President Obama arrived in Panama for the seventh Summit of the Americas with a clear mission: restore the feel-good atmosphere of his first regional summit in Trinidad. There he received plaudits as the first African-American president, a post-unilateralist leader for a more multipolar world. Six years later, and with a complicated record to defend, he had to work harder for the ovations. But his administration’s efforts paid off, and he left Panama a winner. The President’s decision to remove Cuba from the dreaded U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism is further demonstration that Obama is convinced that U.S. interests in Cuba are best served through constructive engagement and not onerous sanctions. Now he must persuade Congress.

First and foremost, the Panama Summit will be remembered for cementing the historic process of normalization of ties between the United States and Cuba launched by Presidents Obama and Raúl Castro on December 17. The Panama meeting offered a chance not only for the rest of the region to ratify Obama’s overture to Castro, but to close the books on the Cold War and open a new chapter in inter-American relations. Bill Clinton led the way on this track in the 1990s, but the train got derailed in the 2000s under George W. Bush. The ghosts of Washington’s heavy-handed past, on matters such as the war on drugs, immigration, counter-terrorism, and the hangover of the “Washington consensus,” returned to haunt Obama’s second summit in Cartagena in 2012. The White House was determined to re-set course before sitting through another series of harangues against the sins of the past by delivering important progress on several policy fronts in the months leading up to Panama. 

No issue was more representative of U.S. bullying in the region than the decades-old embargo against Cuba. When the region’s presidents said they would not come to Panama unless Cuba was invited as a full participant, the White House was forced to fish or cut bait. Correctly, President Obama chose to fish. The breakthrough of December 17 was rewarded with widespread praise by his counterparts and by publics in both the United States and Cuba. The president’s main task for Panama, then, was to deliver a winning message for the first face-to-face meeting in over five decades of hostilities.

Source: REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

No image better captures the competing narratives of the deep historical differences between the United States and Cuba than the one above. The elder Raúl Castro, who does not have to worry about his state-controlled media, plugs his ears to drown out the clamor of journalists asking questions after the two leaders’ first meeting, while the younger Obama is ready to engage the press, a customary stance for leaders in a democracy.

The contrast between old and new continued in the plenary where Obama gave a focused presentation  about moving beyond “the old grievances that had too often trapped us in the past” to a future based on shared responsibility and mutual respect. “We’re looking to the future and to policies that improve the lives of the Cuban people.”

Castro, on the other hand, multiplied his allotted eight minutes of remarks to 48 (to make up for the six summits Cuba was not invited to, he joked) to recount a long litany of transgressions by previous U.S. governments dating back to 1800. He reminded the audience of Washington’s overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Guatemala in 1954 as the precursor to Cuba’s own popular revolution and invoked his brother Fidel in blaming global poverty on the aggressions of colonial and imperialist powers. Remarkably, however, Castro specifically absolved President Obama from any responsibility for such actions, an important gesture that opens the door for more progress. “President Obama is an honest man…I admire his humble origins,” Castro said, and urged others to support his efforts to eliminate the embargo. Castro also said Cuba was prepared to work with the United States on such issues as climate change, terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and poverty eradication.

With the removal of Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the last-minute softening of U.S. rhetoric toward Cuba’s chief ally, Venezuela, the Americas may be entering an unprecedented era of peace and cooperation. That leaves respect for democracy and human rights as the chief area of conflict between the United States and Cuba (and a few other countries).

Here again, the contrast between the behavior of pro- and anti-government Cuban activists emerged in sharp relief in Panama. Highly aggressive actions by “official” Cuban nongovernmental organizationss against dissidents from Cuba and Miami, including physical and verbal insults and attacks, were completely out of tune with the modern era of inclusion and respect of independent civil society voices at such meetings. Their orchestrated disruptions of what should have been a robust but civil debate laid bare the real threat Cuba’s rulers face—from its own public tired of the regime’s broken economic system and closed politics—and the heavy challenge they face in opening economically while maintaining political control. President Obama spoke to this issue when he told the press: “On Cuba, we are not in the business of regime change. We are in the business of making sure the Cuban people have freedom and the ability to…shape their own destiny.” The primary way to do this, Obama added, is through “persuasion” and not sanctions. Cuba’s behavior “does not implicate our national security in a direct way,” foreshadowing this week’s decision to de-list Cuba from the terrorism sponsor category.

Cuban officials claim they are practicing a form of popular democracy that is just as legitimate as representative democracy. But few honestly believe this can be squared with core universal norms like free speech and association. For his part, Castro acknowledged that “[w]e could be persuaded of some things; of others we might not be persuaded.” Patience, he added, is needed, signaling yet again that progress toward normalizing relations will be slow. He then proceeded to instruct his closest assistants to “follow the instructions of both Presidents,” a telling reminder of the continued resistance to change from his own bureaucracy. Obama will now have to persuade his colleagues in Congress that Cuba is no longer the threat it was in the past.

