple strategy for their use by the experimental scientist in quantitative proteomics work generally. The strategy focuses on the desirability of simultaneous use of several different methods, the choice and emphasis dependent on research priorities and the results in hand. This approach is demonstrated using case scenarios with experimental and simulated model data.




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The multilevel identity politics of the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Galia Press-Barnathan and Naama Lutz

This article uses the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) that took place in Tel Aviv to explore how cultural mega-events serve both as political arenas and as tools for identity construction, negotiation and contestation. These processes of identity politics are all conducted across national–subnational–international–transnational levels. The hosting of mega-events fleshes out these multiple processes in a very strong manner. We first discuss the politics of hosting mega-events in general. We then examine the identity politics associated more specifically with the Eurovision Song Contest, before examining in depth the complex forms of identity politics emerging around the competition following the 2018 Israeli victory. We suggest that it is important to study together the multiple processes—domestic, international and transnational—of identity politics that take place around the competition, as they interact with each other. Consequently, we follow the various stakeholders involved at these different levels and their interactions. We examine the internal identity negotiation process in Israel surrounding the event, the critical actors debating how to use the stage to challenge the liberal, western, ‘normal’ identity Israel hoped to project in the contest and how other stakeholders (participating states, national broadcasting agencies, participating artists) reacted to them, and finally we examine the behaviour of the institution in charge, the European Broadcasting Union, and national governments. We contribute to the study of mega-events as fields of contestation, to the understanding of the complex, multilevel nature of national identity construction, negotiation and contestation in the current era, and more broadly to the role that popular culture plays in this context.




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Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition

Invitation Only Research Event

28 November 2019 - 1:30pm to 3:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Annette Bohr, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Kassymkhan Kapparov, Founder, Economist.kz
Joanna Lillis, Reporter, The Guardian, The Economist and The Independent
Kate Mallinson, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Dossym Satpayev, Director, Kazakhstan Risk Assessment Group; Member of the Presidium, Kazakhstan Council on International Relations
Chair: James Nixey, Head, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

At face value at least, Central Asia’s wealthiest state has embarked on a bold experiment following the March 2019 decision by its founding father and long-standing ruler, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to resign from the presidency and initiate a managed political succession. A generational transition of this nature, untried in other former Soviet republics, brings with it high stakes.
 
As well as seeking to secure his own legacy, having dominated the country since before independence in 1991, Nazarbayev wants to ensure Kazakhstan does not depart from the course he has set while safeguarding Kazakhstan’s stability in the context of multiple and evolving domestic and international challenges. But this is easier said than done. Is Kazakhstan ready for the challenges of the future?
 
This event marks the launch of Chatham House’s major report Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition.

Department/project

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition

27 November 2019

A partial handover of political power through an orchestrated transition takes Kazakhstan into uncharted territory. Will it be able to pursue modernization and reform, and break from its authoritarian past?

Annette Bohr

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Dr Nigel Gould-Davies

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

Kate Mallinson

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

James Nixey

Director, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Birgit Brauer

Analyst, Writer and Journalist Covering Central Asia

Nargis Kassenova

Senior Fellow, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University

Joanna Lillis

Kazakhstan-Based Journalist Reporting on Central Asia

Dosym Satpayev

Independent Political Analyst and the Director of the Kazakhstan Risks Assessment Group

Kazakhstan is at a turning point in its history. At face value, at least, Central Asia’s wealthiest state has embarked on a bold experiment following the March 2019 decision by its founding father and long-standing ruler, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to resign from the presidency and initiate a managed political succession. A generational transition of this nature, untried in other former Soviet republics, brings with it high stakes. As well as looking to secure his own legacy, having dominated the country since before independence in 1991, Nazarbayev seeks to ensure Kazakhstan does not depart from the course he has set, while safeguarding regime stability in the context of multiple and evolving domestic and international challenges. This is easier said than done.

The uncertainty around this project is substantial, especially considering a ‘rowback’ decree just seven months after Nazarbayev’s resignation, limiting the powers of his anointed successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. How long can Tokayev credibly remain president considering such a transparent undermining of his authority? Is Nazarbayev, in fact, grooming his daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, another relative or a power player from outside the family for the leadership in the longer term? Will the ‘Kazakh tandem’ of Nazarbayev and Tokayev function effectively, or will tensions and conflicts arise between them as many claim is happening already? How will the leadership cope with the protest mood now manifest on the streets of Kazakhstan, and address the political and socio-economic grievances fuelling this discontent? How might the political transition play out if Nazarbayev were to suddenly exit the political scene altogether?And what is the long-term transition plan for the time when Nazarbayev has departed, and how effective will it be?

