be

Will restaurants be allowed to offer alcohol for take-out and delivery after pandemic?

Restaurants have been struggling to stay afloat since the pandemic hit, but there has been a silver lining: relaxed liquor laws mean customers can get their booze delivered along with their meals.




be

Photos Of Kim Jong Un Spark Conspiracy Theories About A Body Double…You Be The Judge

The following article, Photos Of Kim Jong Un Spark Conspiracy Theories About A Body Double…You Be The Judge, was first published on 100PercentFedUp.com.

For several weeks rumors of the North Korean dictator’s sickness and ultimately, his death, have been making their rounds in the media. North Korea’s state-run media released photos of  Kim Jong Un that were allegedly taken on May 1, at the opening of a fertilizer factory in Sunchon, N. Korea. Twitter users who’ve studied the images are […]

Continue reading: Photos Of Kim Jong Un Spark Conspiracy Theories About A Body Double…You Be The Judge ...




be

MI Barber Shop Owner Defies Gov. Whitmer Shutdown Order…Opens Business…Police Officer Walks In…Says, “I love you!”…Walks Out

The following article, MI Barber Shop Owner Defies Gov. Whitmer Shutdown Order…Opens Business…Police Officer Walks In…Says, “I love you!”…Walks Out, was first published on 100PercentFedUp.com.

Last week, we reported about how Shelley Luther, owner of the Salon Á La Mode in North Dallas, Texas, who opened up her business in defiance of lockdown orders in the city. The salon owner said that she was ignoring a citation and a cease and desist order from the city to shut down. This one […]

Continue reading: MI Barber Shop Owner Defies Gov. Whitmer Shutdown Order…Opens Business…Police Officer Walks In…Says, “I love you!”…Walks Out ...




be

Donald Trump Jr. Offers To Walk Bride-to-Be Down The Aisle After Liberal Parents Refuse To Attend Her Wedding Because Fiance Is A Conservative

The following article, Donald Trump Jr. Offers To Walk Bride-to-Be Down The Aisle After Liberal Parents Refuse To Attend Her Wedding Because Fiance Is A Conservative, was first published on 100PercentFedUp.com.

TDS or Trump Derangement Syndrome brings out the worst in a lot of people. One young Texan girl’s story of her intolerant parents who refuse to attend her wedding because she’s marrying a conservative, however, is a new low. Lawyer and conservative civil rights activist, Rogan O’Handley tweeted a Tik Tok video of a Texan […]

Continue reading: Donald Trump Jr. Offers To Walk Bride-to-Be Down The Aisle After Liberal Parents Refuse To Attend Her Wedding Because Fiance Is A Conservative ...




be

77-Yr-Old MI Barber Defies Gov Whitmer’s Shutdown Order: ”I don’t need another mother” Shop Will Stay Open Until “Jesus walks in or until they arrest me” [VIDEO]

The following article, 77-Yr-Old MI Barber Defies Gov Whitmer’s Shutdown Order: ”I don’t need another mother” Shop Will Stay Open Until “Jesus walks in or until they arrest me” [VIDEO], was first published on 100PercentFedUp.com.

Emergency orders that “non-essential businesses” remain closed during the Covid-19 crisis have devastated small business owners across America. A wave of business owners across the nation are defying executive orders by their governors and opening their businesses anyhow. Yesterday, we reported about a small business owner in the state of Michigan, where Governor Gretchen Whitmer […]

Continue reading: 77-Yr-Old MI Barber Defies Gov Whitmer’s Shutdown Order: ”I don’t need another mother” Shop Will Stay Open Until “Jesus walks in or until they arrest me” [VIDEO] ...




be

Dem Congresswoman: Biden Allegation ‘Put To Rest’ Because He ‘Went on TV’ And Denied It

The following article, Dem Congresswoman: Biden Allegation ‘Put To Rest’ Because He ‘Went on TV’ And Denied It, was first published on 100PercentFedUp.com.

Democrat Rep. Dina Titus says that the allegations against 2020 Democrat presidential candidate Joe Biden are “put to rest” because he “went on TV” and denied them. Rep. Titus spoke with MSNBC’s Ayman Mohyeldin today about how she believes Biden because he flatly said he didn’t do it and didn’t say he doesn’t remember. It’s […]

Continue reading: Dem Congresswoman: Biden Allegation ‘Put To Rest’ Because He ‘Went on TV’ And Denied It ...




be

‘Schiff in Panic Mode’: Sources Say Russia Probe Transcripts Affirm Officials Found Nothing on Collusion

The following article, ‘Schiff in Panic Mode’: Sources Say Russia Probe Transcripts Affirm Officials Found Nothing on Collusion, was first published on 100PercentFedUp.com.

Transcripts of House Intelligence Committee interviews have been cleared for release, and Adam Schiff is reportedly in panic mode. Unfortunately for Schiff, top law enforcement and intel officials said they saw no evidence of collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia in the transcripts. Republicans sought and got approval for the release of the transcripts […]

Continue reading: ‘Schiff in Panic Mode’: Sources Say Russia Probe Transcripts Affirm Officials Found Nothing on Collusion ...




be

MSNBC’s Brian Williams Chuckles With Dem Strategist as He Gloats, Mocks Trump About Tragic Downturn in Economy: “They were going to lose before this hit. They’re just going to lose worse now”

The following article, MSNBC’s Brian Williams Chuckles With Dem Strategist as He Gloats, Mocks Trump About Tragic Downturn in Economy: “They were going to lose before this hit. They’re just going to lose worse now”, was first published on 100PercentFedUp.com.

James Carville spoke out before the coronavirus crisis to say that there is no way  Joe Biden has a chance at beating President Trump in the 2020 election. Well, He’s singing a different tune now at the expense of Americans suffering through this horrible pandemic and economic crisis. James Carvill is a Democratic strategist who […]

Continue reading: MSNBC’s Brian Williams Chuckles With Dem Strategist as He Gloats, Mocks Trump About Tragic Downturn in Economy: “They were going to lose before this hit. They’re just going to lose worse now” ...




be

Texas Gov Abbott Frees Salon Owner Shelley Luther: “Criminals shouldn’t be released to prevent COVID-19 just to put business owners in their place”

The following article, Texas Gov Abbott Frees Salon Owner Shelley Luther: “Criminals shouldn’t be released to prevent COVID-19 just to put business owners in their place”, was first published on 100PercentFedUp.com.

Texas Governor Greg Abbott just changed the coronavirus order to free Salon A La Mode owner Shelley Luther from jail. Abbott tweeted out a comment about the poor treatment of the business owner: Throwing Texans in jail whose biz’s shut down through no fault of their own is wrong. I am eliminating jail for violating […]

Continue reading: Texas Gov Abbott Frees Salon Owner Shelley Luther: “Criminals shouldn’t be released to prevent COVID-19 just to put business owners in their place” ...




be

Video Scrubbed of Obama-Biden Ambassador To China Praising Their Response to Coronavirus: “I take my hat off to China”

The following article, Video Scrubbed of Obama-Biden Ambassador To China Praising Their Response to Coronavirus: “I take my hat off to China”, was first published on 100PercentFedUp.com.

During a recent interview on CNN, Obama-Biden ambassador to China (2014-2017) Max Baucus compared standing up to China on the coronavirus to “Hitler in the ’30s.” Baucus has proven himself to be sympathetic to China in recent interviews, where he puts down America and praises the Chinese. The MSNBC video via The Washington Free Beacon […]

Continue reading: Video Scrubbed of Obama-Biden Ambassador To China Praising Their Response to Coronavirus: “I take my hat off to China” ...




be

Fed Judge Releases 21-Yr-Old Man To “Clean and Sober House” After Appearing In Court For Sexually Assaulting 12-Yr-Old Girl For One Month While Hiding In Her Bedroom

The following article, Fed Judge Releases 21-Yr-Old Man To “Clean and Sober House” After Appearing In Court For Sexually Assaulting 12-Yr-Old Girl For One Month While Hiding In Her Bedroom, was first published on 100PercentFedUp.com.

The normalizing of pedophilia is not a far-right conspiracy theory...

Continue reading: Fed Judge Releases 21-Yr-Old Man To “Clean and Sober House” After Appearing In Court For Sexually Assaulting 12-Yr-Old Girl For One Month While Hiding In Her Bedroom ...




be

Rush Limbaugh Predicts Joe Biden Won’t Be The Dem Nominee: “Something’s Gonna Happen”

The following article, Rush Limbaugh Predicts Joe Biden Won’t Be The Dem Nominee: “Something’s Gonna Happen”, was first published on 100PercentFedUp.com.

Is Joe Biden going to become the Democrat nominee and run against Trump in the fall?

Continue reading: Rush Limbaugh Predicts Joe Biden Won’t Be The Dem Nominee: “Something’s Gonna Happen” ...




be

Empty restaurant space could be turned into women's support centre

The empty space next to Winnipeg City Hall that once housed restaurants could be turned into a place to help exploited women.




be

Why China Should Be Wary of Devaluing the Renminbi

29 August 2019

David Lubin

Associate Fellow, Global Economy and Finance Programme
There are four good reasons why Beijing might want to think twice before using its currency to retaliate against US tariffs.

2019-08-29-Renminbi.jpg

RMB banknotes. Photo: Getty Images

The renminbi seems to be back in business as a Chinese tool of retaliation against US tariffs. A 1.5 per cent fall in the currency early this month in response to proposed new US tariffs was only a start. Since the middle of August the renminbi has weakened further, and the exchange rate is now 4 per cent weaker than at the start of the month. We may well see more of a ‘weaponized’ renminbi, but there are four good reasons why Beijing might be wise to think before shooting.

The first has to do with how China seeks to promote its place in the world. China has been at pains to manage the collapse of its relations with the US in a way that allows it to present itself as an alternative pillar of global order, and as a source of stability in the international system, not to mention moral authority. This has deep roots.

Anyone investigating the history of Chinese statecraft will quickly come across an enduring distinction in Chinese thought: between wang dao, the kingly, or righteous way, and ba dao, the way of the hegemon. Since Chinese thinkers and officials routinely describe US behaviour since the Second World War as hegemonic, it behoves Chinese policymakers to do as much as possible to stay on moral high-ground in their behaviour towards Washington. Only in that way would President Xi be able properly to assert China’s claim to leadership.

Indeed, China has a notable track record of using exchange rate stability to enhance its reputation as a force for global stability. Both in the aftermath of the Asian crisis in 1997, and of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, Chinese exchange rate stability was offered as a way of demonstrating China’s trustworthiness and its commitment to multilateral order.

Devaluing the renminbi in a meaningful way now might have a different rationale, but the cost to China’s claim to virtue, and its bid to offer itself as a guardian of global stability, might be considerable.

That’s particularly true because of the second problem China has in thinking about a weaker renminbi: it may not be all that effective in sustaining Chinese trade. One reason for this is the increasing co-movement with the renminbi of currencies in countries with whom China competes.

As the renminbi changes against the dollar, so do the Taiwan dollar, the Korean won, the Singapore dollar and the Indian rupee. In addition, the short-run impact of a weaker renminbi is more likely to curb imports than to expand exports, and so its effects might be contractionary. 

An ineffective devaluation of the renminbi would be particularly useless because of the third risk China needs to consider, namely the risk of retaliation by the US administration. Of this there is already plenty of evidence, of course.

The US Treasury’s declaration of China as a ‘currency manipulator’ on 5 August bears little relationship to the actual formal criteria that the Treasury uses to define that term, but equally the US had warned the Chinese back in May that these criteria don’t bind its hand. By abandoning a rules-based approach to the definition of currency manipulation, the US has opened wide the door to further antagonism, and Beijing should have no doubt that Washington will walk through that door if it wants to.

The fourth, and possibly most self-destructive, risk that China has to consider is that a weaker renminbi might destabilize China’s capital account, fuelling capital outflows that would leave China’s policymakers feeling very uncomfortable.

Indeed, there is already evidence that Chinese residents feel less confident that the renminbi is a reliable store of value, now that there is no longer a sense that the currency is destined to appreciate against the dollar. The best illustration of this comes from the ‘errors and omissions’, or unaccounted-for outflows, in China’s balance of payments.

The past few years have seen these outflows rise a lot, averaging some $200 billion per year during the past four calendar years, or almost 2 per cent GDP; and around $90 billion in the first three months of 2019 alone. These are scarily large numbers.

The risk here is that Chinese expectations about the renminbi are ‘adaptive’: the more the exchange rate weakens, the more Chinese residents expect it to weaken, and so the demand for dollars goes up. In principle, the only way to deal with this risk would be for the People's Bank of China (PBOC) to implement a large, one-off devaluation of the renminbi to a level at which dollars are expensive enough that no one wants to buy them anymore.

This would be very dangerous, though: it presupposes that the PBOC could know in advance the ‘equilibrium’ value of the renminbi. It would take an unusually brave central banker to claim such foresight, especially since that equilibrium value could itself be altered by the mere fact of such a dramatic change in policy.