Editors’ Note: We need to do better with the long-term instruments of counterterrorism, write Raymond Odierno and Michael O’Hanlon. That includes efforts within our own societies to promote social cohesion. This article originally appeared on USA Today.

In the aftermath of the Brussels tragedy, many good ideas are being floated to improve defenses against terrorists who are poised to strike. Belgium needs more resources for police work, including staking out suspects. Europe needs terrorist watch lists that are better automated and integrated. Police forces and national intelligence agencies need to work together more effectively, readjusting the point at which traditional police work ends and counterterrorism raids begin. We need to use technology such as closed-circuit TV, as well as simpler but time-tested methods like bomb-smelling dogs, more effectively in unhardened public places like subway stops and the external lobbies of airports.

The above are immediate and short-term measures. They are crucial. They are also insufficient. We need to continue to go after Islamic State's finances, too, leading a worldwide effort to restrict its sources of revenue and ability to store and move funds around. Beyond these actions, we need to do better with the long-term instruments of counterterrorism. These include the use of social media and other counter-messaging against the so-called caliphate. But they also include efforts within our own societies and especially those in Europe to promote social cohesion. Within many countries the inability to develop programs encouraging assimilation of immigrants, and of the home-born disaffected, has led to substantial pockets of disenfranchised citizens, a large majority being Muslim.

At least on issues concerning Muslim-majority communities, the United States can help point the way. We are fortunate, largely to the credit of our nation's Muslims who join our society in full and pursue the American dream, to have relatively few problems with Islamist extremism. Of course, there are exceptions, but on the whole, Muslim-American communities are our single greatest domestic allies in the struggle against extremism at home. They help provide information on would-be terrorists in their midst; they do not typically shelter, aid or condone the thinking of such extremists. Most of all, acting as loyal citizens, they provide role models and hopeful visions to their young, reducing the odds that the 20-somethings who seem to wind up the main culprits in most attacks abroad will feel the same urge within the United States. Because our own terror watch lists have gotten better since 9/11, and because of the hard work of border and immigration agencies, we are also often able to limit the movements of suspected terrorists to the United States from abroad.

None of this is to sound complacent. More than 70 individuals were arrested on American soil last year on suspicion of interest in supporting Islamic State or otherwise conducting extremist activity, and we suffered the San Bernardino tragedy.

Beyond matters of culture and assimilation, specific programs here contribute as well. In Montgomery County, Maryland, a coalition of faith leaders, school officials and law enforcement officers collaborate to try to identify and help would-be radicals before they turn to dangerous ways. In Ohio, fire departments try to reach into difficult neighborhoods and recruit workers. They recognize that their role in society can be less polarizing to some disaffected than would, say, certain types of police outreach, but that by extending the presence of the government into places where it is not always welcome, they can tamp down the temptations of some to turn to violence.

Many places in Britain are doing the same thing. Britain is a sort of bridge to Europe on this issue, like on many others—not having the apparent problems of say Molenbeek, the enclave in Brussels from which recent attackers have originated, but also having more concentrations of recent immigrants from the Middle East than does the United States. Aware of this situation, British authorities also try to extend the state's connections with shaky neighborhoods in ways that seek to engender trust in the state and better community rapport. Sometimes this can rely on police, who in the United Kingdom are usually unarmed. However, at other times, less traditional instruments, or less potentially imposing symbols of state authority, can be better. Again, fire departments come to mind, as do work programs that foster a sense of community involvement and cohesion (while also providing a paycheck). Sometimes armies can help, depending on their roles and reputations in given societies. Any of these can improve the government's image in key neighborhoods, while also helping create the kinds of communications between community leaders and authorities that produce intelligence leads when things start to go off the tracks.

U.S. presidential candidates are not talking much about these kinds of issues. But efforts to build social cohesion are not at odds with what some of them are advocating in response to Brussels. Greater police presence in jurisdictions like Molenbeek, intelligence surges and reforms, and also stronger actions against Islamic State in the Middle East and beyond are needed, to be sure. But such measures are not, in themselves, adequate.

Building social cohesion is difficult, of course, and often the strides forward are slow to come and hard to measure. It usually must happen at the city level. It is usually manpower-intensive work. It is always painstaking. Sometimes, of course, it simply fails. But without a reinvigorated emphasis on building social cohesion, in which cities and other jurisdictions learn from each other and share best practices to tie their communities more strongly together, we will not succeed in this crucial challenge of our times.

In the face of seemingly weekly terrorist attacks and reports that Islamic State affiliates are growing in number, political leaders are under pressure to take tougher action against ISIS and other violent extremist threats. Removing terrorists from the battlefield and from streets remains critical—President Obama announced last week that the United States will send 250 more special operations forces to Syria, for one, and other military, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts will be important. According to one assessment, the United States has spent $6.4 billion on counter-ISIS military operations since August 2014, with an average daily cost of $11.5 million. As a result of these and related efforts, the territory the Islamic State controls has been diminished and its leadership and resources degraded.

