The Justice Laboratory: International Law in Africa Book dora.popova 30 March 2022

The Justice Laboratory is the first major study of the institutions created to enforce international criminal justice standards in Sub-Saharan Africa, including the UN tribunal for the Rwandan genocide.

Since the Second World War, the United Nations and other international actors have created laws, treaties, and institutions to punish perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. But international criminal justice now seems to be a declining force — its energy sapped by long delays in prosecutions, lagging public attention, and a globally rising authoritarianism that disregards legal niceties.

The Justice Laboratory reviews five examples of international criminal justice as they have been applied across Africa, where brutal civil conflicts in recent decades resulted in varying degrees of global attention and action.

Written in an accessible style, the book explores the connections between politics and the doctrine of international criminal law. Highlighting little-known institutional examples and under-discussed political situations, the book contributes to a broader international understanding of African politics and international criminal justice, and the lessons African experiences can offer to other countries.

This book is part of the Insights series.

Praise for The Justice Laboratory

About the author

Kerstin Bree Carlson is associate professor of international law at the Department of Social Science and Business, Roskilde University, where she teaches topics in law and society, global studies, international politics, and Nordic migration.

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There is nothing quite like the excitement of discovery in science—of finding something no one else knew and seeing a story unfold. One has to be part of an emerging picture to feel the elation. These moments in a lifetime are few and far between, but they fuel enthusiasm and keep one going. They are embedded in struggles and joys of everyday life, years of establishing what Louis Pasteur called “the prepared mind,” working with mentors, trainees, and colleagues, failures and successes. This article recalls 1) how I got to be a biochemist; 2) my contributions as an educator and researcher, especially regarding meprin metalloproteases; and 3) my participation in communities of science. Perhaps my reflections will help an aspiring scientist see how fulfilling a career in science can be.

The faithful segregation, or “partition,” of many low-copy number bacterial plasmids is driven by plasmid-encoded ATPases that are represented by the P1 plasmid ParA protein. ParA binds to the bacterial nucleoid via an ATP-dependent nonspecific DNA (nsDNA)-binding activity, which is essential for partition. ParA also has a site-specific DNA-binding activity to the par operator (parOP), which requires either ATP or ADP, and which is essential for it to act as a transcriptional repressor but is dispensable for partition. Here we examine how DNA binding by ParA contributes to the relative distribution of its plasmid partition and repressor activities, using a ParA with an alanine substitution at Arg351, a residue previously predicted to participate in site-specific DNA binding. In vivo, the parAR351A allele is compromised for partition, but its repressor activity is dramatically improved so that it behaves as a “super-repressor.” In vitro, ParAR351A binds and hydrolyzes ATP, and undergoes a specific conformational change required for nsDNA binding, but its nsDNA-binding activity is significantly damaged. This defect in turn significantly reduces the assembly and stability of partition complexes formed by the interaction of ParA with ParB, the centromere-binding protein, and DNA. In contrast, the R351A change shows only a mild defect in site-specific DNA binding. We conclude that the partition defect is due to altered nsDNA binding kinetics and affinity for the bacterial chromosome. Furthermore, the super-repressor phenotype is explained by an increased pool of non-nucleoid bound ParA that is competent to bind parOP and repress transcription.

In eukaryotic DNA replication, DNA polymerase ε (Polε) is responsible for leading strand synthesis, whereas DNA polymerases α and δ synthesize the lagging strand. The human Polε (hPolε) holoenzyme is comprised of the catalytic p261 subunit and the noncatalytic p59, p17, and p12 small subunits. So far, the contribution of the noncatalytic subunits to hPolε function is not well understood. Using pre-steady-state kinetic methods, we established a minimal kinetic mechanism for DNA polymerization and editing catalyzed by the hPolε holoenzyme. Compared with the 140-kDa N-terminal catalytic fragment of p261 (p261N), which we kinetically characterized in our earlier studies, the presence of the p261 C-terminal domain (p261C) and the three small subunits increased the DNA binding affinity and the base substitution fidelity. Although the small subunits enhanced correct nucleotide incorporation efficiency, there was a wide range of rate constants when incorporating a correct nucleotide over a single-base mismatch. Surprisingly, the 3'→5' exonuclease activity of the hPolε holoenzyme was significantly slower than that of p261N when editing both matched and mismatched DNA substrates. This suggests that the presence of p261C and the three small subunits regulates the 3'→5' exonuclease activity of the hPolε holoenzyme. Together, the 3'→5' exonuclease activity and the variable mismatch extension activity modulate the overall fidelity of the hPolε holoenzyme by up to 3 orders of magnitude. Thus, the presence of p261C and the three noncatalytic subunits optimizes the dual enzymatic activities of the catalytic p261 subunit and makes the hPolε holoenzyme an efficient and faithful replicative DNA polymerase.

The origin recognition complex (ORC), composed of six subunits, ORC1–6, binds to origins of replication as a ring-shaped heterohexameric ATPase that is believed to be essential to recruit and load MCM2–7, the minichromosome maintenance protein complex, around DNA and initiate DNA replication. We previously reported the creation of viable cancer cell lines that lacked detectable ORC1 or ORC2 protein without a reduction in the number of origins firing. Here, using CRISPR-Cas9–mediated mutations, we report that human HCT116 colon cancer cells also survive when ORC5 protein expression is abolished via a mutation in the initiator ATG of the ORC5 gene. Even if an internal methionine is used to produce an undetectable, N terminally deleted ORC5, the protein would lack 80% of the AAA+ ATPase domain, including the Walker A motif. The ORC5-depleted cells show normal chromatin binding of MCM2–7 and initiate replication from a similar number of origins as WT cells. In addition, we introduced a second mutation in ORC2 in the ORC5 mutant cells, rendering both ORC5 and ORC2 proteins undetectable in the same cells and destabilizing the ORC1, ORC3, and ORC4 proteins. Yet the double mutant cells grow, recruit MCM2–7 normally to chromatin, and initiate DNA replication with normal number of origins. Thus, in these selected cancer cells, either a crippled ORC lacking ORC2 and ORC5 and present at minimal levels on the chromatin can recruit and load enough MCM2–7 to initiate DNA replication, or human cell lines can sometimes recruit MCM2–7 to origins independent of ORC.

