Editor’s note: This week the Democrats gather in Philadelphia to nominate a candidate for president and adopt a party platform. Given that there are no minority reports to the Democratic platform, it is likely that it will be adopted as-is this week. And so we can begin the comparison of the two major party platforms. For those who say there are no differences between the Republican and Democratic parties, just read the platforms side-by-side. In many instances, the differences are—as Donald Trump would say, yuuuge. But in one surprising instance, the two parties actually agree. This piece walks readers through one of the biggest contrasts, while an earlier piece by Elaine Kamarck detailed a striking similarity.

When it comes to Republicans and the environment, black is the new green. In addition to denouncing “radical environmentalists” and calling for dismantling the EPA, the platform adopted in Cleveland yesterday calls coal “abundant, clean, affordable, reliable domestic energy resource” and unequivocally opposes “any” carbon tax.

Meanwhile, Democrats are moving in the opposite direction. By the time the party’s draft 2016 platform emerged from the final regional committee meeting in Orlando, it contained a robust section on environmental issues in general and climate change in particular. One of the many amendments adopted in Orlando contains the following sentence: “Democrats believe that carbon dioxide, methane, and other greenhouse gases should be priced to reflect their negative externalities, and to accelerate the transition to a clean energy economy and help meet our climate goals.” In plain English, there should be what amounts to a tax (whatever it may be called) on the atmospheric emissions principally responsible for climate change, including but not limited to CO2.

As Brookings’ Adele Morris pointed out in a recent paper, this proposal raises a host of design issues, including determining initial price levels, payers, recipients, and uses of revenues raised. It would have to be squared with existing federal tax, climate, and energy policies as well as with climate initiatives at the state level.

But these devilish details should not obstruct the broader view: To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that the platform of a major American political party has advocated taxing greenhouse gas emissions. Many economists, including some with a conservative orientation, will applaud this proposal. Many supporters and producers of fossils fuels will be dismayed.

It remains to be seen how the American people will respond. In a survey conducted in 2015 by Resources for the Future in partnership with Stanford University and the New York Times, 67 percent of the respondents endorsed requiring companies “to pay a tax to the government for every ton of greenhouse gases [they] put out,” with the proviso that all the revenue would be devoted to reducing the amount of income taxes that individuals pay. Previous surveys found similar sentiments: public support increases sharply when the greenhouse gas tax is explicitly revenue-neutral and declines sharply if it threatens an overall increase in individual taxes.

Once this plank of the Democratic platform becomes widely known, Republicans are likely to attack it as yet another example of Democrats’ propensity to raise taxes. The platform’s silence on the question of revenue-neutrality may add some credibility to this charge. Much will depend on the ability of the Democratic Party and its presidential nominee to clarify its proposal and to link it to goals the public endorses.

The federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) will boost earnings for over 18 million low-income working families in the U.S. by more than $30 billion this year. This survey finds that the EITC provided a $737 million boost to the Chicago regional economy in 1998, and lifted purchasing power in the city of Chicago by an average of $2 million per square mile. Large numbers of Low-income working families lived not only in inner-city Chicago neighborhoods, but also in smaller cities throughout the region like Aurora, Joliet, Elgin and Waukegan. The survey concludes by describing steps that state and local leaders could take to build on existing efforts to link working families to the EITC, such as increasing resources for free tax preparation services, helping EITC recipients to open bank accounts, and expanding and making refundable the Illinois state EITC.

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This presentation by Alan Berube to the Cleveland EITC Forum explains how boosting low-income families' participation in tax credits can help put the city's workers, neighborhoods, and the local economy itself on more solid financial ground.

The metro program hosts and participates in a variety of public forums. To view a complete list of these events, please visit the metro program's Speeches and Events page which provides copies of major speeches, powerpoint presentations, event transcripts, and event summaries.

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Researchers from the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program have released new Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) data from the IRS on federal individual income tax filers. The interactive data are available for all ZIP codes, cities, counties, metropolitan areas, states, state legislative districts, and congressional districts in the U.S. Users can also find new MetroTax model estimates of the EITC-eligible population in 2012 based on the latest American Community Survey data.

From the 2012 MetroTax model, here are 10 facts about EITC-eligible tax filers

• 71.1 million people live in tax units that are eligible
• 31.1 million children live in eligible households
• 72.8% of eligible filers speak English
• 50.9% are white
• 36.1% received food stamps at some point in the last year
• 25.8% are married filing jointly
• 13.2% have earned a bachelor’s degree or higher
• The median adjusted gross income is $13,638
• 12.7% of eligible filers work in the retail trade industry
• 13.6% work in office and administrative occupations

Read the blog post by Jane Williams and Elizabeth Kneebone to learn more and also visit the EITC interactive.

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provides a refundable tax credit to lower-income working families. In 2011, the EITC reached 27.9 million tax filers at a total cost of $62.9 billion. Almost 20 percent of tax filers receive the EITC, and the average credit amount is $2,254 (IRS 2013). After expansions to the EITC in the late 1980s through the late 1990s—under Democrat and Republican administrations—the EITC now occupies a central place in the U.S. safety net. Based on the Census Bureau’s 2012 Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), the EITC keeps 6.5 million people, including 3.3 million children, out of poverty (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities [CBPP] 2014a). No other tax or transfer program prevents more children from living a life of poverty, and only Social Security keeps more people above poverty.

