Premier Li Keqiang's government work report was a pragmatic and concrete one, pointing out challenges as well as strengths and opportunities, according to a US-based China scholar.

The report, delivered by Premier Li at the opening of the fourth session of the 12th National People's Congress (NPC) on Saturday, is now being deliberated by some 3,000 deputies.

Cheng Li, director of the John L. Thornton China Center of the Brookings Institution, said the report tells people that the Chinese economy is facing difficulties as a result of structural reforms, the need for better environmental protection and the impact of a sluggish global economy.

"It tells the public that such economic challenges will last for a period of time, so the report does not give the public an unachievable expectation," Cheng Li said.

Meanwhile, the report has also elaborated on China's strength, such as the potential to be unleashed in urbanization, the development of the service sector, the employment policy and the innovation policy, according to Cheng Li.

"So this is a report that neither gives the public too high an expectation nor disappointment," said Cheng Li, whose research has focused on the transformation of Chinese leaders and technological development in China.

Cheng Li believes that this is especially important during the coming two years, or the beginning years of the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), when there won't be excessive high economic growth rate, something he said China also does not need.

In the work report, China's gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 2016 has been set between 6.5 percent and 7 percent. It is the first time since 1995 for the target to be in a range rather than one single number.

China's economy grew by 6.9 percent in 2015, the lowest in a quarter of a century, but it was still among the highest in the world.

According to the report, an average annual growth of at least 6.5 percent should be maintained in the coming five years in order to achieve the goals of doubling GDP and household income by 2020 from the 2010 levels.

It also says that by 2020, the contribution from scientific and technological advances should account for 60 percent of GDP growth.

Cheng Li said structural reforms will bring a lot of challenges, all of which would require dealing with by the Chinese government.

He described the goals in the work report as very specific. "There isn't much empty content and slogan type of things," he said.

"It is what the Chinese public wants to see... and it's a relatively balanced and good report, one quite pertinent to China's situation today," Cheng Li said.

He hoped that the report had emphasized more that many of the challenges are also opportunities. "It is just the beginning and the potential is huge," he said, citing how areas such as environmental protection could help job creation and business opportunities.

To Cheng Li, the potential opportunities will help small- and medium-sized companies, large companies, Chinese companies overseas and foreign-funded companies in China break new ground.

Cheng Li said the growth targets set in the 13th Five-Year Plan are quite reasonable. "More than 90 percent of what's in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) had been achieved, and there is a better reason to achieve what's in the 13th Five-Year Plan," he said.

This piece was originally published by China Daily.

Chinese President Xi Jinping is paying a US visit to attend the 4th Nuclear Security Summit. A US-based scholar noted that the trip not only shows China’s will to beef up cooperation with the rest of the world, but also signals that China, which has kept a low-profile, is ready to play a bigger role in global governance.

During the two-day summit starting from Thursday, President Xi will also meet with his US counterpart Barack Obama.

Li Cheng, director of the John L. Thornton China Center of the Brookings Institute, said that Xi’s second visit to Washington DC in six months highlights that the two major powers are seeking cooperation rather than confrontation.

The new type of major-power ties between the two nations, with win-win cooperation and mutual respect at its core, advocates collaboration rather than conflict, saidLi, explaining that such a relationship emphasizes a desire for cooperation.

He also pointed out that Xi’s attendance at the summit shows China's willingness to further collaborate with the international community. "His attendance will be greatly welcomed," Li stressed, adding that China now plays a crucial role in climate change, cyber security, nuclear security and global economic governance.

"As a major power, China's voice should be heard, and views should be delivered," said Li. He also noted that the international community will continue to respect China's growing role in international affairs.

Though China has previously maintained a low-profile in global governance, its role has since increased, the scholar commented.

Along with its rising international status, China also shoulders more responsibilities and obligations in narrowing the rich-poor gap, promoting South-South Cooperation and other global affairs, he added.

Li also applauded the momentum of Sino-US ties, saying that the leaders of both nations are making far-sighted choices based on an expandedworld view and their fundamental interests.

Though some disputes emerged, they are far outweighed by bilateral cooperation, he noted, especially praising their collaboration in global issues.

"I believe their worldwide cooperation will generate a spillover effect, so that the two will better understand each other and advance cooperation," said Li. 

This piece originally appeared in People's Daily.

