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News24.com | Pieter du Toit: Beyond Covid-19 lies turbulence, change and opportunity

South Africans must insist on innovative solutions and new policies to ensure that when the country emerges from this governance and economic crisis, it does so not only aware of the country’s weaknesses but also primed to effect the necessary changes, writes Pieter du Toit.




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News24.com | Lockdown: Eastern Cape MEC's bodyguard among 5 arrests for illegal hunting on East London farm

A bodyguard of Eastern Cape Social Development MEC Siphokazi Mani-Lusithi has been arrested with four others by the Green Scorpions for illegal hunting on a private farm outside East London, as well as for breaking Covid-19 lockdown regulations.




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Dog stolen from foster home in Chestermere, Alta. found safe

Wera, a four-year-old terrier cross, has found her way home to a Calgary-care organization after fraudsters tricked the dog's foster family.




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Sport24.co.za | Stewart prepared for first county cricket wipeout since WWII

Surrey director of cricket Alec Stewart has reluctantly accepted there could yet be a long-term good for the county game if it is wiped out in 2020.




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Sport24.co.za | Former Junior Springbok star set to stay at Stormers

The Stormers look set to receive a boost with centre Rikus Pretorius signing a contract extension.




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Every country in the United Nations agreed to a global ceasefire during the pandemic — except the United States

After six weeks of negotiating, the UN Security Council was close to agreeing on a resolution for a global ceasefire during the Covid-19 pandemic. Seems fair, right? Let's agree to stop killing each other for a while, so we can focus on the virus that's killing us instead?

China proposed that the text explicitly mention a commitment by member nations to support the efforts of the World Health Organization — who Donald Trump has blamed (without evidence) for withholding information on the coronavirus outbreak.

So the US looked at the resolution and said "LOL no," despite last minute efforts to reach a compromise. As The Guardian reports:

On Thursday night, French diplomats thought they had engineered a compromise in which the resolution would mention UN “specialized health agencies” (an indirect, if clear, reference to the WHO).

The Russian mission signaled that it wanted a clause calling for the lifting of sanctions that affected the delivery of medical supplies, a reference to US punitive measures imposed on Iran and Venezuela. However, most security council diplomats believed Moscow would withdraw the objection or abstain in a vote rather than risk isolation as the sole veto on the ceasefire resolution.

While everyone else seemed game to go along with these compromises, the US insisted it was one big Chinese trick. As one diplomat told CNN:  "This discussion has been taken hostage by issues that do not have to do with the real issues at stake. Instead it has been transformed into a fight between the US and China. Read the rest





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101-year-old Oak Bay veteran surpasses $101K fundraising goal

John Hillman - the 101-year-old Second World War veteran who has been walking laps around the courtyard of his Oak Bay retirement home in hopes of raising $101,000 for charity - has surpassed his goal.




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Communist Party’s Plenum Will Be Important, Not Transformative, for China

8 November 2013

Professor Kerry Brown

Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme

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View of the Pudong financial district skyline from the historic Bund, Shanghai 29 October 2013. Photo by Getty Images.

Despite the hype surrounding it, the gathering of the country’s ruling elite in Beijing is likely to prize measured change over dramatic reform.

If there was a clearer idea of what makes China’s new elite leadership tick, then the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party that is about to be held in Beijing would not be such a big deal. But in a polity which privileges concealment over overt statement, it is viewed widely as the one chance for outsiders to see more clearly what the leadership aims to achieve. Expectations were raised by the October statement by one of the most staid members of the current Standing Committee of the Politburo, Yu Zhengsheng, that the plenum would presage a new era of reform.

In Chinese politics reform is a word that has a wholesome, positive air about it. But the question is where and when reform will happen and who will gain from it. The plenum is not like a party convention in the Western sense. It is not an eye-grabbing, media-dominating event that produces surprises. Comparing this year’s installment with the great Third Plenum of 1978 that heralded the repudiation of late Maoism and the embracing of the market, the non-state sector and foreign capital – all anathema before then – is misleading. The significance of the 1978 meeting was only obvious in hindsight. It took years for the scale of the radical transformation of the whole strategic direction of the Communist Party to be appreciated. That 2013 will prove a similar historic moment is unlikely, perhaps even impossible.

What is much more likely is that the highly tactical leadership now in charge will reaffirm its commitment to incremental reform. It will make some statements about the radical urbanization that China is about to undergo and say something about social welfare reform. China’s leaders will do what they have always done in plenums over the last three decades, namely set the broad parameters of politically permissible activity that provinces, ministries and other stakeholders will then need to implement.

