Improving the labor market and encouraging work are central to our goals of achieving greater responsibility and opportunity in America. The private economy is the arena where most Americans work hard to realize their dreams.

But employment today is failing to achieve the promise it did a few decades ago. Wages of unskilled workers have been fairly stagnant in real terms (especially among men) and have fallen relative to those of more-educated workers; and some groups of Americans (like less-educated men generally and black men, specifically) are working considerably less than they once did.

Stagnant wages and low work participation among some groups of workers are blocking progress. Both must be addressed.

In Chapter 4 of a new report from the AEI-Brookings Working Group on Poverty and Opportunity, the Working Group recommends policies that:

1. Expand opportunities for the disadvantaged by improving their skills;
2. Make work pay better than it does now for the less educated;
3. Expand both work requirements and opportunities for the hard-to-employ while maintaining an effective work-based safety net for the most vulnerable members of our society, especially children; and
4. Make more jobs available.

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The Roma people, the largest minority group in Europe and in many European countries, trail other ethnic groups in almost every characteristic that defines well-being. Perhaps of greatest importance, the Roma are less educated than other ethnic groups. But they also suffer from excess health problems, high unemployment, poverty, and political weakness. The Roma population of Bulgaria is certainly no less disadvantaged than the Roma in other countries. An especially poignant example of Bulgarian Roma disadvantage is that the death rate among children under age 1, a prime indicator of children’s health in any nation, is 25 per 1,000 for Roma children as compared with 9.9 for children of Bulgarian ethnic origin. The mathematics of death almost before life gets started is a symbolic indicator of the Roma burden in Bulgaria. Similarly, research conducted for UNICEF by the University of York shows that the poverty rate among Roma children in Bulgaria is 92 percent, perhaps the highest poverty rate for any ethnic group in Europe. By contrast, the poverty rate among children of Bulgarian heritage is less than half as high at 43 percent.

It is not surprising, then, that over at least the past decade, the European Union (EU) and most European governments, joined by the Open Society Foundation, the World Bank, and other organizations, have created important initiatives to address all these problems. It is possible to think that now is an historic moment in which European governments and dominant ethnic groups, after eight or nine centuries of the most pernicious types of discrimination against the Roma, are finally, albeit often reluctantly, admitting the problems facing their Roma populations and their own role in creating and sustaining these problems. Equally important, most of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) governments, where discrimination against the Roma has been and continues to be particularly intense, are gradually adopting policies to address the problems.

To the extent that the moment of Roma opportunity has arrived, perhaps the most important force moving Bulgaria and other CEE nations in the direction of integration and inclusion is the EU. In the period leading up to the ascension of Bulgaria and other CEE nations to membership in the EU, all the new member states were required to meet a host of conditions required by the EU as the price of admission. Among these conditions were laws outlawing discrimination and requiring equality of educational opportunity. The CEE nations complied with the EU directive to pass such laws, but implementation of the laws in Bulgaria and other nations has been something less than aggressive.

Nor is EU ascension the only force driving the CEE nations to reduce discrimination against the Roma and other minorities. The Open Society, the World Bank, and a number of other private organizations, including several Roma nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), have initiated a sweeping program to promote inclusion of the Roma in the civil society of the CEE nations. Called the “Decade of Roma Inclusion” (2005-2015) the initiative is notable for getting all the CEE nations (plus Spain) to participate, to commit themselves to activities designed to promote inclusion and nondiscrimination, and to make a financial commitment to a fund administered by the World Bank to promote the initiative. As a part of the initiative, Bulgaria and the other participating nations originated ten-year action plans. The Bulgarian action plan, the purpose of which is to create a set of goals and activities that will promote Roma integration, includes proposals for education, health care, housing, employment, discrimination and equal opportunity, and culture.

An important part of the Decade program was the establishment of the Roma Education Fund in 2005. Eight nations (Canada, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK), as well as several international agencies including the Open Society, pledged a total of 34 million Euros to support Fund activities during the Roma decade. The major goal of the fund is to “support policies and programs which ensure quality education for Roma, including the desegregation of education systems.”

By joining the EU, Bulgaria and the other CEE nations brought themselves into a well-developed culture of inclusion and a complex system of interlocking laws and agencies that not only outlaw exclusion and discrimination, but provide funds to implement inclusion policies and to monitor the extent to which EU nations are aggressively implementing these laws. The laws and directives include the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Racial Equality Directive, and several others. It would be a mistake to conclude that every EU member, even the original 15 EU nations with relatively more advanced economies and longer histories as democracies than the CEE nations, faithfully implement every component of the various legal requirements of being an EU member. Even so, EU requirements and funds have initiated both profound legal changes and a host of programs to increase the social, economic, political, and cultural inclusion of the Roma as well as studies and evaluations that bring some light to the actual situation of the Roma and other minorities in member nations. Given the all but inevitable distance between the laws on inclusion and discrimination the CEE nations passed in order to join the EU and the actual implementation of those laws, studies commissioned by various EU agencies and NGOs illuminate the gaps between policies and implementation.

An excellent example of such illumination is a 2006 study commissioned by the Economic and Scientific Policy program of the European Parliament. The report is a hard-hitting assessment of the status of Roma throughout Europe with regard to their legal status and socio-economic conditions. The latter category includes assessments of Roma exclusion from employment, education, social services, health care, and community integration. The upshot of the report is that although there may be some progress in these important areas of integration, the Roma are still a second-class group throughout the CEE nations. Seemingly, good laws have not yet produced good results. Laws may be changed, but changing human behavior and culture takes longer.

