rani

Terania Creek protest




rani

Terania Creek protesters




rani

Terania Creek bulldozer




rani

Terania Creek landmark environmental protest remembered four decades on

In 1979, protesters blocked the path of bulldozers to stop the logging of a rainforest on the New South Wales north coast, the first blockade of its kind in Australia.





rani

Abdullah Chaarani is seen in CCTV footage carrying a large machete

CCTV released by the Supreme Court showed Abdullah Chaarani carrying a large machete up the driveway at his home.




rani

Growing concerns for Australian Academic Kylie Moore-Gilbert, held in Iranian prison

Kylie Moore-Gilbert, who continues to be held in an Iranian prison throughout this pandemic, despite more than 85,000 prisoners being temporarily released in Iran.



  • Prisons and Punishment
  • Health

rani

Former uranium mine now an Instagram hotspot for Queensland tourists

Mary Kathleen's shuttered uranium mine is bright blue, incredibly Instagram-worthy, radioactive and Queensland's latest hotspot.




rani

Kakadu uranium protest documentary Dirt Cheap unearthed by Northern Territory Library

A rare copy of the nearly 40-year-old documentary Dirt Cheap, which details the early resistance against uranium mining in Kakadu National Park, is rediscovered in Darwin.




rani

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren

(United States Supreme Court) - Held that the federal Atomic Energy Act did not preempt a Virginia law prohibiting uranium mining. While six justices agreed that the state ban on uranium mining was not preempted, they divided on broader questions concerning statutory interpretation and preemption doctrine, and thus were unable to agree on the rationale for the decision. Justice Gorsuch delivered a plurality opinion, and several justices concurred in the judgment only.




rani

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren

(United States Supreme Court) - Held that the federal Atomic Energy Act did not preempt a Virginia law prohibiting uranium mining. While six justices agreed that the state ban on uranium mining was not preempted, they divided on broader questions concerning statutory interpretation and preemption doctrine, and thus were unable to agree on the rationale for the decision. Justice Gorsuch delivered a plurality opinion, and several justices concurred in the judgment only.




rani

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren

(United States Supreme Court) - Held that the federal Atomic Energy Act did not preempt a Virginia law prohibiting uranium mining. While six justices agreed that the state ban on uranium mining was not preempted, they divided on broader questions concerning statutory interpretation and preemption doctrine, and thus were unable to agree on the rationale for the decision. Justice Gorsuch delivered a plurality opinion, and several justices concurred in the judgment only.




rani

Hranice směrem k Česku otevřeme. Takový je plán, zní z Chorvatska

Istrie patří k nejoblíbenějším částem Chorvatska. Jako skoro všude na světě se tam hoteliérský a restaurační byznys letos v březnu úplně zastavil, což si ještě nedávno nikdo nedokázal představit. Teď se ale blíží oživení. „Ani přinejmenším ale neočekáváme, že zopakujeme výsledky loňského roku,“ říká v rozhovoru šéf turistického sdružení celé oblasti Denis Ivošević.



  • Ekonomika - Zahraniční

rani

#2: It's Potterania




rani

Iranian spies ‘smuggle millions to terrorists’ in Lebanon and Syria



IRANIAN agents are delivering suitcases stuffed with £800,000 in cash to Hezbollah terrorists despite the Islamic state begging for financial help to deal with coronavirus, it is claimed.




rani

COVID-19 and the Iranian Shadows of War

8 April 2020

Dr Sanam Vakil

Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme
Coronavirus has plunged Iran into the country’s biggest crisis since its war with Iraq. More than 30 years later, the lingering effects of the war are shaping Iran’s reaction to the pandemic.

2020-04-08-Iran-COVID-Tehran

Spraying disinfectant at Tajrish bazaar in Tehran, Iran, during the coronavirus pandemic in March 2020. Photo by Majid Saeedi/Getty Images.

In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, many global leaders have invoked war analogies – from the Pearl Harbor attack to the collective spirit on display during the Second World War – to highlight past lessons learned or rally their populations.