This plenum will also have to produce something about the need to achieve greater egality and balance in the economy. It needs to answer some of the questions about how Premier Li Keqiang, in particular, intends to meet the goal of 'fast, sustainable growth' when a falling overall GDP figure looks likely. It needs to communicate to as broad a constituency as possible the arch-narrative of a world where the raw statement of growth on its own is no longer the be all and end all of government policy. It needs to say something about how the party is going to fulfill the increasingly complex aspirations of the Chinese people, aspirations that exceed purely having a materially good level of life and concern broader questions of well-being that vex the politics of all developed economies.

Observers will want to see some signs too of addressing the most sensitive issues. Yu Zhengsheng talked of economic reform. Reforming the economy is now a wholly uncontroversial mantra in China. However, it impacts on one enormously important issue that reaches beyond economics: whether wealth, prosperity and development benefit the few or are accessible to the many – in other words, good, old-fashioned questions of economic and social justice. At the heart of this lies the question of how state-owned enterprises have become vehicles of profit not just for the party state, but also for tightly knit networks of vested interests. Reforms that lap at the doors of these entities also creep into the space of powerful political players, who will resist any attempt to cut down their wealth, and who have the power to resist.

China’s new leadership is proving more confident than was expected and displays a high sense of historic mission. President Xi Jinping speaks increasingly like a politician who believes it is almost his historic destiny to sit at the centre of the leadership of a renascent 'rich, strong country'. The ultimate question for the plenum is not what outside observers make of it but what the vastly complex mixture of groups in China does. For them, a sign that the leadership is willing to take on some of the entrenched vested interests that penetrate the operations of some state-owned sectors to the core is critical.

This is likely to be couched in the language of more support for the market, which is the key channel in any attack on vested interests – through widening access to wealth and economic benefits, and support for the non-state sector and entrepreneurs. It is hard to see how deeper reform can occur without these two crucial elements. And it is through these that the attitude of China’s leadership to political and legal reforms – far more complex issues that, almost certainly, will not be addressed at the plenum but will lurk in the background − will become clearer. The leadership thinks it is too early to tackle these issues directly, but this plenum will still be part of the process for it to come up with ideas for how to transform not just China’s economy, but its polity too.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




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A Changing Role for the United States in Asia-Pacific

18 June 2014

Xenia Wickett

Former Head, US and the Americas Programme; Former Dean, The Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs
Unless the United States finds ways to be more transparent in its intentions and willingness to act in the region, it might find that its allies there have different ideas about its role.

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Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and India's then prime minister, Manmohan Singh, at Hyderabad House, New Delhi, India, on 25 Jan 2014, during the first visit to India by a Japanese leader since 2011. Photo by Graham Crouch/Bloomberg/Getty Images.

President Barack Obama’s recent visit to Asia has reanimated the debate over what America’s ‘pivot’ to Asia really means. The level of uncertainty over its regional engagement has been heightened by what many in the region, and beyond, consider an inadequate response to the events taking place in Ukraine. Rather than being reassured by the ‘rebalancing’, many Asian allies suspect the United States is becoming a less reliable ally. At the same time, concern is also growing about China’s increasing assertiveness, as demonstrated by recent events with Vietnam.

America’s Asian partners are increasingly exploring new ways to ensure their security, and they will, in time, find different ways to engage with it in the region. Unless the United States is more transparent about its intentions, and what others can expect from it, it is possible that it will be pushed towards a role not necessarily in line with its interests.

President Obama’s announcement of the ‘pivot’ to Asia in November 2011 provoked much debate over what it would mean in practice. It continues to be treated with much scepticism in the region and has raised tensions, with many fearing a military response from China (a fear that, in the eyes of many in the region, has already come to pass).

Allies have also questioned whether American rhetoric is being matched by action. US assets in the region remain strong (additional troops are being rotated in and new partnerships are being formed with the Philippines and others), but America’s will to use them appears less so.

Despite reassurances from Obama during his trip that the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands ‘fall within the scope of Article 5 of the US–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security’ and that the United States opposes any unilateral attempts to change this, Japan was not reassured. A more ambiguous statement made last year by Secretary of State John Kerry, that the United States ‘does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the islands’, has left many Japanese policy-makers wondering whether the US would ultimately back their country up in a conflict. Again, they look at America’s responses to events in Ukraine, Libya and Syria and wonder what it would be prepared to commit to if China were to try to seize control of disputed territory.

This uncertainty is leading many of America’s principal allies to consider additional ways to ensure their security. There are three main paths available to them: building domestic capabilities, forming ad hoc groupings, and reinforcing established regional groups.

The allies are first looking internally: across the board, defence spending has increased; for the first time, in 2012, Asia surpassed European spending, reaching a total of $310 billion. Countries such as India are expanding their naval capabilities to enhance their power projection and Japan is moving forward a reinterpretation of its constitution to allow a more ‘normalized’ role for its military, one in which it could come to the assistance of allies.

