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Regional politics of Kazakhstan in Central Asia

Source

Central Asia Analytical Network

Release date

03 December 2019

Expert

Annette Bohr

In the news type

Op-ed

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Corporate Raiding in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan

Invitation Only Research Event

5 November 2019 - 9:00am to 1:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

John Patton, Argentem Creek
Rachel Cook, Peters & Peters
Tom Mayne, University of Exeter
Olga Bischof, Brown Rudnick LLP
Isobel Koshiw, Global Witness
Anton Moiseienko, RUSI

The widespread practice of illicit acquisition of a business or part of a business in the former Soviet states, known as ‘reiderstvo’ or asset-grabbing, is a major risk that disincentivises investment in the region.

It is distinct from the way corporate raiding occurs in the West and enabled by factors such as corruption and weak protection of property rights.

This roundtable will assess the practice of corporate raiding in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan: its evolution over time, knock-on effects and potential solutions. The speakers will also address the implications for the UK legal system and possible policy responses.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Department/project

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




hst

Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition

Invitation Only Research Event

28 November 2019 - 1:30pm to 3:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Annette Bohr, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Kassymkhan Kapparov, Founder, Economist.kz
Joanna Lillis, Reporter, The Guardian, The Economist and The Independent
Kate Mallinson, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Dossym Satpayev, Director, Kazakhstan Risk Assessment Group; Member of the Presidium, Kazakhstan Council on International Relations
Chair: James Nixey, Head, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

At face value at least, Central Asia’s wealthiest state has embarked on a bold experiment following the March 2019 decision by its founding father and long-standing ruler, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to resign from the presidency and initiate a managed political succession. A generational transition of this nature, untried in other former Soviet republics, brings with it high stakes.
 
As well as seeking to secure his own legacy, having dominated the country since before independence in 1991, Nazarbayev wants to ensure Kazakhstan does not depart from the course he has set while safeguarding Kazakhstan’s stability in the context of multiple and evolving domestic and international challenges. But this is easier said than done. Is Kazakhstan ready for the challenges of the future?
 
This event marks the launch of Chatham House’s major report Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition.

Department/project

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition

27 November 2019

A partial handover of political power through an orchestrated transition takes Kazakhstan into uncharted territory. Will it be able to pursue modernization and reform, and break from its authoritarian past?

Annette Bohr

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Dr Nigel Gould-Davies

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

Kate Mallinson

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

James Nixey

Director, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Birgit Brauer

Analyst, Writer and Journalist Covering Central Asia

Nargis Kassenova

Senior Fellow, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University

Joanna Lillis

Kazakhstan-Based Journalist Reporting on Central Asia

Dosym Satpayev

Independent Political Analyst and the Director of the Kazakhstan Risks Assessment Group

Kazakhstan is at a turning point in its history. At face value, at least, Central Asia’s wealthiest state has embarked on a bold experiment following the March 2019 decision by its founding father and long-standing ruler, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to resign from the presidency and initiate a managed political succession. A generational transition of this nature, untried in other former Soviet republics, brings with it high stakes. As well as looking to secure his own legacy, having dominated the country since before independence in 1991, Nazarbayev seeks to ensure Kazakhstan does not depart from the course he has set, while safeguarding regime stability in the context of multiple and evolving domestic and international challenges. This is easier said than done.

The uncertainty around this project is substantial, especially considering a ‘rowback’ decree just seven months after Nazarbayev’s resignation, limiting the powers of his anointed successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. How long can Tokayev credibly remain president considering such a transparent undermining of his authority? Is Nazarbayev, in fact, grooming his daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, another relative or a power player from outside the family for the leadership in the longer term? Will the ‘Kazakh tandem’ of Nazarbayev and Tokayev function effectively, or will tensions and conflicts arise between them as many claim is happening already? How will the leadership cope with the protest mood now manifest on the streets of Kazakhstan, and address the political and socio-economic grievances fuelling this discontent? How might the political transition play out if Nazarbayev were to suddenly exit the political scene altogether?And what is the long-term transition plan for the time when Nazarbayev has departed, and how effective will it be?

