ukrainian

Fighting COVID-19 the Ukrainian Way

28 April 2020

Orysia Lutsevych

Research Fellow and Manager, Ukraine Forum, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Coronavirus has exposed vulnerabilities in Ukraine but also activated private sector and citizen engagement in delivering help. This could accelerate social change if a smart response is adopted and political reforms follow.

2020-04-28-Ukraine-COVID-Chernobyl

Girls wearing face masks at the monument to Chernobyl victims in Slavutich during a memorial ceremony amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Photo by SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images.

Ukrainians are accustomed to crisis. As COVID-19 spread, forest fires were raging in the Chernobyl exclusion zone, turning Kyiv into the most polluted city in the world. The fighting in Donbas continued, claiming the lives of more Ukrainian soldiers, bringing the total to more than 4,000 — and, on top of that, President Zelenskyy overhauled his government. So Ukraine is fighting three battles at the same time — war with Russia, the struggle against its own ineffective system, and now COVID-19.

Every crisis is a reality check — the coronavirus provoked and exposed the strategic vulnerabilities and deep-rooted features of Ukraine’s system of governance. Three trends have come to the fore. First, the inefficiency and paralysis of many state agencies, particularly the lack of coordination between them and the prevalence of vested interests. Second, the reliance of the country’s leaders on large financial-industrial groups (FIGs) to compensate for weak institutional capacity. Third, a strong societal and private sector mobilization to fill the gaps in the dilapidated public health system.

State agencies are rigid and ineffective. Despite the modern Prozorro digital public procurement system, and the government’s allocation of $2.5 million from the early days of the epidemic, the Ministry of Health blocked COVID-related purchases for over a month. This was a tactic by — now ex-minister — Yemets to pressure the state medical procurement agency into appointing a protégé of his as one of its deputy heads.

Lowest testing rate in Europe

Similarly, in some regions, notably Odesa, procurement stalled and orders went to politically connected businesses at higher-than-market prices. Lack of tests and laboratory equipment means Ukraine has administered only 72,000 tests within a population of 42 million to date — the lowest rate in Europe.

Doctors were given orders to ensure they only test patients in hospitals with COVID-19 symptoms and only those arriving from Asia, while ignoring the fact that millions of Ukrainian labour migrants were in Europe. Indeed, the first confirmed case was imported from Italy.

Ukrainian government and public health officials lack information to take informed decisions. There is no accurate electronic database of registered deaths and reporting is lagging behind events. Information on testing availability in the regions is missing.

Thirteen days after the first case of the virus was recorded, Zelenskyy exhorted business tycoons to come to the rescue. Taking a populist tone, Zelenskyy said ‘Ukraine has been feeding you for a long time and it is time that you helped the country’. The tycoons divided the regions among themselves to deliver relief efforts according to the location of their enterprises.

It is believed FIGs have donated around $25 million to procure testing kits, ventilators, personal protective equipment (PPE) and disinfectants. This may sound impressive, but many of those same tycoons actually owe millions to the state, some even billions, and cause serious problems by perpetuating the current rent-seeking system, where public resources benefit those groups resulting in serious social losses.

Reliance on these groups makes Zelenskyy a hostage to their favour in any potential reform efforts. It is a dangerous solution, as these tycoons often obstruct Ukraine’s economic development.

An alternative — and more transformative — trend of public-private partnerships is emerging in some regions. Across Ukraine, hundreds of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have led efforts to deliver PPE, support the vulnerable with food supplies, and to procure ventilators for key hospitals.

They have mobilised hundreds of volunteers to deliver assistance and partnered with local non-profits. Fundraising initiatives have begun in Lviv, Odesa, Kyiv and Poltava with donations and expenditure has been posted online for transparency. Companies have repurposed to produce PPE kits and medical equipment. The efforts unfolded quickly and, in some cases, in smooth collaboration with municipal and regional authorities.

Ukraine cannot afford to ‘waste’ this crisis, which could help accelerate healthcare reform, decentralization, modernize governance, and boost citizen empowerment. But for this to happen, the country has to deploy a ‘smart response’.

Such ‘smart response’ means applying a resilience framework that nurtures the agility of the system of governance, ensures a diversity of actors in decision-making, supporting both self-regulation and better coordination. Rather than reaching out to tycoons, Zelenskyy should enter a coalition with true agents of change — SME leaders, volunteers, and mayors who have mobilized effective grassroots action. These actors demand a level playing field with accountable governance and effective state institutions.