Asia-Pacific states are also looking to engage one another in informal bilateral or plurilateral groupings. Over the past decade, a proliferation of new groups has formed for such activities as strategic dialogue, joint training or operations. Building on their similar values and concerns, Japan, Australia and India, in particular, have been prolific in creating various combinations of partnerships among themselves and the United States. There are also some more unexpected (and potentially valuable) groupings, including that established between China, Japan and South Korea.

Where they are based on similar interests, these informal groupings can be a source of moral and political support, and even perhaps in time more operational support in the security arena. They can also provide a starting point for engaging a wider audience through more traditional regional groups, such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit – the third option for allies to enhance their security.

These more established groups, while widely dismissed in the West as mere ‘talking shops’, perform a well-regarded function in the region. By supporting the broader web of networks on which states can come to depend, they provide opportunities for debating and managing (or diffusing) regional tensions.

America remains the most militarily powerful nation in the world. Its influence and common interests with its Asian allies will continue to ensure that it has strong sway in the region. Realistically, it will for the foreseeable future remain a necessary partner for its traditional allies, particularly those concerned by China’s growing assertiveness. And it remains in America’s interests to stay engaged. However, as ambiguity about its willingness to act increases, these allies will continue to reach for alternative solutions for managing their security.

While this aligns with the US desire to share more of the burdens of global citizenship, if it wants to remain a key Asia-Pacific power, America still needs its allies to need it. A little more clarity and transparency on its part, even if only stated privately, could start to rebuild trust and confidence, which would serve both America and its allies well. 

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback





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Business in China: Risks and Opportunities

Research Event

23 October 2014 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Jeremy Gordon, Director, China Business Services
Chair: Roderic Wye, Associate Fellow, Asia Programme, Chatham House

In light of China’s economic reforms and a high-profile anti-corruption campaign, the speaker will argue that fundamental political, economic and social shifts have changed the nature of opportunities and risks for foreign businesses in China.

Registration for this event is now closed.

Joshua Webb

+44 (0)20 7314 3678




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Is China Finally Overtaking the United States?

Members Event

9 June 2015 - 6:00pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Professor Joseph S Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor, Harvard Kennedy School of Government
Chair: Gideon Rachman, Chief Foreign Affairs Commentator, Financial Times

Long predicted, many observers now think that China has or is about to become more powerful than the United States on the global stage. Joseph Nye will explore the facts behind these beliefs and question if the century of American centrality in the global balance of power is at an end.

LIVE STREAM: This event will be live streamed. The live stream will be made available at 18:00 BST on Tuesday 9 June.

ASK A QUESTION: We will endeavour to ensure that questions are put to the speaker from our online audience as well as from the audience in the auditorium. Questions can be sent in advance via email to questions@chathamhouse.org and during the event on Twitter using #CHEvents.

This event will be followed by a reception.

 

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Event attributes

Livestream

Members Events Team




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Xi Furthers China’s Great Power Case at UN

30 September 2015

Professor Shaun Breslin
Former Associate Fellow, Asia Programme
The president’s speeches highlight China’s latest strategies for shaping its vision of a new type of global leadership.

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Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers remarks at the UN General Assembly on 28 September 2015 in New York City. Photo by Getty Images.

It has become routine for China’s leaders to use high profile international events as a means of projecting a preferred image of what China stands for and how it will act as  a great power, one that is perhaps now second only to the US in the league table of global powers. So it is no surprise that Xi Jinping has used his interventions at the UN development summit and his address to the General Assembly to showcase China’s growing role as a global aid actor, and to call for greater ‘democratization’ of global governance institutions (or, in other words, a greater role and say for China and other developing countries). China’s alleged and self-proclaimed (and challenged) predilection for peace, a desire to build a ‘new type’ of (vaguely defined) international relations, and support for the UN as the sole arbiter of when sovereignty might possibly be put aside (instead of the US or a coalition of the willing) are also now relatively well-established and rehearsed Chinese positions.

In addition to wielding China’s financial power in support of this national image projection, Xi’s activities also represent a move towards mobilizing discursive power (话语权) as well. To date, and for a number of years, this discursive power has been primarily deployed in a defensive manner, with the aim of denying the supposed universal nature of many of the norms and principles of the international order. These norms, as articulated by both Chinese government officials and some supportive academic scholars, are not universal at all, but merely the product of a small number of Western countries’ histories, philosophies and developmental trajectories. So, in this formulation, while it is important to have a common set of principles and responsibilities as the basis for international interactions, each country should be free to develop its own nation-specific definitions based on its own unique histories and contexts. And it is only these Chinese-inspired definitions and aspirations – of human rights, for example, or development – that China should be judged against.

But this position has changed under Xi, with China’s leaders increasingly keen on promoting Chinese understandings and definitions as the basis for international debates and international action. Hot on the heels of Chinese attempts to take a leading role in defining the basis for global cyber diplomacy,  China is now seeking to shape the way that development is defined and understood – which of course has massive implications for how development, thus defined, might be attained.

