South Sudan’s prolonged peace process is approaching a critical juncture. There is uncertainty about whether the country’s political leaders will meet the 12 November 2019 deadline to form a transitional government of national unity – a process already delayed after a revitalized power-sharing deal was signed in September 2018. A political impasse has been caused by a lack of progress on outstanding issues such as deciding on the number of states and reunifying the security forces. The latter issue is seen as critical to preventing the reoccurrence of large-scale violence which would exacerbate already considerable humanitarian needs. Continued mediation by regional and international partners remains important to finding a way forward and preventing a return to widespread conflict.

At this event, a panel of speakers will examine the status of the peace deal, the issue of federalism and subdivision, measures needed to prevent the humanitarian crisis from worsening and opportunities to foster greater security and unity in the country.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

President Cyril Ramaphosa led the African National Congress (ANC) to electoral victory in South Africa in May 2019. His promise of rooting out corruption and generating job-creating growth resonated with an electorate scarred by corruption scandals and structural economic and racial inequality.

However, divisions within the ruling party have meant that the delivery of these promises has been slow. Complex and often divisive racial dynamics continue to dominate political discourse especially around land reform and economic transformation.

The country’s main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), faces its own political crisis following the resignation of former leader Mmusi Maimane, bringing into question the role of opposition parties in the young democracy. 

At this event, South African journalists, Martin Plaut and Carien du Plessis, discuss their new book, Understanding South Africa, providing insights into the current and historical trends that define the political fault lines of modern South Africa. Is Ramaphosa shying away from the difficult political decisions necessary to encourage meaningful change in South Africa’s political environment? And how should the international community understand the trends and dynamics that dominate South African politics?

The study of secrecy and spies remain subjects dominated by Anglo-American experiences. In recent years there has been some effort to refocus the lens of research upon ‘intelligence elsewhere’, including the global South. This is partly because of intense interest in the Arab Spring and ‘managed democracy’, placing a wider range of secret services under the spotlight. However, the approach to research is still dominated by concepts and methods derived from studying the English-speaking states of the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance and their European outriders. This article calls for a re-examination of research strategies for Intelligence Studies and for those theorizing surveillance, suggesting that both fields have much to learn from area studies and development studies, especially in the realm of research practice and ethics. If the growing number of academics specializing in intelligence genuinely wish to move forward and examine the global South they will need to rethink their tool-kit and learn from other disciplines. We suggest there is a rich tradition to draw upon.

South Africa has significant economic potential based on its resource endowment, quality human capital and well-developed infrastructure compared to the region. However, the country’s economic growth rate has not topped 2 per cent since 2013, and in 2018, was below 1 per cent. This has put a strain on citizens and communities in a country that still suffers from structural inequality, poverty and high unemployment. Economic recovery and anti-corruption were the central pillars of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s 2019 electoral campaign and he has set an investment target of $100 billion. However, voters and investors alike are demanding faster and more visible progress from the country’s enigmatic leader who has a reputation for caution and calculation.

At this event, Professor Nick Binedell will discuss the progress of and opposition to the president’s economic reform agenda and the opportunities for international investment to support long term inclusive and sustainable growth in South Africa.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Swapo’s victory in Namibia two weeks ago was the last in a series of recent ‘end of decade’ elections that have returned dominant parties to power across Southern Africa. However, the “enduring appeal of liberation” is wearing thin.

Experiences across the region show that if governments are to deliver on their electoral promises, they must empower institutions, actively promote a culture of accountability and transparency within their party ranks and pursue economic reforms that untangle the web of party-state-business alliances. Such actions are critical for the survival of national liberation movements as the dominant force in the politics of Southern Africa – but will be difficult to implement.

Avoid political factionalism

South Africa, Botswana, Angola and Zimbabwe all saw new presidents take over just before elections. All used the rhetoric of anti-corruption to distance themselves from the tainted image of their predecessors. But acting on this requires a shift in mind-set in parties that have always preferred to deal with their problems behind closed doors. High profile adversaries from past regimes make tempting targets but could also drive party divisions.

