A Louisiana law that sought to post the Ten Commandments in every schoolroom in the state has been shelved by a federal judge. U.S. District Court Judge John W. deGravelles, […]

The post Obama-Appointed Federal Judge Temporarily Blocks Ten Commandments Law appeared first on The Western Journal.

Evidence Makgopa wore a sheepish smile when Bafana Bafana coach Hugo Broos showered him with praise before literally patting the forward on the back, making him blush at Dobsonville Stadium.

American Media Periscope Published  Sep. 19, 2022 In this episode of MSOM, Sean Morgan interviews Ladislav Vrabel about the populist movement in Czech Republic. Next Cynthia Farahat explains the secret apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood. CynthiaFarahat.com https://americanmediaperiscope.com/amp/signup Check Out This Episode’s Podcast: https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-chpay-12c2875

By Walter Donway, Savvy Street originally published on Dec. 4, 2022 Book Review: The Secret Apparatus: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Industry of Death by Cynthia Farahat, Post Hill Press, Bombardier Books (2022) A grim irony of twentieth-century history (but, of course, also predating it) is that the most horrendous threats to humanity have simply been too monstrously evil […]

A feminist and postcolonial approach to nuclear politics Expert comment NCapeling 20 July 2022

The July issue of International Affairs includes eight articles on the global nuclear order and eight more covering Chinese lending, abortion rights, and global security.

Disarmament and arms control has been a consistent area of debate in this journal for the past century, as underscored in our recent archive collection of research on a century of war and conflict.

The July edition moves this debate forward with a collection of papers guest-edited by Shine Choi and Catherine Eschle. The section ‘Feminist interrogations of global nuclear politics’ includes work by nine authors exploring seven global case-studies that help rethink nuclear politics and feminism.

As the guest editors note in their introduction, the section brings together research on nuclear power and nuclear weaponry to ‘begin the process of decentring 1980s white, western experiences of the global nuclear order in feminist IR’.

The articles speak to three core themes: they provide evidence of the ongoing destructive nature of nuclear technologies, extend understanding of the gendered, racialized, and colonial dimensions of nuclear discourses, and unearth the impact of colonialism on the global nuclear order.

Global nuclear politics

Anne Sisson Runyan examines the gendered effects of uranium mining and nuclear waste dumping on North American Indigenous women, showing how the nuclear cycle tends to have a disproportionate effect on certain communities but also that the area of disposal remains problematic.

This is a global problem – for example, the Royal Navy has yet to successfully dispose of a single redundant nuclear-powered submarine and is rapidly running out of space to store further vessels.

Hebatalla Taha goes back to the early years of nuclear development and, using Egypt as a case-study, her article argues the early visualizations of the atomic age were fluid and ambivalent. She concludes – perhaps controversially – that feminizing nuclear politics and nuclear images will not lead to disarmament but rather reinforce the nuclearized world. The piece is a welcome addition to the emerging field of visuality within international relations.

Anand Sreekumar brings together feminist and Gandhian thinking to suggest a way for Narendra Modi’s government to move beyond the possession of nuclear weapons as symbols of power. In doing so, he also critiques the binary labels of ‘West’ and ‘non-West’ that often frame our understanding of the world.

Lorraine Bayard de Volo revisits the Cuban missile crisis – a point in time where nuclear war looked likely. She compares the actions of Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy and finds the pursuit of masculinity led to the rejection of approaches considered more feminine, such as diplomacy and negotiation – the crisis was exacerbated by what might be referred to now as toxic masculinity.

Sweden’s and Finland’s recent application to join the nuclear alliance NATO lends a particular urgency to Emma Rosengren’s article on the original Swedish decision to renounce the development of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Her article concludes much of the emphasis on power in international relations has contributed to a gendered and racialized nuclear order.

Similarly, Laura Rose Brown and Laura Considine’s article on the Non-Proliferation Treaty finds that ‘gender-sensitive’ approaches focus almost exclusively on women’s inclusion as opposed to feminist policy analysis. They end by making recommendations for future policymaking.

Finally, Rebecca Hogue and Anais Maurer look at the anti-nuclear poetry of Pacific women. This article raises fundamental questions about what is currently considered to constitute evidence. They point to the role of oral history in many communities and the tendency of policymakers and social scientists to ignore this source of understanding.

National politics with international implications

This edition’s ‘Editor’s Choice’ is Jeffrey A. Friedman’s article which questions whether US grand strategy is dead in a post-Trump world. Running counter to much of the existing literature, he suggests there is a strong bilateral commitment to existing partnerships and alliances within the US political establishment.

Following the US Supreme Court decision over Roe vs Wade, it is important to note the issue of abortion rights can have an international dimension. Megan Daigle, Deirdre N. Duffy, and Diana López Castañeda reveal that, although Colombia now has the most progressive legal framework for abortion in Latin America, intense backlash persists as legacies of the civil war overshadow the issue and lead to barriers to safe abortion care.

China

Ric Neo and Chen Xiang look at Chinese public opinion and finds that citizens can be upset by foreign policies of other states even when they have no impact on their daily lives. It reminds us of the potency of nationalism and the importance of who controls the prevailing narrative.

Deborah Brautigam examines China’s role in creating Zambia’s debt crisis, arguing this has not been brought about by a centralized master plan which would give China control over Zambia. Instead, the crisis has been caused by the failure of Chinese bureaucracy with too many state organs offering funding in an uncoordinated fashion.

Security and defence

Using Iran as a case-study, Henrik Stålhane Hiim argues the development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles is a key indicator when looking for potential nuclear proliferators.

Eray Alim demonstrates the impact of an external great power interacting with local states. Russia’s involvement in the Syrian civil war has allowed it – sometimes through restrictive and punitive measures – to ensure Turkey and Israel do not harm its interests in the region.