As Kazakhstan enters uncharted territory, the purpose of this report is twofold. First, to make the case for the West to devote more attention to Kazakhstan. The country’s relative importance in Central Asia, and as the constant focus of intense attention from China and Russia, suggests that the West is wrong to direct so little time and diplomatic effort and so few resources towards it. This is not so much a miscalculation (that would be to assume there had been a calculation in the first place) as a misstep through neglect, presupposing that the future will resemble the present – with Kazakhstan remaining stable internally, relatively inconsequential geopolitically but nevertheless a friendly ally to the West. In fact, the country’s trajectory over the next few years is of potentially strategic import. This is because even its political semi-transition presents the West with a rare opportunity to push back against the global rise of authoritarianism, in a state that is open to rational argument and economic logic.

The second function of the report is to serve as a well-intentioned message to the leadership of Kazakhstan. The research undertaken by the report’s eight authors shows that Kazakhstan is at risk of failing to achieve the goals its leadership has set for the country. As significant as it has been, the partial stepping aside of Nazarbayev by no means guarantees the modernization and renewal that he and his successor have promised. Far deeper political, economic and social reforms will be needed if Kazakhstan is to meet the growing challenges to its stability, prosperity and development. Street protests since Nazarbayev’s resignation have demonstrated a level of popular disaffection far higher than the authorities acknowledge. The leadership needs to bridge the disconnect between the rulers and the ruled and start listening to its people.

To avoid slipping into decline, and to resist external pressures and geopolitical overtures that could diminish the sovereignty that its leadership is so determined to safeguard, Kazakhstan needs new faces – innovators and reformers – throughout every level of the administration, as well as new ideas. This report is intended to help with the ‘ideas’ part of that proposition. It also includes a series of recommendations for Western governments and institutions and for the Kazakhstan government. 




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Kazakhstan: Reaching Out to Central Asian Neighbours

4 December 2019

Annette Bohr

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Despite its regional outreach, Kazakhstan’s diplomatic priority will remain Russia, China, and Europe.

2019-12-04-Kaz.jpg

Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakh Majilis Chairman Nurlan Nigmatulin and ex-president Nursultan Nazarbayev at an inauguration ceremony in parliament. Photo: Pavel AleksandrovTASS via Getty Images.

Leaders of the resource-rich Central Asian region have the propensity to remain in power until mortality dictates otherwise. Much like the UK and Brexit, however, few wanted to see Central Asia’s longest reigning ruler, Kazakhstan’s septuagenarian president Nursultan Nazarbayev, crash out without a deal.

The sudden departure of the country’s official leader of the nation with no clear succession plan could have led to investment chaos, intra-elite fighting and the unravelling in a matter of months of a system he had built over decades, à la Uzbekistan following the death of long-serving autocrat Islam Karimov in 2016.

In order to avoid just such a ‘no-deal’ scenario and ensure the continuity of his policies, in March Nazarbayev carefully choreographed his own resignation and the election of a hand-picked successor, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, while retaining plum positions and powers for himself.

Tokayev’s assumption of the presidency was accompanied by protesters in the streets, increasing wealth inequality, rising Sinophobia among rank-and-file Kazakhstanis, a hard-to-kick economic dependence on oil revenues and a lack of clarity as to which leader—the old or the new president—would actually be calling the shots. But, amidst this plethora of concerns, as argued in a recent Chatham House report, Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition, one bright spot has been the tangible growth of intra-Central Asian cooperation, with the Nazarbayev-Tokayev ruling duo appearing eager to improve the regional dialogue.

Kazakhstan has long shaped its identity as a Eurasian state that has acted as more of an intermediary between Russia and Central Asia than as an integral part of the Central Asian region. But since 2017, in particular, Kazakhstan has been increasingly looking for opportunities to boost hitherto weak cooperation with its Central Asian neighbours. While this is first and foremost owing to the liberalization of Uzbekistan’s large market, there are other factors at work that get less airplay.

