Scandal and speculation surrounding the demise of Politburo member Bo Xilai raised questions about the stability and cohesiveness of China's political elite. However as his trial comes to an end the main political challenge is not at the elite level, but in the Communist party's ability to gain legitimacy among the wider public. 

The trial of Bo Xilai for bribery, embezzlement and abuse of power has generated a number of surprises. To start with, there has been more transparency than most observers had expected, with the court issuing transcripts at regular intervals. Plus, the court used Chinese social media to post images of the proceedings.

This level of transparency is unusual in Chinese trials. However, we should be cautious about seeing this as a precedent for the future development of judicial practice. Bo's case is rather special, both because of the senior positions he held and because of the level of speculation around the case – and Bo's fate – ever since the drama began last February when Wang Lijun, Bo's former police chief in Chongqing, fled to the US Consulate-General in Chengdu. 

Wang, who is already serving a prison sentence after being convicted of abuse of power and other offences, gave testimony at Bo's trial. The exchanges between Bo and Wang will be picked over further, with their salacious details of the arguments that apparently ensued in January 2012 when Wang told Bo that Bo's wife was suspected of murdering British businessman Neil Heywood, in Chongqing the previous November. 

It is highly likely that Bo will be found guilty. Nonetheless, the trial gave Bo the opportunity to put across his views in court. He surprised observers on the first day by retracting confessions he made during the pre-trial investigation process. It is not clear whether this was expected by the prosecutors in advance of the trial, but it contributed to the trial lasting for five days – much longer than expected. 

Result already decided

Most media coverage and comment has focused on the details of the various events, which came out in court. However the political implications lie elsewhere. 

The trial should not be seen in isolation but as the culmination of a process which began in the days after Wang's attempted defection was brought to light. The party's subsequent handling of Bo Xilai proceeded in cautious stages: first the removal from his post as Party Secretary in Chongqing in March last year, then his 'suspension' from the Politburo and Party Central Committee a month later while an investigation was carried out by the party. Only in September 2012 was Bo expelled from the Communist Party and the file handed over to state authorities for prosecution.

This train of events serves as a reminder of the context in which China's judicial system operates. Whatever the transparency of proceedings in court, or the professionalism of judges and lawyers, the party's 'leadership' of judicial work means that politically important cases are often subject to direction from the party apparatus. 

Popular, not elite, politics is at stake

The Bo case has often been presented as a story of turbulence and factional infighting at the top of the party. But in November 2012 the party delivered a clear leadership transition at the top of both party and military from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, with the government handover in March this year. With the new team firmly in place, the transparency accorded to Bo's trial demonstrates confidence among the leadership, not division. 

Political challenges lie not at the top of the party, but in the ability of the party leadership to achieve legitimacy among the wider public. The revelations in the Bo case, from last spring and up to and including the trial, have increased levels of public cynicism about the behaviour of senior officials. Posts on China's social media will provide glimpses of the wider response to the trial; popular opinion is likely to be divided – as it was when Bo was still a serving official, and has remained since his removal from office. 

Given that the party seeks to present itself as being 'responsive' to public concerns, the main political implications of the trial will be seen in the impact it has on the leadership's credibility, not in elite politics. It is that imperative, not judicial reform, which explains what we have been allowed to see of the trial. 

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One year after a transition at the top of China's Communist Party, a major party gathering − the third plenum − was held on 9-12 November, with Chinese officials preparing a 'comprehensive plan for reform' in the context of apparently slowing growth in China as well as social and environmental challenges.

The speaker will comment on the outcomes of the plenum and the debates which led up to it, and examine likely policy changes and their impact on developments in China.

Despite the hype surrounding it, the gathering of the country’s ruling elite in Beijing is likely to prize measured change over dramatic reform.

If there was a clearer idea of what makes China’s new elite leadership tick, then the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party that is about to be held in Beijing would not be such a big deal. But in a polity which privileges concealment over overt statement, it is viewed widely as the one chance for outsiders to see more clearly what the leadership aims to achieve. Expectations were raised by the October statement by one of the most staid members of the current Standing Committee of the Politburo, Yu Zhengsheng, that the plenum would presage a new era of reform.

In Chinese politics reform is a word that has a wholesome, positive air about it. But the question is where and when reform will happen and who will gain from it. The plenum is not like a party convention in the Western sense. It is not an eye-grabbing, media-dominating event that produces surprises. Comparing this year’s installment with the great Third Plenum of 1978 that heralded the repudiation of late Maoism and the embracing of the market, the non-state sector and foreign capital – all anathema before then – is misleading. The significance of the 1978 meeting was only obvious in hindsight. It took years for the scale of the radical transformation of the whole strategic direction of the Communist Party to be appreciated. That 2013 will prove a similar historic moment is unlikely, perhaps even impossible.

