russian

Russian Economic Policy and the Russian Economic System: Stability Versus Growth

17 December 2019

How is it possible for the directors of the Russian economy to pursue an orthodox stabilization policy with a great measure of success and yet to have achieved so little to stem the growth slowdown? This paper examines the reasons for the divergence in economic management.

Professor Philip Hanson OBE

Former Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

GettyImages-1174485152.jpg

Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina, Economic Development Minister Maxim Oreshkin, Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Mutko, Labour and Social Safety Minister Maxim Topilin, Economy and Finance Department Head Valery Sidorenko, and Russian presidential aide Andrei Belousov (l–r) after a meeting on stimulating economic growth, at Gorki residence, Moscow, on 8 October 2019. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • Russia’s economic management is currently praised for its achievement of macroeconomic stability. Inflation has been brought down; the budget is in surplus; national debt is low; and the reserves are ample. At the same time, there is much criticism of the failure at present to secure more than very slow economic growth.
  • The macro-stabilization of 2014–18 was of a conventional, ‘liberal’ kind. Public spending was cut, and a budget rule was introduced that (so far) has weakened the link between increases in oil prices and increases in budgetary expenditure. The austerity campaign was harsh. Pensioners, the military, regional budgets and business all lost out, but in reality put up little resistance. The austerity drive was facilitated by the autocratic nature of the regime.
  • The growth slowdown dates from 2012, and cannot simply be blamed on falls in the oil price and sanctions. Rapid growth in 1999–2008 consisted in large part of recovery from the deep recession of the 1990s and the initial development of a services sector. These sources of growth are no longer available; investment is low; and the labour force is declining. The Western world also has a slow growth problem, but at a higher level of per capita output. In Russia, private investment and competition are inhibited by an intrusive and corrupt state. If the rule of law were in place, the economy would perform better in the long run. That would require a profound reform of formal and informal institutions.
  • The leadership wants faster growth, but has powerful incentives not to embark on systemic reform. Even the pragmatic ministers of the ‘economic bloc’ of government, who understand the problem, share this interest in maintaining the status quo. Growth is thus being sought through a highly ambitious programme, in 2018–24, of ‘national projects’, state-led and largely state-financed. This is already running into difficulties.
  • The contrast between successful stabilization and a (so far) unsuccessful growth strategy illustrates the difference between policymaking within a given system and reform of that system. Systemic reform brings with it more potential unintended consequences than do changes in policy. In the case of Russia, movement towards a rule of law could destabilize the social and political system. It is therefore unlikely to be attempted.




russian

Beware Russian and Chinese Positioning for After the Pandemic

9 April 2020

Keir Giles

Senior Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Authoritarian regimes can use the COVID-19 crisis to improve their international standing, taking advantage of others’ distraction. Their aims are different, but their methods have much in common.

2020-04-09-Russia-Aid-Serbia

An airlifter of the Russian Aerospace Forces prepares to fly to Serbia carrying equipment and professionals during the COVID-19 crisis. Photo by Russian Defence MinistryTASS via Getty Images.

Both Russia and China have mounted combined charm offensives and disinformation campaigns on the back of the pandemic. Shipments of ‘aid’ – reportedly of questionable utility and quality - have gone hand in hand with a concerted effort to deflect any blame from China for the early spread, and an ongoing drive by Russia to undermine states’ confidence and have sanctions lifted.

These concurrent operations have very different objectives, as Russia seeks to subvert international order while China is continuing its bid to demonstrate global leadership - but in both cases, they are seeking long-term gains by exploiting the inattention and distraction of their targets.

Both seek to present themselves as globally responsible stakeholders, but for divergent reasons – especially China which needs the rest of the world to recover and return to stability to ensure its own economic recovery. But despite this, the two campaigns appear superficially similar.

Fertile ground for disinformation

One reason lies in the unique nature of the current crisis. Unlike political issues that are local or regional in nature, COVID-19 affects everybody worldwide. The perceived lack of reliable information about the virus provides fertile ground for information and disinformation campaigns, especially feeding on fear, uncertainty and doubt. But Russia in particular would not be succeeding in its objectives without mis-steps and inattention by Western governments.