For Iran’s leadership, more recent war analogies hold resonance and help explain the ideological and political conundrum limiting an effective COVID-19 response. While the Islamic Republic has weathered a multitude of challenges, COVID-19 is putting unprecedented strain on Iran’s already fragile, heavily-sanctioned economy and further exposing domestic political fissures amid ongoing international tensions.

Iran has been identified as the regional epicentre of the pandemic with a steadily rising number of deaths, including several of the country’s political and military elite. Yet the Iranian government has not evoked the collective memory of the war as an opportunity for national resistance and mobilization.

Sluggish and poorly managed

This is unsurprising, because thus far the Iranian government’s response to COVID-19 has been sluggish and poorly managed. After an initial slow response, Iran then attempted to downplay the impact of the virus, covering up the number of cases and deaths and blaming the United States, before implementing a poorly coordinated action plan marred by government infighting.

For the Iranian leadership, the Iran-Iraq war has been the single most influential and defining period – it has impacted its political ideology, domestic and security policies and international relations. More than half a million Iranians died, and a paranoid worldview and sense of isolation was cemented among many elite leaders such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The war created a valiant culture of leadership from Qassem Soleimani to presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hashemi Rafsanjani and, over time, has resulted in the development of Iran’s asymmetrical defense capabilities.

The war enabled a dark purge of political opponents and the gradual birth of Iran’s reformist faction, all while the ethos of sacrifice and martyrdom was linked to the collective notions of resistance.

These would be carried forward in other resistance campaigns both regional and economic. Most defining was Ayatollah Khomeini’s infamous 1988 decision to ‘drink the poisoned chalice’ and end the long war. Three decades later, Iran continues to contend with those outcomes.

To acknowledge that the COVID-19 crisis could have equally profound consequences would add further pressure to the Islamic Republic at a time of incomparable vulnerability. Even before this crisis, the Iranian government linked sanctions to economic warfare, making future negotiations conditional on sanctions relief.

Iranian hardliners used the opportunity to promote Iran’s subsistence-based resistance economy designed to insulate Iran’s economy from external shocks such as sanctions. While both groups recognize the economic urgency, their contending strategies help explain the muddled government response and the ongoing ideological competition between the political elites.

Rouhani has argued that a full lockdown of the Iranian economy is impossible because it is already under significant strain from sanctions - the Iranian economy experienced a 9.5% contraction in 2019 and is expected to worsen in the coming year.

That said, through Iran’s New Year holidays the government did take action to slow the spread of the virus, discouraging travel and shutting schools, pilgrimage sites and cancelling Friday prayers. Finally, on 4 April, after receiving permission from Khamenei to do so, Rouhani withdrew $1 billion from Iran’s National Development Fund and is distributing the money through loans and credits to 23 million households.

Aid from a number of Iran’s parastatal agencies was also announced. Conversely, in his annual New Year’s speech the supreme leader securitized the crisis by laying blame on the United States for spreading the virus as a form of biological terrorism. Iran’s army chief of staff Major General Bagheri was tasked with building hospitals and the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps given authority to clear the streets.

The recent expulsion of Médecins Sans Frontières from Iran highlights the mix of paranoia and resistance culture still on display. US sanctions on Iran have significantly weakened Iran’s economy and limited Tehran’s ability to purchase much needed medical supplies and equipment. Unable to access its foreign reserves due to sanctions, the Rouhani government has applied for a $5 billion loan from the IMF.

European countries alongside a number of US members of congress have appealed to the Trump administration to ease sanctions on humanitarian grounds. While Washington continues to pursue its steadfast approach, referring to Iran’s campaign as a ‘sanctions relief scam’, Germany, France, and the UK have offered $5 million in aid and launched INSTEX – a trading mechanism designed to circumvent sanctions to allow non-sanctioned humanitarian trade.

The impact of coronavirus on Iranian society remains to be seen. But the impact of sanctions has placed heavy economic and psychological burden on the people. Feeling abandoned by the Iranian state and the United States could produce a mix of contradictory nationalistic and independent impulses.

