The Ferguson Commission—convened by Missouri Governor Jay Nixon in the aftermath of the police shooting death of Michael Brown—was given a daunting task. Its charge was not only to examine the underlying causes of “the social and economic conditions that impede progress, equality, and safety in the St. Louis region,” but also to issue a report “containing specific, practical policy recommendations for making the region a stronger, fairer place for everyone to live.”

Reflecting the magnitude of that charge, the Ferguson Commission’s final report, released on Monday, totals almost 200 pages and contains 189 calls to action that span a range of issue areas, from police and court reform, to creating higher-quality education and training opportunities, to improving access to jobs, transportation, and affordable housing.

The sweeping scope of the report’s recommendations is in proportion to the complexity of the shifting economic and demographic trends and the legacy of racial discrimination that helped set the stage for last summer’s events. Like many of its neighboring communities, and suburbs across the country, Ferguson has recently experienced rapid demographic and economic changes, transitioning from a largely white to a majority black community that has seen its poor population double since 2000.

The report’s authors emphasize that they want readers to “realize how interconnected all of these issues are.” (That’s one reason for the interactive online design—to allow users to navigate across related initiatives, even if they fall in different issue areas.) And the commission situates their calls to action within a regional framework that recognizes these issues operate at a scale broader than one neighborhood or suburb.

Even so, the challenge of municipal fragmentation looms large, both in the commission’s report and in any move towards implementing its recommendations. The report acknowledges that “the current state of municipal fragmentation is both a result of and a propagator of racial disparity” and that many of St. Louis’ suburbs “have problems with budgets because of their small size.” The commission calls for consolidation of the region’s 60 local police departments and 81 municipal courts, a move which could improve oversight and compliance and save the region millions of dollars a year.

But the commission stops short of addressing the municipalities themselves, many of which would continue to struggle with strapped budgets even after these reforms. Capping the share of municipal revenue generated by fines and fees, as the state legislature has done, could help curb abusive practices, but it doesn’t solve the underlying problem. Many of these small municipalities don’t have the resources they need to meet their current budget obligations, let alone pay for additional services and programs that increase access to opportunity (like those called for in the Ferguson Commission’s report).

There is no easy solution, but there are models for the region to consider that could ameliorate the negative effects of fragmentation (e.g., municipal collaboration, municipal consolidation, and regional revenue sharing and governance structures) and potentially ease the way for the broader slate of reforms recommended by the commission.

Presented with a Gordian knot of a challenge, the Ferguson Commission has put forward its framework for changing the status quo—what it believes “to be the best starting point, the beginning of a path toward a better St. Louis.” And the reality is that failing to act on the deep-seated challenges facing the region means struggling suburbs like Ferguson, and their residents, will only fall further behind.

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Antibacterial drug resistance is a global public health threat poised to worsen due to the combination of the inappropriate use of existing drugs and a marked decline in innovative antibacterial drug development. In order to tackle this problem, stakeholders must consider comprehensive strategies that address both drug development and stewardship.

On February 7, the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform convened an expert workshop, “Modernizing Antibacterial Drug Development and Promoting Stewardship” to explore a two-pronged approach to combating antibacterial drug resistance that includes: 1) the development of pathogen-focused antibacterial drugs that target the most serious public health threats; and 2) stewardship efforts for all antibacterial products in order to preserve their utility. Participating stakeholders included experts from the drug development and health care industries, the clinical community, government, and academia. These stakeholders shared their insights on potential frameworks and evidentiary considerations for pathogen-focused drug development, and efforts underway to promote the appropriate use of commonly used antibacterial drugs in the ambulatory care setting.

Event Materials

• Antibiotic Development Slides
• 07 antibacterial expert workshop discussion guide
• 07 antibacterial expert workshop public agenda
• 07 antibacterial expert workshop meeting summary

Antimicrobial resistance is one of the most significant threats to public health globally. It will worsen in the coming decades without concerted efforts to spur the development of new antibiotics, while ensuring the appropriate use of existing antibiotics. Antimicrobial therapy is essential for treating and preventing bacterial infections, some of which can be life-threatening and acquired as a result of
critical medical interventions, including surgery, chemotherapy and dialysis. However, the international rise in antimicrobial resistance has weakened our antibiotic armamentarium and multi-resistant bacteria now cause over 150,000 deaths annually in hospitals around the world (WHO, 2013). Unfortunately, the evolution of drug-resistant pathogens is unavoidable due to random genetic changes in the pathogens that can render antibiotics ineffective. While antibiotic therapy can succeed in killing susceptible pathogens, it also inadvertently selects for organisms that are resistant. Because each exposure to antibiotics contributes to this process, efforts to restrict antibiotic usage only slow the development of resistance. Ultimately, innovative antimicrobial drugs with diverse mechanisms of action will be needed to treat emerging resistant pathogens.

Combating resistance

Inappropriate use of antibiotics contributes significantly to the acceleration of resistance. Needlessly exposing patients to antibiotics (for example, for viral or mild infections likely to resolve on their own), the use of overly broad-spectrum antibiotics and suboptimal doses of appropriate therapy hasten the evolution of resistant pathogens. While affordable, rapid and accurate point-of-care diagnostics are essential for determining appropriate therapy for many bacterial diseases, routine clinical use will be limited if the tests are too expensive or not accessible during routine clinical encounters. In the absence of a clear diagnostic result, many health care providers prescribe empiric broadspectrum therapy without knowing exactly what they are treating. Although inappropriate use is widespread in many parts of the world, where antibiotics are available without a prescription or oversight by a health care provider or stewardship team, overuse abounds even where antibiotic prescribing is more tightly regulated.

Studies conducted in the USA indicate that around 258 million courses of antibiotics are dispensed annually for outpatient use (Hicks, 2013) and up to 75 per cent of ambulatory antibiotic prescriptions are for the treatment of common respiratory infections, which may or may not be bacterial in origin (McCaig,1995). Recent evidence suggests that over half of these prescriptions are not medically indicated. For example, 60 per cent of US adults with a sore throat receive an antibiotic prescription after visiting a primary care practice or emergency department, despite the fact that only ten per cent require treatment with antibiotics. This is particularly troubling given the availability of rapid tests that can detect Group A Streptococcus, the bacteria responsible for the ten per cent of cases that require antibiotic treatment.

The overuse of antibiotics has been driven largely by their low cost and clinical effectiveness, which has led many patients to view them as cure-alls with few risks. This perception is reinforced by the fact that antibiotics are curative in nature and used for short durations. However, the clinical effectiveness of these drugs decreases over time, as resistance naturally increases, and this process is accelerated with inappropriate use. Moreover, there are numerous consequences associated with the use of antibiotics, including over 140,000 emergency department visits yearly in the USA for adverse incidents (mostly allergic reactions; CDC, 2013a). In addition, antibiotics can eliminate protective bacteria in the gut,
leaving patients vulnerable to infection with Clostridium difficile, which causes diarrhoeal illness that results in 14,000 deaths every year in the USA (CDC, 2013b). It is estimated that antimicrobial resistance costs the US health care system over US$20 billion annually in excess care and an additional $35 billion in lost productivity (Roberts et al., 2009).

The inappropriate use of antimicrobial drugs is particularly concerning because highly resistant pathogens can easily cross national borders and rapidly spread around the globe. In recent years, strains of highly drug-resistant tuberculosis, carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae and other resistant pathogens have spread outside their countries of origin within several years of their detection. Because resistant bacteria are unlikely to stay isolated, stewardship efforts must be improved globally and international attention is needed to improve surveillance of emerging pathogens and resistance patterns.

A major challenge for clinicians and regulators will be to find stewardship interventions that can be scaled-up and involve multiple stakeholders, including providers, drug manufacturers, health care purchasers (insurers), governments and patients themselves. Such interventions should include practical and costeffective educational programmes targeted towards providers and patients that shift expectations for antibiotic prescriptions to a mutual understanding of the benefits and risks of these drugs.

Educational programmes alone, however, will not be sufficient to lower prescribing rates to recommended levels. Pushing down the inappropriate use of antibiotics also warrants stronger mechanisms that leverage the critical relationships between the stakeholders. For example, health care purchasers can play an important role by using financial disincentives to align prescribing habits with clinical guidelines that are developed by infectious disease specialists in the private and public sectors. This type of approach has the potential to be effective because it includes multiple stakeholders that share responsibility for the appropriate use of antibiotics and, ultimately, patient care.

Key obstacles to antibiotic development

The continual natural selection for resistant pathogens despite efforts to limit antibiotic use underscores the need for new antibiotics with novel mechanisms of action. To date, antimicrobial drug innovation and development have not kept pace with resistance. The number of approved new molecular entities (NME) to treat systemic infections has been steadily declining for decades (see Figure 1). Some infections are not susceptible to any antibiotic and in some cases the only effective drugs may cause serious side effects, or be contra-indicated due to a patient’s allergies or comorbidities (e.g. renal failure). There is significant unmet medical need for therapies that treat serious and life-threatening bacterial diseases caused by resistant pathogens, as well as some less serious infections where there are few treatment alternatives available (e.g. gonorrhoea).

Antibiotic development for these areas of unmet medical need has been sidelined by a number of scientific, regulatory and economic obstacles. While the costs and complexity of any clinical trial necessary for approval by drug regulators can be substantial, in part due to the large study samples needed to demonstrate safety and efficacy, the infectious disease space faces a number of unique clinical challenges. Patients with serious drug-resistant infections may be in need of urgent antibiotic therapy, which can preclude efficient consent and timely trial enrolment procedures; prior therapy can also confound treatment effects if the patient is later enrolled in a trial for an experimental drug. In addition, many patients with these pathogens are likely to have a history of longterm exposure to the health care setting and may have significant comorbidities that render them less likely to meet inclusion criteria for clinical trials.

Emerging infections for which there are few or no treatment options also tend to be relatively rare. This makes it difficult to conduct adequate and well-controlled trials, which typically enrol large numbers of patients. However, clinical drug development can take many years and waiting until such infections are more common is not feasible. Another issue is that it may also not be possible to conclusively identify the pathogen and its susceptibility at the point of enrolment due to the lack of rapid diagnostic technologies. Ultimately, uncertainty about the aetiology of an infection may necessitate trials with larger numbers of patients in order to achieve sufficient statistical power, further compounding the challenge of enrolling seriously ill infectious disease patients in the first place.