One such factor is a perceptible disentangling from the Kremlin’s policy directions as Kazakhstan has come to view Russia’s foreign policy as increasingly neo-colonial. The example of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union is in many respects more off-putting than inspiring, and Nur-Sultan does not want to be locked tightly into the union’s economic orbit. And in distancing itself slightly from Moscow in order to limit Russian leverage in its affairs, Nur-Sultan has shown itself to be more open to Central Asian regional initiatives.

As part of the leadership’s plan to offset oil dependence, Kazakhstan aspires to become the transport, telecommunications and investment hub for Eurasian integration. The intense focus on connectivity and the development of logistical arteries and infrastructure could have the knock-on effect of boosting trade within the Central Asian region and reducing transit times, which are currently greater than in most other parts of the globe.

In addition, demographic trends and educational shifts that favour ethnic Kazakhs, together with a growing ethno-nationalist narrative, have allowed the state’s leadership to identify more closely with Kazakhstan’s common Central Asian heritage and, by extension, a common Central Asian region—although Kazakhstan’s leadership still remains eager to demonstrate that the country is not just another ‘stan’. The coming to power of President Mirziyoyev in Uzbekistan appears to have made Kazakhstan more aware of the interconnectedness of the two countries in terms of geographical location and potential economic complementarities, as well as culture and history.

Not least, there is a growing recognition among the Central Asian states themselves—including isolationist Turkmenistan to a degree—that deepening regional trade is mutually beneficial, especially given the constraints associated with Russia’s economic problems. The strengthening of Kazakhstan’s ties with Uzbekistan has slowly kick-started regional cooperation as a whole: trade turnover between the Central Asian states in 2018 grew by 35 per cent on the previous year.

But both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are keen to stress that there is no discussion of integration or institutionalization, not least because previous attempts at integration have been overtaken by Russia, leaving Central Asia without its own coordinating body.

The official consensus in Kazakhstan is that Uzbekistan’s economic reforms after years of isolation will spur ‘a healthy rivalry’ and ultimately boost Kazakhstan’s own economy, in so far as the competition for foreign investment will require both countries to work harder to improve their respective business and regulatory environments.

At the unofficial level, however, some Kazakhstani analysts view Uzbekistan’s rise as potentially unprofitable, given the possible diversion of some investments and market activity from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan. Moreover, Uzbekistan has the advantage of having undergone a clear change of executive, while it remains unclear which developments await Kazakhstan once First President Nazarbayev leaves the scene for good.

It can certainly be argued that Uzbekistan does pose a potential threat in the long-term to Kazakhstan’s entrenched position as Central Asia’s economic powerhouse: Uzbekistan’s population is one-and-a-half times bigger, even if its nominal GDP is three times smaller. Uzbekistan has a bigger market and a well-developed industrial sector, and is already the regional leader in terms of security. But it is not as though the world’s interest is moving from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan; rather, Uzbekistan is in the process of trying to catch up.

Despite this relatively upbeat picture, Kazakhstan’s combined trade with the other Central Asian states accounts for less than 5 per cent of its total volume of foreign trade—a figure that cannot begin to equal its trade with Russia, China, and Europe. As a result, Kazakhstan will continue to give greater importance to positioning itself as a global player than as a regional leader.

This article was originally published in The Diplomat.




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Corporate Raiding in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan

Invitation Only Research Event

5 November 2019 - 9:00am to 1:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

John Patton, Argentem Creek
Rachel Cook, Peters & Peters
Tom Mayne, University of Exeter
Olga Bischof, Brown Rudnick LLP
Isobel Koshiw, Global Witness
Anton Moiseienko, RUSI

The widespread practice of illicit acquisition of a business or part of a business in the former Soviet states, known as ‘reiderstvo’ or asset-grabbing, is a major risk that disincentivises investment in the region.