The social contract – already fragile amid protests and government repression – reveals declining trust. Without national mobilization and calls for unity reminiscent of the war period, Iranians have stepped in, highlighting the continued resilience of civil society. Support for the medical establishment has been celebrated throughout the country and on social media. Charities, the private sector - through one initiative known as Campaign Nafas (Breathe) - and diaspora groups have initiated fundraising drives and assistance measures.

Iran’s relations with the international community, and specifically the United States, remain an unresolved consequence of the war. The 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement was the closest Tehran and Washington came to resolving decades of tensions, containment and sanctions.

COVID-19 has further heightened the trajectory of tensions between Tehran and Washington suggesting that any new deal, while necessary, is not on the cards. Tit-for-tat military exchanges have been on the rise in Iraq and Yemen while American and Iranian leaders issue threats and warnings of potential escalation.

Abdullah Nasseri, an advisor to Iran’s reformists, recently stated that in order to manage the coronavirus crisis, the Iranian government needed to make a decision akin to the 1988 United Nations resolution 598 that ended war hostilities. Ayatollah Khomeini famously commented on that ceasefire, stating: ‘Happy are those who have departed through martyrdom. Unhappy am I that I still survive.… Taking this decision is more deadly than drinking from a poisoned chalice. I submitted myself to Allah's will and took this drink for His satisfaction’. 

While a similar compromise today might appear deadly to the political establishment, it is clear that a paradigm shift away from the shadows of Iran’s last war is urgently needed to manage the challenges stemming from COVID-19.





rani

COVID-19 and the Iranian Shadows of War

8 April 2020

Dr Sanam Vakil

Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme
Coronavirus has plunged Iran into the country’s biggest crisis since its war with Iraq. More than 30 years later, the lingering effects of the war are shaping Iran’s reaction to the pandemic.

2020-04-08-Iran-COVID-Tehran

Spraying disinfectant at Tajrish bazaar in Tehran, Iran, during the coronavirus pandemic in March 2020. Photo by Majid Saeedi/Getty Images.

In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, many global leaders have invoked war analogies – from the Pearl Harbor attack to the collective spirit on display during the Second World War – to highlight past lessons learned or rally their populations.

For Iran’s leadership, more recent war analogies hold resonance and help explain the ideological and political conundrum limiting an effective COVID-19 response. While the Islamic Republic has weathered a multitude of challenges, COVID-19 is putting unprecedented strain on Iran’s already fragile, heavily-sanctioned economy and further exposing domestic political fissures amid ongoing international tensions.

Iran has been identified as the regional epicentre of the pandemic with a steadily rising number of deaths, including several of the country’s political and military elite. Yet the Iranian government has not evoked the collective memory of the war as an opportunity for national resistance and mobilization.

Sluggish and poorly managed

This is unsurprising, because thus far the Iranian government’s response to COVID-19 has been sluggish and poorly managed. After an initial slow response, Iran then attempted to downplay the impact of the virus, covering up the number of cases and deaths and blaming the United States, before implementing a poorly coordinated action plan marred by government infighting.

For the Iranian leadership, the Iran-Iraq war has been the single most influential and defining period – it has impacted its political ideology, domestic and security policies and international relations. More than half a million Iranians died, and a paranoid worldview and sense of isolation was cemented among many elite leaders such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The war created a valiant culture of leadership from Qassem Soleimani to presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hashemi Rafsanjani and, over time, has resulted in the development of Iran’s asymmetrical defense capabilities.

The war enabled a dark purge of political opponents and the gradual birth of Iran’s reformist faction, all while the ethos of sacrifice and martyrdom was linked to the collective notions of resistance.

These would be carried forward in other resistance campaigns both regional and economic. Most defining was Ayatollah Khomeini’s infamous 1988 decision to ‘drink the poisoned chalice’ and end the long war. Three decades later, Iran continues to contend with those outcomes.

To acknowledge that the COVID-19 crisis could have equally profound consequences would add further pressure to the Islamic Republic at a time of incomparable vulnerability. Even before this crisis, the Iranian government linked sanctions to economic warfare, making future negotiations conditional on sanctions relief.