Leading on development, missing on security

Xi’s willingness – or should that be desire – to establish Chinese potential global leadership was less apparent when it came to solving the major security challenges of the day. To be sure, there was talk about the need for new ways of dealing with insecurity that recognize the consequences of globalization and that no country can solve problems on its own – including, presumably, the United States. The pledge of more peacekeepers will cement China’s position as one of the world’s major contributors to UN overseas activities, and the promise of a military assistance fund to the African Union shows that Beijing really is an important security actor beyond its own borders. But when it comes to conflict in places like Syria, China seems content to maintain its back seat and allow Russia to take the lead in a crisis that is admittedly some distance from China’s own backyard. Expect a Chinese-led agenda for the G20 summit in 2016 in China that reinforces this differential willingness to assume leadership roles depending on the specific issue at hand.  

So for the time being, the aim seems to be primarily to confirm the idea that China is a new and very different type of great power; one that is a friend and supporter of those smaller developing states and emerging powers that had previously suffered from the asymmetric economic and military power of great powers in the West (or in some cases, still do). As part of this ‘difference’ a second related objective seems to be to establish China as a global leader on development issues.

But simply asserting something does not mean that it is true, and its something of an understatement to suggest that China’s pacific and non-interventionist self-identity has not been accepted by everybody, particularly in East and Southeast Asia. China’s developmental achievements have also been questioned. The response in Beijing to Hilary Clinton’s tweet that it was ‘shameless’ that Xi was co-host of a meeting on women’s rights shows that the defensive nature of Chinese policy remains in place: ‘those in the best position to judge the state of women's issues in China are Chinese people, particularly Chinese women’, according to the foreign ministry. And Clinton’s comments also show that the field of ideas is not being left open for China to do whatever it wants just yet; gaining widespread acceptance for Chinese preferences is not going to be an easy task and will likely face considerable resistance. But the suggestion here is that the world is likely to see a growing Chinese presence over the coming years not just as a global development and aid provider, but also as a putative developer of new global norms.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




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India Under Modi: A Superpower in the Making?

Members Event

30 June 2016 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Chatham House London, UK

Event participants

Dr Mukulika Banerjee, Director, South Asia Centre, London School of Economics
Nandan Nilekani, Co-founder and Chairman, EkStep; Chairman, Unique Identification Authority of India (UIAI) (2009-14)
Dr Gareth Price, Senior Research Fellow, Asia Programme, Chatham House
Mihir Swarup Sharma, India Columnist, Bloomberg View; Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi
Chair: James Crabtree, Contributing Editor, Financial Times; Senior Visiting Fellow, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

On the surface, the Indian economy is performing well, and the popularity of Narendra Modi, the prime minister elected on the promise of liberalizing reform two years ago, is holding up. Christine Lagarde, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has referred to India as a ‘bright spot’ in the slowing global economy. According to them, growth equalled China’s last year at 7.3% and has now taken the lead as the world’s fastest growing economy. Yet some joke that India’s prospects look brighter the farther away you are.

The panel will reflect on Modi’s two years in power and discuss what they think the government got wrong and what they got right. They will question whether India’s resurgence can be sustained into the future, and discuss what this actually means for the prospects of India’s 1.3 billion people, as well as the balance of power in Asia and beyond.

This event is organized in association with the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.

Members Events Team




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Review article: Understanding change and continuity in India’s foreign policy

6 January 2017 , Volume 93, Number 1

Aseema Sinha

The field of Indian foreign policy is rich and wide ranging, offering new empirical material across a broad array of topics and relationships. This article reviews three recent books on the subject, with an eye towards evaluating change amid continuity in the pursuit of Indian foreign policy. This scholarship calls out for a new paradigm to understand India’s changing position and actions at global, regional and domestic levels. I argue that Indian foreign policy can and should be seen through the prism of an open border, interdependence framework, wherein both the domestic and global levels are analysed in a linked manner. While the literature surveyed here does not yet offer a new paradigm, some common findings suggest the need for new approaches. We also need to find and use new sources of data and seek ways to measure institutional effects in foreign policy. The task of measurement and theoretical modelling is made more challenging by the need to theorize the linkages across levels and to measure foreign policy variables in different countries simultaneously.




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Neighbor of father and son arrested in Ahmaud Arbery killing is also under investigation

The investigation into the fatal shooting in Brunswick, Georgia, will also look at a neighbor of suspects Gregory and Travis McMichael who recorded video of the incident, authorities said.





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Ousted health official dismisses Trump's claim he is disgruntled: 'I am frustrated at a lack of leadership'

Ousted vaccine expert Rick Bright said he is "frustrated at our inability to be heard as scientists."





