A.F. Branco Cartoon – Revised from 2018 and revised for 2024 Veterans Day. Our Veterans are being left in the..

Conservative activist Scott Presler, whose organization Early Vote Action helped swing Pennsylvania to the right in the general election, announced Monday he will be working to do the same in […]

The post Democrats Have Another Problem to Worry About as Man Who Helped Trump Win Has Eyes on Blue State appeared first on The Western Journal.

Americans will only achieve healthy public discourse when we agree on basic principles and start telling the truth. As it stands, however, too many elected officials engage in hypocrisy by […]

The post Dem Lawmaker Says the Quiet Part Out Loud as She Suddenly Changes Her Tune on the Senate Filibuster appeared first on The Western Journal.

One of the greatest pass rushers in NFL history appears to be taking a pass himself when it comes to directly addressing a raging controversy. Pro Football Hall of Famer […]

The post NFL Analyst Michael Strahan Speaks Out After Becoming Embroiled in National Anthem Controversy appeared first on The Western Journal.

Late injection Johan Grobbelaar may find himself more than simply an “extra” on the Bok tour, writes Rob Houwing.

Cairo, Egypt Oct. 28, 2022 On Egyptian TV show, “Headlines,” Dr. Hossam Farouk dedicated an episode to discussing national and international coverage of the Secret Apparatus: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Industry of Death. It was a great honor having the book featured on this great show.

TikTok will have more US users than Snapchat and Pinterest in 2022   January 24, 2022 (New York, NY) – YouTube is the “OG” of influencer marketing platforms, and it’s […]

Member’s question time: Is Russia losing the South Caucasus? 22 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 September 2024 Online

Join us and ask Chatham House Senior Research Fellow, Natalie Sabanadze anything about the situation in the Caucasus. Submit your questions in advance.

Whilst Russia focuses on its illegal invasion of Ukraine, the situation at its southern border is evolving. Relations between the three states in the South Caucasus and Moscow have never been easy as Russia tried to maintain its dominance by leveraging vulnerabilities, playing one side against another to keep conflicts simmering and even engaging in open military aggression.  Although the violence seen in the 1990s and early 2000s has abated, the war in Ukraine has had an indirect impact on the region, bringing a change to the status quo.

Russia abandoned its long-standing support for Armenia, allowing for the collapse of Nagorny-Karabakh and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan with the backing of Turkey. As a result, Azerbaijan has emerged as a dominant regional player with Baku recently declaring its interest to join BRICS.  Turkey’s influence has grown, while Armenia frustrated by Russia’s change of heart has been turning cautiously towards the EU and the US.

In Georgia, meanwhile, the ruling party has been consolidating its grasp on power, rolling back democratic reforms and pivoting away from the West. Georgia’s long-awaited European integration process has been suspended, following the adoption of the Russian-style foreign agents legislation.

Join us as our Senior Research Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme answers your questions in this quick-fire session assessing the extent to which the Russian influence has changed since the start of the invasion of Ukraine and who is there to fill the vacuum; how geopolitical contestation in the region is going to impact aspirations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; and much more.

Submit your questions to Natalie Sabanadze in advance of the event. Your questions will drive the conversation.

Water, Ecosystems and Energy in South Asia: Making Cross-Border Collaboration Work Research paper sysadmin 29 June 2016

A new paper sets out the factors that have made previous cross-border projects in South Asia successful, arguing that cooperation around water is feasible despite the region’s political differences and economic assymetries.