The need to conduct large trials involving acutely ill patients that are difficult to identify can make antibiotic development prohibitively expensive for drug developers, especially given that antibiotics are relatively inexpensive and offer limited opportunities to generate returns. Unlike treatments for chronic diseases, antibiotic therapy tends to last no longer than a few weeks, and these drugs lose efficacy over time as resistance develops, leading to diminishing returns. The decline in antimicrobial drug innovation is largely due to these economic obstacles, which have led developers to seek more durable and profitable markets (e.g. cancer or chronic disease) in recent decades. There are only a handful of companies currently in the market and the development pipeline is very thin. Changes to research infrastructure, drug reimbursement and regulation are all potentially needed to revitalise antibiotic innovation.

Opportunities to streamline innovative antibiotic development

In the USA, several proposals have been made to expedite the development and regulatory review of antibiotics while ensuring that safety and efficacy requirements are met. In 2012, the US President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology recommended that the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) create a ‘special medical use’ (SMU) designation for the review of drugs for subpopulations of patients with unmet medical need. Drug sponsors would be required to demonstrate that clinical trials in a larger patient population would need much more time to complete or not be feasible. A drug approved under the SMU designation could be studied in subgroups of patients that are critically ill, as opposed to the broader population, under the condition that the drug’s indication would be limited to the narrow study population. The SMU designation was discussed at an expert workshop convened by the Brookings Institution in August 2013. Many participants at the meeting agreed that there is a pressing need to develop novel antibiotics and that such a limited-use pathway could support the appropriate use of newly approved drugs.

The Infectious Diseases Society of America developed a related drug development pathway called the Limited Population Antibacterial Drug (LPAD) approval mechanism. The LPAD approach calls for smaller, faster and less costly clinical trials to study antibiotics that treat resistant bacteria that cause serious infections. Both the SMU and LPAD approaches would allow drug developers to demonstrate product safety and efficacy in smaller patient subpopulations and provide regulatory clarity about acceptable benefit–risk profiles for antibiotics that treat serious bacterial diseases. The US House of Representatives is currently considering a bill¹ that incorporates these concepts.

A recent proposal from the drug manufacturer industry for streamlined antibiotic development is to establish a tiered regulatory framework to assess narrow-spectrum antibiotics (e.g. active versus a specific bacterial genus and species or a group of related bacteria) that target resistant pathogens that pose the greatest threat to public health (Rex, 2013: pp. 269–275). This is termed a ‘pathogen-focused’ approach because the level of clinical evidence required for approval would be correlated with the threat level and feasibility of studying a specific pathogen or group of pathogens. The pathogen-focused approach was also highlighted at a recent workshop at the Brookings Institution (Brookings Institution, 2014). Some experts felt that the approach is promising but emphasised that each pathogen and experimental drug is unique and that it could be challenging to place them in a particular tier of a regulatory framework. Given that pathogen-focused drugs would likely be marketed internationally, it will be important for drug sponsors to have regular interactions and multiple levels of discussion with regulators to find areas of agreement that would facilitate the approval of these drugs.

Antibiotics with very narrow indications could potentially support stewardship as well by limiting use to the most seriously ill patients. Safe use of these drugs would likely depend on diagnostics, significant provider education, labelling about the benefits and risks of the product, and the scope of clinical evidence behind its approval. Because these antibiotics would be used in a very limited manner, changes would potentially need to be made to how they are priced and reimbursed to ensure that companies are still able to generate returns on their investment. That said, a more focused drug development programme with regulatory clarity could greatly increase their odds of success and, combined with appropriate pricing and safe use provisions, could succeed in incentivising antimicrobial drug development for emerging infections.

Endnote
1 H.R. 3742 – Antibiotic Development to Advance Patient Treatment (ADAPT) Act of 2013.

References
Barnett, M. L. and Linder, J. A., 2014. ‘Antibiotic prescribing to adults with sore throat in the United States, 1997–2010’. JAMA Internal Medicine, 174(1), pp. 138–140.

Brookings Institution, 2013. Special Medical Use: Limited Use for Drugs Developed in an Expedited Manner to Meet an UnmetMedical Need. Brookings Institution. Available at: www.brookings.edu/events/2013/08/01-special-medical-use

Brookings Institution, 2014. Modernizing Antibacterial Drug Development and Promoting Stewardship. Available at: www.brookings.edu/events/2014/02/07-modernizing-antibacterialdrug-development [Accessed 11 March 2014].

CDC, 2013a. Antibiotic resistance threats in the United States,2013 [PDF] CDC. Available at: www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/threatreport-2013/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf#page=25 [Accessed 16 January 2014].

CDC, 2013b. Clostridium difficile. Antibiotic resistance threats in the United States, 2013 [PDF] CDC. Available at: www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/threat-report-2013/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf#page=50 [Accessed 16 January 2014].

Hicks, L. A. et al., 2013. ‘US Outpatient Antibiotic Prescribing, 2010’. New England Journal of Medicine, 368(15), pp. 1461–1463.
Infectious Disease Society of America, 2012.

Limited Population Antibacterial Drug (LPAD) Approval Mechanism. Available at: www.idsociety.org/uploadedFiles/IDSA/News_and_Publications/IDSA_News_Releases/2012/LPAD%20one%20pager.pdf [Accessed 5 March 2014].

Infectious Disease Society of America, 2012. Limited Population Antibacterial Drug (LPAD) Approval Mechanism [PDF] Infectious
Disease Society of America. Available at: www.idsociety.org/uploadedFiles/IDSA/News_and_Publications/IDSA_News_Releases/2012/LPAD%20one%20pager.pdf  [Accessed 18 January 2013].

Kumarasamy, K. K., Toleman, M. A., Walsh, T. R. et al.,2010. ‘Emergence of a new antibiotic resistance mechanism in India,
Pakistan, and the UK: A molecular, biological, and epidemiological study’. Lancet Infectious Diseases, 10(9), pp. 597–602.

McCaig, L. F. and Hughes, J. M., 1995. ‘Trends in antimicrobial drug prescribing among office-based physicians in the United
States’. Journal of the American Medical Association, 273(3), pp. 214–219.

President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 2012. Report to the President on Propelling Innovation in Drug
Discovery, Development and Evaluation. Available at:www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-fdafinal.pdf    [Accessed 5 March 2014].

Rex, J. H. et al., 2013. ‘A comprehensive regulatory framework to address the unmet need for new antibacterial treatments’. Lancet Infectious Diseases, 13(3), pp. 269–275.

Roberts, R. R., Hota, B., Ahmad, I. et al., 2009. ‘Hospital and societal costs of antimicrobial – Resistant infections in a Chicago
teaching hospital: Implications for antibiotic stewardship’. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 49(8), pp. 1175–1184.

WHO (World Health Organization), 2010. Fact Sheet: Rational Use of Medicines [webpage] WHO. Available at:
www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs338/en [Accessed 28 February 2014].

WHO (World Health Organization), 2013. Antimicrobial Drug Resistance [PDF] WHO. Available at: http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB134/B134_37-en.pdf [Accessed 6 March 2014].

WHO (World Health Organization), 2013. Notified MDR-TB cases (number per 100,000 population), 2005–12. WHO. Available at:
https://extranet.who.int/sree/Reports?op=vs&path=/WHO_HQ_Reports/G2/PROD/EXT/MDRTB_Indicators_map [Accessed 28 February 2014].

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U.S. policy towards South Asia has changed considerably over the last seven decades. The nature of U.S. engagement with different countries in the region has varied over time, as has the level of U.S. interest. While India and Pakistan have received the most attention from Washington, the United States has also been engaging with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, albeit to different degrees. 

On May 19, The India Project at Brookings hosted a panel discussion exploring the past and present U.S approaches towards South Asia, based on Senior Fellow Stephen Cohen’s new book, “The South Asia Papers: A Critical Anthology of Writings” (Brookings Institution Press, 2016). Panelists also assessed the Obama administration’s policies toward the region, and the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for the next U.S. administration. Fellow Tanvi Madan, director of The India Project, moderated the discussion.

After the discussion, the panelists took questions.

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• U.S. policy toward South Asia: Past, present, and future

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• U.S. policy toward South Asia: Past, present, and future

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20160519_south_asia_transcript

INTRODUCTION

In an earlier policy brief, Where is the Learning? Measuring Schooling Efforts in Developing Countries, we drew attention to what was labeled “the global learning crisis.” While tremendous progress has been made over the past couple of decades to get tens of millions of additional children to enroll in school, progress in improving learning outcomes has been considerably less impressive. Although, shockingly, comprehensive learning outcome data are not available for most of the developing world, the many small scale, local or, in some cases, national studies that have been done show a dismal picture. For instance, Uwezo, an East African initiative, found that in Tanzania, only 44 percent of students in Grade 4 were able to read a basic story from Grade 2. Similarly, the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) facilitated by Pratham found that in rural India, less than half of Grade 4 students were able to do basic subtraction. These examples demonstrate the gravity of “the global learning crisis” as students fail to master competencies appropriate for their grade level, hindering the development of life skills and success in further schooling, as well as performance in the labor market.

With about 61 million children in the developing world still not yet in school, it is too early to declare victory on the “enrollment agenda”. But we would do a disservice to the 250 million children around the world who fail to reach Grade 4 or attain minimum learning standards, if we don’t step up efforts to improve learning outcomes.

This policy brief is part of a larger effort to link resources in the education sector with outcome measures. As we have documented elsewhere, few countries systematically collect comprehensive financial data on education, although fortunately an increasing number of initiatives is trying to address this issue by producing, for instance, National Education Accounts (NEAs). When the focus of the sector changes from enrollment to enrollment plus learning, efforts to better grasp the size and use of financial resources should evolve accordingly. For instance, much learning takes place outside of the classroom, especially in the early years. For NEAs to be a useful tool for adjusting the allocation of scarce resources, the “learning” sector should be defined more broadly than the education or “schooling” sector. We will address this and related issues in a subsequent policy brief.

Once our focus becomes enrollment plus learning, we have to broaden our view and look at the entire environment in which a child develops skills, starting with the households in which children are born. It has beenknown for many decades and throughout the world, that among the best predictors of future school performance are some basic household characteristics, such as income and mother’s education level.

Data from international assessments also show a relationship between income and educational performance, exemplified by intra and intercountry results. In Colombia, average Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) math scores at Grade 8 for the richest quintile of students were close to 100 points higher than those from the poorest quintile. On the other hand, the difference in average scores between the poorest quintile in the United States and the richest quintile in Colombia was about 50 points. Income is not the only predictor of success, as exemplified in Peru, where children whose mothers have completed primary school and whose maternal language is Spanish rather than an indigenous language, have a greater probability of reaching the appropriate school grade for their age. In Kenya, Uwezo found that the higher their father’s educational attainment, the more likely children were able to read a story at Grade 3 or attend extra tutoring sessions.

