It is now clear that President Putin’s ‘new model Russia’ cannot be constructively accommodated into the international system. The war in Ukraine, in part the result of the West's laissez-faire approach to Russia, demonstrates the need for a new Western strategy towards Russia.

The Russian Challenge - a major new report by six authors from the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House - argues that a new strategy must recognise that:                  

• The decline of the Russian economy, the costs of confrontation and the rise of China mean that the Putin regime is now facing the most serious challenge of its 15 years in power.  The West has neither the wish nor the means to promote regime change in Russia. But Western countries need to consider the possible consequences of a chaotic end to the Putin system.             
• A critical element in the new geo-economic competition between the West and Russia is the extent of Western support for Ukraine, whose reconstruction as an effective sovereign state, capable of standing up for itself, is crucial. This will require much greater resources than have been invested up until now.                  
• Russia has rapidly developed its armed forces and information warfare capabilities since the war in Georgia in 2008. The West must invest in defensive strategic communications and media support to counter the Kremlin’s false narratives and restore its conventional deterrent capabilities as a matter of urgency. In particular, NATO needs to demonstrate that the response to ‘ambiguous’ or ‘hybrid’ war will be robust.                  
• Sanctions are exerting economic pressure on the Russian leadership and should remain in place until Ukraine’s territorial integrity is properly restored. In particular, it is self-defeating to link the lifting of sanctions solely to implementation of the poorly crafted and inherently fragile Minsk accords.                  
• While deterrence and constraint are essential in the short term, the West must also prepare for an eventual change of leadership in Russia. There is a reasonable chance that current pressures will incline a future Russian leadership to want to re-engage with the West.

James Nixey, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, said:  

'Pursuing these goals and achieving these objectives will ensure that the West is better prepared for any further deterioration in relations with Russia. The events of the last 18 months have demonstrated conclusively that when dealing with Russia, optimism is not a strategy.'

Seeing geo-strategic rivalry between the US and China as the sole variable in Asia-Pacific security risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, according to a forthcoming Chatham House paper.            

As Xi Jinping’s visit to the US approaches, The Asia-Pacific Power Balance: Beyond the US–China Narrative, warns against deploying Cold War-type narratives that pit the two countries against each other. Such narratives not only misunderstand the complexity of the region and the growing influence of India, Japan and Indonesia, but also risk increasing the likelihood of conflict and of missing vital opportunities for future cooperation.                

The paper, by John Nilsson-Wright, Tim Summers and Xenia Wickett argues that by focusing too heavily on the US and China, policymakers risk narrowing the aperture through which they evaluate policy choices regarding major regional challenges. Some of the key findings include the following:

Military

• Despite rapidly rising defence spending across Asia, the relative importance of traditional military means is declining relative to instruments such as development assistance and cyber offence.
• The militaries of Japan and India are becoming – in very different ways – more versatile and potentially expanding their remits. In the future, there will be a larger number of more capable military powers in the region, including South Korea and Vietnam.
• Current perceptions that the main dynamic is China’s rising military capabilities outstripping others in the region, therefore, need to be tempered. India’s defence spending, for example, as a percentage of GDP has surpassed China’s for the past several decades.

Economics

• Although China has the world’s second-largest economy and – despite recent problems – is growing faster than most major economies, its growth rate is in secular decline. China has gone from near-constant double-digit growth over the past four decades to 7.4 per cent in 2014 and could dip below 7 per cent this year.
• Whilst India’s economy remains notably smaller than those of China, the US and Japan, it will surpass China’s growth rate this year and has a lot of potential.
• If the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is successfully negotiated, the potential for integration and growth between the United States, Japan and the other 10 TPP members may reduce their current trade dependence on China.

Demography

• The demography of Asia is another reason to look beyond the US-China nexus, as China faces the challenge of an aging society, while countries such as India have the advantage of a younger population and decades of demographic dividend ahead of them.
• Likewise populations across much of Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines and Indonesia are growing rapidly and expanding their middle classes. 