Event Information

As China presides over the G-20 for the first time, the country has the significant opportunity to impact a system of global governance under increasing stress. At the same time, while enduring the costs and realizing the benefits of its leadership role, China can address critical issues including innovation, global security, infrastructure development, and climate change. Even as China recently has made its own forays into regional institution-building with the launch of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, its G-20 presidency presents a new platform from which the country can advance its own agenda as part of a broader global agenda. As the first and second largest economies in the world, the United States and China can benefit enormously by understanding each other’s perspective.

Think tanks like the Brookings-Tsinghua Center have been playing an important role in this bilateral and multilateral exchange of views. On March 22, in celebration of the 10th anniversaries of the Brookings-Tsinghua Center and the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, Tsinghua University hosted a conference to examine how China can realize the 2016 G-20 theme of “an innovative, invigorated, interconnected, and inclusive world economy.” The event began with introductory keynote remarks on the substantive advancements China and the United States have made in think tank development and people-to-people diplomacy, followed by an additional set of keynote remarks and panel discussions presenting Chinese and American perspectives on the G-20 agenda and the state of global governance.

Event Materials

• Chinas G20 Presidency Transcript

For the past several years, international affairs have been analyzed through two lenses. One lens has focused on geopolitics: in particular, the question of how great power relations are evolving at a time of redistribution in the world’s economic and now also political power. The second lens considers the framework of global governance, especially the question of whether or not the existing formal and informal institutions have the tools and the ability to manage complex global challenges.

China's presidency of the G-20 bridges the issues of global governance and great power relations. At a basic level, the G-20 will set a tone for how major powers attempt to tackle the challenges that confront us all.

China’s assumption of the G-20 chairmanship in 2016 marks an important symbolic threshold. It is the first time a major non-Western power will chair the world’s premier body for international economic cooperation—not to mention one of the world’s most important geopolitical bodies, as well. China’s presidency comes at an important time in the substance of the G-20’s agenda, too, as a slowing Chinese economy is integral to the dynamics of an overall slowing global economy. As such, this event offers an opportunity to reflect on geopolitics and global governance—and the way forward. In short, what is the state of international order? 

Heading down a bumpy road?

There is little doubt that we are at an important inflection point in international order. For the past 25 years, the international system—with its win-win economic structures—has been relatively stable. But this order is under challenge and threat, and it is eroding. We risk the rise of a lose-lose international system, encompassing a deterioration of the security relations between great powers, and a breakdown of the basic structures of international cooperation. 

That may be the worst-case scenario, but it is a plausible one. Countries must be vigilant about preventing this outcome. Even though the established powers and the so-called emerging powers (clearly China is an emerged power) may not hold the same views about the content of international order, all sides have a stake in pursuing intense negotiations and engaging in debate and dialogue. It is imperative that parties find a middle ground that preserves key elements of the existing order while introducing some degree of adaptation, such that this order does not collapse.

For the past 25 years, the international system—with its win-win economic structures—has been relatively stable. But this order is under challenge and threat, and it is eroding.

A version of this kind of negotiation may occur later this year. Japan’s presidency of the G-7 will begin just ahead of China's presidency of the G-20, putting important issues into sharp relief. As the older, Western-oriented tool for managing global issues, the G-7 still focuses on global economics but increasingly tackles cross-cutting and security issues. The G-20 is the newer, multipolar tool through which both emerged and emerging powers collaborate—but, so far, members have limited their deliberations to economic issues. The two processes together will reveal the tensions and opportunities for improvement in great power relations and in geopolitics. 

Of particular note is where political and security issues fall on the dockets of these two bodies. Although the G-20 did tackle the Syria crisis at its St. Petersburg meeting in 2013, political and security issues have otherwise not been part of the group’s agenda. But these topics form an important part of the landscape of great power politics and global governance, and they are issues for which we find ourselves in very difficult waters. Tensions between the West—particularly Europe—and Russia are running high, just as disputes are mounting in Northeast Asia. The question of America’s naval role in the Western Pacific and China’s claims of a nine-dash line are serious flash points in the U.S.-China relationship, and we should not pretend that they are not increasingly difficult to manage, because they clearly are.

I believe it is shortsighted for the G-20 not to take up some of these tense security issues.

These are not part of the formal agenda of the G-20, but they should be. Although many economists may disagree with me, I believe it is shortsighted for the G-20 not to take up some of these tense security issues. The group’s argument has been to focus on economic issues, for which there are shared interests and progress can be made, which is a fair point. But history tells us that having difficult, tense issues involving a number of stakeholders leads to one of two scenarios: either these issues are managed in a credible forum, or tensions escalate and grow into conflict. There is no third option. Moreover, these are not issues that can be resolved bilaterally. They have to be settled in a multilateral forum.