Faithful replication of the mitochondrial genome is carried out by a set of key nuclear-encoded proteins. DNA polymerase γ is a core component of the mtDNA replisome and the only replicative DNA polymerase localized to mitochondria. The asynchronous mechanism of mtDNA replication predicts that the replication machinery encounters dsDNA and unique physical barriers such as structured genes, G-quadruplexes, and other obstacles. In vitro experiments here provide evidence that the polymerase γ heterotrimer is well-adapted to efficiently synthesize DNA, despite the presence of many naturally occurring roadblocks. However, we identified a specific G-quadruplex–forming sequence at the heavy-strand promoter (HSP1) that has the potential to cause significant stalling of mtDNA replication. Furthermore, this structured region of DNA corresponds to the break site for a large (3,895 bp) deletion observed in mitochondrial disease patients. The presence of this deletion in humans correlates with UV exposure, and we have found that efficiency of polymerase γ DNA synthesis is reduced after this quadruplex is exposed to UV in vitro.

Homologous recombination (HR) repairs DNA double-strand breaks using intact homologous sequences as template DNA. Broken DNA and intact homologous sequences form joint molecules (JMs), including Holliday junctions (HJs), as HR intermediates. HJs are resolved to form crossover and noncrossover products. A mismatch repair factor, MLH3 endonuclease, produces the majority of crossovers during meiotic HR, but it remains elusive whether mismatch repair factors promote HR in nonmeiotic cells. We disrupted genes encoding the MLH3 and PMS2 endonucleases in the human B cell line, TK6, generating null MLH3−/− and PMS2−/− mutant cells. We also inserted point mutations into the endonuclease motif of MLH3 and PMS2 genes, generating endonuclease death MLH3DN/DN and PMS2EK/EK cells. MLH3−/− and MLH3DN/DN cells showed a very similar phenotype, a 2.5-fold decrease in the frequency of heteroallelic HR-dependent repair of restriction enzyme–induced double-strand breaks. PMS2−/− and PMS2EK/EK cells showed a phenotype very similar to that of the MLH3 mutants. These data indicate that MLH3 and PMS2 promote HR as an endonuclease. The MLH3DN/DN and PMS2EK/EK mutations had an additive effect on the heteroallelic HR. MLH3DN/DN/PMS2EK/EK cells showed normal kinetics of γ-irradiation–induced Rad51 foci but a significant delay in the resolution of Rad51 foci and a 3-fold decrease in the number of cisplatin-induced sister chromatid exchanges. The ectopic expression of the Gen1 HJ re-solvase partially reversed the defective heteroallelic HR of MLH3DN/DN/PMS2EK/EK cells. Taken together, we propose that MLH3 and PMS2 promote HR as endonucleases, most likely by processing JMs in mammalian somatic cells.

Phillies pitchers and catchers have their first workout Wednesday morning at Carpenter Complex. Almost anything can happen between Wednesday and Opening Day. That said, here is a very early prediction of the Phillies' Opening Day roster, knowing the Phillies remain in the hunt to sign Bryce Harper or Manny Machado.

We're reluctant to finalize our list of offseason winners because, as you may have heard, there are some prominent unsigned free agents. Not just Bryce Harper and Manny Machado, either.

The next five weeks will see lots of shuffling on Major League rosters. Here are the most intriguing positional battles on each of the 30 MLB clubs.

The Phillies list isn't quite as strong as it once was because of the Realmuto deal, but there's still some very good talent at the top and some exciting players on the rise.

Leading up to the start of Spring Training, the Around the Horn series will examine each of the Angels' positional groupings heading into the 2019 season. Here's a look at the bullpen.

MLB.com looked at each team's two highest-ranked position players in WAR, according to the Steamer projections. Here are the top 10, but keep in mind that things could change once Manny Machado and Bryce Harper find homes.

Our weekly series previewing each of baseball's six divisions begins with the American League West. Let's take a team-by-team look at the biggest questions this season.

The Angels head to Spring Training with most of their roster set, but there will be competition for a few spots. Here's a look at the projected roster for the Angels, as they begin their first campaign under manager Brad Ausmus.

After Ohtani's nearly unprecedented two-way success during his American League Rookie of the Year campaign last year, more clubs are looking into the possibility of having players who can both pitch and play a position. Walsh fits that bill, as he has been a power-hitting first baseman and outfielder in the Minors, but he's made 10 pitching appearances over the past three seasons as well. The Angels are experimenting with him doing both this spring and this upcoming season.

The next five weeks will see lots of shuffling on Major League rosters. Here are the most intriguing positional battles on each of the 30 MLB clubs.

The Angels have a new closer in Cody Allen and there isn't any manager in baseball who knows him better than Indians skipper Terry Francona.

Ramaphosa Has Won the Battle. But Can He Win the War? Expert comment sysadmin 21 December 2017

Cyril Ramaphosa is taking charge of South Africa’s ruling party, the ANC, at its weakest point in post-apartheid history. Expectations couldn’t be higher.