Since the EITC is only eligible to tax filers who work, the credit’s impact on poverty takes place through encouraging employment by ensuring greater pay after taxes. The empirical research shows that the tax credit translates into sizable and robust increases in employment (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000, 2001). Thus, the credit reduces poverty through two channels: the actual credit, and increases in family earnings. This dual feature gives the EITC a unique place in the U.S. safety net; in contrast, many other programs redistribute income while, at least to some degree, discouraging work. Importantly, transferring income while encouraging work makes the EITC an efficient and cost-effective policy for increasing the after-tax income of low-earning Americans. Yet a program of this size and impact could be more equitable in its reach. Under the current design of the EITC, childless earners and families with only one child, for instance, receive disproportionately lower refunds. 

In 2014, families with two children (three or more children) are eligible for a maximum credit of $5,460 ($6,143) compared to $3,305 for families with one child. Married couples, despite their larger family sizes, receive only modestly more-generous EITC benefits compared to single filers. Childless earners benefit little from the EITC, and have a maximum credit of only $496—less than 10 percent of the two-child credit. 

Prominent proposals seek to mitigate these inequalities. President Obama’s fiscal year 2015 budget includes an expansion of the childless EITC, a concept outlined by John Karl Scholz in 2007 in a proposal for The Hamilton Project. Notably, MDRC is currently evaluating Paycheck Plus, a pilot program for an expanded EITC for workers without dependent children, for the New York City Center for Economic Opportunity (MDRC 2014). The recent Hamilton Project proposal for a secondary-earner tax credit addresses the so-called EITC penalty for married couples (Kearney and Turner 2013). And the more generous EITC credit for three or more children was recently enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and is currently scheduled to sunset in 2017. 

Considering this broad set of EITC reforms, and recognizing the demonstrated effectiveness of the program as an antipoverty program with numerous benefits, this policy memo proposes an expansion for the largest group of  EITC recipients: families with one child. In particular, I propose to expand the one-child schedule to be on par with the two-child schedule, in equivalence scale-adjusted terms. An equivalence scale captures the cost of living for a household of a given size (and demographic composition) relative to the cost of living for a reference household of a single adult, and is a standard component in defining poverty thresholds. The proposal expands the maximum credit for one-child families to $4,641, from $3,305 under current law, an increase of about 40 percent. The expansion will lead to a roughly $1,000 increase in after-tax income for taxpayers in the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution receiving the higher credit. As this paper outlines, the expansion is justified on equity and efficiency grounds. This expansion is anchored in the equity principle in that the generosity of the credit should be proportional to the needs of families of differing sizes; I use the equivalence scale implicit in the poverty thresholds of the Census SPM as a guide for household needs. This proposal is also supported by efficiency principles given the EITC’s demonstrated success at raising labor supply among single mothers. 

The target population for the proposal is low-income working families with children. Implementing this proposal requires legislative action by the federal government; it is important to note that altering the EITC schedule requires a simple amendment to the tax code, and not a massive overhaul of our nation’s tax system. The revenue cost of the proposal derives from additional federal costs of the EITC, less the additional payroll and ordinary federal income taxes. The private benefits include increases in after-tax income and reductions in poverty. The proposal would also generate social benefits through the spillover effects that the increase in income plays in improving health and children’s cognitive skills (Dahl and Lochner 2012; Evans and Garthwaite 2014; Hoynes, Miller, and Simon forthcoming).

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In new Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center analysis of Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) take-up at the county level, Benjamin Harris, a fellow in Economic Studies, and Research Assistant Lucie Parker use zip-code level data on taxes and demographics to take a "fresh look" at the EITC. "Since its creation in 1975," they write, "the Earned Income Tax Credit has played a major role in the U.S. safety net." Earlier this year, Harris presented EITC take-up using IRS data from 2007. Compare that to the new list of ten counties with the highest share of EITC recipients below:

"The regional variation EITC claiming is stark," Harris and Parker conclude. "The counties with the highest share of taxpayers claiming the EITC are overwhelming located in the Southeast. ... [O]ver half the taxpayers in a large share of counties in Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi claim the EITC. With few exceptions, almost all counties with high EITC claiming are located in the South. Relative to the South, the Northeast and the Midwest have much lower claiming rates. Moreover, average EITC benefit closely follows the pattern for share of taxpayers taking up the credit: in counties where more taxpayers claim the credit, the credit is larger on the whole."

Visit this U.S. map interactive to get county level data on share of taxpayers claiming EITC as well as average EITC amount, in dollars, per county.

April 15 is tax day, but not many Americans will be lining up at the post office or logging onto TurboTax as midnight approaches. Taxpayers who receive refunds often file well ahead of the April 15 deadline. And according to new research, many of those refund dollars are already spent or spoken for.

Early filing is particularly common among taxpayers who claim the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which supplements earnings for low-income workers and their families. EITC recipients often receive substantial refunds, especially in relation to their income. According to new data available through our EITC Interactive, nationwide 26.8 million taxpayers benefited from the EITC for the 2013 tax year, and they claimed a total of $64.7 billion from the credit. Combined with other credits and over-withholding these families received, the average refund for EITC filers topped $4,100 that year. As the accompanying map shows, that amount approached $4,500 or more in many southern states.

I thought of those large refunds while reading a fascinating new book by sociologist Kathryn Edin and her colleagues, titled, It’s Not Like I’m Poor: How Working Families Make Ends Meet in a Post-Welfare World. The book provides insights from in-depth interviews with 115 families with children in the Boston area who claimed the EITC. It examines their household budgets and how the families view and use the credit. The authors find that these families rely greatly on their tax refunds to close the gap between the wages they earn and the daily costs of living in an expensive region like Greater Boston. For some, a large tax refund also enabled them to purchase something normally confined to middle-class families, such as a special birthday present for a child or dinner out at a restaurant.

