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Securing China’s core interests: the state of the debate in China

12 March 2015 , Volume 91, Number 2

Jinghan Zeng, Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin




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Scholarship and the ship of state: rethinking the Anglo-American strategic decline analogy

12 March 2015 , Volume 91, Number 2

Katherine C. Epstein




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Is China Finally Overtaking the United States?

Members Event

9 June 2015 - 6:00pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Professor Joseph S Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor, Harvard Kennedy School of Government
Chair: Gideon Rachman, Chief Foreign Affairs Commentator, Financial Times

Long predicted, many observers now think that China has or is about to become more powerful than the United States on the global stage. Joseph Nye will explore the facts behind these beliefs and question if the century of American centrality in the global balance of power is at an end.

LIVE STREAM: This event will be live streamed. The live stream will be made available at 18:00 BST on Tuesday 9 June.

ASK A QUESTION: We will endeavour to ensure that questions are put to the speaker from our online audience as well as from the audience in the auditorium. Questions can be sent in advance via email to questions@chathamhouse.org and during the event on Twitter using #CHEvents.

This event will be followed by a reception.

 

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Event attributes

Livestream

Members Events Team




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China's Foreign Policy as Domestic Policy: The Case of 'One Belt, One Road'

Research Event

29 September 2015 - 12:30pm to 1:30pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Charlie Parton, Counsellor, Political Section, Beijing Delegation, European External Action Service
Chair: Roderic Wye, Assciate Fellow, Asia Programme, Chatham House

The speaker will argue that Chinese foreign policy should be viewed as an extension of domestic policy to a degree not seen in other countries. China's foreign policy aims to support domestic growth and employment, must be aligned with nationalist and narratives of ‘rejuvenation’ and the ‘China Dream’, and must help dilute hostile foreign values. The ‘One Belt, One Road’ project, also known as the ‘New Silk Road’, exemplifies this. The speaker will illustrate its origins and development, discuss how it promotes the Communist Party’s domestic agenda, as well as look at (secondary) geostrategic aims and difficulties. Finally, he will look at the lessons for Europe, and why and how this Chinese initiative should be welcomed.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION IS CLOSED.

Department/project

Joshua Webb

+44 (0)20 7314 3678




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Xi Furthers China’s Great Power Case at UN

30 September 2015

Professor Shaun Breslin
Former Associate Fellow, Asia Programme
The president’s speeches highlight China’s latest strategies for shaping its vision of a new type of global leadership.

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Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers remarks at the UN General Assembly on 28 September 2015 in New York City. Photo by Getty Images.

It has become routine for China’s leaders to use high profile international events as a means of projecting a preferred image of what China stands for and how it will act as  a great power, one that is perhaps now second only to the US in the league table of global powers. So it is no surprise that Xi Jinping has used his interventions at the UN development summit and his address to the General Assembly to showcase China’s growing role as a global aid actor, and to call for greater ‘democratization’ of global governance institutions (or, in other words, a greater role and say for China and other developing countries). China’s alleged and self-proclaimed (and challenged) predilection for peace, a desire to build a ‘new type’ of (vaguely defined) international relations, and support for the UN as the sole arbiter of when sovereignty might possibly be put aside (instead of the US or a coalition of the willing) are also now relatively well-established and rehearsed Chinese positions.

In addition to wielding China’s financial power in support of this national image projection, Xi’s activities also represent a move towards mobilizing discursive power (话语权) as well. To date, and for a number of years, this discursive power has been primarily deployed in a defensive manner, with the aim of denying the supposed universal nature of many of the norms and principles of the international order. These norms, as articulated by both Chinese government officials and some supportive academic scholars, are not universal at all, but merely the product of a small number of Western countries’ histories, philosophies and developmental trajectories. So, in this formulation, while it is important to have a common set of principles and responsibilities as the basis for international interactions, each country should be free to develop its own nation-specific definitions based on its own unique histories and contexts. And it is only these Chinese-inspired definitions and aspirations – of human rights, for example, or development – that China should be judged against.

But this position has changed under Xi, with China’s leaders increasingly keen on promoting Chinese understandings and definitions as the basis for international debates and international action. Hot on the heels of Chinese attempts to take a leading role in defining the basis for global cyber diplomacy,  China is now seeking to shape the way that development is defined and understood – which of course has massive implications for how development, thus defined, might be attained.

Leading on development, missing on security

Xi’s willingness – or should that be desire – to establish Chinese potential global leadership was less apparent when it came to solving the major security challenges of the day. To be sure, there was talk about the need for new ways of dealing with insecurity that recognize the consequences of globalization and that no country can solve problems on its own – including, presumably, the United States. The pledge of more peacekeepers will cement China’s position as one of the world’s major contributors to UN overseas activities, and the promise of a military assistance fund to the African Union shows that Beijing really is an important security actor beyond its own borders. But when it comes to conflict in places like Syria, China seems content to maintain its back seat and allow Russia to take the lead in a crisis that is admittedly some distance from China’s own backyard. Expect a Chinese-led agenda for the G20 summit in 2016 in China that reinforces this differential willingness to assume leadership roles depending on the specific issue at hand.  

