As part of the implementation strategy for the recently adopted OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains in the Garment and Footwear Sector, the OECD is conducting a series of surveys that target SMEs operating within the sector.

This annual, multi-stakeholder forum provides the opportunity to review and discuss compliance and implementation of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance, the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism and other initiatives to enable responsible mineral supply chains.

Demand for jobs, characterized by skill type and industry of employment, is driven by changes in technology, trade and consumption. Using structural decomposition analysis, we study the relative importance of these drivers for the period 1995-2008.

Participants in this multi-stakeholder meeting launched the Gold Implementation programme and advanced implementation of due diligence in the 3Ts supply chain to ensure that companies avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral or metal purchasing decisions and practices.

Participants in this multi-stakeholder meeting reviewed and discussed the implementation of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance and in the 3Ts supply chain to ensure that companies avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral or metal purchasing decisions and practices.

This workshop focused on how to comply with international regulations on conflict-free gold supply chains and how to make the most of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.

This meeting provided the opportunity to review and discuss implementation of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance and the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism. Issues pertinent to the tin, tantalum and tungsten (3Ts) and gold supply chains were addressed during the three-day forum.

Participants at the forum adopted a communiqué calling for companies to confront challenges they encounter openly and transparently by publicly reporting on due diligence in accordance with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas

This meeting provided the opportunity to review and discuss implementation of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance, the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism, and other initiatives to enable responsible mineral supply chains. Issues pertinent to the tin, tantalum and tungsten (3Ts) and gold supply chains were also addressed during the Forum.

The German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR), supported by the OECD, has initiated a study to assess the contribution of small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) to due diligence for responsible mineral supply chains. To gather information for this study, SMEs were invited to take part on a confidential survey of due diligence activities by SMEs.

This public consultation was held to gather comments on the draft FAO-OECD guidance for responsible agricultural supply chains which is designed to help enterprises observe standards of responsible business conduct along their agricultural supply chains. The deadline for comment was 20 February 2015.

Two years ago today, the Rana Plaza building in Bangladesh’s capital Dhaka collapsed, killing over 1,100 people and injuring another 2,500. The dead and injured were garment workers. This blog post looks at due diligence in the apparel supply chain.

This public consultation is being held to gather comments on the draft Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains. They are intended to align Chinese company due diligence with international standards and allow for mutual recognition with existing international initiatives and legislations.

Focused mainly on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, this report takes stock of 5 years of implementation of national and international programmes and initiatives designed to operationalise the recommendations of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance on Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa.

This meeting will provide the opportunity to discuss the role of governments, international partners and businesses in promoting responsible mineral supply chains from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. Participants will learn first hand about international standards and approaches, and be able to ask questions to experts in supply chain due diligence implementation.

10-12 May, Paris: The 2016 forum focused on compliance and implementation of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance, including how to maximise the positive impacts on livelihoods through due diligence; viable options for trade in artisanal and small-scale mined gold; and identifying and preventing the worst forms of child labour in the mineral supply chain.

Practical actions for companies to identify and address the worst forms of child labour in mineral supply chains is for use by companies to help them identify, mitigate and account for the risks of child labour in their mineral supply chains. It builds on the due diligence framework of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.

Surprised looks with colleagues or students are commonplace when I observe that the OECD plays an important part in the promotion of responsible business conduct (RBC), not just in OECD countries, but also globally. RBC is OECD “speak” for corporate social responsibility, corporate sustainability and other terms indicating an expectation that businesses take responsibility for their impact on society.

In the wake of the collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory in Bangladesh in 2013, initiatives to strengthen regulation of global supply chains in the textile and garment sector have multiplied. Tackling the issues involved requires sustained collaboration among industry, government, worker organisations and civil society. This project promotes such collaboration as well as the harmonisation of existing standards in the sector.

30/01/2018 - The China National Textile and Apparel Council (CNTAC) and the OECD today signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that sets out their commitment to intensify co-operation to promote responsible business in global textile and apparel supply chains.

This report is part of a series of assessments on Colombian gold supply chains and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas. It analyses conditions of mineral extraction and related risks.

In conflict or high-risk areas, the exploitation of natural mineral resources companies involved in mining and trade in minerals have the potential to generate income, growth and prosperity, but may also be at risk of directly or indirectly fuelling armed conflict, gross violations of human rights, and impeding economic and social development.

This annual, multi-stakeholder forum provides the opportunity to review and discuss compliance and implementation of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance, the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism and other initiatives to enable responsible mineral supply chains.

As part of the implementation strategy for the recently adopted OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains in the Garment and Footwear Sector, the OECD is conducting a series of surveys that target SMEs operating within the sector.

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Supply chains play a big role in geopolitics. India needs to develop and use supply chain capabilities as a tool in geopolitics

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Industrial operations in Gurugram are yet to gather steam. The conditional green signal to resume operations was seen as a much-needed push to the economy. But those trying to get things back up and running realised it will be a challenge. Because the lockdown siloed cities and states. And businesses do not work in silos.

With new orders and output shrinking at the steepest pace since at least early 2005 factories cut jobs at the fastest rate in the survey's history, signaling a high chance of recession.

While tackling the virus, think in terms of zones. While reopening the economy, think in terms of supply chains, Rahul said on Twitter.