As Kazakhstan enters uncharted territory, the purpose of this report is twofold. First, to make the case for the West to devote more attention to Kazakhstan. The country’s relative importance in Central Asia, and as the constant focus of intense attention from China and Russia, suggests that the West is wrong to direct so little time and diplomatic effort and so few resources towards it. This is not so much a miscalculation (that would be to assume there had been a calculation in the first place) as a misstep through neglect, presupposing that the future will resemble the present – with Kazakhstan remaining stable internally, relatively inconsequential geopolitically but nevertheless a friendly ally to the West. In fact, the country’s trajectory over the next few years is of potentially strategic import. This is because even its political semi-transition presents the West with a rare opportunity to push back against the global rise of authoritarianism, in a state that is open to rational argument and economic logic.

The second function of the report is to serve as a well-intentioned message to the leadership of Kazakhstan. The research undertaken by the report’s eight authors shows that Kazakhstan is at risk of failing to achieve the goals its leadership has set for the country. As significant as it has been, the partial stepping aside of Nazarbayev by no means guarantees the modernization and renewal that he and his successor have promised. Far deeper political, economic and social reforms will be needed if Kazakhstan is to meet the growing challenges to its stability, prosperity and development. Street protests since Nazarbayev’s resignation have demonstrated a level of popular disaffection far higher than the authorities acknowledge. The leadership needs to bridge the disconnect between the rulers and the ruled and start listening to its people.

To avoid slipping into decline, and to resist external pressures and geopolitical overtures that could diminish the sovereignty that its leadership is so determined to safeguard, Kazakhstan needs new faces – innovators and reformers – throughout every level of the administration, as well as new ideas. This report is intended to help with the ‘ideas’ part of that proposition. It also includes a series of recommendations for Western governments and institutions and for the Kazakhstan government. 




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The testis-specific LINC component SUN3 is essential for sperm head shaping during mouse spermiogenesis [Cell Biology]

Sperm head shaping is a key event in spermiogenesis and is tightly controlled via the acrosome–manchette network. Linker of nucleoskeleton and cytoskeleton (LINC) complexes consist of Sad1 and UNC84 domain–containing (SUN) and Klarsicht/ANC-1/Syne-1 homology (KASH) domain proteins and form conserved nuclear envelope bridges implicated in transducing mechanical forces from the manchette to sculpt sperm nuclei into a hook-like shape. However, the role of LINC complexes in sperm head shaping is still poorly understood. Here we assessed the role of SUN3, a testis-specific LINC component harboring a conserved SUN domain, in spermiogenesis. We show that CRISPR/Cas9-generated Sun3 knockout male mice are infertile, displaying drastically reduced sperm counts and a globozoospermia-like phenotype, including a missing, mislocalized, or fragmented acrosome, as well as multiple defects in sperm flagella. Further examination revealed that the sperm head abnormalities are apparent at step 9 and that the sperm nuclei fail to elongate because of the absence of manchette microtubules and perinuclear rings. These observations indicate that Sun3 deletion likely impairs the ability of the LINC complex to transduce the cytoskeletal force to the nuclear envelope, required for sperm head elongation. We also found that SUN3 interacts with SUN4 in mouse testes and that the level of SUN4 proteins is drastically reduced in Sun3-null mice. Altogether, our results indicate that SUN3 is essential for sperm head shaping and male fertility, providing molecular clues regarding the underlying pathology of the globozoospermia-like phenotype.




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'The Truth is, Chile is Unequal': What's Behind Chile's Protests

18 December 2019

Dr Christopher Sabatini

Senior Research Fellow for Latin America, US and the Americas Programme

Lyndsey Jefferson

Digital Editor, Communications and Publishing Department
As part of a series on global protests, Dr Christopher Sabatini tells Lyndsey Jefferson why Chileans are taking to the streets.

GettyImages-1177498531.jpg

A demonstrator waves a Chilean flag during a protest in Santiago on 21 October 2019. Photo: Getty Images.

Why are these protests happening now?

The truth is, Chile is unequal, even though it actually reduced poverty from 1989, the time of the democratic transition, until today, from 40% to 16%.

There are a number of reasons for the protests. One is the most proximate cause, which is the increase in the subway fares, but that really doesn’t explain the underlying tensions.