So for the time being, the aim seems to be primarily to confirm the idea that China is a new and very different type of great power; one that is a friend and supporter of those smaller developing states and emerging powers that had previously suffered from the asymmetric economic and military power of great powers in the West (or in some cases, still do). As part of this ‘difference’ a second related objective seems to be to establish China as a global leader on development issues.

But simply asserting something does not mean that it is true, and its something of an understatement to suggest that China’s pacific and non-interventionist self-identity has not been accepted by everybody, particularly in East and Southeast Asia. China’s developmental achievements have also been questioned. The response in Beijing to Hilary Clinton’s tweet that it was ‘shameless’ that Xi was co-host of a meeting on women’s rights shows that the defensive nature of Chinese policy remains in place: ‘those in the best position to judge the state of women's issues in China are Chinese people, particularly Chinese women’, according to the foreign ministry. And Clinton’s comments also show that the field of ideas is not being left open for China to do whatever it wants just yet; gaining widespread acceptance for Chinese preferences is not going to be an easy task and will likely face considerable resistance. But the suggestion here is that the world is likely to see a growing Chinese presence over the coming years not just as a global development and aid provider, but also as a putative developer of new global norms.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




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Xi Jinping’s Dream: What Drives China’s Leader?

Members Event

20 April 2016 - 6:00pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House London, UK

Event participants

Professor Kerry Brown, Director, Lau China Institute, King's College London; Associate Fellow, Asia Programme, Chatham House
Chair: Isabel Hilton OBE, Founder and Editor, Chinadialogue

Professor Brown will examine how Xi Jinping has consolidated authority since becoming head of the Communist Party in 2012 and explore what his goals are for the future of China. Is Xi trying to cement his own power or protect the interests of the party by guiding it towards a more sustainable rule?

This talk will introduce the key arguments in CEO China: The Rise of Xi Jinping, the speaker’s full-length, English language study of Xi, his background, current position and core beliefs.
 

Members Events Team




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China’s Plan for Innovation Could Help It Meet Climate Goals

17 May 2016

Dr Sam Geall

Associate Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
The 13th Five Year Plan will not only shape patterns of global development, but also help determine the fate of the environment.

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Solar panels in Xuzhou. Photo via Getty Images.

Much of the focus on China’s 13th Five Year Plan – its centralized and integrated economic guidelines for the next five years – has been on the estimated growth rate of 6.5 per cent, its lowest in recent history. This reflects the so-called ‘new normal’ of China’s development, as President Xi Jinping’s administration describes its aspiration for higher-quality growth in the context of a slowing economy.

But this growth target is an estimate, rather than a pledge. The emphasis on ‘ecological civilization’ – another of Xi’s signature buzzwords, referring to a broad set of approaches environmental protection – is striking. Further, by putting innovation and ‘green development’ at the heart of its ambition to create a ‘moderately prosperous society’, China has sent an important signal: that the country’s strategy for future prosperity in many respects converges with a shift away from its environmentally costly development model.

Environmental goals

The plan endorses a ‘vertical management system’ that will help overcome structural impediments to the local enforcement of environmental laws,  and of its 13 binding targets, 10 relate to the environment and natural resources. In the plan, China commits to an 18 per cent reduction in carbon emissions per unit of GDP from 2015 levels by 2020 and a 15 per cent reduction in energy consumed per unit of GDP from 2015 levels by 2020. It also re-commits to generate 15 per cent of primary energy from non-fossil sources and introduces an important new target of keeping energy consumption below 5 billion tonnes of standard coal equivalent by 2020. Underlining how air quality has become a major driver of energy and climate policymaking, it also promises a 25 per cent reduction in harmful PM2.5 particulates.

In short, the plan suggests that decision makers in China not only take seriously its UN pledge to see a peak in the country’s emissions before 2030, but also that they hope the country will be the leading supplier of low-carbon technologies. Among its non-binding targets are some significant innovation-related measures: to raise gross expenditure on research and development as a percentage of GDP to 2.5 per cent, from 2.1 per cent today; and over the same period to almost double the number of patents owned per 10,000 people, from 6.3 to 12.

Innovation

The document makes clear the principal driver of China’s economy should be innovation, rather than investment. Innovation, says the plan, ‘must be placed at the heart of overall national development’ and ‘integrated into all the works of the Party and the country’. There is emphasis on strategic areas at the ‘frontiers’ of science, ‘mass entrepreneurship’ through new models such as crowd-funding, and digital economy projects – what the leadership likes to call ‘Internet+’ – including around the Internet of Things, quantum computing and big data.  

Under China’s 12th Five Year Plan (from 2011 to 2015), the state focused on a defined number of specific technology goals in its ‘strategic emerging industries’. Renewable energies and electric vehicles, for example, were afforded specific preferential policies. By contrast, the new plan has a greater focus on ‘clean coal’ and hydropower in the energy sector; and while it doesn’t abandon solar and wind, it also suggests greater diversity in its overall approach, with more of an emphasis on reform of the energy sector, developing smart power grids and investing in energy storage technologies such as batteries and fuel cells.