In addition, the larger environment (such as the village or the urban neighborhood) in which the young child grows up also has a major and lasting impact. In Tanzania, urban students in Grade 3 are three times more likely than their rural counterparts to meet standards in literacy and numeracy. Related to the impact of the larger environment, data from Nigeria suggest that girls are more disadvantaged in school attendance, as parents may be reluctant to send girls to school because of perceived fears for their safety while traveling and concerns about the physical strength required for walking the distance.

Clearly, especially in the early years, most learning takes place outside of the classroom. Consequently, children who grow up in deprived circumstances will start life with a disadvantage leading to a lack of learning in the early grades, which will have lifetime effects.

In the next section, we will summarize the evidence that the early years (ages 0 to 5) are crucial for subsequent learning achievements. From this evidence we conclude that many of the problems with learning outcomes in the developing world (and in many developed countries) need to be addressed well before school age. Before delving into what happens in schools, we explore the relationship between enrollment, learning and dropout. As the crux of this brief is to lay out the evidence on what contributes to learning, we must acknowledge the factors leading to low enrollment and dropout. Next, we turn our attention to what happens in schools and what can be done to improve these activities, as well as try to summarize the evidence about the relationship between specific school-based inputs and learning outcomes. As it turns out, this evidence is, in many cases, rather feeble. Therefore, we will first focus on school-level inputs that are necessary for a good learning environment, i.e. without which we cannot expect any learning to take place. Most of these inputs are rather obvious, but they are worth mentioning. Subsequently, we will discuss additional inputs that have proven to contribute to learning outcomes in some cases, but not in others. Clearly how these inputs are applied matters.

Next, we address factors that contribute to learning outside of a formal environment, after which we review issues in health and nutrition that are closely linked to learning outcomes. We then review the need for the collection and dissemination of learning assessments in order to impact further improvements in these areas and we try to answer the question: what are the building blocks for an education sector that promote learning? Finally we explore needs for future research in learning.

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For over 100 years, the driving force of Ohio’s economy has been the state’s so-called Big Eight cities—Columbus, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Toledo, Akron, Dayton, Canton, and Youngstown. Today, though, the driving reality of these cities is sustained, long-term population loss. The central issue confronting these cities—and the state and surrounding metropolitan area—is not whether these cities will have different physical footprints and more green space than they do now, but how it will happen.

The state must adopt a different way of thinking and a different vision of its cities’ future—and so must the myriad local, civic, philanthropic, and business leaders who will also play a role in reshaping Ohio’s cities. The following seven basic premises should inform any vision for a smaller, stronger future and subsequent strategies for change in these places:

• These cities contain significant assets for future rebuilding
  
• These cities will not regain their peak population
  
• These cities have a surplus of housing
  
• These cities have far more vacant land than can be absorbed by redevelopment
  
• Impoverishment threatens the viability of these cities more than population loss as such
  
• Local resources are severely limited
  
• The fate of cities and their metropolitan areas are inextricably inter-connected
  

These premises have significant implications for the strategies that state and local governments should pursue to address the issues of shrinking cities.

Full Paper on Ohio's Cities » (PDF)
Paper on Shrinking Cities Across the United States »

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Exactly one year after U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s last multi-country tour of sub-Saharan Africa, he is preparing for another visit to the continent—to Kenya and Djibouti from May 3 to 5, 2015. In Kenya, Kerry and a U.S. delegation including Linda Thomas-Greenfield, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, will engage in talks with senior Kenyan officials on U.S.-Kenya security cooperation, which the U.S. formalized through its Security Governance Initiative (SGI) at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit last August. Over the past several years, the U.S. has increased its military assistance to Kenya and African Union (AU) troops to combat the Somali extremist group al-Shabab and has conducted targeted drone strikes against the group’s top leaders.  In the wake of the attack on Kenya’s Garissa University by al-Shabab, President Obama pledged U.S. support for Kenya, and Foreign Minister Amina Mohamed has stated that Kenya is currently seeking additional assistance from the U.S. to strengthen its military and intelligence capabilities.

Kerry will also meet with a wide array of leaders from Kenya’s private sector, civil society, humanitarian organizations, and political opposition regarding the two countries’ “common goals, including accelerating economic growth, strengthening democratic institutions, and improving regional security,” according to a U.S. State Department spokesperson. These meetings are expected to build the foundation for President Obama’s trip to Kenya for the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in July of this year.

On Tuesday, May 5, Kerry will become the first sitting secretary of state to travel to Djibouti. There, he will meet with government officials regarding the evacuation of civilians from Yemen and also visit Camp Lemonnier, the U.S. military base from which it coordinates its counterterror operations in the Horn of Africa region.

This week saw the proliferation of anti-government street demonstrations as current President Pierre Nkurunziza declared his candidacy for a third term, after being in office for ten years.  The opposition has deemed this move as “unconstitutional” and in violation of the 2006 Arusha peace deal which ended the civil war. Since the announcement, hundreds of civilians took to the streets of Bujumbura, despite a strong military presence. At least six people have been killed in clashes between police forces and civilians. 

Since the protests erupted, leading human rights activist Pierre-Claver Mbonimpa has been arrested alongside more than 200 protesters. One of Burundi’s main independent radio stations was also suspended as they were covering the protests.  On Wednesday, the government blocked social media platforms, including Twitter and Facebook, declaring them important tools in implementing and organizing protests. Thursday, amid continuing political protests, Burundi closed its national university and students were sent home. 

Amid the recent protests, Burundi’s constitutional court will examine the president’s third term bid. Meanwhile, U.N. secretary general Ban Ki-moon has sent his special envoy for the Great Lakes Region to hold a dialogue with president Nkurunziza and other government authorities. Senior U.S. diplomat Tom Malinowski also arrived in Bujumbura on Thursday to help defuse the biggest crisis the country has seen in the last few years, expressing disappointment over Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term.

Since the early 2000s, China has become an increasingly significant source of financing for African infrastructure projects, as noted in a recent Brookings paper, “Financing African infrastructure: Can the world deliver?” This week, observers have seen an additional spike in African infrastructure investments from Chinese firms, as three major railway, real estate, and other infrastructure deals were struck on the continent, totaling nearly $7.5 billion in investments.

On Monday, April 27, the state-owned China Railway Construction Corp announced that it will construct a $3.5 billion railway line in Nigeria, as well as a $1.9 billion real estate project in Zimbabwe. Then on Wednesday, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (one of the country’s largest lenders) signed a $2 billion deal with the government of Equatorial Guinea in order to carry out a number of infrastructure projects throughout the country. These deals align with China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy of building infrastructure in Africa and throughout the developing world in order to further integrate their economies, stimulate economic growth, and ultimately increase demand for Chinese exports. For more insight into China’s infrastructure lending in Africa and the implications of these investments for the region’s economies, please see the following piece by Africa Growth Initiative Nonresident Fellow Yun Sun: “Inserting Africa into China’s One Belt, One Road strategy: A new opportunity for jobs and infrastructure?”

What if I told you I’d found a surefire way to decrease community involvement in our local schools while at the same time increasing the costs of providing education for taxpayers? Probably not a political winner, eh? And yet, for well over 100 years we’ve adopted such an approach to governing America’s public schools.

I’m talking of course, about the widespread and increasingly questionable practice of local school district governments holding their school board elections “off-cycle” so that they are contested apart from regular national elections.

Just how significant and widespread are “off-cycle” school board elections? And what are the consequences of using off-cycle elections for the tone and direction of education policy? UC Berkeley Political Scientist Sarah Anzia recently penned a terrific book examining the causes and consequences of off-cycle elections in American politics in which she finds that 90 percent of states hold at least some municipal races apart from major national elections and three quarters of states do so for school board elections. Data from the National School Boards Association seem to confirm Anzia’s descriptive account on the prevalence of these elections.

By exploiting the occasional episode in which a change in state law forced localities to move their elections “on cycle,” Anzia is able to provide some pretty rigorous causal evidence that off-cycle elections decrease voter turnout and equip organized interests (e.g. teachers unions) to obtain more favorable policy outcomes. Anzia’s findings mesh nicely with other work done by University of Pennsylvania Political Scientist, Marc Meredith, who found that when school boards are given the authority to choose election dates for raising revenue (e.g. bond elections) boards will “manipulate” the timing of elections in predictable ways to ensure an electorate that is most favorable to increased school spending.

"While most citizens are tuned into the presidential primary contests this year, the important reality is that thousands of school board members will be 'elected' by tiny and unrepresentative electorates prior to next November’s general election."

While most citizens are tuned into the presidential primary contests this year, the important reality is that thousands of school board members will be “elected” by tiny and unrepresentative electorates prior to next November’s general election. This isn’t an accident or an oversight. The helpless position of today’s “education voter” is a predictable consequence of Progressive era reforms that sought to “take politics out of education.” As Columbia Professor, Jeffrey Henig, explains in his insightful and wide-ranging book, The End of Exceptionalism in American Education, the widespread use of single-purpose governments that are insulated from the electorate has been a hallmark of American school governance that is only recently beginning to come undone.

Advocates of off-cycle elections sometimes contend that holding school elections apart from major federal elections helps foster a more informed electorate. But shouldn’t the onus be on those who defend off-cycle elections to demonstrate better outcomes in districts that cling to a policy that often results in higher costs to taxpayers and diminishes small-d democracy. Of course it’s fair and important to ask, “How much democracy is good for our schools?” However, there are at least three reasons to be skeptical that the benefits of using “off-cycle” elections outweigh the costs:

First, I’m unaware of any scholarly evidence that the voters who participate in off-cycle elections are significantly more informed than the electorates participating in on-cycle elections. More importantly, I am not aware of any scholarly research that demonstrates a linkage between off-cycle elections and better student achievement outcomes. To the contrary, my friend and collaborator Arnie Shober (Lawrence University) and I found a strong association between a district’s relative academic performance and the use of on-cycle elections in a 2014 analysis that we undertook for the Fordham Institute. Although that report could not establish any causal relationship between on-cycle elections and better student achievement (clearly we could not randomly assign on-cycle elections), the fact that we found a positive correlation between on-cycle school board elections and a district’s academic performance arguably puts the ball back in the court of those who would prefer diminished citizen participation and higher fiscal costs.

Second, on the subject of higher costs, consider the takeaway from a recent piece in Governing Magazine that quotes Rice University Political Scientist and local elections expert, Melissa Marschall.  It paraphrases Marschall, saying “There's no doubt about it. Holding concurrent elections is bound to increase turnout…Holding elections less frequently should save them [local governments] money.” In short, even if some benefits (a marginally more informed electorate?) could in theory be demonstrated, one would also need to account for known costs: lower citizen participation and more frequent elections that school districts cannot piggyback onto national or statewide elections.