Nina Wilén draws on fieldwork in Niger to study how Security Force Assistance (SFA) impacts on Niger’s security sector and compares this to global trends in security. She finds these developments contribute to blurred borders and confusion regarding labour division in the security sector and points to wider questions for intervenors in developing local units.

In conversation with David Miliband: Finding a new approach to tackle conflict, climate and extreme poverty 11 September 2024 — 5:00PM TO 5:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

David Miliband discusses how the climate crisis, extreme poverty and conflict are becoming inextricably linked and how the global community must respond.

Combatting the climate crisis, ending protracted conflicts, and alleviating poverty are three of the greatest priorities for international action. However, these three challenges become increasingly concentrated in a handful of countries. The subsequent feedback loop makes addressing these challenges even more complex.

The International Rescue Committee’s (IRC’s) work in crisis-affected communities highlights this new geography of crisis. Just 16 countries, which are both climate-vulnerable and conflict-affected. This represents 43% of all people living in extreme poverty, 44% of all people affected by natural disasters and 79% of all people in humanitarian need. This trend towards the concentration of crisis is only deepening. In three decades, the number of conflict-affected, climate-vulnerable states has increased from 44% to more than two-thirds.

Affected countries - like Sudan, Myanmar, and Syria - are also among the least supported financially. Debt burdens are siphoning away critical resources needed for adaptation and resilience. Humanitarian aid budgets are being slashed by donor governments. The private sector refuses to invest in these communities they view as too risky. And the international financial institutions meant to alleviate poverty and spur climate action are not well-designed to work with crisis-affected states or local communities. With the upcoming COP29 Summit in Azerbaijan focused on the New Collective Quantified Goal for climate finance, vulnerable communities will be watching closely whether they will get support in their fight against the worst impacts of the climate crisis.

Conflict, the climate crisis, and extreme poverty are taking their toll. But how can the world best respond?

Key questions to be discussed during the session include:

• At a time of political disruption, how does the West engage with vulnerable countries? What actions should be prioritised in providing support to such countries?
• Can global institutions evolve to better protect vulnerable and displaced people from conflict and climate-risk, particularly as geopolitical rivalries reduce space for cooperation?
• What is the UK’s role in supporting climate action in fragile states and how does this align with its agenda on the Sustainable Development Goals and extreme poverty?

Alfred C. O. Vertegaal
Dec 1, 2006; 5:2298-2310
Research

Steven A. Carr
Mar 1, 2014; 13:907-917
Technological Innovation and Resources

Roland Bruderer
May 1, 2015; 14:1400-1410
Research

Christian Tagwerker
Apr 1, 2006; 5:737-748
Research

Albrecht Gruhler
Mar 1, 2005; 4:310-327
Research

Shao-En Ong
May 1, 2002; 1:376-386
Research

Chatham House appoints new director and chief executive News release jon.wallace 5 April 2022

Bronwen Maddox will take up the role at the end of August, succeeding Dr Robin Niblett CMG.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) is delighted to announce that its new director and chief executive will be Bronwen Maddox, who joins from the Institute for Government.

Bronwen Maddox has been the director of the Institute for Government, an independent think tank based in London promoting better government, since September 2016. 

She joined the institute from the current affairs magazine Prospect, where she spent six years as editor and CEO.

Bronwen was previously foreign editor, chief foreign commentator and US editor at The Times, and before that, she ran award-winning investigations and wrote economics editorials for the Financial Times, after a career as an investment analyst in the City. She writes frequent op-ed columns for the Financial Times and broadcasts widely.

She is also visiting professor in the Policy Institute at King’s College London, a non-executive board member of the Law Commission, and has just been appointed a council member of Research England, one of the research councils of UK Research & Innovation.

Ms Maddox succeeds Dr Robin Niblett CMG who is standing down in the summer after 15 years in the role. She will take up the role at the end of August.

Chair of Chatham House, Sir Nigel Sheinwald said:

‘This is an exciting appointment for the future of Chatham House and for London as a global hub. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the unprecedented response of the rest of the world reminds us that organizations like Chatham House, with its outstanding record of independent analysis and new ideas on how to build a secure and prosperous world, are needed more than ever.

‘Bronwen Maddox has an international reputation as a compelling commentator and analyst on world affairs, with a proven ability to spot emerging issues and frame them in ways which will provoke intelligent debate and fresh thinking. She has provided successful and innovative leadership at the IFG, Prospect and The Times, and is committed to continuing to broaden Chatham House’s diverse appeal and impact. She is the ideal person to lead the institute into the next stage of its development at this crucial time for the future of international relations.’

Bronwen Maddox said:

‘I am honoured and delighted to become Chatham House’s next director. It’s a momentous period in international affairs and Chatham House, with its reputation for rigour, independence and expert analysis, has a unique role to play in assessing these changes and prompting solutions to confront them – as it shows every day. I look forward to the privilege of working with its teams, and the many others who have come together to advance its work.’

Sir Nigel also paid tribute to Dr Niblett:

‘Robin Niblett has transformed Chatham House in his fifteen years as its head. The institute’s research, activities and impact have grown considerably in that time thanks to Robin’s own high-quality commentary, his productive relationships with our stakeholders, partners, supporters and members and his commitment to the institute’s staff. He leaves an institute which has a much wider and fresher appeal and has strengthened London’s standing as a great centre for international affairs.’

Dr Niblett said:

‘This appointment is excellent news for Chatham House. Bronwen Maddox is ideally placed to ensure the institute continues to play its part in helping governments, business and civil society tackle the serious challenges we face, not just from the return of geopolitical competition and interstate conflict, but also from climate change, unsustainable economic activity and growing inequality, priorities for the institute that have been underlined by the COVID-19 pandemic.’

