Realizing the Potential of Extractives for Industrial and Economic Development 18 October 2018 — 5:30PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 October 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Over the past two decades, the extractives industries have risen in importance for many low- and middle- income countries their prospects for economic development and poverty reduction. During a period of rising commodities prices, the development of extractives became increasingly attractive to both governments and companies. There was - and remains - much discussion about their potential to support inclusive development.

However, there are also risks and uncertainties associated with the extractives industries and many things can, and do, go wrong. Fluctuations in commodity prices can be hard to manage and can lead to considerable fiscal pressures. In the longer-term, climate change and the various policy responses to this, will profoundly affect the extractives sector as renewables replace fossil fuels in the global energy mix.

Managing the extractives sectors will therefore remain highly challenging especially in low-income countries where institutions are often weak. This roundtable will bring together some of the foremost academics and practitioners working in the extractives industries and also in economic development to discuss a major new UNU-WIDER study Extractive Industries: The Management of Resources as a Driver of Sustainable Development.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The Impact of Brexit on Energy Transformation in the UK and EU 28 March 2019 — 8:15AM TO 9:45AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 December 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The UK’s decision to leave the EU will fundamentally reshape many of the UK’s policies and its relations with countries around the world. For energy and climate, the changes could be significant and will need to be managed carefully to secure ongoing investment, stable energy prices and ambitious climate objectives. The UK’s departure will also affect the balance of political support for climate and energy policies with the EU institutions and potentially impact upon regional initiatives.

This roundtable will discuss:

• The impact on the energy sector of Brexit during the transition period through until December 2020 including the operation of interconnectors and access to the Internal energy market, ongoing engagement in European research collaboration and the replacement of European financial resources.
• The possible opportunities and risks for the UK’s energy sector in 2021 and beyond.
• The implications of Brexit on the EU’s energy and climate policy.

The roundtable will discuss the role of the public and business in shaping the future deal as it will need to be ratified by the parliaments of all member states.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The Global Implications of China's Energy Revolution 4 March 2019 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 7 February 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Ten years ago, it would have been difficult to believe that China – the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter – would be one of the global leaders in some elements of clean energy development and deployment. With increasing air pollution and predominantly coal-fired power generation fueled by a booming economy and population, China has had to rethink its approach to environmental protection and climate mitigation.

Strong government signalling and national policies have led to the construction of the world’s largest fleets, wind farms and solar photovoltaic arrays in an effort to reduce national GDP intensities of energy and CO2 emissions. How has the availability of large amounts of capital, and the number of state-owned companies with soft budgetary constraints, helped contribute to this?

Against this backdrop, this event will consider how China must re-evaluate its approach to energy security – coal made up the majority of the country’s energy in 2016, followed by oil, of which 65 per cent had to be imported – despite the country being one of the pioneers of renewable energy. This event will look at how, in delivering on its clean energy objectives, China could redefine the traditional energy security paradox and in fact become more resilient to previously overlooked vulnerabilities.

The Future of Food Post-Brexit 26 February 2019 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 7 February 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

For almost half a century, the UK’s food system – comprising the totality of food production, transport, manufacturing, retailing and consumption – has been intrinsically and intricately linked to its membership of the European Community and, subsequently, the EU. Arguably, for no other sectors are the challenges and opportunities of Brexit as extensive as they are for UK food and agriculture.

Reforming the UK’s food system won’t be easy. The tight Brexit timeline, the complexities of negotiations and the political pressure to secure new trade deals could lead to decisions that are poorly conceived and become near impossible to correct.

This event will explore the challenges of the UK’s ‘just in time’ food system which only maintains 5-10 days’ worth of groceries country-wide, what the impacts of structural changes will be post-Brexit such as longer inspections of food imports at the border and what the main priorities for policymakers should be in the event of a no-deal Brexit to ensure the country’s food-stock can satisfy demand.

Sino-Russian Gas Cooperation: Power of Siberia I and II and Implications for Global LNG Supplies 27 November 2019 — 8:30AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 19 November 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

In a new event in the Sustainable Transitions series, the speaker will present an update of Sino-Russian gas cooperation.