Civic COVID-19 response hubs and local authorities should be joined in a network that spans the regions, and connected with the national agencies designing pandemic responses. For a national strategy to be effective, central headquarters should draw information from local communities and manage a ‘team of teams’ in a decentralised fashion.

Ensuring effective public service delivery without compromising integrity and keeping the risk of corruption low should also be a priority of political reform, with volunteers and the private sector ensuring civic oversight of both regional and national funding.

Civic engagement such as this can be transformative as it defies the Soviet legacy of paternalism and expands the belief among citizens that society can work for them. By assisting the relief effort, citizens are gaining valuable insights into quality of public services and participate in holding them to account.

Citizens are also developing a better understanding of the purpose of having effective armed forces, police, border guards and modern hospitals. They are coming to understand the value of taxpayer money and witnessing how corruption erodes institutions.

This survival mobilization — if properly harnessed by the state — could drive transformative change and make Ukraine more resilient, not just against present crises, but future ones too.




ukrainian

Undercurrents: Episode 52 - Defining Pandemics, and Mikheil Saakashvili's Ukrainian Comeback





ukrainian

Fighting COVID-19 the Ukrainian Way

28 April 2020

Orysia Lutsevych

Research Fellow and Manager, Ukraine Forum, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Coronavirus has exposed vulnerabilities in Ukraine but also activated private sector and citizen engagement in delivering help. This could accelerate social change if a smart response is adopted and political reforms follow.

2020-04-28-Ukraine-COVID-Chernobyl

Girls wearing face masks at the monument to Chernobyl victims in Slavutich during a memorial ceremony amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Photo by SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images.

Ukrainians are accustomed to crisis. As COVID-19 spread, forest fires were raging in the Chernobyl exclusion zone, turning Kyiv into the most polluted city in the world. The fighting in Donbas continued, claiming the lives of more Ukrainian soldiers, bringing the total to more than 4,000 — and, on top of that, President Zelenskyy overhauled his government. So Ukraine is fighting three battles at the same time — war with Russia, the struggle against its own ineffective system, and now COVID-19.

Every crisis is a reality check — the coronavirus provoked and exposed the strategic vulnerabilities and deep-rooted features of Ukraine’s system of governance. Three trends have come to the fore. First, the inefficiency and paralysis of many state agencies, particularly the lack of coordination between them and the prevalence of vested interests. Second, the reliance of the country’s leaders on large financial-industrial groups (FIGs) to compensate for weak institutional capacity. Third, a strong societal and private sector mobilization to fill the gaps in the dilapidated public health system.

State agencies are rigid and ineffective. Despite the modern Prozorro digital public procurement system, and the government’s allocation of $2.5 million from the early days of the epidemic, the Ministry of Health blocked COVID-related purchases for over a month. This was a tactic by — now ex-minister — Yemets to pressure the state medical procurement agency into appointing a protégé of his as one of its deputy heads.

Lowest testing rate in Europe

Similarly, in some regions, notably Odesa, procurement stalled and orders went to politically connected businesses at higher-than-market prices. Lack of tests and laboratory equipment means Ukraine has administered only 72,000 tests within a population of 42 million to date — the lowest rate in Europe.

Doctors were given orders to ensure they only test patients in hospitals with COVID-19 symptoms and only those arriving from Asia, while ignoring the fact that millions of Ukrainian labour migrants were in Europe. Indeed, the first confirmed case was imported from Italy.

Ukrainian government and public health officials lack information to take informed decisions. There is no accurate electronic database of registered deaths and reporting is lagging behind events. Information on testing availability in the regions is missing.

Thirteen days after the first case of the virus was recorded, Zelenskyy exhorted business tycoons to come to the rescue. Taking a populist tone, Zelenskyy said ‘Ukraine has been feeding you for a long time and it is time that you helped the country’. The tycoons divided the regions among themselves to deliver relief efforts according to the location of their enterprises.

It is believed FIGs have donated around $25 million to procure testing kits, ventilators, personal protective equipment (PPE) and disinfectants. This may sound impressive, but many of those same tycoons actually owe millions to the state, some even billions, and cause serious problems by perpetuating the current rent-seeking system, where public resources benefit those groups resulting in serious social losses.

Reliance on these groups makes Zelenskyy a hostage to their favour in any potential reform efforts. It is a dangerous solution, as these tycoons often obstruct Ukraine’s economic development.