• The countries of South Asia share some of the world’s major river basins – the Ganga (or Ganges), the Brahmaputra and the Indus. These rivers and their tributaries flow through seven countries, support more than 1 billion people, irrigate millions of hectares of land and are of cultural importance to many of those who rely on them.
• River management presents common challenges across the region. These include physical factors such as droughts, flooding, cyclones and climate change, as well political and institutional factors impeding the development of solutions and policies to improve resource management and reduce vulnerability. Water is increasingly seen as a source of competition, with population growth, industrialization and urbanization exacerbating the pressures on supply.
• Although South Asian examples of regional cooperation in general are limited, there is a clear positive trend. In areas such as disaster response and cross-border power trading, regional and bilateral engagement is beginning to take place. Multilateral official arrangements exist for trade and other economic issues, but there is none on water or ecosystems. However, as the benefits from cooperation become proven, its desirability is likely to gradually enter mainstream policy thinking on water issues.
• This research paper sets out the factors that have enabled cooperation, and the processes adopted, in previous successful cross-border projects. It focuses on four categories of cooperation: development of early-warning systems for natural disasters, in particular floods; protection of cross-border ecosystems; sharing of learning, through the showcasing of innovative approaches in one country that can be adopted by others; and power trading, in particular the development of hydropower in Bhutan and its export to India.
• The paper argues that cooperation around water in South Asia is feasible despite political differences and economic asymmetries. Different forms of collective action, and common understanding of both the threats and the shared benefits from cooperation, are required to foster more partnerships within the river basin states.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook to 2024 - Workshop 4 26 November 2019 — 9:30AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 January 2020 Gateway House, Stevens Street, Colaba

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within India’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Indian perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, Gateway House in Mumbai.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by the International Security Studies Programme at Gateway House.

Read a summary and essay

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook From Now to 2024 - Workshop 5 18 February 2020 — 12:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 February 2020 Langafonua Centre

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Tonga’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Tongan perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Nuku’alofa and was co-hosted by the Royal Oceania Institute in Tonga.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Lady Fane Fakafanua, Director of Operations at the Royal Oceania Institute.

Read a summary and essay

Jacek R. Wiśniewski
Dec 1, 2014; 13:3497-3506
Research

AUKUS reveals much about the new global strategic context Expert comment NCapeling 17 September 2021

The new AUKUS partnership as well as the furore in Paris surrounding its announcement says a lot about the new geopolitical landscape.

The growing diplomatic drama surrounding the announcement of the new Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) risks concealing rather than highlighting what the deal reveals about profound changes in the global strategic context. Several elements stand out.

First, Australia’s decision to break off the $66 billion contract it signed with France in 2016 to purchase a new fleet of diesel electric submarines underscores the heightened level of concern in Canberra about China’s growing naval capabilities.

Despite all the industrial, legal, and diplomatic disruption, the Australian government has decided only the stealthy nuclear-powered submarines developed by Britain with US support can provide the genuine naval capability it needs long-term.

Next, in helping Australia resolve this conundrum, the British government has revealed the versatility of its new foreign policy. Part of the reason UK prime minister Boris Johnson eschewed the concept of a formal foreign policy and security treaty in the post-Brexit deal with the European Union (EU) was to pursue freely new ventures such as the recent ‘G7-plus’ summit in Cornwall, and enhanced cooperation among the Five Eyes allies. AUKUS reveals that this approach can produce real results.

Europe or the Indo-Pacific

During this week’s Polish-British Belvedere Forum in Warsaw, one of the main Polish concerns was that this ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific could overstretch Britain’s scarce resources when it should be focusing on Europe, where they are most needed.

But AUKUS does not over-extend Britain. There is no military commitment involved in the agreement. The UK also remains outside the Quad – made up of the US, India, Japan, and Australia. And the ongoing stately voyage of its new aircraft carrier from the Mediterranean into the South China Sea provides better insight into the substance of the UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt.

Much derided for not carrying enough of its own aircraft – and for depending on US and Dutch escort vessels – the UK has in fact managed to coalesce a flexible group of allies around the Queen Elizabeth while enabling it to fly the British flag in Asian waters and strengthening interoperability with its allies for future joint operations.

Despite the hype, Britain’s main defence investments and deployments remain firmly focused in Europe, as laid out by the recent Integrated Review. And the decision to draft a new NATO Strategic Concept – midwifed by Britain at the 70th anniversary NATO summit hosted in London in December 2019 and confirmed during Joe Biden’s visit to NATO headquarters in June – will give Britain’s role in European security a new purpose and focus in the coming years.