Iranian hardliners used the opportunity to promote Iran’s subsistence-based resistance economy designed to insulate Iran’s economy from external shocks such as sanctions. While both groups recognize the economic urgency, their contending strategies help explain the muddled government response and the ongoing ideological competition between the political elites.

Rouhani has argued that a full lockdown of the Iranian economy is impossible because it is already under significant strain from sanctions - the Iranian economy experienced a 9.5% contraction in 2019 and is expected to worsen in the coming year.

That said, through Iran’s New Year holidays the government did take action to slow the spread of the virus, discouraging travel and shutting schools, pilgrimage sites and cancelling Friday prayers. Finally, on 4 April, after receiving permission from Khamenei to do so, Rouhani withdrew $1 billion from Iran’s National Development Fund and is distributing the money through loans and credits to 23 million households.

Aid from a number of Iran’s parastatal agencies was also announced. Conversely, in his annual New Year’s speech the supreme leader securitized the crisis by laying blame on the United States for spreading the virus as a form of biological terrorism. Iran’s army chief of staff Major General Bagheri was tasked with building hospitals and the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps given authority to clear the streets.

The recent expulsion of Médecins Sans Frontières from Iran highlights the mix of paranoia and resistance culture still on display. US sanctions on Iran have significantly weakened Iran’s economy and limited Tehran’s ability to purchase much needed medical supplies and equipment. Unable to access its foreign reserves due to sanctions, the Rouhani government has applied for a $5 billion loan from the IMF.

European countries alongside a number of US members of congress have appealed to the Trump administration to ease sanctions on humanitarian grounds. While Washington continues to pursue its steadfast approach, referring to Iran’s campaign as a ‘sanctions relief scam’, Germany, France, and the UK have offered $5 million in aid and launched INSTEX – a trading mechanism designed to circumvent sanctions to allow non-sanctioned humanitarian trade.

The impact of coronavirus on Iranian society remains to be seen. But the impact of sanctions has placed heavy economic and psychological burden on the people. Feeling abandoned by the Iranian state and the United States could produce a mix of contradictory nationalistic and independent impulses.

The social contract – already fragile amid protests and government repression – reveals declining trust. Without national mobilization and calls for unity reminiscent of the war period, Iranians have stepped in, highlighting the continued resilience of civil society. Support for the medical establishment has been celebrated throughout the country and on social media. Charities, the private sector - through one initiative known as Campaign Nafas (Breathe) - and diaspora groups have initiated fundraising drives and assistance measures.

Iran’s relations with the international community, and specifically the United States, remain an unresolved consequence of the war. The 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement was the closest Tehran and Washington came to resolving decades of tensions, containment and sanctions.

COVID-19 has further heightened the trajectory of tensions between Tehran and Washington suggesting that any new deal, while necessary, is not on the cards. Tit-for-tat military exchanges have been on the rise in Iraq and Yemen while American and Iranian leaders issue threats and warnings of potential escalation.

Abdullah Nasseri, an advisor to Iran’s reformists, recently stated that in order to manage the coronavirus crisis, the Iranian government needed to make a decision akin to the 1988 United Nations resolution 598 that ended war hostilities. Ayatollah Khomeini famously commented on that ceasefire, stating: ‘Happy are those who have departed through martyrdom. Unhappy am I that I still survive.… Taking this decision is more deadly than drinking from a poisoned chalice. I submitted myself to Allah's will and took this drink for His satisfaction’. 

While a similar compromise today might appear deadly to the political establishment, it is clear that a paradigm shift away from the shadows of Iran’s last war is urgently needed to manage the challenges stemming from COVID-19.




rani

COVID-19 and the Iranian Shadows of War

8 April 2020

Dr Sanam Vakil

Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme
Coronavirus has plunged Iran into the country’s biggest crisis since its war with Iraq. More than 30 years later, the lingering effects of the war are shaping Iran’s reaction to the pandemic.

2020-04-08-Iran-COVID-Tehran

Spraying disinfectant at Tajrish bazaar in Tehran, Iran, during the coronavirus pandemic in March 2020. Photo by Majid Saeedi/Getty Images.