Moreover, innovation in the plan is not framed as simply being about hardware – the commercialization of science and technology. Rather, the text reiterates that innovation should come in many different varieties: ‘theoretical, institutional, scientific and technological, and cultural innovation’. This raises the intriguing and hopeful possibility that the country’s planners recognize some of the challenges and opportunities the public, particularly in the form of newly vocal, engaged and connected urban constituencies, pose in the governance of innovation.

Policymakers – taking ‘social innovation’ seriously – could begin look at the public as technology users, incubators of demand-driven successes, and innovators in their own right. In a context of low public trust around food and agriculture in China, for example, organic cooperatives and ecological entrepreneurs have pioneered supply-chain innovations, typically facilitated by digital networks, to connect farmers with urban consumers looking for safer food. Lower-tech approaches to energy too – such as inexpensive solar water heaters, which garner a mention in the latest plan – have been driven by rural users and supported by local initiatives, rather than central government coordination or subsidies.

These approaches to innovation would present a quite different model than previous central government plans have encouraged. Whether in the plan’s implementation they are harnessed and given support might be critical to meeting China’s environmental goals, as well as its drive to create a more innovative economy and society.

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To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback 




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China's Fury Over South China Sea Belies Its Legal Insecurities

4 July 2016

Sonya Sceats

Associate Fellow, International Law Programme
Despite its dramatic rejection of the South China Sea arbitration case initiated by the Philippines, China is gearing up to play a much larger role in the evolution of the international legal system.

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A vendor in Beijing stands behind a map including an insert depicting the 'nine-dash line' in the South China Sea. Photo by Getty Images.

It is tempting to read China's refusal in this case to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal in The Hague as the defiance of an arrogant superpower that views itself as above international law. No doubt many in Manila, Washington and elsewhere are purveying this view. But there is more here than meets the eye.

For decades, Beijing has complained that the global order was forged in an era when China was weak and the rules of the game are rigged against it.

But this lament is more difficult to sustain in relation to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which China helped negotiate in the 1970s and early 1980s. Beijing signed the treaty as soon as it was opened for signature in 1982 and ratified it in 1996.

The Philippines initiated this arbitration against China in 2013 as part of a long-running dispute over rights in the South China Sea, including over the Spratly Islands (known as the 'Nansha Islands' in China) and surrounding maritime areas. 

Under the treaty, China is not obliged to defend the case but this is no bar to proceedings and it remains legally bound by the award. From a legal perspective, its refusal to participate is thus a risky move, all the more so since the ruling is likely to have legal ramifications for China's highly charged maritime disputes with other neighbours such as Vietnam and Malaysia.

It is well known that the legal proceedings launched by the Philippines sparked a contest of ideas in Beijing. Behind closed doors, some Chinese international lawyers argued that China should prove its commitment to the international rule of law by vigorously fighting its corner in the arbitration. The defeat of these liberal voices is usually interpreted as an inevitable effect of the nationalists' grip on power under President Xi Jinping.

In a significant concession to those on the losing side of the argument, however, China published a position paper setting out its objections to the jurisdiction of the tribunal and formally conveyed this to the tribunal which treated it as ‘effectively constituting a plea on jurisdiction’.

This novel form of ‘non-participating participation’ must be seen against the backcloth of a strategic ambition by China to develop a greater mastery of international law. At an important meeting just two months earlier, the Communist Party called for China to strengthen its ‘discourse power and influence in international legal affairs’ and use legal methods to safeguard its ‘sovereignty, security and development interests’.

Our research team at Chatham House has been tracking impressive steps by China to realize this goal, including new government decision-making machinery designed to promote compliance with international law, a hiring spree of international lawyers and new advisory committee for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, promotion of scholarship and efforts to show norm leadership especially in ‘new domains’ of international law such as cyber law, and a training programme to share growing Chinese international law expertise with the global South.

We know from Chinese colleagues that maritime disputes are a major impetus for this drive. For years, the Chinese government has fretted about its low capabilities in the international legal field, compared with other permanent members of the UN Security Council and regional rivals such as Japan. Now, impelled by the need to protect its strategic interests in the South China Sea and elsewhere, it is doing something about it.

It may seem paradoxical in light of its bullish attacks on the Philippines and even the tribunal itself, but China's boycott of the arbitration should also be seen as a manifestation of its low confidence in its own capacities in the realm of international law. Speculation is rife that the leadership lacks faith in its ability to convince the tribunal of the legal validity of its controversial ‘nine dash line’ demarcation of China's rights in the South China Sea.  

In the arbitration and otherwise, China has avoided clarifying the precise legal basis and implications of its ‘nine dash line’ claims while sponsoring a vast industry of academic studies to support its position.

In the meantime, China is playing to its strengths, including its deep pockets, in pursuing an extrajudicial approach. An audacious programme of land reclamation and militarization of atolls and escalating patrols and exercises in disputed territories is a clear effort to alter ‘the facts on the water’. And in recent months it has choreographed statements of political support for its South China Sea claims from a motley crew of states with economic ties to China.