No one really knows precisely by what mechanism capital outflows from China have accelerated in recent years, but a very good candidate is tourism. The expenditure of outbound Chinese tourists abroad has risen a lot in recent years, and that increase very closely mirrors the rise in ‘errors and omissions’. So the suspicion must be that the increasing flow of Chinese tourists – nearly one half of whom last year simply travelled to capital-controls-free Hong Kong and Macao – is just creating opportunities for unrecorded capital flight.

This raises a disturbing possibility: that the most effective way for China to devalue the renminbi without the backfire of capital outflows would be simultaneously to stem the outflow of Chinese tourists. China has form in this regard, albeit for differing reasons: this month it suspended a programme that allowed individual tourists from 47 Chinese cities to travel to Taiwan.

A more global restriction on Chinese tourism might make a devaluation of the renminbi ‘safer’, and it would have the collateral benefit of helping to increase China’s current account surplus, the evaporation of which in recent years owes a lot to rising tourism expenditure and which is almost certainly a source of unhappiness in Beijing, where mercantilism remains popular.

But a world where China could impose such draconian measures would be one where nationalism has reached heights we haven’t yet seen. Let’s hope we don’t go there.

This article was originally published in the Financial Times.




be

ER stress increases store-operated Ca2+ entry (SOCE) and augments basal insulin secretion in pancreatic beta cells [Molecular Bases of Disease]

Type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM) is characterized by impaired glucose-stimulated insulin secretion and increased peripheral insulin resistance. Unremitting endoplasmic reticulum (ER) stress can lead to beta-cell apoptosis and has been linked to type 2 diabetes. Although many studies have attempted to link ER stress and T2DM, the specific effects of ER stress on beta-cell function remain incompletely understood. To determine the interrelationship between ER stress and beta-cell function, here we treated insulin-secreting INS-1(832/13) cells or isolated mouse islets with the ER stress–inducer tunicamycin (TM). TM induced ER stress as expected, as evidenced by activation of the unfolded protein response. Beta cells treated with TM also exhibited concomitant alterations in their electrical activity and cytosolic free Ca2+ oscillations. As ER stress is known to reduce ER Ca2+ levels, we tested the hypothesis that the observed increase in Ca2+ oscillations occurred because of reduced ER Ca2+ levels and, in turn, increased store-operated Ca2+ entry. TM-induced cytosolic Ca2+ and membrane electrical oscillations were acutely inhibited by YM58483, which blocks store-operated Ca2+ channels. Significantly, TM-treated cells secreted increased insulin under conditions normally associated with only minimal release, e.g. 5 mm glucose, and YM58483 blocked this secretion. Taken together, these results support a critical role for ER Ca2+ depletion–activated Ca2+ current in mediating Ca2+-induced insulin secretion in response to ER stress.




be

Brain manganese and the balance between essential roles and neurotoxicity [Molecular Bases of Disease]

Manganese (Mn) is an essential micronutrient required for the normal development of many organs, including the brain. Although its roles as a cofactor in several enzymes and in maintaining optimal physiology are well-known, the overall biological functions of Mn are rather poorly understood. Alterations in body Mn status are associated with altered neuronal physiology and cognition in humans, and either overexposure or (more rarely) insufficiency can cause neurological dysfunction. The resultant balancing act can be viewed as a hormetic U-shaped relationship for biological Mn status and optimal brain health, with changes in the brain leading to physiological effects throughout the body and vice versa. This review discusses Mn homeostasis, biomarkers, molecular mechanisms of cellular transport, and neuropathological changes associated with disruptions of Mn homeostasis, especially in its excess, and identifies gaps in our understanding of the molecular and biochemical mechanisms underlying Mn homeostasis and neurotoxicity.




be

As Parliamentary Elections Loom, the Legitimacy of Iran’s Regime Has Been Shaken

5 December 2019

Dr Sanam Vakil

Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme
The latest wave of protests highlights a fracturing social contract in the Islamic Republic.

2019-12-05-Iran.jpg

Iranian protesters block a road during a demonstration against an increase in gasoline prices in Isfahan on 16 November. Photo: Getty Images.

For four decades, the rule of Iran’s Islamic Republic has rested on the pillars of redistributive social justice, foreign policy independence, Islam and a managed form of electoral legitimacy.  These pillars, each of equal importance, have served as guiding principles bolstering Iran’s domestic and foreign policy decisions.  Amid the latest round of protests to have gripped Iran, it is clear that these pillars are fracturing. 

On 15 November at midnight, the Iranian government, in a move supported by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Hassan Rouhani, Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani and Head of the Judiciary Ebrahim Raisi, announced a 200 per cent increase in fuel prices – a redistributive measure designed to provide cash transfers to the population.

In immediate reaction, Iranian citizens took to the streets to express their discontent with this policy move alongside mounting economic and political grievances.

What ensued over the subsequent days was an outbreak of protests through 100 Iranian cities, including at universities and bazaars, that was followed by a weeklong internet blackout and a brutal crackdown that has left at least 200 people dead and 7,000 arrested. Initially, public anger focused on the price increases but quickly targeted the political leadership, lack of government accountability, effective governance and corruption.

This wave of protests is the fourth in a two-decade period – 1999, 2009, 2017 and 2019 – for the Islamic Republic and comes at time when the Iranian government is under severe economic strain from Washington’s maximum pressure campaign. It is equally burdened by endemic factional politicking.

These protests are one of many reminders of the shattered social contract between state and society in Iran, which without repair will continue to resurface.

With internet connectivity resumed and news of the regime’s brutality spreading, conservatives and reformists are both trying to distance themselves from this internal crisis and reposition themselves in advance of the 2020 parliamentary elections.

Parliamentary elections for Iran’s 290-person legislature are expected to be held on 21 February. Amid concerns over public apathy and lower political participation, both reformists and conservatives are trying to develop strategies to maximize gains at their ballot box.

Even before these protests, voter turnout was anticipated to be lower than normal. Participation in the July 2019 Tehran municipality election was at a nadir of 9 per cent.  To prepare for this challenge, Iran’s parliament has lowered the vote threshold for a valid result from 25 to 20 per cent.

Elections in Iran, while by no means completely free and fair due to the vetting of candidates by the Guardian Council, have repeatedly been an important barometer of public support and participation. Electoral participation, which is traditionally higher than in most Western democracies, and compared to the lack of electoral opportunities in the Middle East, is heralded as a sign of public legitimacy. 

Voter participation is generally higher in presidential elections than in legislative ones.

For example, 73% voted in the 2017 presidential elections, 72% in 2013, 80% in the contested 2009 elections, and 59% in 2005 elections that brought Mahmood Ahmadinejad to office. Comparatively, in the 2016 parliamentary elections 62% voted, in 2012, 66%, in 2008, 47%, and in 2004, 51% participated.

Voter turnout in the 2008 parliamentary elections, reflective of public apathy, mounting international tensions over the nuclear programme, and Guardian Council vetting of reformist candidates, could be emblematic of what to expect next year. 

In the run up to the election, conservative groups are trying to capitalize on popular economic frustrations, disappointment with reformists, wider regional security concerns and tensions with the United States to rally voters. 

Reformists associated with the Rouhani government, who also supported the Iran nuclear agreement, have been severely weakened by the US maximum pressure campaign and the return of US sanctions.  They are also blamed for the current economic downturn and remain frustrated by their ability to affect change in a political system that affords more power to unelected figures.

Amidst this stalemate, Rouhani has continued to call for a national referendum to no avail, while reformist groups are debating how to position themselves – some even calling for greater accountability – so as not be tainted by the government crackdown. Leading reformist politicians such as Mohammad Khatami have called on reformists to stay united and avoid boycotting the elections. It remains to be seen how their strategy will develop after the protests.

Should the Guardian Council bar too many reformists from running, calls for a boycott could snowball and even incite new protests. Together with low turnout at the ballot box, the outcome of this election could further damage the regime’s already fragile electoral pillar and weaken its claims to legitimacy.




be

How the Soleimani Assassination Will Reverberate Throughout the Middle East

6 January 2020

Dr Sanam Vakil

Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

Dr Renad Mansour

Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme; Project Director, Iraq Initiative

Dr Lina Khatib

Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme
Regional experts examine how Iran benefits from the fallout of the killing, the implications for politics in Iraq and how Tehran might respond with its proxies in the region.

2020-01-06-Soleimani.jpg

Protesters hold up an image of Qassem Soleimani during a demonstration in Tehran on 3 January. Photo: Getty Images.

An unexpected bounty for Iran

Sanam Vakil

The assassination of Qassem Soleimani has been an unexpected bounty for the Islamic Republic at a time when Iran was balancing multiple economic, domestic and regional pressures stemming from the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.

Coming on the heels of anti-Iranian demonstrations in Iraq and Lebanon, and following Iran’s own November 2019 protests that resulted in a brutal government crackdown against its own people, the Soleimani killing has helped the Iranian government shift the narrative away from its perceived regional and domestic weaknesses to one of strength.  

The massive funeral scenes in multiple Iranian cities displaying unending waves of mourners chanting against the United States has provided the Islamic Republic with a unique opportunity to showcase its mobilizing potential. This potential is not limited to Iran but also extends to Iraq and Lebanon, where Tehran’s transnational summoning power has also been visible. The Iraqi parliamentary vote to end the American military presence is one early negative consequence. While the region awaits Iran’s response, further anti-American rallying cries will continue to reverberate.  

Domestically, Soleimani’s death and President Donald Trump’s continued provocations on Twitter, including threats to attack 52 Iranian cultural sites, are being used as a nationalist rallying cry. This sentiment should not be seen solely as Islamic or ideological, but rather an opportunity for the state to pivot to an Iranian-based nationalism that is more inclusive and empowering for much of the country’s disgruntled youth.

Iran’s notoriously divided political factions have also unified in the face of this crisis. With parliamentary elections looming in February and turnout previously expected to be low, the political establishment is likely to use this crisis to mobilize voters in favour of conservative candidates.  

How Tehran chooses to respond to Qassem Soleimani’s death will very much determine its ability to continue to control the narrative and manage its swell of domestic and regional support. For these benefits to continue to manifest, it is important for Tehran to balance the mix of public sympathy and international anxiety and not overplay its hand in its quest for revenge.

A reset for Iraqi politics

Renad Mansour

The US strike which killed Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis has grave implications for Iraq. The act jeopardizes Iraq’s recently stabilized security situation, and threatens to reshape the country’s political environment, moving backwards to the days of anti-Americanism and sect-based mobilization. If Baghdad loses relations with the US and other diplomatic representations, it risks turning into a pariah state. 

Over the past few years, and notably since October 2019, young Iraqis have taken to the streets demanding reform and the downfall of the political establishment, and its main external backer Iran. The political establishment, including political parties and militias close to Tehran, failed to appease or suppress these protests. Now, these political elites are using the deaths of Muhandis and Soleimani to (re)gain popularity from their own population, by drawing on the old tool of anti-Americanism. 

Following the attacks, Shia populist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr – who until recently had called for an end to Iranian and pro-Iranian militia influence in Iraq – has called to revamp the Mehdi Army that he led until 2008 and is calling for ‘Islamic resistance’ to the US. In seeking to regain control of his former movement, he is coming closer to former Shia foes.

For years, pro-Iranian groups attempted to push the US out of Iraq. Their calls often fell on deaf ears, as public opinion in Iraq did not consider the US as a threat and some even supported the US and international effort against ISIS. Following the attacks, however, anti-American voices have gained more ammunition.

A complete American withdrawal would not only have direct security implications but force other countries and organizations, from European states to NATO, to reconsider their positions and role.

Limited options for ‘revenge’ in the Levant

Lina Khatib

Iran’s use of Lebanon and Syria as spaces for revenge against the US is unlikely.

On Sunday, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah vowed revenge for Soleimani’s death by singling out American soldiers as a target. However, Hezbollah’s options are limited. Lebanon is in the middle of wide-ranging protests against the country’s ruling political class, of which Nasrallah is a key figure.

Unlike in 2006, when Hezbollah’s military actions against Israel rallied the public around it, today there is no public appetite for dragging Lebanon into a war. Were Hezbollah to instigate one, it would incur public anger, if only for the economic repercussions that would exacerbate an already severe financial crisis in Lebanon. Lebanon also does not have any US military bases that could be a target for Hezbollah.

In theory, Hezbollah or other Iranian-backed groups could attack American bases in Syria. But these bases are staffed by multinational forces from the international anti-ISIS coalition. Attacking them would therefore put Iran in confrontation with other countries besides the US, which is not in Iran’s interest.

Attacking US soldiers in northeast Syria would also go against Kurdish interests because it would weaken the anti-ISIS coalition front of which Kurdish forces are part. It would, furthermore, anger Arab tribes in the area, opening up possibilities for ISIS to take advantage of public dissent to stage a comeback. Iran would then find itself fighting on several fronts at once, which it does not have the capacity to handle. 

More likely, Iran’s allies and proxies in the Levant are going to engage in strong rhetoric without taking hasty actions. When a key Hezbollah leader, Imad Mughniyeh, was assassinated in Damascus on 2008, there were strong words and public vows to seek revenge for his killing, but ultimately there was no response.    




be

Is the GCC Cyber Resilient?