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The federal government finally announced initial plans to distribute Gilead's coronavirus drug remdesivir after days of confusion

The government said it's distributing the promising coronavirus drug, remdesivir, to some hard-hit states. Eventually, all 50 states should get it.





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A photographer spent two weeks flying around in helicopters to capture the parked planes at US airports during the pandemic — see his eerie and beautiful work

Travel blogger and photographer Andy Luten drove 4,200 miles across six states to see the grounded jets, detailing the shocking state of aviation.





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‘Not a Bonafide Counterintelligence Investigation’: Barr Slams Comey’s Handling of Flynn Probe

Attorney General Bill Barr explained that the FBI did not conduct “a bonafide counterintelligence investigation” in the case that led former Trump national security adviser Michael Flynn to plead guilty to federal investigators in 2017.Barr, speaking in an exclusive interview with CBS News after the Justice Department dropped its case against Flynn on Thursday, said that his review of the case found Bureau investigators laid “a perjury trap” for Flynn in a January 2017 White House interview.“They didn’t warn him, the way that would usually be required by the Department, they bypassed the Justice Department, they bypassed the protocols at the White House, and so forth,” Barr stated. “These were things that persuaded me that there was not a legitimate counterintelligence investigation.”Former FBI director James Comey admitted in a December 2018 interview that he “sent” the agents to interview Flynn, adding that it was “something I probably wouldn’t have done or maybe gotten away with in a more organized administration.”In its Thursday court filing, the Justice Department explained that it was “not persuaded” that Flynn’s interview, which led to his guilty plea for lying to FBI agents Peter Strzok and Joe Pientka, had proper predication and was materially relevant.Comey tweeted his disappointment, following the decision, saying "the DOJ has lost its way."> The DOJ has lost its way. But, career people: please stay because America needs you. The country is hungry for honest, competent leadership.> > -- James Comey (@Comey) May 7, 2020Barr pointed to recently-released information that showed the FBI moved to close its surveillance of Flynn after finding “no derogatory information” about the retired general’s contacts with Russians, only for Strzok to keep the case open, leading to the eventual interview.“They were closing the investigation, in December [2016], they started that process and on January 4, they were closing it. When they heard about the phone call, which the FBI had the transcripts to — there was no question as to what was discussed, the FBI knew exactly what was discussed — and General Flynn, being the former director of the DIA, said to them, ‘you listen to everything, you know what was said,’” Barr explained.“So there’s no mystery about the call, but they initially tried some theories of how could open another investigation, which didn’t fly, and then they found out that they had not technically closed the earlier investigation, and they kept it open for the expressed purpose of trying to catch — lay a perjury trap — for General Flynn,” he added. A different filing released last week showed handwritten notes from an FBI official that questioned if the goal of Flynn’s White House interview was “to get him to lie, so we can prosecute him or get him fired.”Barr also did not comment on whether those that sought to entrap Flynn would face criminal charges, pointing to U.S. Attorney John Durham’s probe into the origins of the Trump-Russia investigation and saying his team was “in the middle” of “looking at the whole pattern of conduct.”“I’m going to wait until all the evidence is [in], and I get their recommendations as to what they found and how serious it is. But, if we were to find wrongdoing, in the sense of any criminal act, obviously we would follow through on that,” Barr said. “But again, just because something may even stink to high heaven, and appear to everyone to be bad, we still have to apply the right standard and be convinced that there is a violation of a criminal statute and that we can prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. The same standard applies to everybody.”





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Kruppel-like factor 3 (KLF3) suppresses NF-{kappa}B-driven inflammation in mice [Immunology]

Bacterial products such as lipopolysaccharides (or endotoxin) cause systemic inflammation, resulting in a substantial global health burden. The onset, progression, and resolution of the inflammatory response to endotoxin are usually tightly controlled to avoid chronic inflammation. Members of the NF-κB family of transcription factors are key drivers of inflammation that activate sets of genes in response to inflammatory signals. Such responses are typically short-lived and can be suppressed by proteins that act post-translationally, such as the SOCS (suppressor of cytokine signaling) family. Less is known about direct transcriptional regulation of these responses, however. Here, using a combination of in vitro approaches and in vivo animal models, we show that endotoxin treatment induced expression of the well-characterized transcriptional repressor Krüppel-like factor 3 (KLF3), which, in turn, directly repressed the expression of the NF-κB family member RELA/p65. We also observed that KLF3-deficient mice were hypersensitive to endotoxin and exhibited elevated levels of circulating Ly6C+ monocytes and macrophage-derived inflammatory cytokines. These findings reveal that KLF3 is a fundamental suppressor that operates as a feedback inhibitor of RELA/p65 and may be important in facilitating the resolution of inflammation.