Ramaphosa ran for the leadership of the ANC on a platform of party renewal, economic recovery, and building the capacity of the state. But Jacob Zuma remains the President of South Africa and, under the constitution, can stay in office until elections in 2019. Therefore, meeting expectations on economic recovery will depend on Ramaphosa taking the presidency – and he has a number of political battles to face before that becomes reality.

To begin with, Ramaphosa and his supporters did not win a total victory at the elective conference. The presidency was only one position in the senior cadre – the co-called ‘top six’ – that was elected. This body is now split evenly between Ramaphosa and his allies, and those that supported his opponent Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma - Jacob Zuma’s preferred successor. This creates two centres of power in the ANC, limiting what Ramaphosa will be able to achieve from within the party.

Although there is significant pressure from the electorate to remove Zuma from national office, actually doing so will be difficult. Zuma’s predecessor Thabo Mbeki was removed from the national presidency before his term was up when the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the party recalled him from office following Zuma’s assumption of party leadership. But this option may not be available to Ramaphosa. The split within the ‘top six’ and new NEC will make it difficult to present an ultimatum to Zuma. His loyalists will not want a witch hunt within the party.

Corruption and elitism within the party

Much of the tension centres on questions of corruption, the dominant political issue in South Africa at the moment. In the build up to the elective conference Gwede Mantashe - now national chairperson - admitted that “The biggest challenge from where we’re sitting is the image and the reputation of the ANC. The ANC is seen as equal to corruption and looting.” Ramaphosa made anti-corruption initiatives a centrepiece of his campaign, including the establishment of a judicial commission and rapid action to investigate and prosecute the guilty.

But the split within the party may undermine the credibility of these promises. Ramaphosa’s problem is that some of the new ‘top six’ - including Deputy President David Mabuza, and Secretary General Ace Magashule – would be high on the list of those the electorate want to see investigated. Party resistance may restrict the extent to which Ramaphosa can demonstrate a comprehensive break from the past.

Corruption within the party goes far deeper than the headline cases of ‘state capture’ and expropriation. At a branch level, access to political power has become the primary means of access to economic resource. It is a process of selective patronage that differentiates between those who are ‘in’ from those who aren’t. At its broadest, this type of corruption has created a mistrust of the ANC and the new economic elite that the party has created around it – including Ramaphosa himself.

Having lost out to Mbeki in the fight to succeed Mandela despite being the favourite for the job, Ramaphosa spearheaded the ANC’s deployment of cadres in business. He has become one of the country’s richest men, and a highly sought after board member by South Africa’s largest companies across mining, telecoms, and logistics.

One of his biggest challenges will be to remove the perception of elitism as his senior position within the party and economy has given rise to mistrust from a grass roots level. The political tussle at the conference was also largely driven by a small number of the party elite being able to control large groups of delegate votes. The nature of political competition within the party is symptomatic of the ANCs electoral dominance in the early days of the nation’s democracy. But this support is now far less certain, and the party cannot afford to become complacent.

Resetting the relationship with business

Ramaphosa’s business dealings may mean he has to walk a fine line in censuring his colleagues for making money from politics. But it may also be a significant opportunity for the party to reset its relationship with the private sector. Under Mbeki, relations between the ANC and business were distant, but characterized by recognition of mutual dependence.

Under Zuma this relationship deteriorated, and the President demonstrated he was willing to make decisions to boost his political power irrespective of economic consequences. Ramaphosa could, for the first time, truly align the interests of business and government, without abandoning his transformative policy agenda.

At an ANC regional economic colloquium in Johannesburg in November Ramaphosa outlined his ten-point economic plan. It would deliver the party’s adopted mantra of ‘radical economic transformation’, but through broadly neo-liberal policies on private business development and state-owned enterprise reform to allow private capital to co-invest.

He took the ethos and principles of the Freedom Charter – the 1955 statement of core ANC principles – and applied them to a modernising economy. Talk of a ‘new deal’, productive partnerships in the mining sector, and an emphasis on job creation in manufacturing will woo investors. The rand surged upon his election.

But Ramaphosa will not be able to deliver on the economic demands of the country until he is in the office of the presidency - and Zuma still holds many of the cards. Ramaphosa can promise his followers potential power and government positions in future, but Zuma can still offer them now.

Removing Zuma will require skilful internal party politicking, and Ramaphosa will need to limit the fallout – he cannot afford to further damage the credibility of the party before it faces the electorate in 2019. He has won the battle, but the outcome of the war is far from certain.

Tsvangirai Leaves an Important Political Legacy in Southern Africa Expert comment sysadmin 21 February 2018

The story of Zimbabwe’s ‘people’s champion’ offers a powerful example to a region in need of new political compromises.

The death of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai is a loss for Zimbabwe. In nearly three decades of speaking truth to power, Tsvangirai helped to change his nation and the region.

Southern Africa’s new politics

His death marks a period of transition for regional governments and opposition parties alike. The Zuma era has ended in South Africa while Mozambique, Namibia and Angola have also seen political transitions, pushing modernization agendas to appeal to young citizenries that increasingly see politics in separate terms from the liberationist struggles of the previous generation.

Regional opposition movements also face winds of change: the longstanding opposition leader in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Etienne Tshekedi, passed away in 2017, and Mozambique’s Afonso Dhlakama and Kenya’s Raila Odinga are both aging. These movements similarly need to appeal to a younger audience or risk losing relevance.

From trade unionist to opposition leader

Tsvangirai’s career is an eloquent illustration of these challenges. Born in Buhera in rural eastern Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai worked in textiles and mining before politics – diverse experience which gave him crucial exposure to the lives of ordinary people across the country. In his early years, he also worked for ZANU-PF, before leaving to forge his own political path. He became increasingly active in mining politics, rising to the executive of the National Mineworker’s Union and, in 1989, to secretary-general of the powerful Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.