Alone on the strategic landscape

For France, of course, the cancellation of its submarine deal is a painful humiliation, and a severe blow to thousands of workers in its hi-tech defence industry. It also comes at a sensitive moment politically, with Emmanuel Macron keen to demonstrate his international standing ahead of the 2022 presidential election. Instead, France now looks rather lonely on the strategic landscape alongside the more homogeneous and collectively powerful AUKUS trio.

But, rather than take the high road, a furious French reaction has compared Biden to Donald Trump and argued that this defence industrial failure for France should drive an acceleration towards European – for which, read EU – strategic autonomy.

This implies France sees European strategic autonomy as protecting and extending its own sovereign power and industrial interests rather than as a process for EU members to achieve more together in security and foreign policy than they can alone – thereby undermining rather than enhancing its case.

The gap between European strategic rhetoric and practical action was further highlighted by the AUKUS partnership being announced the evening before the EU launched its own Indo-Pacific strategy, and on the same day as China refused to allow a German frigate its first planned port visit to Shanghai.

America is still back

There is still a long way to go before the new submarine deal becomes reality. Australia needs to extricate itself from the French deal, decide how to secure the highly enriched uranium to power its new nuclear submarines, decide with the US and UK the division of labour and technology transfer of production, and assuage the International Atomic Energy Agency’s concerns about the precedent this deal sets. The fruits of this dramatic announcement will, therefore, be a long time in coming.

But, however the details play out, 15 September 2021 was a consequential day. The AUKUS announcement showed that China’s growing hard power is now eliciting a genuinely tough and structural political-military reaction.

Across the Atlantic, it also allowed President Biden – flanked ‘virtually’ by the British and Australian prime ministers – to send the global message that America is indeed back, just three weeks after the ignominious retreat from Afghanistan and chaotic exit from Kabul. And it offered him the opportunity to remind the world that the Indo-Pacific is where the US will be putting its main effort in the future.

For many in China, AUKUS now confirms their belief that the US and its principal allies are determined to contain China’s rise in its own ‘backyard’, where it believes it has the right to flex its muscles. For others, it will confirm Xi Jinping has overreached and China is now paying the price of his more assertive strategy. Either way, the Chinese are on notice that the ambivalent nature of the Obama pivot to Asia has given way to a more determined pivot under Biden.

While the US is stepping up, the UK has shown it is in the mix, leveraging opportunities as they arise. For example, the goodwill the UK has generated in Tokyo with this new partnership with Australia could help its case as it pursues membership of the Transpacific Partnership trade area in 2022.

The EU looks like a bystander in comparison and ill-equipped for the geopolitical competition inherent in this new strategic context. It is essential, therefore, once the dust has settled from these fraught few days, that the US and UK reach out to find ways to involve France and its EU partners in a meaningful, shared transatlantic approach to the Indo-Pacific.

How Beijing is closing surveillance gaps in the South China Sea The World Today iallan.drupal 15 October 2024

The discovery of a new radar system on China’s Triton Island military base shows that Beijing is rapidly developing its intelligence capacities in contested waters, write John Pollock and Damien Symon.

New satellite images reveal how the Chinese military is dramatically expanding its capabilities on Triton Island, which looks set to become a one of Beijing’s key signal intelligence bases in the South China Sea.

Once completed, the radar system would significantly increase China’s signals intercept and electronic warfare capabilities across the disputed Paracel Islands archipelago and add to a wider surveillance network spanning much of the South China Sea.

The enhanced facility on Triton is likely to offer a challenge to China’s competitors in the region and internationally.

China seized control of the Paracels from Vietnam in a 1974 naval battle, and competition for access to it waters has intensified since the recent discovery of oil and gas reserves. Chinese and Vietnamese maritime militia clashed off the coast of Triton in 2014.

In addition, American, British and Australian naval forces have for the past decade patrolled the waters to collectively challenge China’s contested ‘nine-dash-line’ claim to large stretches of the South China Sea. 