In 2016, Japan will take up the issue of the South China Sea in the G-7—a scenario that is far from ideal, since key stakeholders will not be present. Even so, the G-20 refuses to take up security issues, leaving countries without an inclusive forum to deal with these tense security concerns. Of course, they could be raised in the U.N. Security Council, but that is a crisis management tool. We should be building political relations and involving leaders in preventing great power conflict, all of which, by and large, does not happen at the U.N. But it could happen at the G-20. 

With great power comes great responsibility

A better dynamic is at work with respect to the issues of climate change and global energy policy. The Paris climate accords are counted as a major breakthrough in global governance. To understand how the outcome in Paris was achieved, we have to look again at great power relations. What really broke the logjam of stale and unproductive negotiations was the agreement struck between President Xi and President Obama. Their compact on short-lived climate pollutants transformed the global diplomacy around climate change, yielding the broader agreement in Paris.

[G]reat power status primarily entails a responsibility to act first in resolving tough global challenges and absorbing costs.

Why did the U.S.-China agreement on climate change facilitate the Paris climate accords? The United States and China did not impose a framework, nor did they insist on a particular process or stipulate a set of rules. What they did was lead. They acted first and they absorbed costs. This is the essence of the relationship between great power politics and global governance.

Great power status confers a certain set of privileges, not least of which is a certain degree of autonomy. To that end, the United States has avoided multilateral rules more than other countries, and other countries may aspire to that status. But the larger point is that great power status primarily entails a responsibility to act first in resolving tough global challenges and absorbing costs. That is how great powers lead through a framework of global governance. In today’s world, where global governance will necessarily be more multipolar than in the past, we have to find new approaches to sharing the burdens of moving first and absorbing costs. That is, far and away, the most likely way to maintain a relatively stable but continuously adapting international order—one that is empowered to tackle global challenges and soothe geopolitical tensions.

The mobile economy in China and India has grown by leaps and bounds over the past decade. Mobile technology has the potential to shrink the broadband gap, improve financial inclusion, and support humanitarian efforts. A recent report from the Boston Consulting Group adds another interesting perspective into the existing conversation about the impact of mobile technologies. India appears poised to eschew building up its fixed broadband infrastructure and jump directly to mobile. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in India appeared poised to take advantage of this amazing change.

Mobile innovation lower costs and improve performance

Source: Boston Consulting Group

Maximum download speeds have risen greatly when comparing second generation networks with current fourth generation technology. 2G networks were capable of reaching 20 kilobits per second and 4G technologies can reach 250 megabits per second, which is about 12,000 times faster. At the same time the actual cost of network infrastructure per megabyte is falling dramatically: a 95 percent decrease from 2G to 3G and 67 percent decrease from 3G to 4G. Subsequently, the consumer cost of data per megabyte decreased sharply. From 2005 to 2013, the average cost of a mobile subscription relative to the maximum data speed dropped about 40 percent each year or 99 percent in an 8 year period. Higher speeds and lower costs make mobile a viable development platform for SMEs. In America this had led to the growth of the app economy. In India this effect is even more pronounced.

Widespread use of mobile technologies fuels the leap

In 2013 India reached 900 million mobile connections and became the second largest market in terms of mobile connections and unique subscribers. Indians spend 45 percent of their incomes on mobile technologies and platforms whereas Americans only spend 11 percent.

Source: World Bank Indicators

For the average Indian, mobile is the only point-of-entry to the Internet. Mobile devices are much more common than computers. The PC penetration rate in India of 5 percent stands in stark contrast to the 75 percent rate for mobile devices. Rates of fixed broadband Internet usage increased at a snails pace in India and at the same time mobile cellular subscriptions soared. More and more people in India are choosing to access Internet solely through mobile devices. Currently about 34 percent of people in India access the Internet exclusively from mobile devices. Flipkart an Indian e-commerce company predicts that 75 to 80 percent of their customer’s traffic will come on mobile platforms. The proliferation of mobile technologies in India provides incentives for SMEs to focus on developing mobile oriented business models.

Existing mobile focused SMEs lead the leap

SMEs in India place a greater emphasis on mobile platforms compared to companies in other countries. About 25 to 35 percent of surveyed SMEs in India are identified as mobile leaders, firms that use mobile productivity tools, operational tools (real-time job tracking or mobile data analytics) and sales and marketing tools. In developed countries such as Germany, only 14 percent of the surveyed SMEs are mobile leaders. Further, mobile oriented SMEs are thriving in India in a variety of fields. India’s largest E-commerce marketplace Flipkart Sidesteps has seen its traffic grow twice as face on mobile when compared with PC. Anti-violence apps such as FightBack and mobile health initiatives such as Swasthya Samvedana Sena are also experiencing great success.

