Eliza Manningham-Buller is confirmed as a president of Chatham House replacing Paddy Ashdown who steps down after 10 years.

The appointment of Baroness Manningham-Buller as a president of Chatham House was confirmed at the institute’s annual general meeting on Tuesday 21 July. Baroness Manningham-Buller joins Sir John Major and Baroness Scotland of Asthal as a co-president and succeeds Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon who has stepped down from the role after two terms.

Eliza Manningham-Buller was director-general of the UK Security Service (MI5) between 2002 and 2007 and became an independent life peer in 2008. She served as Chairman of Imperial College London from 2011 to 2015. She brings to Chatham House an extensive knowledge of and experience in international security as well as a deep interest in medical research and global health, having served as a member of the Board of Governors of the Wellcome Trust since 2008. In October 2015, Baroness Mannigham-Buller will become Chairman of the Trust’s Board of Governors.

Paddy Ashdown steps down after serving as a president for 10 years alongside Sir John Major, Patricia Scotland and their predecessors Lord Hurd of Westwell and Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, respectively. Over that period, the institute benefitted enormously from his extensive experience in international politics and conflict resolution, including as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2002 to 2006.

Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, said:

'I am delighted to welcome Elizabeth Manningham-Buller as a president of Chatham House. Throughout her career, she has brought deep knowledge, careful analysis and sound judgement to bear upon some of the most difficult dimensions of public policy. The institute will benefit greatly from these qualities as it draws on her engagement with Chatham House over the coming years.

I would like to pay tribute to Paddy Ashdown for his long-standing support of Chatham House. His contributions to our substantive debates, both internally and externally, have been invaluable on numerous occasions, and we look forward to his continued involvement with the institute as a member of our Panel of Senior Advisers.'

Baroness Manningham-Buller said:

“I am delighted to be elected as a Chatham House president at this important time in the institute’s history, as it grapples with a complex and inter-connected agenda of policy challenges. I look forward to working with John Major and Patricia Scotland in supporting Chatham House and its valuable and necessary work.

The Chatham House Prize is presented annually to the person, persons or organization deemed by members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs to have made the most significant contribution to the improvement of international relations in the previous year.

This year, members of the institute voted for President Juan Manuel Santos in recognition of his role in formally ratifying a peace agreement with the FARC rebel group and bringing an end to the armed conflict in Colombia.

In 2016, after four years of negotiation, Juan Manuel Santos led the Colombian government in ratifying a peace agreement with the FARC. Success was by no means certain: after coming to a ceasefire and disarmament agreement in June, followed by a peace accord in September, Santos was forced to return to the drawing board with FARC negotiators after a referendum in October rejected the initial deal. But Santos persevered, drafting and signing a new deal that incorporated changes suggested by the No camp and was ratified by the Colombian congress on 24 November 2016.

The deal ended one of the world’s longest running armed conflicts, during which 220,000 people were killed and 6 million displaced. This was a complex, sensitive and intense process which required exceptional political diplomacy and perseverance. Ultimately, his determination and commitment to peace guided the main parties and international partners to one of the biggest successes in brokering peace in modern history.

Nominees

The nominees for the Chatham House Prize 2017 were:

• Charlotte Osei, Chairperson of the Electoral Commission of Ghana
• Juan Manuel Santos, President of Colombia
• Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary-General of NATO

Event

President Santos will be presented the award at an event in London on Thursday 9 November.

About the Chatham House Prize

The Chatham House Prize is presented to the person, persons or organization deemed by members of Chatham House to have made the most significant contribution to the improvement of international relations in the previous year.

The selection process is independent, democratic and draws on the deep knowledge of Chatham House's research teams, making the Prize a distinctive and unique award in the field of international affairs.

A short-list of nominees is selected by the institute's three presidents from a longer list submitted by the research programmes and departments in their areas of expertise. The recipient is then determined by Chatham House's broad membership base on a one-member, one-vote basis. The award is presented on behalf of the institute's patron, Her Majesty the Queen, representing the non-partisan and authoritative character of the Prize.