One of the authors’ central findings, however, was that EITC recipients bear a considerable amount of debt—95 percent of the families studied had debt of some kind. The most common (66%) was credit card debt, with the typical family owing nearly $2,000. Considerable shares of families also had utility, car, or student loan debt.

Their indebtedness was not surprising given that wages covered on average only about two-thirds of monthly expenditures. The authors classified one-quarter of families’ refund spending as dedicated to debt/bills, but other ways families  spend the money—such as repairing a car or paying ahead on bills—point to the lack of financial cushion EITC recipients endure throughout the year.

For the families Edin and colleagues studied, the average tax refund represented a staggering three months of earnings. Despite that, the authors report that many families expressed that they preferred the "windfall" versus receipt of payments over several months, partly because the lump sum held out the prospect of helping them save. But one has to wonder if the EITC, now routinely referred to as the nation's most effective anti-poverty policy, best supports families' financial security in this form, as its recipients fall further behind each month.

We should experiment with new ways of delivering EITC recipients' tax refunds that preserve some of its windfall aspect while also periodically delivering portions of the credit throughout the year. A small periodic payment pilot is underway in Chicago, and early findings suggest that advance payments of taxpayers' anticipated EITC helped them meet basic needs, pay off debt, and reduce financial stress relative to similar families not receiving such payments. It’s time to try making the EITC more than an annual boom in a bust-filled financial cycle for low-income families. 

Each year millions of low- to moderate-income Americans supplement their income by claiming the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) during tax season. Last year, 1 in 5 taxpayers claimed the credit and earned an average of nearly $2,400.

This tax season, some of those eligible for the EITC may also be able to claim, for the first time, a new credit created by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to offset the cost of purchasing health insurance for lower-income Americans. It’s called the ACA premium tax credit.

To qualify for the ACA premium tax credit, filers need first to have an annual income that falls between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty line (between $11,670 and $46,680 for a single-person household in 2014). Beyond the income requirements, however, filers must also be ineligible for other public or private insurance options like Medicaid or an employer-provided plan.

Why the tax credit overlap matters

Identifying the Americans eligible for both credits is important because it sheds light on how many still need help paying for health insurance even after the ACA extended coverage options.

In a recent study of the EITC-eligible population, Elizabeth Kneebone, Jane R. Williams, and Natalie Holmes estimated what share of EITC-eligible filers might also qualify for the ACA premium tax credit this year.

Below, see a list of the top 10 states with the largest overlap between filers eligible for the EITC and those estimated to qualify for the ACA premium tax credit.* Notably, none of these states has expanded Medicaid coverage to low-income families after the passage of the ACA.

Nationally, an estimated 7.5 million people (4.2 million “tax units”) are likely eligible for both the ACA premium tax credit and the EITC. Nearly 1.3 million of those tax units are from the following ten states.

1. Florida

Overlap: 22.5 percent / 405,924 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

2. Texas

Overlap: 21.4 percent / 513,061 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

3. South Dakota

Overlap: 20.5 percent / 15,124 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

4. Georgia

Overlap: 19.8 percent / 186,020 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

5. Louisiana

Overlap: 19.6 percent / 86,512 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

6. Idaho

Overlap: 19.3 percent / 28,855 tax units
State-based exchange? Yes Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

7. Montana

Overlap: 18.9 percent / 18,138 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

8. Wyoming

Overlap: 18.4 percent / 7,276 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

9. Utah

Overlap: 18.1 percent / 42,284
State-based exchange? No (Utah runs a small businesses marketplace, but it relies on the federal government for an individual marketplace) Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

10. Oklahoma

Overlap: 18.0% / 63,045 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

* For the purposes of this list, we measured the overlap in “tax units,” not people. One tax unit equals a single tax return. If a family of four together qualifies for the ACA premium tax credit, they would be counted as one tax unit, not four, since they filed jointly with one tax return.

This originally appeared in “Insight,” a publication of Grantmakers for Children, Youth, and Families.

For many in the United States, American poverty conjures images of urban blight or remote Appalachian hardship that motivated the War on Poverty in the 1960s. But the geography of poverty in the U.S. has shifted well beyond its historical confines (Kneebone and Berube, 2013). During the first decade of the 2000s, the poor population living in suburbs of the nation’s largest metropolitan areas for the first time outstripped the poor population living in central cities, and poverty continues to grow faster today in the suburbs.¹ This trend has been even more pronounced for those living below twice the federal poverty line—equivalent to $48,500 for a family of four in 2015—which roughly mirrors the population eligible to receive the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).

Although it was not originally billed as an antipoverty program, in its 40 years, the EITC has become one of the nation’s most effective tools for lifting low-income workers and their families above the poverty line. In 2013 alone, Brookings estimates that the EITC lifted 6.2 million people, including 3.1 million children, out of poverty (Kneebone and Holmes, 2014). What follows is a discussion of the EITC’s growing importance to recipients in light of the new geography of poverty, its role in boosting local economies, and how expanding participation in the program and paying the credit differently could enhance its effectiveness as a local economic stabilizer.

The shifting geography of poverty challenges traditional approaches to combat poverty through investments in place.

When President Johnson declared a War on Poverty in 1964, poverty in the U.S. was primarily urban or rural. This was also the case in 1975 when the EITC was created: Nearly a million more low-income individuals at that time lived in rural areas or big cities than in the suburbs of major metropolitan areas.² Place-based antipoverty interventions dating to the War on Poverty were thus designed with these two geographies—especially cities—in mind. Brookings estimates that today, the federal government spends about $82 billion per year across more than 80 place-focused antipoverty programs, spread across 10 agencies (Kneebone and Berube, 2013). Many are not well-suited to suburban contexts, for several reasons.