To give a comprehensive account of their impact on global liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies, he will discuss the following points:

• Gas is scheduled to start flowing from the Power of Siberia I (POS) on 2 December 2019. But what is the background of development of POS 1 and what is its current status and prospects?
• What are the chances of exporting gas through the proposed Altai pipeline? Why is the Mongolia export route so significant? And how will it affect the Central Asian Republics and in particular Turkmenistan’s gas export to China?
• What are the implications of both POS I and Altai gas via Mongolia route in the context of global LNG supply?
• What are the prospects for multilateral pipeline gas cooperation in northeast Asia?
• What are the implications for other Arctic onshore LNG supply, in particular, for Novatek’s Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 1 and 2 to China on top of POS 1 and Altai gas?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Impact of the US Election on Global Climate Politics 25 November 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 November 2020 Online

Panellists discuss how Joe Biden’s victory will impact international efforts to tackle climate change. Will climate finally become a common area for global cooperation?

Joe Biden’s victory over Donald Trump is already having a positive impact on international efforts to tackle climate change. Leaders from across the world, including the UK, Canada, Australia and Fiji, have used their first messages to the President-elect to draw attention to the climate crisis.

Biden has promised to re-join the global community in its commitment to the Paris Agreement – but this could be the easy part. More difficult will be whether and how Biden is able to deliver his ambitious climate plan, and how effectively he is able to integrate climate change into foreign policy efforts and national security strategies.

Global climate action has also moved forward in the last four years. The European Union recently pledged to become climate neutral by 2050, and China, Japan and South Korea have committed to achieving carbon neutral economies.

How will the US re-enter this global landscape of distributed leadership and what difficulties does it face? Will the US be willing to work within a competitive partnership with the EU and China? How will Biden’s win change the dynamic of COP26 next year? 

China Paves Its Way in New Areas of International Law Expert comment sysadmin 31 March 2017

China is looking to increase its capacity and influence in international legal matters – and it is particularly in frontier areas of the law that China is likely to take a proactive stance.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi called China a staunch defender and builder of the international rule of law in his speech to the UN General Assembly in October 2014. He promised that as China grew stronger, it would make a greater contribution to the maintenance and promotion of international rule of law, and would work with other countries to build a fairer and more reasonable international political and economic order.

For many in China, that time has now come: there is a sense that China deserves a much stronger and more respected voice in discussions surrounding the future of the international system. The recent speeches of Xi Jinping in Davos and Geneva in January 2017 suggest that China is now seizing the initiative and fighting for a voice and influence commensurate with its status and power as the number two economy in the world.

But there is an interesting divide in the areas in which China chooses to assert itself. In traditional areas of international law – such as the law of the sea and international human rights law – China continues to harbour reservations about the fairness of the existing international order. Its misgivings are fuelled by a perception that it did not play a significant part in the creation of the post-Second World War international order, and that those rules operate mainly in the interests of Western powers.

There is also a sense that traditional areas of international law do not offer a level playing field for China, since Western states have far more experience at operating in those. We know from Chinese experts that in the South China Sea case, one background issue that played into China’s refusal to engage in litigation with the Philippines and other interested states (which were represented by leading Western international lawyers) was a lack of experience before international courts and tribunals.

Contrast this with newer areas of international law– such as the regimes governing cyber, space, climate change and deep sea mining issues. In these areas, the rules are still in the process of being developed and tested, and the influence of the existing powers is not so firmly established or accepted, so there is more opportunity for China’s voice to be heard and heeded.

On climate change, China has become a champion of the Paris Agreement, which it worked hard with the Obama administration to secure. China is also active in some of the processes related to cyber rule-making, both as a member of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on cyber issues and through bilateral dialogues with a number of states. China has taken a keen interest in the regime applicable to the mining of the international seabed, making submissions to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea about the procedure for settling disputes. In international economic law, another relatively new area, China has been assiduously cultivating expertise, and is a major player in the negotiation of the ‘mega regional’ trade deal, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

In time, the development of China’s much heralded Belt and Road Initiative may provide an opportunity for China to be further involved in international norm-setting, through the creation of a system of economic and political interaction that is built and run more along Chinese determined lines. The emergence of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank may offer an early indicator of China’s attempts to shape global governance, although in this context China has so far scrupulously observed international standards and has made no open attempt to challenge them.