In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, many global leaders have invoked war analogies – from the Pearl Harbor attack to the collective spirit on display during the Second World War – to highlight past lessons learned or rally their populations.

For Iran’s leadership, more recent war analogies hold resonance and help explain the ideological and political conundrum limiting an effective COVID-19 response. While the Islamic Republic has weathered a multitude of challenges, COVID-19 is putting unprecedented strain on Iran’s already fragile, heavily-sanctioned economy and further exposing domestic political fissures amid ongoing international tensions.

Iran has been identified as the regional epicentre of the pandemic with a steadily rising number of deaths, including several of the country’s political and military elite. Yet the Iranian government has not evoked the collective memory of the war as an opportunity for national resistance and mobilization.

Sluggish and poorly managed

This is unsurprising, because thus far the Iranian government’s response to COVID-19 has been sluggish and poorly managed. After an initial slow response, Iran then attempted to downplay the impact of the virus, covering up the number of cases and deaths and blaming the United States, before implementing a poorly coordinated action plan marred by government infighting.

For the Iranian leadership, the Iran-Iraq war has been the single most influential and defining period – it has impacted its political ideology, domestic and security policies and international relations. More than half a million Iranians died, and a paranoid worldview and sense of isolation was cemented among many elite leaders such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The war created a valiant culture of leadership from Qassem Soleimani to presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hashemi Rafsanjani and, over time, has resulted in the development of Iran’s asymmetrical defense capabilities.

The war enabled a dark purge of political opponents and the gradual birth of Iran’s reformist faction, all while the ethos of sacrifice and martyrdom was linked to the collective notions of resistance.

These would be carried forward in other resistance campaigns both regional and economic. Most defining was Ayatollah Khomeini’s infamous 1988 decision to ‘drink the poisoned chalice’ and end the long war. Three decades later, Iran continues to contend with those outcomes.

To acknowledge that the COVID-19 crisis could have equally profound consequences would add further pressure to the Islamic Republic at a time of incomparable vulnerability. Even before this crisis, the Iranian government linked sanctions to economic warfare, making future negotiations conditional on sanctions relief.

Iranian hardliners used the opportunity to promote Iran’s subsistence-based resistance economy designed to insulate Iran’s economy from external shocks such as sanctions. While both groups recognize the economic urgency, their contending strategies help explain the muddled government response and the ongoing ideological competition between the political elites.

Rouhani has argued that a full lockdown of the Iranian economy is impossible because it is already under significant strain from sanctions - the Iranian economy experienced a 9.5% contraction in 2019 and is expected to worsen in the coming year.

That said, through Iran’s New Year holidays the government did take action to slow the spread of the virus, discouraging travel and shutting schools, pilgrimage sites and cancelling Friday prayers. Finally, on 4 April, after receiving permission from Khamenei to do so, Rouhani withdrew $1 billion from Iran’s National Development Fund and is distributing the money through loans and credits to 23 million households.

Aid from a number of Iran’s parastatal agencies was also announced. Conversely, in his annual New Year’s speech the supreme leader securitized the crisis by laying blame on the United States for spreading the virus as a form of biological terrorism. Iran’s army chief of staff Major General Bagheri was tasked with building hospitals and the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps given authority to clear the streets.

The recent expulsion of Médecins Sans Frontières from Iran highlights the mix of paranoia and resistance culture still on display. US sanctions on Iran have significantly weakened Iran’s economy and limited Tehran’s ability to purchase much needed medical supplies and equipment. Unable to access its foreign reserves due to sanctions, the Rouhani government has applied for a $5 billion loan from the IMF.

European countries alongside a number of US members of congress have appealed to the Trump administration to ease sanctions on humanitarian grounds. While Washington continues to pursue its steadfast approach, referring to Iran’s campaign as a ‘sanctions relief scam’, Germany, France, and the UK have offered $5 million in aid and launched INSTEX – a trading mechanism designed to circumvent sanctions to allow non-sanctioned humanitarian trade.