First, suburban poverty is more geographically diffuse than urban poverty. Suburban communities tend to be less densely populated than cities and larger in size, and cover more total area. Whereas centralized services might be appropriate in an urban context because they are easily accessible to many in need, it is more difficult to achieve those economies of scale in the suburbs, where residents live farther apart and have limited access to transit. Many competitive federal grant programs allocate points based on population served and population density, implicitly favoring large central cities.

Second, suburban municipalities may lack the experience and administrative capacity needed to sustain services for low-income families and communities. Cities have dealt with poverty longer, and have had more time to develop strategies and structures to support their poor populations. Some of this capacity stemmed explicitly from Community Action Agencies, one of the original War on Poverty programs, which was intended to spur local innovation. Small suburban communities by and large did not have this same experience. Because of their relatively small size, suburban governments may not be able to achieve the administrative scale needed to deliver effective safety-net programs.

Third, many suburban communities lack the economic scale and fiscal structure needed to fund services for low-income residents. Because many small municipalities are limited in how they are permitted to raise revenues—typically through a combination of property and sales taxes—they are especially prone to financial instability caused by the very economic conditions that also generate greater need for services. As poverty suburbanizes, small suburban communities simultaneously face rising demand and falling tax revenues to support those services. Moreover, tax “competition” among many small suburbs within a metro area can further erode the fiscal capacity and political will for these jurisdictions to support people in need.

The new geography of poverty makes direct investments in low-income individuals and families—like the EITC—even more important.

The mismatch between existing place-based antipoverty strategies and the places where poverty is growing fastest heightens the importance of investing directly and effectively in low-income individuals and families through programs such as the EITC. Following its expansion in the mid-1990s, the EITC became the most significant cash transfer program available to low-income working families. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS, 2014) estimates that approximately 79 percent of EITC-eligible taxpayers nationally claim the credit each year—a remarkably strong participation rate among federal safety-net programs.

The high program participation rate and growth over time in EITC expenditures reflects both increases in the credit’s generosity and growing need. In 2000, according to our analysis of IRS Stakeholder Partnerships, Education and Communities (IRS-SPEC) data, total EITC expenditures topped $42 billion (in 2013 dollars). In 2013, they approached $65 billion, equivalent to approximately 80 percent of the amount spent by the federal government on place-based poverty interventions.³

Analysis of IRS-SPEC data further suggests that the EITC’s geographic incidence closely tracks the shifting geography of need. From 2000 to 2013, the number of suburban filers claiming the EITC rose by 62 percent, compared to 33 percent in cities. Changes in the distribution of EITC claims mirrored changes in the location of poor and near-poor populations, particularly growth in the suburbs.⁴ And because lower-income suburban communities (where at least 40 percent of residents are poor or near-poor) are becoming more diverse, too—60 percent of their residents are non-white or Hispanic—the EITC also effectively reduces growing race-based income gaps in suburbs.⁵

EITC dollars support local economies.

The EITC benefits not only low-income families, but also the wider communities in which they live. Although it is widely regarded today as one of the country’s most successful antipoverty programs, the EITC was originally designed to be a temporary economic stimulus measure, in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 (Nichols and Rothstein, 2015). During the 2000s, more local and state governments made a concerted push to expand participation in the EITC among eligible filers, in part to inject more federal dollars into their local economies (Berube, 2006a).

There are several mechanisms through which the EITC could benefit local economies. California State University researchers categorize the local economic impact of EITC refunds as the sum of direct effects (EITC recipients spending their refunds), indirect effects (business spending in response to EITC recipient spending), and induced effects (changes in household income and spending patterns caused by direct and indirect effects). Together, these effects represent the local “multiplier” effect (Avalos and Alley, 2010). Their estimates for California counties suggest that, in many cases, the credit creates local economic impacts equivalent to at least twice the amount of EITC dollars received.

Direct economic effects result from EITC recipients spending a portion of their refund locally, supporting local businesses and jobs. Consumer surveys show that low-income families spend a relatively large share of their income on groceries and other necessities, which tend to be purchased locally. Analysis of those surveys links tax refund season to increased likelihood of consumer activity as well as larger purchases (Adams, Einav, and Levin, 2009). People spend more, and more frequently, during tax refund season.

The EITC also supports local communities in less obvious ways. The concept of “tax incidence” reflects that the party being taxed, or receiving a tax credit, may not bear its full costs (or reap its benefits) because others shift their behavior in response to the tax. Along these lines, Jesse Rothstein estimates that as much as 36 cents of every dollar of EITC received flows to employers, because by enabling workers to better make ends meet on low wages, the credit effectively lowers the cost of labor. Those lower labor costs may, in turn, allow local employers to hire more local workers (Nichols and Rothstein, 2015).

Finally, emerging evidence suggests that progressive tax expenditures like the EITC can enhance intergenerational income mobility for local children, possibly by counteracting credit constraints that many low-income families face (Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez, 2015). In areas with larger state EITCs, low-income children are more likely to move up the income ladder over time.

The local impact of the EITC depends on how, and how many, eligible filers claim the credit.

The local impact of the EITC also depends on whether eligible workers and families file tax returns and claim the credit. As noted above, the IRS estimates that 79 percent of those eligible to receive the EITC nationally claim it. Given local variation in characteristics associated with uptake, there is likely also considerable local variation in EITC participation (Berube, 2005). Efforts to increase participation locally can thus increase the level of investment communities receive from the program.

Research has identified several factors associated with EITC participation rates among the eligible population. Eligible filers less likely to claim the credit include those who live in rural areas, are self-employed, do not have qualifying children, do not speak English well, are grandparents, or recently changed their filing status (IRS, 2015). One study suggests that communities with moderately sized immigrant populations may exhibit lower EITC participation rates, due perhaps to less robust social networks or more dispersed/heterogeneous populations that may limit awareness of the credit (Berube, 2006b).