So far, China’s practical input to international norm-setting has been limited. While China is prone to making wide-ranging statements of principle, it finds it more challenging to engage in the nitty gritty of specific rule making. But as is clear from its membership of the WTO, China can adapt quickly. While initially it was a reluctant adherent to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, China is now adept at making active and effective use of its rules to promote China’s interests, including launching a legal challenge regarding the contested issue of its non-market economy status. Overall, there is strong leadership backing for a more activist approach to its engagement with the international legal system.

China sees international law as an important instrument in the “toolbox” of international diplomacy. It will increasingly be seeking to leverage international law to promote its own interests, particularly in newer areas, as it seeks to strengthen its wider soft power and influence.

‘Hong Kong is now in the hands of its people – they cannot rely on others to stick up for them now.’ Expert comment sysadmin 29 June 2017

Kerry Brown on ‘one country, two systems’, the UK’s diminishing influence and the territory’s future, 20 years after the handover.

1 July marks the 20th anniversary of the transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty from Britain to China. Kerry Brown speaks with Jason Naselli about what the future holds for the territory.

How sustainable is the ‘one country, two systems’ framework? Will the arrangement last the full 50 years (until 2047) as originally envisioned?

It is questionable whether the arrangement that exists today was the one envisioned in 1997 when the handover happened. It was always a very abstract, flexible system, granting Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy, meaning it could maintain its capitalist system. Of course, in the lead up to 1997 all these things were broadly seen as being in Beijing’s interests to preserve.

But these days, the one thing that few said in 1997 has come to pass – the People’s Republic has maintained one-party rule as a political system, but become one of the world’s great economies. It has been so far a huge success.

Hong Kong therefore has diminished in importance over the years to the point that maintaining at least some semblance of one country, two systems is almost like an act of charity. It has been nibbled at, compromised and seems to grow weaker by the day. Most in Hong Kong would say there is a system: one country, one system. That’s the deal.

The central government’s deepening involvement in the territory’s politics is a subject of growing controversy in Hong Kong. Does the Chinese government need to alter its approach?

Not particularly. It doesn’t want to see Hong Kong fail as an economy. That doesn’t suit its interests at all. But nor does it want a truculent, disobedient polity that is meant to be part of its sovereign territory.

So it has increasingly set political parameters. Hong Kong can have its unique system – as long as it is obedient. And on the whole, that is the deal that all of the city’s chief executives until now have internally understood perfectly.

As part of the 1997 handover, the UK has ‘a continuing moral and political obligation’ to Hong Kong. How will this relationship play out as Brexit shifts Britain’s place in the world?

The Foreign Office offers a six-monthly report to Parliament, updating on how the handover deal is going. As the years go on, however, it becomes increasingly illusive how the UK has any real locus to say much about the situation on Hong Kong. It did say, rightly, that the detainment of one of the booksellers taken in in 2015 was a violation of the treaty because he was British. This was the strongest wording that has ever appeared from an official British source. But with dependence on creating a new kind of relationship with China now foremost in people’s minds because of Brexit and other economic pressures, it is not surprising that the priority increasingly lies elsewhere.

With direct management of Hong Kong gone, the UK was always going to be more and more irrelevant. That has happened. And in any case, relations with China have had to become more complex and multifaceted. Hong Kong was always the tail wagging the dog for the UK relations with China. Now there has been a rebalancing, the calculation always has to be how much unilaterally supporting Hong Kong will damage relations with Beijing. This has become an increasingly asymmetrical question: in a playoff, preserving links with Beijing will always prevail. That’s just the reality of the new world we are seeing come into being.

Hong Kong has played an important financial role for China over the past 20 years, but where will it fit as markets and financial institutions on the mainland mature?