The entire country is facing a situation where everyone is recommended to stay at home to curb the spread of coronavirus. The Indian Government has requested people to avoid human contact and maintain social distancing. A nationwide lockdown was

Supply Chain 2020

Conference on Supply Chain Management

Supply Chain Management

Modern material handling drives supply chain efficiency

Responding to oncoming U.S.-China commercial friction in recent years, firms operating in the complex, dense semiconductor ecosystem centered on the United States and Northeast Asia began a gradual evaluation of whether and how to reshape their supply chains and investments, and still maximize profit. As a foundational industry for maintaining economic competitiveness and national security, semiconductors serve as a keystone in U.S. and Japanese technological leadership.  Against the backdrop of nascent U.S.-China technology competition and the standstill from the coronavirus, adjustments  to enhance resiliency and mitigate disruption through developing semiconductor supply chains and investments outside of China, including in Southeast Asia, should be supported.    

The Japanese government’s April 8, 2020, announcement that it will support Japanese corporations in shifting operations out of China and reducing dependency on Chinese inputs reflects this impulse. While impressive sounding, the $2.2 billion Japan allocated as part of its larger stimulus package to counter the headwinds of the coronavirus, is a mere drop in the bucket for the semiconductor industry of what would be an immense cost to totally shift operations and supply chains out of China. Semiconductor manufacturing is among the most capital-intensive industries in the global economy. Moreover, costs within Japan to “bring manufacturing back” are very high. Despite this – while Japan is not the super power it once was in semiconductors – it still has cards to play. 

Concurrently, officials in the United States, through a combination of  concerns over security and lack of supply chain redundancy, are also pushing for new investments to locate a cutting-edge fabrication facility in the continental U.S. One idea is to build a new foundry operated by Taiwanese pure-play giant TSMC. The Trump administration is considering other incentives to increase attractiveness for companies to invest in new front-end facilities in the United States, to maintain the U.S. dominant position in the industry and secure supply for military applications. Global semiconductor companies may be reluctant. After all, investments, facilities, and the support eco-system in China are in place, and revenues from the Chinese market enable U.S. semiconductor firms to reinvest in the research and development that allows them to maintain their market lead. And in the United States, there may be limits on the pool of human capital to rapidly absorb extensive new advanced manufacturing capacity.   

But there are two factors in a geopolitical vise closing at unequal speed on companies in the industry that will increase supply chain disruption: China’s own semiconductor efforts and U.S.-Japanese export controls. As part of the Made in China 2025 industrial policy initiative, General Secretary Xi Jinping and Chinese Communist Party leadership have tripled down to overcome past failures in Chinese efforts to develop indigenous semiconductor manufacturing capability. Following penalties brought by the U.S. Department of Commerce against ZTE and then Huawei, the Chinese leadership’s resolve to reduce its dependence on U.S. semiconductors has crystalized. The Chinese government intends to halve U.S. sourced semiconductor imports by 2025 and be totally independent of U.S. chips by 2030. And while behind in many areas and accounting for the usual state-directed stumbles, Chinese companies have made some progress in designing AI chips and at the lower end of the memory storage market. Even if the overall goals may prove unattainable, firms should heed the writing on the wall – China only wants to buy U.S. chips for the short term and as soon as possible end all foreign dependence. 

Leaders in the United States and Japan are also crafting some of their first salvos in what is likely to be a generation-long competition over technology and the future of the regional economic order with China. The Trump administration, acting on a bipartisan impetus after years of Chinese IP theft and recognizing mounting hardware security concerns, has begun planning to implement additional export controls directed at Chinese companies and certain chips. Japan and the United States have also reportedly initiated dialogue about coordinating export controls in the area of semiconductor manufacturing equipment. 

Collectively, these policies will be highly disruptive to semiconductor value chains and downstream technology companies like Apple and NEC, which are dependent on these networks to maintain a cadence of new products every 18-24 months. Japan’s action to place export controls on critical chemical inputs for South Korean semiconductor firms in the summer of 2019 serves as a warning of the supply chain’s vulnerability to miscalculated policy. In short, Washington and Tokyo must tread carefully. Without support from other key actors like South Korea, Taiwan, and the Netherlands, and by failing to incorporate industry input, poorly calibrated export controls on semiconductors could severely damage U.S. and Japanese companies’ competitiveness.     

A third course out of the bind for semiconductor firms may be available: a combination of on-shoring, staying in China, and relocation. For semiconductor companies, the relocation portion will not happen overnight. Shifting supply chains takes time for a capital-intensive industry driven by know-how that has limited redundancy. Destinations worth exploring from both cost and security perspectives as alternatives to China include South and Southeast Asia. Specific ASEAN countries, namely Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore, offer good prospects for investment. There is an existing industry presence in several locations in the region. Multinational firms already operating in Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam have benefited from diversification during the ongoing U.S.-China trade war, but are still dependent on Chinese inputs. Shifting low-value operations to Southeast Asia, such as systems integration, could likely be done relatively quickly – and some firms have – but shifting or adding additional high-value nodes such as back-end (assembly, packaging, and testing) facilities to the region will require incentives and support. At a minimum, a dedicated, coordinated effort on the part of the United States and Japan is essential to improve the investment environment.   

How can the United States and Japan help? Programs and initiatives are needed to address myriad weaknesses in Southeast Asia. Semiconductor manufacturing requires robust infrastructure, for example stable electricity supply, deep logistical networks, a large talent pool of engineers and STEM workers, and a technology ecosystem that includes startups and small or medium enterprises to fill gaps and provide innovations. The United States and Japan can fund high quality infrastructure, frame curriculum for semiconductor industry training through public-private partnerships, and help build capacity in logistical, regulatory, and judiciary systems.   

The burden in many of these areas will fall on specific Southeast Asian governments themselves, but the United States and Japan should assist. Effectively diversifying the regional technology supply chain to mitigate the impact of pending and future shocks may depend on it.