What is much more likely is that the highly tactical leadership now in charge will reaffirm its commitment to incremental reform. It will make some statements about the radical urbanization that China is about to undergo and say something about social welfare reform. China’s leaders will do what they have always done in plenums over the last three decades, namely set the broad parameters of politically permissible activity that provinces, ministries and other stakeholders will then need to implement.

This plenum will also have to produce something about the need to achieve greater egality and balance in the economy. It needs to answer some of the questions about how Premier Li Keqiang, in particular, intends to meet the goal of 'fast, sustainable growth' when a falling overall GDP figure looks likely. It needs to communicate to as broad a constituency as possible the arch-narrative of a world where the raw statement of growth on its own is no longer the be all and end all of government policy. It needs to say something about how the party is going to fulfill the increasingly complex aspirations of the Chinese people, aspirations that exceed purely having a materially good level of life and concern broader questions of well-being that vex the politics of all developed economies.

Observers will want to see some signs too of addressing the most sensitive issues. Yu Zhengsheng talked of economic reform. Reforming the economy is now a wholly uncontroversial mantra in China. However, it impacts on one enormously important issue that reaches beyond economics: whether wealth, prosperity and development benefit the few or are accessible to the many – in other words, good, old-fashioned questions of economic and social justice. At the heart of this lies the question of how state-owned enterprises have become vehicles of profit not just for the party state, but also for tightly knit networks of vested interests. Reforms that lap at the doors of these entities also creep into the space of powerful political players, who will resist any attempt to cut down their wealth, and who have the power to resist.

China’s new leadership is proving more confident than was expected and displays a high sense of historic mission. President Xi Jinping speaks increasingly like a politician who believes it is almost his historic destiny to sit at the centre of the leadership of a renascent 'rich, strong country'. The ultimate question for the plenum is not what outside observers make of it but what the vastly complex mixture of groups in China does. For them, a sign that the leadership is willing to take on some of the entrenched vested interests that penetrate the operations of some state-owned sectors to the core is critical.

This is likely to be couched in the language of more support for the market, which is the key channel in any attack on vested interests – through widening access to wealth and economic benefits, and support for the non-state sector and entrepreneurs. It is hard to see how deeper reform can occur without these two crucial elements. And it is through these that the attitude of China’s leadership to political and legal reforms – far more complex issues that, almost certainly, will not be addressed at the plenum but will lurk in the background − will become clearer. The leadership thinks it is too early to tackle these issues directly, but this plenum will still be part of the process for it to come up with ideas for how to transform not just China’s economy, but its polity too.

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Moisés Naím will share his insights into the changing nature of power in the 21st century. He will articulate what he considers to be the shift and dispersal of power between traditionally dominant actors (such as large, stable governments, corporations and armies), and newly ascendant ‘micropowers’ (such as the Tea Party, WikiLeaks, and Somali pirates). 

Crucially, however, he will argue power today is decaying. He will suggest power is easier to acquire, but harder to use, and easier to lose. Coupled with this, the drive for power makes emerging actors across many fields of endeavour vulnerable, leading to chaos, confusion and paralysis. 

There will be a reception after the event.

This is an Under 35s Forum event.

Following the Third Plenum of the Communist Party’s 18th Central Committee in November 2013, the panel will offer their thoughts on whether the economic, political and social reforms announced, such as the relaxation of the one child policy and establishment of a national security council, signal a new era for China’s domestic and foreign policies. The speakers will consider how significant these reforms will be in comparison to those announced in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping following the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee.

Dr Naím will discuss the changing nature of power in the 21st century and will argue power today is decaying. He will suggest that while power is easier to acquire, it is harder to use, and easier to lose. In addition to this, the drive for power makes emerging actors across many different fields of endeavour vulnerable, leading to chaos, confusion and paralysis. The conversation will take place under the Chatham House Rule. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

This event will present the findings of the Transatlantic Academy’s new report, Liberal Order in a Post-Western World, which examines the future of international liberal order in a world shaped by the rise of emerging powers and a transatlantic community dealing with internal challenges. Produced by collaboration between scholars from Europe and North America, it recommends ways to build an enduring rules-based order for the 21st century.

China’s rise was highlighted again recently by reports that World Bank calculations of purchasing power parity could put the Chinese economy ahead of the US this year. China’s global influence has clearly spread substantially over recent decades, though the extent and impact of the country’s rise remain debated, and its economic size is not yet matched by influence in other areas.

