The leaked record of the five meetings of the UK–US Trade & Investment Working Group held in 2017–18 has led to a controversy in the UK election campaign around the claim that ‘the NHS is up for sale’.

But a careful reading of the leaked documents reveals how remarkably little concerns the NHS – in five meetings over 16 months, the NHS is mentioned just four times. The patent regime and how it affects medicines is discussed in more depth but largely in terms of the participants trying to understand each other’s systems and perspectives. For the most part, the discussions were overwhelmingly about everything else a trade deal would cover other than healthcare – matters such as subsidies, rules of origin and customs facilitation.

But this does not mean there will be no impact on Britain’s health service. There are three main concerns about the possible implications of a US–UK trade deal after Brexit – a negotiation that will of course only take place if the UK remains outside the EU customs union and single market and also does not reach a trade agreement with the EU that proves incompatible with US negotiating objectives.

One concern is that the US aim of securing ‘full market access for US products’, expressed in the US negotiating objectives, will affect the ability of NICE (The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence) to prevent the NHS from procuring products that are deemed too expensive in relation to their benefits. It could also affect the ability of the NHS to negotiate with companies to secure price reductions as, for instance, happened recently with Orkambi, a cystic fibrosis drug.

A peculiarity of the main US government healthcare programme (Medicare) is that it has historically not negotiated drug prices, although there are several bills now before Congress aiming to change that. US refusal to negotiate or control prices is one reason that US drug prices are the highest in the world.  

A second concern is that the US objective of securing ‘intellectual property rights that reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in US law’ will result in longer patent terms and other forms of exclusivity that will increase the prices the NHS will have to pay for drugs.

However, it is not immediately apparent that UK standards are significantly different from those in the US – the institutional arrangements differ but the levels of protection offered are broadly comparable. Recent publicity about a potential extra NHS medicine bill of £27 billion resulting from a trade deal is based on the NHS having to pay US prices on all drugs – which seems an unlikely outcome unless the UK contingent are extraordinarily bad negotiators.

Nevertheless, in an analysis section (marked for internal distribution only), the UK lead negotiator noted: ‘The impact of some patent issues raised on NHS access to generic drugs (i.e. cheaper drugs) will be a key consideration going forward.’

A third concern is that the US objective of providing ‘fair and open conditions for services trade’ and other US negotiating objectives will oblige the UK to open up the NHS to American healthcare companies.

This is where it gets complicated. At one point in a discussion on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) the US asked if the UK had concerns about their ‘health insurance system’ (presumably a reference to the NHS). The UK response was that it ‘wouldn’t want to discuss particular health care entities at this time, you’ll be aware of certain statements saying we need to protect our needs; this would be something to discuss further down the line…’

On this exchange the UK lead negotiator commented:  ‘We do not currently believe the US has a major offensive interest in this space – not through the SOE chapter at least. Our response dealt with this for now, but we will need to be able to go into more detail about the functioning of the NHS and our views on whether or not it is engaged in commercial activities…’

On the face of it, these documents provide no basis for saying the NHS would be for sale – whatever that means exactly. The talks were simply an exploratory investigation between officials on both sides in advance of possible negotiations.

But it is a fact that US positions in free trade agreements are heavily influenced by corporate interests. Their participation in framing agreements is institutionalized in the US system and the pharmaceutical and healthcare industries in the US spend, by a large margin, more on lobbying the government than any other sector does. Moreover, President Donald Trump has long complained about ‘the global freeloading that forces American consumers to subsidize lower prices in foreign countries through higher prices in our country’.

It is when (and if) the actual negotiations on a trade deal get under way that the real test will come as the political profile and temperature is raised on both sides of the Atlantic.