While China's rejection of the South China Sea arbitration is true to form for a powerful state that, like its great rival the United States, is generally ill-disposed towards binding international dispute resolution processes, it is not inconceivable that this approach will give way when China becomes more confident in its ability to play and win at ‘law fare’, as we are already seeing in the context of World Trade Organization disputes. Until then, in time-honoured fashion, Beijing is biding its time, plugging its skills gap and hoping it can shake off mounting reputational damage from its petulant spurning of these proceedings.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




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South China Sea: The Result of the Arbitration

Invitation Only Research Event

18 July 2016 - 9:30am to 10:30am

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Professor Philippe Sands QC, Barrister, Matrix Chambers
Chris Whomersley, Deputy Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2002-14)
Professor Julia Xue, Academy Senior Fellow, International Law Programme, Chatham House
ChairElizabeth Wilmshurst, Distinguished Fellow, International Law Programme, Chatham House

The arbitration between the Philippines and China on the dispute in the South China Sea is coming to an end. The Permanent Court of Arbitration is to issue its decision on 12 July. This meeting will discuss the notable points of the tribunal’s award and the next steps. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Chanu Peiris

Programme Manager, International Law
+44 (0)20 7314 3686




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Will There Now Be Peace in the South China Sea?

14 July 2016

Bill Hayton

Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme
China’s sense of entitlement has collided with international law and, for the time being, lost. The way is open for a new regional understanding.

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A member of the Philippines military stands on the beach at Thitu island, one of the disputed Spratly Islands. Photo by Getty Images.

The ruling by an arbitral tribunal of five members based in The Hague was simple and devastating. It declares that ‘China’s claims to historic rights… with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the “nine-dash line” are contrary to the [The UN] Convention [on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS]’. This is a result that Southeast Asia’s maritime countries have long sought. The way is now clear to resolve all the disputes in the region, if the participants choose to do so.

For decades, countries around the South China Sea lived under the shadow of a quasi-territorial claim that no one really understood. What did the U-shaped, nine-dashed line marked on Chinese maps actually mean? In 2009, the Chinese government attached a copy of the map to an official submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the region became alarmed. For the first time, it seemed that China was serious about asserting a claim to all the land and water inside the line.

On Tuesday that claim was dismissed as entirely incompatible with international law. Moreover, the Arbitral Tribunal ruled that not one of the Spratly Islands qualifies as an ‘island’. This ruling is at least as significant: it means none of the features in the archipelago are entitled to an exclusive economic zone. Theoretically it should now be simple to resolve all the maritime disputes in the southern part of the South China Sea. The Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines can, in principle, draw lines up to 200 nautical miles out from their coasts and agree compromises where they overlap. China is now irrelevant to this process because its nearest coastline is simply too far away.

All the 50 or so features in the Spratly Islands that are naturally above water at high tide would be granted a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea. The resulting settlement would resemble a Swiss cheese: large areas of exclusive economic zone measured from national coastlines punctuated by a few dozen ‘bubbles’ of disputed territory. This would not resolve the disputes about which country is the rightful owner of those ‘bubbles’ but it would settle the maritime disputes in the sea around them.

Of course, there are still wrinkles. Not least is the Philippines claim to the Malaysian province of Sabah in northern Borneo. This means that, for the time being, those two countries can’t settle the maritime boundary between them. They could, nonetheless, agree how far it projects offshore.

The bigger problem will be China’s attitude. Its response to the tribunal’s ruling has been angry but curiously misdirected. State media have focused their ire on questions of territorial sovereignty – even though the tribunal was barred from even considering this subject. China’s territorial claims to the rocks of the Spratly Islands are entirely unaffected by Tuesday’s ruling. There must be separate processes to resolve those questions.

China has many interests in the South China Sea – including defence, trade routes, fisheries and hydrocarbons – so it’s not surprising that it pursues whatever approach it thinks practical in order to protect them. However, the whole purpose of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was to create an international order that defended the rights of countries to exploit the resources off their own coasts without threat from other states further away. China was a full participant in the negotiations between 1973 and 1982 that created UNCLOS and, at that time, was a strong defender of the rights of coastal countries.

While it may feel that it has lost out from this week’s ruling, China has much to gain from a strong community of regional order in the South China Sea. Most Southeast Asian countries remain alarmed by China’s intentions − which is why, in the past few years, they have been strengthening their ties with the United States and increasing military spending. China’s wider interests would benefit from a de-escalation of this tension. Reassuring its neighbours would give them less reason to rely on the US.

Putting a new maritime order in place, based upon UNCLOS and commitments between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, would be a major step towards this. It would also bring many associated benefits – not least cooperation to protect the region’s fish stocks, which are facing disastrous collapse. The first step is accepting the implications of Tuesday’s ruling.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




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Don't even think of it

captain_j03 posted a photo:

Wish me a happy mother's day and I'll slit your guts like a ripe melon.

My mood is not the best today - my sister woke me at 6 AM for said reason. On a sunday. And guess what - I am not even a mother.

Toy Project Day 1746





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Ousted health official dismisses Trump's claim he is disgruntled: 'I am frustrated at a lack of leadership'

Ousted vaccine expert Rick Bright said he is "frustrated at our inability to be heard as scientists."





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A former editor at the Observer says Kushner's claim of coronavirus 'success' stems from his inability to empathize with other people's grief

Elizabeth Spiers wrote about an incident where Jared Kushner used the memorial of an employee to congratulate himself for success.