Within China itself, the idea that the country has become a major power has become stronger. Put alongside Chinese analysis of global flux, this has resulted in changes in China’s approaches to foreign and security policy.

The impact of these changes remain uncertain. As set out in a new report on China’s Global Personality , there are several debates in China about the country’s approach to international affairs: around the implications of its rise for its continued identity as a developing country, whether it should become more ‘revisionist’ towards international affairs, and how assertive Chinese foreign and security policy should be.

So far, China’s post-2012 leadership has taken forward a number of areas of policy change. Institutionally, the creation of a new National Security Commission, chaired by Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, is likely to strengthen policy coordination and integration across a broad range of domestic and external issues.

The Chinese leadership has also promoted a much-discussed ‘new type of major power relationship’ in its approach to the US. The aim here is to avoid conflict between the US and a rising China, and to work towards a relationship characterized by equality, including in Asia – this therefore does not imply a desire to be a regional hegemon. The outcome, however, remains to be seen, and US responses so far have been cautious.

In dealing with disputes in East Asia, Chinese policy has become more assertive since around 2010, though the leadership has also set out its desire to deepen relations with its neighbours, and Beijing has been among the first to reach out to new Indian Prime Minister Modi. However, there are clear limits to this: relations with Japan in particular are likely to remain poor, and those with Vietnam have deteriorated substantially over recent weeks.

These issues are not simply bilateral, but should be seen as part of a wider renegotiation of regional order, involving not just China, but Japan, the US, and others. The last few years have seen changes in US approaches to the ongoing evolution of the international order and in particular to East Asia – the so-called ‘rebalance’ strategy, including ongoing – but slowing – negotiations for a trade and investment Trans-Pacific Partnership. And Japan’s security policy has been changing under Prime Minister Abe.

The idea of renegotiation can also be seen in the debates around institutions of global economic governance, such as the International Monetary Fund. Our research finds that China’s engagement with the existing international order remains strong, but there is also a growing element of gradual revisionism from China (and maybe others) within that order. China’s approach is consistent with the open and rules-based way that international institutions have developed, but it looks for its voice to be considered more in the setting of those rules.

The view from Europe

The implications of this analysis are that the questions policy-makers need to address should not be framed simply in terms of dealing with the rise of China and the changes in Chinese approaches this brings. Instead, the framework should be one which takes account of global flux and policy changes by other actors.

This means that there is space for European governments, for example, to engage in shaping the future global and regional order. In doing so, there could be particular challenges if strategic difficulties in the US-China relationship continue − the perceptions of opportunities and threats in Asia as seen from Europe may increasingly diverge from Washington’s. As China’s rise continues, it will not just affect relationships with China – Europe’s relationships with the US, and their stances on questions of regional order and governance in Asia, will also be called into question.

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With China’s economic power on the rise, there is a growing sense among many publics around the world that the global balance of power is shifting and that China already is, or will soon be, the world’s leading power, according to a new survey. The Pew Research Center’s latest Global Attitudes survey found that despite China’s rise in economic power, the People’s Republic is not very popular in Asia, Europe and the United States. As for the US, although the ‘Obama Bounce’ effect of more positive attitudes toward the United States is waning in Europe and China, anti-Americanism in most countries remains much lower than it was during the Bush administration, but remaining consistent in the Middle East. 

Bruce Stokes will present these findings and the expert panel will discuss the insights it provides into an emerging superpower rivalry. In addition they will discuss how these nuances in global attitudes might increasingly shape the security and economic policies of governments around the world.

As Nigeria celebrates one hundred years of unity, significant differences – real and perceived – remain between different parts of the country. This event marks the Nigeria launch of the Chatham House Briefing Who Speaks for the North? Politics and Influence in Northern Nigeria. Its author, Dr Leena Hoffmann, will discuss the effects of democratization and pacted politics on northern Nigeria, broader governance challenges, and how relations among decision-makers nationally have evolved.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The US derives significant geopolitical power by issuing the dominant reserve currency. Not surprisingly, China would like to wield similar power and is successfully promoting the use of the renminbi to settle trade. The speaker will argue that the RMB’s chances of becoming a major reserve currency are poor, as financial liberalization, although a necessary condition, is insufficient. China must also earn the unquestioning trust of global money managers. History suggests this takes decades even for a rules-bound democracy, let alone an opaque, unpredictable single-party state.