CEE governments and their defenders are reluctant to admit the lamentable lack of progress in Roma integration. In part for this reason, the European Commission, based on extensive evidence from evaluations, surveys, and news reports of often ferocious discrimination against the Roma, felt the need to publish “An EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020” in April 2011. The need for a new framework is a clear signal that the EU Commission believes the CEE governments in general and Bulgaria in particular are not achieving the results the EU hoped for when it approved these nations for EU membership and is therefore trying to push the governments of these nations into further action.

Following publication of the Framework, the Open Society released one of the most thorough and provocative reports on the situation faced by the Roma in Europe and strategies that should be adopted to attack the wide range of Roma disadvantages. Appropriately entitled “Beyond Rhetoric,” the Open Society report includes entire chapters on two issues that I will examine in more detail below.

First, the Open Society strongly recommends that nations collect ethnically disaggregated data. Logically enough, the report holds that it is impossible to document the effects of policy initiatives on the Roma and other groups unless outcome data, including measures of health, education, housing, employment, income, and death rates by age, are collected for individual ethnic groups. So important are ethnically disaggregated data that the report goes so far as to recommend that, if necessary, governments should change their statistical systems to “incorporate ethnic data components into regular statistical surveys.” A second recommendation that deserves special attention is the report’s emphasis on early childhood education and care. Virtually every report about the Roma emphasizes the vital importance of education in fighting Roma exclusion, but the Open Society report strongly recommends that nations implementing the EU Framework should “give urgent consideration” to establishing an early child development fund to “support innovative early development programs and allow for scale up of what works.”

Beyond these specific recommendations, the Open Society report emphasizes that the EU Commission stated explicitly in its Framework document that “member states do not properly use EU money for the purpose of effective social and economic integration of Roma. As if this judgment, which seems to represent the views of many EU agencies, the World Bank, the Open Society, and many Roma groups themselves, needed additional reinforcement, a United Nations expert on minority issues visited Bulgaria this summer and called upon the government to “turn its policies on Roma integration into concrete action.” She went on to give what seems to represent the views of all these groups on the flaws in the Bulgarian government’s approach to fighting Roma exclusion: “Many policies seem to remain largely only rhetorical undertakings aimed at external audiences – official commitments that are not fulfilled in practice.” The result, according to the UN expert, is that “all the evidence demonstrates that Roma remain in desperate circumstances at the very bottom of the socio-economic ladder.” In particular, she mentioned that the access of Roma children to quality education “remains overwhelmingly unfulfilled.”

If CEE nations are now entering a period in which governments will be working, often ineffectively or at a very modest pace, to improve the conditions of the Roma, judging by the efforts of other nations to reduce discrimination against minority groups and by the stately rate of progress so far in the CEE nations, it can be assumed that the fight for Roma equality in Bulgaria will be measured in decades. In the U.S., for example, the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s was largely successful. By the mid-1960s, vital court decisions had dismantled major parts of the system of legal discrimination against blacks and the federal government had enacted programs to ensure voting rights and other fundamental rights to blacks. To enhance the legal war on poverty and discrimination, the federal government also initiated an army of social programs designed to boost the education, health, employment, housing, and political participation of the poor in general and blacks in particular. Yet today, nearly half a century after achieving legal rights and the initiation of large-scale government inclusion programs, blacks (and Hispanics) still trail whites by large margins in education, income, housing, poverty levels, and health. Although achieving significant progress against discrimination may require decades or generations, discrimination will not diminish until strong legal, economic, and social forces are mobilized against it. Expecting a long struggle cannot be a reason not to begin.

If the history of making substantial progress in overcoming ethnic discrimination in the U.S. can serve as a rough comparison to the situation of the Roma in CEE nations, several factors are going to be vital in the fight of the Roma to overcome discrimination and exclusion in Bulgaria and throughout Europe. These factors include an antidiscrimination plan, aggressive implementation of the plan by all levels of government, leadership by the Roma themselves, educational progress by Roma children and young adults, political activism by the Roma people, a media committed to accurate reporting and fairness, and a civil society that reflects underlying public opinion favoring integration and opposed to discrimination. Most of these factors appear to be present in Bulgaria, often in rudimentary and brittle form, but present and in many cases moving in the right direction nonetheless. The progress that is just now beginning can be greatly enhanced by the efforts of groups that have the resources, the will, and the vision to roll up their sleeves and help promote Roma inclusion.

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This week, the richest business leaders and investors from around the world will gather in Davos, Switzerland, for the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum. In keeping with tradition, a small portion of the agenda will be devoted to global development and the plight of people living at the other end of the global income distribution.

Philanthropy is one way of linking the fortunes of these disparate communities. What if some of the mega-rich could be persuaded to redistribute their wealth to the extreme poor?

This question may feel hackneyed, but it deserves a fresh hearing in light of a dramatic reduction in the global poverty gap over the past several years (Figure 1). The theoretical cost of transfers required to lift all poor people’s income up to the global poverty line of $1.90 a day stood at approximately $80 billion [1] in 2015, down from over $300 billion in 1980. (Values expressed here are in 2015 market dollars.)

Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD, World Bank

This reduction can be unpacked into two parts. The first is a steep decline in the number of people living below the global poverty line. This is increasingly recognized as one of the defining features of the era. A U.N. goal to halve the poverty rate in the developing world between 1990 and 2015 was nearly achieved twice over. The second and lesser-known factor is the shrinking average distance of the world’s poor from the poverty line. In 1980, the mean daily income of those living below $1.90 was $1.09. In 2012 it was 25 cents higher at $1.34. (Values expressed here in 2011 purchasing power parity dollars.)   

Despite this good news, global poverty still demands attention. Hundreds of millions of people continue to suffer this most acute form of deprivation. In several countries, the prospects for ending poverty over the next generation, in line with a recently endorsed successor U.N. goal, appear challenging at best.