COP27: What was achieved, and what needs to happen now Expert comment NCapeling 20 November 2022

Chatham House environment experts give their initial reaction to the end of COP27, examining how much progress was achieved, and the key issues still to be worked on.

Loss and Damage fund is a historic moment

Anna Aberg

COP27 will go down in history as the UN climate change conference where the Loss and Damage fund was agreed. After decades of pushing, this is a momentous victory for climate-vulnerable developing countries.

The shift in the conversation – and in the positions of developed countries – since COP26 is remarkable. It is critical parties continue to build on the positive momentum created in Sharm as challenging discussions on how the new loss and damage fund will work – and who will contribute to it financially – ensue.

Tim Benton

Overall COP27 was a hectic, sometimes chaotic, event. The COP advanced some matters but on others failed to drive ambition towards the sort of climate action required to keep alive the possibility of restricting climate change within the envelope of the Paris agreement.

Loss and Damage progressed but, especially in week two, the risk was of going backwards in this COP relative to COP26 in Glasgow. The final cover declaration managed to avoid the worst, but also avoided the best.

Notably disappointing was that, although food systems were much in debate unlike in previous COPs, there was still significant political resistance to fully adopting a systems approach. Globally, food systems emit about one-third of all greenhouse gasses, while poor diets – in rich and poor countries alike – are arguably the single biggest factor in ill-health and early death.

COP27 maintained a firm focus on supply-side solutions to tackle food insecurity, avoiding the politically more contentious demand-side issues of ensuring nutritious and sustainable diets for all.

Start of implementation phase demands renewed urgency

Bernice Lee

It has often been said climate action is moving from target-setting into the implementation phase. What COP27 shows is that, as the implementation phase begins, integrity and accountability will be ever more critical, as the voices of the vulnerable economies and the youth remind the world time and time again.

This compromised outcome is also a reminder that the delivery of climate action begins at home, as does the bread-and-butter politics of money and influence. It is significant the link between fossil energy and climate impacts has now been openly made in the international arena, regardless of whether it appeared in the final cover agreement.

As the dust settles, there will be many questions and reflection over tactics chosen by different parties and actors, and much to be learned that can help those pushing for more breakthrough moments at COP28.

Antony Froggatt

There was insufficient progress on the energy transition both in and around COP27. Few countries followed through on their promises to increase the ambition of their nationally determined contributions (NDCs), although Australia and the European Union (EU) were rare exceptions among the developed countries.

Higher fossil fuel prices, due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, can and should have resulted in an accelerated energy transition. Yet the language in the final decision around carbon reductions and energy at best repeats the language of COP26 and does not reflect the renewed urgency of the situation, stemming from accelerating climate impacts and the weaponization of fossil fuels in Russia’s conflict.

At COP28, parties to the UNFCCC will finalize a Global Stock Take which will include a review of national progress in meeting carbon abatement targets. This will be a key moment and unfortunately is likely to highlight once again how much faster the world needs to reduce its dependency on fossil fuels.

Fossil fuel discussions show failure of imagination

Glada Lahn

Overshadowed by the pain of developing country fuel importers and European attempts to replace Russian gas, discussion of fossil fuels was fraught. The text, which called for accelerating the ‘phasedown of unabated coal’ use for the first time only last year, failed to expand to include oil and gas, despite calls to do so from India, the US, EU, and UK. Gas use also appeared to gain a pass via the inclusion of ‘low emission’ energy alongside renewables.

Given that extracting and burning oil and gas accounts for 40 per cent of all annual greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), and leaders agree on the need for ‘deep, rapid and sustained’ emission cuts, that language is beyond logical argument. However, current dependencies, fears of stranded investments, and a failure of imagination won out.

Stronger than usual oil and gas industry presence led to a higher number of meetings focused on decarbonization of the sector. Major producer countries such as Canada and Saudi Arabia were keen to emphasize technologies to ‘clean up’ rather than phase down their fuels as the future.

Not all developing country governments with hydrocarbon reserves see the ‘phase down’ text as conflicting with their economic interests. Large oil and gas exporter Colombia supported the inclusion of ‘all fossil fuels’ and Kenya, a country which had been pursuing oil and coal prospects, became a friend of the high ambition Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance which seeks a ‘managed phase out of oil and gas supply’.

A vocal contingent of African civil society meanwhile railed against health and ecology-damaging oil and gas projects and investments that would lock them into a high emissions future.

With stronger resolve to reorient finance towards net zero both in Sharm el-Sheikh and at the concurrent G20 summit in Bali, the practicalities of economic adaptation to the shift out of fossil fuels – including just transition for workers – rose up the agenda. These issues will overtake the wrangle over wording in the run up to COP28.

Adaptation must now move to the forefront

Ruth Townend

There are three pillars of climate action: mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. This year progress was made on mitigation and loss and damage but, to avoid wild spiralling of the latter, adaptation must have its day in the sun in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at COP28 next year.

Adaptation lacks a concrete goal, akin to the 1.5 degree limit, and few countries have set out plans to adapt to climate change. Momentum will come when the promised ‘global goal on adaptation’ (GGA) is finally defined, to help mobilize finance and spur implementation.

The Glasgow-Sharm-el-Sheikh (GLASS) work programme to achieve this has so far lacked focus. At COP27, parties decided to define a framework to measure the goal’s achievement and enable reviews of progress over the next year.

Some concrete progress on adaptation was seen at the COP: UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called for worldwide extreme weather early warning systems within the next five years, while the Adaptation Fund received more than $230 million for the most climate-vulnerable in 2022.