Recent research also suggests that EITC participation is higher in areas with more tax preparers, who may promote greater local awareness of the credit (Chetty, Friedman, and Saez, 2012). While individuals who enlist the help of tax preparers are more likely to receive the EITC, they may face significant fees that blunt the credit’s overall impact (Berube, 2006a). Expanding access to volunteer tax preparation services or simple, free online filing could help preserve more of the credit’s value for low-income families and their communities.

To maximize the EITC’s role as a local economic stabilizer, we should consider periodic payment options.

 The EITC already functions as an important antipoverty tool for low-income workers and families, and a boon to local economic stability. Communities should nonetheless be interested in efforts to connect taxpayers to a portion of their EITC throughout the year, rather than only as a lump-sum refund at tax time.

Debt features significantly on the balance sheets of EITC recipients. Recent research finds that about 95 percent of EITC recipients have debt of some kind, and that large shares of refunds are dedicated to debt payments or deferred expenses (such as car repair). Recipients do not use the majority of EITC refunds to pay for monthly expenses, despite the fact that their wages typically cover only two-thirds of those expenses (Halpern-Meekin, Edin, Tach, and Sykes, 2015).

Paying a portion of filers’ anticipated EITC periodically (and directly, rather than through employers like the defunct Advance EITC program) in smaller amounts over the course of a year could help them cope with these spending constraints and avoid taking on debt (Holt, 2008). By enabling families to better keep up with spending on regular items most often purchased locally—rent, food, vehicle maintenance—periodic payments could also support local economies. And by improving families’ liquidity, such payments could reduce reliance on high-cost financial products such as payday loans.

The EITC continues to gain importance as place-based strategies lag behind poverty’s suburbanization, and communities seek ways to maximize public investment in the face of budget constraints at all levels. The program lifts millions of working individuals and families out of poverty each year regardless of their location, and in doing so also supports community financial stability. An expanded EITC—at the federal, state, or local level—with options for periodic payment and better alternatives to high-cost tax preparation could provide even stronger support to low-income families and the places where they live.

References

Adams, W., Einav, L., and Levin, J. (2009). Liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending. American Economic Review. 99(1), 49–84. Retrieved from http://web.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Papers/Liquidity.pdf

Avalos, A., and Alley, S. (2010). The economic impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in California. California Journal of Politics and Policy. 2(1). Retrieved from http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2jj0s1dn

Berube, A. (2005). Earned income credit participation—What we (don’t) know. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/metro/eitcparticipation.pdf

Berube, A. (2006a). Using the Earned Income Tax Credit to stimulate local economies. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2006/11/childrenfamilies-berube/berube20061101eitc.pdf

Berube, A. (2006b). ¿Tienes EITC? A study of the Earned Income Tax Credit in immigrant communities, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Retrieved from  http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2005/4/childrenfamilies-berube02/20050412_tieneseitc.pdf

Chetty, R., Friedman, J., and Saez, E. (2012). Using differences in knowledge across neighborhoods to uncover the impacts of the EITC on earnings (NBER Working Paper Series no. 18232). Retrieved from http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/chetty-friedman-saezNBER13EITC.pdf

Chetty, R., Hendren, N., Kline, P., and Saez, E. (2015). The economic impacts of tax expenditures: Evidence from spatial variation across the U.S. Retrieved from http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/14rptaxexpenditures.pdf

Halpern-Meekin, S., Edin, K., Tach, L., and Sykes, J. (2015). It’s not like I’m poor: How working families make ends meet in a post-welfare world, Oakland, CA: University of California Press.

Holt, S. D. (2008). Periodic payment of the Earned Income Tax Credit. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/06/0505-metroraise-supplement-holt

Internal Revenue Service. (2014). Statistics for tax returns with EITC. Retrieved from http://www.eitc.irs.gov/EITC-Central/eitcstats

Internal Revenue Service. (2015). About EITC. Retrieved from http://www.eitc.irs.gov/EITC-Central/abouteitc

Kneebone, E., and Berube, A. (2013). Confronting suburban poverty in America. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Kneebone, E., and Holmes, N. Fighting poverty at tax time through the EITC. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/the-avenue/posts/2014/12/16-poverty-tax-eitc-kneebone-holmes

Nichols, A., and Rothstein, J. (2015). The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) (NBER Working Paper Series no. 21211). Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w21211.pdf

From its modest beginnings in 1975, the Earned Income Tax Credit has grown into one of the nation’s most effective anti-poverty programs. Each year, the EITC supplements low-income workers’ earnings, encouraging work and lifting millions of people out of poverty.¹ It has positive lasting effects for parents, who have shown longer-run earnings increases and better health outcomes. At the same time, their children exhibit a host of benefits, from better school performance and higher rates of college enrollment to more hours worked and higher incomes in adulthood.² 

Moreover, the EITC supports economic stability in communities throughout the country where filers collectively receive millions of dollars in earnings supplements annually.³ These successes stem from a series of targeted expansions—supported by both Republicans and Democrats—over the EITC’s 40-year history, transforming it from a small credit into a significant income supplement for low-income working families.⁴

Yet more can be done to preserve and build on the effectiveness of the EITC, and a growing number of elected officials and policy experts have proposed  strengthening the credit. Three main recommendations have emerged from these proposals.

Preserve two key provisions of the EITC that are set to expire in 2017;

Expand the credit for workers without qualifying children; and

Offer filers options to receive a portion of the credit outside of tax time.