Third and finally, as Eitan Hersh explains in a hard-hitting recent post on FiveThirtyEight, there’s more than a tinge of hypocrisy when it comes to those who defend off-cycle elections. Ironically, while the Democratic Party and organized labor often advocate for policies that enhance workplace democracy and reduce barriers to voter participation (i.e., opposing voter ID laws, supporting same day registration and vote by mail), these two groups have, according to Hersh, led the charge to retain off-cycle school board elections that all but assure lower and more unrepresentative turnout.  

Admittedly, there’s no perfect approach to governing American K-12 education. And, governance “reform” is hardly a panacea for improving our schools. Nonetheless, as Noel Epstein wisely observed in her 2004 volume, Who’s in Charge Here?, when education governance is fragmented ordinary citizens are challenged to hold policy-makers accountable because it is difficult for the public to mobilize and readily identify which political authority or authorities are responsible. The bottom line: we don’t do the electorate any additional favors by purposefully staggering school board races across multiple off-year election cycles. Consolidating the school election calendar is a small, but nonetheless sensible step in the right direction.  

Thanks in large part to his decision to participate in the war in Iraq, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair is a controversial figure in Europe. Yet, Blair’s legacy as a center-left reformer is alive and well in two of Europe’s ruling center-left forces, France’s Socialist Party (PS) and Italy’s Democratic Party (PD).

Both Italy’s Prime Minister Matteo Renzi from the PD and French Prime Minister Manuel Valls of the PS bear strong similarities to the former leader of Britain’s “New” Labour Party. As Blair was when he took office, they are young–Valls is 52 and Renzi is just 39; they are centrists; and they have excellent communication skills that allow them to present themselves as harbingers of change.

Taking a Page Out of Prime Minister Blair’s Book

Renzi and Valls will have to take three pages out of Blair’s book if they want to replicate his electoral achievements: 

1. They must wrest control of their parties from the old guard; 
2. They must take control of the political agenda by giving it a centrist thrust (along the lines of Blair’s ‘Third Way’ between conservatism and social democracy); 
3. They must take control of the political center, even at the cost of shedding votes on the left.  

Renzi is far ahead of Valls in all three respects. He has taken over the PD (via an open primary election which he won resoundingly) after a bitter fight against the party’s old guard. Since taking office in early 2014, he has shown a remarkable ability to dictate the terms of the political debate. While he became prime minister via an inner party coup rather than a general election, he sailed triumphantly through his first electoral test: the European Parliament elections of May 2014. The PD won a larger share of the votes than any other Italian party since the 1950s (41 percent), tapping into constituencies such as entrepreneurs and businessmen who all have a long tradition of contempt for the left.

However, none of Renzi’s achievements rest on firm ground. The main reason is Italy’s appalling financial predicament. The economy has performed abysmally since the 2008 to 2009 recession. Unemployment is over 12 percent, the labor market is overly protective of certain categories and overly unfair to others (particularly the young), the public sector is costly and ineffective and the judicial system byzantine and not entirely reliable. Renzi continues to face harsh criticisms from within his party as his reform agenda flies in the face of traditionally left-leaning constituencies (a few weeks ago the main leftist trade union managed to get about a million people to the streets in protest against a labor market reform bill). Finally, Renzi’s room for maneuver is severely constrained by the tight fiscal rules imposed by the European Union (EU).

For Valls, the path to leadership is a more complicated matter. This is largely due to France’s constitutional set-up, in which the prime minister runs domestic policies but is second in authority to the president. This involves for Valls a variation from Blair’s three-step process—as prime minister, his most urgent priority is not leading the PS but pushing forward a political agenda capable of winning over the political center. He was appointed to the premiership by the current president, the socialist François Hollande, because his previous stint as a tough-talking interior minister and his profile as a business-friendly politician and skillful local manager made him fairly popular with the public. Hollande’s decision was a desperate attempt to revive his own popularity, which has plummeted to unprecedented lows only half-way into his 5-year term, by imparting a new, essentially more pro-market direction to his presidency. Since he stepped in, Valls has tried to change the political agenda by advocating reduced labor costs and lower taxes on businesses.

Like Renzi, Valls is confronted with both internal and external challenges. The first is of course that, although in charge of domestic policies, he is still second-in-command to a highly unpopular president. Because he does not control the PS, Valls faces stiffer opposition to his centrist agenda from within the party than does his Italian counterpart. His calls for a ‘common house’ for reform-oriented leftists and rightists have, unsurprisingly, met with acerbic criticism in the PS. France is in a better economic state than Italy and the government machine is as efficient as ever; yet the French have shown an idiosyncratic resistance to reform which Valls might lack the political authority to overcome. And Valls, just like Renzi, must also make decisions that both help France and comply with EU fiscal rules.

What to Make of Continental Europe’s New Blairs?

In spite of the huge challenges Renzi faces both at home and in the EU, he seems to be the better positioned. Realistically, the chances that he will successfully revive Italy’s economy are slim. Yet Italians do not dream of an era of prosperity, but one of action. Provided Renzi can show that he has begun to tackle the many roadblocks on the path towards growth, Italians are likely to see him as a safer bet than the opposition, which consists of Silvio Berlusconi’s much weakened center-right party and the comedian-turned-politician Beppe Grillo’s anti-establishment 5 Star Movement.

Valls has a harder road ahead. His approval ratings now hover at just around 36 percent (though no other center-left French politician fares much better). He certainly has a popularity problem in his own party during the last presidential campaign, he won only 5.5 percent of the votes in a PS primary contest. Yet Valls also stood out as a credible politician and is now in a position to attract more support. He encapsulates the second half of Hollande’s presidential term, which has made a decision to openly target centrist voters. If Valls manages to regain, at least in part, the favor of the public, the PS might in the end see him as a more appealing presidential candidate in 2017 than Hollande, whose credibility is in poor shape.

Appearing to the public the safer bet is the mark of shrewd politicians. But strong leadership requires one step further. Blair mapped out a course towards prosperity in the much more competitive world of globalization; this, the Iraq war notwithstanding, secured him three electoral victories in a row. For Renzi and Valls, the time to do something alike cannot come soon enough.

Over the course of my career, I have watched Egypt’s transformation from an authoritarian state to a revolutionary one and back again. But last month’s murder of Italian graduate student Giulio Regeni (with some pointing fingers at Egyptian security forces) illuminates that today’s Egypt is even less safe, less free, and less tolerant than it was under Hosni Mubarak—an impressive feat. The disintegration in Egypt’s security environment could haunt the country and its leaders, as it will only push international travelers and researchers further from its shores.

Fear and loathing in Cairo

In 2010, shortly before the 2011 revolution, I lived in Cairo interviewing civil society activists and government officials on the ability of NGOs to challenge the Mubarak regime. I returned a few months after the uprising to a very different Egypt. 

In some ways, the environment had become more hospitable for discussing democracy and seeking honest assessments of the regime. Egyptians were still brimming with hope that the revolution would bring them the Egypt they had fought for and expressed overwhelming pride in their accomplishments in Tahrir Square. They were forthcoming with critiques of the former regime and inspired to begin by participating in politics, overturning the draconian NGO law, and founding innovative organizations to help usher in an era of democracy in Egypt. 

But in other ways, the conditions in Egypt had become dangerous. The security situation was precarious, as a post-revolutionary crime wave and general lawlessness keeping Egyptians at home and tourists away. For the first time, I hired a driver to ensure my safety. I was afraid to walk alone at night, ride the metro, or hang out in the same cafes I had frequented during my trips to Mubarak’s Egypt. 

Ironically, I was also far more cognizant of the security services in this new “freer” Egypt than I had been in past visits. The vestiges of Mubarak’s security apparatus remained, but they were operating under different and far more arbitrary and kinetic rules, making it challenging to identify—and avoid—redlines. I heard stories of NGO raids that were no different from the Mubarak era and possibly more punitive, with pro-regime security forces hoping to exact revenge on the activists who unseated their leader. Frustration and anger towards foreigners—governments, donor organizations, and even researchers—had emerged among civil society actors, who believed that Washington, in particular, was meddling in a process that was home-grown. Civil society activists whose NGOs had been fully reliant on international funding vowed to no longer take USAID money, for example. And although I was a full-time doctoral student with no ties to the U.S. government, some of those whom I interviewed distrusted my motives and saw me and other foreign scholars as inextricably linked to our governments. 

I heard stories of NGO raids that were no different from the Mubarak era and possibly more punitive, with pro-regime security forces hoping to exact revenge on the activists who unseated their leader.

Pining for yesterday

But the atmosphere in the immediate aftermath of the revolution was nothing like that of today’s Egypt. The murder of Italian national and Cambridge University student Giulio Regeni, who was last seen alive in Cairo on January 25 (the five-year anniversary of the Egyptian revolution), has sparked outrage around the world. The Italian ambassador to Egypt has said that Regeni’s autopsy revealed “clear, unequivocal marks of violence, beating and torture.” Egyptian security officials have admitted taking Regeni into custody. And while the Ministry of Interior subsequently denied such reports, Egyptian State Prosecutor Ahmed Nagi would not rule out police involvement in his murder. 

Despite the similarity of Regeni’s case to “widespread” reports of torture and forced disappearances by the Egyptian security services, we do not know for sure who is responsible for Regeni’s murder. Scholars across the globe have called on the Egyptian government to conduct a thorough and honest investigation. But regardless of the outcome, the very perception that students are no longer safe in Cairo has caused great harm to Egypt. The very fact that scholars, some of whom have studied Egyptian politics for decades, believe that the Egyptian Security Services could have committed this crime speaks volumes about the state of repression there. 

The very fact that scholars, some of whom have studied Egyptian politics for decades, believe that the Egyptian Security Services could have committed this crime speaks volumes about the state of repression there.

Not all press is good press

Regeni’s violent and tragic death and the Egyptian government’s response have far-reaching implications for Egypt. First, the sheer volume of attention on the Regeni case has caused harm to Egypt’s already decaying reputation. Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi’s regime is engaged in a crackdown on freedom of expression surpassing that of Mubarak. As the leadership of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA)—the most prominent academic organization on the Middle East—rightly note in an open letter to the Egyptian regime, Regeni’s case is not an exception, but rather the latest example of an increasingly vicious attack on freedom of expression in Egypt. As the MESA letter states, “human rights reports suggest that academics, journalists and legal professionals are in greater danger of falling victim to arbitrary state repression today than at any time since the establishment of the republic in 1953.” This was particularly true in the weeks leading to the anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, as the state sought to quiet any public discontent before it started. 