Figure 1 illustrates that in 2006, global aid flows exceeded the cost of the global poverty gap for the first time. This suggests that the elimination of extreme poverty should be possible simply through a more efficient allocation of aid. However, this confuses foreign aid’s goals and functions. The bulk of official foreign aid is used in the provision of public goods, such as physical infrastructure and strengthening institutions. Only 2 percent is directed to social payments and their administration. If the elimination of extreme poverty is to be achieved through targeted transfers, it depends on sources other than foreign aid.

The main source of transfers to the poor is welfare programs run and financed by developing countries themselves. These social safety nets have emerged as an increasingly prominent instrument in the toolkit of developing economy governments. Eighty-three percent of developing economies employ unconditional cash transfer programs, although many are small in scale. Several countries are in the process of building the apparatus for more accurate targeting and authentication through the assembly of beneficiary registries and the rolling out of identity programs. In at least 10 developing countries, social safety nets have succeeded in establishing a social floor by lifting all those people under the poverty line up above the threshold. In the vast majority, however, safety nets are insufficiently targeted or generous for that purpose, reflecting not only resource constraints, but also political choices that can be resistant to change.

A complementary approach is to consider the role of private mechanisms and wealth. NGOs were among the original pioneers of cash transfers in the developing world. More recently, the NGO GiveDirectly has designed a compelling new method of charitable giving that sends money directly to the poor using digital monitoring and payment technology. Its approach has received strong endorsements from independent charity assessors and has been validated by impact evaluations. Yet the scale of its existing donations remains tiny relative to the global poverty gap.

This is where Davos’s global elite could come into play: What difference could a philanthropic donation from the world’s richest people make?

To explore this question, we begin by identifying those developing countries that are home to a least one billionaire. (Our analysis is restricted to billionaires by data, not by the potential largesse of the world’s multi-millionaires. We focus our attention on billionaires in the developing world given the traditional focus of philanthropy on domestic causes.) Let’s assume that the richest billionaire in each country agrees to give away half of his or her current wealth among his or her fellow citizens, disbursed evenly over the next 15 years, roughly in accordance with the Giving Pledge promoted by Bill Gates. That money would be used exclusively to finance transfers to poor people based on their current distance from the poverty line. Transfers would be sustained at the same level for the full 15-year period with the aim of providing a modicum of income security that might allow beneficiaries to sustainably escape from poverty by 2030.

Table 1 summarizes the key results. In each of three countries—Colombia, Georgia, and Swaziland—a single individual's act of philanthropy could be sufficient to end extreme poverty with immediate effect. Swaziland is an especially striking case as it is among the world’s poorest countries with 41 percent of its population living under the poverty line. In Brazil, Peru, and the Philippines, poverty could be more than halved, or eliminated altogether if the billionaires could be convinced to match Mark Zuckerberg’s example and increase their donation to 99 percent of their wealth.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on Forbes, International Monetary Fund, PovcalNet, and the World Bank. Poverty rates post-transfer calculated based on average distance of the poor from the poverty line.  

In other countries—Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Angola—the potential impact on poverty is only modest. A number of factors account for differences between countries, but two factors that penalize African countries are especially noteworthy. First, the depth of poverty in Africa remains high, with 15 percent of the population living on less than $1.00 a day; and second, Africa has relatively high prices compared to other poor regions, which means more dollars are required to deliver the same amount of welfare.  

For those nations that have more than one billionaire, an alternative scenario is that the country’s club of billionaires makes the pledge together and combines resources to tackle domestic poverty. This would end poverty in China, India, and Indonesia—countries that rank first, second, and fifth globally in terms of the absolute size of their poor populations. The last two columns of Table 2 describe the results.

Table 2. The potential impact on poverty of collective billionaire giving pledges

Source: Authors’ calculations based on Forbes, IMF, PovcalNet, and the World Bank. Poverty rates post-transfer calculated based on average distance of the poor from the poverty line.

This exercise is of course laden with simplifying assumptions. [2] It is intended to provoke discussion, not to provide definitive figures. Moreover, it is open to debate whether transfers represent the most cost-effective way of sustainably ending poverty, the extent to which transfers ought to be targeted, the efficacy of building private transfer programs alongside public safety nets, and whether cash transfers represent the most appropriate use of billionaires’ philanthropy.  

What is less contestable is that a falling global poverty gap presents an opportunity for more systematic efforts for poverty reduction. This raises the question: How low does the poverty gap have to fall before we explicitly design programs to bring the remaining poor above the poverty line? We would argue that we are already beyond this point, not least in countries that remain a long way from ending poverty. Were a billionaire at Davos to commit to using his or her wealth in this fashion, it could trigger a powerful demonstration effect of innovative solutions—not just for other billionaires, but for countries that are currently at risk of being left behind.

[1] The cost of the global poverty gap in 2015 is an overestimate compared with the World Bank’s tentative poverty estimate for the same year. This is due to a different treatment of Nigeria. For this exercise, we rely on data from the 2009/10 Harmonized Nigeria Living Standards Survey reported in PovcalNet, despite its well-documented problems, whereas the Bank draws on the 2010/11 General Household Survey.

[2] Simplifying assumptions include: zero administrative costs in identifying the poor, assessing their income, and administering payments with no leakages, or no portion of those costs being borne by billionaires; the efficacy of administering miniscule transfers to those who stand on the margin of the poverty line; and no change in the cost of closing the poverty gap in a country over time, whether due to population growth, an increase or decrease in poverty, or a change in prices relative to the dollar.   

Executive Summary

In the concluding chapter of Red and Blue Nation? Consequences and Correction of America’s Polarized Politics (Brookings Press, 2007), Pietro S. Nivola and William A. Galston lay out a series of changes aimed at “depolarizing” the politics of the United States. One of their recommendations calls on the states to introduce fundamental changes to the process of redistricting congressional electoral districts. A handful of states have already established redistricting commissions, so the first steps have been taken in reforming one of the most important pillars of the electoral process.

