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For the first time in Turkey’s history, the electorate directly cast their votes for president earlier this week, overwhelmingly electing current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to the position with 52 percent of the votes. After 12 years in power, Erdoğan’s victory was widely expected, even though the two main opposition parties chose Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu as their common candidate in a rare show of unity, and Selahattin Demirtaş the leader of the main Kurdish political party in Turkey, tried hard to appeal to an electoral base beyond just Kurds. The impact of the election’s results, however, remains to be seen.

How should the election results be interpreted? Will Erdoğan succeed in transforming Turkey from a parliamentary system to a presidential one? Who will he chose as prime minister? What will this outcome mean for Turkey’s economic performance and its foreign policy at a time when the neighborhood is sliding deeper into instability, if not chaos? What will happen to Turkey’s European vocation and its transatlantic relations?

On September 4, the Turkey Project of the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings hosted a panel discussion to consider what President Erdoğan’s new mandate means for the nation, its government and institutions and the ruling Justice and Development Party. Kemal Kirisci, TÜSİAD senior fellow and Turkey project director, moderated the conversation. Panelists included Robert Wexler of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace, Kadir Üstün of the SETA Foundation, and Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Ömer Taşpınar.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #PresErdogan

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• President Erdoğan: Turkey’s Election and the Future

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20140904_erdogan_turkey_transcript

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This year marks the centenary of the atrocities perpetrated against the Armenian people of the Ottoman Empire during World War I by the governing Committee of Union and Progress. Most scholars and many governments consider these horrific events––in which more than one million people were systematically massacred or marched to their deaths––to constitute the first modern European genocide. Turkish society has begun to open up and confront the issue over the last decade. Turkish authorities, however, continue to reject the use of the term genocide, contest the number of deaths, and highlight the fact that many other minority groups, Muslims, and Turks were killed in the same period as the war-ravaged empire unraveled. For descendants of the survivors, Turkey’s official refusal to reckon fully with this painful chapter of its past is a source of deep distress and concern and undermines societal efforts toward understanding and reconciliation. Armenians have also raised the question of reparations, further adding to the problem.

On May 13, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE), together with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Center for International Studies, the Hrant Dink Memorial Human Rights and Justice Lectureship at MIT, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace held a conference with several leading scholars of the Armenian genocide and other international experts. Speakers considered the historical record and circumstances of the genocide amid the disorder of World War I; how Turkey, Armenia, and other key actors have dealt with the legacy of 1915; and how this legacy continues to reverberate in the region today, with protracted conflicts in the Caucasus and where religious and ethnic minority groups have been deliberately targeted for expulsion and death amid the upheavals in Iraq, Syria, and other states that emerged from the rubble of the Ottoman Empire.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #Armenia1915

Video

• 1915 and the unmaking of peoples: Deportations, massacres, and genocide
• The making of an “almost intractable conflict” and attempts at its resolution
• 2015 and its horrors : A century after 1915

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• Armenians and the legacies of World War I

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• Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20150513_armenia_transcript

Editors' Note: How can the U.S. government better counter ISIS propaganda? As the State Department overhauls its counter messaging program, Will McCants and Clint Watts examine what makes ISIS’s online magazine, Dabiq, so successful, and the obstacles to the U.S. government producing a publication that effective. This piece originally appeared on The Daily Beast.

The Obama administration attributes much of ISIS’s success at communicating to its technological savvy, which has elevated the group to a global media and terrorist phenomenon. The president has gone so far as to say that the Paris attackers were a “bunch of killers with good social media.”

Despite the praise heaped on the so-called Islamic State for its cutting-edge propaganda online, one of its most effective products is decidedly low tech. Dabiq, ISIS’s online news magazine, has a small but devoted readership that spans the globe. News of advances on the battlefield excite them—more evidence that God’s kingdom on earth has returned and grows. Stories of fighters inspire them—more models to emulate as they contemplate what role they can play in the divine drama unfolding.

Journalists and analysts read it with almost the same intensity as ISIS fans; the contents of each volume fill newspapers and think-tank reports soon after it’s released. And no wonder: the magazine clearly states the organization’s goals; provides news of its activities that advance those goals; showcases personal stories of the people engaged in the activities; and announces major developments in the organization’s fight against its enemies. It’s a wealth of information presented between two covers every few months.

Can you name a single U.S. government publication or online platform devoted to the anti-ISIS fight that is as informative or as widely-read as Dabiq? Is there anything that tells us what all these air sorties are for? Who’s fighting this fight on the ground? What advances the coalition has made and why we should we care? We couldn’t come up with one either.

That got us to thinking: why can’t the U.S. government publish something like Dabiq online? Lack of imagination isn’t the reason. A news magazine isn’t a very creative idea—Americans perfected the form, which ISIS copied. And if anything, folks inside the government have too many overly-imaginative ideas, most of them involving whiz-bang technology. If you’ve thought it, they’ve thought it. A social media campaign for youth to come up with ways to counter violent extremism? Check. Sock-puppetry? Check.

The only real obstacle impeding the U.S. government is itself. The executive branch’s complicated bureaucracy, legal strictures, and sensitivity to criticism from media and Congress make it tough to publish a Dabiq-style magazine. To see what we mean, let’s look at two of Dabiq’s regular features and see what would happen if the U.S. government tried to mimic them:

Attack Reports: Each issue of Dabiq details its attacks on its enemies. One entry in issue 12 chronicled ISIS’s efforts to capture an airbase in Dayr al-Zawr, Syria. Another described four suicide attacks on the Saudi-led coalition fighting southern Yemen. Pictures accompany most entries, some quite gruesome.

The U.S. government routinely writes these types of reports for internal consumption. But when they’re public—and thus under the scrutiny of Congress that holds the pursestrings and the media that holds the careerstrings—routine gives way to caution and quarreling.

If the president asks his government to write attack reports for the public, the U.S. Department of State and the Department of Defense will quarrel about who will take the lead in writing and publishing them. Then they and the intelligence agencies will quarrel over which reports should be included. Will this report counter the president’s insistence that we have no boots on the ground? Will that report make it look like our Iraqi partners aren’t carrying their weight? Does this one tell the enemy too much about our game plan? Does that picture make U.S. soldiers look too menacing? Will this report later be discredited by the media? Will these battlefield successes be reversed in the future? Does anyone know if another agency has said this or its opposite? Will anyone trust what we’re saying? Shouldn’t someone else be saying this?

When something finally slides off the serpentine conveyor belt months later, it will be a bland blob devoid of detail and relevance. Meanwhile, ISIS will have added twelve more volumes to its shelves.

Biographies of Fighters: Dabiq sometimes profiles its fighters, including the young men on the front lines dying for ISIS’s cause. The fighters tell their stories and explain their reasons for fighting. In issue 8, for example, there is a Q&A with the man who murdered a prominent politician in Tunisia. He explains why he did it and how it advances the greater goals of the Islamic State.

The United States military used to feature these sorts of stories, too—back when the American war in Iraq was a massive, overt affair. Now, that’s not the case. The identities of the Americans fighting in Syria and Iraq are a well-guarded secret because the government does not want them or their families to become targets. The government would also frown on them for nonchalantly talking about killing lest the American public get upset. And then there’s that boots on the ground thing.