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Meet the Ohio health expert who has a fan club — and Republicans trying to stop her

Some Buckeyes are not comfortable being told by a "woman in power" to quarantine, one expert said.





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Ahmaud Arbery is dead because Americans think black men are criminals

Whenever Americans see videos of police brutality against black men and women, the first thing they do is assume they deserved their executionWhat skin color are the bad guys in America’s fantasies of vigilantism? When the proverbial “fellas” get together to drink beers and talk about their newest guns and who they’d take down, what race are the “criminals” in the theater of their minds?When Greg McMichael and his son, Travis, got the call from their neighbor that a “burglar” was running through their Brunswick, Georgia neighborhood that chilly February day, what color man do you think they imagined as they locked, loaded, and embarked on their “mission”?Ahmaud Arbery is dead today because when Americans dream of vigilante justice, black men are the villains of their imaginations.We as a nation are so comfortable with this baseline bigotry that our first assumption whenever we see videos of police brutality against or shootings of black men and women, the first thing we do is assume that the victims must have done something wrong to earn their own public execution.This assumption is both a function of white America having a completely different experience with police officers than black America as well as the hundreds of years of vilifying blackness in media and American culture.I will never forget the biggest and most uproarious applause during the theater debut of the lackluster 2007 vigilante film, Brave One, came when the protagonist Jodi Foster got her first vigilante kills of the movie – two threatening and scary black men. That theater filled with men the same age range as Greg and Travis McMichael erupted as if at that moment, all that they had ever imagined had been fulfilled on the big screen. Needless to say, I left that theater before the credits rolled.Across the country, our political leaders hold these same bigoted beliefs which inevitably lead to policies that directly assume criminality based on skin color.During his tenure as mayor of New York City, billionaire Michael Bloomberg made it explicitly clear why it was that he sent police officers into black and brown communities to “throw them” up against the wall. In his 2015 Aspen Institute speech he stated:“People say, ‘Oh my God, you are arresting kids for marijuana who are all minorities.’ Yes, that’s true. Why? Because we put all the cops in the minority neighborhoods. Yes, that’s true. Why’d we do it? Because that’s where all the crime is. And the way you should get the guns out of the kids’ hands is throw them against the wall and frisk them.”And it is for this reason that I do not distinguish between the violence committed by American citizens acting as vigilantes and the violence committed by so-called officers of the law when, in both cases, the working assumption and driving force behind that violence is the deeply bigoted and firmly American association between blackness and criminality.For Ahmaud, that association not only led to his brutal killing, but it also initially meant his killer not being arrested. It took more than two months for the father and son duo to be arrested. When explaining why they were not charged immediately the district attorney, George Barnhill, immediately stated that the victim, Ahmaud Arbery, was, in fact, the “criminal suspect”.“It appears that [Greg and Travis McMichael’s] intent was to stop and hold this criminal suspect until law enforcement arrived. Under Georgia Law [sic] this is perfectly legal.”Even after viewing the video and with no evidence beyond Ahmaud’s skin color, the top cop in the institution designed to bring equal justice under the law concluded that Ahmaud was a criminal suspect when he was simply a black man taking a jog.What are black Americans to do when justice is delayed or outright denied because of the assignment of innocence to vigilantes and police officers?What are black Americans to do when the assumption of guilt because of our skin color is as American as the guns they use to kill us?What are we to do when in our neighbors’ dreams and fantasies of cop-and-robber, the skin color of the bad guy matches our own?The very first thing we are going to do is defend ourselves as if our lives depend on it because when Americans fantasize about killing, those fantasies become our living nightmares. * Benjamin Dixon is the host of the Benjamin Dixon show.





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Top Republican Lawmaker Disclosed Stock in Chinese Company He Labeled a Nat Sec Threat

Representative Michael McCaul, who has harshly criticized China in his position as the ranking member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, disclosed that his family owns stock in a Chinese tech company he described as a threat to national security.An April 20 periodic transaction report showed that McCaul disclosed a February purchase of between $50,000 and $100,000 in shares of the Chinese firm Tencent Holdings, Politico reported.In November, several months before the shares were purchased, the Texas congressman said that Tencent Holdings is among the "Chinese companies that threaten America’s economic and national security."The tech conglomerate is "heavily involved" in the "social credit system, a dystopian system China has implemented to score its citizens’ behavior," McCaul said at the time, as well as an "integral part" of the Chinese Communist Party’s industrial policies and "one of four national champions for artificial intelligence."McCaul's lawyer, Elliot Berke, said that the shares are not owned personally by McCaul but by his wife, and the decision to invest in Tencent was made by a third party.“Congressman McCaul did not purchase any shares in China’s Tencent Holdings or any other Chinese company,” the attorney said. “Congressman McCaul’s wife has assets she solely owns and a third party manager made the purchase without her direction.”Rachel Walker, a spokeswoman for McCaul, emphasized that the revelation of the Tencent shares “highlights that many Americans unwittingly invest their money in Chinese owned companies."Federal employees are often unaware they own such investments because the federal government’s thrift savings plan program creates portfolios that include Tencent and other Chinese companies, Walker said. McCaul has argued that such retirement investment plans should not invest American dollars in such "shady" Chinese companies, often without the knowledge of the investor."Congressman McCaul has been a fierce critic of the brutal behavior of the Chinese Communist Party and will continue to fight to hold them accountable as the Chair of the China Task Force," Walker said. "This should be a wake-up call to us all that the CCP’s involvement in the U.S. economy is far more reaching than many Americans realize and that we need to change the way we do business with China, including our investments."Tencent owns the Chinese social media platform WeChat, which has more than one billion users and is suspected of monitoring the activities of users both inside and outside of China. Tencent is also associated with Chinese tech firm Huawei, which U.S. officials said can secretly access American cellular phone networks, giving it access to sensitive information.McCaul has taken a leading role in criticizing China's handling of the coronavirus pandemic as well, accusing Beijing of launching perhaps the "worst cover-up in human history."He was tapped on Thursday by House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy as chairman of the China Task Force, the aim of which is to develop "legislative solutions to address the Chinese Communist Party’s malign global agenda."The task force will "develop new and enduring policy solutions that, among others, enhance our economic strength and create jobs, protect our national security, rethink our supply chains and grow our competitive edge in technology," McCaul said in a statement on his appointment.