It maintains is role as a major RMB hub, and as a finance centre. But it is surrounded by competition. Singapore, and Sydney, and other places in the region have RMB deals. Shanghai and Tianjin aspire to be portals for entry to the domestic Chinese market. Hong Kong every day has to think of new ways to maintain its relevance and beat back competition. So far, it has done well. But this is an issue it can never be complacent about.

What has been the most significant change in Hong Kong society since 1997?

The rising cultural and linguistic influence of the mainland on Hong Kong. Hong Kong has maintained its difference – but it has had to change. It is clear that Hong Kong is now in the hands of Hong Kongese – they cannot rely on others to stick up for them now. The culture, identity and future of the territory are in their hands. In that sense, they have autonomy.

China, Liu Xiaobo and the New Reality of Human Rights Expert comment sysadmin 18 July 2017

Liu Xiaobo, Chinese Nobel laureate and human rights campaigner, died on 13 July while serving an 11-year prison sentence for ‘subversion’. Steve Tsang tells Jason Naselli that the reaction to Liu’s death reflects the growing confidence of the Chinese government that it can ignore Western criticism.

What does the Communist Party’s handling of the case of Liu Xiaobo tell us about its approach to dissidents and freedom of speech in the Xi era?

What it tells us is the party is tightening control much more than before. The Liu Xiaobo case shows that the party is not comfortable with people asking for the constitution of the People’s Republic of China to be enforced. Charter 08, for which Liu Xiaobo was jailed, ultimately amounts to asking for the rights of Chinese citizens, as articulated in the constitution, to be fully implemented. That resulted in Liu Xiaobo being incarcerated.

But what is really important isn’t so much that the party is tightening its control – that is happening anyway. What is more important is that the party is not that worried about how the Liu Xiaobo case affects international opinion.

If that’s the case, what lessons should countries looking to trade with China but concerned about human rights abuses take from Liu’s case?

We haven’t seen any major Western country come out to strongly and clearly hold the Chinese government to account over Liu Xiaobo’s human rights situation. A few leading governments have asked for Liu Xiaobo’s widow to be allowed to choose to stay or leave China. But so far there is no indication of any government backing that up with anything concrete.

That is very weak support for human rights in China. And it reflects a new reality: of the unwillingness of leading democracies to challenge the Chinese government on human rights matters, and the confidence on the part of the Chinese government to simply ignore what the rest of the world may think about it.

Given that there has been much discussion of China taking a larger global leadership role in the wake of an inward political turn in the US, what are the implications of Liu’s case for China’s global standing?

The implications are really small. There is a stronger expectation and desire to see China playing a global role because Donald Trump has damaged the standing of the United States as a global leader. It is not because of something that the Chinese government has done; it’s because of Trump.

That wider context hasn’t changed. So the Chinese government’s calculation is that the negative international reaction to Liu Xiaobo’s death will blow over in a matter of days – at worst, a couple of weeks – and then things will get back to normal.

There is no serious reason to believe that the Chinese government is wrong in their calculation. At the moment, the major Western countries are focusing on the economic relationship, and doing what they have to do pro forma about human rights issues in China. No major Western government is going to say that they are going to reconsider a major trade deal with China because of how Liu Xiaobo or his family has been treated. The Chinese government knows that and they act accordingly.

Moving on from the international reaction, how does Liu’s situation resonate within China?

Most Chinese don’t even know who Liu Xiaobo is. Within China, you cannot even search Liu Xiaobo’s name, or any permutation of Liu Xiaobo’s name, or the English initials of Liu Xiaobo. Anything potentially about or related to Liu Xiaobo is being censored.

Some things still get through; the ingenuity of a lot of bloggers is infinite. But most Chinese don’t even know what happened to Liu Xiaobo, or if they do, they mostly see him as a shill of the Western world trying to infiltrate and destabilize China.

If Western governments won’t engage China over human rights, what implications does that have for the global treatment of human rights as China becomes a bigger global player?

You can ‘engage’ in the sense of raising the issue with the Chinese authorities, as indeed the UK government and the German government have done, for example. But they haven’t actually taken any concrete steps.

