mo

Britain’s Soft Power Potential: In Conversation with Penny Mordaunt

Members Event

5 February 2020 - 6:00pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Penny Mordaunt MP, Member of Parliament for Portsmouth North; Secretary of State for Defence (2019); Secretary of State for International Development (2017-2019)

Chair: Thomas Raines, Director, Europe Programme, Chatham House

Drawing on her experience as secretary of state for defence and secretary of state for international development, Penny Mordaunt discusses how soft power can protect, promote and project Britain’s international interests and foreign policy agenda.

Often defined as the capacity to influence others without coercion or force, soft power differs from traditional military capabilities in favour of more subtle forms of influence rooted in values, culture and civic institutions.

Consistently upholding democratic values and human rights can contribute to a nation’s soft power as much as its cultural icons and legacies.  However, utilising soft power – the power of attractiveness – is not straightforward: the government is only part of a broad mix of institutions and actors with a role to play.

Can the UK develop a long term approach that brings together all of the components of its soft power for a common purpose?

What are the key sources of Britain’s soft power? How has Brexit affected perceptions of Britain internationally? And with the UK’s departure from the European Union now confirmed, how should we think about its soft power in the future?

Members Events Team




mo

The Future of Democracy in Europe: Technology and the Evolution of Representation

3 March 2020

To the extent that perceptions of a crisis in liberal democracy in Europe can be confirmed, this paper investigates the nature of the problem and its causes, and asks what part, if any, digital technology plays in it.

Hans Kundnani

Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme

2020-02-27-Irish-Referendum.jpg

A woman writes a note on the Savita Halappanavar mural in Dublin on 26 May 2018, following a referendum on the 36th amendment to Ireland’s constitution. The referendum result was overwhelmingly in favour of removing the country’s previous near-universal ban on abortion. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • There is a widespread sense that liberal democracy is in crisis, but little consensus exists on the specific nature and causes of the crisis. In particular, there are three prisms through which the crisis is usually seen: the rise of ‘populism’, ‘democratic deconsolidation’, and a ‘hollowing out’ of democracy. Each reflects normative assumptions about democracy.
  • The exact role of digital technology in the crisis is disputed. Despite the widely held perception that social media is undermining democracy, the evidence for this is limited. Over the longer term, the further development of digital technology could undermine the fundamental preconditions for democracy – though the pace and breadth of technological change make predictions about its future impact difficult.
  • Democracy functions in different ways in different European countries, with political systems on the continent ranging from ‘majoritarian democracies’ such as the UK to ‘consensual democracies’ such as Belgium and Switzerland. However, no type seems to be immune from the crisis. The political systems of EU member states also interact in diverse ways with the EU’s own structure, which is problematic for representative democracy as conventionally understood, but difficult to reform.
  • Political parties, central to the model of representative democracy that emerged in the late 18th century, have long seemed to be in decline. Recently there have been some signs of a reversal of this trend, with the emergence of parties that have used digital technology in innovative ways to reconnect with citizens. Traditional parties can learn from these new ‘digital parties’.
  • Recent years have also seen a proliferation of experiments in direct and deliberative democracy. There is a need for more experimentation in these alternative forms of democracy, and for further evaluation of how they can be integrated into the existing institutions and processes of representative democracy at the local, regional, national and EU levels.
  • We should not think of democracy in a static way – that is, as a system that can be perfected once and for all and then simply maintained and defended against threats. Democracy has continually evolved and now needs to evolve further. The solution to the crisis will not be to attempt to limit democracy in response to pressure from ‘populism’ but to deepen it further as part of a ‘democratization of democracy’.




mo

Webinar: Challenges to Democracy: What is the Future of Democracy in Europe?

Members Event Webinar

30 March 2020 - 6:00pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Dr Catherine Howe, Director, Democracy Society

Hans Kundnani, Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House

Chair: Thomas Raines, Director, Europe Programme, Chatham House

PLEASE NOTE: THIS EVENT HAS BEEN CANCELLED.

There is a widespread sense that liberal democracy is in crisis but little consensus about how to understand it. While some attribute this crisis to the rise of populist figures, movements and parties, others see populism as a response to a deeper hollowing out of democracy during the last several decades. Some blame the development of digital technology – in particular the emergence of social media – while others argue that the correlation between the development of digital technology and the perceived corrosion of democracy is exaggerated or that it has facilitated greater participation in politics from traditionally under-represented demographics in a way that was not previously possible.

Launching the Chatham House research paper The Future of Democracy in Europe, this panel will discuss how liberal democracy is evolving against the background of social and technological change. What are the challenges to liberal democracy in Europe? How should we understand the impact of technology on how democracy in Europe functions? Given the plurality of democratic structures and institutions across the continent, how can democracy in Europe be reinvigorated? And what role can citizens' assemblies and referendums play in making democracy more responsive to citizens?

This event is open to Chatham House Members only. Not a member? Find out more.

For further information on the different types of Chatham House events, visit Our Events Explained.




mo

Coronavirus and the Future of Democracy in Europe

31 March 2020

Hans Kundnani

Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme
The pandemic raises difficult questions about whether liberal democracies can adequately protect their citizens.

2020-03-31-Police-Poland

Police officers wearing protective face masks patrol during coronavirus lockdown enforcement in Wroclaw, Poland. Photo by Bartek Sadowski/Bloomberg via Getty Images.

It is less than a month since we published our research paper on the future of democracy in Europe. But it feels like we now live in a different world. The coronavirus has already killed thousands of people in Europe, led to an unprecedented economic crisis and transformed daily life – and in the process raised difficult new questions about democracy.

The essence of our argument in the paper was that democracy in Europe should be deepened. But now there is a much more basic question about whether democracies can protect their citizens from the pandemic.