Overlapping anti-stealth network

A year after work was first identified on Triton, satellite images from Maxar have helped build a clearer picture of Beijing’s efforts to defend this strategic waterway.

The most striking development is the construction of a new radar system, known as SIAR – synthetic impulse and aperture radar – which purportedly detects stealth aircraft. The counter-stealth radar on Triton is characterized by its distinctive octagonal structure, which resembles another SIAR system built by China on Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands, south of the Paracels, in 2017. A half-completed tower also sits near the SIAR radar on Triton, which is likely to be the operations centre.

Once completed, the radar on Triton will form what is believed to be a wider network of at least three overlapping counter-stealth radars built across Chinese bases in the South China Sea over the past decade, including on Hainan Island, home to several Chinese naval bases. 

The positioning of the radar on Triton, 320km south of Hainan, is telling, says J. Michael Dahm, Senior Resident Fellow for Aerospace and China Studies at the Mitchell Institute. 

‘SIAR radars cannot see over the curve of the Earth, which means there is a gap in China’s air surveillance coverage between Subi Reef and Hainan Island. The Triton Island site will help close that gap’, said Dahm.

The aim, he suggests, is to give China contiguous counter-stealth radar coverage of the South China Sea.

More construction underway

The satellite images reveal other building projects on Triton. One is a large pad at the end of the road network which will probably be used as a launching point for a mobile anti-ship missile battery. The building at the northeast end of the road is probably a storage building for missile transport vehicles. 

Diminishing Vietnam’s options

The development of a new counter-stealth radar system and other suspected signals intercept structures on Triton represents a notable increase in China’s intelligence capabilities in the Paracels. The Chinese Communist Party has not disclosed the purpose of the building work on Triton, but its effects on regional and global competitors are likely to be wide ranging.

For Vietnam, which is rapidly expanding its own bases in the South China Sea, the intelligence structures on Triton would significantly diminish its capacity to operate undetected in the area. Alongside existing radar on Triton which can detect sea-going vessels, Beijing now has the potential to track Vietnamese air movements and gain forewarning of Hanoi’s manoeuvres in the area, including efforts to access oil and gas deposits.

The desire to strengthen control over these resources may explain why China is fortifying Triton Island, says Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House. ‘The developments might be a warning that China is planning to mount another drilling expedition’, he suggests.

The US election could create the need for a G7 alternative – without American representation Expert comment jon.wallace 15 October 2024

Traditional allies of the US need to find a way to work together on some global policy issues even when the US itself is not engaged. A ‘G6 plus’ group could provide an answer.

When Jamaica pulled out of the nascent West Indies Federation in 1961, Trinidad and Tobago’s then prime minister, Dr Eric Williams, famously said ‘One from ten leaves nought’. In the run up to the US elections on 5 November, the US’s longstanding allies need to ask themselves if the same logic must apply to the G7. 

A Donald Trump victory will result in stark differences between the US and its closest partners on key global economic issues. US allies would no doubt try and persuade the new president to moderate his position, but experience suggests that this will have little, if any, effect.  

They may then want to work around the US, or on a parallel track. But doing so will be very hard unless they have a framework for discussing and developing ideas collectively. Could some form of ‘G6 plus’ forum help?

The role of the G7 today

The G7 no longer acts as a steering group for the global economy. However, it remains a critical forum for the US and its allies to coordinate their efforts to help solve global problems, to defend common Western interests, to resolve internal disputes and to underpin information exchange. 

In the past two years, the G7 has come to be seen by the US and other members as one of the most effective international mechanisms. It has played a critical role coordinating Western efforts to recover from the last pandemic and prepare for future ones.  

It has been pivotal in weakening Russia’s economy following the attack on Ukraine and has acted to strengthen Western economic security and resilience more broadly.  

The G7 has also responded to ‘Global South’ calls for help in dealing with the pandemic aftermath and the Ukraine war. 

Trump’s approach to the G7

The problem is that the G7’s effectiveness depends critically on full US engagement, sometimes as a leader of initiatives (such as the decision to impose an ‘oil price cap’ on Russia in autumn 2022) or as an essential partner. 