Confused reporting on Russia sending medical supplies to the United States showed Moscow taking advantage of a US administration in apparent disarray. Claims Russia was sending ’humanitarian aid’ were only belatedly countered by the US State Department pointing out it had been paid for. Meanwhile the earlier arrival of Russian military equipment in Italy also scored a propaganda victory for Russia, facilitated by curious passivity by the Italian government.

In both cases Russia also achieved secondary objectives. With the United States, Russia scored bonus points by shipping equipment produced by a subsidiary of a company under US sanctions. In the case of Italy, Russian state media made good use of misleading or heavily edited video clips to give the impression of widespread Italian acclaim for Russian aid, combined with disdain for the efforts of the EU.

Beijing’s external information campaigns have sought to deflect or defuse criticism of its early mishandling and misinformation on coronavirus and counter accusations of secrecy and falsifying data while also pursuing an opportunity to exercise soft power. For Moscow, current efforts boost a long-standing and intensive campaign to induce the lifting of sanctions, demonstrating if nothing else that sanctions are indeed an effective measure. Official and unofficial lobbying has intensified in numerous capital cities, and will inevitably find supporters.

But both the aid and the information campaigns are seriously flawed. While appropriate and useful aid for countries that are struggling should of course be welcomed, both Russian and Chinese equipment delivered to Europe has repeatedly been found to be inappropriate or defective

Russian photographs of cardboard boxes stacked loose and unsecured in a transport aircraft bound for the United States sparked alarm and disbelief among military and aviation experts - and there has still been no US statement on what exactly was purchased, and whether it was found to be fit for purpose when it arrived.

Reporting from Italy that the Russian equipment delivered there was ‘80% useless’ has not been contradicted by the Italian authorities. In fact, although the Italian sources criticizing Russia remain anonymous it is striking that - President Trump aside - no government has publicly endorsed materials and assistance received from Russia as actually being useful and helpful.

Even in Serbia, with its traditionally close ties with Russia, the only information forthcoming on the activities of the Russian Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops and their equipment that arrived on April 3 was from Russian press releases.

Both countries’ strategic communications efforts are similarly fallible. China’s notoriously heavy-handed approach to its critics is of only limited use in the face of such a severe and immediate threat. One suggestion that the virus originated in the US – an early response to US criticism – has already been walked back by the Chinese diplomat who made it.

And Russia continues to be capable of spectacularly misjudging its targets. When investigative journalists looked more closely at the nature of the assistance to Italy, Russia’s official response was rage and personal threats, laying bare the real nature of the campaign and immediately alienating many of those whom Moscow had sought to win over.

Errors and deficiencies such as these provide opportunities to mitigate the worst side-effects of the campaigns. And actions by individuals can also mitigate much of the impact. The most effective disinformation plays on deeply emotional issues and triggers visceral rather than rational reactions.

Advocates of ’informational distancing’ as well as social distancing suggest a tactical pause to assess information calmly, instead of reacting or spreading it further unthinkingly. This approach would bolster not only calm dispassionate assessment of the real impact of Russian and Chinese actions, but also counter spreading of misinformation on the pandemic as a whole - especially when key sources of disinformation are national leaders seeking to politicize or profit from the crisis.

Limitations of Russian and Chinese altruism must be stated clearly and frankly to fill gaps in public understanding. Where help is genuine, it should of course be welcomed: but if it is the case that assistance received from Moscow or Beijing is not appropriate, not useful, or not fit for purpose, this should be acknowledged publicly.

Even without central direction or coordination with other Russian strategic communications efforts, the self-perpetuating Russian disinformation ecosystem continues to push narratives designed to undermine confidence in institutions and their ability to deal with the crisis. This too must continue to be monitored closely and countered where it matters.

In all cases, miscalculations by Russia or China that expose the true intent of their campaigns – no matter how different their objectives might be - should be watched for closely and highlighted where they occur.