The type of engagement where Western governments would get the Chinese government to demonstrate that something concrete was being done to improve the human rights situation – that era has gone. It is not going to come back in the foreseeable future. And therefore, the situation in terms of human rights in China will not be improving in the foreseeable future.

But what is more significant is how the Chinese government is asserting itself and dealing with domestic and international challenges, including on human rights issues. For many other countries around the world, China is showing an example for how to deal with the West. They don’t see it as being negative; they see it in positive terms.

There are still more countries in the world that abuse human rights than respect human rights. Most of those governments are pleased to see what the Chinese government has done in terms of how it handles the West.

Root Causes of Rohingya Crisis Must Not be Ignored Expert comment sysadmin 28 September 2017

The focus on Aung San Suu Kyi masks the complete lack of an adequate response to the crisis in Myanmar, whether at the global or regional level.

Aung San Suu Kyi’s recent speech on the Rohingya crisis was - at best - light on details on how the current situation could be remedied and - at worst - full of easily disproven assertions.

While she does not directly control the military, it is her government that is blocking humanitarian access to the areas affected by the violence. And the Rohingya have faced systemic persecution and discrimination for decades.

Some may argue this is simply realpolitik and that any public support for the Rohingya could mean facing a backlash from the military and a large part of her support base. But arguably, she does have moral authority (which helped her in the past to stand up to the military generals) that is now being eroded by her ambivalence in speaking out.

However, the focus on Aung San Suu Kyi masks the complete lack of an adequate response to the crisis – whether at the global or regional level.

Undertaking dangerous and perilous journeys

Since the attacks on border and military posts by the armed group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in August 2017, there has been a strong military crackdown against the Rohingya in Rakhine state: a substantial number of Rohingya villages destroyed; close to half a million people Rohingya fleeing into Bangladesh and tens of thousands internally displaced within Myanmar.

Prince bin Ra’ad , UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has called the crisis a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” and tens of thousands of Rohingya are still undertaking dangerous and perilous journeys seeking sanctuary. In response, the UN and EU have focused on addressing the immediate humanitarian crisis in Bangladesh, which is already home to many formerly displaced Rohingya communities.

Within the region, Sheikh Hasina’s secular Awami League government in Bangladesh initially proposed joint military operations with Myanmar against the ARSA - in part because of concerns about the long standing relationship between Rohingya political or armed groups and the Jamaat-e-Islami, an ally of the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

However, faced with massive refugee flows, Bangladesh turned its focus to the humanitarian crisis while stressing that Myanmar must allow the return of refugees. Bangladesh’s concern is partly motivated by internal security concerns. If the current situation becomes protracted, with no clear resolution in sight, frustration could create the conditions for further radicalisation within Rohingya communities.

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has yet to come to grips with the situation. Despite its mandate to ensure peace and stability within the region, its policy of non-interference and consensus trumps the need to secure and maintain stability. Instead countries have responded bilaterally - for example, Indonesia sent its foreign minister to both Myanmar and Bangladesh while Malaysia has been consistently vocal about its concerns.

So this raises broader questions on the effectiveness of ASEAN. Currently celebrating its 50th anniversary, ASEAN needs to decide how to mediate and resolve issues with regional implications as its principle of non-intervention effectively blocks any constructive discussion on the Rohingyas ongoing statelessness and impact of this on the region.

However, there is also an opportunity here for ASEAN to consider how mediation and negotiation could potentially manage such crises. And there is a historical precedent: the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action on Indo-Chinese refugees saw cooperation between recipient countries in the region and the international community on how to resettle Vietnamese refugees (although Cold War considerations did play a part in that specific crisis).

India and China have both backed Myanmar, reflecting their economic and security interests in the country but also motivated by each wanting to contain the influence of the other within Myanmar. Rakhine is important with its natural resources and coastal location and, as China is not directly affected by the refugee crisis, it has less to lose than others in standing by Aung San Suu Kyi and her government.

India is nearing completion of the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project, connecting the Bay of Bengal with the northeast Indian state of Mizoram, and sees Myanmar as an important market for its regional ambitions. For parts of the Indian administration, the crisis plays to a domestic narrative that some of the Rohingya already settled in Jammu and Kashmir have links to armed groups in Pakistan and are an internal security concern.