But unlike the hundreds of cases of forced disappearances and systematic torture of Egyptians in custody, the sheer brutality of Regeni’s murder and his status as a young, Western scholar, have made it difficult for Western states to ignore and have shed much needed light on the escalating attack on the rights and freedoms of both foreigners and Egyptians. Most clearly, Egypt’s relationship with an important political and economic partner, Italy, is tarnished. And the suspected state involvement in torture is now an issue that Western interlocutors must raise with their Egyptian counterparts, obliging the Egyptian government to address, or at least find a way to dance around, the issue.

the suspected state involvement in torture is now an issue that Western interlocutors must raise with their Egyptian counterparts, obliging the Egyptian government to address, or at least find a way to dance around, the issue.

Egypt’s foreign minister Sameh Shoukry happened to be in Washington when the circumstances of Regeni’s death was made public. His tone-deaf public responses were telling. He not only flatly denied that Egypt is engaged in a widespread crackdown on freedom of expression, he even compared Egypt’s critics, including internationally respected human rights organizations, to Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels. Shoukry’s response, so undiplomatic and divorced from reality, is unlikely to quiet Egypt’s critics. Rather, it will keep Regeni’s death (and the issue of security service abuses) in the international press even longer. 

This sort of public attention is something that the Mubarak regime would have taken seriously. Mubarak regularly acknowledged and attempted to diffuse, albeit often ineffectively, accusations of human rights abuses under his watch, often justifying repression in the name of security. But the Sissi regime’s response has been far less strategic, and this has potentially dangerous consequences. By ignoring the festering wound the regime has created for itself by torturing, jailing, disappearing, and killing those who speak out against it, the infection will spread, not disappear. 

Fading from view?

Another outcome of Regeni’s murder is that universities will steer their students away from studying in Cairo, traditionally one of the most popular destinations for American students of Arabic, and may discourage faculty from visiting as well. For the American University in Cairo (AUC), an institution known for high standards and academic freedom, the loss of foreign students and researchers could pose serious financial problems. 

That may not concern the regime, but it is not only AUC that will suffer from a deterioration of foreign contacts. Even prior to Regeni’s murder, some Western scholars believed it was too difficult and risky to conduct serious research in Egypt, and this trend will increase. Other scholars may still study Egypt, but will do so from a distance, rather than risking their lives on the ground there. 

This sort of public attention is something that the Mubarak regime would have taken seriously.

A dramatic decline in international academic contacts should worry the Egyptian government. This will greatly harm the world’s understanding of what is happening in a country that has proven time and again its importance to the region’s economy and political trajectory. Egyptian students and scholars will suffer as well, missing out on the important information and cultural education that comes from cross-border academic exchange. 

Not to mention that Egypt is in the midst of an economic crisis. Regeni’s death will likely keep Western tourists away, harming the tourism industry, which makes up over 10 percent of Egypt’s GDP, and which has failed to recover from dramatic declines during the revolution. 

A continued crackdown on freedom of expression and an increasingly dangerous environment for American and European visitors also has implications for Egypt’s diplomatic relationships. While Egypt’s history, size, and political role in the region will keep it on Washington’s radar, it risks joining the ranks of Somalia or Yemen or Libya—states with a limited (if any) diplomatic presence, and even more limited economic assistance package. The robust U.S.-Egyptian relationship—including several high-profile visits each year and a $1.5 billion aid package--is based, in part, on Egypt’s portrayal of itself as the “leader” of the Arab world and a country on the path toward democracy. If the Sissi regime continues to jail, torture, and murder its critics, including Western scholars, it will make it very challenging for the United States to continue this level of support. 

As Secretary of State John Kerry said last month following his meeting with Shoukry, Egypt is “going through a political transition. We very much respect the important role that Egypt plays traditionally within the region--a leader of the Arab world in no uncertain terms. And so the success of the transformation that is currently being worked on is critical for the United States and obviously for the region and for Egypt.”

The Egyptian government is underestimating the negative repercussions of Regeni’s death. Scholars like Regeni and me study Egypt and visit Egypt are driven by Egypt’s incredible history and because of its important cultural, economic, and political role in the modern Middle East. On my very first day in Cairo back in 2002, a kind Egyptian man took my hand and helped me cross the street amidst the infamously crazy Cairo traffic. When we safely made it across and the look of trepidation fell from my face, he told me to repeat after him, “Ana b’hib Masr” (I love Egypt). It was the first colloquial Egyptian phrase I learned and one I have repeated many times. But sadly, it is not one that I or other international researchers will likely be able to repeat in Egypt any time soon.

Editor's Note: This article originally appeared on Lawfare.

Faced with the breakdown of national armies in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, Arab states have increasingly turned toward alliances with armed militias to ensure security. Popular, anti-government protests and insurgencies for the most part precipitated the breakdown of regime military institutions, yet pre-existing internal ethnic, clan, and ideological cleavages helped to hasten the breakdown. The beleaguered state security forces have now entered into a variety of alliances—tacit or active—with militias they deem sympathetic to their interests, often organized on the basis of entrenched ethno-sectarian or tribal identities. Such militia forces supplement and at times even stand in for the weak or absent army and police as providers of local security.

On the one hand, militia forces have in certain circumstances proven effective at counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. On the other hand, they have also committed atrocities against civilians that hamper long-term efforts to build trust and stability. Their greatest risk is that, by eroding the central government’s monopolization on force, they jeopardize the territorial cohesion of the state.

In Iraq, the rise of powerful communal militias has paralleled the growth of the threat from the Islamic State. This has presented the United States with a quandary: how to combat the Islamic State by mobilizing local Sunnis while at the same time safeguarding the broader integrity of the Iraqi state and its security institutions. The national guard concept, which successive Iraqi governments have tried in the past, was seen as one way to do this. A national guard force would retain the militias’ local knowledge and roots, both unique tools necessary for a successful counterinsurgency against the Islamic State. At the same time, the guard would (at least in theory) be subject to increased oversight and control by the central government.

Other fractured Arab states, most notably Libya, have tried to implement a national guard model as a way to harness militia power, but this too has failed. Variations of hybrid, provincially-organized military forces exist in Yemen and Syria. While each case is different, the failure of national guards bears certain similarities. Examining the Iraqi case in particular can highlight the potential utility of national guards but also the parallel political and institutional reforms that are necessary to make the concept work.

The idea of creating a national guard in Iraq has been a centerpiece of U.S. engagement since the dramatic advance of the Islamic State on Tikrit and Mosul in 2014. President Obama specifically mentioned U.S. support for a national guard as a means to help Iraqi Sunnis “secure their own freedom” from the Islamic State. Much of U.S. thinking about the Iraqi National Guard (ING) was guided by the example of the Sunni Awakening of 2006 and 2007, when the United States actively recruited and “flipped” Sunni tribes that had supported the al-Qaeda-inspired insurgency. In return for guarantees of autonomy and military, financial, and political backing, the Sunni tribes were able to turn the tables on the insurgent fighters and impose a measure of peace and stability. The 2014 initiative essentially sought to reproduce this arrangement. The idea was that given proper incentives, the Sunni tribes would again fight the radical Islamists who threatened their supremacy. Over the long term, such national guard forces could be integrated formally as auxiliary troops in a federal structure, comparable in many ways to the U.S. National Guard.

Yet the Awakening analogy failed on a number of levels. The Shi’i-dominated Iraqi central government had never been enthusiastic about empowering Sunni tribes in the first place. With the dismantling of the Iraqi army in 2003, security had effectively devolved to party, tribal, and sectarian militias. Many Iraqis wondered why the United States would seek to create new militias, especially ones recently tied to al-Qaeda and other terrorists. As Iraq scholar Adeed Dawisha described, the gains in security came“not because of the state, but in spite of it.”

As the U.S. began withdrawing from Iraq in 2009 and 2010, then-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki quickly moved to dismantle the Awakening-associated militias. Only a handful of former militia fighters received their promised positions in the police, army, or civil services. Some former militia leaders were arrested on seemingly politically-motivated charges of terrorism or subversion. Efforts to enact a Sunni-dominated super-region comparable to the federal status of the Kurdish Regional Government in the north were rebuffed, despite the provisions of Iraq’s constitution that allowed for the creation of such an entity. Politically marginalized, some Sunnis returned to their alliance with the radical mujahideen.

The election of the new prime minister Haydar al-Abadi in 2014 raised the promise of renewed Sunni-Shi’i reconciliation. Abadi expressed support for the national guard initiative and forwarded a bill to parliament in 2014. Thousands of volunteers came forward from the Sunni tribes in the west and U.S. and Iraqi officials met with tribal leaders to help solidify support. The United States began to enlist support from Iraq’s Sunni neighbors to provide training and support for the ING.

Yet resistance within Abadi’s own political coalition stymied these efforts. The National Guard bill foundered in parliamentary committee, with open questions about the extent of control vested in provincial governors and the chain of command subordinating the ING to the ministries of interior, defense, or the prime minister himself. Officers of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) regarded the militias as unfit for duty and as rivals for budget and resources. Iraq’s constitution specifically prohibited the formation of militias outside the framework of the armed forces (with an exception of the peshmergaforces of the Kurdish Regional Government). Moreover, there was concern that once the Sunnis were authorized to organize a militia, other ethno-sectarian communities, such as Christians or Turkomen,might try to follow suit out of fear of falling under the mercy of their more powerful neighbors. The ING, then, could undercut any pretense of the Iraqi state possessing a monopoly over the use of force.

At base, though, many of Iraq’s Shi’i leaders simply believed that they didn’t need Sunni support. With the ING initiative stalled in parliament, the Shi’i factions have actively cultivated Shi’i militias as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, or Hashd al-Shaabi). The origins of the PMF can be traced to a statement by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq’s senior Shi’i cleric, which explicitly called on the faithful to take up arms to defend Iraq in the face of the Islamic State onslaught in 2014. Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi, the Badr Organization, and other political factions quickly took the opportunity to reconstitute or expand their private armies.

Backed by Iran’s expeditionary al-Qods Force, PMF militias played a prominent role in the spring 2015 offensive against the Islamic State in Tikrit. By spring 2015, PMF counted around 60,000 men under arms. Still, the performance of these militias has been less than stellar. In the spring 2015 offensive on Tikrit, PMF forces failed repeatedly to dislodge Islamic State resistance, despite enjoying superiority in numbers. U.S. air support proved critical to allowing the offensive to proceed. Some PMF units quit the fight instead of working under American air cover. Others were involved in a campaign of terror against Sunnis, looting, kidnapping, and killing those suspected of collaborating with the Islamic State.