In Angola, the transition of power was safeguarded by an agreement that former president José Eduardo dos Santos would be immune from prosecution. But this week his son faced corruption charges before the country’s supreme court, a high-profile example of a wave of anti-corruption cases across Southern Africa, driven by dominant parties wary of their future.

The allegations against José Filemino De Sousa Dos Santos, nickname ‘Zenu’, include a $500-million fraud involving the country’s central bank. Pressure is also mounting on Zenu’s sister Isabel — once prominent in Angola, she is now absent from public life.

Other leaders have had to tread more carefully. Immunity was a luxury Cyril Ramaphosa was neither willing nor politically able to grant Jacob Zuma in South Africa. Reliant on a few close allies at the top of the party, Ramaphosa lacks foot soldiers at the grassroots level, and his campaign against corruption within the ANC has faced persistent opposition.

Rebuilding institutions and empowering authorities takes time, and with few high-profile cases to point to, people are getting restless. This is also the case in Zimbabwe, where a worsening economic situation has left policy reformers politically isolated.

Party, state, and business

Long term incumbency has blurred the distinction between the party and the state. Liberation movements have created vast party-linked business empires. Political allegiance grants access to economic resources through appointments to lucrative positions in state-owned enterprises, preferential bids for tenders and licenses, and direct access to decision makers.

In Angola, this was fuelled by oil revenues. In South Africa, state capture flourished in an environment where the ANC and its constituent elements had significant power on the panels that chose leaders for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In Namibia, an Icelandic fishing company paid backhanders to officials for fishing rights in what has become known as the ‘Fishrot’ scandal. Zanu-PF officials’ access to preferential foreign exchange rates present them with lucrative opportunities in Zimbabwe.

Ending this bureaucratic rent seeking goes beyond appointing ‘clean’ officials, which has been central to the anti-corruption campaigns in Angola and South Africa. Governments must also allow scrutiny of the state and empower those institutions designed for that role, such as the National Prosecuting Authority and the Public Protector in South Africa. Zimbabwe’s auditor general has published an in-depth report of the state of corruption in the country’s SOEs.

Companies must also be held to account for their role in aiding, and at worst directly benefitting, from state graft. International businesses have actively sought to benefit from corruption. They are now starting to face the consequences. A former Credit Suisse banker has pleaded guilty in the US over handling alleged kickbacks in Mozambique’s $2-billion “tuna bond” scandal. Global banks and consultancies continue to feel the squeeze for their complicity in state capture in South Africa.

Competition and pluralism

National liberation movements may only have a limited window within which to act. Across the region civil society campaigns and investigative journalists have shed light on some of the worst abuses of power. Anti-corruption campaigns are starting to bite. The state will continue to play a central role in Southern African economies, an important arbiter of economic transformation able to balance the region’s highly unequal and resource-dependent economies.

But opposition, civil society and the media are also critical for the progression towards democratic competition and pluralism in Southern Africa. Parliaments remain vital for holding rulers to account. Long used to unchallenged dominance, liberation movements have significant adjustments to make to rise to the challenge of a new era.

This article was originally published in the Mail and Guardian.

South Sudan’s new power sharing government must be formed by 22 February 2020, as specified in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). There have been two extensions to this process already, reflecting the continued distrust among leaders and the complexity of the conflict.

The lack of progress in several contentious areas has delayed the formation of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) for nine months, but the recent decision taken by President Salva Kiir Mayardit to re-establish 10 states has been welcomed by opposition groups, regional mediators and international partners.

It is seen as the breakthrough needed for an agreement to be reached, despite some outstanding concerns. Further meaningful compromises and difficult decisions will be needed to implement a lasting peace agreement.

At this event, a panel of speakers will examine the status of the peace deal following the February deadline and the steps needed to progress the key issues underlying implementation.