Without personal stories, we’re left with drones buzzing in the sky, and buzz-cut officers droning through stale Pentagon briefings. The human cost on both sides is reduced to numbers on slides, which means Americans can’t appreciate the true costs of war and foreigners can’t appreciate the sacrifices Americans are making on their behalf.

Some readers might feel that the U.S. government should be constrained in these ways. They want the government to be sensitive to public opinion and exceedingly cautious when talking about war and violence. If so, they shouldn’t complain when the U.S. government explains its anti-ISIS fight in the vaguest possible terms—that’s the outcome of extreme caution compounded by bureaucratic bargaining on a mind-boggling scale. Others might feel we need to reform the way government does messaging. If so, don’t propose to change the system first. Rather, ask the system to perform a simple task like the one we’ve described and see where it breaks down. Then you’ll know what to fix.

Making a news magazine probably isn’t the high tech solution the government is looking for, at least judging by Friday’s pilgrimage of senior security officials to Silicon Valley and the revamping of State Department’s online counter messaging campaign. But if our byzantine, poll-sensitive government can’t do something so basic, it won’t perform better when it’s tasked with something more complicated no matter how much technology it uses.

I had been mulling a rebuttal to my colleague and friend Jon Rauch’s interesting—but wrong—new Brookings paper praising the role of “hacks, machines, big money, and back room deals” in democracy. I thought the indictments of Chris Christie’s associates last week provided a perfect example of the dangers of all of that, and so of why Jon was incorrect. But in yesterday’s L.A. Times, he beat me to it, himself defending the political morality (if not the efficacy) of their actions, and in the process delivering a knockout blow to his own position.

Bridgegate is a perfect example of why we need fewer "hacks, machines, big money, and back room deals" in our politics, not more. There is no justification whatsoever for government officials abusing their powers, stopping emergency vehicles and risking lives, making kids late for school and parents late for their jobs to retaliate against a mayor who withholds an election endorsement. We vote in our democracy to make government work, not break. We expect that officials will serve the public, not their personal interests. This conduct weakens our democracy, not strengthens it.

It is also incorrect that, as Jon suggests, reformers and transparency advocates are, in part, to blame for the gridlock that sometimes afflicts our American government at every level. As my co-authors and I demonstrated at some length in our recent Brookings paper, “Why Critics of Transparency Are Wrong,” and in our follow-up Op-Ed in the Washington Post, reform and transparency efforts are no more responsible for the current dysfunction in our democracy than they were for the gridlock in Fort Lee. Indeed, in both cases, “hacks, machines, big money, and back room deals” are a major cause of the dysfunction. The vicious cycle of special interests, campaign contributions and secrecy too often freeze our system into stasis, both on a grand scale, when special interests block needed legislation, and on a petty scale, as in Fort Lee. The power of megadonors has, for example, made dysfunction within the House Republican Caucus worse, not better.

Others will undoubtedly address Jon’s new paper at length. But one other point is worth noting now. As in foreign policy discussions, I don’t think Jon’s position merits the mantle of political “realism,” as if those who want democracy to be more democratic and less corrupt are fluffy-headed dreamers. It is the reformers who are the true realists. My co-authors and I in our paper stressed the importance of striking realistic, hard-headed balances, e.g. in discussing our non-absolutist approach to transparency; alas, Jon gives that the back of his hand, acknowledging our approach but discarding the substance to criticize our rhetoric as “radiat[ing] uncompromising moralism.” As Bridgegate shows, the reform movement’s “moralism" correctly recognizes the corrupting nature of power, and accordingly advocates reasonable checks and balances. That is what I call realism. So I will race Jon to the trademark office for who really deserves the title of realist!

One of the great parts of being at Brookings has been the many champions of government reform in the US and around the world who have reached out to visit us here, meet me and my colleagues, and talk about how best to transform government and make it work better for people. The latest was MK Erel Margalit, who before joining the Israeli Knesset started a leading venture capital firm in Israel (and was the first Israeli to make the Forbes Midas list of top tech investors globally). My Brookings colleagues, including Elaine Kamarck, Bill Galston, Natan Sachs and John Hudak talked with MK Margalit about the lessons he learned in the private sector, and about his efforts to bring those lessons to his work in government. 

Coming not long after our meeting with Czech Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Andre Babis, who enjoyed similar success in business and has ambitious reform goals of his own informed by his business career, it was fascinating to talk about what does and does not translate to the government sector. MK Margalit’s focus includes supporting peace and economic development by developing enterprise zones in and around Israel that encourage economic partnerships between Jewish and Arab Israelis and their businesses, and that include Palestinians as well. It was an impressive melding of business and government methodologies. The meeting built on similar ones we have had with other innovators including CFPB Director Rich Cordray, former Mayor and Governor Martin O’Malley, and of course DPM Babis, all of whom have in common innovating to make government function more effectively.

Part III of the 2015 Brown Center Report on American Education

Student engagement refers to the intensity with which students apply themselves to learning in school.  Traits such as motivation, enjoyment, and curiosity—characteristics that have interested researchers for a long time—have been joined recently by new terms such as, “grit,” which now approaches cliché status.  International assessments collect data from students on characteristics related to engagement.  This study looks at data from the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), an international test given to fifteen-year-olds.  In the U.S., most PISA students are in the fall of their sophomore year.  The high school years are a time when many observers worry that students lose interest in school.

Compared to their peers around the world, how do U.S. students appear on measures of engagement?  Are national indicators of engagement related to achievement?  This analysis concludes that American students are about average in terms of engagement.  Data reveal that several countries noted for their superior ranking on PISA—e.g., Korea, Japan, Finland, Poland, and the Netherlands—score below the U.S. on measures of student engagement.  Thus, the relationship of achievement to student engagement is not clear cut, with some evidence pointing toward a weak positive relationship and other evidence indicating a modest negative relationship. 

Education studies differ in units of analysis.  Some studies report data on individuals, with each student serving as an observation.  Studies of new reading or math programs, for example, usually report an average gain score or effect size representing the impact of the program on the average student.  Others studies report aggregated data, in which test scores or other measurements are averaged to yield a group score. Test scores of schools, districts, states, or countries are constructed like that.  These scores represent the performance of groups, with each group serving as a single observation, but they are really just data from individuals that have been aggregated to the group level.

Aggregated units are particularly useful for policy analysts.  Analysts are interested in how Fairfax County or the state of Virginia or the United States is doing.  Governmental bodies govern those jurisdictions and policymakers craft policy for all of the citizens within the political jurisdiction—not for an individual.  

The analytical unit is especially important when investigating topics like student engagement and their relationships with achievement.  Those relationships are inherently individual, focusing on the interaction of psychological characteristics.  They are also prone to reverse causality, meaning that the direction of cause and effect cannot readily be determined.  Consider self-esteem and academic achievement.  Determining which one is cause and which is effect has been debated for decades.  Students who are good readers enjoy books, feel pretty good about their reading abilities, and spend more time reading than other kids.  The possibility of reverse causality is one reason that beginning statistics students learn an important rule:  correlation is not causation.