This paper explores the possibility that the United States could build on those initial moves. Additionally, would it be possible to “import” the Canadian model of independent electoral boundary redistricting commissions? For the first 100 years of Canadian history redistricting seats in the federal House of Commons followed a pattern familiar to Americans. It was a process firmly under the control of the politicians, and the results reflected that. Wide disparities in population size were a tell-tale sign of the extent to which Canada’s parliamentary districts were gerrymandered.

Starting at the provincial level in the 1950s, partisan redistricting eventually gave way in all jurisdictions to nonpartisan commissions. How that change came about and why the Canadian commission-directed redistricting commends itself to Americans concerned about the highly politicized state of redistricting in the United States are the subjects of this study.

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During the height of the Ebola crisis in September 2014 there were 21 confirmed cases of the virus and 8 deaths in Nigeria. The African nation has the continent’s largest population, a high poverty rate, and the government spends relatively little on health care. At the time many were worried about a scenario where the virus spread throughout Nigeria. But, the Nigerian Minister of Health Onyebuchi Chukwu disagreed with that assessment. He commented to Forbes, “Nigeria will be as clean as any other country as far as Ebola virus disease is concerned.” His comments were proven to be accurate in the coming months. There were a variety of factors that contributed to Nigeria’s success at combating the disease. One important factor was the use of mobile electronic health records programs.

How mobile fights disease

1. Training Healthcare Workers

Training health care providers was a priority at the beginning of the Ebola outbreak. A survey found that 85 percent of health care workers in the country believed you could avoid Ebola by abstaining from handshakes or touching. Correcting these myths about the disease was a critical part of the response effort, especially for health care workers.

2. Rapid Deployment

One of the virtues of mHealth is its speed and flexibility. Mobile allows officials to quickly disseminate the latest information to front line health care workers. Increasing the speed of communication is a general boon to any large public health response.

3. Virtual Records

Ebola Treatment Units (ETU) greatly benefitted from using digital rather than paper records. Paper records cannot be removed from an ETU. Deborah Theobald co-founder of Vecna Technologies that created the mHealth platform in Nigeria has pointed out that, “If the patient is isolated, so is their paperwork”. Electronic records are easy to share and also lower the risk of infection for health care workers.

Mobile health policy challenges

Despite the potential benefits of mHealth, barriers in some countries prevent the full positive impact of these technologies from coming into effect. Many developing nations lack the electrical infrastructure that is necessary to power mobile devices. Health care regulations are often too overly bureaucratic and burdensome. This makes it difficult for innovators to develop and equip workers with mobile tools and applications. It often takes an emergency situation like the Ebola crisis to make substantive changes. Success in the long term is only possible if leaders create an environment that is more hospitable to mHealth.

Mobile interventions have also demonstrated potential to address important public health issues. Recently experts gathered at the Brookings Institution to discuss how mHealth can improve health outcomes. Apps like Mobile Midwife and Text4Baby can encourage healthy pregnancies by providing valuable tips to expecting mothers. Mobile health platforms are successful because they directly inform caregivers. The proliferation of mobile phones through the developing world presents a health opportunity to communicate with the people who need help.

After years of irresponsible fiscal management, Puerto Rico has few good options to address its growing debt crisis. But in most tales of bad behavior, there comes a point where continued punishment for past mistakes becomes counterproductive. We're reaching that point on Puerto Rico, and the Barack Obama administration has put forward a sensible new approach. 

(Citigroup, my employer, has various business relationships with Puerto Rico, including serving as underwriter and market maker in various securities. I've had no involvement in those activities, and this column represents my personal views, not those of Citi.)

Puerto Rico's population and its economy are about 10 percent smaller than they were a decade ago. The poverty rate is 45 percent, only about 40 percent of adults are in the labor force, and unemployment is more than 11 percent. 

Given these dire economic indicators, it's not surprising that Puerto Rico has a serious debt problem. At this point, the territory's total liabilities amount to more than 160 percent of the economy, and debt service is projected to be more than a third of government revenue. Over the next five years, the fiscal deficit looks to be $28 billion, and although the Puerto Rican government has proposed aggressive policy actions, these could, at best, only cut the deficit in half. Because the territory's fiscal dynamic is unsustainable, its uninsured debt is selling at discounts of 30 to 70 percent. 

Something has to give. Which brings us to the White House's plan.

The first imperative is to restore economic growth. For this, there are no magic bullets, but one useful strategy is to extend the Earned Income Tax Credit to Puerto Rico. The EITC is one of the most powerful, market-friendly mechanisms for encouraging labor force participation, and its absence in Puerto Rico makes no sense.

The Obama administration also proposes removing an anomaly in the Medicaid system. If Medicaid treated Puerto Rico in the same way as it does the 50 states, the federal government would pay for an estimated 83 percent of its Medicaid costs. But because Medicaid payments to the territory are capped, the federal government has generally paid only 15 to 20 percent. In addition, temporary Medicaid payments enacted as part of the Affordable Care Act are almost exhausted, posing a near-term threat to Puerto Rico's Medicaid program.

Establishing an EITC in Puerto Rico and adjusting the share of Medicaid payments paid by the federal government make sense from a fairness perspective. The EITC piece would encourage work, and the Medicaid component would attenuate fiscal pressure on the island. These steps would, though, come at a cost to the federal budget, probably in the billions of dollars per year. The administration should clarify both the amounts involved and how they would be financed. 

The island's fiscal governance also needs to be strengthened. Its accounting systems have been shoddy, and revenue estimates have been overly rosy. A period of external oversight is appropriate, to improve transparency and budgetary rigor. 