The government of South Africa is pursuing a programme of reform to revitalize the economy, strengthen institutions and combat corruption. The State of the Nation Address (SONA) on 13 February and the budget speech of 26 February represent the most significant articulation of the government’s economic strategy. Central to this is the government’s plans for the energy sector, which is fundamental for reviving the economy, and the reform of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). But questions remain about possible divergence of the approach taken by government ministers from the policy position of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), and what this might mean for the sustainability and progress of reform.  

At this event, Paul Mashatile, Treasurer General of the ANC, will discuss the party’s assessment of reform efforts to date and priorities for delivering on inclusive growth.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

In the COVID-19 crisis so far, Cyril Ramaphosa has been widely praised for displaying the decisive leadership so many hoped for when they cast their ballot for him in May 2019. Buttressed by others such as health minister Dr Zweli Mkhize, and on a simple objective to prevent transmission, South Africa has been a lesson to the world. Act fast. Act hard.

Former president Thabo Mbeki’s disastrous response to the HIV crisis cast a long shadow over his legacy, and Ramaphosa has taken note. South Africa has had one of the tightest lockdowns in the world. No exercise. No cigarettes. No alcohol.

The lockdown was imposed when the country had only around 1,000 recorded cases and just two deaths. As a result, transmission from returning travellers has not yet led to an exponential infection rate within the community. The government’s swift reaction has bought much needed time with the peak now seemingly delayed to September or October.

Continental and national leadership

Ramaphosa has also emerged as a key focal point for Africa-wide responses. As current chair of the African Union (AU) he leads the continental engagement with the World Health Organization (WHO), and the various international finance institutions, while South African officials are working with the AU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) on a push for African debt restructuring.

He has also been active in trouble shooting to unlock external assistance to the continent, including from China and Russia. Appointing special envoys is typical of his boardroom-honed leadership style.

International and regional partnerships are vital for resilience and the arrival of 217 Cuban doctors to South Africa is strongly reminiscent of the liberationist solidarity of the Cold War era. And regional economies remain dependent on South Africa to protect their own vulnerable citizens. Following the 2008 financial crisis, it was South Africa’s regional trading relationships that remained robust, while trade with its main global partners in China and the US dropped.

Despite the plaudits, Ramaphosa remains vulnerable to challenge at home, notably around his failure to stimulate South Africa’s moribund economy. On the eve of lockdown, Moody’s joined its peers Standard and Poor’s and Fitch in giving South Africa a below investment grade credit rating. The move was a long time coming. Long mooted economic reforms were slow to materialise, and South Africa had fallen into recession.

Ramaphosa depends on a small core of close advisors and allies, initially united in apparent opposition to the kleptocratic rule of President Jacob Zuma and the deep patronage networks he created within both the party and the state. But this allegiance is being tested by economic reality. Support within the party was already drifting prior to the crisis.

Disagreements are not just technocratic – there are big ideological questions in play around the role of the state in the economy, the level of intervention, and its affordability, with key government figures sceptical of rapid market reforms. Energy minister and former union stalwart Gwede Mantashe is wary of job losses, and minister of public enterprises Pravin Gordhan protective of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Before coronavirus hit, Ramaphosa seemed content to allow these policy disputes to play themselves out with little decisive intervention.

Slow progress on reform, against worsening economic performance, left Ramaphosa and his allies exposed. In January the president missed the UK’s African Investment Summit in order to assert control over a party meeting at which it was expected his detractors would seek to remove Gordhan.

COVID-19 has sharpened thinking

As the independently assertive - and eminently quotable - pro-market reformist finance minister Tito Mboweni stated, ‘you can’t eat ideology’. Accelerated reform and restructuring is required if the government turns to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance.

For the first time, Gordhan has been forced to deny a bailout to beleaguered state airline South African Airways (SAA), and the government’s lockdown bailout of R300 billion has been applauded by business. Much like the fiscal stimulus and recovery plan of 2018, it relies on smart spending, targeting sectors with high multiplier effects. It also includes significant reserve bank loans.

But it has been criticised for not doing enough to help the most vulnerable. There is considerable fear of what could happen when the virus takes hold in South Africa’s townships and informal settlements where social distancing is almost impossible, basic toilet facilities are shared, and HIV and TB rates high.