The call from Glasgow to double adaptation finance was repeated, but overall, progress was muted, when parties really needed to come together for implementation of this crucial element of climate action.

Not enough done for agriculture and food security

Richard King

It is welcome that the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture – adopted in 2017 as the first and only formal UNFCCC agenda item focusing on agriculture and food security – has concluded in a decision to implement a new four-year work programme focused on implementing solutions.

While this has an objective of promoting holistic approaches to addressing climate impacts both on and from agriculture and food security, it disappointingly falls short of taking a food systems lens that includes all activities and actors from farm to fork.

There is now a small window of opportunity until March 2023 for governments and civil society to shape and broaden this agenda for the next four years. If not in the negotiating halls, then certainly in the myriad side events and discussions focusing on the issue, this year’s COP has clearly demonstrated a growing appreciation of the imperative of tackling food systems in their entirety.

An overarching and integrated approach to sustainable food production, distribution, and retail; nutrition and dietary shifts; and addressing food loss and waste will be vital to making comprehensive headway in addressing climate change and other planetary and social challenges.

It is important the parties at COP28 in the UAE seize this rising momentum to become the first climate negotiations to make tangible progress on transforming food systems towards sustainability, equitability, and resilience.

Rainforest leadership challenges traditional aid

Thiago Kanashiro Uehara

COP27 served well as a business fair for entrepreneurs wishing to benefit from new carbon markets. But forests, peatlands, and nature-based solutions did not receive the attention they deserve in guaranteeing climate security.

The good news is the COP26 pledges on forest finance, for the Congo basin, and for indigenous peoples (IP) and local communities’ (LC) forest tenure are pretty much alive, with disbursement rates at decent levels, albeit rarely directly to IP and LC-led organizations. The bad news is the financialization of forest governance and voluntary sustainability standards in global supply chains are solution ‘myths’ and were exposed by scientists as such at the conference.

On the second day of COP27, there was a last-minute launch led by the Global North, with Rishi Sunak and Emmanuel Macron announcing the ‘forests and climate leaders’ partnership’. One week later, at the G20 Bali summit, ministers from Indonesia, DR Congo, and Brazil announced a South-South rainforest leadership alliance – referred by some as the ‘OPEC of forests’ – challenging traditional forms of top-down international aid.

The climate crisis is one symptom of the inequality crisis engulfing our world at present. The African COP represented a step forward in addressing climate justice, an improvement over COP26 in Glasgow, where the issue was virtually denied.

The time has come for Global North constituents to work together with self-fashioned ‘solution countries’, such as the DRC now and Brazil after 2023. An ‘implementation COP’ will be successful only after establishing a new framework of co-leadership in climate action based on principles of justice and strong sustainability.

Outcomes of an African COP

Christopher Vandome

Africa’s contribution to the global energy transition cannot be at the expense of its own industrialization.

While pledges of increased financing for adaptation and the landmark establishment of a fund for loss and damage are important steps, the reality of under-disbursement and delivery of promised funds is causing many African leaders to rethink their engagement with multilateral climate initiatives.

African leaders are intent on advancing their own strategies for energy generation and adaptation that deliver on national priorities of job creation, sustainable growth, and environmental protection.

Many countries strategies involve exploiting gas reserves. But with mounting global pressures against further hydrocarbon extraction, African leaders need to demonstrate to international partners that these operations are part of a long-term transition away from other fossil fuels and contribute towards poverty alleviation.

Leaders need to be coordinated in their demands to international partners on how to phase out over time as well as de-risk potential stranded assets. President Ramaphosa’s unveiling of the investment plan for the South African Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) was a significant mark of progress to unlocking the $8.5 billion pledge for lowering the economy’s reliance on coal.

While progress has at times faltered over the past year, it has been critical that South Africa articulate its own needs and desired energy mix, rather than this be internationally prescribed. It has also demonstrated to other African nations that bilateral not multilateral initiatives may offer a fast-track route to green finance.

Chatham House appoints Tim Benton as Research Director for Energy, Environment and Resources News Release sysadmin 30 May 2019

Chatham House is pleased to announce that Professor Tim Benton has been appointed as research director of the Energy, Environment and Resources Department.

Chatham House appoints Rob Yates as the new head of the Centre on Global Health Security News Release sysadmin 27 June 2019

Chatham House is pleased to announce that Rob Yates has been appointed as head of the Centre on Global Health Security.

Creon Butler appointed to lead Global Economy and Finance Programme News Release sysadmin 22 October 2019

Creon Butler has been appointed to lead the Global Economy and Finance programme at Chatham House, joining the institute at the beginning of December. He will also form part of the institute’s senior leadership team.

Monitoring of trade deals needs a risk-based approach Expert comment NCapeling 24 May 2021

On human rights issues, trading partners must do more than trust to luck.

The recent row within the UK government about the treatment of agricultural products in a proposed new trade deal with Australia provides a reminder that changes to trading arrangements can have social and environmental costs, as well as benefits.

Although the UK government clearly feels political pressure to demonstrate its ‘Global Britain’ credentials with some speedily concluded new deals, rushing ahead without a full understanding of the social, environmental, and human rights implications risks storing up problems for later. In the meantime, calls for better evaluation and monitoring of trade agreements against sustainability-related commitments and goals – ideally with statutory backing – will only get stronger.

EU experiences with these kinds of processes are instructive. For more than 20 years the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission (DG Trade) has been commissioning sustainability impact assessments (SIAs) from independent consultants in support of trade negotiations, and since 2012 these assessments have explicitly encompassed human rights impacts as a core part of the analysis.

These processes have since been augmented with a programme of periodic ‘ex post’ evaluations of trade agreements to ‘analyse the observed economic, social, human rights, and environmental impacts’ of live trade deals and to make recommendations about any mitigation action which may be needed.