Finally, there's the hard question of what to do about the existing overhang of debt. Write-offs are inevitable; the only question is how to do them in a structured and timely way. We have bankruptcy laws precisely to handle this sort of situation, which would otherwise involve overlapping negotiations with multiple creditors (Puerto Rico has 18 different debt issuers and 20 creditor committees) and probably extended lawsuits. 

At the very least, Congress should extend Chapter 9 bankruptcy laws to Puerto Rico's cities and public corporations. Municipalities in the states enjoy this protection, and there's no reason to treat cities in Puerto Rico differently than those in Florida or Texas. This step would cover about a third of the territory's debt. 

The more controversial question, though, is whether Puerto Rico's government should also have access to bankruptcy protection. State governments do not, but the administration proposes that territories such as Puerto Rico should. 

Bankruptcy would not necessarily mean that less debt would be repaid. So it is not clear that the traditional argument against bankruptcy protection -- that it would raise future borrowing costs -- carries much force. Negotiated write-offs and default would have largely the same effect, but would probably take longer and be messier. Among the options left, the administration's is the least bad. 

The plan requires legislation, and in today's polarized Congress, that's a daunting prospect. But as former Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner once emphasized, in a crisis, "plan beats no plan." the administration has one. Its congressional opponents don't.

Editor's Note: this op-ed originally appeared on Bloomberg View.

Last month’s decision by the Palestinian Authority to schedule municipal elections in early October hardly registered in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, much less here in Washington. In light of Hamas’ recent decision to take part in the process, however, those elections have suddenly taken on new meaning. While the election of some 414 village, town, and city councils across the West Bank and Gaza Strip will not change the face of the Palestinian leadership or alter the diplomatic impasse with Israel, local elections have the potential to unlock the current paralysis within Palestinian politics.

Although Palestinian law calls for local elections to take place every four years, they have only been held twice since the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1993, only one of which could be deemed genuinely competitive. The first and only local elections to take place in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip were held in 2004-05, in which Hamas—in its first foray into electoral politics—made major gains. Local elections were again held in 2012, although this time Hamas boycotted the process, preventing the vote from taking place in Gaza and allowing Fatah to declare a sweeping, if somewhat hollow, victory. 

Hamas’ decision to take part in this year’s local elections was therefore something of a surprise. Indeed, Hamas initially expressed dismay at the announcement, accusing the leadership in Ramallah of acting without consulting the other parties. Moreover, should the elections proceed as planned on October 8, they would be the first competitive electoral contest in the occupied territories since Hamas defeated Mahmoud Abbas’s ruling Fatah faction in the 2006 legislative election. Those elections triggered an international boycott of the PA which eventually led to the split between Fatah and Hamas and the current political paralysis.

If nothing else, Hamas’ entry into the elections averts another needless internal crisis in Palestinian politics. A boycott by Hamas would likely have further entrenched the political and geographic division between the Fatah-dominated West Bank and Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, while dealing yet another blow to the beleaguered National Consensus Government, which despite being accepted by both factions in April 2014 has yet to physically return to Gaza. Movement on the reconciliation track could also help push the long-stalled reconstruction of Gaza, which has yet to recover from the devastating war of 2014.

Hamas has little to lose from participating in an election that is unlikely to significantly alter the political landscape one way or the other...[and Fatah] has little to gain from “winning” another electoral process that is largely uncontested.

What explains Hamas’ apparent change of heart? For one, Hamas may believe it has an advantage over Fatah, which continues to suffer from widespread perceptions of corruption and incompetence—a perception reinforced by the collapse of the peace process as well as the unprecedented unpopularity of President Abbas. Hamas may also view the upcoming vote as a way to gauge its current standing and future prospects in anticipation of long-awaited legislative and presidential elections. Either way, Hamas has little to lose from participating in an election that is unlikely to significantly alter the political landscape one way or the other. 

Hamas’ decision to participate in the elections is welcome news for Palestinian voters eager to see the return of competitive elections and a revival of political life after years of stagnation. It even helps Fatah, which has little to gain from “winning” another electoral process that is largely uncontested. More important, as the party that lost both parliamentary elections and a civil war in 2006-07 and that remains the chief proponent of a failed process, Fatah desperately needs a political victory of some kind as well as a basis on which to stake its claim to legitimacy and continued grip on power.

That said, it is important not to overstate the significance of local elections, which in the end will do nothing to address the deeper problems facing Palestinians in the occupied territories, whether from Israel’s continued occupation and its ever-expanding settlement enterprise or the ongoing political dysfunction within their own ranks. On the other hand, the prospect of the first competitive Palestinian elections in a decade represents a small but significant ripple in the otherwise stagnant waters of Palestinian politics.

Employment is down among everyone between the ages of 16 and 64—particularly among teens, but with a great deal of variation by geography, race, and education. The disparity between blacks and whites is especially stark. For example, unemployment among white young adults peaked at 14% in 2010—still considerably lower than unemployment rates for black young adults at any point in the 2008 to 2014 time period. Unemployment for black 20- to 24-year-olds rose to 29.5% in 2010 and fell to 22.3% in 2014, compared to 10.3% among whites in 2014.

While there is no silver bullet, higher levels of education and work experience clearly improve job prospects down the line for young people. There are multiple strategies local and regional leaders can use to build more structured pathways into employment.

Teens and young adults (referring to 16- to 19-year-olds and 20- to 24-year-olds, respectively) are not monolithic populations. Age is an obvious differentiator, but so are a number of other factors, such as educational attainment, skill level, interests, parental support, and other life circumstances.  Schools, families, and neighborhoods all play a role in a young person’s trajectory—both positive and negative. But at the most basic level, a program for a 17-year-old high school student is likely not appropriate for a 23-year-old, regardless of educational attainment. Successful programs integrate education, training, work-readiness, and youth development principles, but the particular blend of these elements and settings vary: more school-based and educationally focused programs for younger youth, and more community-based and career-focused programs with strong ties to education for older youth.