There are mounting concerns of the humanitarian cost of a prolonged lockdown, and the government has been faster than others in implementing a tiered lockdown system, trying to get people back to work and keep the economy afloat.

South Africa has been criticized by the UN for the use of lethal force by security forces in enforcing lockdown and, in a society plagued by corruption, there are fears legislation to stop the spread of false information could be used to restrict legitimate reporting on the virus response or other issues.

COVID-19 shines a spotlight on societies’ fault-lines worldwide. South Africa is often touted as having one of the highest levels of inequality in the world but, in a globalized economy, these divisions are international as much as they are local.

Resilience comes from within, but also depends on regional and global trading and financial systems. South Africans and international partners have long recognised Ramaphosa’s leadership qualities as an impressive voice for the global south.

But he must also be an advocate for South Africa’s poor. This crisis could accelerate implementation of his landmark pro-poor National Health Insurance and Universal Health Care programmes. Or the hit of COVID-19 on top of South Africa’s existing economic woes could see them derailed entirely. Ramaphosa must push through economic reforms at the same time as managing COVID-19 and rebuilding trust in his government.

In the COVID-19 crisis so far, Cyril Ramaphosa has been widely praised for displaying the decisive leadership so many hoped for when they cast their ballot for him in May 2019. Buttressed by others such as health minister Dr Zweli Mkhize, and on a simple objective to prevent transmission, South Africa has been a lesson to the world. Act fast. Act hard.

Former president Thabo Mbeki’s disastrous response to the HIV crisis cast a long shadow over his legacy, and Ramaphosa has taken note. South Africa has had one of the tightest lockdowns in the world. No exercise. No cigarettes. No alcohol.

The lockdown was imposed when the country had only around 1,000 recorded cases and just two deaths. As a result, transmission from returning travellers has not yet led to an exponential infection rate within the community. The government’s swift reaction has bought much needed time with the peak now seemingly delayed to September or October.

Continental and national leadership

Ramaphosa has also emerged as a key focal point for Africa-wide responses. As current chair of the African Union (AU) he leads the continental engagement with the World Health Organization (WHO), and the various international finance institutions, while South African officials are working with the AU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) on a push for African debt restructuring.

He has also been active in trouble shooting to unlock external assistance to the continent, including from China and Russia. Appointing special envoys is typical of his boardroom-honed leadership style.

International and regional partnerships are vital for resilience and the arrival of 217 Cuban doctors to South Africa is strongly reminiscent of the liberationist solidarity of the Cold War era. And regional economies remain dependent on South Africa to protect their own vulnerable citizens. Following the 2008 financial crisis, it was South Africa’s regional trading relationships that remained robust, while trade with its main global partners in China and the US dropped.

Despite the plaudits, Ramaphosa remains vulnerable to challenge at home, notably around his failure to stimulate South Africa’s moribund economy. On the eve of lockdown, Moody’s joined its peers Standard and Poor’s and Fitch in giving South Africa a below investment grade credit rating. The move was a long time coming. Long mooted economic reforms were slow to materialise, and South Africa had fallen into recession.

Ramaphosa depends on a small core of close advisors and allies, initially united in apparent opposition to the kleptocratic rule of President Jacob Zuma and the deep patronage networks he created within both the party and the state. But this allegiance is being tested by economic reality. Support within the party was already drifting prior to the crisis.

Disagreements are not just technocratic – there are big ideological questions in play around the role of the state in the economy, the level of intervention, and its affordability, with key government figures sceptical of rapid market reforms. Energy minister and former union stalwart Gwede Mantashe is wary of job losses, and minister of public enterprises Pravin Gordhan protective of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Before coronavirus hit, Ramaphosa seemed content to allow these policy disputes to play themselves out with little decisive intervention.

Slow progress on reform, against worsening economic performance, left Ramaphosa and his allies exposed. In January the president missed the UK’s African Investment Summit in order to assert control over a party meeting at which it was expected his detractors would seek to remove Gordhan.