If elected, former President Trump is likely to abandon the G7 as an instrument of international economic policy. This is effectively what happened during his first presidency and there are reasons to expect this to be repeated. 

Many of Trump’s international economic policies are highly controversial with US allies, including his apparent determination to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, impose across the board 10-20 per cent tariffs and even punish countries for not using the dollar. His domestic policies, including mass deportation of undocumented immigrants and aggressive deregulation and fiscal easing could lead to further sharp disagreements.  

Furthermore, Trump demonstrates general antipathy towards multilateralism. Under his presidency, US representatives in the G7 and G20 sought to weaken core values and policies that have underpinned international economic cooperation for decades – including the importance of a rules based international system, the IMF’s global safety net role, and the responsibility of the advanced world to assist the poorest countries financially.  

Other G7 and G20 countries tried to preserve as much as possible of the previous consensus. But in the case of climate change, the only solution was to have a separate text for the US. Critically, such efforts diverted time and attention from the enormous challenges facing the world at the time. 

Trump went through four different G7/G20 Sherpas during his presidency and disowned the final declaration of the 2018 Canadian G7 summit after hundreds of hours of negotiation, and despite previously signing off on the text. The US failed to host a final leaders’ summit, even virtually, during his administration’s G7 presidency.  

Of course, how far Trump carries through his most radical policies will depend, among other things, on the outcome of the Congressional elections and the stance taken by US courts. 

He may also have second thoughts if elected. His first administration sometimes supported significant multilateral economic initiatives, notably the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative and ‘Common Framework’ for debt rescheduling. 

But, in the event of a second Trump administration, the most likely scenario for the G7 is a repeat of the paralysis of 2017-20, which would be even more costly today.

Should Vice President Kamala Harris win on 5 November, the situation should in theory be very different. She will likely continue with President Joe Biden’s collaborative approach to the G7.

Nonetheless, major issues may still arise where America’s allies want to take a fundamentally different approach and need a mechanism to do so. These could include policy on the WTO, de-risking the economic relationship with China, restricting carbon leakage, and regulating US-dominated big tech.  

How should US allies respond?

No US ally will want to be seen to be leading development of a new ‘G6’ that excludes the US. The top priority will be securing the best possible relationship with the incoming president. Political weakness and/or new governments in France, Germany, the UK and Japan will add to this hesitancy.

Any new forum will therefore need to be as low profile as possible. The concept should initially be discussed in private by sherpas from each participating country. Once established, officials should as far as possible meet online. Leaders should only meet online, at least initially.  

Participants should be fully transparent about the forum’s existence and avoid any grand ‘framing’ along the lines of the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’. Instead, it should be described as a practical, largely technocratic forum intended to coordinate activity among Western economic powers in those areas where the US chooses not to engage. A suitably innocuous name – such as the ‘the sustainable growth club’ could help.

Topics should be limited to those requiring urgent collective global action, such as climate, health, tech governance, development finance and trade – and where the US federal government is not an ‘essential’ partner. Such a forum should not therefore address defence.  

Imagine a World Without Fake News Explainer Video NCapeling 25 February 2021

Harriet Moynihan and Mathieu Boulegue explain how we can avoid drowning in an ocean of fake news and information manipulation.

The flow of fake news is vast and unlikely to go away. What’s more, imagining a world where fake news is eradicated completely has implications for freedom of expression.

But what if, instead of wishing fake news away, we can adapt and become immune to it? 

Chatham House is built on big ideas. Help us imagine a better world.

Our researchers develop positive solutions to global challenges, working with governments, charities, businesses and society to build a better future.

SNF CoLab is our project supported by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF) to share our ideas in experimental, collaborative ways – and to learn about designing a better future, overcoming challenges such as fake news, COVID-19, food security, and conflict.