9 March 2020

How would the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) respond to a serious cyber incident? This could be a global ransomware event, a critical infrastructure incident targeted at the energy sector, or an attack on government departments. This paper examines cyber resilience in the states of the GCC. 

Joyce Hakmeh

Senior Research Fellow, International Security Programme; Co-Editor, Journal of Cyber Policy

James Shires

Assistant Professor at the Institute for Security and Global Affairs, University of Leiden

GettyImages-1052280468.jpg

Saudi nationals attend the Gitex 2018 exhibition at the Dubai World Trade Center in Dubai on 16 October 2018. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • GCC states seek to be leaders in digital innovation, but this leaves them vulnerable to an increasing range of cyberthreats. Governments have invested significantly in cybersecurity but these measures have been unevenly implemented, makingit difficult for these states to be resilient against a large-scale cyber incident.
  • Strategies, structures and processes (‘approaches’) for achieving cyber resilience can be conceptualized along a scale from centralized to distributed: centralized approaches maintain decision-making power in a single body, while distributed ones disperse power over many sites.
  • Centralized approaches provide more resilience against unwanted influence, while distributed approaches provide more resilience against intrusions into infrastructure. The GCC states have so far prioritized centralized over distributed cyber resilience, seeking internet and social media control over sustainable network recovery.
  • GCC governments should make a sustainable commitment to cyber resilience that provides clear guidance to organizations and makes best use of emerging cybersecurity structures. This may involve further engagement with international initiatives and partners to increase cyber resilience.
  • Given limited resources, GCC governments should rebalance their efforts from centralized towards distributed approaches to resilience.
  • GCC governments should examine the impact of relevant new technologies, discussing openly the risks of these technologies and appropriate solutions.




be

Biosynthesis of depsipeptides with a 3-hydroxybenzoate moiety and selective anticancer activities involves a chorismatase [Metabolism]

Neoantimycins are anticancer compounds of 15-membered ring antimycin-type depsipeptides. They are biosynthesized by a hybrid multimodular protein complex of nonribosomal peptide synthetase (NRPS) and polyketide synthase (PKS), typically from the starting precursor 3-formamidosalicylate. Examining fermentation extracts of Streptomyces conglobatus, here we discovered four new neoantimycin analogs, unantimycins B–E, in which 3-formamidosalicylates are replaced by an unusual 3-hydroxybenzoate (3-HBA) moiety. Unantimycins B–E exhibited levels of anticancer activities similar to those of the chemotherapeutic drug cisplatin in human lung cancer, colorectal cancer, and melanoma cells. Notably, they mostly displayed no significant toxicity toward noncancerous cells, unlike the serious toxicities generally reported for antimycin-type natural products. Using site-directed mutagenesis and heterologous expression, we found that unantimycin productions are correlated with the activity of a chorismatase homolog, the nat-hyg5 gene, from a type I PKS gene cluster. Biochemical analysis confirmed that the catalytic activity of Nat-hyg5 generates 3-HBA from chorismate. Finally, we achieved selective production of unantimycins B and C by engineering a chassis host. On the basis of these findings, we propose that unantimycin biosynthesis is directed by the neoantimycin-producing NRPS–PKS complex and initiated with the starter unit of 3-HBA. The elucidation of the biosynthetic unantimycin pathway reported here paves the way to improve the yield of these compounds for evaluation in oncotherapeutic applications.




be

The hibernating 100S complex is a target of ribosome-recycling factor and elongation factor G in Staphylococcus aureus [Protein Synthesis and Degradation]

The formation of translationally inactive 70S dimers (called 100S ribosomes) by hibernation-promoting factor is a widespread survival strategy among bacteria. Ribosome dimerization is thought to be reversible, with the dissociation of the 100S complexes enabling ribosome recycling for participation in new rounds of translation. The precise pathway of 100S ribosome recycling has been unclear. We previously found that the heat-shock GTPase HflX in the human pathogen Staphylococcus aureus is a minor disassembly factor. Cells lacking hflX do not accumulate 100S ribosomes unless they are subjected to heat exposure, suggesting the existence of an alternative pathway during nonstressed conditions. Here, we provide biochemical and genetic evidence that two essential translation factors, ribosome-recycling factor (RRF) and GTPase elongation factor G (EF-G), synergistically split 100S ribosomes in a GTP-dependent but tRNA translocation-independent manner. We found that although HflX and the RRF/EF-G pair are functionally interchangeable, HflX is expressed at low levels and is dispensable under normal growth conditions. The bacterial RRF/EF-G pair was previously known to target only the post-termination 70S complexes; our results reveal a new role in the reversal of ribosome hibernation that is intimately linked to bacterial pathogenesis, persister formation, stress responses, and ribosome integrity.




be

Connecting the digital divides: Technology and cyber policy experts launch new journal

30 June 2015

Chatham House and Routledge, Taylor & Francis are launching the Journal of Cyber Policy on 2 July.

Fifteen years ago it would be unthinkable for cyber security to top the list of priorities at the annual US-China Security and Economic Dialogue, as it did last week. But, in the intervening years, cyber technologies and the internet have become fundamental tools for everything from running critical infrastructure such as energy grids and satellite systems, to political, economic and social interactions. Given the pace of change, it should not surprise us that we have barely started to understand how to govern this new order and manage the global internet in ways that both empower and protect us.

In response, Chatham House and Routledge (part of the Taylor & Francis Group) are launching the Journal of Cyber Policy, addressing a rapidly changing situation and connecting creative, technical and policy experts.

Informing the growing security challenges of an interconnected digital world, this new peer-reviewed journal will provide a valuable resource to decision-makers in the public and private sectors grappling with the challenges of cyber security, online privacy, surveillance and internet access. The journal will offer informed and rigorous thinking, supported by the journal’s internationally renowned editorial board.

'The Journal of Cyber Policy will empower experts with new thinking and diverse ideas delivered in a way which is practically relevant as well as academically rigorous,' Dr Patricia Lewis, research director, International Security Department at Chatham House and co-editor of the journal, said. 'It will change the game for those working on cyber issues.' 

'As the preferred publisher for think tanks around the world, we are proud to be Chatham House’s partner on this new journal, which seeks to address issues that touch upon all our lives on a daily basis,' said Leon Heward-Mills, Global Publishing Director (Journals) at Taylor & Francis Group.

The Journal of Cyber Policy launches on the evening of 2 July at a reception at Chatham House.

Editor's notes

Patricia Lewis, research director, International Security, Chatham House, is available for interview on cyber issues. To request an interview, please contact the press office.

Reflecting the global nature of cyber issues, the Journal of Cyber Policy is intent on drawing upon a geographically and culturally diverse set of contributors.

The editorial board includes:

  • Subimal Bhattacharjee, independent consultant on defense and cyber security issues, New Delhi (India)
  • Pablo Bello, secretary general, Asociación Iberoamericana de Centros de Investigación y Empresas de Telecomunicaciones (AHCIET) [and former vice minister of telecommunications] (Chile)
  • Dr Myriam Dunn Cavelty, lecturer for security studies and senior researcher in the field of risk and resilience at the Center for Security Studies, Zurich (Switzerland)
  • Prof Richard Dasher, director, US-Asia Technology Management Center, Stanford University (USA)
  • Dorothy Gordon, director-general, Ghana-India Kofi Annan Centre of Excellence in ICT (Ghana)
  • Alexandra Kulikova, programme coordinator, Global Internet Governance and International Information Security, PIR Center (Russia)
  • Dr Victoria Nash, deputy director, Oxford Internet Institute (UK)
  • Prof Motohiro Tsuchiya, professor, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University (Japan)

Editor, the Journal of Cyber Policy: Caroline Baylon, Chatham House
Co-editors, the Journal of Cyber Policy: Dr Patricia Lewis and Emily Taylor, Chatham House

Topics for the first edition are as follows:

  • How did we get here?
  • Cyber crime – the impact so far
  • How does the internet run and who owns it?
  • Privacy vs security
  • Vulnerability and resilience of critical infrastructure
  • Cyber war is already underway
  • The next billion online
  • ​Cyber security awareness: Are politicians fit for purpose?
  • Internet of Things

The first two issues of the Journal on Cyber Policy will be published in 2016 and subscriptions to the journal can be placed in August 2015.

Chatham House 

Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is an independent policy institute based in London. It is renowned for open debate, independent analysis and new ideas. Chatham House experts develop new ideas on how best to confront critical international challenges and take advantage of opportunities from the near- to the long-term. Policy recommendations are developed in collaboration with policy-makers, experts and stakeholders in each area. Chatham House staff regularly brief government officials, legislators and other decision-makers on their conclusions.

Taylor & Francis Group

Taylor & Francis Group partners with researchers, scholarly societies, universities and libraries worldwide to bring knowledge to life.  As one of the world’s leading publishers of scholarly journals, books, ebooks and reference works our content spans all areas of Humanities, Social Sciences, Behavioural Sciences, Science, and Technology and Medicine.

From our network of offices in Oxford, New York, Philadelphia, Boca Raton, Boston, Melbourne, Singapore, Beijing, Tokyo, Stockholm, New Delhi and Johannesburg, Taylor & Francis staff provide local expertise and support to our editors, societies and authors and tailored, efficient customer service to our library colleagues.

Contacts

Press Office

+44 (0)20 7957 5739




be

Risk of serious cyber attacks on nuclear facilities underestimated, says new report

2 October 2015

20150930CyberSecurity.jpg

Workers at the Wolsong nuclear power plant participate in an anti-cyber attack exercise, Gyeongju, South Korea. Photo: Getty Images.

The risk of a serious cyber attack on civil nuclear infrastructure is growing, as facilities become ever more reliant on digital systems and make increasing use of commercial ‘off-the-shelf’ software, according to a major new report from Chatham House.

Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear Facilities: Understanding the Risks is the result of an 18-month study that draws on in-depth interviews with 30 leading industry practitioners based in more than eight countries. It found that the trend to digitization, when combined with a lack of executive-level awareness of the risks involved, means that nuclear plant personnel may not realize the full extent of their cyber vulnerability and are thus inadequately prepared to deal with potential attacks. 

Specific findings include:                

  • The conventional belief that all nuclear facilities are ‘air gapped’ (isolated from the public internet) is a myth. The commercial benefits of internet connectivity mean that a number of nuclear facilities now have VPN connections installed, which facility operators are sometimes unaware of.
  • Search engines can readily identify critical infrastructure components with such connections.
  • Even where facilities are air gapped, this safeguard can be breached with nothing more than a flash drive.
  • Supply chain vulnerabilities mean that equipment used at a nuclear facility risks compromise at any stage.
  • A lack of training, combined with communication breakdowns between engineers and security personnel, means that nuclear plant personnel often lack an understanding of key cyber security procedures.
  • Reactive rather than proactive approaches to cyber security contribute to the possibility that a nuclear facility might not know of a cyber attack until it is already substantially under way.

In the light of these risks, the report outlines a blend of policy and technical measures that will be required to counter the threats and meet the challenges. 

Recommendations include:

  • Developing guidelines to measure cyber security risk in the nuclear industry, including an integrated risk assessment that takes both security and safety measures into account.
  • Engaging in robust dialogue with engineers and contractors to raise awareness of the cyber security risk, including the dangers of setting up unauthorized internet connections.
  • Implementing rules, where not already in place, to promote good IT hygiene in nuclear facilities (for example to forbid the use of personal devices) and enforcing rules where they do exist.
  • Improving disclosure by encouraging anonymous information sharing and the establishment of industrial CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Team).
  • Encouraging universal adoption of regulatory standards.

Editor's notes

Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear Facilities: Understanding the Risks, written by Caroline Baylon with Roger Brunt and David Livingstone, is embargoed until Monday 5 October 2015.

Caroline Baylon is the research associate in science, technology and cyber security at Chatham House. Roger Brunt was appointed the UK government's regulator for security in the civil nuclear industry as the director of the Office for Civil Nuclear Security after retiring from the British Army in 2004. David Livingstone is an associate fellow at Chatham House, where he has participated in a broad range of projects on national-level risk management, cyber security, counterterrorism, serious organized crime, nuclear security and space security.

Fore more information, or to request an interview with the authors, contact the press office

Contacts

Press Office

+44 (0)20 7957 5739




be

The resource curse has not been lifted

5 August 2015

20150804ResourceCurse2.jpg

Hoping to make a little money from Sudan's ocean of black gold, a woman sells tea to roughnecks at an oil rig near Bentiu, Sudan. Photo by Getty Images.

During a decade-long commodities boom, new or emerging producers of oil, gas or mineral resources registered some of the fastest rates of economic growth in the world. Development banks, governments giving foreign aid, extractives companies and major consultancies broadly agreed that ‘extractives-led growth’ is a viable path to socio-economic development for poor countries. 
               
Following over a year of decline in global commodities prices and as efforts to tackle climate change mount, a new paper re-examines the 'curse of natural resources'. It finds that a policy of extractives-led growth entails serious risks. As governments of countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Mauritania, Somalia, Liberia and Cuba prepare to follow an extractives-led growth path, both the advice being handed to them and the growth model itself require a fundamental rethink.