COVID-19 has sharpened thinking

As the independently assertive - and eminently quotable - pro-market reformist finance minister Tito Mboweni stated, ‘you can’t eat ideology’. Accelerated reform and restructuring is required if the government turns to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance.

For the first time, Gordhan has been forced to deny a bailout to beleaguered state airline South African Airways (SAA), and the government’s lockdown bailout of R300 billion has been applauded by business. Much like the fiscal stimulus and recovery plan of 2018, it relies on smart spending, targeting sectors with high multiplier effects. It also includes significant reserve bank loans.

But it has been criticised for not doing enough to help the most vulnerable. There is considerable fear of what could happen when the virus takes hold in South Africa’s townships and informal settlements where social distancing is almost impossible, basic toilet facilities are shared, and HIV and TB rates high.

There are mounting concerns of the humanitarian cost of a prolonged lockdown, and the government has been faster than others in implementing a tiered lockdown system, trying to get people back to work and keep the economy afloat.

South Africa has been criticized by the UN for the use of lethal force by security forces in enforcing lockdown and, in a society plagued by corruption, there are fears legislation to stop the spread of false information could be used to restrict legitimate reporting on the virus response or other issues.

COVID-19 shines a spotlight on societies’ fault-lines worldwide. South Africa is often touted as having one of the highest levels of inequality in the world but, in a globalized economy, these divisions are international as much as they are local.

Resilience comes from within, but also depends on regional and global trading and financial systems. South Africans and international partners have long recognised Ramaphosa’s leadership qualities as an impressive voice for the global south.

But he must also be an advocate for South Africa’s poor. This crisis could accelerate implementation of his landmark pro-poor National Health Insurance and Universal Health Care programmes. Or the hit of COVID-19 on top of South Africa’s existing economic woes could see them derailed entirely. Ramaphosa must push through economic reforms at the same time as managing COVID-19 and rebuilding trust in his government.

What does Britain’s departure from the EU mean for the country’s policy towards the South Caucasus, a small region on the periphery of Europe, fractured by conflict? Although Britain is not directly involved in any of the region’s peace processes (except in the case of the Geneva International Discussions on conflicts involving Georgia, as an EU member state), it has been a significant stakeholder in South Caucasian stability since the mid-1990s.

Most obviously, Britain has been the single largest foreign investor in Caspian oil and gas. Yet beyond pipelines, Britain also has been a significant investor in long-term civil society-led strategies to build peace in the South Caucasus.

Through what was then the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, in the early 2000s the Department for International Development (DfID) pioneered large-scale peacebuilding interventions, such as the Consortium Initiative, addressing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in 2003-09. These built civic networks in the South Caucasus and partnerships with British-based NGOs.

This experience left a strong intellectual legacy. British expertise on the South Caucasus, including specific expertise on its conflicts, is highly regarded in the region and across the world.

There is also a strong tradition of British scholarship on the Caucasus, and several British universities offer Caucasus-related courses. Through schemes such as the John Smith Fellowship Trust, the Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellowship at Chatham House and Chevening Scholarships, significant numbers of young leaders from the South Caucasus have spent time in British institutions and built effective relationships within them.

Three challenges

This niche as a champion of long-term, strategic peacebuilding and repository of area-specific knowledge should not be lost as Britain’s relationship with the EU and regional actors evolves. This can be ensured through awareness of three challenges confronting a post-Brexit Caucasus policy.

The first challenge for London is to avoid framing a regional policy in the South Caucasus as an extension of a wider ‘Russia policy’. Deteriorating Russian-British relations in recent years strengthen a tendency to view policies in the European neighbourhood through the traditional prisms of Cold War and Russian-Western rivalries.

Yet an overwhelming focus on Russia fails to capture other important aspects of political developments in South Caucasus conflicts. Although often referred to as ‘breakaway’ or ‘occupied’ territories, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh are not ungoverned spaces. They have evolved into examples of what scholars call ‘de facto states’ that, to differing degrees, control territory, provide governance and exercise internal sovereignty.