In the late 1990’s, Zimbabwe was riven by questions over land, war veterans, the Congo conflict, a shrinking economy and growing doubts about ZANU-PF itself. Opposition leaders of the time could not answer them; those such as Edgar Tekere and Margaret Dongo struggled to win support beyond their local constituencies, and liberation leader Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU had been merged with ZANU-PF in the 1987 Unity Accord.

But in 2000, Zimbabwe’s ‘perfect storm’ of a divisive constitutional referendum, land redistribution and a June election made Tsvangirai and the newly minted MDC, formed in 1999, a national rival to ZANU-PF. Through subsequent national elections in 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013, Zimbabwe remained polarized between competing visions of Zimbabwe future: ZANU-PF’s powerful black liberationist politics of identity and the opposition’s equally compelling liberal democracy agenda.

Tsvangirai’s achievement was to provide a credible alternative to liberation icon Robert Mugabe. Tsvangirai also resuscitated Zimbabwe’s tradition of urban nationalism, and was a successor to Benjamin Burombo and other mid-century Zimbabwean urban leaders. Tsvangirai would in turn be a touchstone for contemporary urban activists Evans Mawarire, Linda Masarira and others.

From opposition to coalition

The political struggle for Zimbabwe became global, with Mugabe and Tsvangirai both winning support from rival international power blocs. In March 2007, pictures of a beaten and bloodied Tsvangirai helped to galvanize support for the MDC in the 2008 elections. But the disputed result and violent subsequent run-off between Tsvangirai and Mugabe led the regional community to push both men into a coalition government, with Tsvangirai as prime minister.

Despite continuous ructions, the Government of National Unity (GNU) held, and stabilized Zimbabwe’s collapsed economy, until 2013. Although often politically out-manoeuvred by Mugabe, Tsvangirai deserves credit for getting the opposition a share of political power and for holding his nerve against many who wanted to collapse the GNU.

Tsvangirai was no saint; his complicated love life, and tacit approval of violent attacks on party dissenters, do him no credit. More importantly, the MDC neglected its grassroots supporters during the GNU, and paid the price in its comprehensive 2013 electoral defeat. But although diminished, Tsvangirai remained Zimbabwe’s most popular opposition politician, and the MDC’s new leaders will have quite a task ahead of them, even if they have been planning since his courageous 2016 public admission of colon cancer.

The MDC after Tsvangirai

Nelson Chamisa, one of the three MDC vice presidents, has now been appointed as acting president by the party’s national committee. Chamisa inherits a fractured and fractious party, and one which has also fallen out with the Tsvangirai family. The other two vice presidents, Thokozani Khupe and Elias Mudzuri, have also set their sights on party leadership.

At 40, Chamisa, an orator with grassroots appeal, has a huge task. With general elections due by July, he has to unite the party, counter Zimbabwe’s rising ethno-politics, prove himself as leader of a broader opposition coalition and take on a resurgent President Emmerson Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF.

Electorally, the opposition’s strongest card has always been the urban vote and the economy. But Mnangagwa has fast forwarded a comprehensive economic reform and internationalist agenda. This, and Mugabe’s exit, have forced Chamisa, Joice Mujuru and other opposition leaders to play catch-up. Zimbabwe’s elections, the first since 2000 without Mugabe and Tsvangirai as contenders, will be of global interest as the country navigates the new political dynamics.

The people’s champion

Morgan Tsvangirai’s resilience earned him respect from friends and foes alike, with Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa and Vice President Constantino Chiwenga visiting him at home a few weeks ago. A former nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, Tsvangirai, popularly known by his totem of ‘Save’ and also called mudhara [the old man] deserves national hero status. He will certainly be remembered as the ‘people’s champion’, and a pioneer in bridging the generational and ideological fissures that have shaped Southern Africa’s politics.

With their leader now gone, the turbulent MDC will undoubtedly be hoping for a ‘remembrance vote’ in his memory to carry them through the elections. But beyond that, his story offers a powerful example to a region in need of new political compromises.

Angola Forum 2018: 30th Anniversary of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale 23 March 2018 — 10:00AM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 March 2018 Chatham House, London

Reflections on Southern Africa’s Turning Point

23 March 2018 marks the 30th anniversary of the final assault of what became known as the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

The confrontation between the Angolan army, supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union, and the armed opposition UNITA, supported by the South African Defence Force, is the largest land battle to have taken place in Africa since World War Two.

The battle was a watershed in Angolan and southern African history, but its significance continues to be contested. Today, although the battlefield has a monument and museum, it remains one of the most landmine-contaminated parts of Angola and this hinders development plans for international tourism.

This event brings together veterans and experts to contribute towards developing a deeper understanding of the battle. Discussions will further focus on the significance of the wider events around the battle, its regional implications, as well as the legacy of the battlefield.

Zimbabwe Ahead of the Elections: Political and Economic Challenges 8 May 2018 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 May 2018 Chatham House, London

The upcoming elections in Zimbabwe will be the first since 2000 in which former president Robert Mugabe and long-time opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai are not on the ballot paper. A key electoral issue for many voters will be the economy: recent years have been marked by high unemployment rates, chronic cash shortages and mounting public debt. Although this has traditionally been a strong campaigning issue for the opposition, President Emmerson Mnangagwa has fast-tracked comprehensive economic reforms.

At this event, Nelson Chamisa, MDC Alliance presidential candidate, will discuss his efforts to build a united opposition coalition with a strong message, the steps needed to ensure a free and fair election can take place, and the role that international partners can play in Zimbabwe’s democratic process.