The Resource Curse Revisited argues that:

  • The steep decline in the oil price in the second half of 2014 demolished the main assumption of the extractives-led growth agenda. The assumption that prices of raw materials would continue to increase as global demand grew and well-established sources were exhausted has actually led several low- to middle-income producers such as Ghana into unmanageable debt. At the very least, the current price context  puts new producers at a serious disadvantage, as the focus on cost-cutting has made investors reluctant to accept the risks of developing projects in countries with little infrastructure or capacity to support them.

  • Good governance initiatives are not the antidote to the resource curse. There has often been a mismatch in terms of policy advice given (for example on transparency and revenue management) and the capacity of a country to implement it. Furthermore, basing economic growth on the extraction of below-ground resources will create strong pressures towards poor governance. In the absence of strong institutions, this path leads to the enrichment of minority elite groups, whose interest in capturing rents is likely to become a barrier to improving governance.

  • Both governments with extractives potential and those advising them give too little consideration to the size and nature of the resource base. If extractives-led growth is to be sustained, resource extraction must persist long enough for new economic sectors to emerge and generate revenues that can support government spending and import needs as income from extractives declines.
  • The extractives-led growth model, in its current form, is at odds with green growth strategies. The advice from international agencies and initiatives to countries with extractive resources offers no suggestions on how governments should manage the risk of stranded assets or how they can reconcile extractives-led growth with national sustainable-development goals.

The report concludes that the extractives-led growth agenda has tended to reinforce domestic, government and investor pressures to ‘develop fast’. However, this can threaten long-term opportunities for robust economic diversification. In many cases, there is a strong case for slowing development of extractives projects to allow time to develop the capacity of the government and the private sector to maximize the linkages with the rest of the economy.

Avoiding the resource curse needs not only good governance but also an economic policy that provides for the transition of an economy over time in accordance with its competitive advantages. This report recommends that countries considering extractives development, and their would-be advisors, take into account a wider set of issues at the outset including the likely value of the asset to the economy over time, the options for slow or indeed no development of extractives, and how the rest of the economy would lessen reliance on support from the extractives sector over time.

Editor's notes

Read the report The Resource Curse Revisited from the Energy, Environment and Resources Department, Chatham House.

For all enquiries, please contact the press office

Contacts

Press Office

+44 (0)20 7957 5739




be

Dame Margaret Anstee remembered

20 January 2017

Dame Margaret Anstee, the first female UN under-secretary general, who died last year after a long and distinguished career as a diplomat, was remembered this week at Chatham House.

Dame Margaret Anstee was a diplomat whose postings as UN representative included in Colombia, Uruguay and Argentina, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Morocco and Chile. She was also special representative of the secretary-general to Angola (1992-93) and, when Chatham House launched its British Angola Forum in 1998 Dame Margaret served on its board until 2009.

Her involvement with the institute’s work on Angola included most recently a Chatham House conference on Angola in 2015 where she sent a video message to delegates. In a separate interview, recorded at the same time, she reflected on the UN on its 70th anniversary and discussed its successes and failures and her optimism for its future.

On 17 January 2017 a memorial service was held at St James’s Church and a message from José Eduardo dos Santos, Angola’s president, acknowledged Dame Margaret’s courage and the remarkable role she played in Angola’s transition to democracy. A eulogy address was delivered by Sir Jeremy Greenstock, member of Chatham House’s council, and the service was followed by a reception at Chatham House. In an obituary published last year Alex Vines, head of Chatham House’s Africa programme, wrote about the vital role she played in Angola’s recent history.




be

Chatham House appoints Tim Benton as Distinguished Visiting Fellow

26 January 2017

Chatham House is pleased to announce that Tim Benton has joined the institute as a Distinguished Visiting Fellow in the Energy, Environment and Resources Department.

Professor Tim Benton has joined Chatham House’s Energy, Environment and Resources department to help develop the institute’s work on the critical challenges of climate change, resilience and sustainable development. He brings renowned expertise on food security and environmental change, and will focus on establishing new initiatives at the intersection of research and policymaking.

Previously Tim has been UK champion for global food security, acting as an ambassador and spokesperson as well as coordinating work between research councils and government departments in this increasingly important area or research. Tim is also the dean for strategic research initiatives at the University of Leeds and a global agenda steward for the World Economic Forum.

Rob Bailey, director of the Energy, Environment and Resources department, said: 'I am delighted to welcome Tim to Chatham House. He has distinguished himself as a leading thinker on climate change and food security and we are all excited at the prospect of working with him.'

Tim Benton said: 'It is an honour to join Chatham House, with its great international reputation for independent thinking. I am looking forward to making a contribution to meeting the challenges implicit in managing the world’s resources sustainably whilst the global population and economy grows.'

Editor's notes

About the Energy, Environment and Resources Department

The Energy, Environment and Resources department at Chatham House seeks to advance the international debate on energy, environment and development policy and to influence and enable decision-makers - governments, NGOs and business - to take well-informed decisions that contribute to achieving sustainable development. Independent of any actor or ideology, we do this by carrying out innovative research on major policy challenges, bringing together diverse perspectives and constituencies and injecting new ideas into the international arena.




be

Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership Announces 2018/19 Fellows

1 October 2018

The Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs, based at Chatham House, is delighted to announce the arrival of its new cohort of Academy fellows.

The Academy was launched by Her Majesty the Queen in November 2014 to offer potential and established leaders from around the world the opportunity to spend ten months as Academy fellows and develop the tools needed to address the major policy challenges and critical issues facing the world today.

Academy fellows are drawn from government and the broader policy community, the private sector, media and civil society. During their time at the Academy, fellows deepen their understanding of critical issues, learn new skills, develop their networks and propose new ideas and solutions to complex policy challenges and opportunities.

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Dean, QEII Academy for Leadership in International Affairs says:

'Chatham House recognizes the need for inspirational and effective leadership in today’s complex and rapidly changing global environment. We remain absolutely committed to the mission of developing leadership skills and feel privileged to welcome the 2018-19 Academy Fellows. The Queen Elizabeth II Academy is uniquely well-positioned, drawing on the historical depth of expertise at Chatham House, our international and national networks, and the dynamism of London to develop skills, knowledge, and global insights that benefit emerging and accomplished leaders across diverse sectors in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and the Americas.'

Academy Fellows 2018/19

Rustam Anshba
Rustam’s research will explore the prospects for transforming the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. He will be hosted by the Russia and Eurasia Programme. His fellowship is supported by the Robert Bosch Stiftung.

Rita Dayoub
Rita will analyse attacks against healthcare systems during conflicts in Syria and South Sudan. She will be hosted by the Centre on Global Health Security. Her fellowship is supported by the Asfari Foundation.

Isabel Dunstan
Isabel’s research will focus on digital literacy among women as a means to counter radicalization and intolerance in Indonesia. She will be hosted by the Asia-Pacific Programme. Her fellowship is supported by Mr Richard Hayden.

Sophia Ignatidou
Sophia will examine the political and security implications of Artificial Intelligence. She will be hosted by the International Security Department. Her fellowship is supported by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation.

Anna Korbut
Anna’s research will examine the current media landscape in Ukraine and its transformative potential. She will be hosted by the Russia and Eurasia Programme. Her fellowship is supported by the Robert Bosch Stiftung.

Damir Kurtagic
Damir will research the challenges and possibilities of private sector engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa. He will be hosted by the Africa Programme. His fellowship is supported by the Robert Bosch Stiftung.

Zaki Mehchy
Zaki will research the role and dynamics of non-state actors in Syria and their relationship with state institutions. He will be hosted by the Middle East and North Africa Programme. His fellowship is supported by the Asfari Foundation.

Anne Nyambane
Anne will examine the synergies and trade-offs involved in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). She will be hosted by the Energy, Environment and Resources Department. Her fellowship is supported by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation.

Masterclass
The Academy is also pleased to welcome three Masterclass participants from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.




be

Chatham House appoints Tim Benton as Research Director for Energy, Environment and Resources

30 May 2019

Chatham House is pleased to announce that Professor Tim Benton has been appointed as research director of the Energy, Environment and Resources Department.

He brings substantial expertise on food systems and environmental change to the role and will focus on establishing new initiatives at the intersection of research and policymaking.

Tim was appointed as a distinguished visiting fellow of Chatham House in the Energy, Environment and Resources Department in 2016. He has since contributed to the institute in a number of ways, not least through leading the GCRF-AFRICAP project which aims to enhance policy making in Sub-Saharan Africa, through building climate-smart food systems.

Tim’s research focuses on food security and building food systems that are resilient and sustainable, working within the broader areas of ecology, natural resources and climate change impacts. He has published over 150 academic papers, most tackling the core themes of agriculture’s environmental impact and more generally how systems respond to environmental change. He is a lead author of the upcoming Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on climate change and land. He is also coordinating lead author on international risks for the UK’s Climate Change Risk Assessment, which draws on his broader interests in sustainable finance, trade and energy. He has advised other governments as well as global companies on related issues.

Tim joins Chatham House in his new capacity from the University of Leeds where he is dean of strategic research initiatives. Prior to this, from 2011 to 2016, Tim was the champion of the UK’s Global Food Security programme, a large multi-agency partnership of the UK’s public bodies involved in addressing challenges around food. He has also been research dean in the Faculty of Biological Sciences, and head of department, at Leeds.

Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, said: 'Tim’s wealth of experience will be especially valuable as we build up our interdisciplinary Chatham House research theme of promoting sustainable growth. We look forward to welcoming Tim to his new role in early July.'

Tim Benton said: 'I am honoured to be joining Chatham House as Research Director for Energy, Environment and Resources. Chatham House has a global reputation in these areas, on which we can build. Informed analysis, combined with effective action to transition towards sustainable economies, is needed now, more than ever.'

About the Energy, Environment and Resources Department

The Energy, Environment and Resources department at Chatham House seeks to advance the international debate on energy, environment and development policy and to influence and enable decision-makers – governments, NGOs and business – to take well-informed decisions that contribute to achieving sustainable development. Independent of any actor or ideology, we do this by carrying out innovative research on major policy challenges, bringing together diverse perspectives and constituencies and injecting new ideas into the international arena.

Tim Benton takes over the role from Rob Bailey who has joined Marsh & McLennan Insights as Director, Climate Resilience.




be

Brexit Would Be a Further Blow to the Special Relationship

20 April 2016

Xenia Wickett

Former Head, US and the Americas Programme; Former Dean, The Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs
But increased British leadership, in Europe and beyond, could reverse the decline of US–UK ties.

2016-04-20-Cameron-Obama.jpg

Barack Obama and David Cameron at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit on 1 April 2016 in Washington. Photo by Getty Images.

The US−UK ‘Special Relationship’ is in decline, and a British decision to leave the EU would hasten its demise. As Great Britain increasingly becomes just one of America’s many strategic relationships, Brexit would speed the transfer of US attention and energy from the UK to the continent. This, however, does not need to be inevitable. The necessary ingredient to reverse this decline is stronger British leadership internationally.

The US government has made it abundantly clear that its preference is to see the UK remain in the European Union. In January 2013, when David Cameron had not yet committed to a referendum, Phil Gordon, the US assistant secretary of state for European affairs bluntly stated that it is in the American interest for the US ‘to see a strong British voice in that European Union.’ The fact that a senior US official would go so far – to be seen to intervene so early in a divisive domestic political issue – spoke volumes about how important this is to America. This week, President Obama will visit the UK to send an equally firm, if polite, message to the British public.

Why does the US want the UK to remain in Europe?

From the US perspective, there are three principal elements that the UK brings to the table in the bilateral relationship. The first stems from Britain’s capabilities, particularly in the military and intelligence arenas. US−UK intelligence sharing, the closest for both countries, has a long history dating back to the Second World War. For good or ill the UK has been among America’s leading allies in every major conflict the US has been involved in for the last quarter of a century – in the Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo, Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, the interventions in Libya as well as current operations against ISIS in Iraq and, belatedly, Syria.

The second relates to the political value of having a reliable partner in international engagements – and thereby avoiding the perception of acting unilaterally. Shared history and values, and thus often perspectives (as well as capabilities) have ensured that the UK has long been the first port of call for the US when seeking to solve international problems or build coalitions. At the same time, Britain’s historical global reach and diplomatic experience around the world (not least in areas of current concern such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel and Palestine, and Iraq) have provided American policy-makers with valuable input on foreign policy issues that has contributed to their own internal decision making.

The third area of added value for the US is Britain’s place in the EU. While British and US policy preferences may at times diverge, as they have recently on the Israel−Palestine issue, for example, their common outlooks and interests mean that Britain is the closest thing that the United States has to having a voice in the EU. At the same time, the US also sees the UK as the country most likely to support an open trade and investment agenda and a more proactive approach to dealing with the challenges in Europe’s neighbourhood, policies that leaders in both countries agree are necessary to make the EU a more effective actor and better partner to the US on the international scene.

The transition from US−UK ties to US−European ties

In recent years, however, the US has begun to diversify its relationships within Europe, in part as the UK has become unable or unwilling to step up and fulfil these three elements of paramount importance to the US.