For credibility and objectivity, the Commission outsources much of its sustainability assessment and ex post evaluation activities to independent consultants, who are encouraged to innovate and tailor their approaches subject to broad methodological parameters laid down by the Commission. Over time, experiences with specific assessment and monitoring assignments have enabled external SIA practitioners – and the Commission itself – to progressively strengthen these processes and underlying methodologies.

Yet despite the improvements there remains legitimate questions about whether the human rights aspects of these SIA processes – and subsequent evaluations – are having real policy impact. The difficulty of predicting human rights impacts of trade agreements in advance – as the COVID-19 crisis amply demonstrates – suggests a need for realism about the extent to which a ‘one off’ process, often carried out at a time when there is only ‘agreement in principle’ as to future trading terms, can produce a robust roadmap for heading off future human rights-related risks.

Human rights impact assessments have a potentially valuable role to play in laying down the substantive and structural foundations for future human rights monitoring as part of a broader, iterative, human rights risk management strategy. But the fragmented manner in which many trade agreements approach human rights issues, and the fact that outcomes are the product of negotiation rather than necessarily design, make it difficult to turn this vision into reality.

Controversies surrounding the SIA process for the EU-Mercosur agreement illustrate why striving for more coherence in the identification and subsequent management of human rights-related risks is important. In June 2019, the Commission decided to wrap up negotiations with the South America Mercosur bloc, even though the SIA process for the proposed agreement was still incomplete and the interim and final SIA reports yet to be delivered. Frustrated NGOs made their feelings clear in the form of a formal complaint – and a slap on the wrist from the EU Ombudsman duly followed.

However, when it eventually appeared in December 2020, the final SIA report for the EU-Mercosur deal did include a number of interesting recommendations for responding to specific areas of human rights-related risk identified through the pre-signing assessment process – such as flanking measures designed to address issues pertaining to health, equality, and protection of indigenous peoples, and stressing the need for ‘continuous monitoring’.

Hopefully these recommendations will be proactively followed up, but there are reasons not to be overly optimistic about that. To the extent that these recommendations might have required, or benefitted from, some tweaks to the terms of the trade agreement itself, it was clearly too late. And while there may be opportunities for EU institutions to follow up the recommendations through unilateral ex post evaluation processes, current legal, policy, and institutional arrangements provide few guarantees this will take place.

The credibility of the EU SIA programme has clearly taken a knock because of the problems with the EU-Mercosur process, and stakeholders could be forgiven for questioning whether expending time and effort on engaging in these processes is actually worthwhile. As a first step towards rectifying this, the Commission should be transparent about how it plans to respond to the EU-Mercosur SIA recommendations regarding flanking measures and follow up – ideally consulting with stakeholders about the various human rights monitoring options available.

Looking further ahead, the Commission should be urging SIA practitioners to deal more expansively with the options for follow up human rights monitoring in future SIA reports, setting out recommendations not just on the need for ongoing monitoring of human rights-related issues but on the detail of how this might be done, and how progress towards human rights-related goals could be tracked. And creativity should be encouraged because, as detailed in a newly-published Chatham House research paper, there may be more opportunities for human rights monitoring than first appear.

The SIA process could also provide a forum for exploring complementary measures needed to make future monitoring efforts as effective as possible – jointly and unilaterally; politically, structurally, and resources-wise; both within the framework of the trading relationship and extraneously. The credibility of the process – and hence stakeholder trust – would be further enhanced by commitments from the Commission to be more transparent in future about how different human rights monitoring recommendations laid out in SIAs have been taken into account in subsequent negotiations, in the supervisory arrangements developed for specific trading relationships, and in the implementation of EU trade policy more generally.

Elizabeth Wilmshurst CMG appointed Honorary Queen’s Counsel News release jon.wallace 14 January 2022

Founder of the International Law Programme at Chatham House recognized for her major contribution to the law of England and Wales.

Elizabeth Wilmshurst CMG, distinguished fellow of Chatham House’s International Law Programme, has been awarded the title of Honorary Queen’s Counsel (QC Honoris Causa), recognizing her major contribution to the law of England and Wales, outside practice in the courts. The Lord Chancellor will preside over an appointment ceremony at Westminster Hall on 21 March 2022.

Elizabeth founded the International Law Programme at Chatham House and is an academic expert member of Doughty Street Chambers. She was a legal adviser in the United Kingdom diplomatic service between 1974 and 2003. Between 1994 and 1997 she was the Legal Adviser to the United Kingdom mission to the United Nations in New York. She also took part in the negotiations for the establishment of the International Criminal Court.

Throughout her career, Elizabeth has worked to strengthen the role of international law in reducing global tensions, addressing cross-border challenges and promoting individual liberty, including through influential publications at the Institute such as The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence. 

Robin Niblett CMG, Director and Chief Executive of Chatham House said:

‘We are delighted by this award which recognizes Elizabeth’s outstanding contribution to the field of international law, both in government and – on a continuing basis – through the International Law Programme at Chatham House.’

What is happening in Sri Lanka? Explainer Video aboudiaf.drupal 15 July 2022

Chanu Peiris reflects on the unfolding political and economic crisis in Sri Lanka and its impact on human rights.

What is happening in Sri Lanka?

Sri Lanka has been a leader in South Asia on many human development indicators including health and education. Until recently, it was considered an upper middle-income country. Its GDP, when adjusted for purchasing power, was on par with South Africa’s.  

But the country is now experiencing economic collapse. The crisis has its roots in economic mismanagement by multiple governments. This was made worse by global market disruptions and by internal security emergencies including the 2019 Easter bombings.  

What rights are being impacted?   