An admittedly non-comprehensive review includes the following types of promising and proven programs:  

For high school students:

• Paid internship programs, such as Urban Alliance and Genesys Works
• High school programs that bridge school and work with occupationally-focused courses and career exposure, such as Career Academies, Linked Learning, High Tech High, Advanced Career, Alamo Academies, and P-Tech, some of which also incorporate post-secondary courses and credentials into their programs
• Youth apprenticeships, such as state programs in Georgia and Wisconsin 

For out-of-school youth and young adults:

• Highly structured programs offering work readiness and technical skills development, often in partnership with community colleges, and coupled with paid internships, such as Year Up, i.c.stars, npower, and Per Scholas
• Programs that offer stipends and combine academics, job training, mentoring, and supportive services while carrying out community improvement projects, such as YouthBuild and Youth Corps

The sobering fact is that promoting employment and economic security among young people is not a straightforward proposition. To succeed in today’s economy and earn middle-class wages, a young person needs to complete several steps: graduate from high school or earn an alternate credential; enroll in and complete some post-secondary education or job training; preferably gain meaningful work experience; and enter the labor market with in-demand skills. (A decent economy and some luck help, too.) There are many points along that path from which a young person can get off-track, particularly young people of color and those from high-poverty neighborhoods. And while high youth unemployment is increasingly in the news these days, the difficulties youth without college degrees face in finding good jobs has been a problem for decades.

Programs such as the ones listed above are part of the solution. But they are not enough, given the magnitude of the problem. In order to produce better employment outcomes at scale, leaders from all sectors and levels of government need to make broader shifts in how education and workforce programs are designed, and how they interact with each other and employers. That is a heavy lift, but it is worth it to address the high costs imposed by the status quo: high unemployment, poverty, and untapped potential.  

We tend to think of having a formal identity as an enabler for social and economic inclusion, but in fact identity can have entirely the opposite effect. Once socioeconomic interactions are based on a standardized notion of identity, it is likely that social status based on past achievements, family histories, personal connections, political backing, wealth and education levels will influence socioeconomic outcomes — thereby potentially reinforcing the established class hierarchy. Systems that are based on anonymity might in fact be the most equitable and inclusive, in the sense of ensuring equal participation by all, by systematically stripping out social status.

But anonymous systems carry a high cost in terms of efficiency. Reputations would be impossible to establish, contracts would be hard to enforce, and there would be more insecurity as it would be much harder to track and clamp down on illicit activities. It is therefore not at all certain that the poorer segments of the population would be better off in absolute terms if the economy worked on the basis of anonymity.

The need for digital identities for inclusive access

In fact, giving lower-income people digital identities would make it possible for them to participate in the modern digital economy in many ways: to open accounts and receive moneys from anyone, assert their rights over digital services they have contracted and digital assets they have purchased, settle disputes, etc. But establishing a formally recognized identity can be a major hurdle in itself, especially in countries that do not have digitized national ID schemes.

It is ironic that the difficulty of establishing formal identity in the first place often prevents so many lower-income, and especially rural, people from accessing digital services. Identity systems with selective coverage of the population create a double whammy of inequality: on the one hand, these partial systems help the haves to carry their social and economic status symbols and reputations into every market interaction they are engaged in, and on the other they negate digital visibility and access to digital services for the have not´s.

We argue in a new research paper that it should be the government´s responsibility to ensure that every citizen in fact has a digital identity, not merely to create a platform that enables people to have digital identities. The Indian government´s Aadhar push to provide everyone in India with a unique number ID linked to biometrics is a good example of such a policy.

The demands of identity verification systems

The problem is that different policy agendas converge on the issue of identity and have different requirements for a digital identity platform. What works as an identify standard for financial systems may not be good enough for law enforcement agencies. The risk is that governments adopt the highest standard, with the result that the inclusion agenda and the needs of the poor are ignored.

If there is no centralized government system for identity, then what we need is a system that:

1. Lets the issue of identity be resolved in the first instance within the communities where poor people live, shop and work (e.g. through attestation by known local figures)
2. Draws people into seeking and improving their digital identities over time, much in the way that they develop their social network over time.

This is the notion of social identity. Let people with meager resources help each other overcome their limitations: each may have very little voice, but collectively they represent a potentially vast information system for official identification purposes. That is hard to reconcile with the way governments and formal institutions tend to handle identity verification: in silos, contained within databases and cards. We need more flexible notions of identity, which build layers of identity information and verification through social networks – as well as bureaucratized ID-seeking processes.

Editors’ Note: Science diplomacy can help countries solve on-the-ground challenges and improve standards of living for their citizens, writes David Hajjar. But it can also lay groundwork for improving relations through functional, scientific cooperation that is less politicized. This post originally appeared on Lawfare.

In the Middle East, governments and non-state actors alike have tried all forms of diplomacy to solve the challenges they face, with mixed results: shuttle diplomacy by the United States between the Israelis and Palestinians worked for a time, great-power diplomacy over the Syrian civil war largely hasn’t, and direct negotiations with unsavory groups like the Taliban have moved in fits and starts. 

But progress can come from unlikely sources, and science diplomacy—whereby experts collaborate scientifically to address common problems and build constructive international partnerships—has more potential than is often recognized. Science diplomacy can of course help countries solve on-the-ground challenges and improve standards of living for their citizens. But it can also lay groundwork for improving relations in a region often defined by tension (if not outright conflict) through functional, scientific cooperation that is less politicized. 