In this brief, we consider the first two recommendations, using our MetroTax model and detailed microdata from the 2014 American Community Survey to estimate the impact of these potential changes on workers and on the metropolitan areas and states where they live.⁵ A new analysis by Steve Holt will take an in-depth look at the issue of periodic payment.

If two key EITC provisions expire in 2017, 7.4 million filers would lose part or all of their EITC.

In 2009, Congress and the Obama administration enacted two targeted, but temporary, expansions to the EITC. The legislation reduced the “penalty” for married couples filing jointly by extending their eligibility for the credit $5,000 beyond that for unmarried filers, and it boosted the credit for families with three or more children (who are more likely to be low-income even when working).

If those provisions expire in 2017, the EITC would shrink for 6.7 million taxpayers, while a little under 700,000 filers would lose eligibility altogether. Two-thirds of filers who would be affected are married couples, 1.8 million of whom are also raising more than two kids (meaning they would be subject to both cuts). The remaining third are unmarried workers with at least three children. Most of these taxpayers (58 percent) have a high school diploma or less, and they are most likely to work in manufacturing, construction, and retail. The typical adjusted gross income of these filers is $28,000 a year, just above the poverty line for a family of four (roughly $24,000 in 2014).

States and metro areas in the Midwest and West would see the steepest cuts if these provisions expire. 

Every state stands to lose millions of dollars if these EITC provisions are not made permanent. States and metro areas with higher-than-average shares of married couples and larger families would be hardest hit. In the Intermountain West, Idaho and Utah could see a 10 percent drop in federal EITC dollars coming into the state (Table 1). The major population centers in those states—including metropolitan Provo and Ogden in Utah and Boise, Idaho—top the list of major metro areas that would experience the biggest cuts if these provisions expire.

While larger states like California and Texas would see their EITC claims drop by smaller percentages, the size of the EITC-eligible population in these states mean that the expiration of these two provisions would translate into a loss of more than half a billion dollars in California ($538 million) and over $400 million in Texas. Taxpayers in the Los Angeles metro area stand to lose an estimated $185 million in EITC receipts, while those in Dallas would forfeit nearly $100 million. (For detailed state and metro data see the appendix.)

Expanding the credit for workers without qualifying children would benefit more than 14.4 million filers. 

The EITC for childless workers is significantly smaller than the credit for families with children. In tax year 2013 (the most recent year for which detailed data are available), workers with qualifying dependents received $2,794 on average through the EITC, compared to the meager $281 claimed by the average childless worker.⁶ In fact, low-wage earning childless adults are the only group of taxpayers actually taxed into (or deeper into) poverty by the federal tax system.⁷

Both President Obama and House Speaker Paul Ryan have proposed expanding the EITC for these workers, as have legislators—including Sen. Patty Murray (D-Wash.), Rep. Richard Neal (D-Mass.), and Rep. Barbara Lee (D-Calif.)—and Republican presidential candidate Jeb Bush.⁸ (Republican presidential candidates Ted Cruz and John Kasich have also called for the EITC to be expanded but have not specified whom that expansion would target.⁹)

The proposals put forward by Obama, Ryan, Lee, and Bush are strikingly similar (although they differ considerably in how they would pay for it). These expansions would double the size of the credit for childless workers and the pace at which the credit phases in and out (Figure 1). They would also lower the minimum age of eligibility from 25 to 21.¹⁰

Together, these changes would boost the value of the credit for 8 million filers and extend eligibility to 6.4 million more taxpayers, increasing EITC dollars for these workers by $6.9 billion.¹¹

The filers who would benefit from these changes are largely unmarried workers (87 percent) who are most likely to be employed in service industries (retail, accommodation and food service, administrative services), health care, and construction. Half of these workers have a high school diploma or less. The typical adjusted gross income for these workers is just $8,300, well below the poverty threshold for individuals and married couples without children (e.g., $12,316 and $15,853, respectively, in 2014).

Several states and large metro areas in the Midwest and Northeast would see the number of childless workers eligible for the EITC more than double if the credit were expanded. 

The District of Columbia and Utah, each of which has above-average shares of the population between 21 and 24, would experience the largest percentage growth in the number of childless workers eligible for the EITC (135 and 134 percent, respectively). However, the bulk of states that would double their pool of eligible filers without qualifying children fall in the Midwest (North Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, and Wisconsin) and Northeast (Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Vermont), and tend have higher-than-average shares of one-person households and households without children.

Similarly, while the number of EITC-eligible childless workers in the Provo metro area would more than triple if the credit were expanded, most of the major metro areas that would at least double the number of eligible workers without qualifying children are in the Midwest (e.g., Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, and Toledo) and Northeast (e.g., Bridgeport, Boston, and Springfield) (Map 1).

In this era of partisan gridlock in Washington, it is rare to find a policy with the kind of bipartisan support the EITC has received—a testament to its effectiveness in encouraging work, alleviating poverty, and improving outcomes for workers and their children. By preserving key provisions of the EITC for working families and by making the EITC work better for workers without qualifying children, millions of Americans across the country stand to benefit.

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Each year, one in five households filing a federal income tax return claims the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Targeted primarily to lower-income workers with children, it is one of many credits and deductions filers take each year on their federal income tax forms. However, unlike typical credits and deductions, the EITC is a refundable credit, meaning that after offsetting what is owed to the government filers receive the remainder of the benefit as a refund.

By supplementing earnings for low- and moderate-income households, the EITC helps bridge the gap between what the labor market provides and what it takes to support a family. It encourages and rewards work and has become one of the nation’s largest and most effective anti-poverty programs. In contrast to other work support and poverty alleviation programs, it achieves this with very little bureaucracy beyond what otherwise exists to administer the tax code.