Starting with the first international assessments in the 1960s, a curious pattern has emerged. Data on students’ attitudes toward studying school subjects, when examined on a national level, often exhibit the opposite relationship with achievement than one would expect.  The 2006 Brown Center Report (BCR) investigated the phenomenon in a study of “the happiness factor” in learning.^[i]  Test scores of fourth graders in 25 countries and eighth graders in 46 countries were analyzed.  Students in countries with low math scores were more likely to report that they enjoyed math than students in high-scoring countries.  Correlation coefficients for the association of enjoyment and achievement were -0.67 at fourth grade and -0.75 at eighth grade. 

Confidence in math performance was also inversely related to achievement.  Correlation coefficients for national achievement and the percentage of students responding affirmatively to the statement, “I usually do well in mathematics,” were -0.58 among fourth graders and -0.64 among eighth graders.  Nations with the most confident math students tend to perform poorly on math tests; nations with the least confident students do quite well.   

That is odd.  What’s going on?  A comparison of Singapore and the U.S. helps unravel the puzzle.  The data in figure 3-1 are for eighth graders on the 2003 Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS).  U.S. students were very confident—84% either agreed a lot or a little (39% + 45%) with the statement that they usually do well in mathematics.  In Singapore, the figure was 64% (46% + 18%).  With a score of 605, however, Singaporean students registered about one full standard deviation (80 points) higher on the TIMSS math test compared to the U.S. score of 504. 

When within-country data are examined, the relationship exists in the expected direction.  In Singapore, highly confident students score 642, approximately 100 points above the least-confident students (551).  In the U.S., the gap between the most- and least-confident students was also about 100 points—but at a much lower level on the TIMSS scale, at 541 and 448.  Note that the least-confident Singaporean eighth grader still outscores the most-confident American, 551 to 541.

The lesson is that the unit of analysis must be considered when examining data on students’ psychological characteristics and their relationship to achievement.  If presented with country-level associations, one should wonder what the within-country associations are.  And vice versa.  Let’s keep that caution in mind as we now turn to data on fifteen-year-olds’ intrinsic motivation and how nations scored on the 2012 PISA.

PISA’s index of intrinsic motivation to learn mathematics comprises responses to four items on the student questionnaire:  1) I enjoy reading about mathematics; 2) I look forward to my mathematics lessons; 3) I do mathematics because I enjoy it; and 4) I am interested in the things I learn in mathematics.  Figure 3-2 shows the percentage of students in OECD countries—thirty of the most economically developed nations in the world—responding that they agree or strongly agree with the statements.  A little less than one-third (30.6%) of students responded favorably to reading about math, 35.5% responded favorably to looking forward to math lessons, 38.2% reported doing math because they enjoy it, and 52.9% said they were interested in the things they learn in math.  A ballpark estimate, then, is that one-third to one-half of students respond affirmatively to the individual components of PISA’s intrinsic motivation index.

Table 3-1 presents national scores on the 2012 index of intrinsic motivation to learn mathematics.  The index is scaled with an average of 0.00 and a standard deviation of 1.00.  Student index scores are averaged to produce a national score.  The scores of 39 nations are reported—29 OECD countries and 10 partner countries.^[ii]  Indonesia appears to have the most intrinsically motivated students in the world (0.80), followed by Thailand (0.77), Mexico (0.67), and Tunisia (0.59).  It is striking that developing countries top the list.  Universal education at the elementary level is only a recent reality in these countries, and they are still struggling to deliver universally accessible high schools, especially in rural areas and especially to girls.  The students who sat for PISA may be an unusually motivated group.  They also may be deeply appreciative of having an opportunity that their parents never had.

The U.S. scores about average (0.08) on the index, statistically about the same as New Zealand, Australia, Ireland, and Canada.  The bottom of the table is extremely interesting.  Among the countries with the least intrinsically motivated kids are some PISA high flyers.  Austria has the least motivated students (-0.35), but that is not statistically significantly different from the score for the Netherlands (-0.33).  What’s surprising is that Korea (-0.20), Finland (-0.22), Japan (-0.23), and Belgium (-0.24) score at the bottom of the intrinsic motivation index even though they historically do quite well on the PISA math test.

Let’s now dig a little deeper into the intrinsic motivation index.  Two components of the index are how students respond to “I do mathematics because I enjoy it” and “I look forward to my mathematics lessons.”  These sentiments are directly related to schooling.  Whether students enjoy math or look forward to math lessons is surely influenced by factors such as teachers and curriculum.  Table 3-2 rank orders PISA countries by the percentage of students who “agree” or “strongly agree” with the questionnaire prompts.  The nations’ 2012 PISA math scores are also tabled.  Indonesia scores at the top of both rankings, with 78.3% enjoying math and 72.3% looking forward to studying the subject.  However, Indonesia’s PISA math score of 375 is more than one full standard deviation below the international mean of 494 (standard deviation of 92).  The tops of the tables are primarily dominated by low-performing countries, but not exclusively so.  Denmark is an average-performing nation that has high rankings on both sentiments.  Liechtenstein, Hong Kong-China, and Switzerland do well on the PISA math test and appear to have contented, positively-oriented students.

Several nations of interest are shaded.  The bar across the middle of the tables, encompassing Australia and Germany, demarcates the median of the two lists, with 19 countries above and 19 below that position.  The United States registers above the median on looking forward to math lessons (45.4%) and a bit below the median on enjoyment (36.6%).  A similar proportion of students in Poland—a country recently celebrated in popular media and in Amanda Ripley’s book, The Smartest Kids in the World,^[iii] for making great strides on PISA tests—enjoy math (36.1%), but only 21.3% of Polish kids look forward to their math lessons, very near the bottom of the list, anchored by Netherlands at 19.8%. 

Korea also appears in Ripley’s book.  It scores poorly on both items.  Only 30.7% of Korean students enjoy math, and less than that, 21.8%, look forward to studying the subject.  Korean education is depicted unflatteringly in Ripley’s book—as an academic pressure cooker lacking joy or purpose—so its standing here is not surprising.  But Finland is another matter.  It is portrayed as laid-back and student-centered, concerned with making students feel relaxed and engaged.  Yet, only 28.8% of Finnish students say that they study mathematics because they enjoy it (among the bottom four countries) and only 24.8% report that they look forward to math lessons (among the bottom seven countries).  Korea, the pressure cooker, and Finland, the laid-back paradise, look about the same on these dimensions.

Another country that is admired for its educational system, Japan, does not fare well on these measures.  Only 30.8% of students in Japan enjoy mathematics, despite the boisterous, enthusiastic classrooms that appear in Elizabeth Green’s recent book, Building a Better Teacher.^[iv]  Japan does better on the percentage of students looking forward to their math lessons (33.7%), but still places far below the U.S.  Green’s book describes classrooms with younger students, but even so, surveys of Japanese fourth and eighth graders’ attitudes toward studying mathematics report results similar to those presented here.  American students say that they enjoy their math classes and studying math more than students in Finland, Japan, and Korea.