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Affinity maturation, humanization, and co-crystallization of a rabbit anti-human ROR2 monoclonal antibody for therapeutic applications [Immunology]

Antibodies are widely used as cancer therapeutics, but their current use is limited by the low number of antigens restricted to cancer cells. A receptor tyrosine kinase, receptor tyrosine kinase-like orphan receptor 2 (ROR2), is normally expressed only during embryogenesis and is tightly down-regulated in postnatal healthy tissues. However, it is up-regulated in a diverse set of hematologic and solid malignancies, thus ROR2 represents a candidate antigen for antibody-based cancer therapy. Here we describe the affinity maturation and humanization of a rabbit mAb that binds human and mouse ROR2 but not human ROR1 or other human cell-surface antigens. Co-crystallization of the parental rabbit mAb in complex with the human ROR2 kringle domain (hROR2-Kr) guided affinity maturation by heavy-chain complementarity-determining region 3 (HCDR3)-focused mutagenesis and selection. The affinity-matured rabbit mAb was then humanized by complementarity-determining region (CDR) grafting and framework fine tuning and again co-crystallized with hROR2-Kr. We show that the affinity-matured and humanized mAb retains strong affinity and specificity to ROR2 and, following conversion to a T cell–engaging bispecific antibody, has potent cytotoxicity toward ROR2-expressing cells. We anticipate that this humanized affinity-matured mAb will find application for antibody-based cancer therapy of ROR2-expressing neoplasms.




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Polarization of protease-activated receptor 2 (PAR-2) signaling is altered during airway epithelial remodeling and deciliation [Immunology]

Protease-activated receptor 2 (PAR-2) is activated by secreted proteases from immune cells or fungi. PAR-2 is normally expressed basolaterally in differentiated nasal ciliated cells. We hypothesized that epithelial remodeling during diseases characterized by cilial loss and squamous metaplasia may alter PAR-2 polarization. Here, using a fluorescent arrestin assay, we confirmed that the common fungal airway pathogen Aspergillus fumigatus activates heterologously-expressed PAR-2. Endogenous PAR-2 activation in submerged airway RPMI 2650 or NCI–H520 squamous cells increased intracellular calcium levels and granulocyte macrophage–colony-stimulating factor, tumor necrosis factor α, and interleukin (IL)-6 secretion. RPMI 2650 cells cultured at an air–liquid interface (ALI) responded to apically or basolaterally applied PAR-2 agonists. However, well-differentiated primary nasal epithelial ALIs responded only to basolateral PAR-2 stimulation, indicated by calcium elevation, increased cilia beat frequency, and increased fluid and cytokine secretion. We exposed primary cells to disease-related modifiers that alter epithelial morphology, including IL-13, cigarette smoke condensate, and retinoic acid deficiency, at concentrations and times that altered epithelial morphology without causing breakdown of the epithelial barrier to model early disease states. These altered primary cultures responded to both apical and basolateral PAR-2 stimulation. Imaging nasal polyps and control middle turbinate explants, we found that nasal polyps, but not turbinates, exhibit apical calcium responses to PAR-2 stimulation. However, isolated ciliated cells from both polyps and turbinates maintained basolateral PAR-2 polarization, suggesting that the calcium responses originated from nonciliated cells. Altered PAR-2 polarization in disease-remodeled epithelia may enhance apical responses and increase sensitivity to inhaled proteases.




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Cell-specific expression of the transcriptional regulator RHAMM provides a timing mechanism that controls appropriate wound re-epithelialization [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

Prevention of aberrant cutaneous wound repair and appropriate regeneration of an intact and functional integument require the coordinated timing of fibroblast and keratinocyte migration. Here, we identified a mechanism whereby opposing cell-specific motogenic functions of a multifunctional intracellular and extracellular protein, the receptor for hyaluronan-mediated motility (RHAMM), coordinates fibroblast and keratinocyte migration speed and ensures appropriate timing of excisional wound closure. We found that, unlike in WT mice, in Rhamm-null mice, keratinocyte migration initiates prematurely in the excisional wounds, resulting in wounds that have re-surfaced before the formation of normal granulation tissue, leading to a defective epidermal architecture. We also noted aberrant keratinocyte and fibroblast migration in the Rhamm-null mice, indicating that RHAMM suppresses keratinocyte motility but increases fibroblast motility. This cell context–dependent effect resulted from cell-specific regulation of extracellular signal-regulated kinase 1/2 (ERK1/2) activation and expression of a RHAMM target gene encoding matrix metalloprotease 9 (MMP-9). In fibroblasts, RHAMM promoted ERK1/2 activation and MMP-9 expression, whereas in keratinocytes, RHAMM suppressed these activities. In keratinocytes, loss of RHAMM function or expression promoted epidermal growth factor receptor–regulated MMP-9 expression via ERK1/2, which resulted in cleavage of the ectodomain of the RHAMM partner protein CD44 and thereby increased keratinocyte motility. These results identify RHAMM as a key factor that integrates the timing of wound repair by controlling cell migration.