It is distinct from the way corporate raiding occurs in the West and enabled by factors such as corruption and weak protection of property rights.

This roundtable will assess the practice of corporate raiding in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan: its evolution over time, knock-on effects and potential solutions. The speakers will also address the implications for the UK legal system and possible policy responses.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Department/project

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




hst

Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition

Invitation Only Research Event

28 November 2019 - 1:30pm to 3:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Annette Bohr, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Kassymkhan Kapparov, Founder, Economist.kz
Joanna Lillis, Reporter, The Guardian, The Economist and The Independent
Kate Mallinson, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Dossym Satpayev, Director, Kazakhstan Risk Assessment Group; Member of the Presidium, Kazakhstan Council on International Relations
Chair: James Nixey, Head, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

At face value at least, Central Asia’s wealthiest state has embarked on a bold experiment following the March 2019 decision by its founding father and long-standing ruler, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to resign from the presidency and initiate a managed political succession. A generational transition of this nature, untried in other former Soviet republics, brings with it high stakes.
 
As well as seeking to secure his own legacy, having dominated the country since before independence in 1991, Nazarbayev wants to ensure Kazakhstan does not depart from the course he has set while safeguarding Kazakhstan’s stability in the context of multiple and evolving domestic and international challenges. But this is easier said than done. Is Kazakhstan ready for the challenges of the future?
 
This event marks the launch of Chatham House’s major report Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition.

Department/project

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




hst

Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition

27 November 2019

A partial handover of political power through an orchestrated transition takes Kazakhstan into uncharted territory. Will it be able to pursue modernization and reform, and break from its authoritarian past?

Annette Bohr

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Dr Nigel Gould-Davies

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

Kate Mallinson

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

James Nixey

Director, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Birgit Brauer

Analyst, Writer and Journalist Covering Central Asia

Nargis Kassenova

Senior Fellow, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University

Joanna Lillis

Kazakhstan-Based Journalist Reporting on Central Asia

Dosym Satpayev

Independent Political Analyst and the Director of the Kazakhstan Risks Assessment Group

Kazakhstan is at a turning point in its history. At face value, at least, Central Asia’s wealthiest state has embarked on a bold experiment following the March 2019 decision by its founding father and long-standing ruler, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to resign from the presidency and initiate a managed political succession. A generational transition of this nature, untried in other former Soviet republics, brings with it high stakes. As well as looking to secure his own legacy, having dominated the country since before independence in 1991, Nazarbayev seeks to ensure Kazakhstan does not depart from the course he has set, while safeguarding regime stability in the context of multiple and evolving domestic and international challenges. This is easier said than done.

The uncertainty around this project is substantial, especially considering a ‘rowback’ decree just seven months after Nazarbayev’s resignation, limiting the powers of his anointed successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. How long can Tokayev credibly remain president considering such a transparent undermining of his authority? Is Nazarbayev, in fact, grooming his daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, another relative or a power player from outside the family for the leadership in the longer term? Will the ‘Kazakh tandem’ of Nazarbayev and Tokayev function effectively, or will tensions and conflicts arise between them as many claim is happening already? How will the leadership cope with the protest mood now manifest on the streets of Kazakhstan, and address the political and socio-economic grievances fuelling this discontent? How might the political transition play out if Nazarbayev were to suddenly exit the political scene altogether?And what is the long-term transition plan for the time when Nazarbayev has departed, and how effective will it be?

As Kazakhstan enters uncharted territory, the purpose of this report is twofold. First, to make the case for the West to devote more attention to Kazakhstan. The country’s relative importance in Central Asia, and as the constant focus of intense attention from China and Russia, suggests that the West is wrong to direct so little time and diplomatic effort and so few resources towards it. This is not so much a miscalculation (that would be to assume there had been a calculation in the first place) as a misstep through neglect, presupposing that the future will resemble the present – with Kazakhstan remaining stable internally, relatively inconsequential geopolitically but nevertheless a friendly ally to the West. In fact, the country’s trajectory over the next few years is of potentially strategic import. This is because even its political semi-transition presents the West with a rare opportunity to push back against the global rise of authoritarianism, in a state that is open to rational argument and economic logic.