It is clear from Table 3-2 that at the national level, enjoying math is not positively related to math achievement.  Nor is looking forward to one’s math lessons.  The correlation coefficients reported in the last row of the table quantify the magnitude of the inverse relationships.  The -0.58 and -0.57 coefficients indicate a moderately negative association, meaning, in plain English, that countries with students who enjoy math or look forward to math lessons tend to score below average on the PISA math test.  And high-scoring nations tend to register below average on these measures of student engagement.  Country-level associations, however, should be augmented with student-level associations that are calculated within each country.

The 2012 PISA volume on student engagement does not present within-country correlation coefficients on intrinsic motivation or its components.  But it does offer within-country correlations of math achievement with three other characteristics relevant to student engagement. Table 3-3 displays statistics for students’ responses to: 1) if they feel like they belong at school; 2) their attitudes toward school, an index composed of four factors;^[v] and 3) whether they had arrived late for school in the two weeks prior to the PISA test. These measures reflect an excellent mix of behaviors and dispositions.

The within-country correlations trend in the direction expected but they are small in magnitude.  Correlation coefficients for math performance and a sense of belonging at school range from -0.02 to 0.18, meaning that the country exhibiting the strongest relationship between achievement and a sense of belonging—Thailand, with a 0.18 correlation coefficient—isn’t registering a strong relationship at all.  The OECD average is 0.08, which is trivial.  The U.S. correlation coefficient, 0.07, is also trivial.  The relationship of achievement with attitudes toward school is slightly stronger (OECD average of 0.11), but is still weak.

Of the three characteristics, arriving late for school shows the strongest correlation, an unsurprising inverse relationship of -0.14 in OECD countries and -0.20 in the U.S.  Students who tend to be tardy also tend to score lower on math tests.  But, again, the magnitude is surprisingly small.  The coefficients are statistically significant because of large sample sizes, but in a real world “would I notice this if it were in my face?” sense, no, the correlation coefficients are suggesting not much of a relationship at all.    

The PISA report presents within-country effect sizes for the intrinsic motivation index, calculating the achievement gains associated with a one unit change in the index.  One of several interesting findings is that intrinsic motivation is more strongly associated with gains at the top of the achievement distribution, among students at the 90^th percentile in math scores, than at the bottom of the distribution, among students at the 10^th percentile. 

The report summarizes the within-country effect sizes with this statement: “On average across OECD countries, a change of one unit in the index of intrinsic motivation to learn mathematics translates into a 19 score-point difference in mathematics performance.”^[vi]  This sentence can be easily misinterpreted.  It means that within each of the participating countries students who differ by one unit on PISA’s 2012 intrinsic motivation index score about 19 points apart on the 2012 math test.  It does not mean that a country that gains one unit on the intrinsic motivation index can expect a 19 point score increase.^[vii]    

Let’s now see what that association looks like at the national level.

PISA first reported national scores on the index of intrinsic motivation to learn mathematics in 2003.  Are gains that countries made on the index associated with gains on PISA’s math test?  Table 3-4 presents a score card on the question, reporting the changes that occurred in thirty-nine nations—in both the index and math scores—from 2003 to 2012.  Seventeen nations made statistically significant gains on the index; fourteen nations had gains that were, in a statistical sense, indistinguishable from zero—labeled “no change” in the table; and eight nations experienced statistically significant declines in index scores. 

The U.S. scored 0.00 in 2003 and 0.08 in 2012, notching a gain of 0.08 on the index (statistically significant).  Its PISA math score declined from 483 to 481, a decline of 2 scale score points (not statistically significant).

Table 3-4 makes it clear that national changes on PISA’s intrinsic motivation index are not associated with changes in math achievement.  The countries registering gains on the index averaged a decline of 3.7 points on PISA’s math assessment.  The countries that remained about the same on the index had math scores that also remain essentially unchanged (-0.09) And the most striking finding: countries that declined on the index (average of -0.15) actually gained an average of 10.3 points on the PISA math scale.  Intrinsic motivation went down; math scores went up.  The correlation coefficient for the relationship over all, not shown in the table, is -0.30.

The analysis above investigated student engagement.  International data from the 2012 PISA were examined on several dimensions of student engagement, focusing on a measure that PISA has employed since 2003, the index of intrinsic motivation to learn mathematics.  The U.S. scored near the middle of the distribution on the 2012 index.  PISA analysts calculated that, on average, a one unit change in the index was associated with a 19 point gain on the PISA math test.  That is the average of within-country calculations, using student-level data that measure the association of intrinsic motivation with PISA score.  It represents an effect size of about 0.20—a positive effect, but one that is generally considered small in magnitude.^[viii]

The unit of analysis matters.  Between-country associations often differ from within-country associations.  The current study used a difference in difference approach that calculated the correlation coefficient for two variables at the national level: the change in intrinsic motivation index from 2003-2012 and change in PISA score for the same time period.  That analysis produced a correlation coefficient of -0.30, a negative relationship that is also generally considered small in magnitude.

Neither approach can justify causal claims nor address the possibility of reverse causality occurring—the possibility that high math achievement boosts intrinsic motivation to learn math, rather than, or even in addition to, high levels of motivation leading to greater learning.  Poor math achievement may cause intrinsic motivation to fall.  Taken together, the analyses lead to the conclusion that PISA provides, at best, weak evidence that raising student motivation is associated with achievement gains.  Boosting motivation may even produce declines in achievement.

Here’s the bottom line for what PISA data recommends to policymakers: Programs designed to boost student engagement—perhaps a worthy pursuit even if unrelated to achievement—should be evaluated for their effects in small scale experiments before being adopted broadly.  The international evidence does not justify wide-scale concern over current levels of student engagement in the U.S. or support the hypothesis that boosting student engagement would raise student performance nationally.

Let’s conclude by considering the advantages that national-level, difference in difference analyses provide that student-level analyses may overlook.

1. They depict policy interventions more accurately.  Policies are actions of a political unit affecting all of its members.  They do not simply affect the relationship of two characteristics within an individual’s psychology. Policymakers who ask the question, “What happens when a country boosts student engagement?” are asking about a country-level phenomenon.

2.  Direction of causality can run differently at the individual and group levels.  For example, we know that enjoying a school subject and achievement on tests of that subject are positively correlated at the individual level.  But they are not always correlated—and can in fact be negatively correlated—at the group level. 

3.  By using multiple years of panel data and calculating change over time, a difference in difference analysis controls for unobserved variable bias by “baking into the cake” those unobserved variables at the baseline.  The unobserved variables are assumed to remain stable over the time period of the analysis.  For the cultural factors that many analysts suspect influence between-nation test score differences, stability may be a safe assumption.  Difference in difference, then, would be superior to cross-sectional analyses in controlling for cultural influences that are omitted from other models.

4.  Testing artifacts from a cultural source can also be dampened.  Characteristics such as enjoyment are culturally defined, and the language employed to describe them is also culturally bounded.  Consider two of the questionnaire items examined above: whether kids “enjoy” math and how much they “look forward” to math lessons.  Cultural differences in responding to these prompts will be reflected in between-country averages at the baseline, and any subsequent changes will reflect fluctuations net of those initial differences.