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White House won't consider another stimulus bill in May -Kudlow

The White House has halted talks with Congress over any further coronavirus stimulus package as it waits for more information about how U.S. state reopenings affect the economy, White House top economic adviser Larry Kudlow told reporters on Friday. The Senate and House of Representatives have already passed four major bills to address the novel coronavirus outbreak, including three aimed at stabilizing the economy as most Americans have sheltered in place and unemployment has soared.





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China reports first coronavirus case in Wuhan since April 3 among 14 new infections

China's National Health Commission reported 14 new confirmed coronavirus cases on May 9, the highest number since April 28, including the first for more than a month in the city of Wuhan where the outbreak was first detected late last year. While China had officially designated all areas of the country as low-risk last Thursday, the new cases according to data published on Sunday represent a jump from the single case reported for the day before. The new Wuhan case, the first reported in the epicentre of China's outbreak since April 3, was previously asymptomatic, according to the health commission.





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Tripoli airport shelling hits fuel tanks, passenger plane-ministry

Shelling of Tripoli's Mitiga airport early on Saturday, part of an intensified barrage of artillery fire on the capital in recent days, hit fuel tanks and damaged passenger planes, the Transport Ministry said in a statement. Mitiga is the last functioning airport in the Libyan capital, though civilian flights stopped in March because of repeated shelling even before the country imposed a lockdown over the coronavirus pandemic. Brega Petroleum Marketing Company, part of the National Oil Corporation, said its jet fuel tanks at Mitiga caught fire after coming under attack and firemen were working to control the blaze.





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A photographer spent two weeks flying around in helicopters to capture the parked planes at US airports during the pandemic — see his eerie and beautiful work

Travel blogger and photographer Andy Luten drove 4,200 miles across six states to see the grounded jets, detailing the shocking state of aviation.





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Inter-{alpha}-inhibitor heavy chain-1 has an integrin-like 3D structure mediating immune regulatory activities and matrix stabilization during ovulation [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

Inter-α-inhibitor is a proteoglycan essential for mammalian reproduction and also plays a less well-characterized role in inflammation. It comprises two homologous “heavy chains” (HC1 and HC2) covalently attached to chondroitin sulfate on the bikunin core protein. Before ovulation, HCs are transferred onto the polysaccharide hyaluronan (HA) to form covalent HC·HA complexes, thereby stabilizing an extracellular matrix around the oocyte required for fertilization. Additionally, such complexes form during inflammatory processes and mediate leukocyte adhesion in the synovial fluids of arthritis patients and protect against sepsis. Here using X-ray crystallography, we show that human HC1 has a structure similar to integrin β-chains, with a von Willebrand factor A domain containing a functional metal ion-dependent adhesion site (MIDAS) and an associated hybrid domain. A comparison of the WT protein and a variant with an impaired MIDAS (but otherwise structurally identical) by small-angle X-ray scattering and analytical ultracentrifugation revealed that HC1 self-associates in a cation-dependent manner, providing a mechanism for HC·HA cross-linking and matrix stabilization. Surprisingly, unlike integrins, HC1 interacted with RGD-containing ligands, such as fibronectin, vitronectin, and the latency-associated peptides of transforming growth factor β, in a MIDAS/cation-independent manner. However, HC1 utilizes its MIDAS motif to bind to and inhibit the cleavage of complement C3, and small-angle X-ray scattering–based modeling indicates that this occurs through the inhibition of the alternative pathway C3 convertase. These findings provide detailed structural and functional insights into HC1 as a regulator of innate immunity and further elucidate the role of HC·HA complexes in inflammation and ovulation.