There has already been much discussion about whether authoritarian states will emerge stronger from this crisis than democracies. In particular, although the virus originated in China and the government initially seemed to struggle to deal with it, it was able to largely contain the outbreak in Hubei and deploy vast resources from the rest of the country to deal with it.

Come through the worst

China may have come through the worst of the health crisis – though a second wave of infections as restrictions are lifted is possible – and there have already been three times as many deaths in Italy, and twice as many in Spain, as in China (although there is increasing doubt about the accuracy of China’s figures).

However, it is not only authoritarian states that seem so far to have coped relatively well with the virus. In fact, some East Asian democracies appear to have done even better than China. At the time of writing South Korea, with a population of 51.5 million, has had only 144 death rates so far. Taiwan, with a population of nearly 24 million, has had only two deaths.

So rather than thinking in terms of the relative performance of authoritarian states and democracies, perhaps instead we should be asking what we in Europe can learn from East Asian democracies.

It is not yet clear why East Asian democracies were able to respond so effectively, especially as they did not all follow exactly the same approach. Whereas some quickly imposed restrictions on travel (for example, Taiwan suspended flights from China and then prohibited the entry of people from China and other affected countries) and quarantines, others used extensive testing and contact tracing, often making use of personal data collected from citizens.

Whatever the exact strategy they used, though, they did all act quickly and decisively – and the collective memory of the SARS outbreak in 2003 and other recent epidemics seems to have played a role in this. For example, following the SARS outbreak, Taiwan created a central epidemic command center. Europe, meanwhile, was hardly affected by SARS – and we seem to have assumed the coronavirus would be the same (although that does not quite explain why we were still so slow to react in February even after it was clear that the virus had spread to Italy).

However, while the relative success of East Asian democracies may have something to do with this recent experience of epidemics, it may also have something to do with the kind of democracies they are. It may be a simple matter of competence – the bureaucracy in Taiwan and South Korea may function better, and in particular in a more coordinated way, than in many European countries.

But it may also be more than that. In particular, it could be that East Asian democracies have a kind of 'authoritarian residue' that has helped in the initial response to this crisis. South Korea and Taiwan are certainly vibrant democracies – but they are also relatively new democracies compared to many in Europe. As a result, citizens may have a different relationship with the state and be more willing to accept sudden restrictions of freedoms, in particular on movement, and the use of personal data – at least in a crisis.

In that sense, the pandemic may be a challenge not to democracy as such but to liberal democracy in particular – in other words, a system of popular sovereignty together with guaranteed basic rights, such as including freedom of association and expression and checks and balances on executive power. There may now be difficult trade-offs to be made between those basic rights and security – and, after the experience of coronavirus, many citizens may choose security.

This brings us back to the issues we discussed in our research paper. Even before the coronavirus hit, there was already much discussion of a crisis of liberal democracy. In particular, there has been a debate about whether liberalism and democracy, which had long been assumed to go together, were becoming decoupled.

In particular, ‘illiberal democracies’ seemed to be emerging in many places including Europe (although, as we discuss in the paper, some analysts argue that the term is incoherent). This model of ‘illiberal democracy’ – in other words, one in which elections continue to be held but some individual rights are curtailed – may emerge stronger from this new crisis.

It is striking that Singapore – also seen as responding successfully to coronavirus – was seen as a paradigmatic ‘illiberal democracy’ long before Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán embraced the idea. In particular, there is little real opposition to the People’s Action Party, which has been in power since 1959.

Since this new crisis began, Orbán has gone further in suspending rights in Hungary. On March 11, he declared a state of emergency – as many other European countries have also done. But he has now gone further by passing legislation that allows him to govern by decree indefinitely and make it illegal to spread misinformation that undermines the government’s response to the pandemic. Clearly, this is a further decisive step in the deconsolidation of liberal democracy in Hungary.

So far, though, much of the discussion, particularly in the foreign policy world, has focused mainly on how to change popular perceptions that liberal democracies are failing in this crisis. For example, High Representative Josep Borrell, the European Union’s foreign minister, wrote last week of a 'battle of narratives'.

But this misses the point. It is not a matter of spinning the European model, but of taking seriously the substantial questions raised by the coronavirus about the ability of liberal democracies to adequately protect their citizens.




mo

Webinar: European Democracy in the Last 100 Years: Economic Crises and Political Upheaval

Members Event Webinar

6 May 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Event participants

Pepijn Bergsen, Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House

Dr Sheri Berman, Professor of Political Science, Barnard College

Chair: Hans Kundnani, Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House

 

In the last 100 years, global economic crises from the Great Depression of the 1930s to the 2008 financial crash have contributed to significant political changes in Europe, often leading to a rise in popularity for extremist parties and politics. As Europe contends with a perceived crisis of democracy - now compounded by the varied responses to the coronavirus outbreak - how should we understand the relationship between externally-driven economic crises, political upheaval and democracy?

The panellists will consider the parallels between the political responses to some of the greatest economic crises Europe has experienced in the last century. Given that economic crises often transcend borders, why does political disruption vary between democracies? What can history tell us about the potential political impact of the unfolding COVID-19-related economic crisis? And will the unprecedented financial interventions by governments across Europe fundamentally change the expectations citizens have of the role government should play in their lives?

This event is based on a recent article in The World Today by Hans Kundnani and Pepijn Bergsen who are both researchers in Chatham House's Europe Programme. 'Crawling from the Wreckage' is the first in a series of articles that look at key themes in European political discourse from the last century. You can read the article here

This event is open to Chatham House Members. Not a member? Find out more.




mo

Renewable Energy: Generating Money

1 November 2007 , Number 7

City types are waking up to wind, waves and the sun and their potential to make energy – and money. This is just as new energy policies for Europe emerge with twenty percent targets for renewable energy and greenhouse gas cuts. Add to the mix climate change negotiations which will be back in Bali in December.