India is in the midst of a mobile revolution that is categorically different than other parts of the world. Without existing complex legacy systems, businesses in India are now in the unique position to leapfrog terrestrial Internet technologies and reap the full benefits of a truly mobile economy.

Yikun Chi contributed to this post

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Last month, we experienced yet another breakthrough in the epic battle of man against machine. Google’s AlphaGo won against the reigning Go champion Lee Sedol. This success, however, was different than that of IBM’s Deep Blue against Gary Kasparov in 1987. While Deep Blue still applied “brute force” to calculate all possible options ahead, AlphaGo was learning as the game progressed. And through this computing breakthrough that we can learn how to better leverage the data revolution.

In the game of Go, brute-force strategies don’t help because the total number of possible combinations exceeds the number of atoms in the universe. Some games, including some we played since childhood, were immune to computing “firepower” for a long time. For example, Connect Four wasn’t solved until 1995 with the conclusion being the first player can force a win. And checkers wasn’t until 2007, when Jonathan Schaeffer determined that in a perfect game, both sides could force a draw. For chess, a safe strategy has yet to be developed, meaning that we don’t know yet if white could force a win or, like in checkers, black could manage to hold on to a draw.

But most real-life situations are more complicated than chess, precisely because the universe of options is unlimited and solving them requires learning. If computers are to help, beyond their use as glorified calculators, they need to be able to learn. This is the starting point of the artificial intelligence movement.  In a world where perfection is impossible, you need well-informed intuition in order to advance. The first breakthrough in this space occurred when IBM’s Watson beat America’s Jeopardy! champions in 2011. These new intelligent machines operate in probabilities, not in certainty.

That being said, perfection remains important, especially when it comes to matters of life and death such as flying airplanes, constructing houses, or conducting heart surgery, as these areas require as much attention to detail as possible. At the same time, in many realms of life and policymaking we fall into a perfection trap. We often generate obsolete knowledge by attempting to explain things perfectly, when effective problem solving would have been better served by real-time estimates. We strive for exactitude when rough results, more often than not, are good enough.

By contrast, some of today’s breakthroughs are based on approximation. Think of Google Translate and Google’s search engine itself. The results are typically quite bad, but compared to the alternative of not having them at all, or spending hours leafing through an encyclopedia, they are wonderful. Moreover, once these imperfect breakthroughs are available, one can improve them iteratively. Only once the first IBM and Apple PCs were put on the market in the 1980s did the cycle of upgrading start, which still continues today.

In the realm of social and economic data, we have yet to reach this stage of “managed imperfection” and continuous upgrading. We are producing social and economic forecasts with solid 20th century methods. With extreme care we conduct poverty assessments and maps, usually taking at least a year to produce as they involve hundreds of enumerators, lengthy interviews and laborious data entry. Through these methods we are able to perfectly explain past events, but we fail to estimate current trends—even imperfectly.

The paradox of today’s big data era is that most of that data is poor and messy, even though the possibilities for improving it are unlimited. Almost every report from development institutions starts with a disclaimer highlighting “severe data limitations.” This is because only 0.5 percent of all the available data is actually being curated to be made usable. If data is the oil of the 21st century, we need data refineries to convert the raw product into something that can be consumed by the average person.

Thanks to the prevalence of mobile device and rapid advances in satellite technology, it is possible to produce more data faster, better, and cheaper. High-frequency data also makes it possible to make big data personal, which also increases the likelihood that people act on it. Ultimately, the breakthroughs in big data for development will be driven by managerial cultures, as has been the case with other successful ventures. Risk averse cultures pay great attention to perfection. They nurture the fear of mistakes and losing. Modern management accepts failure, encourages trial and error, and reaches progress through interaction and continuous upgrading.

Editor's Note: As part of the 2014 Midterm Elections Series, Brookings scholars and outside experts will weigh in on issues that are central to this year's campaigns, how the candidates are engaging those topics, and what will shape policy for the next two years.