Efforts in science and technology, on the one hand, and diplomacy on the other, can achieve more if they are thoughtfully merged—rather than siloed. Science diplomacy, therefore, can contribute to peace- and security-building in the Middle East (and with the United States) in unique ways. 

Science and global governance

Across the world, science diplomacy has helped set the stage for advancing foreign policy and global governance goals.

The 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 illuminated how negotiating over and collaborating on science and technology issues can be an important gateway to achieving significant foreign policy goals. Direct (and often very technical) diplomacy between U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, was key to achieving the framework agreement, as was collaboration between Iranian and Western nuclear scientists more broadly. Provided that the agreement is thoroughly enforced, it’s a major victory for global nuclear nonproliferation efforts—and much credit goes to effective science diplomacy. 

Global efforts to combat climate change are another area in which science diplomacy has had a real impact on policy. The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has become a model for critical science policy research and recommendations. The 2015 conference in Paris brought together hundreds of political leaders and experts to examine the scientific evidence that the globe is warming, discuss remedies, and chart a path forward that can help slow environmental damage. So, science diplomacy was again central—this time in shaping and implementing the global climate governance framework. 

Another area where we have observed substantive gains from science diplomacy is the global management of infectious diseases. The Zika outbreak in Latin America, Ebola epidemic in West Africa, dengue in the Caribbean and Asia, MERS in the Gulf region and in South Korea, and the global threat of pandemic influenza all underscore that international cooperation is key to fighting modern plagues, which spread more rapidly in an era of constant global travel. In some cases more than in others, political leaders have devoted considerable resources to promoting international scientific cooperation—whether in clinical monitoring, medical interventions, research into pathogen biology and diagnostics, and treatments (including vaccine development). In fact, the global response to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an example where international collaboration helped identify affected populations and coordinate treatment through the WHO Global Alert and Response System (which has identified new cases in Europe, the Middle East, Australia, Canada, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Hong Kong). The system’s main goal is to send supplies and medical specialists (including epidemiologists), design clinical trials, provide diagnostic tests, identify modes of transmission, and provide treatment. This coordinated response effort has controlled the pandemic.

Science in a fraught region

In the Middle East, opportunities abound for science diplomacy. Not only can this type of approach help solve practical, quality-of-life challenges—from energy to health and beyond—it can bring together expert communities and bureaucracies. In the process, it can contribute to more normalized people-to-people and government-to-government relations. Even at the height of the Cold War, for example, U.S. and Russian nuclear scientists and other experts worked together to monitor each other’s nuclear facilities; even though Moscow and Washington had nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed directly at each other, bureaucratic cooperation on technical issues became a normal part of the relationship and helped enhance transparency and trust.

In the energy sector, for example, innovation in science and technology will play a crucial role in helping to transition Middle Eastern states in the region away from a dependence on fossil fuels—a broad goal of the Paris accords and a specific strategic goal of states like Saudi Arabia and Iran. Notwithstanding the sectarian disagreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia, both need to address their fast-growing demand for electricity; they need not be in competition with each other. Saudi Arabia currently fuels its own 10 percent annual rise in electricity needs with crude oil, owing to domestic natural dry gas reserves. Iran’s vast gas reserves could be used to meet the kingdom’s growing energy needs, but Iran’s decaying gas fields need $250 billion in major repairs. Many think that if Saudi Arabia used its investment power to revitalize Iran’s gas industry, it would secure the energy it needs to meet demands. The economic benefits of cooperation on energy could promote better relations. Another area of cooperation that can drive the local economies is the Arab Gulf’s first major cross-border enterprise, the Dolphin Gas Project, which was started in 2007. The project involves the transportation of natural gas from Qatar to Oman and to the UAE. Finally, international cooperation between Oman and Iran is developing, where Oman intends to import natural gas from Iran for industrial development. This would require investing in an underwater pipeline from the Iranian coast to Oman. The UAE could do the same to build its economy: import natural gas from Iran, since the pipelines exist. The technical know-how for all these initiatives already exists—to date the main stumbling block has been overcoming regional politics.

Qatari Oil Minister Abdullah bin Hamad al-Attiyah (L) and Dolphin Energy Chief Executive Ahmed Ali Al Sayegh hold a news conference about the inauguration of the Dolphin Energy plant in Doha May 12, 2008. Photo credit: Reuters.

In health, there is also room for mutually-beneficial cooperation. Back in 1996, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs helped establish the Middle East Cancer Consortium—that effort continues to help train the next generation of scientists and medical professionals in cancer biology in the region. Other programs have focused on vaccine development for childhood diseases; preventing HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis infections; ending childhood malnutrition; and managing unwanted pregnancies. Programs like these have yielded important advances in public health and have enhanced cooperation between countries like the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Cyprus, Turkey, and Israel with the United States.

And in a unique cross-sectoral approach, Jordan is host to a promising initiative called the Synchrotron Light for Experimental Science and Application in the Middle East (SESAME). Modeled after the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), SESAME is a partnership between Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Iran, Jordan, Pakistan, the Palestinian Authority, and Turkey that aims to create research career opportunities that will limit “brain drain” from the region and serve as a model for scientific collaboration.

STEM education: The root of science diplomacy

Science diplomacy has the potential to deliver real dividends that extend beyond the science and technology spaces themselves. When states cooperate on functional, non-politicized (or at least less politicized) issues—whether at the level of non-state scientific communities or at the level of state bureaucracies focused on energy, health, or other issues—they become more accustomed to working together and trusting each other. This can gradually have spillover effects into politics and security arenas.

Science diplomacy doesn’t just happen, though—it requires real efforts on behalf of policymakers and experts. One crucial step is advancing STEM education (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) to build more robust and diverse expert communities. This is something that President Obama emphasized in his speech at Cairo's Al-Azhar University in 2009. He identified possible areas of cooperation, both within the region and with the United States, including researching and piloting new sources of energy, creating “green” jobs, enhancing communication and informatics, sharing medical information, generating clean water, and growing new crops. 