The Chatham House Prize was launched in 2005. Previous recipients of the Prize include Burmese democracy campaigner Aung San Suu Kyi, Médecins Sans Frontières, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Melinda Gates, co-founder of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

For more information, please contact: 
Jenny Williams, Head of Media
Email: jwilliams@chathamhouse.org
Phone:  +44 (0) 207 314 3687 

The British vote to leave the EU is (and should be) seen as a wakeup call for political elites on both sides of the Atlantic. Under normal circumstances, the institutional support that crossed party lines for the Remain campaign should have ensured it a comfortable victory; instead, it lost by a not-insignificant 52−48 per cent margin. Similarly, Donald Trump has alienated the establishment of both American parties – while Democratic dislike is predictable, the extent of the Republican elite’s discomfort with Trump, clearly on display at the party’s convention in Cleveland this week, is extremely unusual at this point in an election campaign which is more typically a display of ‘rally around the candidate’. But as Brexit demonstrated, the conventional logic may not apply in 2016.

There are significant differences between the UK referendum and the US elections. Some of this is structural – a national referendum operates along very different lines than a US presidential election, after all, and the US electorate is much larger and more diverse than its British equivalent. Furthermore, American voters will be making a choice between individuals as well as ideas. This does not necessarily work to the advantage of either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton (both of whom have the highest unfavourability ratings for presidential candidates seen in decades), but highly individualized questions of personality and temperament will impact voter behaviour in a way that they did not for British referendum voters. Finally, who wins the US election will depend in very large part on state politics and electoral college math – as the 2000 election showed, the candidate who wins the popular vote does not necessarily end up as president.

But there is a far more important message that politicians in the US, UK and, more broadly, Europe, should take away from the Brexit result. Regardless of what happens in the US elections, elites no longer necessarily hold the preponderance of power. The disenfranchised who have historically either not had the mass or the coherence to communicate it now do - at least on occasion.

This is not an ideological split – Brexit voters came together from all parts of the political spectrum. Equally, in the US, Sanders and Trump voters are bucking the system in both the Democratic and Republican parties.

There is a significant backlash under way in both countries towards aspects of globalization, going beyond the traditional right/left divide. Allowing for some differences in specifics, the American and British political establishments have, over the past few decades, broadly eased restrictions on the free movement of capital, goods and people across national borders. There have been notable benefits associated with this approach that have mostly been distributed inclusively, but the costs have typically hit those already less advantaged and without opportunities or skills to mitigate them. Those who have been left out or left behind from these changes are discovering their own political power.

Politicians are going to have to find ways not just to appeal to these voters who feel disenfranchised by existing structures, but also address their legitimate concerns. There will of course be partisan policy solutions put forward on both sides. But inevitably the political leadership is going to have to find ways to bridge party lines to realize solutions to those social and economic inequalities. Ignoring them, as many have in the past, is increasingly a quick path to losing power.

Unless the world wants to turn back to more isolationist and protectionist times, with the slower growth and inequalities that this includes, politicians are also going to have to do a better job of explaining the benefits of globalization. And, more importantly, they will have to ensure that these benefits reach their broader population more equitably and that the costs are better mitigated. 

So the Brexit vote does not necessarily presage a Trump victory on 8 November, but it shows in stark terms that the world has fundamentally changed – the time when elites alone could call the shots is gone. Politicians, including Hillary Clinton, will need to respond proactively to the causes of the dissatisfaction rather than waiting until the next time they need the public vote.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Please note this an online-only event.

Norway is one of the few European countries that remains outside of the European Union. After the country’s population rejected the prospect of joining the EU twice, Norway’s relationship with the Union has been based on its membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), alongside Iceland and Liechtenstein.

The ‘Norway Model’ was often mentioned in the run up to the Brexit vote as a possible basis for Britain’s future relationship with the bloc, not least because it offers the least disruption to the current arrangement. Equally, Norway is not subject to the EU fisheries policy - an anticipated major issue in the next phase of Brexit talks. Nor is it part of the EU Customs Union.

Even though Prime Minister Johnson has now ruled out the type of deep economic and regulatory integration with the EU that Norway enjoys through its EEA membership, the country’s experience can still offer valuable lessons for the UK as it prepares to exit the transition period at the end of 2020.

In this session, the speaker will share Norway’s experience as a long-standing EEA member and discuss the challenges of engaging with the EU from the outside. What lessons can Norway offer the UK ahead of the negotiations on the future of UK-EU relations? What are the limits of its current arrangement with the EU? And is there any appetite among the Norwegian population to revisit it?