Afonso Dhlakama’s Death Changes the Calculation for Peace Prospects in Mozambique Expert comment sysadmin 4 May 2018

If politicians continue to act in good faith, the death of the opposition leader may be a significant opportunity to finally draw a line under Mozambique’s long war.

The unexpected death of opposition and ex-rebel leader Afonso Dhlakama on 3 May is a game changer for Mozambique’s politics and an almost-completed peace process. The 65-year old Dhlakama, who died of a heart attack, had led Renamo for 38 years and had totally dominated his party. Dhlakama regularly boasted that he was Mozambique’s ‘father of democracy’, despite not allowing competition within his own party, and he leaves a legacy of more than 30 years of struggle, through both armed action and peaceful politics.

A long war

Originally Renamo had been a tool for the white minority regimes of Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa to challenge the socialist Frelimo political party that took power in Mozambique in 1975. But under Dhlakama’s command, by the late 1980s Renamo had become increasingly independent and rooted in Mozambique. After Renamo’s long war with Frelimo ground to a hurting stalemate, a transition led to Mozambique’s first multiparty elections in 1994, and the creation of a new joint army. A ‘pay and scatter’ programme successfully dispersed and reintegrated many thousands of ex-combatants.

But early post-election gains did not translate to lasting peace. Disarmament was a time-limited, technical process, and devoted declining resources and attention to clusters of ex-combatants that failed to disperse. In addition, Dhlakama was allowed to maintain an armed militia under the guise of a presidential guard.

Mounting economic inequality, notably in opposition strongholds such as central Mozambique, saw Renamo made political gains and Dhlakama nearly won the 1999 presidential elections. (Some believe he did.) The result focused Frelimo’s attention on the threat that Renamo posed and, ultimately, a strategy of pursuing total Frelimo domination across the country, culminating in a crushing Frelimo victory at the 2009 elections.

This humiliated and marginalized former Renamo rebels, resulting in Dhlakama ordering their return to targeted armed violence in 2013. Frelimo’s new leader, President Filipe Nyusi, took power in 2015 and sought direct dialogue with Dhlakama. Five rounds of internationally mediated peace talks took place from July to December. Finally, in late December 2016, Dhlakama announced a unilateral truce, which was extended twice and subsequently made indefinite.

New peace talks also started and, in August 2017 and February 2018, President Nyusi and Dhlakama showed the courage to meet in person, near Renamo’s base in central Mozambique, to build up mutual trust and discuss the details of the emerging peace deal – including the demobilization or integration into government security forces for Renamo’s now mostly middle-aged gunmen.

Dhlakama the ‘Big Man’

Dhlakama’s sudden death has fundamentally changed the negotiation dynamics. He never allowed for any serious succession planning, and ensured all key decisions were his and his alone. Renamo had already decided that he would be its presidential candidate for the 2019 national elections.

His party is significantly weakened by his death and unlikely able to fully recover – but needs to try and reach consensus quickly on a successor, as it will also compete in municipal elections in October and was expecting significant gains. There will be a number of contenders to succeed him including from the parliamentary wing, led by his niece Ivone Soares, its secretary general, Manuel Bissopo, and a few others.

But Renamo’s key leverage for now remains some 1,000 middle-aged gunmen in central Mozambique who have been stoically loyal to Dhlakama since the 1980s and who have little respect for the younger generation of professional politicians based in Maputo. Some may be bought off by government offers, others integrated into localised organized crime groups and others into internal Renamo sectarianism. The risk of fragmentation is real.

Renamo’s weakness could also embolden Frelimo hardliners to seek a return to unilateral domination of Mozambique’s political landscape, and to undermine the peace process. That would be a serious tactical mistake by Frelimo, as a lasting deal is close and the death of Dhlakama could actually assist in making this settlement lasting. Dhlakama was quixotic and prone to changing his mind, often influenced by the last person he spoke to – his death potentially introduces greater predictability in negotiations and in any post-deal implementation.

President Nyusi is clearly aware of this as he hailed on state television TVM that Dhlakama was ‘a citizen who has always worked for Mozambique’ and said he was distraught at the news of his death. He stated, ‘I hope that we as Mozambicans can continue to do everything so things do not go down.’ He also addressed Renamo’s support base by saying that ‘[Dhlakama] did everything so that there would be peace. The last time he spoke to me, he said he was not going to miss out anything in peace negotiations.’

Renamo’s gunmen are fatigued and want to retire with dignity but are vulnerable to manipulation and political miscalculation by Mozambican’s positioning politicians. International partners and investors can engage, by emphasizing that sustainable peace is the only pathway to poverty reduction and inclusive economic development.

This includes assisting development and reconciliation projects in areas impacted by the renewed conflict since 2013. Long-term investment for development in Renamo’s key constituencies could help avoid fragmentation at a critical time – faith groups and NGOs may also have a key role to play.

If Mozambique’s politicians continue to act in good faith, the death of Dhlakama may constitute a significant opportunity to finally draw a line under Mozambique’s long war.

Higher Education in South Africa: Demands for Inclusion and the Challenges of Reform 17 October 2018 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2018 Chatham House, London

South Africa After the Elections: Balancing Domestic and International Policy Priorities 16 May 2019 — 1:30PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 May 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The government that emerges from the 8 May election in South Africa faces immediate domestic and international foreign policy demands. Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to stimulate job growth, accelerating anti-corruption and good governance efforts are at the forefront of the new government’s agenda.

International ambitions will be upgraded such as UN security council reform, maximizing South Africa’s G20, BRICS and IBSA membership and preparing for South Africa’s chairmanship of the African Union (AU) in 2020.