In light of China’s economic reforms and a high-profile anti-corruption campaign, the speaker will argue that fundamental political, economic and social shifts have changed the nature of opportunities and risks for foreign businesses in China.

Registration for this event is now closed.

This past Sunday, incumbent Dilma Rousseff defeated Aécio Neves in Brazil’s presidential runoff election, thus guaranteeing a fourth consecutive term in office for the Workers’ Party (PT). Her slim margin of victory (just over three percentage points) made this the closest presidential election in the country’s modern history, but it was also the sixth consecutive election fought between the PT and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), which led Brazil in the 1990s.

The PT-PSDB duopoly, firmly in place since the Plano Real stabilization programme in 1994, has provided Brazil with unprecedented political stability. At the same time, it has made it difficult for new actors to gain a foothold in national politics: Marina Silva of the Socialist Party (PSB) failed spectacularly in her bid to establish a third force this year.

Another problem generated by the duopoly is that it oversimplifies Brazilian politics to a competition between two recent legacies. The legacy of the PSDB’s Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) was macroeconomic stability, and the legacy of the PT’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-10) was social inclusion. Pointing to resurgent inflation, Neves ran on the Cardoso legacy of sound economic management; pointing to recent social change, Rousseff ran on the Lula legacy of pro-poor policies.

Although this style of campaigning provided useful informational shortcuts to voters, at times it seemed as if Cardoso and Lula were on the ballot themselves. Televised debates verged on shouting matches and were woefully devoid of programmatic details. At a time when Brazil faces a host of policy challenges — anaemic growth, rising prices, creaking infrastructure, corruption scandals, and an alarming credit bubble — this was the most backward-looking presidential campaign in recent memory.

Although both Rousseff and Neves called for national unity in the wake of the close result, there is no doubt that Brazil is a house divided. Since 2006, presidential elections have been characterized by strong regional and class cleavages. The more modern south and southeast regions voted solidly for Neves, while the poor northeast supported Rousseff by a margin of three to one.

Support for Rousseff in any given state or city was closely linked to the percentage of the local population receiving Bolsa Família, the popular conditional cash transfer policy introduced by the Lula government. Meanwhile, firms and investors showed their clear preference for Neves: every increase by Rousseff in pre-election polls led to drops in share prices and increased demand for dollars. Although Neves carried only 12 of Brazil’s 27 states, these 12 states are responsible for 62 per cent of Brazil’s GDP. In her second term, Rousseff will be making course corrections to her economic policy in the clear knowledge that the private sector, especially in the influential state of São Paulo, largely opposed her re-election.

…but the Opposition Advances in Congress

Rousseff will also have to contend with the most complex Congress of modern times. Of Brazil’s 32 registered parties, some 28 will be represented in the 2015-18 legislature, the highest number ever recorded. The largest party, the PT, will control only 14 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Both the PT and its principal coalition partner, the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), lost ground in comparison to their performance in 2010. This means that the ruling coalition in 2015 will likely be reduced from two-third to three-fifths of the lower house, making it more difficult for Rousseff to approve constitutional amendments.

With a larger opposition bloc in Congress and a slim majority in the popular vote, Rousseff’s authority is clearly reduced. Unlike her predecessor Lula, she has only modest prestige and authority within the ruling PT, making it very unlikely that she will be able to promote an unchallenged successor from within the party ranks. Given that she cannot seek a third term, she runs the risk of facing early lame duck status. PT luminaries are already floating the name of Lula, now 69 years old, as the party’s possible candidate for 2018. To avoid sliding into irrelevance, Rousseff will need to name her new economic team (she is expected to make changes at the finance ministry and the central bank) as soon as possible, and to seize the legislative agenda in 2015.

The Path to Political Reform

A major item on Rousseff’s agenda will be political reform. Since the current constitution was introduced in 1988, every successive president has announced major proposals for changing the electoral system and the rules for campaign finance, with a few to reducing corruption and increasing accountability. Almost all of these proposals have died a slow death in Congress, so Rousseff is already advocating a plebiscite in order to preempt the expected foot-dragging by the political class.

One item that will certainly merit attention is the issue of re-election. Consecutive re-election of executives (presidents, governors and mayors) was introduced in 1997 and has revolutionized Brazilian politics. Some 65 per cent of mayors and 70 per cent of governors who attempt re-election are successful, and this has also been true of 100 per cent of presidents (Cardoso, Lula, and now Rousseff). In the past century, there has been only one other instance of three consecutive re-elected presidents in a democracy (Clinton, Bush and Obama in the US).