Despite face-to-face diplomatic meetings being increasingly rare during the current disruption, COVID-19 will ultimately force a redefinition of national security and defence spending priorities, and this could provide the possibility of an improved political climate at RevCon when it happens in 2021.

With US presidential elections due in November and a gradual engagement growing between the EU and Iran, there could be a new context for more cooperation between states by 2021. Two key areas of focus over the coming months will be the arms control talks between the United States and Russia, and Iran’s compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal.

It is too early to discern the medium- and longer-term consequences of COVID-19 for defence ministries, but a greater focus on societal resilience and reinvigorating economic productivity will likely undercut the rationale for expensive nuclear modernization.

Therefore, extending the current New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) would be the best, most practical option to give both Russia and the United States time to explore more ambitious multilateral arms control measures, while allowing their current focus to remain on the pandemic and economic relief.

Continuing distrust

But with the current treaty — which limits nuclear warheads, missiles, bombers, and launchers — due to expire in February 2021, the continuing distrust between the United States and Russia makes this extension hard to achieve, and a follow-on treaty even less likely.

Prospects for future bilateral negotiations are hindered by President Donald Trump’s vision for a trilateral arms control initiative involving both China and Russia. But China opposes this on the grounds that its nuclear arsenal is far smaller than that of the two others.

While there appears to be agreement that the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and the UK (the NPT nuclear-weapons states) and those of the states outside the treaty (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) will all have to be taken into account going forward, a practical mechanism for doing so proves elusive.

If Joe Biden wins the US presidency he seems likely to pursue an extension of the New START treaty and could also prevent a withdrawal from the Open Skies treaty, the latest arms control agreement targeted by the Trump administration.

Under a Biden administration, the United States would also probably re-join the JCPOA, provided Tehran returned to strict compliance with the deal. Biden could even use the team that negotiated the Iran deal to advance the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

For an NPT regime already confronted by a series of longstanding divergences, it is essential that Iran remains a signatory especially as tensions between Iran and the United States have escalated recently — due to the Qassim Suleimani assassination and the recent claim by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps to have successfully placed the country’s first military satellite into orbit.

This announcement raised red flags among experts about whether Iran is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles due to the dual-use nature of space technology. The satellite launch — deeply troubling for Iran’s neighbours and the EU countries — may strengthen the US argument that it is a cover for the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

However, as with many other countries, Iran is struggling with a severe coronavirus crisis and will be pouring its scientific expertise and funds into that rather than other efforts — including the nuclear programme.

Those European countries supporting the trading mechanism INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) for sending humanitarian goods into Iran could use this crisis to encourage Iran to remain in compliance with the JCPOA and its NPT obligations.

France, Germany and the UK (the E3) have already successfully concluded the first transaction, which was to facilitate the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran. But the recent Iranian escalatory steps will most certainly place a strain on the preservation of this arrangement.

COVID-19 might have delayed Iran’s next breach of the 2015 nuclear agreement but Tehran will inevitably seek to strengthen its hand before any potential negotiations with the United States after the presidential elections.

As frosty US-Iranian relations — exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic — prevent diplomatic negotiations, this constructive engagement between the E3 and Iran might prove instrumental in reviving the JCPOA and ensuring Iran stays committed to both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

While countries focus their efforts on tackling the coronavirus pandemic, it is understandable resources may be limited for other global challenges, such as the increasing risk of nuclear weapons use across several regions.

But the potential ramifications of the COVID-19 crisis for the NPT regime are profound. Ongoing tensions between the nuclear-armed states must not be ignored while the world’s focus is elsewhere, and the nuclear community should continue to work together to progress nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, building bridges of cooperation and trust that can long outlast the pandemic.

In 2011, many Syrians took to the streets of Damascus to demand the overthrow of the government of Bashar al-Assad. Today, much of Syria has become a warzone and many worry that the country is on the brink of collapse.

Drawing on first-hand testimonies from opposition fighters, exiles and human rights activists, the panel will explore the complicated reality of life in present-day Syria. Looking at the militarization of the uprising, the rise of the Islamists and sectarian warfare, and the role of Syria’s government in the conflict, the speakers will discuss the issues from the grassroots to the geopolitical, including the role of the international community in bringing to an end the bloodshed.

This event is now full and registration has closed. An audio recording will be made available shortly after the event has taken place.