The current situation is impacting the full range of human rights for people in Sri Lanka. According to the World Food Programme, over a third of people are now facing moderate to severe hunger.

Shortages of other essentials including cooking gas, fuel and lifesaving medicines are disrupting the normal functioning of society and causing loss of life, enormous hardship, mental distress and social unrest.

There are serious concerns about the long-term impacts to the more vulnerable members of Sri Lanka society – including children, whose development due to lack of proper nutrition and disruptions to schools will be affected.  

The global human rights community has called attention to rights violations by the government, which has been seen to be slow to take the necessary steps to rectify the economic situation. It has also used lethal force and social media blackouts in response to protests. 

What are the broader human rights implications? 

The country is seeing the most widespread and diverse mass demonstrations in its history. So far they have led to the resignation of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and the cabinet. They have also resulted in President Gotabaya Rajapaksa leaving the country. 

The scale of the protests signals an important shift in the social contract. The crisis has united people who were previously divided and there are demands for the abolition of the executive presidency.   

It is also significant that people are calling for more than the economic issues to be addressed. They are focusing on the need for systemic changes, including accountability and transparency within a government which has long resisted both.

In other words, what we are seeing is a clear assertion from the streets of the indivisibility of human rights – that access to food, water, and electricity rely on the safeguarding of civil and political rights and proper accountability.

They are making a powerful argument in favour of human rights-sensitive governance – something that has been in short supply around the world. 

Expert

Defining discontinuous antigenic epitopes remains a substantial challenge, as exemplified by the case of lipid transfer polyproteins, which are common pollen allergens. Hydrogen/deuterium exchange monitored by NMR can be used to map epitopes onto folded protein surfaces, but only if the complex rapidly dissociates. Modifying the standard NMR-exchange measurement to detect substoichiometric complexes overcomes this time scale limitation and provides new insights into recognition of lipid transfer polyprotein by antibodies. In the future, this new and exciting development should see broad application to a range of tight macromolecular interactions.

Myosins generate force and motion by precisely coordinating their mechanical and chemical cycles, but the nature and timing of this coordination remains controversial. We utilized a FRET approach to examine the kinetics of structural changes in the force-generating lever arm in myosin V. We directly compared the FRET results with single-molecule mechanical events examined by optical trapping. We introduced a mutation (S217A) in the conserved switch I region of the active site to examine how myosin couples structural changes in the actin- and nucleotide-binding regions with force generation. Specifically, S217A enhanced the maximum rate of lever arm priming (recovery stroke) while slowing ATP hydrolysis, demonstrating that it uncouples these two steps. We determined that the mutation dramatically slows both actin-induced rotation of the lever arm (power stroke) and phosphate release (≥10-fold), whereas our simulations suggest that the maximum rate of both steps is unchanged by the mutation. Time-resolved FRET revealed that the structure of the pre– and post–power stroke conformations and mole fractions of these conformations were not altered by the mutation. Optical trapping results demonstrated that S217A does not dramatically alter unitary displacements or slow the working stroke rate constant, consistent with the mutation disrupting an actin-induced conformational change prior to the power stroke. We propose that communication between the actin- and nucleotide-binding regions of myosin assures a proper actin-binding interface and active site have formed before producing a power stroke. Variability in this coupling is likely crucial for mediating motor-based functions such as muscle contraction and intracellular transport.

E. A. Rakhmanov and S. P. Suetin
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 269-290.
Abstract, references and article information

L. Oeding
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 227-250.
Abstract, references and article information

Loss and damage: Where are we now and what happens next? 25 January 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 January 2022 Online

This event discusses the progress of the loss and damage agenda within climate negotiations. 

Loss and damage refers to harms and destruction caused by climate change impacts that cannot be avoided through mitigation or adaptation.

While it has gained increasing recognition in international climate change negotiations, turning the concept of loss and damage into tangible action for climate-vulnerable countries has been contentious.

Loss and damage is interwoven with issues of fairness and equity. The issue is highly disputed due to its connection with the historical responsibility of developed countries in causing climate change, as well as associated calls for compensation from developing countries.

At COP26, Scotland became the first government to pledge funds for loss and damage for countries in the Global South. However, most climate-vulnerable countries left disappointed by the failure of the Glasgow Climate Pact to secure the establishment of a dedicated loss and damage financing facility.

Developing countries have made it clear that they will continue to push for a new financing facility in the Glasgow Dialogue, a set of international discussions on loss and damage kicking off in June.

The Environment and Society Discussion Series is hosting two events on loss and damage ahead of that date. This first event outlines the key debates and discuss what progress has been made on advancing the loss and damage agenda within climate negotiations to date.

The second event focuses on solutions and possible ways forward, looking ahead to the COP27 negotiations in Egypt later in 2022, where loss and damage is expected to be a high-profile agenda item.

What happened at COP27? 23 November 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 November 2022 Online

Is the world getting back on track for staying within a 1.5°C temperature rise?

The COP27 summit closes out another year marked by record-breaking floods, deadly heatwaves and other extreme weather events, on top of global energy and food shortages and a cost-of-living crisis.

Remarkable geopolitical shifts including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have weakened commitments to climate goals and led many to worry that governments are backtracking on their climate pledges.

UN officials have urged countries to show up to COP27 with greater ambition but instead of new pledges, the focus is expected to be on whether countries are following through on commitments made at COP26.

This event explored whether COP27 has met the challenge of truly moving the needle, and whether the world is getting back on track for staying within the 1.5°C temperature rise, or for loss and damage and climate justice.

Our expert panel discusses the summit’s overall success and impact on delivering in key areas: climate finance, mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, nature and biodiversity and the just transition.