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Processivity of dextransucrases synthesizing very-high-molar-mass dextran is mediated by sugar-binding pockets in domain V [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

The dextransucrase DSR-OK from the Gram-positive bacterium Oenococcus kitaharae DSM17330 produces a dextran of the highest molar mass reported to date (∼109 g/mol). In this study, we selected a recombinant form, DSR-OKΔ1, to identify molecular determinants involved in the sugar polymerization mechanism and that confer its ability to produce a very-high-molar-mass polymer. In domain V of DSR-OK, we identified seven putative sugar-binding pockets characteristic of glycoside hydrolase 70 (GH70) glucansucrases that are known to be involved in glucan binding. We investigated their role in polymer synthesis through several approaches, including monitoring of dextran synthesis, affinity assays, sugar binding pocket deletions, site-directed mutagenesis, and construction of chimeric enzymes. Substitution of only two stacking aromatic residues in two consecutive sugar-binding pockets (variant DSR-OKΔ1-Y1162A-F1228A) induced quasi-complete loss of very-high-molar-mass dextran synthesis, resulting in production of only 10–13 kg/mol polymers. Moreover, the double mutation completely switched the semiprocessive mode of DSR-OKΔ1 toward a distributive one, highlighting the strong influence of these pockets on enzyme processivity. Finally, the position of each pocket relative to the active site also appeared to be important for polymer elongation. We propose that sugar-binding pockets spatially closer to the catalytic domain play a major role in the control of processivity. A deep structural characterization, if possible with large-molar-mass sugar ligands, would allow confirming this hypothesis.




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The Escherichia coli cellulose synthase subunit G (BcsG) is a Zn2+-dependent phosphoethanolamine transferase [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

Bacterial biofilms are cellular communities that produce an adherent matrix. Exopolysaccharides are key structural components of this matrix and are required for the assembly and architecture of biofilms produced by a wide variety of microorganisms. The human bacterial pathogens Escherichia coli and Salmonella enterica produce a biofilm matrix composed primarily of the exopolysaccharide phosphoethanolamine (pEtN) cellulose. Once thought to be composed of only underivatized cellulose, the pEtN modification present in these matrices has been implicated in the overall architecture and integrity of the biofilm. However, an understanding of the mechanism underlying pEtN derivatization of the cellulose exopolysaccharide remains elusive. The bacterial cellulose synthase subunit G (BcsG) is a predicted inner membrane–localized metalloenzyme that has been proposed to catalyze the transfer of the pEtN group from membrane phospholipids to cellulose. Here we present evidence that the C-terminal domain of BcsG from E. coli (EcBcsGΔN) functions as a phosphoethanolamine transferase in vitro with substrate preference for cellulosic materials. Structural characterization of EcBcsGΔN revealed that it belongs to the alkaline phosphatase superfamily, contains a Zn2+ ion at its active center, and is structurally similar to characterized enzymes that confer colistin resistance in Gram-negative bacteria. Informed by our structural studies, we present a functional complementation experiment in E. coli AR3110, indicating that the activity of the BcsG C-terminal domain is essential for integrity of the pellicular biofilm. Furthermore, our results established a similar but distinct active-site architecture and catalytic mechanism shared between BcsG and the colistin resistance enzymes.




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Inhibition of glycosphingolipid biosynthesis reverts multidrug resistance by differentially modulating ABC transporters in chronic myeloid leukemias [Cell Biology]

Multidrug resistance (MDR) in cancer arises from cross-resistance to structurally- and functionally-divergent chemotherapeutic drugs. In particular, MDR is characterized by increased expression and activity of ATP-binding cassette (ABC) superfamily transporters. Sphingolipids are substrates of ABC proteins in cell signaling, membrane biosynthesis, and inflammation, for example, and their products can favor cancer progression. Glucosylceramide (GlcCer) is a ubiquitous glycosphingolipid (GSL) generated by glucosylceramide synthase, a key regulatory enzyme encoded by the UDP-glucose ceramide glucosyltransferase (UGCG) gene. Stressed cells increase de novo biosynthesis of ceramides, which return to sub-toxic levels after UGCG mediates incorporation into GlcCer. Given that cancer cells seem to mobilize UGCG and have increased GSL content for ceramide clearance, which ultimately contributes to chemotherapy failure, here we investigated how inhibition of GSL biosynthesis affects the MDR phenotype of chronic myeloid leukemias. We found that MDR is associated with higher UGCG expression and with a complex GSL profile. UGCG inhibition with the ceramide analog d-threo-1-(3,4,-ethylenedioxy)phenyl-2-palmitoylamino-3-pyrrolidino-1-propanol (EtDO-P4) greatly reduced GSL and monosialotetrahexosylganglioside levels, and co-treatment with standard chemotherapeutics sensitized cells to mitochondrial membrane potential loss and apoptosis. ABC subfamily B member 1 (ABCB1) expression was reduced, and ABCC-mediated efflux activity was modulated by competition with nonglycosylated ceramides. Consistently, inhibition of ABCC-mediated transport reduced the efflux of exogenous C6-ceramide. Overall, UGCG inhibition impaired the malignant glycophenotype of MDR leukemias, which typically overcomes drug resistance through distinct mechanisms. This work sheds light on the involvement of GSL in chemotherapy failure, and its findings suggest that targeted GSL modulation could help manage MDR leukemias.




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Classifying deaths from COVID-19: Why the official statistics will never reflect the true mortality from coronavirus, and how future studies could try to address this




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Rethinking Points Systems and Employer-Selected Immigration

Two competing models for selecting economic-stream immigrants are now prevalent in advanced industrialized economies: points-based and employer-led selection. Increasingly, however, hybrid selection systems are being created, implementing best practices from each selection process.