There has been a renaissance in the study of how the backgrounds of individual leaders affect foreign policy outcomes. Donald Trump's presidency highlights the limits of this approach. Trump's psychology is so unique, and so akin to that of a small child, that studying his background alone is insufficient to explain his decision-making. The evidence for this characterization of Trump's leadership comes not from his political opponents, but his allies, staffers and subordinates. Trump's lack of impulse control, short attention span and frequent temper tantrums have all undercut his effectiveness as president as compared to his predecessors. Nonetheless, the 45th president helps to clarify ongoing debates in American politics about the relative strength of the presidency as an institution. In particular, the powers of the presidency have become so enhanced that even comparatively weak and inexperienced leaders can execute dramatic policy shifts. The formal checks on presidential power, from the legislative, judicial and executive branches have all eroded. Similarly, the informal checks on the presidency had also degraded before Trump's inauguration. This article uses Trump's presidency—and his severe limitations as a decision-maker—to highlight the ways in which even a weak leader can affect change by holding a powerful office.

This event is part of the Inaugural Virtual Roundtable Series on the US, Americas and the State of the World and will take place virtually only. Participants should not come to Chatham House for these events.

Despite face-to-face diplomatic meetings being increasingly rare during the current disruption, COVID-19 will ultimately force a redefinition of national security and defence spending priorities, and this could provide the possibility of an improved political climate at RevCon when it happens in 2021.

With US presidential elections due in November and a gradual engagement growing between the EU and Iran, there could be a new context for more cooperation between states by 2021. Two key areas of focus over the coming months will be the arms control talks between the United States and Russia, and Iran’s compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal.

It is too early to discern the medium- and longer-term consequences of COVID-19 for defence ministries, but a greater focus on societal resilience and reinvigorating economic productivity will likely undercut the rationale for expensive nuclear modernization.

Therefore, extending the current New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) would be the best, most practical option to give both Russia and the United States time to explore more ambitious multilateral arms control measures, while allowing their current focus to remain on the pandemic and economic relief.

Continuing distrust

But with the current treaty — which limits nuclear warheads, missiles, bombers, and launchers — due to expire in February 2021, the continuing distrust between the United States and Russia makes this extension hard to achieve, and a follow-on treaty even less likely.

Prospects for future bilateral negotiations are hindered by President Donald Trump’s vision for a trilateral arms control initiative involving both China and Russia. But China opposes this on the grounds that its nuclear arsenal is far smaller than that of the two others.

While there appears to be agreement that the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and the UK (the NPT nuclear-weapons states) and those of the states outside the treaty (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) will all have to be taken into account going forward, a practical mechanism for doing so proves elusive.

If Joe Biden wins the US presidency he seems likely to pursue an extension of the New START treaty and could also prevent a withdrawal from the Open Skies treaty, the latest arms control agreement targeted by the Trump administration.

Under a Biden administration, the United States would also probably re-join the JCPOA, provided Tehran returned to strict compliance with the deal. Biden could even use the team that negotiated the Iran deal to advance the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

For an NPT regime already confronted by a series of longstanding divergences, it is essential that Iran remains a signatory especially as tensions between Iran and the United States have escalated recently — due to the Qassim Suleimani assassination and the recent claim by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps to have successfully placed the country’s first military satellite into orbit.

This announcement raised red flags among experts about whether Iran is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles due to the dual-use nature of space technology. The satellite launch — deeply troubling for Iran’s neighbours and the EU countries — may strengthen the US argument that it is a cover for the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

However, as with many other countries, Iran is struggling with a severe coronavirus crisis and will be pouring its scientific expertise and funds into that rather than other efforts — including the nuclear programme.

Those European countries supporting the trading mechanism INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) for sending humanitarian goods into Iran could use this crisis to encourage Iran to remain in compliance with the JCPOA and its NPT obligations.

France, Germany and the UK (the E3) have already successfully concluded the first transaction, which was to facilitate the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran. But the recent Iranian escalatory steps will most certainly place a strain on the preservation of this arrangement.

COVID-19 might have delayed Iran’s next breach of the 2015 nuclear agreement but Tehran will inevitably seek to strengthen its hand before any potential negotiations with the United States after the presidential elections.