Defence and intelligence

With regards to defence capabilities, it is no longer the UK that the United States inevitably looks to first. In Libya, the operation that started with the defence of Benghazi from Gaddafi’s forces in March 2012 (that eventually came to remove Gaddafi himself) was jointly led by the French and the British, although then-French president Nicolas Sarkozy appeared to be the driving force. More recently, it was the French with whom the US partnered in responding to the terrorist activities in Mali and who were first to support the US in action in Syria (following a UK parliamentary vote to stay out in August 2013 and a belated vote to act in December 2015). But in recent years others have worked more closely with the United States militarily as well, including in particular Poland and Denmark (although with the new government in Poland, the relationship might wither again).

This trend towards more diversified military engagement with other European states looks set to continue in the near term. Despite taking a tough position in the 2014 NATO Summit to reinforce the NATO commitment of two per cent of GDP spending on defence, the Cameron government came very close to falling below this line in 2015 (after five years of real defence cuts). The eventual decision to commit to meet this target, along with the newly released Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), have somewhat reassured American policy-makers of the UK’s continued ambition and capabilities. But there remains a lack of US confidence that this is only a temporary uptick in UK attention on defence. Meanwhile, America will continue to expand its horizons.

The story on intelligence sharing is slightly different, but here too obstacles have arisen in the close US-UK exchange of information. Since the end of the Second World War, the US and UK have been part of the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance – with Australia, New Zealand and Canada – that allows the close sharing of intelligence. And arguably, within the Five Eyes, the links between the US and UK are the closest of all. However, more recently, tensions have emerged. Over the past five or so years, the British judicial system in particular has pushed back on US confidentiality rules in ways that make the US intelligence services nervous of continuing to share information; given the current close relationship, this could be more of an obstacle than it is for other countries sharing intel with the US.

At the same time, with the ISIS-inspired resurgence in the terrorist threat in both Europe and the US, it is becoming increasingly clear that the close intelligence sharing between the US and UK must take place much more widely. The current systems – through NATO or INTERPOL – have proven too slow and ineffective, as the recent attacks in Paris and Brussels have made clear. Sharing among the US and UK, or even among the Five Eyes, is insufficient – increasingly the relationships will have to be broadened.

Partnership

The US is also looking elsewhere for partnership in its international engagements, including on some of the issues that are at the top of the inbox for the American president.

On responding to Russian actions in Ukraine, it is clear that German Chancellor Angela Merkel is in the lead, both in corralling Europeans to maintain the sanctions but also in negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin. This was highlighted in the creation of the Normandy format in the summer of 2014, a group encompassing Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine (but not the UK or the US), to resolve the situation in the east of Ukraine. On another issue of significant import to the United States, European economic prosperity and stability, Merkel is again the leading actor in Europe.

In the case of targeted bombing in Syria, it was not the British that were first to join the United States in the offensive against ISIS, but instead the French. President Francois Hollande also proved far more proactive after Syrian President Assad crossed the chemical weapons ‘redline’ in 2013, although in the end France was left hanging when President Obama decided to step back from military action after the failure of the British parliamentary vote to authorize UK involvement.

Finally, on at least one issue of great import to the US – China – the UK appears to be diverging meaningfully. The most recent case – the UK decision to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in March 2015 – is perhaps the starkest example of such differing policy positions that have caused significant frustration in the US.

Influence in the European Union

With regards to Europe, even before the referendum was formally announced, it was increasingly clear that the UK was less inclined to engage proactively in the EU. A number of factors have ensured that, particularly since 2010, the UK has become less influential there.

British influence has been diminished through actions by the Cameron government that have, perhaps unnecessarily, antagonized many across the Channel. Many European conservatives became frustrated early in Cameron’s tenure when he decided to take the Conservative Party out of the principal conservative group in the European parliament, the European People’s Party. This sentiment only worsened in recent years as, albeit for perhaps understandable domestic political reasons, Cameron conducted an adversarial negotiation with his European partners in an effort to secure reforms to the EU and changes in Britain’s terms of membership.

The UK also no longer sends its best and brightest to EU institutions. Many of the leading British officials who once occupied high offices there have left and been replaced by other continental Europeans. This deprives Britain of an important source of influence within the EU.

It is clear that if the US wants influence in the EU, it needs more partners there than just the UK. Britain is still important, and would be a strong driver to make the institution more efficient, but as its influence declines it is no longer sufficient. A Leave vote would immediately dispose of that influence entirely.

The UK is ‘one among many’ for the US

What is clear is that increasingly the UK is not ‘first among equals’ in Europe but ‘one among many’ for the United States. America is diversifying its relationships. More and more the US can find other allies and friends to fulfil the needs in which the UK no longer has interest.

If the UK leaves the European Union, the pace of this trend will only quicken. In addition to needing to find alternative partners to address these policy gaps, the UK will likely no longer have the time to devote to the United States that it does today. If Brexit takes place, Whitehall will find itself inundated with issues which had previously been managed by the EU, from trade deals with third parties to negotiating constant market access adjustments with the EU. Thus, very quickly, British resources are likely to be pulled from the US portfolio, and issues of common concern will get drowned out by other agendas. At least for a while, the US will likely get short shrift.

America’s response then can only be to hasten its search for other partners both in Europe and beyond. And there lies an inevitable negative spiral for the Special Relationship.

Can anything be done to save the Special Relationship?

There is no question that the US and UK will continue to have a strong and positive relationship, but it is clear that, without action, either in or out of Europe, its ‘specialness’ will decline. As the arguments above lay out, the only question is how fast this demise takes place. But there is something that could not only halt, but also reverse this trend.

As President Obama made starkly clear in his interviews with Jeffrey Goldberg in the Atlantic, what he wants most from partners and allies is for them to step up – to show more leadership (a sentiment that the Republican candidates for president would push even further). With the perceived failure of interventions over the last 15 years – from Afghanistan to Iraq to Libya –many politicians and publics have become wary of foreign military intervention. This is true in Europe and the US; but Americans have often felt that they have been left holding both the bag and the blame.  

It should be noted that more leadership does not necessarily mean more military engagement. Or even, necessarily, more spending on foreign policy tools (whether diplomatic, military or development). But it does mean a willingness to step up and take responsibility for trying to guide international events and for promoting common interests.

In the UK’s SDSR released towards the end of 2015, the government stated its intention to remain fully engaged globally; however, its actions belie this. Where Asia is concerned – an issue that is front and centre for the US – the UK joins other European powers in arguing that its lack of resources in the region makes it unable to contribute meaningfully to maintaining stability. Even closer to home, in the Middle East, the UK has been wary of leading.

It is understandable why the UK is hesitant to take such a leadership role, even as part of a coalition, in some of the larger strategic challenges the world faces. There are few benefits. Merely finding the human capital to coordinate an international response is difficult. The complexity of these problems ensures they rarely work out as hoped, and more often lead to international contempt rather than approbation. Thus it is no great surprise that the UK, along with much of the rest of the world, resists the temptation to be out in front. But there are opportunities – two issues that the US would likely welcome greater British leadership on would be building support in Europe for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and taking a more active role in maintaining stability in Asia. Further, having a stronger European partner on issues in the Middle East (from Yemen to Syria) – Europe’s near abroad – is something that many American policy-makers have suggested. 

But the UK would not have to stand alone. With a little leadership from the UK, the US would provide support, as would many others currently loath to take the lead but with very strong interests in the outcomes. But someone has to start; as Obama made clear, there needs to be less ‘free riding’.

If the UK wants to reverse the decline of the Special Relationship, it will need to show more leadership internationally. This should not be as hard as it might seem. Not only does it conform to the government’s own strategy (as laid out in the SDSR) but public concern over further interventions is weaker than one might imagine. Such a leadership role would once again show to the United States the value of the Special Relationship.

This article has also been published by Real Clear World.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




be

Towards Warsaw and Beyond

Invitation Only Research Event

9 June 2016 - 12:15pm to 10 June 2016 - 4:15pm

Chatham House, London

The NATO Summit, to be held this July in Warsaw, will provide an opportunity for NATO to review its progress towards meeting both the new and more traditional challenges it faces. It will also make clear the political will, resources, priorities and direction of the alliance in the coming years. In light of resurgent geopolitical concerns, new and evolving challenges and long-standing structural anxieties, the summit is an important moment to review progress and define a new path forward.

Building on workshops held over the previous six months, the US and the Americas Programme at Chatham House, jointly with the Polish Institute for International Affairs (PISM) and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark are convening an expert roundtable to provide insight and analysis towards answering these questions.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

 

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Courtney Rice

Senior Programme Manager, US and the Americas Programme
(0)20 7389 3298




be

Allies Beware: Americans Support a More Limited Role for the US

12 May 2016

Bruce Stokes

Associate Fellow, US and the Americas Programme (based in the US)

Xenia Wickett

Former Head, US and the Americas Programme; Former Dean, The Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs
While not as isolationist or unilateralist as some campaign rhetoric might suggest, new polling shows the American public broadly supports less engagement with the rest of the world.

2016-05-11-US-Philippines.jpg

US military personnel take part in joint military exercises with the Philippines, Australia and Japan in Crow Valley on 14 April 2016. Photo by Getty Images.

While the American election cycle could be perceived as an occasionally amusing distraction, the rise of new factions and sentiments among the electorate will have an impact not just in America’s domestic politics but also with respect to its role in the world. Recent polling by the Pew Research Center shows clearly the desire among many Americans for a different international engagement for the US, one that could have significant implications for America’s allies.

Polling

To date, the campaign rhetoric of both the Republican and Democratic contenders for the White House has raised questions about America’s continuing global commitment.

But what does the public think? The Pew Research Center has recently released its periodic survey of how Americans view America’s place in the world. The results suggest that stereotypes of Americans’ isolationism or protectionism do not capture the nuance in public sentiment. Wariness of international engagement coexists with assertiveness on some issues and a belief that the US is a force for good in the world. And these views often divide along partisan lines and between generations.

A majority of Americans (57%) think the U.S. should deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with theirs as best they can, a sentiment that has increased from 46% in 2010. Moreover, roughly two-thirds say ‘we should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems’. In part this may be the case because a plurality of Americans thinks the United States does too much (41% too much, 27% too little) in helping solve world problems.

The fact that six-in-ten Americans believe that problems in the world would be even worse without US involvement will not reassure many non-Americans who care deeply about how and where the US is engaged, not just that it is.

American isolationism is a partisan affair. Republicans (62%) are far more likely than Democrats (47%) to voice the view that the US should deal with its own problems. Notably, about two-thirds of registered Republicans or Republican-leaning independents who favour Donald Trump (68%) express such isolationist sentiments, as do more than half of the Democratic backers of Sen. Bernie Sanders (54%). At the same time, over half of registered Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents who favour Hillary Clinton (52%) believe the US should help other countries deal with their problems.

The US has often been seen by its allies as acting in a unilateralist fashion, but the polling is more nuanced than this. About half (51%) believe that the US should take into account the views of its major allies when deciding its foreign policies. However, of more concern for America’s allies (and potentially adversaries), roughly four-in-ten (42%) believe Washington should go it alone in international matters.

Despite Trump’s criticisms, 53% of the American public holds a positive view of NATO and 77% voice the view that US membership in the security alliance has been a good thing for the United States.

In addition to some wariness with regards to engaging internationally in security arenas, Americans are also generally wary of global economic engagement – protectionist sentiment is rising. Only 44% believe such US involvement is a good thing; more (49%) say such engagement is bad, lowering wages and costing jobs. These views also differ along partisan lines with more on the right than left thinking US involvement in the world economy has been a bad thing. Trump supporters are even more against economic globalization.

Rising scepticism

The results do not show an unambiguous move towards more American isolationism or unilateralism. But the trends broadly show that the American public is moving towards, as President Obama put it in 2012, a focus on ‘nation building at home’. It should come as no surprise – President Obama has presided over a period in which the US has increasingly limited its extraterritorial ambitions to those that more directly affect its vital national interests. It is therefore worth noting that this more limited engagement is one that is, broadly, supported by the public on both sides of the aisle.

There are, as have been noted, partisan differences. But the next president will govern over all Americans not just those from their own party. They will have to function in the context of an American public, the majority of whom wants the US to deal with its own problems, letting other countries manage as best they can. While who becomes president clearly matters – they have the capacity to lead their populations in certain directions - the rising scepticism among many Americans for investing in the globalized world will resonate regardless of who takes office.

The implications for America’s allies are significant. For those issues that are not directly of concern to the United States, longstanding partners are going to have to find ways to manage on their own or with less American support. And even on those issues that are of direct national interest, they might find the US less sensitive to their interests and concerns. This could hold true not just in the realm of security but on economic issues also – if America becomes more protectionist, others will surely follow.  

Many of America’s allies have perceived the United States to be an unreliable ally in recent years. Asian partners, such as Japan and South Korea, have started to take more responsibility for their own security and are working to build additional partnerships with neighbours. European allies have been, at times, disappointed by what they perceive to be a less engaged America, such as in Libya and Syria. If the next president follows the public majority, these allies will need to get used to this new role for the United States.