Kirsty Hamilton

Associate Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme

GettyImages-977104176.jpg

Solar panels lined up




mo

The EU’s Un-Common Agricultural Policy

Invitation Only Research Event

21 October 2019 - 8:30am to 10:00am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Ian Mitchell, Co-Director, Development Cooperation in Europe; Senior Policy Fellow and Associate Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Department, Chatham House
Chair: Ana Yang, Head of Land Use and Food Systems, Hoffmann Centre for Sustainable Resource Economy, Chatham House

Despite its name, the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides support to the agricultural sector that varies widely between the 27 member states. The OECD calculates the extent of this support at the EU level but members have blocked the organization calculating support levels for individual EU members. Overall, the EU’s producer support is equivalent to 20 per cent of farm income which is well-above the levels seen in the US at 12.2 per cent and China at 14.3 per cent.
 
This roundtable will discuss the first estimates of support levels by EU countries produced by Ian Mitchell from the Center for Global Development. It will look at both direct subsidies under the CAP and those that inflate market prices. The discussion will consider the implications for EU finance, for the potential role of EU subsidy reform and for the UK’s options after Brexit.
 
Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Chloé Prendleloup




mo

The prospects of carbon dioxide removal in climate policymaking within the United States

Research Event

19 November 2019 - 9:00am to 5:00pm

School of Law, University of California, Davis

This meeting formed part of a programme of work which investigates the role of negative emissions technologies (NETs) in achieving the Paris Agreement climate targets. Previous meetings held in London and Brussels have looked at integrating negative emissions into EU policy-making, the implications and degree to which NETs, and in particular bioenergy with carbon capture storage (BECCS), can be an effective climate mitigation tool. This meeting focused on the possible deployment pathways of NETs and alternatives to BECCS for the US in particular, in the context of geographical constraints and socioenvironmental implications, the role of the private sector, and appropriate governance and finance mechanisms. 

Melissa MacEwen

Project Manager, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme




mo

Promoting a Just Transition to an Inclusive Circular Economy

1 April 2020

Considerations of justice and social equity are as important for the circular economy transition as they are in the contexts of low-carbon transitions and digitalization of the economy. This paper sets out the just transition approach, and its relevance in climate change and energy transition debates.

Patrick Schröder

Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme

2020-04-01-circular-economy.jpg

Residents of Mount Ijen take sulphur at Ijen Crater, Banyuwangi, East Java, on 2 July 2018. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • Many social and political issues have so far been neglected in planning for the circular economy transition. This paper aims to redress this by considering how ‘just transition’ and social equity may be achieved through policy and practice.
  • The prevailing economic model is linear, in that resources are extracted, transformed into products, used, and finally discarded. In contrast, the circular economy recognizes that natural resources are finite, and aims to keep the materials in products in circulation for as long as possible: reusing, repairing, remanufacturing, sharing and recycling. While the concept of the circular economy is largely focused on developing new technologies and businesses to enable keeping materials in circulation, it also includes the notions of ‘designing out’ waste, substituting renewable materials for non-renewable ones, and restoring natural systems.
  • The UN 2030 Agenda demonstrates that environmental, social and economic sustainability objectives cannot be separated. As the links between the environmental issues of climate change, overconsumption of resources and waste generation, and social issues of inequality and the future of work become increasingly obvious, the urgency to connect environmental with social justice is gaining in significance. The language of ‘just transition’ – a transition that ensures environmental sustainability, decent work, social inclusion and poverty eradication – has started to penetrate debates and research on sustainability policy, particularly in the contexts of climate change and low-carbon energy transition.
  • A just transition framework for the circular economy can identify opportunities that reduce waste and stimulate product innovation, while at the same time contributing positively to sustainable human development. And a just transition is needed to reduce inequalities within and between countries, and to ensure that the commitment of the UN Sustainable Development Goals to leave no one behind is fulfilled.
  • It is important to identify the likely impacts on employment as a result of digitalization and industrial restructuring. Combining circular economy policies with social protection measures will be important in order to ensure that the burden of efforts to promote circularity will not fall on the poor through worsening working conditions and health impacts, reduced livelihoods, or job losses. Identifying potential winners and losers through participatory ‘roadmapping’ can help shape effective cooperation mechanisms and partnerships nationally and internationally.
  • Many low- and middle-income countries that rely heavily on ‘linear’ sectors such as mining, manufacturing of non-repairable fast-moving consumer goods, textiles and agriculture, and the export of these commodities to higher-income countries, are likely to be negatively affected by the shift to circularity. These countries will need support from the international community through targeted assistance programmes if international trade in established commodities and manufactures declines in the medium to long term. 
  • International cooperation to create effective and fair governance mechanisms, and policy coordination at regional, national and local levels will play an important role in shaping a just transition. Multilateral technical assistance programmes will need to be designed and implemented, in particular to support low- and middle-income countries.
  • Governments, international development finance institutions and banks are among the bodies beginning to establish circular economy investment funds and programmes. Just transition principles are yet to be applied to many of these new finance mechanisms, and will need to be integrated into development finance to support the circular economy transition.
  • New international cooperation programmes, and a global mechanism to mobilize dedicated support funds for countries in need, will be critical to successful implementation across global value chains. Transparent and accountable institutions will also be important in ensuring that just transition funds reach those affected as intended.




mo

COP26 Diplomatic Briefing Series: Money Matters: Climate Finance and the COP

Research Event

20 April 2020 - 9:00am to 10:30am

Event participants

Tenzin Wangmo, Lead Negotiator of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Group 
Mattias Frumerie, Director at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Rachel Ward, Programme Director and Head of Policy at the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change
Iseoluwa Akintunde, Mo Ibrahim Academy Fellow at Chatham House
Chair: Kirsty Hamilton, Associate Fellow, Chatham House

Finance plays a key role in enabling climate change mitigation and adaptation. It is also a contested issue in the UN climate negotiations. The fourth event in the Chatham House COP26 Diplomatic Briefing Series will explore the politics of climate finance in the context of the COP, and provide a comprehensive update of the main climate finance-related negotiation items and processes. The topic is particularly timely given that the UK Government has made climate finance one of its top thematic priorities for COP26 and that 2020 constitutes the deadline for developed countries to mobilise USD 100 billion per year to support climate action in developing countries.