Few disagree that these entities would not survive without external patronage. But neither does that patronage explain their sustainability on its own. Russia-centricity diminishes Britain’s latitude to engage on the full range of local drivers sustaining these entities, contributing instead to less effective policies predicated on competition and containment.

A second and related challenge is to maintain and develop Britain’s position on the issue of engaging populations in these entities. De facto states appear to stand outside of the international rules-based system. Yet in many cases, their civil societies are peopled by skilled and motivated activists who want their leaders to be held accountable according to international rules.

Strategies of isolation ignore these voices and contribute instead to fearful and demoralized communities less likely to engage in a transformation of adversarial relationships. Making this case with the wider international community, and facilitating the funding of local civil societies in contested territories, would be important steps in sustaining an effective British policy on the resolution of conflicts.    

The third challenge for Britain is to maintain a long-term approach to the conflicts of the South Caucasus alongside potential short-term imperatives in other policy fields, as relationships shift post-Brexit.

In this fluid international environment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has a role to play both as an internal champion of a long-term peacebuilding strategy and a coordinator of British efforts with those of multilateral actors engaged in the South Caucasus. These include the United Nations, the EU’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia and OSCE’s Special Representative for the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, all of which have built relationships with relevant actors on the ground.

Recommendations

Britain’s niche as a champion and advocate of a strategic approach to peaceful change can be secured post-Brexit in the following ways.  

First, in-house expertise is crucial to effective peacebuilding programming. The Foreign Office’s research analysts play a vital role in generating independent internal advice and liaising with academic and NGO communities. Their role could be supplemented by the reinstatement of a regional conflict adviser post, based in Tbilisi, tasked with strengthening Britain’s regional presence on conflict issues and coordinating policy at a regional level.

This post, with a remit to cover conflicts and build up area knowledge and relationships can contribute significantly to working closely with local civil societies, where so much expertise and knowledge resides, as well as other stakeholders.

Second, programming should build in conflict sensitivity by dissociating eligibility from contested political status. This can encourage local populations to take advantage of opportunities for funding, study, comparative learning and professional development irrespective of the status of the entity where they reside.

The Chevening Scholarships are an excellent example, whereby applicants can select ‘South Caucasus’ as their affiliated identity from a drop-down menu. This enables citizens from across the region to apply irrespective of the status of the territory in which they live.   

Finally, a holistic understanding of peace is crucial. Programming in unrecognized or partially-recognized entities should acknowledge that effective peacebuilding needs to embrace political dynamics and processes beyond cross-conflict contact and confidence building. Local actors in such entities may find peacebuilding funding streams defined exclusively in terms of cross-conflict contact more politically risky and ineffective in addressing domestic blockages to peace.

While cross-conflict dynamics remain critical, ‘single-community’ programming framed in terms of civic participation, inclusion, civil society capacity-building, minority and human rights in contested territories, and building the confidence from within to engage in constructive dialogue, are no less important.

The ’global Britain’ promised by Brexit remains a fanciful idea. Quiet, painstaking work to build on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus, on the other hand, is a realistic and attainable goal.

Does the rule of law matter to maritime security? One way into the question is to examine whether states show a discursive commitment that maritime security practices must comply with international law. International law thus provides tools for argument for or against the validity of certain practices. The proposition is thus not only that international law matters to maritime security, but legal argument does too. In this article, these claims will be explored in relation to the South China Sea dispute. The dispute involves Chinese claims to enjoy special rights within the ‘nine-dash line’ on official maps which appears to lay claim to much of the South China Sea. Within this area sovereignty remains disputed over numerous islands and other maritime features. Many of the claimant states have engaged in island-building activities, although none on the scale of China. Ideas matter in such contests, affecting perceptions of reality and of what is possible. International law provides one such set of ideas. Law may be a useful tool in consolidating gains or defeating a rival's claims. For China, law is a key domain in which it is seeking to consolidate control over the South China Sea. The article places the relevant Chinese legal arguments in the context of China's historic engagement with the law of the sea. It argues that the flaw in China's approach has been to underestimate the extent to which it impinges on other states' national interests in the maritime domain, interests they conceptualize in legal terms.