This article has been published jointly with Real Clear World.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




be

September issue newsletter

1 September 2016 , Volume 92, Number 5

Professor Andrew Dorman

Commissioning Editor, International Affairs
Our September issue marks a return to IA’s typical range and breadth of coverage, after the July special issue on China and May’s section on Brexit. In the featured article for this issue, Sara E. Davies and Belinda Bennett examine the gender differential in health outcomes for victims of the Ebola and Zika crises. They highlight the disproportionate impact that such crises have on women, not only from a health perspective but also in terms of economic andsocial factors. In particular, they analyse the ‘women-specific advice’ which was distributed during the Ebola and Zika emergencies, revealing the incorrect assumption of gender equality in the regions affected. Their article reasserts the importance of gender-sensitive policy-making on the part of the governments and NGOs which respond to global health emergencies. Elsewhere in the issue Robert Falkner provides an initial reflection on the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement, while Michele Acuto and Steve Rayner demonstrate the growingrole of global ‘city networks’ in international diplomacy. African countries are the focus of three articles: the use of Information Communications Technology by government authorities in Somaliland is assessed by Alice Hills; Kristof Titeca and Daniel Fahey look at differing representations of rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo; and Alex Vines contributes a review article on Angolan politics. These are just a selection of the many fascinating pieces of research in our new issue. Several of the authors have contributed supplementary commentaries related to their articles, which will be published over the next month on our Medium blogsite. Follow our profile by clickinghere, and keep up with the latest International Affairs news, content and editorials.




be

Beneath the Bluster, Trump Offers the Chance to Rethink Trade

12 December 2016

Marianne Schneider-Petsinger

Senior Research Fellow, US and the Americas Programme
Trump’s trade policy may not be as radical in practice as he described it on the stump, and his win is an opportunity to address the shortcomings in the current global trade system.

2016-12-12-TrumpTrade.jpg

Trump has pointed to some valid concerns about the current trading system. Photo by Getty Images.

With Donald Trump in the White House, US trade policy will probably look very different from the past 70 years - seven decades across which successive Republican and Democratic administrations have participated in and led global trade liberalization initiatives. If the president-elect delivers on his major campaign promises on trade, the negative effects on the American economy would be severe and the United States would give up its role in shaping the global trading system.

But there is no need to panic. Trump will likely leave behind the rhetoric of the campaign trail once he sits in the Oval Office. Trump will probably moderate his proposals, because a faction of the Republican-dominated Congress continues to support free trade. He might also be reined in by his team, though that depends on who best catches the ear of the president: individuals such as Vice-President-elect Mike Pence, who has supported free-trade agreements in the past, or trade-skeptical advisors such as Dan DiMicco, who now heads the transition team for the Office of the United States Trade Representative. 

So what does the Trump presidency actually mean for trade?

Trump won’t likely follow through on his most extreme plans, such as leaving the World Trade Organization. But he will lead a more protectionist United States that focuses on its trade deficits – with particular attention being paid to China and Mexico. Trump will probably impose tariffs on imports from those countries; however, duties will be lower than the mooted 45 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively. With regards to China, Trump will probably bring trade cases against Beijing’s subsidy arrangements and look into alleged currency manipulation (even though most economists accept that the renminbi is no longer undervalued).

Given the prominence of the North American Free Trade Agreement on the campaign trail, Trump will have to address the deal with Canada and Mexico. Whether that means renegotiating or pulling out remains to be seen. One thing is certain: Trump will not move forward with mega-regional trade accords such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership or the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Those would-be pacts are a lost opportunity, but this is not the end of the trade world. Trump will focus instead on striking trade deals with individual countries. One such potential bilateral trade deal could be a US–UK agreement, which Trump and his advisers, despite the prognostications of the current president, see at the front of the queue.  

Opportunity to rethink the trade framework

The fact that Trump is not necessarily against free trade per se bears hope. And there is another silver lining in the dark cloud hanging over trade. Trump has pointed to some valid concerns about the current trading system. His victory can be an opportunity to address these shortcomings. 

NAFTA does need an update. The agreement entered into force in 1994 - before the internet took off. Thus, provisions to include standards to protect digital freedoms could modernize NAFTA and expand its scope to cover 21st century economic issues. In addition, labour rights and environmental protections were not included in NAFTA but were incorporated into side agreements with weak, unenforceable provisions. By better addressing labour and environmental issues, NAFTA could be significantly upgraded.

Trump will aim to tackle unfair competition and look to enforce existing trade deals more vigilantly. This is another important and legitimate issue, and could be tackled in conjunction with European allies. The European Commission has recently proposed redesigning and updating its trade defence instruments because non-market economy practices and state intervention by some WTO countries - for example, China’s overcapacity in the steel sector - have hurt domestic industries. Without action by major players such as the United States or the European Union, China would have no incentive to reform its distortionary policies. Trust in the rules-based trading system requires that existing trade agreements are properly and fairly enforced.

Trump’s win highlights the need for better compensation for those who have felt the adverse effects of trade. His victory was partly fuelled by tapping into economic anxieties and appealing to voters who feel left behind by globalization. Better mechanisms to cushion the blows to the losers of globalization are indeed required. In the United States, Trade Adjustment Assistance has been insufficiently funded and is ineffective. More needs to be done to replace the wages of workers whose jobs have been lost due to trade and to provide them with skills training for re-employment. This reconsideration of assistance for those who are hurt by free trade could provide a foundation for the future. Once the current wave of anti-trade sentiment subsides, new trade agreements can be struck that don’t leave so many citizens feeling left behind. 

Instead of worrying about how Trump might blow up the underpinnings of the global trading system, this is an opportunity to rethink what a new trade framework might look like.

This piece was published in collaboration with Real Clear World.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




be

Liberalism in Retreat

13 December 2016

Robin Niblett

Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House
With the liberal international order under threat, democracies will need to find a way to coexist with their ideological foes.

2016-12-13-EUUS.jpg

Photo by Getty Images.

The liberal international order has always depended on the idea of progress. Since 1945, Western policymakers have believed that open markets, democracy and individual human rights would gradually spread across the entire globe. Today, such hopes seem naïve.

In Asia, the rise of China threatens to challenge US military and economic hegemony. In the Middle East, the United States and its European allies have failed to guide the region toward a more liberal and peaceful future in the wake of the Arab Spring. And Russia’s geopolitical influence has reached heights unseen since the Cold War, as it attempts to roll back liberal advances around its periphery.

But the more important threats to the order are internal. For the past half-century, the European Union has seemed to represent the advance guard of a new liberalism in which nations pool sovereignty and cooperate ever more closely with one another. Today, as it reels from one crisis to the next, the EU has stopped expanding.

Other countries will probably not follow the United Kingdom out of the EU. But few European leaders appear willing to continue relinquishing sovereignty, whether to manage flows of refugees or to ensure the long-term viability of the single currency. Many European politicians are demanding more national sovereign control over their destinies rather than more integration.

Across the Atlantic, the US commitment to global leadership, which until now has sustained the liberal international order through good times and bad, looks weaker than at any point since the Second World War. After the costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the chaos that followed the intervention in Libya, President Barack Obama consistently encouraged allies in Europe and the Middle East to take greater responsibility for their own security. In his presidential campaign, President-elect Donald Trump twisted this argument into an explicitly transactional bargain: America would become a mercenary superpower, protecting only those countries that paid, so that it could focus on making itself great again at home. In so doing, he ignored the hard-won lesson that investing in the security of its allies is the best way of protecting America’s own security and economic interests.

Meanwhile, America’s rebalance to Asia is in jeopardy. With Trump promising to roll back the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Beijing has wasted no time in laying out its own vision for a more integrated Eurasia that may exclude America and in which China will play the leading role. We may be on the brink of a Eurasian century, rather than a Pacific century.

Sustaining an international liberal economic order

In the past, as other political systems have crumbled, the liberal international order has risen to face its challenges. Yet so long as the economies of its leading members remain fragile and their political institutions divided, the order they have championed is unlikely to regain the political momentum that helped democracy spread across the globe. Instead, it will evolve into a less ambitious project: an international liberal economic order that encompasses states with diverse domestic political systems.

This need not be bad news if it allows democracies and their illiberal counterparts to find ways to coexist. Non-Western rising powers, China chief among them, will remain committed to sustaining the international economic order of open markets and free flows of investment. After all, only through continued integration into the global supply chains of goods, services, people and knowledge can emerging markets meet the aspirations of their growing middle classes.

It is in the West’s interests that China’s economic development continues smoothly. US and European markets for goods, services and infrastructure should remain open to Chinese trade and foreign direct investment, as long as Chinese companies abide by their WTO commitments and by US and European rules on security and transparency and the protection of intellectual property. European countries should take the same approach toward Russia, on the condition that Russian companies abide by EU rules. A mutual commitment to the international liberal economic order would help Western governments and their illiberal counterparts keep open other avenues for cooperation on shared challenges, such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

Meanwhile, European governments and businesses should take part in the Chinese-led strategy to connect northeast Asia with Europe across the Eurasian continent, a component of a series of regional infrastructure investments known as the Belt and Road Initiative. Today, the world is experiencing a structural decline in growth rates of trade, as emerging markets like China make more of their own products and developed countries bring some production back on-shore. Against this backdrop, ramping up investment in infrastructure that can connect the thriving coastal areas of Asia to their underdeveloped hinterlands and then to Europe could create new opportunities for economic growth in both the liberal and the illiberal worlds.

Similar cooperation will be harder to build with Russia. Russia’s system of centralized, opaque political and economic governance makes deeper integration incompatible with the EU’s market and rules-based system. And NATO members have begun a much-needed upgrading of their military readiness in the face of recent Russian provocations. EU and NATO tensions with Russia will likely persist. However, the initiative to build new Eurasian economic inter-connections could provide an alternative way for the United States and Europe to engage Russia in the future.

A period of awkward coexistence

The countries that built the liberal international order are weaker today than they have been for three generations. But liberal policymakers would be wrong to hunker down or resort to containment. An extended stand-off with those who contest a liberal international order may accidentally lead to outright conflict. A better approach would be for liberal countries to prepare themselves for a period of awkward coexistence with illiberal ones, cooperating on some occasions and competing on others. Time will then tell whose form of government is more resilient. If history is any guide, liberal democracy remains the best bet.

An extended version of this article appears in Foreign Affairs.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




be

Reviewing Antimicrobial Resistance: Where Are We Now and What Needs to Be Done?

Research Event

8 October 2019 - 10:30am to 12:00pm

RSA House, 8 John Adam Street, London, WC2N 6EZ

Event participants

Tim Jinks, Head of Drug-Resistant Infections Programme, Wellcome
Jim O’Neill, Chair, Review on Antimicrobial Resistance; Chair, Chatham House
Haileyesus Getahun, Director of Global Coordination and Partnership on Antimicrobial Resistance, World Health Organization 
Juan Lubroth, Chief Veterinary Officer, Food and Agriculture Organization (Videolink)
Jyoti Joshi, Head, South Asia, Center for Disease Dynamics, Economics & Policy
Estelle Mbadiwe, Coordinator-Nigeria, Global Antibiotic Resistance Partnership
Charles Clift, Senior Consulting Fellow, Chatham House; Report Author

The Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, chaired by Jim O’Neill, was commissioned by former UK prime minister, David Cameron, in July 2014. Supported by the UK government and the Wellcome Trust, the final report of the review was published in May 2016 and has had a global impact in terms of motivating political leaders and decision-makers to take more seriously the threat posed by antimicrobial resistance.

Yet there is now a perception that the political momentum to address the issue is waning and needs to be reinvigorated.

In a further report produced by Chatham House, the progress of the recommendations of the review is assessed and the key ways to move forward are identified.

Panellists at this event, where highlights of the report are presented, provide their assessment of the progress so far and discuss priorities for future action.

The report was funded by Wellcome.

Alexandra Squires McCarthy

Programme Coordinator, Global Health Programme
+44 (0)207 314 2789




be

Beyond Lockdown: Africa’s Options for Responding to COVID-19

21 April 2020

Ben Shepherd

Consulting Fellow, Africa Programme

Nina van der Mark

Research Analyst, Global Health Programme
The continent’s enormous diversity means that there will be no one African experience of COVID-19, nor a uniform governmental response. But there are some common challenges across the continent, and a chance to get the response right.

2020-04-22-Africa-COVID-Dakar

Dakar after the Interior Ministry announced compulsory wearing of masks in public and private services, shops and transport, under penalty of sanctions. Photo by SEYLLOU/AFP via Getty Images.

African policymakers face a dilemma when it comes to COVID-19. The first hope is to prevent the virus from gaining a foothold at all, and many African states have significant experience of managing infectious disease outbreaks. The establishment of the Africa Centre for Disease Control highlights the hugely increased focus on public health in recent years.

But capacities to track, test and isolate vary wildly, notably between neighbours with porous and poorly controlled borders and, in most cases, sustained national-level disease control is difficult. Initial clusters of COVID-19 cases are already established in many places, but a lack of testing capacity makes it hard to know the full extent of transmission.

It is not obvious what African states should do as a response. Lack of information about COVID-19 means the proportion of asymptomatic or mild cases is not known, still less the ways in which this is influenced by human geography and demographics.