At this meeting, the speakers – Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy chairman of SAIIA and author with Nobantu Mbeki of A Manifesto for Social Change: How to Save South Africa, and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, chief executive of SAIIA and currently co-editing a volume on A South African Foreign Policy for the 2020s which will be published in 2019 – will reflect on the election and discuss the new government’s domestic and international policy agenda. The meeting will be chaired by Ann Grant, former British High Commissioner to South Africa (2000-05) with past experience working for Oxfam, Standard Chartered Bank and Tullow Oil.

Mine Action in Angola: Clearing the Legacies of Conflict to Harness the Potential of Peace Other resource sysadmin 14 June 2019

This publication draws on and updates the briefing note published following a meeting of the All- Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Angola on 26 April 2017. It also incorporates insights from a Chatham House Africa Programme conference session on the legacies of the Angolan Civil War, held on 23 March 2018; and draws on the Africa Programme’s research into conservation-driven development models in Southern Africa.

Almost two decades after the end of its civil war, Angola remains one of the most heavily landmine-contaminated countries in the world. The Angolan government has committed to clearing its landmines by 2025, and there is constructive collaboration between the government and mine clearing agencies in this endeavour, but the target will be achievable only if a decline in funding from international donors is reversed. International funding for mine clearance in Angola fell by more than 80 per cent between 2005 and 2017, and this sharp drop in external support has compounded the impact on domestic funding for national clearance efforts as a result of the downturn in prices for Angola’s main export commodities.

The national mine action agency, the Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária (CNIDAH), is supported by the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and the HALO Trust. By 2017, 15 years after the end of the civil war, these organizations had collectively helped clear 56 per cent of known landmine-contaminated land. State-led demining has focused principally on clearing areas designated for infrastructure projects. Now, it is critical that humanitarian demining in largely agricultural and conservation areas is prioritized to bring to an end the daily threat to Angola’s rural poor – as well as to the country’s livestock and wildlife – of injury or death as a result of landmine accidents.

Angola has some of the world’s most important remaining wilderness, including the tributary system for the unique Okavango Delta, and the country has the potential to host one of the most diverse wildlife populations on the continent. However, the presence of landmines and other remnants of the civil war render large areas of the country unsafe both for wildlife and for the local people, whose ability to derive a sustainable livelihood from their natural environment is fundamental to its protection.

Wildlife and tourism provide important economic opportunities for diversification beyond an oil-dominated economy. Critically, Angola’s economic diversification and development objectives can only be achieved if the landmines that prohibit access to land for agriculture, mining, tourism and wildlife are cleared.

There are economic opportunities for released land in the most heavily mined provinces of Cuando Cubango and Moxico. Already, some new funding for mine action in Angola, if upscaled or matched by international donors, could be transformative for its people, and for the conservation of the region’s vital biodiversity.

Economic Recovery and Anticorruption in South Africa: Assessing Progress on the Reform Agenda 4 December 2019 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 25 November 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

South Africa has significant economic potential based on its resource endowment, quality human capital and well-developed infrastructure compared to the region. However, the country’s economic growth rate has not topped 2 per cent since 2013, and in 2018, was below 1 per cent. This has put a strain on citizens and communities in a country that still suffers from structural inequality, poverty and high unemployment. Economic recovery and anti-corruption were the central pillars of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s 2019 electoral campaign and he has set an investment target of $100 billion. However, voters and investors alike are demanding faster and more visible progress from the country’s enigmatic leader who has a reputation for caution and calculation.

At this event, Professor Nick Binedell will discuss the progress of and opposition to the president’s economic reform agenda and the opportunities for international investment to support long term inclusive and sustainable growth in South Africa.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Can Liberation Movements Really Rid Southern Africa of Corruption? Expert comment sysadmin 16 December 2019

Southern Africa’s national liberation movements have survived ‘end of decade’ elections across the region. Combating corruption has been at the heart of many of the campaigns, but the question is can they succeed?

Swapo’s victory in Namibia two weeks ago was the last in a series of recent ‘end of decade’ elections that have returned dominant parties to power across Southern Africa. However, the “enduring appeal of liberation” is wearing thin.

Experiences across the region show that if governments are to deliver on their electoral promises, they must empower institutions, actively promote a culture of accountability and transparency within their party ranks and pursue economic reforms that untangle the web of party-state-business alliances. Such actions are critical for the survival of national liberation movements as the dominant force in the politics of Southern Africa – but will be difficult to implement.

Avoid political factionalism

South Africa, Botswana, Angola and Zimbabwe all saw new presidents take over just before elections. All used the rhetoric of anti-corruption to distance themselves from the tainted image of their predecessors. But acting on this requires a shift in mind-set in parties that have always preferred to deal with their problems behind closed doors. High profile adversaries from past regimes make tempting targets but could also drive party divisions.

In Angola, the transition of power was safeguarded by an agreement that former president José Eduardo dos Santos would be immune from prosecution. But this week his son faced corruption charges before the country’s supreme court, a high-profile example of a wave of anti-corruption cases across Southern Africa, driven by dominant parties wary of their future.

The allegations against José Filemino De Sousa Dos Santos, nickname ‘Zenu’, include a $500-million fraud involving the country’s central bank. Pressure is also mounting on Zenu’s sister Isabel — once prominent in Angola, she is now absent from public life.

Other leaders have had to tread more carefully. Immunity was a luxury Cyril Ramaphosa was neither willing nor politically able to grant Jacob Zuma in South Africa. Reliant on a few close allies at the top of the party, Ramaphosa lacks foot soldiers at the grassroots level, and his campaign against corruption within the ANC has faced persistent opposition.

Rebuilding institutions and empowering authorities takes time, and with few high-profile cases to point to, people are getting restless. This is also the case in Zimbabwe, where a worsening economic situation has left policy reformers politically isolated.