The second function of the report is to serve as a well-intentioned message to the leadership of Kazakhstan. The research undertaken by the report’s eight authors shows that Kazakhstan is at risk of failing to achieve the goals its leadership has set for the country. As significant as it has been, the partial stepping aside of Nazarbayev by no means guarantees the modernization and renewal that he and his successor have promised. Far deeper political, economic and social reforms will be needed if Kazakhstan is to meet the growing challenges to its stability, prosperity and development. Street protests since Nazarbayev’s resignation have demonstrated a level of popular disaffection far higher than the authorities acknowledge. The leadership needs to bridge the disconnect between the rulers and the ruled and start listening to its people.

To avoid slipping into decline, and to resist external pressures and geopolitical overtures that could diminish the sovereignty that its leadership is so determined to safeguard, Kazakhstan needs new faces – innovators and reformers – throughout every level of the administration, as well as new ideas. This report is intended to help with the ‘ideas’ part of that proposition. It also includes a series of recommendations for Western governments and institutions and for the Kazakhstan government. 




hst

Kazakhstan: Reaching Out to Central Asian Neighbours

4 December 2019

Annette Bohr

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Despite its regional outreach, Kazakhstan’s diplomatic priority will remain Russia, China, and Europe.

2019-12-04-Kaz.jpg

Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakh Majilis Chairman Nurlan Nigmatulin and ex-president Nursultan Nazarbayev at an inauguration ceremony in parliament. Photo: Pavel AleksandrovTASS via Getty Images.

Leaders of the resource-rich Central Asian region have the propensity to remain in power until mortality dictates otherwise. Much like the UK and Brexit, however, few wanted to see Central Asia’s longest reigning ruler, Kazakhstan’s septuagenarian president Nursultan Nazarbayev, crash out without a deal.

The sudden departure of the country’s official leader of the nation with no clear succession plan could have led to investment chaos, intra-elite fighting and the unravelling in a matter of months of a system he had built over decades, à la Uzbekistan following the death of long-serving autocrat Islam Karimov in 2016.

In order to avoid just such a ‘no-deal’ scenario and ensure the continuity of his policies, in March Nazarbayev carefully choreographed his own resignation and the election of a hand-picked successor, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, while retaining plum positions and powers for himself.

Tokayev’s assumption of the presidency was accompanied by protesters in the streets, increasing wealth inequality, rising Sinophobia among rank-and-file Kazakhstanis, a hard-to-kick economic dependence on oil revenues and a lack of clarity as to which leader—the old or the new president—would actually be calling the shots. But, amidst this plethora of concerns, as argued in a recent Chatham House report, Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition, one bright spot has been the tangible growth of intra-Central Asian cooperation, with the Nazarbayev-Tokayev ruling duo appearing eager to improve the regional dialogue.

Kazakhstan has long shaped its identity as a Eurasian state that has acted as more of an intermediary between Russia and Central Asia than as an integral part of the Central Asian region. But since 2017, in particular, Kazakhstan has been increasingly looking for opportunities to boost hitherto weak cooperation with its Central Asian neighbours. While this is first and foremost owing to the liberalization of Uzbekistan’s large market, there are other factors at work that get less airplay.

One such factor is a perceptible disentangling from the Kremlin’s policy directions as Kazakhstan has come to view Russia’s foreign policy as increasingly neo-colonial. The example of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union is in many respects more off-putting than inspiring, and Nur-Sultan does not want to be locked tightly into the union’s economic orbit. And in distancing itself slightly from Moscow in order to limit Russian leverage in its affairs, Nur-Sultan has shown itself to be more open to Central Asian regional initiatives.