The more challenging task, however, may be preventing individuals from joining the Islamic State or future groups in the first place and developing, harnessing, and resourcing a set of tools to achieve this objective. Violent extremism is most likely to take root when communities do not challenge those who seek to radicalize others and can’t offer positive alternatives. Prevention is thus most effectively addressed by the communities themselves—mayors, teachers, social workers, youth, women, religious leaders, and mental health professionals—not national security professionals, let alone national governments. But it’s easier said than done for national governments to empower, train, and resource those communities. 

Political leaders around the globe are increasingly highlighting community engagement and the role of communities more broadly in a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. States, however, continue to struggle with how to operationalize and sustain these elements of the strategy. 

Show us the money

First, there is the funding shortfall. Too many national governments continue not to provide local governments and communities with the resources needed to develop tailored community engagement programs to identify early signs of and prevent radicalization to violence. To take just one example of the disparity, the $11.5 million per day the United States spends on its military presence in Iraq is more than the $10 million the Department of Homeland Security was given this year to support grassroots countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts in the United States, and nearly twice as much as the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism received this year to support civil society-led CVE initiatives across the entire globe. Although a growing number of countries are developing national CVE action plans that include roles for local leaders and communities, funding for implementation continues to fall short. Norway and Finland are two notable examples, and the situation in Belgium was well-documented following the March attacks in Brussels.

Prevention is thus most effectively addressed by the communities themselves...not national security professionals, let alone national governments.

At the international level, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF)—established in 2014 and modeled on the Global AIDS Fund to enable governments and private entities to support grassroots work to build resilience against violent extremism—has struggled to find adequate funding. GCERF offers a reliable and transparent mechanism to give grants and mentoring to small NGOs without the taint of government funding. Yet, despite the fact that “CVE” has risen to near the top of the global agenda, GCERF has only been able raise some $25 million from 12 donors—none from the private sector—since its September 2014 launch. This includes only $300,000 for a “rapid response fund” to support grassroots projects linked to stemming the flow of fighters to Iraq and Syria—presumably a high priority for the more than 90 countries that have seen their citizens travel to the conflict zone. The GCERF Board just approved more than half of the $25 million to support local projects in communities in the first three pilot countries—Bangladesh, Mali, and Nigeria. GCERF’s global ambitions, let alone its ability to provide funds to help sustain the projects in the three pilots or to support work in the next tranche of countries (Burma, Kenya, and Kosovo) are in jeopardy unless donors pony up more resources to support the kind approach—involving governments, civil society, and the private sector—that is likely needed to make progress on prevention over the long-term.

Go grassroots

Second, national governments struggle with how best to involve cities and local communities. Governments still have a traditional view of national security emanating from the capital. Although a growing number of governments are encouraging, and in some cases providing, some resources to support city- or community-led CVE programs, they have generally been reluctant to really bring sub-national actors into conversations about how to address security challenges. Some capitals, primarily in Western Europe, have created national-level CVE task forces with a wide range of voices. Others, like the United States, have stuck with a model that is limited to national government—and primarily law enforcement—agencies, thus complicating efforts to involve and build durable partnerships with the local actors, whether mayors, community leaders, social workers, or mental health officials, that are so critical to prevention efforts. 

Some members of the target communities remain skeptical of government-led CVE initiatives, sometimes believing them to be a ruse for intelligence gathering or having the effect of stigmatizing and stereotyping certain communities. As debates around the FBI’s Shared Responsibilities Committees show, there are high levels of mistrust between the government—particularly law enforcement—and local communities. This can complicate efforts to roll out even well-intentioned government-led programs aimed at involving community actors in efforts to prevent young people from joining the Islamic State. The trouble is, communities are largely dependent on government support for training and programming in this area (with a few exceptions). 

To their credit, governments increasingly recognize that they—particularly at the national level—are not the most credible CVE actors, whether on- or off-line, within the often marginalized communities they are trying to reach. They’re placing greater emphasis on identifying and supporting more credible local partners, instead, and trying to get out of the way. 

Invest now, see dividends later

On the positive side of the ledger, even with the limited resources available, new (albeit small-scale) grassroots initiatives have been developed in cities ranging from Mombasa to Maiduguri and Denver to Dakar. These are aimed at building trust between local police and marginalized groups, creating positive alternatives for youth who are being targeted by terrorist propaganda, or otherwise building the resilience of the community to resist the siren call of violent extremism. 

Perhaps even more promising, new prevention-focused CVE networks designed to connect and empower sub-national actors—often with funds, but not instructions, from Western donors—are now in place. These platforms can pool limited resources and focus on connecting and training the growing number of young people and women working in this area; the local researchers focused on understanding local drivers of violent extremism and what has worked to stem its tide in particular communities; and mayors across the world who will gather next month for the first global Strong Cities Network summit. Much like GCERF, these new platforms will require long-term funding—ideally from governments, foundations, and the private sector—to survive and deliver on their potential. 