Africa is an overwhelmingly young continent with a median age under 20. But it also faces chronic malnutrition, which may weaken immune responses, and infectious diseases such as malaria, TB and HIV are widespread which could worsen the impact of COVID-19, particularly if treatment for these diseases is interrupted.

Complex and unknown

Ultimately, how all these factors interact with COVID-19 is complex and remains largely unknown. Africa may escape with a relatively light toll. Or it could be hit harder than anywhere else.

What is clear, however, is that cost of simply following the rest of the world into lockdown could be high. Africa is relatively rural but has higher populations living in informal settlements than anywhere in the world. Many live in cramped and overcrowded accommodation without clean water or reliable electricity, making handwashing a challenge and working from home impossible.

And the benefits appear limited. The goal of lockdowns in most places is not to eliminate the virus but to accept the economic and social costs as a price worth paying in order to ‘flatten the curve’ of infection and protect healthcare systems from being overwhelmed. But this logic does not hold when many of Africa’s healthcare systems are barely coping with pre-coronavirus levels of disease.

Africa suffers in comparison to much of the rest of the world in terms of access to quality and affordable healthcare, critical care beds and specialist personnel. For example, in 2017, Nigeria had just 120 ICU beds for a country of 200 million, equating to 0.07 per 100,000 inhabitants compared to 12.5 per 100,000 in Italy and 3.6 per 100,000 in China.

The pandemic’s ruinous economic impacts could also be more acute for Africa than anywhere else. The continent is highly vulnerable to potential drops in output and relies heavily on demand from China and Europe. Many states are already facing sharply falling natural resource revenues, and investment, tourism and remittances will suffer - all on top of a high existing debt burden.

Analysis by the World Bank shows that Africa will likely face its first recession in 25 years, with the continental economy contracting by up to 5.1% in 2020. Africa will have scant financial ammunition to use in the fight against COVID-19 with currencies weakening, food prices rising, local agri-food supply chains disrupted and food imports likely to decrease as well. A food security emergency appears a strong possibility.

So, although several states have imposed national lockdowns and others closed major urban centres, lockdowns are difficult to manage and sustain, especially in places where the daily hustle of the informal sector or subsistence agriculture are the only means of survival and where the state has neither the trust of the population nor the capacity to replace lost earnings or meet basic needs.

Of course, this is not simply a binary choice between lockdown or no lockdown - a range of intermediate options exist, such as some restriction on movement, curfews, shutting places of worship, banning only large gatherings, or closing pubs, schools and borders.

A significant number of African states have so far taken this middle path. This will not prevent the virus from spreading nor, in all probability, be enough to ensure adequate healthcare for all Africans infected with COVID-19. But it may help slow the spread and buy invaluable time for African states and partners to prepare.

How this time is used is therefore of paramount importance. Popular trust in the state is low in many African countries so strategies must empower communities, not alienate them. Africa’s experience of previous epidemics and long traditions of collective resilience and community-based crisis response - which persist in many places – are significant strengths.

The right messages must be carried by the right messengers, and policies - including cash transfers and food distribution - implemented sensitively. If not, or if responses become militarized, public consent is unlikely to be sustained for long.




be

Webinar: Coronavirus Crisis – Implications for an Evolving Cybersecurity Landscape

Corporate Members Event Webinar

7 May 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Event participants

Neil Walsh, Chief, Cybercrime and Anti-Money Laundering Department, UN Office of Drugs and Crime

Lisa Quest, Head, Public Sector, UK & Ireland, Oliver Wyman

Chair: Joyce Hakmeh, Senior Research Fellow, International Security Programme; Co-Editor, Journal of Cyber Policy, Chatham House

Further speakers to be announced.

The COVID-19 pandemic is having a profound impact on the cybersecurity landscape - both amplifying already-existing cyber threats and creating new vulnerabilities for state and non-state actors. The crisis has highlighted the importance of protecting key national and international infrastructures, with the World Health Organization, US Department of Health and Human Services and hospitals across Europe suffering cyber-attacks, undermining their ability to tackle the coronavirus outbreak. Changing patterns of work resulting from widespread lockdowns are also creating new vulnerabilities for organizations with many employees now working from home and using personal devices to work remotely.

In light of these developments, the panellists will discuss the evolving cyber threats resulting from the pandemic. How are they impacting ongoing conversations around cybersecurity? How can governments, private sector and civil society organizations work together to effectively mitigate and respond to them? And what could the implications of such cooperation be beyond the crisis? 

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members and giving circles.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.




be

Fluorescent Proteins as Proteomic Probes

Ileana M. Cristea
Dec 1, 2005; 4:1933-1941
Research




be

Comparison of Label-free Methods for Quantifying Human Proteins by Shotgun Proteomics

William M. Old
Oct 1, 2005; 4:1487-1502
Research




be

Exponentially Modified Protein Abundance Index (emPAI) for Estimation of Absolute Protein Amount in Proteomics by the Number of Sequenced Peptides per Protein

Yasushi Ishihama
Sep 1, 2005; 4:1265-1272
Research




be

Accurate Proteome-wide Label-free Quantification by Delayed Normalization and Maximal Peptide Ratio Extraction, Termed MaxLFQ

Jürgen Cox
Sep 1, 2014; 13:2513-2526
Technological Innovation and Resources




be

Stable Isotope Labeling by Amino Acids in Cell Culture, SILAC, as a Simple and Accurate Approach to Expression Proteomics

Shao-En Ong
May 1, 2002; 1:376-386
Research




be

The hibernating 100S complex is a target of ribosome-recycling factor and elongation factor G in Staphylococcus aureus [Protein Synthesis and Degradation]

The formation of translationally inactive 70S dimers (called 100S ribosomes) by hibernation-promoting factor is a widespread survival strategy among bacteria. Ribosome dimerization is thought to be reversible, with the dissociation of the 100S complexes enabling ribosome recycling for participation in new rounds of translation. The precise pathway of 100S ribosome recycling has been unclear. We previously found that the heat-shock GTPase HflX in the human pathogen Staphylococcus aureus is a minor disassembly factor. Cells lacking hflX do not accumulate 100S ribosomes unless they are subjected to heat exposure, suggesting the existence of an alternative pathway during nonstressed conditions. Here, we provide biochemical and genetic evidence that two essential translation factors, ribosome-recycling factor (RRF) and GTPase elongation factor G (EF-G), synergistically split 100S ribosomes in a GTP-dependent but tRNA translocation-independent manner. We found that although HflX and the RRF/EF-G pair are functionally interchangeable, HflX is expressed at low levels and is dispensable under normal growth conditions. The bacterial RRF/EF-G pair was previously known to target only the post-termination 70S complexes; our results reveal a new role in the reversal of ribosome hibernation that is intimately linked to bacterial pathogenesis, persister formation, stress responses, and ribosome integrity.




be

Cross-regulation between LUBAC and caspase-1 modulates cell death and inflammation [Signal Transduction]

The linear ubiquitin assembly complex (LUBAC) is an essential component of the innate and adaptive immune system. Modification of cellular substrates with linear polyubiquitin chains is a key regulatory step in signal transduction that impacts cell death and inflammatory signaling downstream of various innate immunity receptors. Loss-of-function mutations in the LUBAC components HOIP and HOIL-1 yield a systemic autoinflammatory disease in humans, whereas their genetic ablation is embryonically lethal in mice. Deficiency of the LUBAC adaptor protein Sharpin results in a multi-organ inflammatory disease in mice characterized by chronic proliferative dermatitis (cpdm), which is propagated by TNFR1-induced and RIPK1-mediated keratinocyte cell death. We have previously shown that caspase-1 and -11 promoted the dermatitis pathology of cpdm mice and mediated cell death in the skin. Here, we describe a reciprocal regulation of caspase-1 and LUBAC activities in keratinocytes. We show that LUBAC interacted with caspase-1 via HOIP and modified its CARD domain with linear polyubiquitin and that depletion of HOIP or Sharpin resulted in heightened caspase-1 activation and cell death in response to inflammasome activation, unlike what is observed in macrophages. Reciprocally, caspase-1, as well as caspase-8, regulated LUBAC activity by proteolytically processing HOIP at Asp-348 and Asp-387 during the execution of cell death. HOIP processing impeded substrate ubiquitination in the NF-κB pathway and resulted in enhanced apoptosis. These results highlight a regulatory mechanism underlying efficient apoptosis in keratinocytes and provide further evidence of a cross-talk between inflammatory and cell death pathways.




be

Pepijn Bergsen

Research Fellow, Europe Programme

Biography

Pepijn Bergsen joined Chatham House in September 2019 as Research Fellow in the Europe Programme, working mainly on issues related to the European economy. Previously he worked as an economic policy advisor for the Dutch government, focusing mainly on international trade issues, and spent several years as an economic and political analyst working on Europe at the Economist Intelligence Unit. He regularly comments on the European economy and politics, Germany and the EU in international media. He studied International Relations and International Political Economy in Amsterdam and London.

Areas of expertise

  • EU politics
  • European economy
  • Germany

Past experience

2015-18Europe analyst, The Economist Intelligence Unit 
2014-15Economic policy advisor, The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs




be

Turkey in 2020 and Beyond: What Lies Ahead for Turkish Politics?

Invitation Only Research Event

25 November 2019 - 12:30pm to 1:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Fadi Hakura, Manager, Turkey Project, Europe Programme, Chatham House

Turkey witnessed some major developments over the last year. In August 2018, the dramatic Lira devaluation caused the Turkish economy to go into recession. In the 2019 local elections, which took place during the economic downturn, the Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) mayoral candidates took control of Ankara and Istanbul after 25 years of dominance by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

The election results might lead to a rethink of the AKP leadership and consequences on Turkish politics will depend on Erdoğan’s interpretation of this reversal of his political fortune.

Will this affect the long-standing alliance between AKP and MHP that has characterised Turkish foreign policy for the past few years? What impact will this have on both the domestic and international level? Finally, will Turkey’s recent incursion into Syria have lasting effect on the country’s alliances with other powers and its standing?

In this context, the speaker will analyse the significance of these changes and the future trajectory of Turkish politics, economics and foreign policy.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Department/project

Alina Lyadova

Europe Programme Coordinator




be

Don’t Be Afraid of Political Fragmentation

16 December 2019

Pepijn Bergsen

Research Fellow, Europe Programme
If managed correctly, splintering and more volatile political systems – so-called ‘Dutchification’ – need not be a ticket to political and policy paralysis.

2019-12-16-Dutch-Election.jpg

Voters cast their vote as part of the Dutch general elections on March 15, 2017 at a polling station in a mill in Oisterwijk. Photo by ROB ENGELAAR/AFP via Getty Images.

In recent decades, political party systems across Europe have fragmented and electoral volatility has increased. The number of parties represented in parliaments across the continent has grown and the formerly dominant mainstream parties have seen their support base collapse, forcing parties into often uncomfortable and unstable coalitions.

From the United Kingdom to Germany, politicians and commentators talk of such scenarios in often apocalyptic terms and associate it with political instability and policy paralysis.

They shouldn’t. Instead they should focus their energy on making these increasingly competitive political markets work.

The Netherlands is frequently held up as a prime example of this process, which is therefore sometimes referred to as ‘Dutchification’. Its highly proportional political system has created the opportunity for new parties and specific interest groups to win parliamentary representation, ranging from an animal rights party and a party catering specifically to the interests of the elderly.

This has been accompanied by increased electoral volatility. In the 1970s, less than 15% of seats in the Dutch parliament would change party at any election, but in the last election in 2017, this was just over a quarter. The system also created space for the relatively early rise of populist far-right parties, though it was not the cause of their rise.

Nevertheless, despite the regularly difficult coalition politics, it remains one of the most well-governed countries in the world.

A short history of fragmentation

Looking at the effective number of parties represented in parliaments, the number of parties, corrected for their size, provides a good measure of the extent of fragmentation. In the Netherlands this steadily increased from around four in the 1980s to over eight following the election in 2017. Even the populist far-right vote has fragmented, with two parties partly competing for the same electorate. In other countries it has been a more recent phenomenon. Spain remained a de facto two-party system until the financial crisis. Dissatisfaction with both mainstream parties has seen challenger parties on both the left and the right attract significant support, making it harder to form stable coalitions. Political fragmentation decreased slightly in Italy in recent years, but that was from a high base as it shot up in the early 1990s when the post-war political settlement crumbled.

German politics, long a hallmark of stability, is struggling with the decrease in support for the parties that dominated its political scene in the post-war period. The Christian Democrats and Social Democrats only barely managed to win a majority together in the election in 2017, at 53.4% of the vote compared with the 81.3% achieved 30 years earlier. The latest polls suggest they would only get to 40% together if an election were held today.

A similar trend is visible within the European Parliament. Whereas the two largest groups in the European Parliament, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, together won 66% of the vote in the election in 1999, they did not even manage to win a majority together in 2019, taking just 39.5% of the vote.

No crisis of democracy

If electoral volatility and political fragmentation does indeed constitute some sort of crisis of democracy, we should expect to see voters become unhappy about how their national democracy functions. Largely, the opposite seems to be the case.