An alternative — and more transformative — trend of public-private partnerships is emerging in some regions. Across Ukraine, hundreds of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have led efforts to deliver PPE, support the vulnerable with food supplies, and to procure ventilators for key hospitals.

They have mobilised hundreds of volunteers to deliver assistance and partnered with local non-profits. Fundraising initiatives have begun in Lviv, Odesa, Kyiv and Poltava with donations and expenditure has been posted online for transparency. Companies have repurposed to produce PPE kits and medical equipment. The efforts unfolded quickly and, in some cases, in smooth collaboration with municipal and regional authorities.

Ukraine cannot afford to ‘waste’ this crisis, which could help accelerate healthcare reform, decentralization, modernize governance, and boost citizen empowerment. But for this to happen, the country has to deploy a ‘smart response’.

Such ‘smart response’ means applying a resilience framework that nurtures the agility of the system of governance, ensures a diversity of actors in decision-making, supporting both self-regulation and better coordination. Rather than reaching out to tycoons, Zelenskyy should enter a coalition with true agents of change — SME leaders, volunteers, and mayors who have mobilized effective grassroots action. These actors demand a level playing field with accountable governance and effective state institutions.

Civic COVID-19 response hubs and local authorities should be joined in a network that spans the regions, and connected with the national agencies designing pandemic responses. For a national strategy to be effective, central headquarters should draw information from local communities and manage a ‘team of teams’ in a decentralised fashion.

Ensuring effective public service delivery without compromising integrity and keeping the risk of corruption low should also be a priority of political reform, with volunteers and the private sector ensuring civic oversight of both regional and national funding.

Civic engagement such as this can be transformative as it defies the Soviet legacy of paternalism and expands the belief among citizens that society can work for them. By assisting the relief effort, citizens are gaining valuable insights into quality of public services and participate in holding them to account.

Citizens are also developing a better understanding of the purpose of having effective armed forces, police, border guards and modern hospitals. They are coming to understand the value of taxpayer money and witnessing how corruption erodes institutions.

This survival mobilization — if properly harnessed by the state — could drive transformative change and make Ukraine more resilient, not just against present crises, but future ones too.




ukrainian

Fighting COVID-19 the Ukrainian Way

28 April 2020

Orysia Lutsevych

Research Fellow and Manager, Ukraine Forum, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Coronavirus has exposed vulnerabilities in Ukraine but also activated private sector and citizen engagement in delivering help. This could accelerate social change if a smart response is adopted and political reforms follow.

2020-04-28-Ukraine-COVID-Chernobyl

Girls wearing face masks at the monument to Chernobyl victims in Slavutich during a memorial ceremony amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Photo by SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images.

Ukrainians are accustomed to crisis. As COVID-19 spread, forest fires were raging in the Chernobyl exclusion zone, turning Kyiv into the most polluted city in the world. The fighting in Donbas continued, claiming the lives of more Ukrainian soldiers, bringing the total to more than 4,000 — and, on top of that, President Zelenskyy overhauled his government. So Ukraine is fighting three battles at the same time — war with Russia, the struggle against its own ineffective system, and now COVID-19.

Every crisis is a reality check — the coronavirus provoked and exposed the strategic vulnerabilities and deep-rooted features of Ukraine’s system of governance. Three trends have come to the fore. First, the inefficiency and paralysis of many state agencies, particularly the lack of coordination between them and the prevalence of vested interests. Second, the reliance of the country’s leaders on large financial-industrial groups (FIGs) to compensate for weak institutional capacity. Third, a strong societal and private sector mobilization to fill the gaps in the dilapidated public health system.

State agencies are rigid and ineffective. Despite the modern Prozorro digital public procurement system, and the government’s allocation of $2.5 million from the early days of the epidemic, the Ministry of Health blocked COVID-related purchases for over a month. This was a tactic by — now ex-minister — Yemets to pressure the state medical procurement agency into appointing a protégé of his as one of its deputy heads.

Lowest testing rate in Europe

Similarly, in some regions, notably Odesa, procurement stalled and orders went to politically connected businesses at higher-than-market prices. Lack of tests and laboratory equipment means Ukraine has administered only 72,000 tests within a population of 42 million to date — the lowest rate in Europe.

Doctors were given orders to ensure they only test patients in hospitals with COVID-19 symptoms and only those arriving from Asia, while ignoring the fact that millions of Ukrainian labour migrants were in Europe. Indeed, the first confirmed case was imported from Italy.