Somewhat paradoxically, while the United States (working closely with allies) has been at the forefront of efforts to develop and resource these platforms overseas and to recognize the limits of a top-down approach driven by national governments, similar innovations have yet to take root at home. More funding and innovation, both home and abroad, can make a huge difference. For example, it could lead to more community-led counter-narrative, skills-building, or counselling programs for young people at risk of joining the Islamic State. It could also help build trust between local police and the communities they are meant to serve, lead to more training of mainstream religious leaders on how to use social media to reach marginalized youth, as well as empower young filmmakers to engage their peers about the dangers of violent extremism. And national prevention networks that aren’t limited to just government officials can help support and mentor communities looking to develop prevention or intervention programs that take local sensitivities into account. Without this kind of rigorous effort, the large sums spent on defeating terrorism will not pay the dividends that are badly needed. 

My partner was caught at the Istanbul airport during the latest terrorist attack. She hid in a closet with a few people, including a small girl, disconcerted and afraid. And when the attack was over, she saw the blood, desolation, chaos, and tears of the aftermath. This was a horrific moment. Yet, it paled in comparison to what the injured and dead and their relatives had to suffer.

It seems that terrorism and political violence are becoming more prevalent and intense. They have been, however, long brewing and have affected many countries around the world. In the 1980s, my home country, Peru, suffered immensely from terrorism: The badly called “Shining Path” organization, with its communist ideology and ruthless tactics, terrorized first rural communities and then large cities with deadly bombs in crowded places and assassinations of official and civil society leaders.

A few years ago, Phil Keefer, lead economist at the World Bank, and I edited two books on what we perceived to be the main security threats of our time: terrorism and drug trafficking. We thought that the answers had to come from research, and we tried to gather the best available evidence and arguments to understand the links between these security threats and economic development.

After the myriad of recent terrorist attacks—in Istanbul, Munich, Nice, Bagdad, Brussels, and Paris, to name a few—we found it important to recap lessons learned. These lessons are not just academic: Understanding the root causes of terrorism can lead to policies for prevention and for reducing the severity of attacks. To defeat terrorism, a policy strategy should include three components: intelligence, integration, and development.

Intelligence. A terrorist attack is relatively easy to conduct. Modern societies offer many exposed and vulnerable targets: an airport, a crowded celebration by the beach, a bus station at peak hours, or a restaurant full of expats. And the potential weapons are too many to count: a squadron of suicide bombers, a big truck ramming through the streets, two or three comrades armed with semi-automatic guns. It is impossible to protect all flanks, and some of the measures taken to prevent the previous terrorist attacks are, well, frankly silly. For a strategy to have any chance against terrorism, it should be based on intelligence. Intelligence implies understanding the motivations, leadership structure, and modus operandi of terrorist organizations, and developing a plan that can anticipate and adapt to their constantly morphing operations. Importantly, the ideological dimension should not be ignored because it explains the extremes to which terrorists are willing to arrive: A suicide attack requires a person who has muted both his basic survival instinct and all sense of natural compassion for others. It was radical communism in the 1970s and 1980s; it is a perverted and fanatical misrepresentation of Islam nowadays. An intelligence strategy that targets the sources of terrorism, both the perpetrators and the social movements that underlie them, should be the first component of the campaign against terror.

Integration. Foreigners living in the U.S. like to make fun of Hollywood movies and the social rituals that Americans go through each year: Halloween and Thanksgiving are in many respects more popular than Christmas. Yet, thanks to these cultural norms along with widespread economic opportunities and equality under the law, the U.S. has mostly succeeded in what many countries, including some European ones, have failed: the integration of people of different ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. The U.S. is no paradise of integration, but the social melting pot does work for immigrants: Within a generation or two, Mexican Americans, Italian Americans, Iranian Americans, and so forth are just Americans, with a single national identity and, at least by law, the same rights and obligations. In some European countries, in contrast, many immigrants feel like second-class citizens. There is little that can inflame more hatred than the feeling of being excluded, and a misguided search for a sense of belonging can be the trigger that incites religious, ethnic, and ideological radicalization. This may explain why France has suffered more from terrorist acts perpetrated by their own residents than the U.S. or U.K., that paradoxically are substantially more engaged in the war against ISIS and al-Qaeda. Social integration—especially of immigrants—through explicit and targeted programs from education at an early age to immigration and citizenship reforms is a key component in the fight against terrorism.       