As part of the leadership’s plan to offset oil dependence, Kazakhstan aspires to become the transport, telecommunications and investment hub for Eurasian integration. The intense focus on connectivity and the development of logistical arteries and infrastructure could have the knock-on effect of boosting trade within the Central Asian region and reducing transit times, which are currently greater than in most other parts of the globe.

In addition, demographic trends and educational shifts that favour ethnic Kazakhs, together with a growing ethno-nationalist narrative, have allowed the state’s leadership to identify more closely with Kazakhstan’s common Central Asian heritage and, by extension, a common Central Asian region—although Kazakhstan’s leadership still remains eager to demonstrate that the country is not just another ‘stan’. The coming to power of President Mirziyoyev in Uzbekistan appears to have made Kazakhstan more aware of the interconnectedness of the two countries in terms of geographical location and potential economic complementarities, as well as culture and history.

Not least, there is a growing recognition among the Central Asian states themselves—including isolationist Turkmenistan to a degree—that deepening regional trade is mutually beneficial, especially given the constraints associated with Russia’s economic problems. The strengthening of Kazakhstan’s ties with Uzbekistan has slowly kick-started regional cooperation as a whole: trade turnover between the Central Asian states in 2018 grew by 35 per cent on the previous year.

But both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are keen to stress that there is no discussion of integration or institutionalization, not least because previous attempts at integration have been overtaken by Russia, leaving Central Asia without its own coordinating body.

The official consensus in Kazakhstan is that Uzbekistan’s economic reforms after years of isolation will spur ‘a healthy rivalry’ and ultimately boost Kazakhstan’s own economy, in so far as the competition for foreign investment will require both countries to work harder to improve their respective business and regulatory environments.

At the unofficial level, however, some Kazakhstani analysts view Uzbekistan’s rise as potentially unprofitable, given the possible diversion of some investments and market activity from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan. Moreover, Uzbekistan has the advantage of having undergone a clear change of executive, while it remains unclear which developments await Kazakhstan once First President Nazarbayev leaves the scene for good.

It can certainly be argued that Uzbekistan does pose a potential threat in the long-term to Kazakhstan’s entrenched position as Central Asia’s economic powerhouse: Uzbekistan’s population is one-and-a-half times bigger, even if its nominal GDP is three times smaller. Uzbekistan has a bigger market and a well-developed industrial sector, and is already the regional leader in terms of security. But it is not as though the world’s interest is moving from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan; rather, Uzbekistan is in the process of trying to catch up.

Despite this relatively upbeat picture, Kazakhstan’s combined trade with the other Central Asian states accounts for less than 5 per cent of its total volume of foreign trade—a figure that cannot begin to equal its trade with Russia, China, and Europe. As a result, Kazakhstan will continue to give greater importance to positioning itself as a global player than as a regional leader.

This article was originally published in The Diplomat.




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Die neuesten und nützlichsten praktischen Wahrheiten und Erfahrungen für Ärzte und Wundärzte / von Adolf Friedrich Löffler.

Erfurt : Keyser, 1803.




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Diphtheria : its natural hstory and prevention being the Milroy Lectures delivered before the Royal College of Physicians of London, 1891 / by R. Thorne Thorne.

London : Macmillan, 1891.




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Der Weg zu widerstandsfähigem Wachstum führt über internationale Zusammenarbeit

German translation of the BIS Press Release on the presentation of the Annual Report (25 June 2017)




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Die Gunst der Stunde nutzen, um nachhaltiges Wachstum zu sichern

German translation of the BIS press release on the presentation of the Annual Economic Report 2018, 24 June 2018. Die politischen Entscheidungsträger können dem gegenwärtigen Wirtschaftsaufschwung eine nachhaltige Basis verleihen, schreibt die Bank für Internationalen Zahlungsausgleich (BIZ) in ihrem Wirtschaftsbericht. ...