Expert

Expert

Expert

Histone recognition by “reader” modules serves as a fundamental mechanism in epigenetic regulation. Previous studies have shown that Spindlin1 is a reader of histone H3K4me3 as well as “K4me3-R8me2a” and promotes transcription of rDNA or Wnt/TCF4 target genes. Here we show that Spindlin1 also acts as a potent reader of histone H3 “K4me3-K9me3/2” bivalent methylation pattern. Calorimetric titration revealed a binding affinity of 16 nm between Spindlin1 and H3 “K4me3-K9me3” peptide, which is one to three orders of magnitude stronger than most other histone readout events at peptide level. Structural studies revealed concurrent recognition of H3K4me3 and H3K9me3/2 by aromatic pockets 2 and 1 of Spindlin1, respectively. Epigenomic profiling studies showed that Spindlin1 colocalizes with both H3K4me3 and H3K9me3 peaks in a subset of genes enriched in biological processes of transcription and its regulation. Moreover, the distribution of Spindlin1 peaks is primarily associated with H3K4me3 but not H3K9me3, which suggests that Spindlin1 is a downstream effector of H3K4me3 generated in heterochromatic regions. Collectively, our work calls attention to an intriguing function of Spindlin1 as a potent H3 “K4me3-K9me3/2” bivalent mark reader, thereby balancing gene expression and silencing in H3K9me3/2-enriched regions.

Climate action and gender equality: Can we close the gap on one without the other? 8 March 2021 — 2:30PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 February 2021 Online

In partnership with the COP26 presidency, policymakers and experts examine the interrelationship between gender equality and climate action, and highlight innovative examples of policy and practice from around the world.

Marking International Women’s Day, this event organized by the COP26 presidency in partnership with Chatham House, will explore how gender equality and climate action go hand-in-hand. The agreement of the Gender Action Plan (GAP) at COP25 sent the message that the time for gender-responsive climate action is now.

This will be a unique opportunity to hear from policymakers and civil society leaders discussing whether enough is being done, as well as highlighting cutting-edge work around the world and suggesting what the future could hold.

The event will be livestreamed on this event page.

Youth voices on climate action 22 April 2021 — 12:30PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 March 2021 Online

To celebrate Earth Day, youth activists, local change-makers, innovators and entrepreneurs discuss opportunities and challenges for youth-led climate activism.

Young people will bear the brunt of the intensifying impacts of climate change over time. Facing this challenge, youth around the world have emerged at the forefront of climate activism at an unprecedented scale.

School strikes, marches, and declarations complement youth engagement in diplomacy, technology, science, and law. Providing a platform for young people involved in climate action at the local, national and global levels is essential to promote collaboration, generate new policy ideas, and demand accountability from political and business leaders.

Panellists engage in critical conversation about COP26; global leadership in climate mitigation, adaptation, and finance; and how to develop the full potential of youth-led global initiatives going forward.

COVID-19 and food security in southern Africa 16 July 2021 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 10 June 2021 Online

This event aims to take a deeper look at the interlinking issues of food security, nutrition, climate change and food systems in southern Africa.

Developing climate smart agri-food systems in sub-Saharan Africa is a precondition for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Over the years household food security has been affected by different shocks including climate change and the recent COVID-19 pandemic.

The impact on rural households in southern Africa, in particular, has been significant due to the structure of food systems in the region.

This event aims to take a deeper look at the interlinking issues of food security, nutrition, climate change and food systems in southern Africa and consider how practitioners and policymakers can build more equitable, resilient and better food systems. 

Populism Comes to South Korea Expert comment sysadmin 20 December 2016

Public disgust with the embattled president reflects not only the unedifying details of her impeachment but a wider distrust of the political system.

For South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye, the jury is quite literally still out. Impeached by the country’s National Assembly on 9 December over claims of corruption, cronyism and influence peddling, she defiantly rejected – in a detailed statement – all of the charges levelled at her by an independent prosecutor. Any resolution of the issue must now await the ruling of the country’s Constitutional Court on the legitimacy of the impeachment vote – a decision that most likely will come early in the new year.