In the Netherlands, satisfaction with its democracy went up at the same time as Dutchification did its work. Similar trends are visible in other highly fragmented European political systems, often those with very proportional systems. Despite regular minority governments, satisfaction with democracy is above 90% in Denmark and at 80% in Sweden, according to the latest Eurobarometer data.

In comparison, it stood at 52% in the United Kingdom and 53% in France, where the electoral system has, at least on the surface, prevented the kind of fragmentation supposedly plaguing proportional systems.

Satisfaction with democracy seems to be affected by a number of factors. This includes the state of the economy, particularly in countries that were hit the hardest by the global financial and euro zone crises. Nevertheless, the data suggests that, even if we can’t say that Dutchification by definition leads to more satisfaction with democracy, it is clearly not associated with falling faith in the system.

A competitive political market

Dutchification should be seen as accompanying a more competitive political marketplace. A more emancipated, demanding and politically engaged electorate than in the post-war decades is willing to shop around instead of merely vote according to socioeconomic class or other dividing lines, such as religious ones. The fragmented parliaments that emerge as a result provide better representation of different groups within European societies.

This makes life harder for Europe’s political parties and politicians, as they juggle large coalitions, or changing coalitions under minority governments, but provides voters with more choice and democratic renewal. If handled correctly this would also allow more responsiveness to shifts in public opinion.

Such democratic creative destruction in competitive political markets is to be celebrated in a well-functioning democracy. Just as companies prefer to operate in an oligopoly, political parties prefer the stability of limited political competition. But wishing for this kind of stability comes perilously close to preferring stability over proper representation.

Worrying about Dutchification risks confusing a crisis of the traditional mainstream parties with a crisis of democracy. For some countries, particularly those like the Netherlands and Denmark which have longer histories of consensus-based politics and coalition building, this is an easier adjustment. But this should not be an excuse to not attempt to make politics work better as they were forced to go through, arguably still ongoing, adjustment processes too.

Instead of investing in futile attempts to get back to how things were in the old days, or hoping this will somehow magically happen, political leaders and parties across Europe need to reassess how they deal with the new reality of Dutchification.




be

Another CDU Leadership Race Begins in Merkel’s Shadow

28 February 2020

Quentin Peel

Associate Fellow, Europe Programme
The election of a new leader of the chancellor’s party will be another contest over her legacy.

2020-02-28-Merkel.jpg

German Chancellor Angela Merkel is depicted on a float in the Rosenmontag parade in Mainz on 24 February. Photo: Getty Images.

Perhaps it will be second time lucky. At the end of April, Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) will elect a new party leader to follow in the footsteps of Angela Merkel. An emergency party congress has been summoned to do that after the surprise resignation of Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Merkel’s chosen successor.

The plan is to leave the decision on who will be the CDU candidate for chancellor at the next election until after Germany’s EU presidency concludes in December. So Merkel will keep her job until 2021, and the new leader will have to learn to live with her.

The three leading candidates are Armin Laschet, Friedrich Merz and Norbert Röttgen, all from the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. Two of the three – Merz and Röttgen – were sacked by Merkel from their former jobs. They have not forgotten. Only Armin Laschet, currently CDU leader in North Rhine-Westphalia and state premier, can be described as a Merkel loyalist, true to her centrist mantra.

He is the man to beat, having teamed up with Jens Spahn, the 39-year-old health minister, who is popular with party conservatives. Spahn will run as his deputy, so the team straddles the left-right divide in the party. But the contest still seems set to be a bitter battle between pro- and anti-Merkel factions that could leave the party badly split.

After nearly 15 years as chancellor, and 18 years as CDU leader, Merkel remains the most popular politician in Germany. In spite of criticism that she lacks vision, her caution and predictability appear to be just what most German voters like.

But her term in office has also seen the steady shrinking of the centre ground in German politics, with the rise of the environmentalist Green party and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) at the expense of the centre-right CDU and the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD).

The battle for the soul of the CDU is between those who think Merkel has been too left-wing, and want a more conservative leader to win back AfD voters, and those who believe that the CDU must stay in the centre, and prepare for a future coalition with the Greens. Merz is seen as the former, Laschet and Röttgen the latter.

Unless Laschet emerges as the clear winner in April, the leadership contest is likely to leave Germany sorely distracted by domestic politics just as it takes over the EU presidency in the second half of the year. Instead of Merkel having a triumphant international swansong on the EU stage, she could be battling to protect her inheritance at home.

The one area on which all three leadership candidates seem to agree is foreign policy: they all want Germany to take more leadership and responsibility, and for the European Union to play a bigger role in security, defence and international affairs. They are all Atlanticists, but critical of Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ stance. All are on the record criticizing the chancellor – at least tacitly – for not having a more vigorous foreign policy.

There the similarity ends.

On the right, the 64-year-old Merz is both the most conservative and the most popular with the party grassroots. He fell out with the chancellor when she took over his job as CDU leader in parliament in 2002. He quit politics to become a corporate lawyer (and a millionaire), but never lost his political ambition. He is an economic liberal but socially conservative, a strong critic of Merkel’s migration policy and her lack of clear leadership. Critics say he is a man of the past, and not a team player.

On the EU, he believes Germany is ‘leaving too much to the French’. If France and Germany cannot agree on financial matters, he said at the London School of Economics in February, they should instead forge a stronger EU industrial policy focused on creating more ‘European champions’.

Laschet, the Merkel loyalist, is four years younger, and from the left of the party. Like Merz, he is a former member of the European parliament. In 2015, he defended Merkel’s open border policy to accept refugees stranded in the Balkans. On Russia, however, he is more critical, calling for a new effort to re-engage with Vladimir Putin. Most recently, at the Munich Security Conference, he called for stronger Franco-German relations, and more support for the eurozone reforms proposed by Emmanuel Macron.

As CDU leader in North Rhine-Westphalia, Laschet has the strongest power base. He earned his political spurs there by winning the last state election in 2017, in contrast to Röttgen, who lost to the SPD and Greens five years earlier.

Röttgen, chairman of the Bundestag foreign affairs committee, is the surprise candidate. Once a Merkel favourite, they fell out when she sacked him as environment minister after he lost the North Rhine-Westphalia election. By throwing his hat in the ring, he has forced it to become an open contest. He is independent-minded and outspoken, but not as bitterly hostile to the chancellor as Merz, so he could be a compromise candidate.

Laschet is clearly the man Merkel would find it easiest to live with. The decision will be taken by a party congress, not a grassroots ballot, which gives him a better chance. But Merz is the most eloquent orator and seen as the best campaigner. The challenge for party members is whether they believe it is better to swing right and squeeze the AfD, or stick to the centre to hold onto voters tempted by the Greens, who have replaced the SPD as the second-most popular party in Germany.

The race is wide open. So is the future of the CDU. The only prediction one can make with much certainty is that as long as Merkel remains chancellor, any successor will struggle to get out of her shadow.




be

Can the UK Strike a Balance Between Openness and Control?

2 March 2020

Hans Kundnani

Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme
Rather than fetishizing free trade, Britain should aim to be a model for a wider recalibration of sustainable globalization.

2020-03-02-Johnson.jpg

Boris Johnson speaks at the Old Naval College in Greenwich on 3 February. Photo: Getty Images.

This week the UK will start negotiating its future relationship with the European Union. The government is trying to convince the EU that it is serious about its red lines and is prepared to walk away from negotiations if the UK’s ‘regulatory freedom’ is not accepted – a no-deal scenario that would result in tariffs between the EU and the UK. Yet at the same time the story it is telling the world is that Britain is ‘re-emerging after decades of hibernation as a campaigner for global free trade’, as Boris Johnson put it in his speech in Greenwich a few weeks ago.

The EU is understandably confused. It’s a bit odd to claim to be campaigning for free trade at the exact moment you are creating new barriers to trade. If Britain were so committed to frictionless trade, it wouldn’t have left the EU in the first place – and having decided to leave, it would have sought to maintain a close economic relationship with the EU, like that of Norway, rather than seek a basic trade deal like Canada’s. 

As well as creating confusion, the narrative also absurdly idealizes free trade. Johnson invoked Richard Cobden and the idea that free trade is ‘God’s diplomacy – the only certain way of uniting people in the bonds of peace since the more freely goods cross borders the less likely it is that troops will ever cross borders’. But the idea that free trade prevents war was shattered by the outbreak of the First World War, which brought to an end the first era of globalization.

We also know that the domestic effects of free trade are more complex and problematic than Johnson suggested. Economic liberalization increases efficiency by removing friction but also creates disruption and has huge distributional consequences – that is, it creates winners and losers. In a democracy, these consequences need to be mitigated.

In any case, the world today is not the same as the one in which Cobden lived. Tariffs are at a historically low level – and many non-tariff barriers have also been removed. In other words, most of the possible gains from trade liberalization have already been realized. Johnson talked about the dangers of a new wave of protectionism. But as the economist Dani Rodrik has argued, the big problem in the global economy is no longer a lack of openness, it is a lack of democratic legitimacy.

The UK should therefore abandon this confusing and misleading narrative and own the way it is actually creating new barriers to trade – and do a better job of explaining the legitimate reasons for doing so. Instead of simplistically talking up free trade, we should be talking about the need to balance openness and economic efficiency with democracy and a sense of control, which is ultimately what Brexit was all about. Instead of claiming to be a ‘catalyst for free trade’, as Johnson put it, the UK should be talking about how it is trying to recalibrate globalization and, in doing so, make it sustainable.

In the three decades after the end of the Cold War, globalization got out of control as barriers to the movement of capital and goods were progressively removed – what Rodrik called ‘hyper-globalization’ to distinguish it from the earlier, more moderate phase of globalization. This kind of deep integration necessitated the development of a system of rules, which have constrained the ability of states to pursue the kind of economic policy, particularly industrial policy, they want, and therefore undermined democracy.

Hyper-globalization created a sense that ‘the nation state has fundamentally lost control of its destiny, surrendering to anonymous global forces’, as the economist Barry Eichengreen put it. Throughout the West, countries are all struggling with the same dilemma – how to reconcile openness and deep integration on the one hand, and democracy, sovereignty and a sense of control on the other.

Within the EU, however, economic integration and the abolition of barriers to the movement of capital and goods went further than in the rest of the world – and the evolution of the principle of freedom of movement after the Maastricht Treaty meant that barriers to the internal movement of people were also eliminated as the EU was enlarged. What happened within the EU might be thought of as ‘hyper-regionalization’ – an extreme example, in a regional context, of a global trend.

EU member states have lost control to an even greater extent than other nation states – albeit to anonymous regional rather than global forces – and this loss of control was felt intensely within the EU. It is therefore logical that this led to an increase in Euroscepticism. Whereas the left wants to restore some barriers to the movement of capital and goods, the right wants to restore barriers to the movement of people.

However, having left the EU, the UK is uniquely well placed to find a new equilibrium. The UK has an ideological commitment to free trade that goes back to the movement to abolish the Corn Laws in the 1840s – which Johnson’s speech expressed. It is difficult to imagine the UK becoming protectionist in any meaningful sense. But at the same time, it has a well-developed sense of national and popular sovereignty, and the sense that the two go together – which is why it was so sensitive to the erosion of them through the EU. This means that Britain is unlikely to go to one extreme or the other.

In other words, the UK may be the ideal country to find a new balance between openness and integration on the one hand, and a sense of control on the other. If it can find this balance – if it can make Brexit work – the UK could be a model for a wider recalibration of sustainable globalization. That, rather than fetishizing free trade, is the real contribution the UK can make.

A version of this article was originally published in the Observer.




be

A single amino acid substitution uncouples catalysis and allostery in an essential biosynthetic enzyme in Mycobacterium tuberculosis [Enzymology]

Allostery exploits the conformational dynamics of enzymes by triggering a shift in population ensembles toward functionally distinct conformational or dynamic states. Allostery extensively regulates the activities of key enzymes within biosynthetic pathways to meet metabolic demand for their end products. Here, we have examined a critical enzyme, 3-deoxy-d-arabino-heptulosonate 7-phosphate synthase (DAH7PS), at the gateway to aromatic amino acid biosynthesis in Mycobacterium tuberculosis, which shows extremely complex dynamic allostery: three distinct aromatic amino acids jointly communicate occupancy to the active site via subtle changes in dynamics, enabling exquisite fine-tuning of delivery of these essential metabolites. Furthermore, this allosteric mechanism is co-opted by pathway branchpoint enzyme chorismate mutase upon complex formation. In this study, using statistical coupling analysis, site-directed mutagenesis, isothermal calorimetry, small-angle X-ray scattering, and X-ray crystallography analyses, we have pinpointed a critical node within the complex dynamic communication network responsible for this sophisticated allosteric machinery. Through a facile Gly to Pro substitution, we have altered backbone dynamics, completely severing the allosteric signal yet remarkably, generating a nonallosteric enzyme that retains full catalytic activity. We also identified a second residue of prime importance to the inter-enzyme communication with chorismate mutase. Our results reveal that highly complex dynamic allostery is surprisingly vulnerable and provide further insights into the intimate link between catalysis and allostery.