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This week marks the release of the 2015 Brown Center Report on American Education, the fourteenth issue of the series.  One of the three studies in the report, “Girls, Boys, and Reading,” examines the gender gap in reading.  Girls consistently outscore boys on reading assessments.  They have for a long time.  A 1942 study in Iowa discovered that girls were superior to boys on tests of reading comprehension, vocabulary, and basic language skills.^[i]  Girls have outscored boys on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) reading assessments since the first NAEP was administered in 1971. 

I hope you’ll read the full study—and the other studies in the report—but allow me to summarize the main findings of the gender gap study here.

Eight assessments generate valid estimates of U.S. national reading performance: the Main NAEP, given at three grades (fourth, eighth, and 12^th grades); the NAEP Long Term Trend (NAEP-LTT), given at three ages (ages nine, 13, and 17); the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), an international assessment given at fourth grade; and the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), an international assessment given to 15-year-olds.  Females outscore males on the most recent administration of all eight tests.  And the gaps are statistically significant.  Expressed in standard deviation units, they range from 0.13 on the NAEP-LTT at age nine to 0.34 on the PISA at age 15.

The gaps are shrinking.  At age nine, the gap on the NAEP-LTT declined from 13 scale score points in 1971 to five points in 2012.  During the same time period, the gap at age 13 shrank from 11 points to eight points, and at age 17, from 12 points to eight points.  Only the decline at age nine is statistically significant, but at ages 13 and 17, declines since the gaps peaked in the 1990s are also statistically significant.  At all three ages, gaps are shrinking because of males making larger gains on NAEP than females.  In 2012, seventeen-year-old females scored the same on the NAEP reading test as they did in 1971.  Otherwise, males and females of all ages registered gains on the NAEP reading test from 1971-2012, with males’ gains outpacing those of females.

The gap is worldwide.  On the 2012 PISA, 15-year-old females outperformed males in all sixty-five participating countries.  Surprisingly, Finland, a nation known for both equity and excellence because of its performance on PISA, evidenced the widest gap.  Girls scored 556 and boys scored 494, producing an astonishing gap of 62 points (about 0.66 standard deviations—or more than one and a half years of schooling).   Finland also had one of the world’s largest gender gaps on the 2000 PISA, and since then it has widened.  Both girls’ and boys’ reading scores declined, but boys’ declined more (26 points vs. 16 points).  To put the 2012 scores in perspective, consider that the OECD average on the reading test is 496.  Finland’s strong showing on PISA is completely dependent on the superior performance of its young women.

The gap seems to disappear by adulthood.  Tests of adult reading ability show no U.S. gender gap in reading by 25 years of age.  Scores even tilt toward men in later years. 

The words “seems to disappear” are used on purpose.  One must be careful with cross-sectional data not to assume that differences across age groups indicate an age-based trend.  A recent Gallup poll, for example, asked several different age groups how optimistic they were about finding jobs as adults.  Optimism fell from 68% in grade five to 48% in grade 12.  The authors concluded that “optimism about future job pursuits declines over time.”  The data do not support that conclusion.  The data were collected at a single point in time and cannot speak to what optimism may have been before or after that point.  Perhaps today’s 12^th graders were even more pessimistic several years ago when they were in fifth grade.  Perhaps the 12^th-graders are old enough to remember when unemployment spiked during the Great Recession and the fifth-graders are not.   Perhaps 12^th-graders are simply savvier about job prospects and the pitfalls of seeking employment, topics on which fifth-graders are basically clueless.

At least with the data cited above we can track measures of the same cohorts’ gender gap in reading over time.  By analyzing multiple cross-sections—data collected at several different points in time—we can look at real change.  Those cohorts of nine-year-olds in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, are—respectively—today in their 50s, 40s, and 30s.  Girls were better readers than boys when these cohorts were children, but as grown ups, women are not appreciably better readers than men.

Care must be taken nevertheless in drawing firm conclusions.  There exists what are known as cohort effects that can bias measurements.  I mentioned the Great Recession.   Experiencing great historical cataclysms, especially war or economic chaos, may bias a particular cohort’s responses to survey questions or even its performance on tests.  American generations who experienced the Great Depression, World War II, and the Vietnam War—and more recently, the digital revolution, the Great Recession, and the Iraq War—lived through events that uniquely shape their outlook on many aspects of life. 

The gender gap is large, worldwide, and persistent through the K-12 years. What should be done about it?  Maybe nothing.  As just noted, the gap seems to dissipate by adulthood.  Moreover, crafting an effective remedy for the gender gap is made more difficult because we don’t definitely know its cause. Enjoyment of reading is a good example.  Many commentators argue that schools should make a concerted effort to get boys to enjoy reading more.  Enjoyment of reading is statistically correlated with reading performance, and the hope is that making reading more enjoyable would get boys to read more, thereby raising reading skills.

It makes sense, but I’m skeptical.  The fact that better readers enjoy reading more than poor readers—and that the relationship stands up even after boatloads of covariates are poured into a regression equation—is unpersuasive evidence of causality.  As I stated earlier, PISA produces data collected at a single point in time.  It isn’t designed to test causal theories.  Reverse causality is a profound problem.  Getting kids to enjoy reading more may in fact boost reading ability.  But the causal relationship might be flowing in the opposite direction, with enhanced skill leading to enjoyment.   The correlation could simply be indicating that people enjoy activities that they’re good at—a relationship that probably exists in sports, music, and many human endeavors, including reading.

A key question for policymakers is whether boosting boys’ enjoyment of reading would help make boys better readers.  I investigate by analyzing national changes in PISA reading scores from 2000, when the test was first given, to 2102.  PISA creates an Index of Reading Enjoyment based on several responses to a student questionnaire.  Enjoyment of reading has increased among males in some countries and decreased in others.  Is there any relationship between changes in boys’ enjoyment and changes in PISA reading scores? 

There is not.  The correlation coefficient for the two phenomena is -0.01.  Nations such as Germany raised boys’ enjoyment of reading and increased their reading scores by about 10 points on the PISA scale.  France, on the other hand, also raised boys’ enjoyment of reading, but French males’ reading scores declined by 15 points.  Ireland increased how much boys enjoy reading by a little bit but the boys’ scores fell a whopping 37 points. Poland’s males actually enjoyed reading less in 2012 than in 2000, but their scores went up more than 14 points.  No relationship.

How should policymakers proceed?  Large, cross-sectional assessments are good for measuring academic performance at one point in time.  They are useful for generating hypotheses based on observed relationships, but they are not designed to confirm or reject causality.  To do that, randomized control trials should be conducted of programs purporting to boost reading enjoyment.  Also, consider that it ultimately may not matter whether enjoying reading leads to more proficient readers.  Enjoyment of reading may be an end worthy of attainment irrespective of its relationship to achievement.  In that case, RCTs should carefully evaluate the impact of interventions on both enjoyment of reading and reading achievement, whether the two are related or not.  

Today marks Equal Pay Day. How are we doing? We have come a long way since I wrote my doctoral dissertation on the pay gap back in the late 1960s. From earning 59 percent of what men made in 1974 to earning 79 percent in 2015 (among year-round, full-time workers), women have broken a lot of barriers. 