Although the EITC began in 1975 as a small credit (no more than $400), a number of targeted expansions in subsequent years mean that today the EITC’s assistance can be considerable. In 2015, a single parent with three children working full-time all year at the federal minimum wage ($7.25 an hour) is eligible for a credit of $6,242, a boost of more than 40 percent above her earnings of $15,080 (though combined it still leaves her 12 percent below the federal poverty level).

However, the only way to obtain these substantial benefits is to claim the EITC on the annual federal income tax return. While lump-sum payments have perceived benefits (such as being able to pay off debts, make larger purchases, or force savings), the EITC’s single annual disbursement can present a challenge for the working parent trying to make ends meet throughout the year. It can also be problematic for households wanting to stretch out their refund as an emergency savings reserve.

My 2008 paper, “Periodic Payment of the Earned Income Tax Credit,” proposed an option that would allow a family to receive a portion of the EITC outside of tax time, striking a balance between lump-sum delivery and the need for resources throughout the year. Specifically, half of the credit could be claimed in four payments spread out during the year, while the remaining credit would continue to be paid as part of the tax refund.

Since then, several significant developments have occurred. A little-used option for receiving some of the EITC in each paycheck ended in 2010. In 2014, the federal government initiated a new tax credit advance payment process to subsidize health insurance premiums through monthly disbursement of the Affordable Care Act’s Premium Tax Credit. Other countries providing assistance similar to the EITC have continued to innovate and offer access to benefits during the year. Finally, members of Congress and think tanks have proposed alternatives to a single lump-sum disbursement of the EITC, and others have begun to explore and experiment with alternatives, most notably in Chicago, where a 2014 pilot program made quarterly payments to 343 households.

In light of these developments, this paper reviews the author’s original EITC periodic payment proposal, examines emerging alternatives, and addresses the following key questions:

• What is the demand for periodic payment alternatives?
  
  
• What benefits will accrue from the availability of periodic payment?
  
  
• What risks are associated with periodic payment and how can they be managed?
  
  
• What is the administrative feasibility of periodic payment?

The emerging answers point a way forward for identifying different distribution options that would enhance the EITC’s value to low- and moderate-income working families.

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The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) supports millions of single parents and their children each year. Although the majority of these are single moms, Father’s Day provides a good reminder that single dads are also a significant part of the equation.

Using Brookings’ MetroTax model, we estimate that roughly half (49 percent) of all EITC-eligible tax filers in 2014 filed as head of household—a group that includes many single custodial parents. Of these estimated 13.1 million filers, 8.9 million were women, and 4.2 million were men. These female-headed households included an estimated 14.7 million qualifying children, while their male counterparts included 6 million qualifying children.

Although women head of household filers were more likely to be EITC-eligible (69 percent), male heads of household were not far behind, with an estimated 61 percent eligible to receive the EITC in 2014.

To learn more about the EITC-eligible population, visit Brookings’ EITC data interactive.

Executive Summary

Tax increment finance (TIF) is a popular and potentially powerful tool for places that need economic development the most yet have the least to spend. By allowing jurisdictions to use portions of their tax base to secure public-sector bonds, the mechanism allows fiscally strapped localities to finance site improvements or other investments so as to "level the playing field" in economic development.

However, poorly designed TIF programs can cause problems. Not only can they increase the incentives for localities to engage in inefficient, zero-sum competition for tax base with their neighbors. Also, lax TIF rules may promote sprawl by reducing the costs of greenfield development at the urban fringe. It is therefore critical that state legislatures design TIF rules well.

In view of this, an analysis of the way TIF is designed and utilized in Missouri shows that:

• Missouri law creates the potential for overuse and abuse of TIF. Vague definitions of the allowable use of TIF permit almost any municipality, including those market forces already favor, to use it. Weak limits on its use for inefficient inter-local competition for tax base touch off struggles between localities. And the inclusion of sales tax base in the program tilts it toward lower-wage jobs and retail projects, which rarely bring new economic activity into a region.
  
  
• Thanks to these flaws, TIF is used extensively in high-tax-base Missouri suburban areas with little need for assistance in the competition for tax base. This is especially true in the St. Louis metropolitan area. There, TIF money very frequently flows to purposes other than combating "blight" in disadvantaged communities' its classic purpose. In fact, less than half of the 21 St. Louis-area cities that were using TIF in 2001 were disadvantaged or "at-risk" when evaluated on four indicaters of distress. On another measure, just seven of the 20 suburban areas using TIF fell into the "at-risk" category.
  
  
• TIF is also frequently being used in the outer parts of regions' particularly in the St. Louis area. Most notably, only nine of the St. Louis region's 33 TIF districts lie in the region's core. Conversely, 14 of the region's 38 TIF districts lie west of the region's major ring road (I-270). These districts, moreover, contain 57 percent of the TIF-captured property tax base in the region. By contrast, the Kansas City region shows a pattern more consistent with the revitalization goals of TIF. The vast majority of the districts lie in the region's center city, though the huge size of the city means many are still geographically far-flung.

In sum, poorly designed TIF laws are being misused at a time when state and local fiscal pressures require every dollar be spent prudently. As a result, a potentially dynamic tool for reinvestment in Missouri's most disadvantaged communities threatens to become an engine of sprawl as it is abused by high-tax-base suburban areas that do not need public subsidies.

For these reasons, Missouri would be well-served by significant reforms in the laws governing TIF:

• The allowable purposes for TIF should be more strictly defined to target its use to places with the most need for economic development.
  
  
• Higher level review of local determinations that TIF subsidies will support net contributions to the regional or state economy (the "but-for" requirement) should be implemented.
  