One of those tensions is despite reductions in poverty, social mobility remains a large problem in Chile. It remains a very elitist country with limited social mobility. So, poverty may be reduced, but the likelihood that someone in the working middle class would reach the upper middle class has always been a stretch.

The second issue is a lack of political change. The last four presidents were the same two people.

Chile’s been governed, with the exception of Piñera, basically by the same political coalition, La Concertación, which is a combination of the Christian Democratic and Socialist parties. Piñera came from the right, an outside party, but even he has remained. There has been no renewal of the political leadership which again reinforces that lack of social mobility. 

Do the protesters have any other demands or grievances? 

The demands are amorphous and that’s part of the issue – they’re going to be difficult to meet. People are expressing a genuine desire for change but what would that change mean?

Chileans don’t necessarily want to change the economic model; they simply want more mobility. That’s difficult to do and these are untested demands. 

Chileans also want political reform. What Piñera offered is to rewrite the constitution, which was created under military government in 1980. Other than some changes here and there in terms of the electoral system and reduction of military power, it has pretty much remained intact.

Will constitutional change really address these demands? It’s simply a document that may create the rules for how power is allocated and conducted, but it’s not going to dramatically remake Chilean society.

You mentioned inequality as a key driver of the protests. Can you expand a bit more on the current economic situation of ordinary Chileans?

Chile is going to grow at only around 2-3%, but it was growing at around 4-5% earlier. A lot of those funds were ploughed into social programmes that have since been reduced. 

Chile’s economy really boomed in the early 2000s because of Chinese demands of Chilean imports. But as with any sort of commodities-based economy, the jobs it provides tend to be lower wage.

As a result, despite the fact that Chile tried to diversify its economy by investing in entrepreneurship and innovation, it hasn’t grown in a way that provides jobs that many associate with upward mobility. As Chile's economy cooled, its ability to lift people out of poverty lagged as well.

Demonstrators hold placards depicting eyes – in reference to police pellets hitting demonstrators' eyes – during a protest in Santiago on 10 December 2019. Photo: Getty Images.

Two major issues for the protesters are education and pensions – can you explain why this is?

These are two issues of the economic and social model that was held up at one time as being a model for the region, the neoliberal models that are really coming under question and are in some ways at the heart of this.

One is the privatized pension system which is failing to produce the returns that retirees need to survive. The second is the education system. Chile created a voucher system where parents can shop around and send their kids to the best schools. The idea was to create competition among schools to improve.

The problem was like any market, it created a certain amount of inequality among schools. There was a problem of some schools underperforming and being relegated poorer performing students, or students being forced to go to those schools because the more successful schools were already spoken for. 

At the end of October, the government announced a series of social reforms. Will this be enough to satisfy the protesters’ demands?

Social reforms may address some of the issues of insufficient pensions or lack of quality education, but it will take a while for them to have an effect.

The second thing is, social reforms don’t address the issues of power. At the heart of this is this idea of closed economic, political and social power. That comes about through economic growth and how you break up concentrations of wealth. Social reforms aren’t going to do that, although they’ll help on the margins. 

We’re seeing horrific scenes of police violence against protesters and dozens of people have died. Has this deterred the protesters in any way? 

No, in many ways it has sort of inspired them. It has, I think, sustained the protests.

We’re not talking massive repression and tanks rolling in like Tiananmen Square. We’re talking about tear gas, rubber bullets, some injuries and deaths, and even credible reports of torture.

It’s funny you should mention this – a class I’m teaching today is about social media and protests. One of the central arguments is that successful social protests need a martyr; they need a rallying cry.

The deaths and the repression sort of help sustain that, but moreover, social media helps communicate what’s happening through videos and pictures. It really helps maintain this sense of righteousness, disdain for the government, and this idea of the need to demand change.

Where do you see this going next?

I don’t think we know. In the 60s and 70s, the political scientist Samuel Huntington argued in Political Order in Changing Societies that as economies grow, political institutions often strain to contain and channel demands. I think we’re seeing this now.

This social ferment over political, economic and social demands is uncharted water. I don’t know where this will go, but I think we’ll see a change in the constitution. We’ve already seen a fragmenting of the party system, which I think will continue. Hopefully, that will lead to new leadership that can help reflect a change in Chile itself. 