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Development of a novel {beta}-1,6-glucan-specific detection system using functionally-modified recombinant endo-{beta}-1,6-glucanase [Methods and Resources]

β-1,3-d-Glucan is a ubiquitous glucose polymer produced by plants, bacteria, and most fungi. It has been used as a diagnostic tool in patients with invasive mycoses via a highly-sensitive reagent consisting of the blood coagulation system of horseshoe crab. However, no method is currently available for measuring β-1,6-glucan, another primary β-glucan structure of fungal polysaccharides. Herein, we describe the development of an economical and highly-sensitive and specific assay for β-1,6-glucan using a modified recombinant endo-β-1,6-glucanase having diminished glucan hydrolase activity. The purified β-1,6-glucanase derivative bound to the β-1,6-glucan pustulan with a KD of 16.4 nm. We validated the specificity of this β-1,6-glucan probe by demonstrating its ability to detect cell wall β-1,6-glucan from both yeast and hyphal forms of the opportunistic fungal pathogen Candida albicans, without any detectable binding to glucan lacking the long β-1,6-glucan branch. We developed a sandwich ELISA-like assay with a low limit of quantification for pustulan (1.5 pg/ml), and we successfully employed this assay in the quantification of extracellular β-1,6-glucan released by >250 patient-derived strains of different Candida species (including Candida auris) in culture supernatant in vitro. We also used this assay to measure β-1,6-glucan in vivo in the serum and in several organs in a mouse model of systemic candidiasis. Our work describes a reliable method for β-1,6-glucan detection, which may prove useful for the diagnosis of invasive fungal infections.




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Inter-{alpha}-inhibitor heavy chain-1 has an integrin-like 3D structure mediating immune regulatory activities and matrix stabilization during ovulation [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

Inter-α-inhibitor is a proteoglycan essential for mammalian reproduction and also plays a less well-characterized role in inflammation. It comprises two homologous “heavy chains” (HC1 and HC2) covalently attached to chondroitin sulfate on the bikunin core protein. Before ovulation, HCs are transferred onto the polysaccharide hyaluronan (HA) to form covalent HC·HA complexes, thereby stabilizing an extracellular matrix around the oocyte required for fertilization. Additionally, such complexes form during inflammatory processes and mediate leukocyte adhesion in the synovial fluids of arthritis patients and protect against sepsis. Here using X-ray crystallography, we show that human HC1 has a structure similar to integrin β-chains, with a von Willebrand factor A domain containing a functional metal ion-dependent adhesion site (MIDAS) and an associated hybrid domain. A comparison of the WT protein and a variant with an impaired MIDAS (but otherwise structurally identical) by small-angle X-ray scattering and analytical ultracentrifugation revealed that HC1 self-associates in a cation-dependent manner, providing a mechanism for HC·HA cross-linking and matrix stabilization. Surprisingly, unlike integrins, HC1 interacted with RGD-containing ligands, such as fibronectin, vitronectin, and the latency-associated peptides of transforming growth factor β, in a MIDAS/cation-independent manner. However, HC1 utilizes its MIDAS motif to bind to and inhibit the cleavage of complement C3, and small-angle X-ray scattering–based modeling indicates that this occurs through the inhibition of the alternative pathway C3 convertase. These findings provide detailed structural and functional insights into HC1 as a regulator of innate immunity and further elucidate the role of HC·HA complexes in inflammation and ovulation.




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The Escherichia coli cellulose synthase subunit G (BcsG) is a Zn2+-dependent phosphoethanolamine transferase [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

Bacterial biofilms are cellular communities that produce an adherent matrix. Exopolysaccharides are key structural components of this matrix and are required for the assembly and architecture of biofilms produced by a wide variety of microorganisms. The human bacterial pathogens Escherichia coli and Salmonella enterica produce a biofilm matrix composed primarily of the exopolysaccharide phosphoethanolamine (pEtN) cellulose. Once thought to be composed of only underivatized cellulose, the pEtN modification present in these matrices has been implicated in the overall architecture and integrity of the biofilm. However, an understanding of the mechanism underlying pEtN derivatization of the cellulose exopolysaccharide remains elusive. The bacterial cellulose synthase subunit G (BcsG) is a predicted inner membrane–localized metalloenzyme that has been proposed to catalyze the transfer of the pEtN group from membrane phospholipids to cellulose. Here we present evidence that the C-terminal domain of BcsG from E. coli (EcBcsGΔN) functions as a phosphoethanolamine transferase in vitro with substrate preference for cellulosic materials. Structural characterization of EcBcsGΔN revealed that it belongs to the alkaline phosphatase superfamily, contains a Zn2+ ion at its active center, and is structurally similar to characterized enzymes that confer colistin resistance in Gram-negative bacteria. Informed by our structural studies, we present a functional complementation experiment in E. coli AR3110, indicating that the activity of the BcsG C-terminal domain is essential for integrity of the pellicular biofilm. Furthermore, our results established a similar but distinct active-site architecture and catalytic mechanism shared between BcsG and the colistin resistance enzymes.