Despite the enormity of the present emergency it is not a time for any government to relax its vigilance over longer-term threats. States must not lose sight of manoeuvres seeking to exploit weakness and distraction. If Russia and China emerge from the current crisis with enhanced authority and unjustifiably restored reputations, this will make it still harder to resist their respective challenges to the current rules-based international order in the future.




russian

Webinar: Russian Disinformation's Golden Moment: Challenges and Responses in the COVID-19 Era

Invitation Only Research Event

7 May 2020 - 3:00pm to 4:30pm

Event participants

Anneli Ahonen, Head, StratCom East Task Force, European External Action Service
Keir Giles, Senior Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Thomas Kent, Adjunct Associate Professor, Harriman Institute, Columbia University; Senior Fellow, the Jamestown Foundation
Chairs:
James Nixey, Programme Director, Russia and Eurasia, Chatham House
Glen Howard, President, The Jamestown Foundation
The COVID-19 pandemic provides the ideal environment for malign influence to thrive as it feeds on fear and a vacuum of authoritative information. What are the current challenges posed by Russian disinformation, and how should Western nations be responding?
 
In this discussion, jointly hosted by the Jamestown Foundation and the Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme, the speakers will consider what best practice looks like in safeguarding Western societies against the pernicious effects of disinformation. 
 
This event will be held on the record.

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




russian

Russian Economic Policy and the Russian Economic System: Stability Versus Growth

17 December 2019

How is it possible for the directors of the Russian economy to pursue an orthodox stabilization policy with a great measure of success and yet to have achieved so little to stem the growth slowdown? This paper examines the reasons for the divergence in economic management.

Professor Philip Hanson OBE

Former Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

GettyImages-1174485152.jpg

Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina, Economic Development Minister Maxim Oreshkin, Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Mutko, Labour and Social Safety Minister Maxim Topilin, Economy and Finance Department Head Valery Sidorenko, and Russian presidential aide Andrei Belousov (l–r) after a meeting on stimulating economic growth, at Gorki residence, Moscow, on 8 October 2019. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • Russia’s economic management is currently praised for its achievement of macroeconomic stability. Inflation has been brought down; the budget is in surplus; national debt is low; and the reserves are ample. At the same time, there is much criticism of the failure at present to secure more than very slow economic growth.
  • The macro-stabilization of 2014–18 was of a conventional, ‘liberal’ kind. Public spending was cut, and a budget rule was introduced that (so far) has weakened the link between increases in oil prices and increases in budgetary expenditure. The austerity campaign was harsh. Pensioners, the military, regional budgets and business all lost out, but in reality put up little resistance. The austerity drive was facilitated by the autocratic nature of the regime.
  • The growth slowdown dates from 2012, and cannot simply be blamed on falls in the oil price and sanctions. Rapid growth in 1999–2008 consisted in large part of recovery from the deep recession of the 1990s and the initial development of a services sector. These sources of growth are no longer available; investment is low; and the labour force is declining. The Western world also has a slow growth problem, but at a higher level of per capita output. In Russia, private investment and competition are inhibited by an intrusive and corrupt state. If the rule of law were in place, the economy would perform better in the long run. That would require a profound reform of formal and informal institutions.
  • The leadership wants faster growth, but has powerful incentives not to embark on systemic reform. Even the pragmatic ministers of the ‘economic bloc’ of government, who understand the problem, share this interest in maintaining the status quo. Growth is thus being sought through a highly ambitious programme, in 2018–24, of ‘national projects’, state-led and largely state-financed. This is already running into difficulties.
  • The contrast between successful stabilization and a (so far) unsuccessful growth strategy illustrates the difference between policymaking within a given system and reform of that system. Systemic reform brings with it more potential unintended consequences than do changes in policy. In the case of Russia, movement towards a rule of law could destabilize the social and political system. It is therefore unlikely to be attempted.




russian

Beware Russian and Chinese Positioning for After the Pandemic

9 April 2020

Keir Giles

Senior Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Authoritarian regimes can use the COVID-19 crisis to improve their international standing, taking advantage of others’ distraction. Their aims are different, but their methods have much in common.