For the special prosecutor’s office, which is due to start its formal investigation on 21 December, the challenge is to find unambiguous evidence of the president’s direct responsibility for any of the corruption that may have taken place. The president, for her part, can claim, with some credibility that so far she has been tried only in the court of public opinion; that in South Korea’s rumour-prone, scandal-hungry media environment in which prosecutors have been known in the past to leak information to skew public debate, she has been denied natural justice and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.

Long shadows

But for the more than three-quarters of the Korean public calling for Park’s resignation, the president is symptomatic of Korean society’s wider flaws, including a pattern of corruption, privilege and hypocrisy endemic to the country’s political, economic and social elites. At a time of anemic economic growth (the country’s growth rate is predicted to slow to 2.1% next year), widening wealth and income disparities and reduced employment opportunities for a highly educated workforce, there is a growing mood of populist disaffection with the entire social and political system – for its lack of fairness and transparency and its perceived regulatory inefficiencies. This has been highlighted dramatically by disasters such as the Sewol ferry sinking that claimed the lives of some 300 school-children in August 2014 – at which time the president was castigated for being absent from her office at the time of a grave national crisis.

Complicating the current stand-off is the long-shadow of identity politics and unresolved disagreements about the country’s postwar historical narrative. As the daughter of the man responsible for the Korean economic ‘miracle’ who protected the country from the external communist threat in the North and radical subversion from within, Park’s political lineage is, for the older generation of voters in their sixties and above, a powerful reason to back the beleaguered president.

Already there are signs that this constituency is beginning to rally behind Park, with 30,000 demonstrating on 17 December against the impeachment decision, and with the governing Saenuri party showing signs of a consolidation of power around pro-Park legislators. The president, who has a reputation for stubbornness, may be calculating that this core support may allow her to defy the much larger calls for her resignation. She may also be hoping that the constitutional court, in which the majority of justices are politically conservative, will rule in her favour, allowing her to see out the remainder of her time in office, set to end in February 2018.

A pro-Park ruling by the court seems unlikely given the weight of the circumstantial evidence. Leading opposition politicians, including Moon Jae-in, former head of the Democratic Party and the current front runner in any post-impeachment presidential contest, has warned of a popular ‘revolution’ if the impeachment vote is not upheld. Moreover, the appetite for street protests against the president remains undimmed, and even conservative politicians appear to be positioning themselves for a post-Park era. Ban Ki-moon, the outgoing UN secretary general and long considered a likely Saenuri party candidate for the presidency, has been publicly distancing himself from Park. With 20.5% support, behind Moon on 23.7%, he has compelling reasons to align himself with the popular mood.

Lessons

At an individual level, the experience of President Park combines both political failure and personal tragedy. She has demonstrably failed to live up to her early commitments to represent all Koreans and to bridge the deep divisions between left and right in Korean society. She has also remained deeply isolated from the professional politicians and democratic polity she purports to lead. This is perhaps not so surprising given her authoritarian heritage and the experience of seeing both her parents assassinated in space of five years in the 1970s. The trauma of this experience reportedly made her distrustful of government officials and overly inclined to rely on the guidance of personal friends of dubious reliability, the font of her current troubles. There is also a profound irony that a politician who came to power vowing to place ‘trust-politik’ at the heart of her policy towards North Korea has seen her political position undermined, perhaps fatally, by a near complete collapse in public confidence in her administration.

More widely, the Park saga reveals an important and potentially seismic shift in public attitudes in South Korea, perhaps spurred by a growing populist trend evident elsewhere, whether in the US, Europe or parts of Southeast Asia. Koreans appear to have lost patience with their political system. This new climate of dissent – emboldened by the signs that protest can potentially lead to radical political change – is likely to prove a challenge to any future Korean leader hoping to secure the trust and legitimacy needed to govern.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

What to Know About Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Election Expert comment sysadmin 27 March 2017

Tim Summers looks at what we know about Carrie Lam, the territory’s new leader, and where Hong Kong politics goes from here.