Development. One of the puzzles in the evidence on terrorism is that while it tends to be led (and sometimes even perpetrated) by well-off and educated people, it represents the complaints and grievances of the disenfranchised, the poor, and the unemployed. The hundreds of thousands of unemployed and discouraged young men in places as diverse as Afghanistan, Somalia, South Africa, and Brazil are the potential armies of common and political violence. In South Africa and Brazil, lacking an overriding communal ideology, this violence is expressed in robberies, homicides, and common crime. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the violence is mostly political, taking the shape or at least the cover of religious fundamentalism. Somehow in Somalia, violence has adopted both criminal and political expressions: We worry about Somali pirates as much as we do about Somali jihadists. (On the link between vulnerable youth and violence, it is telling that the name of the main terrorist organization in Somalia, al-Shabaab, means literally “The Youth”) But there is hope. A couple of decades ago, thousands of unemployed young people joined terrorist organizations in Cambodia, Colombia, and Peru, when these countries were fragile. Since their economies started growing and providing employment, these armies for criminal and political violence have started to fade away. Investing in development, conducting economic reforms, and providing (yes, equal) opportunities is the third component of a winning strategy against terrorism.

A sound military and police strategy is undoubtedly important to counter terrorism. However, it’s not sufficient in the long run. If we want to defeat terrorism permanently and completely, we need to tackle it comprehensively, using political and military intelligence, social integration, and economic development.

For more, please see Keefer, Philip and Norman Loayza, Editors. Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness. Cambridge University Press. 2008.

Event Information

Welcome and Introduction:
Philip H. Gordon , Director, Center on the United States and Europe

Is the European Union Failing? Politics and Policy after the Referendums
Philip H. Gordon , Director, Center on the United States and Europe

Panelists:
Gerard Baker, The Times (London)
Joschka Fischer, Member of Bundestag and former German Foreign Minister
Noëlle Lenoir, President of the European Institute of HEC, former French Minister for European Affairs
Andrew Moravcsik, Princeton University/Brookings

Is Russia Lost? The Future of Russian Democracy and Relations with the West
Fiona Hill, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

Panelists:
Daniel Fried, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Anatol Lieven, New America Foundation
Strobe Talbott, President, The Brookings Institution
Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center

Is America above the Law? A U.S.-Europe Dialogue about the War on Terror
Jeremy Shapiro, Director of Research, Center on the United States and Europe

Panelists:
Joschka Fischer, Member of Bundestag and former German Foreign Minister
Tom Malinowski, Human Rights Watch
Pauline Neville-Jones, Chair, British Conservative Party National and International Security Group
Victoria Toensing, former U.S. Justice Department Official
Ruth Wedgwood, Johns Hopkins-SAIS

Event Information

On September 30, 2011, the U.S.-born radical Islamic cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, was killed by an American drone strike in Yemen, marking the first extra-judicial killing by the United States government against a U.S. citizen. Placed at the top of a CIA kill list in 2010 by the Obama administration, al-Awlaki was known for his intimate involvement in multiple al-Qaida terrorist plots against U.S. citizens, including the 2009 Christmas Day airline bombing attempt in Detroit and the 2010 plot to blow up U.S.-bound cargo planes. His calls for violent jihad remain prominent on the Internet, and his influence has turned up in many cases since his death, including the Boston Marathon bombing of 2013 and the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris early this year. In a new book, “Objective Troy: A Terrorist, A President, and the Rise of the Drone” (Crown, 2015), The New York Times national security reporter Scott Shane, drawing on in-depth field research in Yemen and interviews with U.S. government officials, charts the intimate details of the life and death of al-Awlaki, including his radicalization, his recruiting efforts for al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and the use of drone strikes by the United States to prosecute its counterterrorism goals.

On September 17, the Intelligence Project hosted Shane to examine the roles played by al-Awlaki in al-Qaida plots against the United States, al-Awlaki’s continued influence on terrorism, and the current state of al-Qaida today. Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

Audio

• Anwar al-Awlaki, Yemen, and American counterterrorism policy

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20150917_awlaki_yemen_transcript

Editors’ Note: Terrorist groups don’t emerge out of nowhere, and wars are perhaps the richest soil for seeding and growing violent groups of all stripes, writes Dan Byman. This post originally appeared in the Washington Post.

Study after study has found no common profile of a terrorist. It is hard to explain why, say, almost four times as many recruits leave Sweden to fight with the Islamic State as from neighboring Norway, though Sweden’s population is only twice Norway’s. Pundits and politicians alike speculate on why individuals might embrace terrorism, but such a question risks missing one obvious point: Having a terrorist group around in the first place is one of the most important factors in influencing an individual’s choice to join.

Terrorist groups don’t emerge out of nowhere, and wars are perhaps the richest soil for seeding and growing violent groups of all stripes. Without the wars in the Middle East there would be no Islamic State, and it is not the only one: al-Qaida, Hezbollah, and other extremist groups all emerged out of regional civil wars. The formation of such groups is a political phenomenon, and so, too, is the radicalization of foreign fighters from the West.

Terrorist groups are rarely the cause of civil wars. Iraq’s civil war began in 2003 after the U.S. invasion and occupation; Syria’s civil war began with peaceful protests against a brutal dictator in 2011; and Libya’s strife came after a terrorist-supporting dictator was toppled in the same year.