Anna Aberg

Research Analyst, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
020 7314 3629




mo

Low molecular weight heparin does not prevent VTE after knee arthroscopy, studies show




mo

Covid-19’s impact on US medical research—shifting money, easing rules




mo

Proline-rich 11 (PRR11) drives F-actin assembly by recruiting the actin-related protein 2/3 complex in human non-small cell lung carcinoma [DNA and Chromosomes]

The actin cytoskeleton is extremely dynamic and supports diverse cellular functions in many physiological and pathological processes, including tumorigenesis. However, the mechanisms that regulate the actin-related protein 2/3 (ARP2/3) complex and thereby promote actin polymerization and organization in cancer cells are not well-understood. We previously implicated the proline-rich 11 (PRR11) protein in lung cancer development. In this study, using immunofluorescence staining, actin polymerization assays, and siRNA-mediated gene silencing, we uncovered that cytoplasmic PRR11 is involved in F-actin polymerization and organization. We found that dysregulation of PRR11 expression results in F-actin rearrangement and nuclear instability in non-small cell lung cancer cells. Results from molecular mechanistic experiments indicated that PRR11 associates with and recruits the ARP2/3 complex, facilitates F-actin polymerization, and thereby disrupts the F-actin cytoskeleton, leading to abnormal nuclear lamina assembly and chromatin reorganization. Inhibition of the ARP2/3 complex activity abolished irregular F-actin polymerization, lamina assembly, and chromatin reorganization due to PRR11 overexpression. Notably, experiments with truncated PRR11 variants revealed that PRR11 regulates F-actin through different regions. We found that deletion of either the N or C terminus of PRR11 abrogates its effects on F-actin polymerization and nuclear instability and that deletion of amino acid residues 100–184 or 100–200 strongly induces an F-actin structure called the actin comet tail, not observed with WT PRR11. Our findings indicate that cytoplasmic PRR11 plays an essential role in regulating F-actin assembly and nuclear stability by recruiting the ARP2/3 complex in human non-small cell lung carcinoma cells.




mo

Single-molecule level structural dynamics of DNA unwinding by human mitochondrial Twinkle helicase [Molecular Biophysics]

Knowledge of the molecular events in mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) replication is crucial to understanding the origins of human disorders arising from mitochondrial dysfunction. Twinkle helicase is an essential component of mtDNA replication. Here, we employed atomic force microscopy imaging in air and liquids to visualize ring assembly, DNA binding, and unwinding activity of individual Twinkle hexamers at the single-molecule level. We observed that the Twinkle subunits self-assemble into hexamers and higher-order complexes that can switch between open and closed-ring configurations in the absence of DNA. Our analyses helped visualize Twinkle loading onto and unloading from DNA in an open-ringed configuration. They also revealed that closed-ring conformers bind and unwind several hundred base pairs of duplex DNA at an average rate of ∼240 bp/min. We found that the addition of mitochondrial single-stranded (ss) DNA–binding protein both influences the ways Twinkle loads onto defined DNA substrates and stabilizes the unwound ssDNA product, resulting in a ∼5-fold stimulation of the apparent DNA-unwinding rate. Mitochondrial ssDNA-binding protein also increased the estimated translocation processivity from 1750 to >9000 bp before helicase disassociation, suggesting that more than half of the mitochondrial genome could be unwound by Twinkle during a single DNA-binding event. The strategies used in this work provide a new platform to examine Twinkle disease variants and the core mtDNA replication machinery. They also offer an enhanced framework to investigate molecular mechanisms underlying deletion and depletion of the mitochondrial genome as observed in mitochondrial diseases.




mo

CRISPR-Cas12a has widespread off-target and dsDNA-nicking effects [DNA and Chromosomes]

Cas12a (Cpf1) is an RNA-guided endonuclease in the bacterial type V-A CRISPR-Cas anti-phage immune system that can be repurposed for genome editing. Cas12a can bind and cut dsDNA targets with high specificity in vivo, making it an ideal candidate for expanding the arsenal of enzymes used in precise genome editing. However, this reported high specificity contradicts Cas12a's natural role as an immune effector against rapidly evolving phages. Here, we employed high-throughput in vitro cleavage assays to determine and compare the native cleavage specificities and activities of three different natural Cas12a orthologs (FnCas12a, LbCas12a, and AsCas12a). Surprisingly, we observed pervasive sequence-specific nicking of randomized target libraries, with strong nicking of DNA sequences containing up to four mismatches in the Cas12a-targeted DNA-RNA hybrid sequences. We also found that these nicking and cleavage activities depend on mismatch type and position and vary with Cas12a ortholog and CRISPR RNA sequence. Our analysis further revealed robust nonspecific nicking of dsDNA when Cas12a is activated by binding to a target DNA. Together, our findings reveal that Cas12a has multiple nicking activities against dsDNA substrates and that these activities vary among different Cas12a orthologs.




mo

Impact of 1,N6-ethenoadenosine, a damaged ribonucleotide in DNA, on translesion synthesis and repair [Enzymology]