Carrie Lam, formerly number two in the Hong Kong government, was selected as the Special Administrative Region’s new chief executive on 26 March. What does the process and her selection say about Hong Kong’s political future?

1. Elections for Hong Kong’s top job are still within Beijing’s control. Due to the failure of political reform proposals in 2015, Lam was elected on the basis of 777 votes from the 1,194 members of the Chief Executive Election Committee. This ‘small-circle’ process was essentially the same as that used since 1997 (the only change being the expansion of the committee from its initial size of 800). The design of the process favours Beijing, and indeed Lam was the favoured candidate of the central government and many of its supporters in Hong Kong.
2. But the influence of the central government has limits. The second-ranked candidate, former finance minister John Tsang (365 votes), had not been encouraged to stand by Beijing, and a fourth candidate, Regina Ip (who did not obtain enough nominations to join the vote), reportedly also rejected suggestions from Beijing that she should not put herself forward. The Committee itself contained 325 individuals affiliated to or sympathetic to opposition parties and around 100 establishment figures who did not support Lam – most of whom voted for Tsang. Although Lam gained more votes than her predecessor, CY Leung, in 2012 (he obtained 689 votes after a controversial campaign when scandals undermined his main opponent), Beijing appears to have expended substantial political capital in securing her victory.
3. Despite the closed process, public opinion matters. The campaign saw all the candidates actively seek not only the votes of committee members, but also wider popular support. This highlights the need for broader legitimacy, and the fact that public participation and media debate are central factors in Hong Kong’s open political culture. A number of opinion polls showed Lam to have notably lower levels of popular support than Tsang. This will constrain her ability to govern effectively and she will not be cut much slack by the Hong Kong population. There were protests at the election venue calling for ‘genuine universal suffrage’.
4. The new chief executive is an economic interventionist. The two main candidates – Lam and Tsang – have different policy approaches. Tsang’s was a more liberal ‘laissez faire’ one. Lam is likely to continue the somewhat more interventionist approach of CY Leung, who intervened more than previous governments to try to stabilize property prices and make more land available for housing, as well as reinstating policies targeting poverty and agreeing measures to limit the social impact of rising numbers of visitors and money from mainland China.
5. Political reform seems very far off. The third candidate, former judge Woo Kwok-hing, had the clearest position on the thorny issue of political reform. Many of the government’s critics see less prospect for progress here under Lam, who fronted the government’s consultation processes during the 2013–15 debates over political reform. Lam gave some conflicting signals during the campaign, and it remains to be seen whether she tries to restart the process. But given rising populism, the growing fragmentation and polarization of Hong Kong politics, and entrenched positions from both Beijing and the opposition, it will be even more difficult to obtain consensus on a way forward than when the last failed attempt at reform took place – a key indicator will be whether all political parties are willing to discuss compromises.
6. July’s anniversary will be contentious. Following formal appointment by the central government, Lam’s term will begin on 1 July. This will also mark the 20th anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, which will coincide with a planned visit by President Xi Jinping. This will no doubt spark protests; for many, the 20th anniversary of the handover will therefore be less a time for celebration than an opportunity for many to highlight concerns about the future of the former British colony.

Is Myanmar Running Out of Time? 17 February 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Just a few years ago the West was celebrating what appeared to be the conclusion of a quarter-century long contest between Myanmar’s democrats and a military dictatorship. Today, the country stands charged with genocide at the International Court of Justice, with Aung San Suu Kyi leading the defence. Is Myanmar a democratic transition gone awry? Or something else entirely?

The speaker will argue that Myanmar is not the simple morality tale often portrayed. It has instead become the stage for some of the world’s most pressing challenges such as climate change, explosive inequality and rising populism, the impact of social media; and the rise of China as the next global superpower.

In this context, are 20th century democratic institutions and free-market reforms the correct remedy for a country plagued by the legacies of colonialism, decades of civil war, tyranny and a predatory economic system? The speaker will offer a prognosis for Myanmar’s future, assessing the question of whether it will become Asia’s next failed state.

This event will be held off the record.

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