Ukrainian government and public health officials lack information to take informed decisions. There is no accurate electronic database of registered deaths and reporting is lagging behind events. Information on testing availability in the regions is missing.

Thirteen days after the first case of the virus was recorded, Zelenskyy exhorted business tycoons to come to the rescue. Taking a populist tone, Zelenskyy said ‘Ukraine has been feeding you for a long time and it is time that you helped the country’. The tycoons divided the regions among themselves to deliver relief efforts according to the location of their enterprises.

It is believed FIGs have donated around $25 million to procure testing kits, ventilators, personal protective equipment (PPE) and disinfectants. This may sound impressive, but many of those same tycoons actually owe millions to the state, some even billions, and cause serious problems by perpetuating the current rent-seeking system, where public resources benefit those groups resulting in serious social losses.

Reliance on these groups makes Zelenskyy a hostage to their favour in any potential reform efforts. It is a dangerous solution, as these tycoons often obstruct Ukraine’s economic development.

An alternative — and more transformative — trend of public-private partnerships is emerging in some regions. Across Ukraine, hundreds of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have led efforts to deliver PPE, support the vulnerable with food supplies, and to procure ventilators for key hospitals.

They have mobilised hundreds of volunteers to deliver assistance and partnered with local non-profits. Fundraising initiatives have begun in Lviv, Odesa, Kyiv and Poltava with donations and expenditure has been posted online for transparency. Companies have repurposed to produce PPE kits and medical equipment. The efforts unfolded quickly and, in some cases, in smooth collaboration with municipal and regional authorities.

Ukraine cannot afford to ‘waste’ this crisis, which could help accelerate healthcare reform, decentralization, modernize governance, and boost citizen empowerment. But for this to happen, the country has to deploy a ‘smart response’.

Such ‘smart response’ means applying a resilience framework that nurtures the agility of the system of governance, ensures a diversity of actors in decision-making, supporting both self-regulation and better coordination. Rather than reaching out to tycoons, Zelenskyy should enter a coalition with true agents of change — SME leaders, volunteers, and mayors who have mobilized effective grassroots action. These actors demand a level playing field with accountable governance and effective state institutions.

Civic COVID-19 response hubs and local authorities should be joined in a network that spans the regions, and connected with the national agencies designing pandemic responses. For a national strategy to be effective, central headquarters should draw information from local communities and manage a ‘team of teams’ in a decentralised fashion.

Ensuring effective public service delivery without compromising integrity and keeping the risk of corruption low should also be a priority of political reform, with volunteers and the private sector ensuring civic oversight of both regional and national funding.

Civic engagement such as this can be transformative as it defies the Soviet legacy of paternalism and expands the belief among citizens that society can work for them. By assisting the relief effort, citizens are gaining valuable insights into quality of public services and participate in holding them to account.

Citizens are also developing a better understanding of the purpose of having effective armed forces, police, border guards and modern hospitals. They are coming to understand the value of taxpayer money and witnessing how corruption erodes institutions.

This survival mobilization — if properly harnessed by the state — could drive transformative change and make Ukraine more resilient, not just against present crises, but future ones too.




ukrainian

Fighting COVID-19 the Ukrainian Way

28 April 2020

Orysia Lutsevych

Research Fellow and Manager, Ukraine Forum, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Coronavirus has exposed vulnerabilities in Ukraine but also activated private sector and citizen engagement in delivering help. This could accelerate social change if a smart response is adopted and political reforms follow.

2020-04-28-Ukraine-COVID-Chernobyl

Girls wearing face masks at the monument to Chernobyl victims in Slavutich during a memorial ceremony amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Photo by SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images.

Ukrainians are accustomed to crisis. As COVID-19 spread, forest fires were raging in the Chernobyl exclusion zone, turning Kyiv into the most polluted city in the world. The fighting in Donbas continued, claiming the lives of more Ukrainian soldiers, bringing the total to more than 4,000 — and, on top of that, President Zelenskyy overhauled his government. So Ukraine is fighting three battles at the same time — war with Russia, the struggle against its own ineffective system, and now COVID-19.