  
• Local TIF administrators should be required to show that TIF subsidies are consistent with land-use and economic development needs both locally and in nearby areas.

If such reforms were put in place, TIF could be returned to its attractive main purpose: that of providing resources that would not otherwise be available to localities that badly need them to promote needed economic development and redevelopment.

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Quickly following on the heels of the midterm elections, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) indicated that the medical device tax was a key target for repeal in the 114th Congress. Today, the Senate Finance Health Care Subcommittee will hold a hearing about the effects of the 2.3 percent tax that was included in the Affordable Care Act. Many believe that a repeal is, in fact, possible. Below is a basic primer about the tax and its contentious history.

Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney has been strategically slippery about his tax plan, largely refusing to explain how he would pay for the sweeping tax cuts that represent his primary promise to voters.

In the second debate, though, he offered just enough detail for us to sketch the outlines of his program. If you’re poor or worried about the state of the U.S. government’s finances, the picture is not pretty.

The first course in Romney’s plan is dessert: Tax breaks for everyone! He would start by extending the tax cuts put in place by former President George W. Bush. He would then cut everyone’s rates by another 20 percent, repeal the alternative minimum tax, and get rid of the estate tax.

How would he pay for this? Mainly by limiting the amount people can deduct from their taxable income. Here’s the most detailed statement Romney has made: “One way of doing that would be say everybody gets—I’ll pick a number—$25,000 of deductions and credits, and you can decide which ones to use. Your home mortgage interest deduction, charity, child tax credit and so forth, you can use those as part of filling that bucket, if you will, of deductions.”

Big Shortfall

Putting both halves of Romney’s plan together, we compared the impact of the tax cuts with the offsetting effect of limiting itemized deductions. The result: While a cap on deductions is an interesting idea, it couldn’t possibly raise enough revenue to make up for the big tax giveaways Romney has promised. The shortfall would be a whopping $3.7 trillion over the next decade. Lowering the deduction limit to, say, $17,000 wouldn’t much change the math. The gap would still be $3.4 trillion.

Romney’s plan is most striking in its distributional implications (see chart). The greatest benefit would go to the rich. The top one-fifth of households would enjoy a staggering $16,000 average tax cut, offset by a tax increase of $4,000 due to the deduction cap. Net gain: $12,000. Actually, though, most of this group wouldn’t see that large of a benefit. About half of the spoils would go directly to the top 1 percent, which would get an average net tax cut of $100,000 a year.

The further one goes down the income scale, the worse Romney’s plan looks. The average household in the middle of the income distribution—the heart of the middle class—would get a cut of a little more than $800, which wouldn’t be much changed by the limit on deductions. The poor would actually pay slightly more tax, because Romney would end stimulus-related measures—such as an expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit—that have benefited them.

True, any across-the-board tax cut would give more money to the rich in dollar terms, because they pay most of the taxes in the first place. But Romney’s plan goes further. It would reduce the amount the richest Americans pay relative to their income more than for anyone else. Specifically, the richest fifth would go from paying 26 percent of their income in taxes to 22 percent. The middle fifth would go from 16 percent to 15 percent. The tax burden on the poor would rise.

Romney has explicitly denied that his tax plan would favor the rich: “I will not, under any circumstances, reduce the share that’s being paid by the highest-income taxpayers.”

If this was truly his intention, he could have proposed tax cuts that were proportional to income—say, by offering simply to cut everyone’s tax rates by a few percentage points, rather than by a certain percentage. This would give the rich a bigger tax cut in dollar terms while preserving the distributional structure of our tax system.

Benefit Distribution

As it stands, Romney’s plan would result in 48 percent of the net tax cut going to the richest 1 percent (see pie chart). Another 32 percent would go to the next richest 4 percent of the population. All told, 94 percent of the benefit would go to the top 10 percent of the income distribution, leaving only 6 percent for the rest.

Many of Romney’s biggest boosters argue that he would be a more moderate president than he has been a candidate. Perhaps that’s plausible. On taxes, though, he has left himself little room to maneuver. His constituency would expect him to deliver on the very specific tax cuts he has promised. Meanwhile, his vagueness on the offsetting deduction limits would leave him with no mandate to get rid of the most popular tax breaks, such as those for charitable giving, mortgage interest or health insurance.

Hence, the most probable outcome would be a tax system that is radically less progressive, achieved through cuts that would create a much larger long-run budget deficit. Both outcomes would be colossal failures at a time in which true tax reform is greatly needed.

Two recently posted papers by Brookings colleagues purport to show that “even a large increase in the top marginal rate would barely reduce inequality.”[1]  This conclusion, based on one commonly used measure of inequality, is an incomplete and misleading answer to the question posed: would a stand-alone increase in the top income tax bracket materially reduce inequality?  More importantly, it is the wrong question to pose, as a stand-alone increase in the top bracket rate would be bad tax policy that would exacerbate tax avoidance incentives.  Sensible tax policy would package that change with at least one other tax modification, and such a package would have an even more striking effect on income inequality.  In brief:

• A stand-alone increase in the top tax bracket would be bad tax policy, but it would meaningfully increase the degree to which the tax system reduces economic inequality.  It would have this effect even though it would fall on just ½ of 1 percent of all taxpayers and barely half of their income.
• Tax policy significantly reduces inequality.  But transfer payments and other spending reduce it far more.  In combination, taxes and public spending materially offset the inequality generated by market income.
• The revenue from a well-crafted increase in taxes on upper-income Americans, dedicated to a prudent expansions of public spending, would go far to counter the powerful forces that have made income inequality more extreme in the United States than in any other major developed economy.

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