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Covid-19: Lack of capacity led to halting of community testing in March, admits deputy chief medical officer




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Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition

Invitation Only Research Event

28 November 2019 - 1:30pm to 3:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Annette Bohr, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Kassymkhan Kapparov, Founder, Economist.kz
Joanna Lillis, Reporter, The Guardian, The Economist and The Independent
Kate Mallinson, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Dossym Satpayev, Director, Kazakhstan Risk Assessment Group; Member of the Presidium, Kazakhstan Council on International Relations
Chair: James Nixey, Head, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

At face value at least, Central Asia’s wealthiest state has embarked on a bold experiment following the March 2019 decision by its founding father and long-standing ruler, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to resign from the presidency and initiate a managed political succession. A generational transition of this nature, untried in other former Soviet republics, brings with it high stakes.
 
As well as seeking to secure his own legacy, having dominated the country since before independence in 1991, Nazarbayev wants to ensure Kazakhstan does not depart from the course he has set while safeguarding Kazakhstan’s stability in the context of multiple and evolving domestic and international challenges. But this is easier said than done. Is Kazakhstan ready for the challenges of the future?
 
This event marks the launch of Chatham House’s major report Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition.

Department/project

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition

27 November 2019

A partial handover of political power through an orchestrated transition takes Kazakhstan into uncharted territory. Will it be able to pursue modernization and reform, and break from its authoritarian past?

Annette Bohr

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Dr Nigel Gould-Davies

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

Kate Mallinson

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

James Nixey

Director, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Birgit Brauer

Analyst, Writer and Journalist Covering Central Asia

Nargis Kassenova

Senior Fellow, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University

Joanna Lillis

Kazakhstan-Based Journalist Reporting on Central Asia

Dosym Satpayev

Independent Political Analyst and the Director of the Kazakhstan Risks Assessment Group

Kazakhstan is at a turning point in its history. At face value, at least, Central Asia’s wealthiest state has embarked on a bold experiment following the March 2019 decision by its founding father and long-standing ruler, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to resign from the presidency and initiate a managed political succession. A generational transition of this nature, untried in other former Soviet republics, brings with it high stakes. As well as looking to secure his own legacy, having dominated the country since before independence in 1991, Nazarbayev seeks to ensure Kazakhstan does not depart from the course he has set, while safeguarding regime stability in the context of multiple and evolving domestic and international challenges. This is easier said than done.

The uncertainty around this project is substantial, especially considering a ‘rowback’ decree just seven months after Nazarbayev’s resignation, limiting the powers of his anointed successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. How long can Tokayev credibly remain president considering such a transparent undermining of his authority? Is Nazarbayev, in fact, grooming his daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, another relative or a power player from outside the family for the leadership in the longer term? Will the ‘Kazakh tandem’ of Nazarbayev and Tokayev function effectively, or will tensions and conflicts arise between them as many claim is happening already? How will the leadership cope with the protest mood now manifest on the streets of Kazakhstan, and address the political and socio-economic grievances fuelling this discontent? How might the political transition play out if Nazarbayev were to suddenly exit the political scene altogether?And what is the long-term transition plan for the time when Nazarbayev has departed, and how effective will it be?

As Kazakhstan enters uncharted territory, the purpose of this report is twofold. First, to make the case for the West to devote more attention to Kazakhstan. The country’s relative importance in Central Asia, and as the constant focus of intense attention from China and Russia, suggests that the West is wrong to direct so little time and diplomatic effort and so few resources towards it. This is not so much a miscalculation (that would be to assume there had been a calculation in the first place) as a misstep through neglect, presupposing that the future will resemble the present – with Kazakhstan remaining stable internally, relatively inconsequential geopolitically but nevertheless a friendly ally to the West. In fact, the country’s trajectory over the next few years is of potentially strategic import. This is because even its political semi-transition presents the West with a rare opportunity to push back against the global rise of authoritarianism, in a state that is open to rational argument and economic logic.

The second function of the report is to serve as a well-intentioned message to the leadership of Kazakhstan. The research undertaken by the report’s eight authors shows that Kazakhstan is at risk of failing to achieve the goals its leadership has set for the country. As significant as it has been, the partial stepping aside of Nazarbayev by no means guarantees the modernization and renewal that he and his successor have promised. Far deeper political, economic and social reforms will be needed if Kazakhstan is to meet the growing challenges to its stability, prosperity and development. Street protests since Nazarbayev’s resignation have demonstrated a level of popular disaffection far higher than the authorities acknowledge. The leadership needs to bridge the disconnect between the rulers and the ruled and start listening to its people.