Incorporation of ribonucleotides into DNA can severely diminish genome integrity. However, how ribonucleotides instigate DNA damage is poorly understood. In DNA, they can promote replication stress and genomic instability and have been implicated in several diseases. We report here the impact of the ribonucleotide rATP and of its naturally occurring damaged analog 1,N6-ethenoadenosine (1,N6-ϵrA) on translesion synthesis (TLS), mediated by human DNA polymerase η (hpol η), and on RNase H2–mediated incision. Mass spectral analysis revealed that 1,N6-ϵrA in DNA generates extensive frameshifts during TLS, which can lead to genomic instability. Moreover, steady-state kinetic analysis of the TLS process indicated that deoxypurines (i.e. dATP and dGTP) are inserted predominantly opposite 1,N6-ϵrA. We also show that hpol η acts as a reverse transcriptase in the presence of damaged ribonucleotide 1,N6-ϵrA but has poor RNA primer extension activities. Steady-state kinetic analysis of reverse transcription and RNA primer extension showed that hpol η favors the addition of dATP and dGTP opposite 1,N6-ϵrA. We also found that RNase H2 recognizes 1,N6-ϵrA but has limited incision activity across from this lesion, which can lead to the persistence of this detrimental DNA adduct. We conclude that the damaged and unrepaired ribonucleotide 1,N6-ϵrA in DNA exhibits mutagenic potential and can also alter the reading frame in an mRNA transcript because 1,N6-ϵrA is incompletely incised by RNase H2.




mo

Atomic force microscopy-based characterization of the interaction of PriA helicase with stalled DNA replication forks [DNA and Chromosomes]

In bacteria, the restart of stalled DNA replication forks requires the DNA helicase PriA. PriA can recognize and remodel abandoned DNA replication forks, unwind DNA in the 3'-to-5' direction, and facilitate the loading of the helicase DnaB onto the DNA to restart replication. Single-stranded DNA–binding protein (SSB) is typically present at the abandoned forks, but it is unclear how SSB and PriA interact, although it has been shown that the two proteins interact both physically and functionally. Here, we used atomic force microscopy to visualize the interaction of PriA with DNA substrates with or without SSB. These experiments were done in the absence of ATP to delineate the substrate recognition pattern of PriA before its ATP-catalyzed DNA-unwinding reaction. These analyses revealed that in the absence of SSB, PriA binds preferentially to a fork substrate with a gap in the leading strand. Such a preference has not been observed for 5'- and 3'-tailed duplexes, suggesting that it is the fork structure that plays an essential role in PriA's selection of DNA substrates. Furthermore, we found that in the absence of SSB, PriA binds exclusively to the fork regions of the DNA substrates. In contrast, fork-bound SSB loads PriA onto the duplex DNA arms of forks, suggesting a remodeling of PriA by SSB. We also demonstrate that the remodeling of PriA requires a functional C-terminal domain of SSB. In summary, our atomic force microscopy analyses reveal key details in the interactions between PriA and stalled DNA replication forks with or without SSB.




mo

Genetic evidence for reconfiguration of DNA polymerase {theta} active site for error-free translesion synthesis in human cells [DNA and Chromosomes]

The action mechanisms revealed by the biochemical and structural analyses of replicative and translesion synthesis (TLS) DNA polymerases (Pols) are retained in their cellular roles. In this regard, DNA polymerase θ differs from other Pols in that whereas purified Polθ misincorporates an A opposite 1,N6-ethenodeoxyadenosine (ϵdA) using an abasic-like mode, Polθ performs predominantly error-free TLS in human cells. To test the hypothesis that Polθ adopts a different mechanism for replicating through ϵdA in human cells than in the purified Pol, here we analyze the effects of mutations in the two highly conserved tyrosine residues, Tyr-2387 and Tyr-2391, in the Polθ active site. Our findings that these residues are indispensable for TLS by the purified Pol but are not required in human cells, as well as other findings, provide strong evidence that the Polθ active site is reconfigured in human cells to stabilize ϵdA in the syn conformation for Hoogsteen base pairing with the correct nucleotide. The evidence that a DNA polymerase can configure its active site entirely differently in human cells than in the purified Pol establishes a new paradigm for DNA polymerase function.




mo

The histone H4 basic patch regulates SAGA-mediated H2B deubiquitination and histone acetylation [DNA and Chromosomes]

Histone H2B monoubiquitylation (H2Bub1) has central functions in multiple DNA-templated processes, including gene transcription, DNA repair, and replication. H2Bub1 also is required for the trans-histone regulation of H3K4 and H3K79 methylation. Although previous studies have elucidated the basic mechanisms that establish and remove H2Bub1, we have only an incomplete understanding of how H2Bub1 is regulated. We report here that the histone H4 basic patch regulates H2Bub1. Yeast cells with arginine-to-alanine mutations in the H4 basic patch (H42RA) exhibited a significant loss of global H2Bub1. H42RA mutant yeast strains also displayed chemotoxin sensitivities similar to, but less severe than, strains containing a complete loss of H2Bub1. We found that the H4 basic patch regulates H2Bub1 levels independently of interactions with chromatin remodelers and separately from its regulation of H3K79 methylation. To measure H2B ubiquitylation and deubiquitination kinetics in vivo, we used a rapid and reversible optogenetic tool, the light-inducible nuclear exporter, to control the subcellular location of the H2Bub1 E3 ligase, Bre1. The ability of Bre1 to ubiquitylate H2B was unaffected in the H42RA mutant. In contrast, H2Bub1 deubiquitination by SAGA-associated Ubp8, but not by Ubp10, increased in the H42RA mutant. Consistent with a function for the H4 basic patch in regulating SAGA deubiquitinase activity, we also detected increased SAGA-mediated histone acetylation in H4 basic patch mutants. Our findings uncover that the H4 basic patch has a regulatory function in SAGA-mediated histone modifications.




mo

Immigration Data Matters: How to Find the Most Accurate Resources

With immigration increasingly visible in the news and the political space in the United States and internationally, getting access to accurate, high-quality data is essential to understand immigration’s demographic effects and impacts on the economy, education and labor systems, and communities. This event marks the release of the Immigration Data Matters guide.