Rather, such wars beget and foster terrorism in several ways. Terror itself is often a tool in war, used to sow an atmosphere of fear and undermine governments. Assassinations of rival political leaders, bombs for police and military recruits and random violence against civilians—these are all methods learned from Insurgency 101.

Groups such as al-Qaida and now the Islamic State exploit new wars wherever they can. Terrorist groups linked to civil wars seek supporters in the United States, Europe, and other areas outside the theater for reasons both obvious and obscure—and these factors generate more terrorists. This pull is especially strong when identities cross borders—as does a religious identity like Islam—and when local ties are weak or the community as a whole is poorly integrated, as the Muslim community is in many European countries.

Foreigners might join these groups for altruistic reasons, to help the genuinely oppressed (the Syrian people facing Bashar al-Assad, or the Afghans facing the Soviets). Yet often the oppression is a myth, or at least greatly exaggerated: One powerful narrative of the Islamic State is that Sunni Muslims are facing a global Shiite conspiracy led by Iran and Hezbollah.

Still others join because they are true believers and want to live the dream. In different ways, the war takes them out of their humdrum or depressing present, giving them a new life: “I’m the most content I have ever been in my life,” tweeted one young American woman who had gone to live in the Islamic State, ending the tweet with a heart emoji. Many are merely thugs who spent time in jail or otherwise led delinquent lives: Joining the Islamic State or a similar group gives them a license to kill and torture.

Because there is no single profile, terrorist groups such as the Islamic State seek to appeal to many different ones. Propaganda stresses the good life in the caliphate, the glory of fighting for God, the oppression the community is facing, and glorified ultra-violence. Religion matters, but only as a badge of meaning and belonging rather than for its specific ideological content. By professing religious beliefs, a young Muslim male can go from marginalized and alienated in his home country to part of God’s army, defending his people with his own sex slaves to boot. Yet one study of the European foreign fighters found that most were theologically illiterate. Omar Mateen, the Orlando shooter, may not have understood the difference between the theologies espoused by the Islamic State, al-Qaida and Hezbollah.

As long as these wars rage, the problems they generate will not stay confined to the Middle East. Only a fraction of a fraction end up fighting, and even fewer engage in terrorism, but only a small number need to respond for the problem to be serious.

The man who drove a truck through packed crowds celebrating Bastille Day, killing more than 80, may have acted alone, according to the early reports. We don't know if he was inspired by a jihadist ideology or linked to any specific group. In any event, these extremist groups are increasingly embracing a "lone wolf" approach, and the West should prepare for more such attacks.

I've argued that such lone wolf" attacks are deadly but often fail in the long-term. Part of the reason is that historically many are poorly prepared and incompetent, bungling the attack or at least not killing as many as a more skilled and trained individual might.

Yet the horrific body count in Nice, along with the 49 dead in recent Orlando nightclub shooting, shows how deadly even an unskilled loser like Omar Mateen can be.

This deadliness is not new – Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, largely acting alone, killed 168 people when they bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 – but it suggests the potential lethality of lone wolves.

A Weaker Islamic State

The Islamic State is putting more emphasis on lone wolves out of desperation.

In the past, it urged its sympathizers to go to Syria to help the fledgling state defend itself and expand. However, the United States, France, and other countries and local fighters hitting hard at the Islamic State's core in Iraq and Syria. Other major areas of operations, like the Islamic State's "province" in Libya, are also under siege. The self-proclaimed state is short of funds, and the number of foreign recruits is declining.

Like all terrorist groups, the Islamic State needs victories to inspire new recruits and prevent existing members from losing hope. CIA Director John Brennan foresaw this in testimony and warned, "as the pressure mounts on [ISIS], we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda."

A silver lining is that lone wolf terrorism, even if lethal, usually fails in a strategic sense. As one IRA terrorist said, "you don't bloody well kill people for the sake of killing them."

Violence with no strategy behind it terrifies, but it can backfire against a group and the cause it embraces. McVeigh and Nichols, for example, discredited other far right movements. McVeigh claimed he was dealing a blow against a tyrannical government, but the death of 19 children and three pregnant women in the bombing made it hard even for anti-government zealots to defend him.

In Nice, the driver killed children out to watch the fireworks, and the dead included innocent Muslims, like the grieving young man asking Allah to accept his mother into heaven may (and should) become the face of the attack, hardly a heroic move in a holy war that would inspire others.

Although the Islamic State's moves smack of desperation, that is no comfort to anyone concerned about terrorism.

Difficult To Prevent

Terrorist groups that draw on foreign fighters or otherwise are organized tend to be more deadly and dangerous in the long-term, but lone wolves are exceptionally hard to stop. The very organizational connections that give most terrorism direction are by definition lacking, and thus it is harder to find and disrupt the attacks. So more attempts, and likely some successful ones, seem inevitable.