The impact of coronavirus on Iranian society remains to be seen. But the impact of sanctions has placed heavy economic and psychological burden on the people. Feeling abandoned by the Iranian state and the United States could produce a mix of contradictory nationalistic and independent impulses.

The social contract – already fragile amid protests and government repression – reveals declining trust. Without national mobilization and calls for unity reminiscent of the war period, Iranians have stepped in, highlighting the continued resilience of civil society. Support for the medical establishment has been celebrated throughout the country and on social media. Charities, the private sector - through one initiative known as Campaign Nafas (Breathe) - and diaspora groups have initiated fundraising drives and assistance measures.

Iran’s relations with the international community, and specifically the United States, remain an unresolved consequence of the war. The 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement was the closest Tehran and Washington came to resolving decades of tensions, containment and sanctions.

COVID-19 has further heightened the trajectory of tensions between Tehran and Washington suggesting that any new deal, while necessary, is not on the cards. Tit-for-tat military exchanges have been on the rise in Iraq and Yemen while American and Iranian leaders issue threats and warnings of potential escalation.

Abdullah Nasseri, an advisor to Iran’s reformists, recently stated that in order to manage the coronavirus crisis, the Iranian government needed to make a decision akin to the 1988 United Nations resolution 598 that ended war hostilities. Ayatollah Khomeini famously commented on that ceasefire, stating: ‘Happy are those who have departed through martyrdom. Unhappy am I that I still survive.… Taking this decision is more deadly than drinking from a poisoned chalice. I submitted myself to Allah's will and took this drink for His satisfaction’. 

While a similar compromise today might appear deadly to the political establishment, it is clear that a paradigm shift away from the shadows of Iran’s last war is urgently needed to manage the challenges stemming from COVID-19.




rani

pas de deux / Indrani Perera.




rani

[Anguttaranikaya pabbakanipata, phuk 11]




rani

[Brah kankhavitarani]

19th century




rani

Increased Neural Activity in Mesostriatal Regions after Prefrontal Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation and L-DOPA Administration

Benjamin Meyer
Jul 3, 2019; 39:5326-5335
Systems/Circuits





rani

The American-Iranian Psychosis, Next Chapter

The mullahs are cold calculators.




rani

Patterns of Retinal Hemorrhage Associated With Increased Intracranial Pressure in Children

Retinal hemorrhage (RH) is an important sign of pediatric abusive head trauma. Raised intracranial pressure (ICP) is sometimes proposed as an alternate cause of RH in children being evaluated for possible child abuse.

Nontraumatic, markedly elevated ICP rarely causes RH in children. When it does, RH are superficial intraretinal and located adjacent to a swollen optic nerve head. This pattern does not match the widespread pattern seen in abusive head trauma. (Read the full article)




rani

Incidental Findings in Children With Blunt Head Trauma Evaluated With Cranial CT Scans

The evaluation of blunt head trauma in children who undergo cranial computed tomography will occasionally reveal incidental findings. These findings may require further evaluation or intervention. The prevalence of incidental findings has previously been described using small cohorts, limiting generalizability.

This study is the largest pediatric multicenter description of the prevalence of incidental findings on cranial computed tomography. Incidental findings are categorized by urgency to describe the spectrum of abnormalities, providing a context for clinicians faced with these unexpected results. (Read the full article)




rani

Intellectual, Behavioral, and Emotional Functioning in Children With Syndromic Craniosynostosis

Children who have syndromic craniosynostosis are at risk for developing intellectual disability, behavioral and emotional problems. Study results were often based on small samples and wide age-based variation, using non-validated instruments and describing no clear inclusion and exclusion criteria.

Intellectual, behavioral, and emotional functioning is described in a national sample (N = 82) of school-aged children with syndromic craniosynostosis. Using standardized instruments, this study indicates higher risks for intellectual disability and behavioral problems mainly in children having Apert and Muenke syndromes. (Read the full article)




rani

Comparison of Rapid Cranial MRI to CT for Ventricular Shunt Malfunction

Rapid cranial MRI is a radiation-free method to assess children with possible ventricular shunt malfunction. However, the test performance of rapid cranial MRI has never been compared with that of cranial CT, the current reference standard.