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This week’s Shutterbugs




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Big blow for former Sunshine Girl - Registered Nurse Nichala Gibson recovered from COVID-19 but her father was not so lucky

THE LAST two months have been two of the worst in the life of former national netball star Nichala Gibson. She lives in New York City, the epicentre for the COVID-19 virus in the United States. Gibson and her sister suffered, then recovered from...




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Daddy, when are you coming home? - Stranded Jamaican cruise ship worker dreads Mother’s Day away from family

For drummer Conroy Gordon, the hardest part of being locked away day after day in the narrow confines of a stranded cruise ship is his inability to tell his two daughters when Daddy will be home. For the past month, he has been battling this...




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Queen of foster care - Supermom Mama Sweetie opens big heart to more than 40 children

To say Judith-Miranda Townsend has a special love for children would not even begin to capture the essence of the Westmoreland supermom. Affectionately called ‘Mama Sweetie’ by foster children and members of the Holly Hill community in Darliston,...




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Changing Demography and Circumstances for Young Black Children in African and Caribbean Immigrant Families

This report finds that the 813,000 U.S. children under the age of 10 who have Black immigrant parents from Africa or the Caribbean generally fall in the middle of multiple well-being indicators, faring less well than Asian and white children but better than their native-born Black and Hispanic peers. Citizenship status, English proficiency, parental characteristics, poverty, housing, and access to social supports are examined.




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A Demographic Profile of Black Caribbean Immigrants in the United States

Immigration from the Caribbean to the United States is a relatively recent phenomenon, beginning largely after 1965. This report provides a demographic profile of the 1.7 million Caribbean immigrants in the United States: their geographic settlement, education and workforce characteristics, earnings, modes of entry, and more.




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Parenting Behavior, Health, and Cognitive Development among Children in Black Immigrant Families: Comparing the United States and the United Kingdom

This report focuses on the development of children of Black immigrants in the United States, comparing against the outcomes for their peers in native-born and other immigrant families. It also compares these U.S. children to those in the United Kingdom, where there is a large Black immigrant population but a notably different policy context of reception.




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Black Immigrant Mothers in Palm Beach County, Florida, and their Children's Readiness for School

This report draws on a six-year longitudinal study of Palm Beach County, FL, examining parenting, child care enrollment, and other factors that encourage early school success. The authors find kindergarten-age children of Black immigrants have significantly higher odds of being ready for school than children of Latina immigrant or Black U.S.-born mothers.




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Patterns and Predictors of School Readiness and Early Childhood Success among Young Children in Black Immigrant Families

Using a nationally representative U.S. birth-cohort study, this report examines levels of school readiness among young children by race/ethnicity and nativity. The authors identify the contextual factors — such as family circumstances, parenting practices, and enrollment in center-based child care — that encourage early school success.




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Young Children of Black Immigrants in America: Changing Flows, Changing Faces

The event discussion, which touched on the intersection of race and immigration, focused on the demographics of Black immigrants (both African and Caribbean) in the United States and their children, their educational success, and the implications of the recently released volume’s findings for research and public policy.




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Young Children of Black Immigrants in America: Changing Flows, Changing Faces

Book release event for MPI's volume on the Children of Black Immigrants, covering topics of education, health, and demographics, with U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Services Policy Ajay Chaudry; Gerald D. Jaynes, Yale University Departments of Economics and African-American Studies; chapter authors Dylan Patricia Conger and Kevin Thomas; and volume editors MPI's Randy Capps and Michael Fix.




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Critical Immigration, Health, and Education Policies Affecting Young Children of Immigrants

MPI’s National Center on Immigrant Integration Policy convened a major public policy research symposium focused on young children of immigrants in the U.S.




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Vladimir Vinokurov | May 9 – the day world history changed

May 9 marked a very special day for all Russians as the day of the victory over Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic war. At 00:16 hours on that day in 1945 Act of Military Surrender was signed by the German military leaders in Berlin. The...




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Mark Wignall | Help! I need to be a child again

Last Thursday morning, I went to visit my youngest grandchild, three-year-old Morgan. As she emerged from her bedroom with her tablet in hand and a scream on her lips then saw me and barged towards me, I knew that a full embrace was not going to...




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10 takeaways from the worst jobs report in US history

Brutal. Horrific. Tragic. Choose your ­description. The April jobs report showed, in harrowing ­detail, just how terribly the coronavirus outbreak has pummelled the United States economy. Most obviously, there’s the 14.7 per cent unemployment rate...




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Rethinking National Identity in the Age of Migration

Across the Atlantic, large-scale migration has brought about unprecedented levels of diversity, transforming communities in fundamental ways — with a resulting immigration backlash and criticism of "multiculturalism." This volume delivers recommendations on what policymakers must do to build and reinforce inclusiveness given the realities on each side of the Atlantic.




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Young Children of Black Immigrants in America: Changing Flows, Changing Faces

This interdisciplinary volume examines the health, well-being, school readiness, and academic achievement of children in Black immigrant families (most with parents from Africa and the Caribbean)—a population that has had little academic attention even as it represents an increasing share of the U.S. Black child population.