One clear recommendation – and the one least likely to be heeded in the aftermath of a terrorist attack – is to ensure community support. If a community has good relations with the police and society in general, it has fewer grievances for terrorists to exploit and is more likely to point out malefactors in their midst.

Even though he was never arrested, Mateen came to the FBI's attention because a local Muslim found him worrisome. In France in particular, however, relations between the Muslim community and the government are often poisonous, and a terrorist attack will probably make this worse as France's already popular far-right movement becomes strong. And this will only mean more lone wolves will slip through in the future.

This piece originally appeared on NPR's Parallels.

The terrible attack in Nice on July 14—Bastille Day—saddened us all. For a country that has done so much historically to promote democracy and human rights at home and abroad, France is paying a terrible and unfair price, even more than most countries. My colleagues Will McCants and Chris Meserole have carefully documented the toll that France, and certain other Francophone countries like Belgium, have suffered in recent years from global terrorism. It is heart wrenching.

From what we know so far, the attack was carried out by a deeply distraught, potentially deranged, and in any case extremely brutal local man from Nice of Tunisian descent and French nationality. Marital problems, the recent loss of his job, and a general sense of personal unhappiness seem to have contributed to the state of mind that led him to commit this heinous atrocity. Perhaps we will soon learn that ISIS, directly or indirectly, inspired the attack in one way or another as well. My colleague Dan Byman has already tapped into his deep expertise about terrorism to remind us that ISIS had in fact encouraged ramming attacks with vehicles before, even if the actual manifestation of such tactics in this case was mostly new. 

This attack will again raise the question: Why France? On this point, I do have a somewhat different take than some of my colleagues. The argument that France has partly brought these tragedies upon itself—perhaps because of its policies of secularism and in particular its limitations on when and where women can wear the veil in France—strikes me as unpersuasive. Its logical policy implications are also potentially disturbing, because if interpreted wrongly, it could lead to a debate on whether France should modify such policies so as to make itself less vulnerable to terrorism. That outcome, even if unintended, could dance very close to the line of encouraging appeasement of heinous acts of violence with policy changes that run counter to much of what French culture and society would otherwise favor. So I feel the need to push back.

Here are some of the arguments, as I see them, against blaming French culture or policy for this recent string of horrible attacks including the Charlie Hebdo massacre, the November 2015 mass shootings in Paris, and the Nice tragedy (as well as recent attacks in Belgium):

• Starting with the simplest point, we still do not know much about the perpetrator of the Nice killings. From what we do surmise so far, personal problems appear to be largely at the root of the violence—different from, but not entirely unlike, the case with the Orlando shooter, Omar Mateen.
• We need to be careful about drawing implications from a small number of major attacks. Since 2000, there have also been major attacks in the Western world by extremist jihadis or takfiris in New York, Washington, Spain, London, San Bernardino, Orlando, and Russia. None of these are Francophone. Even Belgium is itself a mixed country, linguistically and culturally.
• Partly for reasons of geography, as well as history, France does face a larger problem than some other European countries of individuals leaving its country to go to Syria or Iraq to fight for ISIS, and then returning. But it is hardly unique in the scale of this problem.
• Continental Europe has a specific additional problem that is not as widely shared in the United Kingdom or the United States: Its criminal networks largely overlap with its extremist and/or terrorist networks. This point may be irrelevant to the Nice attack, but more widely, extremists in France or Belgium can make use of illicit channels for moving people, money, and weapons that are less available to would-be jihadis in places like the U.K. (where the criminal networks have more of a Caribbean and sub-Saharan African character, meaning they overlap less with extremist networks).
• Of course, the greatest numbers of terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists occur in the broader Muslim world, with Muslims as the primary victims—from Iraq and Syria to Libya and Yemen and Somalia to South Asia. French domestic policies have no bearing on these, of course.

There is no doubt that good work by counterterrorism and intelligence forces is crucial to preventing future attacks. France has done well in this regard—though it surely can do better, and it is surely trying to get better. There is also no doubt that promoting social cohesion in a broad sense is a worthy goal. But I would hesitate, personally, to attribute any apparent trend line in major attacks in the West to a particular policy of a country like France—especially when the latter is in fact doing much to seek to build bridges, as a matter of national policy, with Muslims at home and abroad. 

There is much more to do in promoting social cohesion, to be sure, even here in America (though our own problems probably center more on race than on religion at the moment). But the Nice attacker almost assuredly didn’t attack because his estranged wife couldn’t wear a veil in the manner and/or places she wanted. At a moment like this in particular, I disagree with insinuations to the contrary.

Editors’ Note: The attack in Nice will inevitably, and appropriately, lead to more aggressive intelligence efforts against suspected ISIS networks and tighter security in general, writes Dan Byman. Unfortunately, they are also likely to bolster anti-Muslim voices in France and throughout Europe, and ISIS may in turn exploit Muslims’ resulting shame and anger. This post originally appeared on Slate.