The accuracy of rapid cranial MRI was not inferior to that of CT for diagnosing ventricular shunt malfunction. Rapid cranial MRI is an important radiation-sparing diagnostic alternative for children presenting emergently with possible ventricular shunt malfunction. (Read the full article)




rani

Intellectual and Academic Functioning of School-Age Children With Single-Suture Craniosynostosis

It is unclear whether developmental delays observed among infants with single-suture craniosynostosis (SSC) persist at school age. Few neurodevelopmental studies have examined children with SSC beyond age 3, with most having methodological limitations.

This study is the first to follow and test infants with SSC and a control group at school age. Infancy delays among children with SSC persisted at school age in some areas (IQ, math) but not others (reading, spelling). (Read the full article)




rani

Prevalence of and Risk Factors for Intracranial Abnormalities in Unprovoked Seizures

Weak recommendations exist to guide emergent neuroimaging decisions in children with first, unprovoked seizures. The prevalence of and risk factors associated with clinically relevant abnormalities on neuroimaging have not been well defined in prospective studies.

Clinically relevant intracranial abnormalities on neuroimaging occur in 11% of children with first, unprovoked seizures. Emergent/urgent abnormalities, however, occur in <1%, suggesting that most of these children do not require emergent neuroimaging. Specific clinical findings identify patients at higher risk. (Read the full article)




rani

PHOTOS show Iranians spill into the streets after 5.1 quake centering on sleeping VOLCANO hits Tehran

A 5.1 magnitude earthquake has jolted an area in northern Iran, home to a sleeping volcano, forcing panicked residents in and around Tehran to rush onto the streets despite the Covid-19 lockdown.
Read Full Article at RT.com




rani

"Help Us Get Over Corona Blues": Smriti Irani's Poetic Tribute To Gulzar

Union Minister Smriti Irani on Wednesday shared a poem paying tribute to the legendary lyricist and poet Gulzar, thanking him for making lives happier with his work even during the lockdown.




rani

Seychellois Rupee(SCR)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 Seychellois Rupee = 380.4539 Paraguayan Guarani




rani

Trinidad and Tobago Dollar(TTD)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 Trinidad and Tobago Dollar = 966.5708 Paraguayan Guarani



  • Trinidad and Tobago Dollar

rani

Swedish Krona(SEK)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 Swedish Krona = 668.4135 Paraguayan Guarani




rani

Slovak Koruna(SKK)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 Slovak Koruna = 294.1399 Paraguayan Guarani




rani

Serbian Dinar(RSD)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 Serbian Dinar = 60.2247 Paraguayan Guarani




rani

Polish Zloty(PLN)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 Polish Zloty = 1553.4027 Paraguayan Guarani




rani

Qatari Rial(QAR)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 Qatari Rial = 1793.9023 Paraguayan Guarani




rani

Indian Rupee(INR)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 Indian Rupee = 86.5076 Paraguayan Guarani




rani

Pakistani Rupee(PKR)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 Pakistani Rupee = 40.9124 Paraguayan Guarani




rani

Sierra Leonean Leone(SLL)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 Sierra Leonean Leone = 0.6624 Paraguayan Guarani



  • Sierra Leonean Leone

rani

New Taiwan Dollar(TWD)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 New Taiwan Dollar = 218.7651 Paraguayan Guarani



  • New Taiwan Dollar

rani

Thai Baht(THB)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 Thai Baht = 203.9846 Paraguayan Guarani




rani

Turkish Lira(TRY)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 Turkish Lira = 921.368 Paraguayan Guarani




rani

Singapore Dollar(SGD)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 Singapore Dollar = 4623.5365 Paraguayan Guarani




rani

Mauritian Rupee(MUR)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 Mauritian Rupee = 164.4826 Paraguayan Guarani




rani

Nepalese Rupee(NPR)/Paraguayan Guarani(PYG)

1 Nepalese Rupee = 54.0093 Paraguayan Guarani