What does Britain’s departure from the EU mean for the country’s policy towards the South Caucasus, a small region on the periphery of Europe, fractured by conflict? Although Britain is not directly involved in any of the region’s peace processes (except in the case of the Geneva International Discussions on conflicts involving Georgia, as an EU member state), it has been a significant stakeholder in South Caucasian stability since the mid-1990s.

Most obviously, Britain has been the single largest foreign investor in Caspian oil and gas. Yet beyond pipelines, Britain also has been a significant investor in long-term civil society-led strategies to build peace in the South Caucasus.

Through what was then the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, in the early 2000s the Department for International Development (DfID) pioneered large-scale peacebuilding interventions, such as the Consortium Initiative, addressing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in 2003-09. These built civic networks in the South Caucasus and partnerships with British-based NGOs.

This experience left a strong intellectual legacy. British expertise on the South Caucasus, including specific expertise on its conflicts, is highly regarded in the region and across the world.

There is also a strong tradition of British scholarship on the Caucasus, and several British universities offer Caucasus-related courses. Through schemes such as the John Smith Fellowship Trust, the Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellowship at Chatham House and Chevening Scholarships, significant numbers of young leaders from the South Caucasus have spent time in British institutions and built effective relationships within them.

Three challenges

This niche as a champion of long-term, strategic peacebuilding and repository of area-specific knowledge should not be lost as Britain’s relationship with the EU and regional actors evolves. This can be ensured through awareness of three challenges confronting a post-Brexit Caucasus policy.

The first challenge for London is to avoid framing a regional policy in the South Caucasus as an extension of a wider ‘Russia policy’. Deteriorating Russian-British relations in recent years strengthen a tendency to view policies in the European neighbourhood through the traditional prisms of Cold War and Russian-Western rivalries.

Yet an overwhelming focus on Russia fails to capture other important aspects of political developments in South Caucasus conflicts. Although often referred to as ‘breakaway’ or ‘occupied’ territories, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh are not ungoverned spaces. They have evolved into examples of what scholars call ‘de facto states’ that, to differing degrees, control territory, provide governance and exercise internal sovereignty.

Few disagree that these entities would not survive without external patronage. But neither does that patronage explain their sustainability on its own. Russia-centricity diminishes Britain’s latitude to engage on the full range of local drivers sustaining these entities, contributing instead to less effective policies predicated on competition and containment.

A second and related challenge is to maintain and develop Britain’s position on the issue of engaging populations in these entities. De facto states appear to stand outside of the international rules-based system. Yet in many cases, their civil societies are peopled by skilled and motivated activists who want their leaders to be held accountable according to international rules.

Strategies of isolation ignore these voices and contribute instead to fearful and demoralized communities less likely to engage in a transformation of adversarial relationships. Making this case with the wider international community, and facilitating the funding of local civil societies in contested territories, would be important steps in sustaining an effective British policy on the resolution of conflicts.    

The third challenge for Britain is to maintain a long-term approach to the conflicts of the South Caucasus alongside potential short-term imperatives in other policy fields, as relationships shift post-Brexit.

In this fluid international environment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has a role to play both as an internal champion of a long-term peacebuilding strategy and a coordinator of British efforts with those of multilateral actors engaged in the South Caucasus. These include the United Nations, the EU’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia and OSCE’s Special Representative for the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, all of which have built relationships with relevant actors on the ground.

Recommendations

Britain’s niche as a champion and advocate of a strategic approach to peaceful change can be secured post-Brexit in the following ways.  

First, in-house expertise is crucial to effective peacebuilding programming. The Foreign Office’s research analysts play a vital role in generating independent internal advice and liaising with academic and NGO communities. Their role could be supplemented by the reinstatement of a regional conflict adviser post, based in Tbilisi, tasked with strengthening Britain’s regional presence on conflict issues and coordinating policy at a regional level.