To avoid slipping into decline, and to resist external pressures and geopolitical overtures that could diminish the sovereignty that its leadership is so determined to safeguard, Kazakhstan needs new faces – innovators and reformers – throughout every level of the administration, as well as new ideas. This report is intended to help with the ‘ideas’ part of that proposition. It also includes a series of recommendations for Western governments and institutions and for the Kazakhstan government. 




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Isha Blender opens up about loss of her son - Shares the ­heartbreaking tale in latest track ‘I Wish’

REGGAE ARTISTE Isha Blender is still coming to terms with the loss of her son, Josiah, on January 5, a mere two days after she celebrated her birthday. The daughter of legendary crooner Everton Blender said the death of a child can be one of the...




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Inner Circle to create song from winning poem - Close to 100 entries for Circle of Light contest

IT IS said that every cloud has a silver lining, and that could still hold true, even in the midst of a terrifying global pandemic. Despite COVID-19, the cycle of life continues, and out of it has sprung forth an inspiring poetry competition,...




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The junior doctor protest

Thousands of NHS staff have demonstrated against the government’s threatened “imposition” of an “unsafe and unfair” contract for junior doctors. At a London rally on Saturday 17 October junior doctors and supporters noisily defended their trade union, as speakers accused England’s health secretary, Jeremy Hunt, of misleading the public about...




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Likelihood ratios in diagnostic tests

Andrew Elder, a professor at the University of Edinburgh talks about likelihood ratios in diagnostic testing, and how they’re helpful in thinking about how context changes the predictive value of a test. This is part of a wider discussion on the evidence behind clinical examination of the cardiovascular system...




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Education round up - HIV testing, legal highs and care for relatives of the dying

The BMJ publishes a lot of educational articles, and in an attempt to help you with your CPD, we have put together this round-up. Our authors and editors will reflect on the key learning points in the articles we discuss, and explain how they may change their practice in light of that new understanding. In this week's round up we're...




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Talk Evidence - Recurrent VTE, CRP testing for COPD, CMO report, and a consultation

Helen talks about new research on prevention of recurrent VTE - and Carl things the evidence goes further, and we can extend prophylaxis for a year. 13.00 - CRP testing for antibiotic prescription in COPD exacerbations, should we start doing it in primary care settings - and what will that mean. We also hear from Chris Butler, one of the...




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Ancestry DNA tests can over or under estimate genetic disease risk

Direct-to-consumer genetic tests are sold online and in shops as a way to “find out what your DNA says". They insights into ancestry or disease risks; others claim to provide information on personality, athletic ability, and child talent. However, interpretation of genetic data is complex and context dependent, and DTC genetic tests may produce...




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Testing for TB is only skin deep

A TB infection can take two forms, active and latent. Active disease is transmissible, and causes the damage to the lungs which makes TB one of the biggest killers in the world. In the latent form, the bacteria Mycobacterium tuberculosis is quiescent and can stay that way for years until it becomes active and causes those clinical signs. Testing...




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Talk Evidence - testing under the microscope and opioid prescription

This edition of talk evidence was recorded before the big increase in covid-19 infections in the UK, and then delayed by some self isolation. We'll be back with more evidence on the pandemic very soon. As always Duncan Jarvies is joined by Helen Macdonald (resting GP and editor at The BMJ) and Carl Heneghan (active GP, director of Oxford...




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Talk Evidence Covid-19 update - Confused symptoms, fatality rate uncertainty, Iceland's testing

For the next few months Talk Evidence is going to focus on the new corona virus pandemic. There is an enormous amount of uncertainty about the disease, what the symptoms are, fatality rate, treatment options, things we shouldn't be doing. We're going to try to get away from the headlines and talk about what we need to know - to hopefully give...




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Talk Evidence covid-19 update - pneumonia, guidelines, preprints and testing

For the next few months Talk Evidence is going to focus on the new corona virus pandemic. There is an enormous amount of uncertainty about the disease, what the symptoms are, fatality rate, treatment options, things we shouldn't be doing. We're going to try to get away from the headlines and talk about what we need to know - to hopefully give...




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Talk Evidence covid-19 update - lack of testing transparency, how to give good debate

For the next few months Talk Evidence is going to focus on the new corona virus pandemic. There is an enormous amount of uncertainty about the disease, what the symptoms are, fatality rate, treatment options, things we shouldn't be doing. We're going to try to get away from the headlines and talk about what we need to know - to hopefully give you...