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Re: David Oliver: Is abuse towards doctors in government roles unfair?




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Covid-19: underneath the iceberg




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Re: Prognosis of unrecognised myocardial infarction determined by electrocardiography or cardiac magnetic resonance imaging: systematic review and meta-analysis




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A real opportunity to improve neurology services in England




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Seven days in medicine: 8-14 June 2016




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Cancer Drugs Fund requires further reform




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Potential role for BCG in treatment of autoimmune diseases




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Immigrants in the United States: How Well Are They Integrating into Society?

Immigration is a prominent part of the United States’ DNA, despite concerns about immigrants’ ability to integrate. An examination of recent immigrant inflows shows newcomers to the United States are integrating well, based on language proficiency, socioeconomic attainment, political participation, residential locale, and social interaction indicators.




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Policies to Curb Unauthorized Employment

Illegal immigration is possible in large part because of illegal employment. This report shows the underlying drivers of illegal hiring vary based on the type of employer, the nature of the industry, state of the economy, and a country’s labor market institutions, employment legislation, immigration systems, and even culture.




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Migration and Development: Policy Perspectives from the United States

The report examines U.S. immigration and international development policies, which have unique objectives and respond to distinct political and administrative constraints, and points out that international development has never been a U.S. immigration policy objective; nonetheless, it is an unintended consequence.




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The Role of Immigration in Fostering Competitiveness in the United States

While aspects of the U.S. immigration system facilitate newcomers’ contributions to economic growth and competitiveness, others undermine them. Reforms are needed to enhance the job-creating power of U.S. employers and strengthen the system’s ability to select effectively from the large pool of foreign workers.




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New Streams: Black African Migration to the United States

This report explores the migration patterns and demographics of Black African immigrants in the United States, examining their admission channels, human-capital characteristics, and labor market performance. The authors also provide an analysis of these immigrants' integration prospects.




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Opportunities for Transatlantic Cooperation on International Migration

The EU-U.S. relationship is one of the most significant partnerships among wealthy nations. Interconnections between the two on migration issues make dialogue necessary and inevitable, as each relies on each other to attain a number of policy objectives, most clearly in the case of travel and border security.




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The Role of Civil Society in EU Migration Policy: Perspectives on the European Union's Engagement in its Neighborhood

Civil society provides a crucial link between governments and the communities they represent—infusing policy processes with grassroots knowledge to which governments may not otherwise have access. Looking at the European Union’s efforts to engage with civil society in its “neighborhood,” this report examines the benefits, challenges, and mechanisms to building dialogue and cooperation on migration and development.




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Mexican and Central American Immigrants in the United States

Since 1970, the immigrant populations from Mexico and Central America living in the United States have increased significantly: rising by a factor of 20 even as the total U.S. immigrant population increased four-fold over the period. This demographic report examines the age, educational, and workforce characteristics of these immigrants.




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Immigration and Competitiveness: Responding to Global Challenges in the European Union and United States

Showcasing joint research by MPI and the European University Institute and funded by the European Commission, this event featured discussion on some of the most promising reform proposals on both sides of the Atlantic. Speakers discuss the project’s comparative research, which draws on MPI’s longstanding experience advising European and North American governments on immigration.




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Scientists, Managers, and Tourists: The Changing Shape of European Mobility to the United States

European dominance in U.S. immigration flows has decreased significantly since World War II, a result of economic, demographic, and policy trends on both sides of the Atlantic. Today, migration from European Union Member States to the United States, while small, is characterized by a substantial numbers of European scientists, professionals, and businesspeople.




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The Economic Integration of Immigrants in the United States: Long- and Short-Term Perspectives

The United States has historically offered unparalleled economic opportunity to successive generations of immigrants and their children, poised to play an increasing role in the U.S. economy. But the lasting impact of job loss and slower growth over the next decade will translate into fewer opportunities for workers—and immigrants may prove the most vulnerable.




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Shared Challenges and Opportunities for EU and U.S. Immigration Policymakers

This final report summarizes and reflects upon the key findings of the Improving EU and U.S. Immigration Systems: Learning from Experience comparative research project undertaken by MPI and the European University Institute through a grant from the European Commission.




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Meeting Ground – Mother’s Day Edition

Written from, different angles and spaces, the poems below testify to the great force of motherhood, which nurtures, strengthens, and manifests love. Happy Mother’s Day – Ann-Margaret Lim Words My mother loved words. Not necessarily in...