So while India is providing humanitarian aid to Bangladesh, it is also threatening to deport almost 40,000 Rohingya. The case is currently being heard at the Indian Supreme Court, but given that the Rohingya lack citizenship in Myanmar, it is not clear to where they would be deported.

Myanmar, ASEAN and other affected countries need to show political will to find a solution to the Rohingya’s long-standing issue of statelessness - discrimination was legally formalised in a 1982 Burma Citizenship Law, which recognised 135 ethnicities for citizenship but excluded the Rohingya.

The root causes of this crisis – long standing discrimination, persecution and lack of citizenship – cannot be ignored. There is a need for a comprehensive peace process, which recognises the ethnic and religious diversity within Myanmar.

And incentives, such as improving infrastructure, access to services and livelihoods, may also be needed to ensure there is a lasting solution that allows the Rohingya return and thrive as part of Myanmar society.

Without such a response, it is difficult to see an end to the current impasse.

Is Myanmar Running Out of Time? 17 February 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Just a few years ago the West was celebrating what appeared to be the conclusion of a quarter-century long contest between Myanmar’s democrats and a military dictatorship. Today, the country stands charged with genocide at the International Court of Justice, with Aung San Suu Kyi leading the defence. Is Myanmar a democratic transition gone awry? Or something else entirely?

The speaker will argue that Myanmar is not the simple morality tale often portrayed. It has instead become the stage for some of the world’s most pressing challenges such as climate change, explosive inequality and rising populism, the impact of social media; and the rise of China as the next global superpower.

In this context, are 20th century democratic institutions and free-market reforms the correct remedy for a country plagued by the legacies of colonialism, decades of civil war, tyranny and a predatory economic system? The speaker will offer a prognosis for Myanmar’s future, assessing the question of whether it will become Asia’s next failed state.

This event will be held off the record.

Future of work

Innovation, technology and societal shifts are all changing the world of work, and it is necessary to rethink the rules that govern labour markets and skills.

Advances in automation, digitization, ICT and manufacturing represent enormous opportunities for employers and employees, but also require policymakers and businesses to navigate critical challenges.

Issues under scrutiny include disruption to existing jobs and industries, skills development, how to maintain economic competitiveness and - in the long-term - adapting to systemic and societal changes already in progress.

Core factors in developing the most effective regulatory regimes for managing this shift include the growth of global workplaces and workforces that transcend national borders, and the drivers and policy implications of the emerging ‘on-demand’ and ‘gig’ economies.

Bangladesh: The Trade-Off Between Economic Prosperity and Human Rights 11 March 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 February 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Bangladesh’s recent gains in economic and social indices, set against its record of corruption and poor civil rights, has at times been termed the ‘Bangladesh Paradox’. Yet this label is overly simplistic; the current situation proves that these trends can coexist.

The Awami League government, in power since 2009, has increased political stability, delivered unprecedented economic and social advances, and adopted a counter-terrorism strategy to stamp out extremist groups. At the same time, it is criticized for curbing civil rights and failing to hold credible elections. However, as the two previous regimes have demonstrated, the rights situation is unlikely to improve even if the Awami League were replaced.

How did worsening rights become a feature of the state irrespective of its political dispensation? An unresolved contest between political and non-political state actors may hold the key to that puzzle. The perils of the current dispensation have recently manifested in weakening economic indicators, which jeopardize the very stability and social progress for which the country has garnered much praise.

Webinar: Hong Kong: Dissent in the Age of Coronavirus 17 April 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 April 2020

Street protests demanding greater autonomy and democratization in Hong Kong upended the city for seven months last year. However, with the outbreak of the coronavirus in China in late January, the protests quickly died out. What does this mean for the city’s protest movement?

The speaker will argue that, despite the lack of high-profile street rallies, protest in the city is continuing. It is building on and evolving from last year’s protest movement albeit in different forms. At the same time, the Hong Kong authorities, emboldened by a hard line from Beijing, have begun cracking down on activists and protesters in the city as they seek to put a lid on dissent ahead of important Legislative Council elections scheduled for this September.