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PAHO calls for acceleration of COVID-19 testing in Americas

Director of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Dr Carissa F. Etienne, today called for accelerated and expanded testing for COVID-19 in countries of the Americas. “We need a clearer view of where the virus is circulating and how...




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Type 2 diabetes: 5000 patients to test feasibility of “remission service”




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Dwayne Devonish | Smart virus testing necessary for economic reboot

OP-ED CONTRIBUTION: COVID-19 AND THE ECONOMY FOR MOST countries in the Caribbean, the current testing for COVID-19 has not reached levels suitable for ascertaining an accurate picture of the state of outbreak and spread of the infection. This...




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The multilevel identity politics of the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Galia Press-Barnathan and Naama Lutz

This article uses the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) that took place in Tel Aviv to explore how cultural mega-events serve both as political arenas and as tools for identity construction, negotiation and contestation. These processes of identity politics are all conducted across national–subnational–international–transnational levels. The hosting of mega-events fleshes out these multiple processes in a very strong manner. We first discuss the politics of hosting mega-events in general. We then examine the identity politics associated more specifically with the Eurovision Song Contest, before examining in depth the complex forms of identity politics emerging around the competition following the 2018 Israeli victory. We suggest that it is important to study together the multiple processes—domestic, international and transnational—of identity politics that take place around the competition, as they interact with each other. Consequently, we follow the various stakeholders involved at these different levels and their interactions. We examine the internal identity negotiation process in Israel surrounding the event, the critical actors debating how to use the stage to challenge the liberal, western, ‘normal’ identity Israel hoped to project in the contest and how other stakeholders (participating states, national broadcasting agencies, participating artists) reacted to them, and finally we examine the behaviour of the institution in charge, the European Broadcasting Union, and national governments. We contribute to the study of mega-events as fields of contestation, to the understanding of the complex, multilevel nature of national identity construction, negotiation and contestation in the current era, and more broadly to the role that popular culture plays in this context.




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Covid-19: Home testing programme across England aims to help define way out of lockdown




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Covid-19: Lack of capacity led to halting of community testing in March, admits deputy chief medical officer




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South Korea Carefully Tests the Waters on Immigration, With a Focus on Temporary Workers

Faced with labor shortages in key sectors of the economy, South Korea has moved carefully in recent decades toward accepting greater numbers of workers—albeit in temporary fashion. Its Employment Permit System, launched in 2003, earned international accolades for bringing order and legality to immigration in the country, although several challenges remain to be addressed as this Country Profile explores.




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Nearly 20,000 Teens in Georgia Receive Licenses Without a Road Test

Source:

The sweaty palms on the steering wheel. The repeated exclamations of "Sorry!" The nervous glances from the examiner. They're all part of the dreaded road test, which, for decades, has been a rite of passage for every U.S. teenager to obtain a driver's license. Yet now, due to the coronavirus pandemic, nearly 20,000 teens in Georgia have received licenses without taking an official road test, and Wisconsin will soon follow suit.






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Diabetes INSIDE: Improving Population HbA1c Testing and Targets in Primary Care With a Quality Initiative

OBJECTIVE

To improve outcomes of patients with adult type 2 diabetes by decreasing HbA1c undertesting, reducing the proportion of patients with poor glycemic control, and lowering mean HbA1c levels using a quality improvement (QI) program.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

Six years of outpatient electronic health record (EHR) data were analyzed for care gaps before and 2 years after implementing a QI initiative in an urban academic medical center. QI strategies included 1) individual provider and departmental outcome reports, 2) patient outreach programs to address timely follow-up care, 3) a patient awareness campaign to improve understanding of achieving clinical goals, 4) improving EHR data capture to improve population monitoring, and 5) professional education.

RESULTS

Analysis (January 2010 to May 2018) of 7,798 patients from Tulane Medical Center (mean age 61 years, 57% female, 62% black, 97% insured) with 136,004 visits showed target improvements. A Cox proportional hazards model controlling for age, sex, race, and HbA1c level showed a statistically significant reduction in HbA1c undertesting >6 months (hazard ratio 1.20 ± 0.07). Statistical process control charts showed 15.5% relative improvement in the patient proportion with HbA1c >9% (75 mmol/mol) from 13% to 11% (P < 10–6) following QI interventions and a 2.1% improvement of population mean HbA1c from 7.4% (57 mmol/mol) to 7.2% (55 mmol/mol) (P < 10–6).

CONCLUSIONS

Multidisciplinary QI teams using EHR data to design interventions for providers and patients produced statistically significant improvements in both care process and clinical outcome goals.