There is no reason why the remaining gap can’t be closed. The gap could easily move in favor of women. After all, they are now better educated than men. They earn 60 percent of all bachelor’s degrees and the majority of graduate degrees. Adjusting for educational attainment, the current earnings gap widens, with the biggest relative gaps at the highest levels of education:

If we want to encourage people to get more education, we can't discriminate against the best educated just because they are women.

One source of the current gap is the fact that women still take more time off from work to care for their families. These family responsibilities may also affect the kinds of work they choose. Harvard professor Claudia Goldin notes that they are more likely to work in occupations where it is easier to combine work and family life. These divided work-family loyalties are holding women back more than pay discrimination per se. This should change when men are more willing to share equally on the home front, as Richard Reeves and I have argued elsewhere.  

But there is much to be done while waiting for this more egalitarian world to arrive. Paid family leave and more support for early child care and education would go a long way toward relieving families, and women in particular, of the dual burden they now face. In the process, the pay gap should shrink or even move in favor of women. 

The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) has just released a very informative report on these issues. They call for an aggressive expansion of both early childhood education and child care subsidies for low and moderate income families. Specifically, they propose to cap child care expenses at 10 percent of income, which would provide an average subsidy of $3,272 to working families with children and much more than this to lower-income families. 

The EPI authors argue that child care subsidies would provide needed in-kind benefits to lower income families (check!), boost women’s labor force participation in a way that would benefit the overall economy (check!), and reduce the gender pay gap (check!). In short, childcare subsidies are a win-win-win.

For present purposes I want to focus on the likely effects on the pay gap. In the mid-1990s, the U.S. had the highest rate of female labor force participation compared to Germany, Canada, and Japan. Now we have the lowest. One reason is because other advanced countries have expanded paid leave and child care support for employed mothers while the U.S. has not:

If we want to eliminate the pay gap and perhaps even reverse it, the primary focus must be on women’s continuing difficulties in balancing work and family life. We should certainly attend to any remaining instances of pay discrimination in the workplace, as called for in the Paycheck Fairness Act. But the biggest source of the problem is not employer discrimination; it is women’s continued double burden.

When Franklin Roosevelt delivered his second inaugural address on January 20, 1936 he lamented the “one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished.” He challenged Americans to measure their collective progress not by “whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; [but rather] whether we provide enough for those who have too little.” In our new paper, One third of a nation: Strategies for helping working families, we ask a simple question: How are we doing?

In brief, we find that:

• The gulf in labor market income between the haves and have-nots remains wide. The median income of households in the bottom third in 2014 was $24,000, just a little more than a quarter of the median of $90,000 for the top two-thirds.
• The bottom-third households are disproportionately made up of minority adults, adults with limited educational attainment, and single parents.  
• The most important reason for the low incomes of the bottom third is a “work gap”: the fact that many are not employed at all, or work limited hours. 

The work gap

The decline in labor force participation rates has been widely documented, but the growing gulf in the work gap between the bottom third and the rest of the population is truly striking:

While the share of men who are employed in the top two-thirds has been quite stable since 1980, lower-income men’s work rates have declined by 11 percentage points. What about women?

Middle- and upper-income women have increased their work rates by 13 percentage points. This has helped maintain or even increase their family’s income. But employment rates among lower-income women have been flat, despite reforms of the welfare system and safety net designed to encourage work.

Many on the left point to problems like low pay and lack of access to affordable childcare, and so favor a higher minimum wage and more subsidies for daycare. For many conservatives, the problem is rooted in family breakdown and a dependency-inducing safety net. They therefore champion proposals like marriage promotion programs and strict work requirements for public benefits. Most agree about the importance of education.

Time to debate some more radical solutions 

It may be that the standard solutions to the problems of the bottom third, while helpful, are no longer sufficient. A debate about whether to make safety net programs such as Food Stamps and housing assistance conditional on work or training is underway. So are other solutions such as subsidized jobs (created by some states during the Great Recession as a natural complement to a work-conditioned safety net), more work sharing (used in Germany during the recession), or even a universal basic income (being considered by Swiss voters in June).

For many years, Africans have complained that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has concentrated its efforts exclusively in Africa, a process that has made a mockery of the court’s claims to bring about an end to global impunity. Some Africans have even argued that the ICC’s claims that it is helping bring about justice in Africa are not unlike those made by proponents of the colonial order established by the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885.

On Tuesday, March 11, I participated in a panel discussion entitled, “The International Criminal Court in Africa: Bias, Legitimate Objections, or Excuses for Impunity?” co-hosted by New York University’s School of Continuing and Professional Studies (SCPS), Center for Global Affairs and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ).  The program brought together experts interested in justice and peaceful coexistence in Africa to examine the role that the International Criminal Court (ICC) can play in minimizing impunity in the continent.

I was joined by Ambassador Tiina Intelmann, president of the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court; Richard Dicker, director of the International Justice Program at Human Rights Watch; and Jennifer Trahan, clinical associate professor at the New York University’s School of Continuing and Professional Studies (SCPS), Center for Global Affairs.  David Tolbert, president of the International Center for Transitional Justice, moderated the discussion.

The most important conclusions from what was a robust dialogue were that (i) it is very important that African countries develop the legal and institutional capacity to deal effectively and fully with impunity and other extra-legal activities that impede human development and peaceful coexistence; (ii) the international community should help African countries develop that capacity; (iii) the ICC should make a concerted effort to open dialogue with the African Union in particular and Africans generally in order for the court to gain a better insight into African problems, while, at the same time, help Africans understand and appreciate the nature of the ICC’s work, how it functions, and why it is a critical international body in the fight against impunity; and (iv) the ICC needs to improve openness and transparency in its activities. To make the ICC a truly international court, important countries such as the United States, India, the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation need to be brought aboard. Obviously, more dialogue is needed and it is my hope that soon, we will be able to undertake a discussion of this type somewhere in Africa.

During my presentation, I argued that an important part of improving relations between Africa and the ICC is that Africans must take ownership of their problems and find ways to resolve them themselves. For one thing, justice is most effectively delivered locally. Hence, the first line of business is for each African country to develop the legal and institutional capacity to deal with impunity and other governance problems. External actors, notably the ICC, should only be considered conflict-resolution instruments of last resort.

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The Nile River is one of the most important resources in Africa and supports the livelihoods of millions of people. Recently, though, efficient and equitable utilization of the waters of the Nile River has become an increasingly contentious issue, with many of the riparian countries demanding a revision of what they believe is an inappropriate legal regime. Currently, allocation and utilization of the waters of the Nile River is governed by the colonial-era Nile Waters Agreements, which were negotiated and entered into with the help of Great Britain, but without the participation of most of the river’s riparian states. These agreements allocated most of the waters of the Nile River to the downstream riparians—Egypt and Sudan—largely ignoring the development needs of the upstream riparians, like Ethiopia, whose highlands provide most of the water that flows into the Nile River. The upstream riparians contend that they were not party to the Nile Waters Agreements and thus should not be bound by them. As such, they want these agreements set aside and a new, more equitable legal regime. Egypt, however, considers the existing legal regime binding on all the Nile River riparian states and, thus, is opposed to any changes that might interfere with or reduce its “historically acquired rights.” Already the decision by Addis Ababa to proceed with the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile has caused significant deterioration in relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa.