In this webinar, the speaker will look at the current state of dissent in Hong Kong and prospects for Hong Kong’s future.

This event will be held on the record.

Webinar: On the Front Line: The Impact of COVID-19 on Asia's Migrant Workers 21 May 2020 — 2:00PM TO 2:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 May 2020

Asia’s army of migrant workers are on the frontline in confronting the health and economic effects of COVID-19. Lacking formal safety nets, health care access, and facing social dislocation, hundreds of millions across the region are bearing the brunt of the coronavirus lockdown. Asian governments have scrambled to come up with an effective health and humanitarian response, exposing public apathy and significant shortcomings in public policy.

Is better regional coordination necessary to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 on migrant labourers? Is the private sector in Asia part of the problem or part of the solution?

In this webinar, the speakers will discuss the likely implications of lasting economic damage on the livelihoods of Asia’s migrant workers, as well as responses and measures to effectively mitigate the impact.

Gurmeet K. Bakshi, Jyoti Garg and Gabriela Olteanu
Math. Comp. 93 (), 3027-3058.
Abstract, references and article information

Pierre Lairez, Eric Pichon-Pharabod and Pierre Vanhove
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2985-3025.
Abstract, references and article information

Daniel A. Goldston, Apoorva Panidapu and Jordan Schettler
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2943-2958.
Abstract, references and article information

Zhaonan Wang and Yingpu Deng
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2921-2942.
Abstract, references and article information

Haiyong Wang
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2861-2884.
Abstract, references and article information

Katherine Baker, Lehel Banjai and Mariya Ptashnyk
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2711-2743.
Abstract, references and article information

T. De Ryck and S. Mishra
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2643-2677.
Abstract, references and article information

Constantin Carle and Marlis Hochbruck
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2611-2641.
Abstract, references and article information

What causes wine legs (tears)? Andrea Bertozzi explains and describes how to generate legs.

Ricardo Bermudez-Otero and Tobias Galla discuss the mathematics describing the evolution of human languages. The sounds and structures of the world's approximately 7,000 languages never stop changing. Just compare the English in Romeo and Juliet or the Spanish in Don Quixote to the modern forms. But historical records give an incomplete view of language evolution. Increasingly, linguists draw upon mathematical models to figure out which features of a language change often and which ones change more rarely over the course of thousands of years. A new model inspired by physics assigns a "temperature" to many sounds and grammatical structures. Features with higher temperatures are less stable, so they change more often as time goes on. The linguistic thermometer will help researchers reconstruct how our languages came to be, and how they might change in future generations.

Imelda Flores Vazquez from Econometrica, Inc. explains how economists use mathematics to evaluate the efficacy of health care policies. When a hospital or government wants to adjust their health policies — for instance, by encouraging more frequent screenings for certain diseases — how do they know whether their program will work or not? If the service has already been implemented elsewhere, researchers can use that data to estimate its effects. But if the idea is brand-new, or has only been used in very different settings, then it's harder to predict how well the new program will work. Luckily, a tool called a microsimulation can help researchers make an educated guess.

Sangsan Warakkagun
Conform. Geom. Dyn. 28 (), 115-130.
Abstract, references and article information

Soun-Hi Kwon
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 6021-6022.
Abstract, references and article information

Otto Overkamp
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5863-5903.
Abstract, references and article information

Guido De Philippis, Nicola Fusco and Massimiliano Morini
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5787-5835.
Abstract, references and article information

Kazuhiro Ishige, Paolo Salani and Asuka Takatsu
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5705-5748.
Abstract, references and article information

Shoham Letzter
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5583-5615.
Abstract, references and article information

Víctor González-Aguilera, Alvaro Liendo, Pedro Montero and Roberto Villaflor Loyola
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5483-5511.
Abstract, references and article information

Daniel López Neumann
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5361-5387.
Abstract, references and article information

Christoforos Neofytidis
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5289-5321.
Abstract, references and article information

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The MATRIX-Style colour grading version.

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