The prospects for the mobilization of Iraq’s Sunnis are not dead—yet. A handful of Sunni tribes joined the PMF during the Tikrit offensive. In Anbar, likely the next front in the campaign against the Islamic State, U.S. and Iraqi officials have cultivated ties with local Sunni tribes and organized some 8,000 men into Sunni PMF units. Some tribes have made their service conditional on guarantees of greater autonomy and the removal of Shi’i militia forces. Yet the intake for training programs remains slow and drop-out rates high. On the one hand, tribes continue to resent the central government. On the other hand, they fear retribution should the Islamic State return.

Abadi’s visit to Washington in April 2015 focused on expanding and enhancing security cooperation with the United States. The United States has insisted that the PMF be brought more fully under the control of the Iraqi Security Forces and that PMF units reflect the demographics of the provinces and districts in which they operate. This would mean that in ethnically-mixed areas, such as in Nineveh or Babil, each ethnic group would have its own militia proportional to its size in the locality. The Iraq Train and Equip Program (ITEP) is slowly coming online, funneling American money and weapons to various local militia forces as well as ISF.

Cooperating with the United States has been a delicate balancing act for Abadi. While Kurdish and Sunni leaders see U.S. military support as a means to their own ends, Abadi’s own Shi’i political camp—as well as his allies in Tehran—are far more wary. When the U.S. Congress passed a bill in May 2015 effectively mandating the Defense Department to bypass Baghdad and provide support for Sunni and Kurdish fighters directly, Abadi protested that this constituted a grave violation of Iraqi sovereignty.

Still, reliance on the ragtag PMF alone is not sustainable in the long term. Operating far from home and with limited training, these overwhelmingly Shi’i forces cannot be expected to become an army of occupation in Sunni areas like Tikrit or Fallujah. Ultimately, local partners will be necessary to build and maintain peace and stability. The national guard, then, may well re-emerge as a more sustainable structure for administrative and security devolution.

While analysts and policymakers naturally focus on cases of success, there are important lessons to be learned from Iraq’s failures. For countries like Iraq where central armies have more or less broken down and a bevy of militias has emerged in its stead, as in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, the national guard could represent a path to reconstituting fragile state authority.

But for this to happen, several broad principles need to be heeded:

• National guards cannot simply be conceived as short-term, improvised solutions to immediate security crises. Rather, the creation of national guards is part of the impetus of security-sector reform (SSR) and post-conflict demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of armed groups.
• National guards must overcome the legacies of past authoritarian experiences where pro-government militias were often seen as mere thugs for the regime, not a disciplined professional fighting force. In particular, the older officer class of regular forces may see them as competitors. To build trust among the population and other military institutions, national guards should be accompanied by revisions to chain of command establishing clear relationships of authority between the guards, the police, the army, and other security agencies, and subordinating all security services to civilian authorities.
• National guard initiatives must also be accompanied by moves toward political power-sharing arrangements. The success of national guards ultimately depends not just on their short-term tactical effectiveness but on the degree of local buy-in. Constitutions can provide a structure for bolstering confidence between a central government and subnational militia forces. Since militia membership and cohesion is often based on geographic linkages—to town, municipality or province—national guards may well be a part of federalist power devolution, especially in countries with overlapping ethno-sectarian and regional cleavages.
• Western governments can assist in setting up and training national guards, but they must ensure that proper political and institutional reforms are also undertaken. In many cases, Western states provide models for how decentralized, federally-organized military forces can complement national armies and local police. The United States, for instance, has a great deal of experience with its own federalized national guard structure and can draw on this example in its train-and-equip programs. There are other potentially useful models as well, including the British Territorial Army, a part-time, volunteer force that was integrated into the British Army in the early twentieth century; the Danish Home Guard, which incorporated anti-Nazi resistance militias into a national command structure after World War II; or the Italian Carabineri, which is often discussed as a potential model for dealing with Libya’s unique security challenges.

Outside assistance to national guards must avoid exacerbating existing communal and political fault lines. Helping peripheral and minority groups set up their own armed forces can, on one hand, embolden these groups to resist the central government and, on the other hand, spur resentment from the central government and fear of future disloyalty or rebellion. These concerns become even more acute when national guards are seen as proxies for outside powers. With this in mind, the U.S. and outside powers should calibrate their assistance to both regionally-based national guards and central government forces to ensure rough parity between the two. This could entail making funding, equipment and training for the central security services contingent on a proportional commitment to strengthen the guards.

National guards are political institutions, not just military instruments. They can have far-ranging consequences for political stability and cohesion. While no panacea for the challenge of building effective states, they can play an important role in addressing security concerns and moving toward more meaningful power sharing.

Now well into the final year of his presidency, President Barack Obama recently gave a surprisingly frank and poignant review of his foreign policy record in an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic.

There were a number of notable takeaways from their discussion, such as Obama’s critique of European allies and their lack of follow-through in regard to the Libya conflict. But a central element of the discussion was Obama’s rebuke to many critics of his foreign policy. He complained that much of the “establishment” seems to have a foreign policy playbook that requires frequent and excessive use of force whenever a crisis arises that displeases the United States. Instead, Obama called for a much more restrained, selective, and strategic approach in the employment of American military power.

Making the grade?

In many ways, I think the president is right. As I have written before, Obama’s original and very lofty goals for his presidency have generally proven elusive. Barack Obama may not be able to heal the planet, rid the Earth of nuclear weapons, or stop the oceans’ rise as his signature legacies. 

But, in fact, there is a strategy, even if it is more often implied than explicit, and even if it falls short of the president’s own preferences of what writers and historians might say about his two terms in office. It is more mundane but nonetheless important. Obama is attempting to be strategic in the most literal and relevant senses of the word—defining priorities and holding to them, even when that makes him appear indifferent or indecisive in response to certain types of crises or challenges. Yet he has shown himself willing to employ significant amounts of force when persuaded that there is no alternative.

Consider just a few of the cases that seemed to be on the president’s mind in the conversation with Goldberg:

• Syria. Obama did not use force against Syria after President Bashar Assad violated his “red line” and used chemical weapons. Here I tend to agree with the president; the key point is that Assad had to give up all (or nearly all) of his arsenal. If that could be achieved without U.S. military strikes against chemical weapons depots, so much the better (there is more to say about Syria, however, and I return to that in a minute).
• Russia. Obama did not use force against Vladimir Putin in Ukraine. The president is right: Ukraine is not an American ally, and Russia has a larger stake in its future than does America. As such, economic responses are the preferred policy tool here as well.
• China. Obama stayed firm but restrained towards China in the South China Sea. He took longer to undertake freedom of navigation exercises in response to China’s growing claims than some would have preferred. But his no-drama Obama approach has been correct, as he has left little doubt that America is committed to freedom of these international waterways. 
• Afghanistan. Obama made it harder than it had to be, and still has not given U.S. forces adequate authorities to attack the Taliban. Moreover, the U.S. military footprint there is somewhat too small. But Obama ultimately and rightly concluded that America needed to stay committed beyond his presidency.
• Iran. There is no doubt: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is preferable to a military conflict with Iran, even for those of us who think that the deal could probably have been negotiated with tougher and better terms.
• Iraq. Yes, Obama pulled U.S. forces out too soon—but he was willing to return in 2014 once the situation deteriorated.
• Libya. We mishandled this badly and left too soon after the fall of Moammar Gadhafi. Obama is right that European allies should have done more, but he is wrong to have assumed they would get it right on their own in the first place. If we’re assessing his worldview (as opposed to his actual record), Obama has been honest and fair and acknowledged a mistake at least—though, alas, he has not found a way to meaningfully correct the policy situation since 2011.

These cases add up to a far from perfect record. But they represent a much more credible foreign policy than Obama’s critics often allege. And he has avoided unnecessary escalation in a number of situations where a less judicious president might have erred.

I give Obama reasonable marks for carefulness and strategic thinking.

Finally, however, returning to the Syria issue: On balance, Obama has been more wrong than right. Yes, he achieved a modest success in eliminating chemical weapons. Yet the war has been a travesty. Staying out has not worked any better than President George W. Bush’s approach to Iraq (even if it has of course cost far fewer American lives). Worse, Obama seems to justify his Syria policy largely by invoking Iraq—as if the 2003 invasion and occupation there were the only alternative to his minimalist approach. There have been other approaches that would involve significantly more force than we are employing now, yet far less than we used in Iraq or Afghanistan. Obama continues to refuse to consider them seriously, hinging everything on a diplomatic process that is in many ways a substitute for a real policy.

So, as with any presidency, there is more work to do, and as with any president, there is no untarnished record of systematic accomplishment. But I give Obama reasonable marks for carefulness and strategic thinking. He has been a proficient commander in chief, and it is possible that we will someday badly miss his judiciousness.

Editor’s Note: Brookings will hold an event and live webcast on Wednesday, August 26 to discuss the findings of the 2015 Financial and Digital Inclusion (FDIP) Report and Scorecard. Follow the conversation on Twitter using #FinancialInclusion 

Access to affordable, quality financial services is vital both for ensuring the financial well-being of individuals and for fostering broader economic development. Yet about 2 billion adults around the world still do not have formal financial accounts.

The Financial and Digital Inclusion Project (FDIP), launched within the Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings, set out to answer three key questions:

• Do country commitments make a difference in progress toward financial inclusion?
• To what extent do mobile and other digital technologies advance financial inclusion?
• What legal, policy, and regulatory approaches promote financial inclusion?

To answer these questions, the FDIP team spent the past year examining how governments, private sector entities, non-government organizations, and the general public across 21 diverse countries have worked together to advance access to and usage of formal financial services. This research informed the development of the 2015 Report and Scorecard — the first in a 3-year series of research on the topic.

For the 2015 Scorecard, FDIP researchers assessed 33 indicators across four dimensions of financial inclusion: Country commitment, mobile capacity, regulatory environment, and adoption of selected basic traditional and digital financial services.

The 2015 FDIP Report and Scorecard provide detailed profiles of the financial inclusion landscape in 21 countries, focusing on mobile money and other digital financial services.

On August 26, the Center for Technology Innovation will discuss the findings of the 2015 Report and Scorecard and host a conversation about key trends, opportunities, and obstacles surrounding financial inclusion among authorities from the public and private sectors.

Register to attend the event in-person or by webcast, and join the conversation on Twitter at #FinancialInclusion.

Editor’s note: This post is part of a series on the Brookings Financial and Digital Inclusion Project, which aims to measure access to and usage of financial services among individuals who have historically been disproportionately excluded from the formal financial system. To read the first annual FDIP report, learn more about the methodology, and watch the 2015 launch event, visit the 2015 Report and Scorecard webpage.