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Rohstoffdiplomatie kann dem Kongo helfen

Der Abbau seltener Mineralien ist ein Grund für die Gewalt im Kongo. Die EU könnte hier eine wirkungsvolle Regelung durchsetzen.




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Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Spain into World Cup

Azerbaijan have earned a FIFA Futsal World Cup debut after they, Italy, Kazakhstan, Portugal, Russia, Spain and Ukraine came through their play-offs to reach the finals.




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Freak V-Day glitch? Facebook engine CENSORS iconic photo with Soviet flag raised over Reichstag (PHOTOS)

Social media feeds are filled with historic shots marking Victory Day, but Facebook seems to have taken issue with one that symbolizes the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, and it keeps deleting a recently-colorized version of it.
Read Full Article at RT.com




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International Space Station crew lands in Kazakhstan after more than 200 days

A US-Russian space crew landed safely Friday in the steppes of Kazakhstan, greeted with extra precautions amid the coronavirus pandemic.




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Seychellois Rupee(SCR)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Seychellois Rupee = 24.5799 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Trinidad and Tobago Dollar(TTD)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Trinidad and Tobago Dollar = 62.4472 Kazakhstan Tenge



  • Trinidad and Tobago Dollar

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Swedish Krona(SEK)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Swedish Krona = 43.1841 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Slovak Koruna(SKK)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Slovak Koruna = 19.0035 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Serbian Dinar(RSD)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Serbian Dinar = 3.8909 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Polish Zloty(PLN)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Polish Zloty = 100.3605 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Qatari Rial(QAR)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Qatari Rial = 115.8985 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Indian Rupee(INR)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Indian Rupee = 5.589 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Pakistani Rupee(PKR)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Pakistani Rupee = 2.6432 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Sierra Leonean Leone(SLL)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Sierra Leonean Leone = 0.0428 Kazakhstan Tenge



  • Sierra Leonean Leone

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New Taiwan Dollar(TWD)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 New Taiwan Dollar = 14.1337 Kazakhstan Tenge



  • New Taiwan Dollar

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Thai Baht(THB)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Thai Baht = 13.1788 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Turkish Lira(TRY)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Turkish Lira = 59.5267 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Singapore Dollar(SGD)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Singapore Dollar = 298.7124 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Mauritian Rupee(MUR)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Mauritian Rupee = 10.6267 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Nepalese Rupee(NPR)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Nepalese Rupee = 3.4894 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Bangladeshi Taka(BDT)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Bangladeshi Taka = 4.9649 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Moldovan Leu(MDL)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Moldovan Leu = 23.6659 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Colombian Peso(COP)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Colombian Peso = 0.1083 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Uruguayan Peso(UYU)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Uruguayan Peso = 9.782 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Uzbekistan Som(UZS)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Uzbekistan Som = 0.0417 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Russian Ruble(RUB)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Russian Ruble = 5.7489 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Iraqi Dinar(IQD)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Iraqi Dinar = 0.3546 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Cayman Islands Dollar(KYD)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Cayman Islands Dollar = 506.2539 Kazakhstan Tenge



  • Cayman Islands Dollar

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Swiss Franc(CHF)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Swiss Franc = 434.6023 Kazakhstan Tenge




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CFA Franc BCEAO(XOF)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 CFA Franc BCEAO = 0.6975 Kazakhstan Tenge



  • CFA Franc BCEAO

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Vietnamese Dong(VND)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Vietnamese Dong = 0.018 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Macedonian Denar(MKD)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Macedonian Denar = 7.4259 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Zambian Kwacha(ZMK)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Zambian Kwacha = 0.0813 Kazakhstan Tenge




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South Korean Won(KRW)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 South Korean Won = 0.346 Kazakhstan Tenge



  • South Korean Won

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Jordanian Dinar(JOD)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Jordanian Dinar = 594.769 Kazakhstan Tenge




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Lebanese Pound(LBP)/Kazakhstan Tenge(KZT)

1 Lebanese Pound = 0.279 Kazakhstan Tenge