2020-04-09-Russia-Aid-Serbia

An airlifter of the Russian Aerospace Forces prepares to fly to Serbia carrying equipment and professionals during the COVID-19 crisis. Photo by Russian Defence MinistryTASS via Getty Images.

Both Russia and China have mounted combined charm offensives and disinformation campaigns on the back of the pandemic. Shipments of ‘aid’ – reportedly of questionable utility and quality - have gone hand in hand with a concerted effort to deflect any blame from China for the early spread, and an ongoing drive by Russia to undermine states’ confidence and have sanctions lifted.

These concurrent operations have very different objectives, as Russia seeks to subvert international order while China is continuing its bid to demonstrate global leadership - but in both cases, they are seeking long-term gains by exploiting the inattention and distraction of their targets.

Both seek to present themselves as globally responsible stakeholders, but for divergent reasons – especially China which needs the rest of the world to recover and return to stability to ensure its own economic recovery. But despite this, the two campaigns appear superficially similar.

Fertile ground for disinformation

One reason lies in the unique nature of the current crisis. Unlike political issues that are local or regional in nature, COVID-19 affects everybody worldwide. The perceived lack of reliable information about the virus provides fertile ground for information and disinformation campaigns, especially feeding on fear, uncertainty and doubt. But Russia in particular would not be succeeding in its objectives without mis-steps and inattention by Western governments.

Confused reporting on Russia sending medical supplies to the United States showed Moscow taking advantage of a US administration in apparent disarray. Claims Russia was sending ’humanitarian aid’ were only belatedly countered by the US State Department pointing out it had been paid for. Meanwhile the earlier arrival of Russian military equipment in Italy also scored a propaganda victory for Russia, facilitated by curious passivity by the Italian government.

In both cases Russia also achieved secondary objectives. With the United States, Russia scored bonus points by shipping equipment produced by a subsidiary of a company under US sanctions. In the case of Italy, Russian state media made good use of misleading or heavily edited video clips to give the impression of widespread Italian acclaim for Russian aid, combined with disdain for the efforts of the EU.

Beijing’s external information campaigns have sought to deflect or defuse criticism of its early mishandling and misinformation on coronavirus and counter accusations of secrecy and falsifying data while also pursuing an opportunity to exercise soft power. For Moscow, current efforts boost a long-standing and intensive campaign to induce the lifting of sanctions, demonstrating if nothing else that sanctions are indeed an effective measure. Official and unofficial lobbying has intensified in numerous capital cities, and will inevitably find supporters.

But both the aid and the information campaigns are seriously flawed. While appropriate and useful aid for countries that are struggling should of course be welcomed, both Russian and Chinese equipment delivered to Europe has repeatedly been found to be inappropriate or defective

Russian photographs of cardboard boxes stacked loose and unsecured in a transport aircraft bound for the United States sparked alarm and disbelief among military and aviation experts - and there has still been no US statement on what exactly was purchased, and whether it was found to be fit for purpose when it arrived.

Reporting from Italy that the Russian equipment delivered there was ‘80% useless’ has not been contradicted by the Italian authorities. In fact, although the Italian sources criticizing Russia remain anonymous it is striking that - President Trump aside - no government has publicly endorsed materials and assistance received from Russia as actually being useful and helpful.

Even in Serbia, with its traditionally close ties with Russia, the only information forthcoming on the activities of the Russian Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops and their equipment that arrived on April 3 was from Russian press releases.

Both countries’ strategic communications efforts are similarly fallible. China’s notoriously heavy-handed approach to its critics is of only limited use in the face of such a severe and immediate threat. One suggestion that the virus originated in the US – an early response to US criticism – has already been walked back by the Chinese diplomat who made it.