This event is part of the Waddesdon Club Webinar Series. The Waddesdon Club is a Chatham House initiative to encourage climate leadership in financial and economic policymaking. Since 2016, it has proved a highly successful forum for convening senior policymakers and leading climate scientists with future leaders in finance ministries, central banks and other public sector economic and financial organizations from around the world.

The initiative is supported by Ikea Foundation, KR Foundation and the Rothschild Foundation.

Artificial Intelligence Apps Risk Entrenching India’s Socio-economic Inequities Expert comment sysadmin 14 March 2018

Artificial intelligence applications will not be a panacea for addressing India’s grand challenges. Data bias and unequal access to technology gains will entrench existing socio-economic fissures.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is high on the Indian government’s agenda. Some days ago, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the Wadhwani Institute for Artificial Intelligence, reportedly India’s first research institute focused on AI solutions for social good. In the same week, Niti Aayog CEO Amitabh Kant argued that AI could potentially add $957 billion to the economy and outlined ways in which AI could be a ‘game changer’.

During his budget speech, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley announced that Niti Aayog would spearhead a national programme on AI; with the near doubling of the Digital India budget, the IT ministry also announced the setting up of four committees for AI-related research. An industrial policy for AI is also in the pipeline, expected to provide incentives to businesses for creating a globally competitive Indian AI industry.

Narratives on the emerging digital economy often suffer from technological determinism — assuming that the march of technological transformation has an inner logic, independent of social choice and capable of automatically delivering positive social change. However, technological trajectories can and must be steered by social choice and aligned with societal objectives. Modi’s address hit all the right notes, as he argued that the ‘road ahead for AI depends on and will be driven by human intentions’. Emphasising the need to direct AI technologies towards solutions for the poor, he called upon students and teachers to identify ‘the grand challenges facing India’ – to ‘Make AI in India and for India’.

To do so, will undoubtedly require substantial investments in R&D, digital infrastructure and education and re-skilling. But, two other critical issues must be simultaneously addressed: data bias and access to technology gains.

While computers have been mimicking human intelligence for some decades now, a massive increase in computational power and the quantity of available data are enabling a process of ‘machine learning.’ Instead of coding software with specific instructions to accomplish a set task, machine learning involves training an algorithm on large quantities of data to enable it to self-learn; refining and improving its results through multiple iterations of the same task. The quality of data sets used to train machines is thus a critical concern in building AI applications.

Much recent research shows that applications based on machine learning reflect existing social biases and prejudice. Such bias can occur if the data set the algorithm is trained on is unrepresentative of the reality it seeks to represent. If for example, a system is trained on photos of people that are predominantly white, it will have a harder time recognizing non-white people. This is what led a recent Google application to tag black people as gorillas.

Alternatively, bias can also occur if the data set itself reflects existing discriminatory or exclusionary practices. A recent study by ProPublica found for example that software that was being used to assess the risk of recidivism in criminals in the United States was twice as likely to mistakenly flag black defendants as being at higher risk of committing future crimes.

The impact of such data bias can be seriously damaging in India, particularly at a time of growing social fragmentation. It can contribute to the entrenchment of social bias and discriminatory practices, while rendering both invisible and pervasive the processes through which discrimination occurs. Women are 34 per cent less likely to own a mobile phone than men – manifested in only 14 per cent of women in rural India owning a mobile phone, while only 30 per cent of India’s internet users are women.

Women’s participation in the labour force, currently at around 27 per cent, is also declining, and is one of the lowest in South Asia. Data sets used for machine learning are thus likely to have a marked gender bias. The same observations are likely to hold true for other marginalized groups as well.

Accorded to a 2014 report, Muslims, Dalits and tribals make up 53 per cent of all prisoners in India; National Crime Records Bureau data from 2016 shows in some states, the percentage of Muslims in the incarcerated population was almost three times the percentage of Muslims in the overall population. If AI applications for law and order are built on this data, it is not unlikely that it will be prejudiced against these groups.

(It is worth pointing out that the recently set-up national AI task force is comprised of mostly Hindu men – only two women are on the task force, and no Muslims or Christians. A recent article in the New York Times talked about AI’s ‘white guy problem’; will India suffer from a ‘Hindu male bias’?)

Yet, improving the quality, or diversity, of data sets may not be able to solve the problem. The processes of machine learning and reasoning involve a quagmire of mathematical functions, variables and permutations, the logic of which are not readily traceable or predictable. The dazzle of AI-enabled efficiency gains must not blind us to the fact that while AI systems are being integrated into key socio-economic systems, their accuracy and logic of reasoning have not been fully understood or studied.

The other big challenge stems from the distribution of AI-led technology gains. Even if estimates of AI contribution to GDP are correct, the adoption of these technologies is likely to be in niches within the organized sector. These industries are likely to be capital- rather than labour-intensive, and thus unlikely to contribute to large-scale job creation.

At the same time, AI applications can most readily replace low- to medium-skilled jobs within the organized sector. This is already being witnessed in the outsourcing sector – where basic call and chat tasks are now automated. Re-skilling will be important, but it is unlikely that those who lose their jobs will also be those who are being re-skilled – the long arch of technological change and societal adaptation is longer than that of people’s lives. The contractualization of work, already on the rise, is likely to further increase as large industries prefer to have a flexible workforce to adapt to technological change. A shift from formal employment to contractual work can imply a loss of access to formal social protection mechanisms, increasing the precariousness of work for workers.

The adoption of AI technologies is also unlikely in the short- to medium-term in the unorganized sector, which engages more than 80 per cent of India’s labor force. The cost of developing and deploying AI applications, particularly in relation to the cost of labour, will inhibit adoption. Moreover, most enterprises within the unorganized sector still have limited access to basic, older technologies – two-thirds of the workforce are employed in enterprises without electricity. Eco-system upgrades will be important but incremental. Given the high costs of developing AI-based applications, most start-ups are unlikely to be working towards creating bottom-of-the-pyramid solutions.