mo

A Narrower Path in the House for Most DREAMers

In exchange for resolving the status of DREAMers, the White House and its congressional allies are demanding billions of dollars for a border wall and additional enforcement, sharp limits on asylum, cuts to legal immigration, and more. But what would the two bills expected to be voted on by the House do in terms of extending temporary or permanent status to DREAMers? This commentary offers estimates.




mo

Doctors as Taxi Drivers: The Costs of Brain Waste among Highly Skilled Immigrants in the United States

A report release and presentation of first-ever U.S. estimates on the actual economic costs of skill underutilization for immigrants, their families, and the U.S. economy, in terms of forgone earnings and unrealized federal, state, and local taxes.




mo

Millionaire Emigration: The Allure of Investor Visas among China’s Elite

Over the past decade, immigrant investor programs have proliferated around the world, and Chinese applicants have dominated in a number of countries. In 2015, about 9,000 Chinese millionaires moved to other countries, many through so-called golden visa programs. This article explores the social and cultural factors driving well-off Chinese to move abroad and examines perceptions of elite emigration in China.




mo

Immigration Data Matters: How to Find the Most Accurate Resources

At this release of an updated version of the popular Immigration Data Matters guide, presenters discuss how to navigate and access the increasing number of data sources on immigration and immigrants in the United States and internationally. 




mo

E Pluribus Unum Prizes Panel Discussions and Awards Ceremony

This awards ceremony, honoring the 2011 recipients of the E Pluribus Unum Prizes — a national awards program for exceptional immigrant integration initiatives — featured panel discussions with the awardees and federal officials and remarks by White House Director of Intergovernmental Affairs Cecilia Muñoz and Assistant Secretary of Education Brenda Dann-Messier.




mo

E Pluribus Unum Prizes Panel Discussions and Awards Ceremony

This awards ceremony, honoring the 2011 recipients of the E Pluribus Unum Prizes -- a national awards program for exceptional immigrant integration initiatives -- featured panel discussions with the awardees and federal officials and remarks by White House Director of Intergovernmental Affairs Cecilia Muñoz and Assistant Secretary of Education Brenda Dann-Messier.




mo

2013 E Pluribus Unum Prizes Awards Ceremony

This awards ceremony honored the 2013 winners of the E Pluribus Unum Prizes, which provides $50,000 prizes to exceptional U.S. immigrant integration initiatives. The awardees took part in a panel discussion with White House and state officials, followed by remarks from Congressman Luis Gutierrez and U.S. Senator Amy Klobuchar.




mo

Immigrants and WIOA Services: Comparison of Sociodemographic Characteristics of Native- and Foreign-Born Adults in the United States

As federal and state governments ramp up efforts to implement the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, these fact sheets compare key characteristics of the foreign born and the U.S. born that are relevant to understanding needs for adult education and workforce training services. The fact sheets cover the United States, the 20 states and 25 counties with the largest immigrant populations, and New York City.




mo

Dual Language Learners: A National Demographic and Policy Profile

As the share of U.S. children under age 8 who are Dual Language Learners (DLLs) increases, state policies have an important role to play in ensuring all young learners are able to get their education off to a good start. These fact sheets compare key characteristics of DLLs and their peers nationwide and in 30 states, and identify state policies that support equitable access to high-quality early childhood education and care programs.




mo

English Learners in Select States: Demographics, Outcomes, and State Accountability Policies

States are in the midst of designing new policies to hold schools accountable for the education of English Learner (EL) students, as mandated by the federal Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA). This series of fact sheets sketches the characteristics of immigrant and EL students in 25 states, the gaps between their educational outcomes and those of their peers, and the accountability policies each state is developing.




mo

A Growing Destination for Sub-Saharan Africans, Morocco Wrestles with Immigrant Integration

Long a country of emigration and a springboard for migrants aiming to reach Europe, Morocco has emerged as a destination for many sub-Saharan Africans. As more migrants remain in Morocco, the kingdom has implemented policies to aid with integration. But challenges remain, with most of the estimated 700,000 sub-Saharan Africans living in precarious conditions and irregular status despite some legalization programs.




mo

On the Brink of Demographic Crisis, Governments in East Asia Turn Slowly to Immigration

With many countries in East Asia facing unfavorable demographic shifts in the form of aging populations, low fertility, and shrinking workforces, governments in 2016 continued to explore immigration as a potential policy solution. However, a tradition of cultural homogeneity and wariness among publics about increased immigration is leading policymakers to test the waters with very small steps.




mo

Moving Beyond “Root Causes:” The Complicated Relationship between Development and Migration

Development assistance may be a blunt tool for reshaping migration patterns—and indeed one that could increase flows over the short term. Shifting the focus away from increasing individuals’ skills and assets toward investments in the broader economic or governance structures that are a prerequisite for growth and stability may offer more alternatives to emigration in the long run.




mo

A Once-Smooth Path for the Global Compact on Migration Becomes Rocky

The world’s first international agreement on migration was approved by 164 countries in December 2018, but not without turbulence. U.S. withdrawal from the nonbinding Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, on grounds it could impinge on sovereignty, triggered similar actions by others, particularly in Eastern Europe. Amid ongoing political ripple effects, attention now turns to implementation of the deal's goals.




mo

Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Migration History Marked by Crises and Restrictions

One of the least developed countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has experienced significant migration outflows and inflows tied to political and economic crises in recent decades. While most Congolese migrants head to neighboring countries, destinations have diversified, with an uptick in those leaving for opportunities in Europe and beyond. This country profile explores historical and contemporary patterns of migration to and from DR Congo.




mo

As Colombia Emerges from Decades of War, Migration Challenges Mount

Colombia has more internally displaced persons (IDPs) than any other country in the world, the result of a 52-year civil war. Beyond improving the lives of its 7.3 million IDPs, the country faces a number of crucial migration issues as it works to achieve stability in the wake of an historic peace accord signed in late 2016. This country profile examines historical trends and current and future migration challenges in Colombia.