At least 84 people are dead in Nice, France, after a truck deliberately plowed for over a mile through packed crowds celebrating Bastille Day; ISIS or one of its supporters is believed to be linked to the attack. As we reel in horror from yet another instance of terrorist carnage, news reports are trickling in, giving us a sense of the attack, its victims, and those behind the killings.

We’ll learn more in the days to come, but we already knew Europe—and France in particular—has a terrorism problem and that it may go from bad to worse in the near future. Ironically, one of the reasons for the increased attacks is the military successes the United States, France, and other countries and local fighters are scoring against ISIS’s core in Iraq and Syria and the setbacks suffered by ISIS’s key provinces such as that in Libya. ISIS, which had long trumpeted its success in establishing the now-shrinking caliphate, needs victories to compensate for these major losses. Earlier this month, CIA Director John Brennan warned, “As the pressure mounts on ISIL, we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda.”

Running down people with a truck is a new form of violence for ISIS, though ISIS propaganda has called for supporters to kill by “ramming” people, al-Qaida’s Yemen branch recommended it in the past to “mow down the enemies of Allah,” and in 2008 a Palestinian used a bulldozer to kill three Israelis. But this is the fourth major terror attack in Europe in the past eight months: ISIS-directed terrorists killed 130 people in November in Paris; in March suicide bombers killed 32 people in Brussels, and just two weeks ago three men believed to be tied to ISIS killed more than 40 at the Istanbul airport.

The attacks will inevitably, and appropriately, lead to more aggressive intelligence efforts against suspected ISIS networks and tighter security in general. Unfortunately, they are also likely to bolster anti-Muslim voices in France and throughout Europe, fostering daily humiliations and furthering Muslim communities’ sense that they are suspect and under siege. ISIS will exploit the resulting shame and anger, increasing the risk of future attacks.

European nations face several types of terror threats from ISIS. The first is the unprecedented number of fighters—more than 5,000—that Europe has exported to Iraq and Syria to fight under the banners of ISIS and other jihadi groups. More than 900 of them (including 200 women) have come from France. More than 130 are dead, and almost 250 have returned; the rest are believed to still be in Iraq and Syria. The Paris attacks, which were coordinated and practiced, illustrate the danger such fighters can pose: Time in the battle zone allows them to gain fighting skills, become indoctrinated, and develop a network to exploit for future attacks. In addition, ISIS leaders can direct their operations to achieve maximal effect. As the so-called caliphate shrinks, more of these fighters may try to return. More than 1,000 other Frenchmen are believed to be radicalized but have not gone to Iraq and Syria, and this represents another overlapping danger. In the past many might have tried to go to Syria, but now, perhaps acting on directions from ISIS leaders with whom they are communicating or perhaps mixing with returned foreign fighters, these individuals might strike directly at France or other countries.

The last category are true “lone wolves”—those inspired by ISIS or other jihadi ideologies but with no direct operational connection to a group (the attacks in San Bernardino and Orlando appear to fall into this category). Two years ago ISIS propaganda emphasized coming to the “caliphate” to help it consolidate and expand. Earlier this year, however, its spokesman and external operations leader Muhammad al-Adnani declared, “The smallest action you do in the heart of their land is dearer to us than the largest action by us and more effective and more damaging to them.”

France, as we’ve seen, is particularly vulnerable. As my Brookings colleagues Will McCants and Chris Meserole have recently argued, French political culture is a counterterrorism problem. They found that “four of the five countries with the highest rates of radicalization in the world are Francophone, including the top two in Europe (France and Belgium).” Part of the problem are the large numbers of unemployed urban youth, a fertile field for radical recruiting. But part of it is also France’s aggressive secularization programs, which prohibit girls from wearing the veil in school and are considered by many Muslims to be a deliberate attack on their religion. Muslims’ trust in the government and security services is low. Add such a sense of humiliation to a surging far-right political movement that constantly blasts Muslim immigrants and citizens, and the conditions for radicalization are strong.

The United States is less vulnerable by comparison. Fewer than 300 Americans have gone to fight in Iraq and Syria. Part of this is because of an aggressive and effective law enforcement and intelligence effort to disrupt volunteers. But part of it is because the American Muslim community is far better integrated than its French counterpart and regularly cooperates with law enforcement. U.S. politics are becoming more poisonous toward Muslims, but—we can hope—that anti-Muslim sentiment in America may have peaked, and recent polls suggest positive attitudes toward Muslims are increasing.

Continued military and intelligence operations against the ISIS core by U.S.-led coalition forces and their local partners are necessary, but they will take time to bear fruit and in the end still don’t solve the terrorism problem. Stopping an attack like the one in Nice is exceptionally difficult. The attacker chose a “soft” (undefended) target and showed that one sick person can kill many with the right combination of determination and luck. Unfortunately, the most likely reaction after the Nice attack is also the worst one: more vitriol and hostility toward French and European Muslims, furthering a cycle that makes it harder for European security services to gain the cooperation of local communities and easier for ISIS to gain recruits and score victories.