With significant increases in population and pressure to deliver development, especially in the upstream riparian states, the demand for water has become a very important policy imperative in the region. In fact, earlier this year Egypt claimed that, in order to meet its growing water needs by 2050, it will need to add 21 billion cubic meters of water per year to its current water allocation of 55 billion cubic meters. Thus, there is a fear that if this issue is not fully resolved soon, it could morph into a military crisis.

In our new book, Governing the Nile River Basin: The Search for a New Legal Regime, we argue that the current legal regime governing the allocation and utilization of the waters of the Nile River is not tenable, and there is an urgent need for all the Nile River riparian states to enter into a mutually agreed upon legal regime. Issues pertaining to transboundary water resource management, the evolution of current agreements and the role and interests of colonial powers, theories of treaty succession, and the recent attempts by the riparian states to formulate a new legal agreement, are thoroughly examined. We conclude that the most effective way to deal with conflict arising from the allocation and utilization of the Nile River’s waters is for all the downstream and upstream riparians to engage in fresh negotiations to design and adopt a new legal regime. Through a fully consultative process, these countries can provide the Nile River Basin with a legal regime that enhances equitable allocation and utilization. 

During the 27th Heads of State Assembly of the African Union (AU) meeting in Kigali, Rwanda, from July 17-18, 2016, the heads of state were supposed to elect individuals to lead the AU for the next four years. One of the most important functions that the delegates were expected to perform was to elect the chairperson of the AU Commission to replace the present chairperson, South Africa’s Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, who had indicated that she would not seek re-election.

Three candidates were standing for the position of chairperson of the AU Commission. These were Dr. Pelonomi Venson-Moitoi, foreign minister of Botswana, Dr. Specioza Waigaga Wandira Kazibwe, former vice president of Uganda, and Mr. Agapito Mba Mokuy, foreign minister of Equatorial Guinea. There was great expectation that the election of any one of these three candidates would significantly advance gender and regional balance, with respect to key leadership positions in continental institutions. Hence, the election of either one of the two female candidates would have been welcomed by supporters of gender balance. However, if the delegates had opted for Mr. Mokuy, such a choice would have been welcomed by the Spanish-speaking community, as well as the continent’s smaller and historically marginalized states. Given the fact that the outgoing chairperson of the AU Commission, Dr. Zuma, is a woman, the hope within the central African community was that Mr. Mokuy would emerge victorious and represent the region, as well as serve as a sign of hope for the heretofore marginalized regions.

Reports from Kigali are that the election for the chairperson has been postponed until January 2017. It is reported that the AU took that decision based on the fact that none of the three candidates had secured the two-thirds majority of votes needed to win. During the election’s first round, Dr. Venson-Moitoi received 16 votes, Mr. Mokuy received 12 votes, and Dr. Kazibwe received 11 votes. 

Those who abstained from voting claimed that the candidates were not qualified to lead the commission.

After receiving the least votes in the first round, Dr. Kazibwe withdrew from the competition. That left Dr. Venson-Moitoi and Mr. Mokuy to compete for the position. Although Dr. Venson-Moitoi garnered 23 votes in the next round, that number was less than the 36 votes to constitute the two-thirds majority needed to emerge victorious.

Part of the reason for this quagmire, as the news from Kigali is indicating, is that as many as 15 heads of state abstained from voting in the first round of the competition and that in the second round, 20 acted similarly. These many abstentions derailed the process and made certain that none of the remaining candidates would emerge victorious.

While these may be legitimate issues to raise, one wonders why these issues were not raised and fully resolved before the delegates actually assembled in Kigali.

Indeed, the AU assembly chair, President Idriss Déby of Chad, cited the boycott as a deciding factor in the failure of any of the three candidates to secure the necessary votes to win. He then announced that the elections had been postponed until January 2017 and that the heads of state had opened up the contest to more candidates—a decision that appears to be a slap in the face of the current candidates. Notably, this appears to support the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) bloc’s pre-election petition that the elections be postponed because, as they argued, none of the candidates was qualified to lead. That petition, however, had been previously denied.

President Déby argued, in his post-election proclamation, that the delay would provide candidates and their respective regions with the time to adequately prepare for the elections in January 2017. What appears to be implied by this declaration is that preparations for the failed July elections were inadequate and that with this extra time, the type of behavior exhibited by some representatives during the recently concluded elections would not occur in January. However, unless the AU puts in place rules to prevent such an eventuality, there is no guarantee that January 2017’s elections would not be marred by such last-minute maneuvering again. What is to prevent other blocs from engaging in similar strategic behavior (i.e., boycotting the election) in order to promote their own candidates for the various leadership positions in the commission?

Nevertheless, the AU is a continental organization, and no country or region should be allowed to dominate and monopolize leadership positions in its institutions.

Those who abstained from voting claimed that the candidates were not qualified to lead the commission. Dr. Kazibwe’s candidacy was questioned on the grounds that she was previously convicted of abusing state funds. Mr. Mokuy was taken to task for his country’s human rights record, while Dr. Venson-Moitoi’s candidacy was questioned because her home country, Botswana, has often taken positions that are contrary to those of many other AU members, notably on the issue of Africa’s relations with the International Criminal Court.

While these may be legitimate issues to raise, one wonders why these issues were not raised and fully resolved before the delegates actually assembled in Kigali. Certainly, the AU must have mechanisms to vet individuals who are nominated for leadership positions in its institutions to determine their fit for office. During such a vetting process, groups and individuals within the AU can make known their objections to candidates that they believe are not qualified to perform the jobs for which they are being nominated. Of course, such a vetting process must be governed by rules chosen in an earlier period such as those presented in The Statutes of the Commission of the African Union, which provide information on the minimum qualifications and experience of the commissioners. Hence, any challenge to the qualifications of an individual running to serve on the commission should begin with and be governed by such rules.

Once candidates have been fully vetted and determined to meet the minimum qualifications to stand for the positions for which they have been nominated, no head of state (i.e., elector) should boycott the voting. Of course, it is not surprising that electors would prefer to vote for candidates from either their own countries or region. Nevertheless, the AU is a continental organization, and no country or region should be allowed to dominate and monopolize leadership positions in its institutions. Hence, the AU Commission’s leadership must reflect the continent’s diversity, with specific emphasis on gender and geographic balance. Efforts by heads of state or blocs (e.g., ECOWAS) to engage in last minute strategic maneuvering (e.g., boycotting of elections) in order to secure certain political advantages should be discouraged. Such opportunistic behavior can seriously undermine the AU’s electoral system and place the organization in a very precarious position. In fact, one could argue that the outcome of the July 2016 commission elections in Kigali betray an organization that appears to be adrift and without proper leadership and one that is not willing to follow its own rules.  

In fact, one could argue that the outcome of the July 2016 commission elections in Kigali betray an organization that appears to be adrift and without proper leadership and one that is not willing to follow its own rules.

As the AU looks forward, it must make certain that no voting bloc within the organization is allowed to grant itself the power to derail the electoral process. Such opportunism and capriciousness on the part of any group within the AU can prevent the deepening and institutionalization of democratic principles within the organization and effectively hold hostage the interests of the continent to those of a smaller group or region.