Every crisis is a reality check — the coronavirus provoked and exposed the strategic vulnerabilities and deep-rooted features of Ukraine’s system of governance. Three trends have come to the fore. First, the inefficiency and paralysis of many state agencies, particularly the lack of coordination between them and the prevalence of vested interests. Second, the reliance of the country’s leaders on large financial-industrial groups (FIGs) to compensate for weak institutional capacity. Third, a strong societal and private sector mobilization to fill the gaps in the dilapidated public health system.

State agencies are rigid and ineffective. Despite the modern Prozorro digital public procurement system, and the government’s allocation of $2.5 million from the early days of the epidemic, the Ministry of Health blocked COVID-related purchases for over a month. This was a tactic by — now ex-minister — Yemets to pressure the state medical procurement agency into appointing a protégé of his as one of its deputy heads.

Lowest testing rate in Europe

Similarly, in some regions, notably Odesa, procurement stalled and orders went to politically connected businesses at higher-than-market prices. Lack of tests and laboratory equipment means Ukraine has administered only 72,000 tests within a population of 42 million to date — the lowest rate in Europe.

Doctors were given orders to ensure they only test patients in hospitals with COVID-19 symptoms and only those arriving from Asia, while ignoring the fact that millions of Ukrainian labour migrants were in Europe. Indeed, the first confirmed case was imported from Italy.

Ukrainian government and public health officials lack information to take informed decisions. There is no accurate electronic database of registered deaths and reporting is lagging behind events. Information on testing availability in the regions is missing.

Thirteen days after the first case of the virus was recorded, Zelenskyy exhorted business tycoons to come to the rescue. Taking a populist tone, Zelenskyy said ‘Ukraine has been feeding you for a long time and it is time that you helped the country’. The tycoons divided the regions among themselves to deliver relief efforts according to the location of their enterprises.

It is believed FIGs have donated around $25 million to procure testing kits, ventilators, personal protective equipment (PPE) and disinfectants. This may sound impressive, but many of those same tycoons actually owe millions to the state, some even billions, and cause serious problems by perpetuating the current rent-seeking system, where public resources benefit those groups resulting in serious social losses.

Reliance on these groups makes Zelenskyy a hostage to their favour in any potential reform efforts. It is a dangerous solution, as these tycoons often obstruct Ukraine’s economic development.

An alternative — and more transformative — trend of public-private partnerships is emerging in some regions. Across Ukraine, hundreds of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have led efforts to deliver PPE, support the vulnerable with food supplies, and to procure ventilators for key hospitals.

They have mobilised hundreds of volunteers to deliver assistance and partnered with local non-profits. Fundraising initiatives have begun in Lviv, Odesa, Kyiv and Poltava with donations and expenditure has been posted online for transparency. Companies have repurposed to produce PPE kits and medical equipment. The efforts unfolded quickly and, in some cases, in smooth collaboration with municipal and regional authorities.

Ukraine cannot afford to ‘waste’ this crisis, which could help accelerate healthcare reform, decentralization, modernize governance, and boost citizen empowerment. But for this to happen, the country has to deploy a ‘smart response’.

Such ‘smart response’ means applying a resilience framework that nurtures the agility of the system of governance, ensures a diversity of actors in decision-making, supporting both self-regulation and better coordination. Rather than reaching out to tycoons, Zelenskyy should enter a coalition with true agents of change — SME leaders, volunteers, and mayors who have mobilized effective grassroots action. These actors demand a level playing field with accountable governance and effective state institutions.

Civic COVID-19 response hubs and local authorities should be joined in a network that spans the regions, and connected with the national agencies designing pandemic responses. For a national strategy to be effective, central headquarters should draw information from local communities and manage a ‘team of teams’ in a decentralised fashion.

Ensuring effective public service delivery without compromising integrity and keeping the risk of corruption low should also be a priority of political reform, with volunteers and the private sector ensuring civic oversight of both regional and national funding.

Civic engagement such as this can be transformative as it defies the Soviet legacy of paternalism and expands the belief among citizens that society can work for them. By assisting the relief effort, citizens are gaining valuable insights into quality of public services and participate in holding them to account.

Citizens are also developing a better understanding of the purpose of having effective armed forces, police, border guards and modern hospitals. They are coming to understand the value of taxpayer money and witnessing how corruption erodes institutions.