While the American election cycle could be perceived as an occasionally amusing distraction, the rise of new factions and sentiments among the electorate will have an impact not just in America’s domestic politics but also with respect to its role in the world. Recent polling by the Pew Research Center shows clearly the desire among many Americans for a different international engagement for the US, one that could have significant implications for America’s allies.

Polling

To date, the campaign rhetoric of both the Republican and Democratic contenders for the White House has raised questions about America’s continuing global commitment.

But what does the public think? The Pew Research Center has recently released its periodic survey of how Americans view America’s place in the world. The results suggest that stereotypes of Americans’ isolationism or protectionism do not capture the nuance in public sentiment. Wariness of international engagement coexists with assertiveness on some issues and a belief that the US is a force for good in the world. And these views often divide along partisan lines and between generations.

A majority of Americans (57%) think the U.S. should deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with theirs as best they can, a sentiment that has increased from 46% in 2010. Moreover, roughly two-thirds say ‘we should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems’. In part this may be the case because a plurality of Americans thinks the United States does too much (41% too much, 27% too little) in helping solve world problems.

The fact that six-in-ten Americans believe that problems in the world would be even worse without US involvement will not reassure many non-Americans who care deeply about how and where the US is engaged, not just that it is.

American isolationism is a partisan affair. Republicans (62%) are far more likely than Democrats (47%) to voice the view that the US should deal with its own problems. Notably, about two-thirds of registered Republicans or Republican-leaning independents who favour Donald Trump (68%) express such isolationist sentiments, as do more than half of the Democratic backers of Sen. Bernie Sanders (54%). At the same time, over half of registered Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents who favour Hillary Clinton (52%) believe the US should help other countries deal with their problems.

The US has often been seen by its allies as acting in a unilateralist fashion, but the polling is more nuanced than this. About half (51%) believe that the US should take into account the views of its major allies when deciding its foreign policies. However, of more concern for America’s allies (and potentially adversaries), roughly four-in-ten (42%) believe Washington should go it alone in international matters.

Despite Trump’s criticisms, 53% of the American public holds a positive view of NATO and 77% voice the view that US membership in the security alliance has been a good thing for the United States.

In addition to some wariness with regards to engaging internationally in security arenas, Americans are also generally wary of global economic engagement – protectionist sentiment is rising. Only 44% believe such US involvement is a good thing; more (49%) say such engagement is bad, lowering wages and costing jobs. These views also differ along partisan lines with more on the right than left thinking US involvement in the world economy has been a bad thing. Trump supporters are even more against economic globalization.

Rising scepticism

The results do not show an unambiguous move towards more American isolationism or unilateralism. But the trends broadly show that the American public is moving towards, as President Obama put it in 2012, a focus on ‘nation building at home’. It should come as no surprise – President Obama has presided over a period in which the US has increasingly limited its extraterritorial ambitions to those that more directly affect its vital national interests. It is therefore worth noting that this more limited engagement is one that is, broadly, supported by the public on both sides of the aisle.

There are, as have been noted, partisan differences. But the next president will govern over all Americans not just those from their own party. They will have to function in the context of an American public, the majority of whom wants the US to deal with its own problems, letting other countries manage as best they can. While who becomes president clearly matters – they have the capacity to lead their populations in certain directions - the rising scepticism among many Americans for investing in the globalized world will resonate regardless of who takes office.

The implications for America’s allies are significant. For those issues that are not directly of concern to the United States, longstanding partners are going to have to find ways to manage on their own or with less American support. And even on those issues that are of direct national interest, they might find the US less sensitive to their interests and concerns. This could hold true not just in the realm of security but on economic issues also – if America becomes more protectionist, others will surely follow.  

Many of America’s allies have perceived the United States to be an unreliable ally in recent years. Asian partners, such as Japan and South Korea, have started to take more responsibility for their own security and are working to build additional partnerships with neighbours. European allies have been, at times, disappointed by what they perceive to be a less engaged America, such as in Libya and Syria. If the next president follows the public majority, these allies will need to get used to this new role for the United States.

This article has been published jointly with Real Clear World.

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