As frosty US-Iranian relations — exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic — prevent diplomatic negotiations, this constructive engagement between the E3 and Iran might prove instrumental in reviving the JCPOA and ensuring Iran stays committed to both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

While countries focus their efforts on tackling the coronavirus pandemic, it is understandable resources may be limited for other global challenges, such as the increasing risk of nuclear weapons use across several regions.

But the potential ramifications of the COVID-19 crisis for the NPT regime are profound. Ongoing tensions between the nuclear-armed states must not be ignored while the world’s focus is elsewhere, and the nuclear community should continue to work together to progress nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, building bridges of cooperation and trust that can long outlast the pandemic.

Despite face-to-face diplomatic meetings being increasingly rare during the current disruption, COVID-19 will ultimately force a redefinition of national security and defence spending priorities, and this could provide the possibility of an improved political climate at RevCon when it happens in 2021.

With US presidential elections due in November and a gradual engagement growing between the EU and Iran, there could be a new context for more cooperation between states by 2021. Two key areas of focus over the coming months will be the arms control talks between the United States and Russia, and Iran’s compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal.

It is too early to discern the medium- and longer-term consequences of COVID-19 for defence ministries, but a greater focus on societal resilience and reinvigorating economic productivity will likely undercut the rationale for expensive nuclear modernization.

Therefore, extending the current New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) would be the best, most practical option to give both Russia and the United States time to explore more ambitious multilateral arms control measures, while allowing their current focus to remain on the pandemic and economic relief.

Continuing distrust

But with the current treaty — which limits nuclear warheads, missiles, bombers, and launchers — due to expire in February 2021, the continuing distrust between the United States and Russia makes this extension hard to achieve, and a follow-on treaty even less likely.

Prospects for future bilateral negotiations are hindered by President Donald Trump’s vision for a trilateral arms control initiative involving both China and Russia. But China opposes this on the grounds that its nuclear arsenal is far smaller than that of the two others.

While there appears to be agreement that the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and the UK (the NPT nuclear-weapons states) and those of the states outside the treaty (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) will all have to be taken into account going forward, a practical mechanism for doing so proves elusive.

If Joe Biden wins the US presidency he seems likely to pursue an extension of the New START treaty and could also prevent a withdrawal from the Open Skies treaty, the latest arms control agreement targeted by the Trump administration.

Under a Biden administration, the United States would also probably re-join the JCPOA, provided Tehran returned to strict compliance with the deal. Biden could even use the team that negotiated the Iran deal to advance the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

For an NPT regime already confronted by a series of longstanding divergences, it is essential that Iran remains a signatory especially as tensions between Iran and the United States have escalated recently — due to the Qassim Suleimani assassination and the recent claim by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps to have successfully placed the country’s first military satellite into orbit.

This announcement raised red flags among experts about whether Iran is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles due to the dual-use nature of space technology. The satellite launch — deeply troubling for Iran’s neighbours and the EU countries — may strengthen the US argument that it is a cover for the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

However, as with many other countries, Iran is struggling with a severe coronavirus crisis and will be pouring its scientific expertise and funds into that rather than other efforts — including the nuclear programme.

Those European countries supporting the trading mechanism INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) for sending humanitarian goods into Iran could use this crisis to encourage Iran to remain in compliance with the JCPOA and its NPT obligations.

France, Germany and the UK (the E3) have already successfully concluded the first transaction, which was to facilitate the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran. But the recent Iranian escalatory steps will most certainly place a strain on the preservation of this arrangement.

COVID-19 might have delayed Iran’s next breach of the 2015 nuclear agreement but Tehran will inevitably seek to strengthen its hand before any potential negotiations with the United States after the presidential elections.

As frosty US-Iranian relations — exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic — prevent diplomatic negotiations, this constructive engagement between the E3 and Iran might prove instrumental in reviving the JCPOA and ensuring Iran stays committed to both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

While countries focus their efforts on tackling the coronavirus pandemic, it is understandable resources may be limited for other global challenges, such as the increasing risk of nuclear weapons use across several regions.

But the potential ramifications of the COVID-19 crisis for the NPT regime are profound. Ongoing tensions between the nuclear-armed states must not be ignored while the world’s focus is elsewhere, and the nuclear community should continue to work together to progress nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, building bridges of cooperation and trust that can long outlast the pandemic.