mo

Afghanistan: Displacement Challenges in a Country on the Move

Nearly 6 million Afghans fled after violence erupted in the late 1970s, primarily to Iran and Pakistan. While millions returned after the collapse of the Taliban in 2001, the security situation has since deteriorated and the government struggles to meet the needs of vulnerable populations, particularly the internally displaced. This country profile explores Afghanistan’s complex migration and displacement history as well as ongoing challenges.




mo

No Retreat: Climate Change and Voluntary Immobility in the Pacific Islands

While media and academic discussions of "climate refugees" paint a picture of mass displacement of millions, in reality many communities vulnerable to climate change may choose to stay as a result of strong cultural, historical, and spiritual attachments to place. This article explores this "voluntary immobility" and its implications in the Pacific Islands.




mo

Color Boost: How Vivid Hues in Your Home Can Lift Your Mood

Source:

How do colors make us feel? This question has guided color specialist Leatrice Eiseman since childhood. As the executive director of the Pantone Color Institute, she leads color trends and forecasts as well as the decision-making behind the company's annual "Color of the Year" (the choice for 2020, Classic Blue, is proving to be an apt calming color for an already anxious year).






mo

Research Uses Artificial Intelligence to Measure Human Emotions

Source:

New research presented online at the Cognitive Neuroscience Society annual meeting shows how data-driven computational methods are being used to understand and detect emotions. Investigators believe their findings have the potential to overturn old ideas about the structure of emotions across humanity.






mo

After 6 More Months, 31 Million New Domestic Violence Cases, Warns U.N.

Source:

Women and children are experiencing unprecedented levels of abuse and violence at home as stress and anxiety continue to mount due to the pandemic. Data from the United Nations reveal a 600% increase in the number women who have experienced partner violence, and projections suggest that if coronavirus lockdowns continue for six more months, there will be an estimated 31 million additional domestic violence cases around the world.






mo

Emigration Trends and Policies in China: Movement of the Wealthy and Highly Skilled

This report analyzes the evolution of Chinese emigration from the 1970s, when market-oriented reforms began reducing barriers to movement beyond the country's borders, to the present day. High-skilled and high-value emigration is rising fast. Despite liberalized exit controls, low-skilled labor migration is stagnant as a result of complicated and expensive recruitment procedures.




mo

Achieving Skill Mobility in the ASEAN Economic Community: Challenges, Opportunities, and Policy Implications

This report by MPI and the Asian Development Bank lays out a realistic roadmap toward freer movement among skilled professionals within the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), encouraging cooperation among ASEAN Member States in recognizing foreign qualifications and making government investments in training and educations systems that prepare workers in accordance with common standards.




mo

Building Skills in North and Central America: Barriers and Policy Options toward Harmonizing Qualifications in Nursing

Amid aging populations and the growth of chronic diseases, the demand for skilled health-care professionals is on the rise in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. This report explores the policy implications, benefits, and challenges of harmonizing nursing qualifications in the region, suggesting that a more collaborative approach could result in greater supply and quality of nurses.




mo

Smartphone-Based Glucose Monitors and Applications in the Management of Diabetes: An Overview of 10 Salient "Apps" and a Novel Smartphone-Connected Blood Glucose Monitor

Joseph Tran
Oct 1, 2012; 30:173-178
Practical Pointers




mo

Self-Monitoring of Blood Glucose: The Basics

Evan M. Benjamin
Jan 1, 2002; 20:
Practical Pointers




mo

Mortality Implications of Prediabetes and Diabetes in Older Adults

OBJECTIVE

Diabetes in older age is heterogeneous, and the treatment approach varies by patient characteristics. We characterized the short-term all-cause and cardiovascular mortality risk associated with hyperglycemia in older age.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

We included 5,791 older adults in the Atherosclerosis Risk in Communities Study who attended visit 5 (2011–2013; ages 66–90 years). We compared prediabetes (HbA1c 5.7% to <6.5%), newly diagnosed diabetes (HbA1c ≥6.5%, prior diagnosis <1 year, or taking antihyperglycemic medications <1 year), short-duration diabetes (duration ≥1 year but <10 years [median]), and long-standing diabetes (duration ≥10 years). Outcomes were all-cause and cardiovascular mortality (median follow-up of 5.6 years).

RESULTS

Participants were 58% female, and 24% had prevalent cardiovascular disease. All-cause mortality rates, per 1,000 person-years, were 21.2 (95% CI 18.7, 24.1) among those without diabetes, 23.7 (95% CI 20.8, 27.1) for those with prediabetes, 33.8 (95% CI 25.2, 45.5) among those with recently diagnosed diabetes, 29.6 (95% CI 25.0, 35.1) for those with diabetes of short duration, and 48.6 (95% CI 42.4, 55.7) for those with long-standing diabetes. Cardiovascular mortality rates, per 1,000 person-years, were 5.8 (95% CI 4.6, 7.4) among those without diabetes, 6.6 (95% CI 5.2, 8.5) for those with prediabetes, 11.5 (95% CI 7.0, 19.1) among those with recently diagnosed diabetes, 8.2 (95% CI 5.9, 11.3) for those with diabetes of short duration, and 17.3 (95% CI 13.8, 21.7) for those with long-standing diabetes. After adjustment for other cardiovascular risk factors, prediabetes and newly diagnosed diabetes were not significantly associated with a higher risk of all-cause mortality (hazard ratio [HR] 1.03 [95% CI 0.85, 1.23] and HR 1.31 [95% CI 0.94, 1.82], respectively) or cardiovascular mortality (HR 1.00 [95% CI 0.70, 1.43] and HR 1.35 [95% CI 0.74, 2.49], respectively). Excess mortality risk was primarily concentrated among those with long-standing diabetes (all-cause: HR 1.71 [95% CI 1.40, 2.10]; cardiovascular: HR 1.72 [95% CI 1.18, 2.51]).