Party, state, and business

Long term incumbency has blurred the distinction between the party and the state. Liberation movements have created vast party-linked business empires. Political allegiance grants access to economic resources through appointments to lucrative positions in state-owned enterprises, preferential bids for tenders and licenses, and direct access to decision makers.

In Angola, this was fuelled by oil revenues. In South Africa, state capture flourished in an environment where the ANC and its constituent elements had significant power on the panels that chose leaders for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In Namibia, an Icelandic fishing company paid backhanders to officials for fishing rights in what has become known as the ‘Fishrot’ scandal. Zanu-PF officials’ access to preferential foreign exchange rates present them with lucrative opportunities in Zimbabwe.

Ending this bureaucratic rent seeking goes beyond appointing ‘clean’ officials, which has been central to the anti-corruption campaigns in Angola and South Africa. Governments must also allow scrutiny of the state and empower those institutions designed for that role, such as the National Prosecuting Authority and the Public Protector in South Africa. Zimbabwe’s auditor general has published an in-depth report of the state of corruption in the country’s SOEs.

Companies must also be held to account for their role in aiding, and at worst directly benefitting, from state graft. International businesses have actively sought to benefit from corruption. They are now starting to face the consequences. A former Credit Suisse banker has pleaded guilty in the US over handling alleged kickbacks in Mozambique’s $2-billion “tuna bond” scandal. Global banks and consultancies continue to feel the squeeze for their complicity in state capture in South Africa.

Competition and pluralism

National liberation movements may only have a limited window within which to act. Across the region civil society campaigns and investigative journalists have shed light on some of the worst abuses of power. Anti-corruption campaigns are starting to bite. The state will continue to play a central role in Southern African economies, an important arbiter of economic transformation able to balance the region’s highly unequal and resource-dependent economies.

But opposition, civil society and the media are also critical for the progression towards democratic competition and pluralism in Southern Africa. Parliaments remain vital for holding rulers to account. Long used to unchallenged dominance, liberation movements have significant adjustments to make to rise to the challenge of a new era.

This article was originally published in the Mail and Guardian.

Angola's Business Promise: Evaluating the Progress of Privatization and Other Economic Reforms 21 January 2020 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Minister Nunes Júnior will discuss the progress of the Angolan government’s economic stabilization plans and business reform agenda including the privatization of some state-owned enterprises. These reforms could expand Angola’s exports beyond oil and stimulate new industries and more inclusive economic growth.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Southern Africa

Research focuses on policies for inclusive and diversified economic growth tackling inequality, consolidating democracy, and adapting to environmental change.

Zimbabwe is developing long-term economic reform and international re-engagement, while South Africa remains a major regional hub for international political and commercial relations. Youth perspectives on the country’s future and prospects for higher educational reform are also a major focus of our research.

Mozambique’s peace process is vital to regional progress as is the ongoing work on sustainable development and job creation through bio-diversity conservation and regional political co-operation.

Our research interest areas in this region also include resource governance and extractive industries.

POSTPONED: Pursuing Economic Reform and Growth in South Africa: the view from the African National Congress 18 March 2020 — 10:30AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 March 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The government of South Africa is pursuing a programme of reform to revitalize the economy, strengthen institutions and combat corruption. The State of the Nation Address (SONA) on 13 February and the budget speech of 26 February represent the most significant articulation of the government’s economic strategy. Central to this is the government’s plans for the energy sector, which is fundamental for reviving the economy, and the reform of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). But questions remain about possible divergence of the approach taken by government ministers from the policy position of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), and what this might mean for the sustainability and progress of reform.

At this event, Paul Mashatile, Treasurer General of the ANC, will discuss the party’s assessment of reform efforts to date and priorities for delivering on inclusive growth.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Zimbabwe's Economy During the Coronavirus Pandemic and Beyond 8 September 2020 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 26 August 2020

COVID-19 has had a devastating effect on Zimbabwe’s already floundering economy. Important foreign currency earning industries have virtually stopped, and across the country livelihoods are at risk and an increasing number of people are reliant on government grants.

Businesses are having to become more flexible but are constrained by a weak policy environment and lack of confidence in the economy. Since 2017, the government has been pursuing an economic reform agenda and Transitional Stabilization Programme (TSP), which was scheduled for completion by the end of 2020. The deepening challenges highlight the need to accelerate economic reform and build confidence in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.

At this webinar, speakers discuss the measures that government, businesses, and individuals are adopting in response to the COVID-19 economic challenge, and the policies required for recovery.

Read a meeting summary

This webinar is held in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

South Africa's Economic Reform and Employment in the Context of the Coronavirus Pandemic 3 September 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 August 2020 Online

President of COSATU, Zingiswa Losi, discusses the organization’s priorities for protecting jobs and workers, and working with other stakeholders to build a sustainable post-pandemic economy.

Employment in South Africa fell by an estimated 18 per cent between February and April 2020. The measures imposed to control the spread of COVID-19 suffocated an already weak economy and unemployment has hit a new high.

The stated aims of the government’s economic reform plans include the support of job creation in labour intensive industries, but the reform of the state and rebalancing of the economy and fiscus could lead to further job losses in state agencies and enterprises.

Protecting jobs while ensuring the health and safety of workers are dual priorities, and require the joint commitment and ‘social compact’ of labour, business and government.

South Africa’s foreign policy: Reflections on the United Nations Security Council and the African Union 20 January 2021 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 January 2021 Online

HE Dr Naledi Pandor, South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, discusses South Africa’s role in pursuing its regional and global goals.