An end to immediate re-election was a key demand of both Aécio Neves and Marina Silva during the campaign. If Rousseff is sincere about political reform, she may set into motion the repeal of a rule that has greatly benefited her party.

The speaker will argue that Chinese foreign policy should be viewed as an extension of domestic policy to a degree not seen in other countries. China's foreign policy aims to support domestic growth and employment, must be aligned with nationalist and narratives of ‘rejuvenation’ and the ‘China Dream’, and must help dilute hostile foreign values. The ‘One Belt, One Road’ project, also known as the ‘New Silk Road’, exemplifies this. The speaker will illustrate its origins and development, discuss how it promotes the Communist Party’s domestic agenda, as well as look at (secondary) geostrategic aims and difficulties. Finally, he will look at the lessons for Europe, and why and how this Chinese initiative should be welcomed.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION IS CLOSED.

It has become routine for China’s leaders to use high profile international events as a means of projecting a preferred image of what China stands for and how it will act as  a great power, one that is perhaps now second only to the US in the league table of global powers. So it is no surprise that Xi Jinping has used his interventions at the UN development summit and his address to the General Assembly to showcase China’s growing role as a global aid actor, and to call for greater ‘democratization’ of global governance institutions (or, in other words, a greater role and say for China and other developing countries). China’s alleged and self-proclaimed (and challenged) predilection for peace, a desire to build a ‘new type’ of (vaguely defined) international relations, and support for the UN as the sole arbiter of when sovereignty might possibly be put aside (instead of the US or a coalition of the willing) are also now relatively well-established and rehearsed Chinese positions.

In addition to wielding China’s financial power in support of this national image projection, Xi’s activities also represent a move towards mobilizing discursive power (话语权) as well. To date, and for a number of years, this discursive power has been primarily deployed in a defensive manner, with the aim of denying the supposed universal nature of many of the norms and principles of the international order. These norms, as articulated by both Chinese government officials and some supportive academic scholars, are not universal at all, but merely the product of a small number of Western countries’ histories, philosophies and developmental trajectories. So, in this formulation, while it is important to have a common set of principles and responsibilities as the basis for international interactions, each country should be free to develop its own nation-specific definitions based on its own unique histories and contexts. And it is only these Chinese-inspired definitions and aspirations – of human rights, for example, or development – that China should be judged against.

But this position has changed under Xi, with China’s leaders increasingly keen on promoting Chinese understandings and definitions as the basis for international debates and international action. Hot on the heels of Chinese attempts to take a leading role in defining the basis for global cyber diplomacy,  China is now seeking to shape the way that development is defined and understood – which of course has massive implications for how development, thus defined, might be attained.

Leading on development, missing on security

Xi’s willingness – or should that be desire – to establish Chinese potential global leadership was less apparent when it came to solving the major security challenges of the day. To be sure, there was talk about the need for new ways of dealing with insecurity that recognize the consequences of globalization and that no country can solve problems on its own – including, presumably, the United States. The pledge of more peacekeepers will cement China’s position as one of the world’s major contributors to UN overseas activities, and the promise of a military assistance fund to the African Union shows that Beijing really is an important security actor beyond its own borders. But when it comes to conflict in places like Syria, China seems content to maintain its back seat and allow Russia to take the lead in a crisis that is admittedly some distance from China’s own backyard. Expect a Chinese-led agenda for the G20 summit in 2016 in China that reinforces this differential willingness to assume leadership roles depending on the specific issue at hand.  

So for the time being, the aim seems to be primarily to confirm the idea that China is a new and very different type of great power; one that is a friend and supporter of those smaller developing states and emerging powers that had previously suffered from the asymmetric economic and military power of great powers in the West (or in some cases, still do). As part of this ‘difference’ a second related objective seems to be to establish China as a global leader on development issues.

But simply asserting something does not mean that it is true, and its something of an understatement to suggest that China’s pacific and non-interventionist self-identity has not been accepted by everybody, particularly in East and Southeast Asia. China’s developmental achievements have also been questioned. The response in Beijing to Hilary Clinton’s tweet that it was ‘shameless’ that Xi was co-host of a meeting on women’s rights shows that the defensive nature of Chinese policy remains in place: ‘those in the best position to judge the state of women's issues in China are Chinese people, particularly Chinese women’, according to the foreign ministry. And Clinton’s comments also show that the field of ideas is not being left open for China to do whatever it wants just yet; gaining widespread acceptance for Chinese preferences is not going to be an easy task and will likely face considerable resistance. But the suggestion here is that the world is likely to see a growing Chinese presence over the coming years not just as a global development and aid provider, but also as a putative developer of new global norms.

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