And Russia continues to be capable of spectacularly misjudging its targets. When investigative journalists looked more closely at the nature of the assistance to Italy, Russia’s official response was rage and personal threats, laying bare the real nature of the campaign and immediately alienating many of those whom Moscow had sought to win over.

Errors and deficiencies such as these provide opportunities to mitigate the worst side-effects of the campaigns. And actions by individuals can also mitigate much of the impact. The most effective disinformation plays on deeply emotional issues and triggers visceral rather than rational reactions.

Advocates of ’informational distancing’ as well as social distancing suggest a tactical pause to assess information calmly, instead of reacting or spreading it further unthinkingly. This approach would bolster not only calm dispassionate assessment of the real impact of Russian and Chinese actions, but also counter spreading of misinformation on the pandemic as a whole - especially when key sources of disinformation are national leaders seeking to politicize or profit from the crisis.

Limitations of Russian and Chinese altruism must be stated clearly and frankly to fill gaps in public understanding. Where help is genuine, it should of course be welcomed: but if it is the case that assistance received from Moscow or Beijing is not appropriate, not useful, or not fit for purpose, this should be acknowledged publicly.

Even without central direction or coordination with other Russian strategic communications efforts, the self-perpetuating Russian disinformation ecosystem continues to push narratives designed to undermine confidence in institutions and their ability to deal with the crisis. This too must continue to be monitored closely and countered where it matters.

In all cases, miscalculations by Russia or China that expose the true intent of their campaigns – no matter how different their objectives might be - should be watched for closely and highlighted where they occur.

Despite the enormity of the present emergency it is not a time for any government to relax its vigilance over longer-term threats. States must not lose sight of manoeuvres seeking to exploit weakness and distraction. If Russia and China emerge from the current crisis with enhanced authority and unjustifiably restored reputations, this will make it still harder to resist their respective challenges to the current rules-based international order in the future.




russian

Webinar: Russian Disinformation's Golden Moment: Challenges and Responses in the COVID-19 Era

Invitation Only Research Event

7 May 2020 - 3:00pm to 4:30pm

Event participants

Anneli Ahonen, Head, StratCom East Task Force, European External Action Service
Keir Giles, Senior Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Thomas Kent, Adjunct Associate Professor, Harriman Institute, Columbia University; Senior Fellow, the Jamestown Foundation
Chairs:
James Nixey, Programme Director, Russia and Eurasia, Chatham House
Glen Howard, President, The Jamestown Foundation
The COVID-19 pandemic provides the ideal environment for malign influence to thrive as it feeds on fear and a vacuum of authoritative information. What are the current challenges posed by Russian disinformation, and how should Western nations be responding?
 
In this discussion, jointly hosted by the Jamestown Foundation and the Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme, the speakers will consider what best practice looks like in safeguarding Western societies against the pernicious effects of disinformation. 
 
This event will be held on the record.

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




russian

Sino-Russian Gas Cooperation: Power of Siberia I and II and Implications for Global LNG Supplies

Invitation Only Research Event

27 November 2019 - 8:30am to 9:30am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Professor Keun-Wook Paik, Associate Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Department, Chatham House
Chair: John Lough, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

In a new event in the Sustainable Transitions series, the speaker will present an update of Sino-Russian gas cooperation.

To give a comprehensive account of their impact on global liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies, he will discuss the following points:

  • Gas is scheduled to start flowing from the Power of Siberia I (POS) on 2 December 2019. But what is the background of development of POS 1 and what is its current status and prospects? 
  • What are the chances of exporting gas through the proposed Altai pipeline? Why is the Mongolia export route so significant? And how will it affect the Central Asian Republics and in particular Turkmenistan’s gas export to China? 
  • What are the implications of both POS I and Altai gas via Mongolia route in the context of global LNG supply?
  • What are the prospects for multilateral pipeline gas cooperation in northeast Asia?
  • What are the implications for other Arctic onshore LNG supply, in particular, for Novatek's Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 1 and 2 to China on top of POS 1 and Altai gas?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Chloé Prendleloup




russian

Trump Is Asking Us to Play Russian Roulette With Our Lives

Are we really going to bet that we can go back to life as normal without proper coronavirus tracking in place?