To receive joining instructions, please finalise your registration by clicking the link below. Once you have registered you will receive a confirmation email from Zoom, which will include the unique joining link you will need to attend.

In 2019-2020, South Africa served its third term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, seeking to strengthen its role as a bridge-builder and further justify a more permanent role for the country and continent on the body.

In February 2021, South Africa will also conclude its time as Chair of the African Union, having used its tenure to promote peace and security issues, including closer cooperation with the UNSC, and advance regional economic integration.

South Africa took up these roles at a time of global and regional upheaval. As COVID-19 tested countries’ commitment to cooperation over isolation, South Africa coordinated regional responses to address the challenges of stressed public health systems, vaccine strategies, and economic stimulus and debt support across Africa.

Its leadership has been further tested by ongoing and emerging insecurity in the Sahel, and in Cabo Delgado in neighbouring Mozambique. The crux of its regional strategy remains squaring the circle between promoting regional economic cooperation while protecting its own domestic economic priorities.

At this event, HE Dr Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa, reflects on the country’s two years on the UNSC and one year of chairing the AU, and discuss South Africa’s role in pursuing regional and global goals.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.

Read event transcript. 

Inclusion, agency and influence: The role of women in Zimbabwe’s economy 8 July 2021 — 3:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 July 2021 Online

Speakers discuss the changing role of women in Zimbabwe’s economic structures and the priorities for promoting greater economic inclusion, agency and influence of women.

Zimbabwe’s National Development Strategy of 2021-2025 highlights the importance of gender sensitivity in policymaking and of women’s economic participation in attaining the government’s Vision 2030.

However, women have been among the worst affected groups by the devastating effects that COVID-19 has had on Zimbabwe’s already floundering economy, which has exacerbated the challenges they face in economic life, such as access to credit, financial services and social security.

Leveraging existing structures such as women’s groups, micro-finance facilities, education and training, and national gender mechanisms, as well as supporting wider financial and digital inclusion in Zimbabwe, is central for the country’s sustained economic recovery.

This event also focuses on the differing impacts of COVID-19 on women’s economic activities across various sectors, as well as along rural-urban and formal-informal economy lines.

Read a meeting summary

This webinar is part of a series of events in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on Zimbabwe’s economic recovery and reform.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

War on Ukraine: The state of the global response 17 October 2022 — 6:30PM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

Implications of the war for the future of multilateralism.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has tested the capacity for a unified global response to grave violations of the UN Charter. The world is in unchartered territory as a nuclear member of the United Nations Security Council attacks a non-nuclear country. 

Multilateral institutions that were born out of an effort to prevent war are struggling to prove their relevance in the face of growing existential threats to humanity. The war is exacerbating divisions within the global community, disrupting food and energy supplies worldwide and contributing to a profound crisis of multilateralism.

The longer these divisions last, the longer the war in the middle of Europe and the harder it will be to respond to the interconnected global crises that threaten everyone.

This discussion offers a unique insight into the macro-geopolitical questions in relation to the war in Ukraine with members of the Elders and other experts:

The panel considers:

• How can a more united global response to Russian aggression be built?

• What stands in the way of an effective multilateral response based on international norms?

• In what ways are divisions between UN member states influencing the trajectory of the war or prospects for peace?

• How is the conflict changing geopolitics and the ability of the multilateral system to address global challenges?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. This event is organised in partnership between Chatham House and The Elders, the group of independent global leaders founded by Nelson Mandela who work for peace, justice and human rights.

Read the transcript.

War on Ukraine: The energy crisis and Europe’s impending long winter 2 November 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2022 Online

Can Europe remain unified over the long winter?

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the global community has been responding to significant price shocks, especially energy. As Europe heads into a particularly difficult winter, policymakers are grappling with the costs, both political and economic, required to make sure Russian energy blackmail does not succeed.

Retaining a unified front against Russia and providing continued support to the Ukrainian government will be great challenges. As the cold begins to bite, war fatigue may accelerate among the populations of Europe. Providing their people with adequate heat will not come cheaply for governments across the continent at a time of economic uncertainty.

At this critical moment of Russia’s invasion, experts discuss:

• Have European preparations been sufficient to stave off an energy crisis this winter?
• What will be Russia’s reaction during and after the winter period, particularly if Europe avoids energy market failures?
• How will this ‘energy crisis’ ensure future dependencies on single state actors of goods and services do not occur in the future?

Read the transcript. 

Expanding and enhancing the global cyber workforce 17 November 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

How can we address the cybersecurity workforce shortage and skills gap?

Accelerated digital transformation and heightened geopolitical tensions on the international stage have increased the need for effective cybersecurity practices and policies as well as a skilled workforce. Despite this, the demand for cybersecurity professionals continues to outpace the supply for societies and businesses globally, resulting in a cybersecurity workforce gap.

To ensure that digital transformation is available, safe and beneficial to all, significant efforts are needed to encourage cyber workforce capacity-building and knowledge-sharing at both national and international levels.

This discussion, supported by (ISC)² and the UK Cyber Security Council, will explore how to effectively address the twin challenges of the global cyber workforce shortage and skills gap.

• What are the implications of the global cyber workforce and skills gaps for businesses and societies?

• What shape do these gaps take within society? Where are they most prevalent and how do they vary?

• What is the role of education and private-public partnerships in effectively addressing these gaps?

• How does the UK National Cyber Strategy seek to address these challenges? What are the key lessons from this strategy?

• What other efforts are being made internationally to bridge this gap? What opportunities are there for knowledge-sharing and capacity-building?

• What is the role of diversity, equity and inclusion in tackling these gaps?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. If you are not a member of Chatham House but would still like to attend the event please email Eleanor Macmillan-Fox to enquire about registration.

Read the transcript.