In some countries in the region, particularly in the Gulf, there are signs of new investment in STEM education and related efforts. For example, Qatar has pledged to spend 3 percent of its GDP on scientific research, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has decided to create the world’s first sustainable city. Saudi Arabia created the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) with a $20 billion endowment, $200 million of which has been used to attract scientists and educators from the West. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE continue to build and sustain partnerships with European and American universities. 

Interest in science among students and the general citizenry in many Middle Eastern countries remains low, which is problematic at a time when the region’s young people need to compete in a world increasingly centered around STEM. More governments in the region—perhaps with U.S. help—need to increase efforts to attract their young people to STEM education and careers.

International cooperation on STEM issues—led by science diplomats—can strengthen relationships between Middle Eastern states and with the United States. Science and technology disciplines transcend politics, borders, and cultures, and are thus an important bridge between nations. During a time of strained geopolitical relationships, we can focus on making progress in health and disease, food and water security, and other areas—and thereby enhance domestic stability and international security in the process. 

Last month’s decision by the Palestinian Authority to schedule municipal elections in early October hardly registered in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, much less here in Washington. In light of Hamas’ recent decision to take part in the process, however, those elections have suddenly taken on new meaning. While the election of some 414 village, town, and city councils across the West Bank and Gaza Strip will not change the face of the Palestinian leadership or alter the diplomatic impasse with Israel, local elections have the potential to unlock the current paralysis within Palestinian politics.

Although Palestinian law calls for local elections to take place every four years, they have only been held twice since the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1993, only one of which could be deemed genuinely competitive. The first and only local elections to take place in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip were held in 2004-05, in which Hamas—in its first foray into electoral politics—made major gains. Local elections were again held in 2012, although this time Hamas boycotted the process, preventing the vote from taking place in Gaza and allowing Fatah to declare a sweeping, if somewhat hollow, victory. 

Hamas’ decision to take part in this year’s local elections was therefore something of a surprise. Indeed, Hamas initially expressed dismay at the announcement, accusing the leadership in Ramallah of acting without consulting the other parties. Moreover, should the elections proceed as planned on October 8, they would be the first competitive electoral contest in the occupied territories since Hamas defeated Mahmoud Abbas’s ruling Fatah faction in the 2006 legislative election. Those elections triggered an international boycott of the PA which eventually led to the split between Fatah and Hamas and the current political paralysis.

If nothing else, Hamas’ entry into the elections averts another needless internal crisis in Palestinian politics. A boycott by Hamas would likely have further entrenched the political and geographic division between the Fatah-dominated West Bank and Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, while dealing yet another blow to the beleaguered National Consensus Government, which despite being accepted by both factions in April 2014 has yet to physically return to Gaza. Movement on the reconciliation track could also help push the long-stalled reconstruction of Gaza, which has yet to recover from the devastating war of 2014.

Hamas has little to lose from participating in an election that is unlikely to significantly alter the political landscape one way or the other...[and Fatah] has little to gain from “winning” another electoral process that is largely uncontested.

What explains Hamas’ apparent change of heart? For one, Hamas may believe it has an advantage over Fatah, which continues to suffer from widespread perceptions of corruption and incompetence—a perception reinforced by the collapse of the peace process as well as the unprecedented unpopularity of President Abbas. Hamas may also view the upcoming vote as a way to gauge its current standing and future prospects in anticipation of long-awaited legislative and presidential elections. Either way, Hamas has little to lose from participating in an election that is unlikely to significantly alter the political landscape one way or the other. 

Hamas’ decision to participate in the elections is welcome news for Palestinian voters eager to see the return of competitive elections and a revival of political life after years of stagnation. It even helps Fatah, which has little to gain from “winning” another electoral process that is largely uncontested. More important, as the party that lost both parliamentary elections and a civil war in 2006-07 and that remains the chief proponent of a failed process, Fatah desperately needs a political victory of some kind as well as a basis on which to stake its claim to legitimacy and continued grip on power.

That said, it is important not to overstate the significance of local elections, which in the end will do nothing to address the deeper problems facing Palestinians in the occupied territories, whether from Israel’s continued occupation and its ever-expanding settlement enterprise or the ongoing political dysfunction within their own ranks. On the other hand, the prospect of the first competitive Palestinian elections in a decade represents a small but significant ripple in the otherwise stagnant waters of Palestinian politics.

Financial Data as Driving Force Behind Improved Learning

During the past decade, school enrollments have increased dramatically, mostly thanks to UNESCO’s Education for All (EFA) movement and the UN Millennium Development Goals. From 1999 to 2008, an additional 52 million children around the world enrolled in primary schools, and the number of out-of-school children fell by 39 million. In Sub-Saharan Africa alone, enrollment rates rose by one-third during that time, even with large population increases in school-age children.

Yet enrollment is not the only indicator of success in education, and does not necessarily translate into learning. Even with these impressive gains in enrollment, many parts of the world, and particularly the poorest areas, now face a severe learning crisis. The latest data in the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2011 reveal poor literacy and numeracy skills for millions of students around the world. In Malawi and Zambia, more than one-third of sixth-grade students had not achieved the most basic literacy skills. In El Salvador, just 13 percent of third-grade students passed an international mathematics exam. Even in middle-income countries such as South Africa and Morocco, the majority of students had not acquired basic reading skills after four years of primary education. Although the focus on children out of school is fully justified, given that they certainly lack learning opportunities, the failure to focus on learning also does a disservice to the more than 600 million children in the developing world who are already in school but fail to learn very basic skills.

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