russian

How the Russians Hacked Our Math Curriculum

An overemphasis on calculus in high school may be harming students, writes Dickinson College professor Jeffrey Forrester.




russian

Russians Skip Traveling to America Because of Visa Delays

Before matters started getting worse between Russia and the United States, Russians could get the US travel visa within a week. But now, Russians have to wait for a minimum of eight months, making them restless. It is too long to wait for a travel visa…




russian

Bonny & Clyde, who? WATCH 10yo carjacker FLEE Russian cops with 4yo toddler as ‘accomplice’

A 10-year-old boy and his younger sister sparked a bizarre GTA-style car chase in the Siberian city of Tomsk after the pair grabbed hold of the family vehicle and went for the ride of their lives, which police won’t soon forget.
Read Full Article at RT.com




russian

Victory Day karaoke: Russian flashmob invites ANYONE to iconic WWII sing-along in 100+ languages

A one-of-the-kind Russian website has enabled anyone to pay vocal tribute to the 75th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat – by performing a beloved Russian Victory Day song with lyrics available in multiple languages.
Read Full Article at RT.com




russian

Positive sign? On VE Day, Putin and Johnson agree need to improve British-Russian relationship

Victory Day brought a rare positive moment between Russia and the UK, as President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Boris Johnson agreed on the need to improve the badly soured relations between the two countries.
Read Full Article at RT.com




russian

Coronavirus ‘doesn’t like heat’ & stops being so infectious at just +30°C – Russian health watchdog

Hot summer days may finally rid humanity of the Covid-19 scourge as the virus becomes almost non-infectious at air temperatures of over 30 degrees Celsius (86 degrees Fahrenheit), according to the Russian consumer watchdog.
Read Full Article at RT.com




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Cuts no ice: Why Alexandra Trusova’s 'betrayal' brought Russian figure skating to the brink of civil war

When Russian quad-jumping prodigy Alexandra Trusova parted ways with her famed coach, Eteri Tutberidze, she was quickly denounced as a traitor by some of her former colleagues.
Read Full Article at RT.com




russian

'They say I'll get a BULLET in the head': Russian MMA fighter details threats after releasing Khabib diss track

Russian MMA fighter Dmitry 'Anubis' Kuznetsov has revealed scorned fans threatened he would receive "a bullet in the head" in response to releasing a diss track titled 'Hypocrisy King,' aimed at UFC champ Khabib Nurmagomedov.
Read Full Article at RT.com




russian

Bentley Continental GT Ultratank: Russian-built mutant Bentley with tank tracks




russian

S&P cuts Russian debt one notch to junk

The rating agency cites narrowing possibilities for Russian government and companies to service their debt...




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Expedition 63: NASA astronaut Cassidy, two Russian cosmonauts land on International Space Station

NASA astronaut Chris Cassidy along with two Russian cosmonauts Anatoly Ivanishin and Ivan Vagner reached the International Space Station (ISS) for a six-month-long mission named Expedition 63.




russian

Seychellois Rupee(SCR)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Seychellois Rupee = 4.2756 Russian Ruble




russian

Trinidad and Tobago Dollar(TTD)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Trinidad and Tobago Dollar = 10.8624 Russian Ruble



  • Trinidad and Tobago Dollar

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Swedish Krona(SEK)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Swedish Krona = 7.5117 Russian Ruble




russian

Slovak Koruna(SKK)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Slovak Koruna = 3.3056 Russian Ruble




russian

Serbian Dinar(RSD)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Serbian Dinar = 0.6768 Russian Ruble




russian

Polish Zloty(PLN)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Polish Zloty = 17.4573 Russian Ruble




russian

Qatari Rial(QAR)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Qatari Rial = 20.1601 Russian Ruble




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Indian Rupee(INR)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Indian Rupee = 0.9722 Russian Ruble




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Pakistani Rupee(PKR)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Pakistani Rupee = 0.4598 Russian Ruble




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'Painful to see': rise in Russian medics falling prey to Covid-19 as death toll questioned

Lack of PPE cited as reason for mass infections – with suspicions deaths are not recorded

For weeks, paramedic Dmitry Seryogin had warned about the lack of coronavirus testing and inadequate protective gear that he and his colleagues were given in the city of Oryol, about a four-hour drive south of Moscow. If a patient did not explicitly warn they had coronavirus, he said, teams handled likely infections in simple masks and gloves.