This survival mobilization — if properly harnessed by the state — could drive transformative change and make Ukraine more resilient, not just against present crises, but future ones too.




ukrainian

my dmz ukrainian english v




ukrainian

A Sporting Infusion for Ukrainian Summer Camps

OM Ukraine's sports team equips and trains churches in using non-traditional sports in their summer camps.




ukrainian

Anya's story (stories from Ukrainian refugees)

A 17 year old high school student shares about how she fled from the war zone and came to stay at OM Odessa's centre.




ukrainian

Kadenko's Ukrainian legacy

We meet the Oleksandr Kadenko, the gold medal recipient in the 2010 UEFA Grassroots Day Awards for best leader.




ukrainian

Seychellois Rupee(SCR)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Seychellois Rupee = 1.5633 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Trinidad and Tobago Dollar(TTD)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Trinidad and Tobago Dollar = 3.9716 Ukrainian Hryvnia



  • Trinidad and Tobago Dollar

ukrainian

Swedish Krona(SEK)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Swedish Krona = 2.7465 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Slovak Koruna(SKK)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Slovak Koruna = 1.2086 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Serbian Dinar(RSD)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Serbian Dinar = 0.2475 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Polish Zloty(PLN)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Polish Zloty = 6.3829 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Qatari Rial(QAR)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Qatari Rial = 7.3711 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Indian Rupee(INR)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Indian Rupee = 0.3555 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Pakistani Rupee(PKR)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Pakistani Rupee = 0.1681 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Sierra Leonean Leone(SLL)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Sierra Leonean Leone = 0.0027 Ukrainian Hryvnia



  • Sierra Leonean Leone

ukrainian

New Taiwan Dollar(TWD)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 New Taiwan Dollar = 0.8989 Ukrainian Hryvnia



  • New Taiwan Dollar

ukrainian

Thai Baht(THB)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Thai Baht = 0.8382 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Turkish Lira(TRY)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Turkish Lira = 3.7859 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Singapore Dollar(SGD)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Singapore Dollar = 18.9979 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Mauritian Rupee(MUR)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Mauritian Rupee = 0.6759 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Nepalese Rupee(NPR)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Nepalese Rupee = 0.2219 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Bangladeshi Taka(BDT)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Bangladeshi Taka = 0.3158 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Moldovan Leu(MDL)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Moldovan Leu = 1.5051 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Colombian Peso(COP)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Colombian Peso = 0.0069 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Uruguayan Peso(UYU)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Uruguayan Peso = 0.6221 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Uzbekistan Som(UZS)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Uzbekistan Som = 0.0027 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Russian Ruble(RUB)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Russian Ruble = 0.3656 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Iraqi Dinar(IQD)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Iraqi Dinar = 0.0226 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Cayman Islands Dollar(KYD)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Cayman Islands Dollar = 32.1974 Ukrainian Hryvnia



  • Cayman Islands Dollar

ukrainian

Swiss Franc(CHF)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Swiss Franc = 27.6404 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

CFA Franc BCEAO(XOF)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 CFA Franc BCEAO = 0.0444 Ukrainian Hryvnia



  • CFA Franc BCEAO

ukrainian

Vietnamese Dong(VND)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Vietnamese Dong = 0.0011 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Macedonian Denar(MKD)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Macedonian Denar = 0.4723 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Zambian Kwacha(ZMK)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Zambian Kwacha = 0.0052 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

South Korean Won(KRW)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 South Korean Won = 0.022 Ukrainian Hryvnia



  • South Korean Won

ukrainian

Jordanian Dinar(JOD)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Jordanian Dinar = 37.8268 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Lebanese Pound(LBP)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Lebanese Pound = 0.0177 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Bahraini Dinar(BHD)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Bahraini Dinar = 70.9672 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Chilean Peso(CLP)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Chilean Peso = 0.0325 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Maldivian Rufiyaa(MVR)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Maldivian Rufiyaa = 1.7311 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Malaysian Ringgit(MYR)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Malaysian Ringgit = 6.1924 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Nicaraguan Cordoba Oro(NIO)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Nicaraguan Cordoba Oro = 0.7801 Ukrainian Hryvnia



  • Nicaraguan Cordoba Oro

ukrainian

Netherlands Antillean Guilder(ANG)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Netherlands Antillean Guilder = 14.95 Ukrainian Hryvnia



  • Netherlands Antillean Guilder

ukrainian

Estonian Kroon(EEK)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Estonian Kroon = 1.8817 Ukrainian Hryvnia




ukrainian

Danish Krone(DKK)/Ukrainian Hryvnia(UAH)

1 Danish Krone = 3.9004 Ukrainian Hryvnia