Access to AI-led technology gains is thus likely to be heavily differentiated – a few high-growth industries can be expected, but these will not necessarily result in the welfare of labour. Studies show that labour share of national income, especially routine labour, has been declining steadily across developing countries.

We should be clear that new technological applications themselves are not going to transform or disrupt this trend – rather, without adequate policy steering, these trends will be exacerbated.

Policy debates about AI applications in India need to take these two issues seriously. AI applications will not be a panacea for addressing ‘India’s grand challenges’. Data bias and unequal access to technology gains will entrench existing socio-economic fissures, even making them technologically binding.

In addition to developing AI applications and creating a skilled workforce, the government needs to prioritize research that examines the complex social, ethical and governance challenges associated with the spread of AI-driven technologies. Blind technological optimism might entrench rather than alleviate the grand Indian challenge of inequity and growth.

This article was originally published in the Indian Express.

Rethinking European and Afghan policy approaches to migration 9 February 2021 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 January 2021 Online

Speakers argue for a more multidimensional approach to migration, and for a nuanced reassessment of policy.

Please note this is an online event. Please register using the link below to finalize your registration.

Afghanistan is a key country of origin for asylum seekers in Europe, and the prime global recipient of EU development assistance. It was one of the first nations to conclude a migration partnership agreement with the EU, in 2016.

Implementation has been thwarted, however, by war and violence, limited state capacity, entrenched economic deprivation, internal displacement and the unfolding impact of COVID-19.

The speakers argue for a more multidimensional approach to migration, and for a nuanced reassessment of policy. They underscore the strength of Afghanistan’s responses to migration, returns, reintegration, security and peace, and point to the need for synchronizing the EU’s policy approaches.

They argue that effective policy must consider the historical significance of mobility for Afghanistan and the need for coherent regional responses to migration.

This event launches the publication The EU and the Politics of Migration Management in Afghanistan.

Martin Ehler and Karlheinz Gröchenig
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2885-2919.
Abstract, references and article information

Haiyong Wang
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2861-2884.
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T. De Ryck and S. Mishra
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2643-2677.
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Yinji Li, Zhiwei Wang and Xiangyu Zhou
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5947-5992.
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Christoforos Neofytidis
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5289-5321.
Abstract, references and article information

Ta Cong Son, Tran Manh Cuong, Le Quang Dung and Le Van Dung
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 153-165.
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T. A. Suslina
St. Petersburg Math. J. 35 (), 537-570.
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Alin Bostan, Xavier Caruso and Julien Roques
Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 61 (), 609-658.
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When using the distinct count function in SAS Visual Analytics reports, you might find that a negative value is displayed instead of the actual distinct count: imgalt="distinct_count" src="{fusion_66562_1_disti

Intrinsically disordered protein domains often have multiple binding partners. It is plausible that the strength of pairing with specific partners evolves from an initial low affinity to a higher affinity. However, little is known about the molecular changes in the binding mechanism that would facilitate such a transition. We previously showed that the interaction between two intrinsically disordered domains, NCBD and CID, likely emerged in an ancestral deuterostome organism as a low-affinity interaction that subsequently evolved into a higher-affinity interaction before the radiation of modern vertebrate groups. Here we map native contacts in the transition states of the low-affinity ancestral and high-affinity human NCBD/CID interactions. We show that the coupled binding and folding mechanism is overall similar but with a higher degree of native hydrophobic contact formation in the transition state of the ancestral complex and more heterogeneous transient interactions, including electrostatic pairings, and an increased disorder for the human complex. Adaptation to new binding partners may be facilitated by this ability to exploit multiple alternative transient interactions while retaining the overall binding and folding pathway.

Abnormal changes of neuronal Tau protein, such as phosphorylation and aggregation, are considered hallmarks of cognitive deficits in Alzheimer's disease. Abnormal phosphorylation is thought to precede aggregation and therefore to promote aggregation, but the nature and extent of phosphorylation remain ill-defined. Tau contains ∼85 potential phosphorylation sites, which can be phosphorylated by various kinases because the unfolded structure of Tau makes them accessible. However, methodological limitations (e.g. in MS of phosphopeptides, or antibodies against phosphoepitopes) led to conflicting results regarding the extent of Tau phosphorylation in cells. Here we present results from a new approach based on native MS of intact Tau expressed in eukaryotic cells (Sf9). The extent of phosphorylation is heterogeneous, up to ∼20 phosphates per molecule distributed over 51 sites. The medium phosphorylated fraction Pm showed overall occupancies of ∼8 Pi (± 5) with a bell-shaped distribution; the highly phosphorylated fraction Ph had 14 Pi (± 6). The distribution of sites was highly asymmetric (with 71% of all P-sites in the C-terminal half of Tau). All sites were on Ser or Thr residues, but none were on Tyr. Other known posttranslational modifications were near or below our detection limit (e.g. acetylation, ubiquitination). These findings suggest that normal cellular Tau shows a remarkably high extent of phosphorylation, whereas other modifications are nearly absent. This implies that abnormal phosphorylations at certain sites may not affect the extent of phosphorylation significantly and do not represent hyperphosphorylation. By implication, the pathological aggregation of Tau is not likely a consequence of high phosphorylation.

On October 24 and 25, SophosAI presents ideas on how to use models large and small—and defend against malignant ones.

Alba Simats
Dec 1, 2020; 19:1921-1935
Research

Ji Eun Kim
Dec 20, 2020; 0:RA120.002159v1-mcp.RA120.002159
Research