Thus, the process through which the member states of the African Union choose individuals to serve in and manage their institutions must be competitive and based on democratic principles. The AU should learn a lesson from what happened in Kigali and put legal mechanisms in place to deal fully and effectively with any future efforts by groups, individuals, and factions to engage in any behavior that can frustrate the functioning of the organization and its institutions. Perhaps the failure of the AU to anticipate such behavior is due to its inexperience. Nevertheless, the organization must provide itself with the wherewithal to prevent this type of stalemate. For, come January, another region may, at the last minute, register its dissatisfaction with all candidates and seek to replace them.

If the AU is to teach member states the principles of good governance, it must first put its own house in order and lead by example.

As the AU looks forward to the January 2017 round of elections, Senegalese politician and diplomat, Abdoulaye Bathily, has already indicated his interest in competing for the position of chairperson of the AU Commission. To avoid the problems that were encountered by the electoral process in Kigali, he, his country, and his region should commence the formal nomination process in order to provide all interested parties with the opportunity to properly vet his candidacy and determine his fit for office. In fact, other candidates who are planning to stand for the elections in January 2017 should also have themselves formally nominated as soon as possible so that the vetting process can be completed and a final list of qualified candidates agreed before the delegates meet in January 2017.

If the AU is to teach member states the principles of good governance, it must first put its own house in order and lead by example. It must, for example, make its electoral decisions through a democratic and competitive process. It must be governed by the rule of law in order for it to stand as a beacon of light for the many countries in the continent that are trying to deepen and institutionalize democracy. Unless the AU puts into place mechanisms to deal with the types of behaviors that derailed the commission elections in Kigali in July 2016, it risks descending into a quagmire from which it might not get out uninjured.

A 2010 publication of the U.S. Geological Survey caused major excitement in Cyprus, an island that at the time was suffering from the economic collapse of its neighbor and major trading partner, Greece. According to the publication, the seabed of the Eastern Mediterranean could contain up to 120 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas.3 Three years later, the Cypriot administration has high hopes that natural gas exports may get Cyprus—the third smallest European Union member state—back on its feet, after its own financial collapse in 2012. Unfortunately for the Cypriots, the reality on the ground is sobering, and it is currently unclear whether Cyprus will become a producer, or an exporter, of natural gas. Around Cyprus, other countries hope to benefit from the energy potential as well, including Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority. In the Israeli Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in particular, substantial reserves of natural gas have been found, though the verdict is out whether these will in fact all be produced.

Exploration of Cyprus’s offshore concessions is at an early stage. Energy majors such as ENI and Total are among the first to explore possible gas (and oil) reserves and they expect results not before 2015. To date, only two test wells have been drilled by Houston-based Noble Energy. Proven reserves have been downgraded since and are currently estimated to be between 3 and 5 tcf. At this level of reserves, investing in a natural gas liquefaction terminal, which the Cypriot administration has supported, is not economically viable. A better alternative would be to construct a pipeline to Turkey, which has a large and rapidly growing market for natural gas.

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• Politics Trump Economics in the Complex Game of Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons

The recent outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Hamas is a serious setback to ongoing Turkish-Israeli normalization efforts. Israel launched Operation Protective Edge, its third operation against Hamas since leaving Gaza in 2005, in response to rockets and missiles fired by Hamas from Gaza into Israel. As in Israel’s two previous Gaza campaigns, Operation Cast Lead (2008-09) and Operation Pillar of Defense (2012), Turkey quickly condemned Israel’s actions, yet offered to mediate, together with Qatar, between Israel and Hamas.

After Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in the midst of his presidential campaign, equated Israeli policy towards Gaza to a “systematic genocide” and accused Israel of surpassing “Hitler in barbarism,” Israel accepted an Egyptian cease-fire proposal. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman accused Turkey and Qatar of “sabotaging the cease-fire proposal,” and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu complained to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry about Erdogan’s statements.

Turkish leaders’ harsh rhetoric sparked violent demonstrations in front of Israel’s embassy in Ankara and its consulate in Istanbul, lead the Israeli government to evacuate diplomats’ families, and issue a travel warning advising against travel to Turkey, which prompted numerous cancellations of tourist travel. On Sunday, Netanyahu refrained from declaring Turkish-Israeli reconciliation dead, but accused Erdogan of anti-Semitism more aligned with Tehran then the West.

These heightened Israeli-Turkish tensions come just as the two countries were negotiating a compensation deal for families of victims of the May 31, 2010 Mavi Marmara incident. The deal was intended to facilitate a long-awaited normalization between the two countries, more than a year after Israel’s official apology. The draft stipulated an estimated $21 million in Israeli compensation, the reinstatement of each country’s ambassador, and the reestablishment of a senior-level bilateral dialogue. However, a series of issues has prevented the deal’s finalization, including: Turkish domestic political considerations about the timing (related to March 2014 municipal elections and August 2014 presidential elections) and Israeli demands for Turkish commitments to block future lawsuits related to the Marmara incident.

With the ongoing Gaza conflict, prospects for normalization have again faded at least in the short term, and policymakers on both sides seem to have accepted a limited relationship. Erdogan even declared publicly that as long as he’s in power, there is no chance “to have any positive engagement with Israel”, dismissing any prospect for normalization. Israeli-Turkish animosity runs deep, not only among leaders, but at the grassroots level as well. While it may be difficult to look beyond the short term, a focus on the broader regional picture suggests four reasons why the two countries would benefit from restoring ties.

• First, they share strategic interests. Turkey and Israel see eye to eye on many issues: preventing a nuclear Iran; concerns over spillover from the Syrian civil war; and finally, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS/ISIL) and security and stability in Iraq. A resumed dialogue and renewed intelligence sharing can pave the way for more concrete cooperation between Turkey and Israel on all these regional issues, with development of a joint approach toward Syria topping the agenda.
• Second, regional environment may be beyond their control, the bilateral relationship is not. Normalization can eliminate one factor of instability in an unstable region.
• Third, Washington sees greater cooperation and cohesiveness in the U.S.-Turkey-Israel triangle as essential. President Obama has sought to restore a dialogue between Ankara and Jerusalem, including efforts to “extract” an Israeli apology and Turkish acceptance. Senior U.S. officials remain active in trying to improve the Turkish-Israeli relationship.
• Fourth, normalization may convey benefits in the economic sphere, with possible cooperation on natural gas, tourism, and enhanced trade. Gas in particular is viewed as a possible game-changer. In 2013, bilateral trade first crossed the $5 billion mark, and data from the first six months of 2014 indicates a continued rise. A political thaw can help accelerate these joint business opportunities. 

Nevertheless, at this stage it is clear that serious U.S. involvement is required for Turkish-Israeli rapprochement to succeed, even in a limited fashion. At present, there are far greater challenges for U.S. foreign policy in the region. The question now is whether the relationship between two of America’s closest regional allies reflects a new “normal,” or whether the leaders of both countries – and the U.S. – can also muster the political will to reconnect the US-Turkey-Israel triangle along more productive lines.

Check back to Brookings.edu for Dan Arbell’s upcoming analysis paper: The U.S.-Turkey-Israel Triangle.