Convenient access to banking infrastructure is something many people around the world take for granted. Yet while the number of people outside the formal financial system has substantially decreased in recent years, 2 billion adults still do not have an account with a formal financial institution or mobile money provider.¹

This means that significant opportunities remain to provide access to and promote use of affordable financial services that can help people manage their financial lives more safely and efficiently.

To learn more about how countries can facilitate greater financial inclusion among underserved groups, the Brookings Financial and Digital Inclusion Project (FDIP) sought to answer the following questions: (1) Do country commitments make a difference in progress toward financial inclusion?; (2) To what extent do mobile and other digital technologies advance financial inclusion; and (3) What legal, policy, and regulatory approaches promote financial inclusion?

To address these questions, the FDIP team assessed 33 indicators of financial inclusion across 21 economically, geographically, and politically diverse countries that have all made recent commitments to advancing financial inclusion. Indicators fell within four key dimensions of financial inclusion: country commitment, mobile capacity, regulatory commitment, and adoption of selected traditional and digital financial services.

In an effort to obtain the most accurate and up-to-date understanding of the financial inclusion landscape possible, the FDIP team engaged with a wide range of experts — including financial inclusion authorities in the FDIP focus countries — and also consulted international non-governmental organization publications, government documents, news sources, and supply and demand-side data sets.

Our research led to 5 overarching findings.

1. Country commitments matter.

   Not only did our 21 focus countries make commitments toward financial inclusion, but countries generally took these commitments seriously and made progress toward their goals. For example, the top five countries within the scorecard each completed at least one of their national-level financial inclusion targets. While correlation does not necessarily equal causation, our research supports findings by other financial inclusion experts that national-level country commitments are associated with greater financial inclusion progress. For example, the World Bank has noted that countries with national financial inclusion strategies have twice the average increase in the number of account holders as countries that do not have these strategies in place.

2. The movement toward digital financial services will accelerate financial inclusion.

   Digital financial services can provide customers with greater security, privacy, and convenience than transacting via traditional “brick-and-mortar” banks. We predict that digital financial services such as mobile money will become increasingly prevalent across demographics, particularly as user-friendly smartphones become cheaper² and more widespread.³

   Mobile money has already driven financial inclusion, particularly in countries where traditional banking infrastructure is limited. For example, mobile money offerings in Kenya (particularly the widely popular M-Pesa service) are credited with advancing financial inclusion: The Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) database found that the percentage of adults with a formal account in Kenya increased from about 42 percent in 2011 to about 75 percent in 2014, with around 58 percent of adults in Kenya having used mobile money within the preceding 12 months as of 2014.

3. Geography generally matters less than policy, legal, and regulatory changes, although some regional trends in terms of financial services provision are evident.

   Regional trends include the widespread use of banking agents (sometimes known as correspondents)⁴ in Latin America, in which retail outlets and other third parties are able to offer some financial services on behalf of banks,⁵ and the prevalence of mobile money in sub-Saharan Africa. However, these regional trends aren’t absolute: For example, post office branches have served as popular financial access points in South Africa,⁶ and the GSMA’s “2014 State of the Industry” report found that the highest growth in the number of mobile money accounts between December 2013 and December 2014 was in Latin America. Overall, we found high-performing countries across multiple regions and using multiple approaches, demonstrating that there are diverse pathways to achieving greater financial inclusion.

4. Central banks, ministries of finance, ministries of communications, banks, non-bank financial providers, and mobile network operators have major roles in achieving greater financial inclusion. These entities should closely coordinate with respect to policy, regulatory, and technological advances.

   With the roles of public and private sector entities within the financial sector becoming increasingly intertwined, coordination across sectors is critical to developing coherent and effective policies. Countries that performed strongly on the country commitment and regulatory environment components of the FDIP Scorecard generally demonstrated close coordination among public and private sector entities that informed the emergence of an enabling regulatory framework. For example, Tanzania’s National Financial Inclusion Framework⁷ promotes competition and innovation within the financial services sector by reflecting both public and private sector voices.⁸

5. Full financial inclusion cannot be achieved without addressing the financial inclusion gender gap and accounting for diverse cultural contexts with respect to financial services.

   Persistent gender disparities in terms of access to and usage of formal financial services must be addressed in order to achieve financial inclusion. For example, Middle Eastern countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan have demonstrated a significant gap in formal account ownership between men and women. Guardianship and inheritance laws concerning account opening and property ownership present cultural and legal barriers that contribute to this gender gap.⁹

   Understanding diverse cultural contexts is also critical to advancing financial inclusion sustainably. In the Philippines, non-bank financial service providers such as pawn shops are popular venues for accessing financial services.¹⁰ Leveraging these providers as agents can therefore be a useful way to harness trust in these systems to increase financial inclusion.

To dive deeper into the report’s findings and compare country rankings, visit the FDIP interactive. We also welcome feedback about the 2015 Report and Scorecard at FDIPComments@brookings.edu.

¹ Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Leora Klapper, Dorothe Singer, and Peter Van Oudheusden, “The Global Findex Database 2014: Measuring Financial Inclusion around the World,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7255, April 2015, VI, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/04/15/090224b082dca3aa/1_0/Rendered/PDF/The0Global0Fin0ion0around0the0world.pdf#page=3.

² Claire Scharwatt, Arunjay Katakam, Jennifer Frydrych, Alix Murphy, and Nika Naghavi, “2014 State of the Industry: Mobile Financial Services for the Unbanked,” GSMA, 2015, p. 24, http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/SOTIR_2014.pdf.

³ GSMA Intelligence, “The Mobile Economy 2015,” 2015, pgs. 13-14, http://www.gsmamobileeconomy.com/GSMA_Global_Mobile_Economy_Report_2015.pdf.

⁴ Caitlin Sanford, “Do agents improve financial inclusion? Evidence from a national survey in Brazil,” Bankable Frontier Associates, November 2013, pg. 1, http://bankablefrontier.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/BFA-Focus-Note-Do-agents-improve-financial-inclusion-Brazil.pdf.

⁵ Alliance for Financial Inclusion, “Discussion paper: Agent banking in Latin America,” 2012, pg. 3, http://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/discussion_paper_-_agent_banking_latin_america.pdf.

⁶ The National Treasury, South Africa and the AFI Financial Inclusion Data Working Group, “The Use of Financial Inclusion Data Country Case Study: South Africa – The Mzansi Story and Beyond,” January 2014, http://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/publications/the_use_of_financial_inclusion_data_country_case_study_south_africa.pdf.

⁷ Tanzania National Council for Financial Inclusion, “National Financial Inclusion Framework: A Public-Private Stakeholders’ Initiative (2014-2016),” 2013, pgs. 19-22, http://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/publications/tanzania-national-financial-inclusion-framework-2014-2016.pdf.

⁸ Simone di Castri and Lara Gidvani, “Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Tanzania,” GSMA, February 2014, http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Tanzania-Enabling-Mobile-Money-Policies.pdf.

⁹ Mayada El-Zoghbi, “Mind the Gap: women and Access to Finance,” Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 13 May 2015, http://www.cgap.org/blog/mind-gap-women-and-access-finance.

¹⁰ Xavier Martin and Amarnath Samarapally, “The Philippines: Marshalling Data, Policy, and a Diverse Industry for Financial Inclusion,” FINclusion Lab by MIX, June 2014, http://finclusionlab.org/blog/philippines-marshalling-data-policy-and-diverse-industry-financial-inclusion.

Editor’s Note: The Center for Technology Innovation released the 2015 Financial and Digital Inclusion Project (FDIP) Report on August 26^th. TechTank has previously covered the FDIP launch event and outlined the report’s overall findings. Over the next two months, TechTank will take a closer look at the report’s findings by country and by region, beginning with today’s post on India. 

With about 21 percent of the world’s entire unbanked adult population residing in India as of 2014, the country has tremendous opportunities for growth in terms of advancing access to and use of formal financial services.

In the 2015 Financial and Digital Inclusion Project (FDIP) Report and Scorecard, we detail the progress achieved and possibilities remaining for India’s financial services ecosystem as it moves from a heavy reliance on cash to an array of traditional and digital financial services offered by diverse financial providers.

As noted in the 2015 FDIP Report, government-led initiatives to promote financial inclusion have advanced access to financial services in India. Ownership of formal financial institution and mobile money accounts among adults in India increased about 18 percentage points between 2011 and 2014. Recent regulatory changes and public and private sector initiatives are expected to further promote use of these services.

In this post, we unpack the four components of the 2015 FDIP Scorecard — country commitment, mobile capacity, regulatory environment, and adoption of traditional and digital financial services — to highlight India’s achievements and possible next steps toward greater financial inclusion.

Country commitment: An unprecedented year with no sign of slowing

India’s national-level commitment to promoting financial inclusion earned it a “country commitment” score of 100 percent. A historic government initiative helped India garner a top score: In August 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the “Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan Yojana,” the Prime Minister’s People’s Wealth Scheme (PMJDY). This effort — arguably the largest financial inclusion initiative in the world — “envisages universal access to banking facilities with at least one basic banking account for every household, financial literacy, access to credit, insurance and pension facility,” in addition to providing beneficiaries with an RuPay debit card.

As part of this effort, the program aimed to provide 75 million unbanked adults in India with accounts by late January 2015. As of September 2015, about 180 million accounts had been opened; about 44 percent of these accounts did not carry a balance, down from about 76 percent in September 2014.

The PMJDY initiative is a component of the JAM Trinity, or “Jan-Dhan, Aadhaar and Mobile.” Under this approach, government transfers (also known as Direct Benefit Transfers, or DBT) will be channeled through bank accounts provided under Jan-Dhan, Aadhaar identification numbers or biometric IDs, and mobile phone numbers.

The Pratyaksh Hanstantrit Labh (PaHaL) program is a major DBT initiative in which subsidies for liquefied petroleum gas can be linked to an Aadhaar number that is connected to a bank account or the consumer’s bank details. As of July 2015, about $2 billion had been channeled to beneficiaries in 130 million households across the country.

Mobile capacity: Ample opportunity for digital services, but limited awareness and use

India received 16^th place (out of the 21 countries considered) in the 2015 FDIP Report and Scorecard’s mobile capacity ranking. India’s mobile money landscape features an extensive array of services, and the licensing of new payments banks (discussed below) may drive the entry of new players and products that can improve low levels of awareness and adoption of digital financial services.

An InterMedia survey conducted from September to December 2014 found that while 86 percent of adults owned or could borrow a mobile phone, only about 13 percent of adults were aware of mobile money. Awareness of mobile money is increasing — the 13 percent figure is double that of the first wave of the survey, which concluded in January 2014 — but uptake remains low. The Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) database found only 2 percent of adults in India had a mobile money account in 2014.