CONCLUSIONS

In older adults, long-standing diabetes has a substantial and independent effect on short-term mortality. Older individuals with prediabetes remained at low mortality risk over a median 5.6 years of follow-up.




mo

Within-Trial Evaluation of Medical Resources, Costs, and Quality of Life Among Patients With Type 2 Diabetes Participating in the Exenatide Study of Cardiovascular Event Lowering (EXSCEL)

OBJECTIVE

To compare medical resource use, costs, and health utilities for 14,752 patients with type 2 diabetes who were randomized to once-weekly exenatide (EQW) or placebo in addition to usual diabetes care in the Exenatide Study of Cardiovascular Event Lowering (EXSCEL).

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

Medical resource use data and responses to the EuroQol 5-Dimension (EQ-5D) instrument were collected at baseline and throughout the trial. Medical resources and medications were assigned values by using U.S. Medicare payments and wholesale acquisition costs, respectively. Secondary analyses used English costs.

RESULTS

Patients were followed for an average of 3.3 years, during which time those randomized to EQW experienced 0.41 fewer inpatient days (7.05 vs. 7.46 days; relative rate ratio 0.91; P = 0.05). Rates of outpatient medical visits were similar, as were total inpatient and outpatient costs. Mean costs for nonstudy diabetes medications over the study period were ~$1,600 lower with EQW than with placebo (P = 0.01). Total within-study costs, excluding study medication, were lower in the EQW arm than in the placebo arm ($28,907 vs. $30,914; P ≤ 0.01). When including the estimated cost of EQW, total mean costs were significantly higher in the EQW group than in the placebo group ($42,697 vs. $30,914; P < 0.01). With English costs applied, mean total costs, including exenatide costs, were £1,670 higher in the EQW group than the placebo group (£10,874 vs. £9,204; P < 0.01). There were no significant differences in EQ-5D health utilities between arms over time.

CONCLUSIONS

Medical costs were lower in the EQW arm than the placebo arm, but total costs were significantly higher once the cost of branded exenatide was incorporated.




mo

Plasma Lipidome and Prediction of Type 2 Diabetes in the Population-Based Malmo&#x0308; Diet and Cancer Cohort

OBJECTIVE

Type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM) is associated with dyslipidemia, but the detailed alterations in lipid species preceding the disease are largely unknown. We aimed to identify plasma lipids associated with development of T2DM and investigate their associations with lifestyle.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

At baseline, 178 lipids were measured by mass spectrometry in 3,668 participants without diabetes from the Malmö Diet and Cancer Study. The population was randomly split into discovery (n = 1,868, including 257 incident cases) and replication (n = 1,800, including 249 incident cases) sets. We used orthogonal projections to latent structures discriminant analyses, extracted a predictive component for T2DM incidence (lipid-PCDM), and assessed its association with T2DM incidence using Cox regression and lifestyle factors using general linear models.

RESULTS

A T2DM-predictive lipid-PCDM derived from the discovery set was independently associated with T2DM incidence in the replication set, with hazard ratio (HR) among subjects in the fifth versus first quintile of lipid-PCDM of 3.7 (95% CI 2.2–6.5). In comparison, the HR of T2DM among obese versus normal weight subjects was 1.8 (95% CI 1.2–2.6). Clinical lipids did not improve T2DM risk prediction, but adding the lipid-PCDM to all conventional T2DM risk factors increased the area under the receiver operating characteristics curve by 3%. The lipid-PCDM was also associated with a dietary risk score for T2DM incidence and lower level of physical activity.

CONCLUSIONS

A lifestyle-related lipidomic profile strongly predicts T2DM development beyond current risk factors. Further studies are warranted to test if lifestyle interventions modifying this lipidomic profile can prevent T2DM.




mo

Clinical Outcomes in Patients With Isolated or Combined Diabetic Ketoacidosis and Hyperosmolar Hyperglycemic State: A Retrospective, Hospital-Based Cohort Study

OBJECTIVE

Many patients with hyperglycemic crises present with combined features of diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA) and hyperosmolar hyperglycemic state (HHS). The implications of concomitant acidosis and hyperosmolality are not well known. We investigated hospital outcomes in patients with isolated or combined hyperglycemic crises.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

We analyzed admissions data listing DKA or HHS at two academic hospitals. We determined 1) the frequency distributions of HHS, DKA, and combined DKA-HHS (DKA criteria plus elevated effective osmolality); 2) the relationship of markers of severity of illness and clinical comorbidities with 30-day all-cause mortality; and 3) the relationship of hospital complications associated with insulin therapy (hypoglycemia and hypokalemia) with mortality.

RESULTS

There were 1,211 patients who had a first admission with confirmed hyperglycemic crises criteria, 465 (38%) who had isolated DKA, 421 (35%) who had isolated HHS, and 325 (27%) who had combined features of DKA-HHS. After adjustment for age, sex, BMI, race, and Charlson Comorbidity Index score, subjects with combined DKA-HHS had higher in-hospital mortality compared with subjects with isolated hyperglycemic crises (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] 2.7; 95% CI 1.4, 4.9; P = 0.0019). In all groups, hypoglycemia (<40 mg/dL) during treatment was associated with a 4.8-fold increase in mortality (aOR 4.8; 95% CI 1.4, 16.8). Hypokalemia ≤3.5 mEq/L was frequent (55%). Severe hypokalemia (≤2.5 mEq/L) was associated with increased inpatient mortality (aOR 4.9; 95% CI 1.3, 18.8; P = 0.02).

CONCLUSIONS

Combined DKA-HHS is associated with higher mortality compared with isolated DKA or HHS. Severe hypokalemia and severe hypoglycemia are associated with higher hospital mortality in patients with hyperglycemic crises.