This post, with a remit to cover conflicts and build up area knowledge and relationships can contribute significantly to working closely with local civil societies, where so much expertise and knowledge resides, as well as other stakeholders.

Second, programming should build in conflict sensitivity by dissociating eligibility from contested political status. This can encourage local populations to take advantage of opportunities for funding, study, comparative learning and professional development irrespective of the status of the entity where they reside.

The Chevening Scholarships are an excellent example, whereby applicants can select ‘South Caucasus’ as their affiliated identity from a drop-down menu. This enables citizens from across the region to apply irrespective of the status of the territory in which they live.   

Finally, a holistic understanding of peace is crucial. Programming in unrecognized or partially-recognized entities should acknowledge that effective peacebuilding needs to embrace political dynamics and processes beyond cross-conflict contact and confidence building. Local actors in such entities may find peacebuilding funding streams defined exclusively in terms of cross-conflict contact more politically risky and ineffective in addressing domestic blockages to peace.

While cross-conflict dynamics remain critical, ‘single-community’ programming framed in terms of civic participation, inclusion, civil society capacity-building, minority and human rights in contested territories, and building the confidence from within to engage in constructive dialogue, are no less important.

The ’global Britain’ promised by Brexit remains a fanciful idea. Quiet, painstaking work to build on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus, on the other hand, is a realistic and attainable goal.

On its third anniversary, South Sudan is teetering on the brink of humanitarian disaster. Without urgent action, some parts of the country face famine as a result of conflict, a poor harvest and high, pre-existing levels of malnutrition and poverty. If all this sounds eerily familiar, it should. In July 2011 similar conditions saw famine strike in Somalia, just as South Sudan gained its independence. It is estimated that more than a quarter of a million people died during this catastrophe, most of them children.

The situation in South Sudan shows the lessons of 2011 have not been learned. Early warnings of disaster in Somalia accumulated for almost a year before famine was eventually declared by the UN. The threat was first explicitly raised by the Famine Early-Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) in March 2011 and again in May. Yet the humanitarian system remained dormant. Had donors and agencies intervened early, they could have prevented the downward spiral into destitution and starvation. The reasons why early warnings did not lead to early action were documented in a major Chatham House report that concluded with numerous recommendations for how programmes, funding and decision-making should be reformed to avoid such a failure ever happening again.

Fast forward to 2014 and head 1,000 miles west, and little seems to have changed. FEWSNET warned of famine in South Sudan in early May, yet official UN data reveals no subsequent increase in funding. If anything, contributions to the South Sudan emergency appeal appear to have slowed, with April, May and June showing markedly less being received than in previous months. With the lean season (when food insecurity peaks) now well underway, the appeal is less than half-funded.

Experience shows that the thing most likely to mobilize emergency funding is not early warning but media coverage, which can lead to pressure from publics for donor governments to act. News of the situation in South Sudan has been muted, however. According to Google Trends, there was no increase in the number of headlines on South Sudan following the famine warning in May for example. Three years ago in Somalia, it was not until famine was declared that the crisis caught the global media’s attention and donors finally responded. By then it was, by definition, too late to avert catastrophe.

Despite these alarming similarities, it is not inevitable that South Sudan will mark its third anniversary with famine. Like all complex forecasts, famine early warnings do not deal in certainties. And, although the window of opportunity for preventive action has probably closed by now and the challenge of reaching communities in the midst of conflict is huge, it is still possible for humanitarian actors to mitigate the worst-case scenario with a concerted and coordinated push to distribute aid and scale-up emergency infant nutrition programmes in the worst-affected areas. But even if famine is avoided, communities in South Sudan will be left weaker, poorer and more vulnerable to the next crisis. The risk will remain. 

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The Marikana Commission of inquiry was appointed by South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma following more than 40 deaths (with many others left injured) after police opened fire on striking miners at Marikana in August 2012.

The massacre was reported as the worst use of lethal force by the South African Police Service since 1994, and brought issues of labour dispute resolution, public-order policing and accountability into stark relief.

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