Implementing interoperability across mobile money offerings, increasing 3G network coverage by population, and enhancing unique mobile subscribership could boost India’s mobile capacity score in future editions of the FDIP report.

Regulatory environment: Opening up the playing field to non-bank entities

India tied for 7^th place on the regulatory environment component of the 2015 Scorecard. The country’s recent shift to a more open financial landscape contributed to its strong score, although more time is needed to see how recent regulations will be operationalized.

India has traditionally maintained tight restrictions with respect to which entities are involved in financial service provision. Non-banks could manage an agent network on behalf of a bank as business correspondents or issue “semi-closed” wallets that did not permit customers to withdraw funds without transferring them to a full-service bank account. These restrictions likely contributed to the country’s slow and limited adoption of mobile money services.

However, 2014 brought significant changes to India’s regulatory landscape. The Reserve Bank of India’s November 2014 Payments Banks guidelines were heralded as a major step forward for increasing diversity in the financial services ecosystem. These guidelines marked a significant shift from India’s “bank-led” approach by providing opportunities for non-banks such as mobile network operators to leverage their distribution expertise to advance financial access and use among underserved groups.

While these institutions cannot offer credit, they can distribute credit on behalf of a financial services provider. They may also distribute insurance and pension products, in addition to offering interest-bearing deposit accounts.

We noted in the 2015 FDIP Report that timely approval of license applications for prospective payments banks, particularly mobile network operators, would be a valuable next step for India’s financial inclusion path. In August 2015, the Reserve Bank of India approved 11 applicants, including five mobile network operators, to launch payments banks within the next 18 months. As noted in Quartz India, the “underlying objective is to use these new banks to push for greater financial inclusion.” India has also made strides in terms of establishing proportionate “know-your-customer” requirements for financial entities, including payments banks.

While India has made significant progress in terms of promoting a more enabling regulatory environment, room for improvement remains. For example, concerns have been raised regarding the low commission rate for banks distributing DBT, with many experts noting that a higher commission would enhance the ability of these banks to operate sustainably.

Adoption: Access is improving, but promoting use is key

India ranked 9^th for the adoption component of the 2015 Scorecard. Recent studies have demonstrated that adoption of formal financial services among traditionally underserved groups is improving. For example, InterMedia surveys conducted in October 2013 to January 2014 and September to December 2014 found that the most significant increase in bank account ownership was among women, particularly women living below the poverty line. Still, further work is needed to close the gender gap in account ownership.

As noted above, adoption of digital financial services such as mobile money is minimal compared with traditional bank accounts (0.3 percent compared with 55 percent, according to the September to December 2014 InterMedia survey); nonetheless, we believe that the introduction of payments banks, combined with government efforts to digitize transfers, will facilitate greater adoption of digital financial services.

While PMJDY has successfully promoted ownership of bank accounts, incentivizing use of these services is critical for achieving true financial inclusion. Dormancy rates in India are high — about 43 percent of accounts had not been deposited into or withdrawn from in the previous 12 months, according to the 2014 Global Findex.

More time may be needed for individuals to understand how their new accounts function and, equally importantly, how their new accounts are relevant to their daily lives. A February 2015 survey designed by India’s Ministry of Finance, MicroSave, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation found about 86 percent of PMJDY account holders reported the account was their first bank account. While this survey is not nationally representative, it provides some context as to why efforts to promote trust in and understanding of these new accounts will be key to the success of the program.

An opportunity for promoting adoption of digital financial services was highlighted during the public launch of the 2015 Report and Scorecard: As of June 2015, it was estimated that fewer than 6 percent of merchants in India accepted digital payments. The U.S. government is partnering with the government of India to promote the shift to digitizing transactions, including at merchants.

The next annual FDIP Report will examine the outcomes of such initiatives as we assess India’s progress toward greater financial inclusion. Suggestions and other comments regarding the FDIP Report and Scorecard are welcomed at FDIPComments@brookings.edu.

Good afternoon Chair Ayotte, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today on the important topic of domestic unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).

I am a nonresident senior fellow in Governance Studies and the Center for Technology Innovation at the Brookings Institution. I am also a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, and a professor at UCLA, where I hold appointments in the Electrical Engineering Department and the Department of Public Policy. The views I am expressing here are my own, and do not necessarily represent those of the Brookings Institution, Stanford University or the University of California.

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Editor's Note: With the latest coup attempt in Turkey, Turkish democracy survived a major test, and the country turned from the edge of a precipice. writes Kemal Kirisci. But Turkey’s democracy has also taken a severe blow. This article was originally published in The National Interest.

The history of Turkish politics is littered with coups and coup attempts that have occurred in roughly ten-year intervals. It is almost a genetic defect.

• The nascent Turkish democracy experienced its first coup in 1960 when it was barely into its tenth year—led by a group of left-wing “young officers,” who had also forced the General Staff into its ranks. Administrative authority was returned to civilians in October 1961, after having cost the lives of the then-Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and the Minister of Finance, Hasan Polatkan.
• The second military intervention took place in 1971 against the government of Süleyman Demirel—this time around, though, through a “coup by memorandum.” The military issued to the prime minister an ultimatum—to step aside and be replaced by a technocratic cabinet.
• Less than ten years later, in the midst of endemic violence between left- and right-wing radical groups, the military's top brass carried out another intervention. This was bloodier than the previous two interventions, costing hundreds of lives and leading to massive human-rights violations. After rubberstamping a suffocating constitution on the country, the military handed the government over to a semblance of a democratically-elected government in 1983.
• Surprisingly, Turkey broke this pattern of ten-yearly military interventions, and civilian authority continued until 1997, when there was what was termed a “post-modern coup.” The army rolled out a convoy of tanks into the streets of Ankara, and in a repeat of the coup of 1971, demanded the resignation of the coalition government led by Necmettin Erbakan.
• The next coup occurred a decade later (almost to the day) in April 2007, when the Chief of Staff staged an “e-coup” by posting a set of demands on its website. The coup was a reaction against a long list of democratic reforms that were introduced as a part of the leadership’s pro-EU agenda and were seen as a departure from the staunchly secularist, restrictive mode of governance. Bolstered by the public support for these reforms, however, the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, now the current president of Turkey, successfully withstood the “e-coup,” and for the first time, pushed the military back “into the barracks”.

The latest coup attempt—which took place on Friday, July 15—has widely been attributed to a large Gülenist faction within the military and the judiciary that circumvented the established chain of command and held the high command hostage. Gülenists are the followers of the Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen, who leads a worldwide movement that claims to advocate a moderate form of Sunni Islam with an emphasis on tolerance and interfaith dialogue. Formerly allies with Erdoğan, the Gülenists were blamed for spearheading the corruption scandal in December 2013 that engulfed several government officials, ministers and people in Erdoğan’s intimate circle. Since then, Gülen and Erdoğan have been locked in a power struggle.

Back from the brink

Turkish democracy survived a major test, and Turkey turned from the edge of a precipice. The credit for the coup’s defeat goes to the Turkish people, who heeded Erdoğan’s call to resist this intervention “by any means possible and necessary" and filled the squares. TV reports were filled with eye-to-eye, tense, agitated confrontations between civilians and armed soldiers on the two bridges that connect the Asian and European sides of Istanbul. Public restraint and sobriety helped to prevent escalation of violence. There were nevertheless senseless causalities resulting from fire opened by the mutineers and especially attacks mounted on the parliament building as well as the Headquarters of the General Staff. It could have been a lot worse.

Erdoğan needs to rise above a majoritarian understanding of democracy and do justice to the aspirations of a public that heeded his call by pouring into the streets and squares to defeat the coup attempt.

Clearly, Turkey’s democracy has taken a severe blow—cushioned only by the unequivocal stance of the opposition leaders and the media against the coup. Once again, the nation managed to break this pattern of ten-year coups. This offers the country a matchless opportunity for reconciliation. Granted, Erdoğan has had an exceptionally rough weekend and his frustration with those responsible for or implicated in the coup is understandable. He is correct in calling “for their punishment under the full force of the law of the land.” It will, however, now be critical that he ensure that the rule of law is upheld and rises to the challenge of winning the hearts and minds across a deeply polarized nation. He has the tools for it in his repertoire and had successfully wielded them in the past—especially between 2003 and 2011, when he served as prime minister. In hindsight, this period is often referred to as AKP’s “golden age,” when the economy boomed, democracy excelled, and Turkey was touted as a model for those Muslim-majority countries aspiring to transform themselves into liberal democracies.

As he steers the country from the brink of civil war, Erdoğan needs to rise above a majoritarian understanding of democracy and do justice to the aspirations of a public that heeded his call by pouring into the streets and squares to defeat the coup attempt. This is the least that the Turkish public deserves. This would also be a move in the right direction for Turkey’s neighborhood, which desperately needs a respite from the turmoil resulting from the war in Syria, the instability in Iraq, Russia’s territorial ambitions and now Brexit. This is the moment when a stable, democratic, transparent, accountable and prosperous Turkey needs to come to the fore on the world-stage. The United States needs it too. As much as the White House declared its faith in the strength of Turkey’s democracy and its support for the elected leadership, there is a clear chance for forging closer cooperation between the two countries. The first step in cooperation should be in bringing to justice the perpetrators of this coup, followed by measures to enhance Turkey’s capacity to address and manage the many challenges facing Turkey and its neighborhood.

For over 100 years, the driving force of Ohio’s economy has been the state’s so-called Big Eight cities—Columbus, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Toledo, Akron, Dayton, Canton, and Youngstown. Today, though, the driving reality of these cities is sustained, long-term population loss. The central issue confronting these cities—and the state and surrounding metropolitan area—is not whether these cities will have different physical footprints and more green space than they do now, but how it will happen.

The state must adopt a different way of thinking and a different vision of its cities’ future—and so must the myriad local, civic, philanthropic, and business leaders who will also play a role in reshaping Ohio’s cities. The following seven basic premises should inform any vision for a smaller, stronger future and subsequent strategies for change in these places:

• These cities contain significant assets for future rebuilding
  
• These cities will not regain their peak population
  
• These cities have a surplus of housing
  
• These cities have far more vacant land than can be absorbed by redevelopment
  
• Impoverishment threatens the viability of these cities more than population loss as such
  
• Local resources are severely limited
  
• The fate of cities and their metropolitan areas are inextricably inter-connected
  

These premises have significant implications for the strategies that state and local governments should pursue to address the issues of shrinking cities.

Full Paper on Ohio's Cities » (PDF)
Paper on Shrinking Cities Across the United States »

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