Then, the inevitable happened. Two of his colleagues fell ill with coronavirus, then five more, and now, Seryogin says, more than a dozen have contracted the virus. The regional governor has confirmed an outbreak at a medical station, saying staff had been quarantined and he had “set the goal of providing everyone with PPE. No matter where they are going, what kind of call”.

Related: Concern as coronavirus threatens Russia's closed ‘nuclear cities’

Continue reading...




russian

Russian soldiers' gadget ban extended in crackdown on leaks

Order signed by Vladimir Putin also bars troops from sharing information with reporters

Vladimir Putin has signed an order barring Russian soldiers from carrying many types of electronic devices on duty or sharing information with reporters, in an apparent effort to halt a series of embarrassing leaks about Russia’s military capabilities and secret operations.

The new rules are intended to block the spread of information about troop movements and the identification of individual members of the armed forces. But they could also make it more difficult to discover abuses in the military.

Related: Covid-19 puts Putin's power plans on hold and economy in peril

Continue reading...




russian

Sierra Leonean Leone(SLL)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Sierra Leonean Leone = 0.0074 Russian Ruble



  • Sierra Leonean Leone

russian

New Taiwan Dollar(TWD)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 New Taiwan Dollar = 2.4585 Russian Ruble



  • New Taiwan Dollar

russian

Thai Baht(THB)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Thai Baht = 2.2924 Russian Ruble




russian

Turkish Lira(TRY)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Turkish Lira = 10.3544 Russian Ruble




russian

Singapore Dollar(SGD)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Singapore Dollar = 51.9599 Russian Ruble




russian

Mauritian Rupee(MUR)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Mauritian Rupee = 1.8485 Russian Ruble




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Nepalese Rupee(NPR)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Nepalese Rupee = 0.607 Russian Ruble




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Bangladeshi Taka(BDT)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Bangladeshi Taka = 0.8636 Russian Ruble




russian

Moldovan Leu(MDL)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Moldovan Leu = 4.1166 Russian Ruble




russian

Colombian Peso(COP)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Colombian Peso = 0.0188 Russian Ruble




russian

Uruguayan Peso(UYU)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Uruguayan Peso = 1.7015 Russian Ruble




russian

Uzbekistan Som(UZS)/Russian Ruble(RUB)

1 Uzbekistan Som = 0.0073 Russian Ruble




russian

Russian Ruble(RUB)/Iraqi Dinar(IQD)

1 Russian Ruble = 16.2117 Iraqi Dinar




russian

Russian Ruble(RUB)/Zambian Kwacha(ZMK)

1 Russian Ruble = 70.6981 Zambian Kwacha




russian

Russian Ruble(RUB)/South African Rand(ZAR)

1 Russian Ruble = 0.25 South African Rand




russian

Russian Ruble(RUB)/Yemeni Rial(YER)

1 Russian Ruble = 3.4109 Yemeni Rial




russian

Russian Ruble(RUB)/CFA Franc BCEAO(XOF)

1 Russian Ruble = 8.2421 CFA Franc BCEAO




russian

Russian Ruble(RUB)/Vietnamese Dong(VND)

1 Russian Ruble = 318.7918 Vietnamese Dong




russian

Russian Ruble(RUB)/Venezuelan Bolivar Fuerte(VEF)

1 Russian Ruble = 0.1361 Venezuelan Bolivar Fuerte




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Russian Ruble(RUB)/Uzbekistan Som(UZS)

1 Russian Ruble = 137.7179 Uzbekistan Som