Since the Citizens United decision, political spending by outside groups has been shaping voters’ opinions before Election Day and public policy afterwards.  Spending patterns that began after the 2010 decision will continue during the upcoming midterms: nonparty, outside spending will flow through two distinct pipelines—super PACs and politically active nonprofits. This time around there seems to be a partisan split to the spending, with Democrats leaning towards super PACs and Republicans relying more on dark money nonprofits. But whichever tool is used to funnel money into competitive races, imperfect or non-existent disclosure rules leave voters unable to determine whether access and influence is being sold to highest bidder.

Shining a brighter light on super PAC and nonprofit campaign spending would not cleanse the system of all of its corrupting influences, but it would help to restore citizens’ trust in government by eliminating the secrecy that makes voters believe their elected officials have something to hide. More disclosure would also result in the equally important outcome of demonstrating that government trusts us, its citizens, with information about how the influence industry works.   

When Thomas Jefferson wrote, “Whenever the people are well-informed, they can be trusted with their own government...whenever things get so far wrong as to attract their notice, they may be relied on to set them to rights,” he certainly could not have conceived of secret money’s impact on elections and policy-making. But every year that goes by with Congress failing to address secret campaign spending challenges the founding father’s time-tested wisdom.

When the Supreme Court decided Citizens United, it was either willfully blind or sorely naïve about the state of political finance disclosure. Justice Kennedy swept aside concerns about the corrupting influence of unlimited political spending by claiming that, “With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions. . . This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”

Unfortunately, no such prompt disclosure existed at the time, nor has Congress been able to pass any improvements to the transparency regime since then. In the case of super PACs, while information about donors must eventually be disclosed to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), disclosures can be delayed by up to three months.  This is not an inconsequential delay, especially when contributions come are in the multi-million dollar range.

There is even less disclosure by politically active nonprofits.  Their overall expenditures are only disclosed after the election in annual reports filed with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The donors to dark money groups may never be known, as the law does not require the names of donors to such groups to be disclosed. Yet more than 55 percent of advertising has been paid for by dark money groups, and 80 percent advertising benefitting Republican candidates has been paid for with undisclosed funds according to the New York Times. 

Congress and the executive branch have no shortage of methods to make money in politics more transparent, but have so far failed to demonstrate they respect voters enough to entrust us with that information.  The Real Time Transparency Act (S. 2207, H.R. 4442) would ensure that contributions of $1000 or more to candidates, parties and PACs, including super PACs, are disclosed within 48 hours. It would also require electronic filing of campaign finance reports.  The DISCLOSE Act, S. 2516, would disclose contributors to political nonprofits entrusting voters with information that currently is only known to the candidates who may benefit from dark money contributions. 

Affirmative congressional action would be the strongest signal that government trusts its citizens, but executive branch agencies can also take important steps to make political finance information more transparent. The IRS is in the process of reforming rules to better clarify when a nonprofit is a political organization and thus must disclose its donors.  The Securities and Exchange Commission can likewise modify its rules to require publicly traded companies to disclose their political activities.

Many large donors have gone to great lengths to take their political activities underground, claiming they fear attacks in the form of criticism or boycotts of their companies.  But just as participating in the political process through contributing to election efforts is an expression of free speech, so is criticizing such efforts.  Yet until campaign finance information is fully and quickly made public, the first amendment rights of voters and their ability to participate fully in our democracy are drastically shortchanged.

Executive Summary

At the invitation of President George W. Bush, the G20 leaders met on November 15, 2008, in Washington, DC, in response to the worldwide financial and economic crisis. With this summit meeting the reality of global governance shifted surprisingly quickly. Previously, major global economic, social and environmental issues were debated in the small, increasingly unrepresentative and often times ineffectual circle of G8 leaders. Now, there is a larger, much more legitimate summit group which can speak for over two-thirds of the world’s population and controls 90% of the world’s economy.

The successful first G20 Summit provides a platform on which President-elect Obama can build in forging an inclusive and cooperative approach for resolving the current financial and economic crisis. Rather than get embroiled in a debate about which country is in and which country is out of the summit, the new U.S. administration should take a lead in accepting the new summit framework for now and focus on the substantive issues. Aside from tackling the current crisis, future G20 summits should also drive the reform of the international financial institutions and address other major global concerns—climate change, poverty and health, and energy among others. With its diverse and representative membership of key countries and with a well-managed process of summit preparation and follow-up the new G20 governance structure would allow for a more inclusive deliberation and more effective response to today’s complex global challenges and opportunities.

Policy Brief #168

A Successful G20 Summit—A Giant Step Forward

Once announced, there was speculation that the G20 Summit would be at best a distraction and at worst a costly failure, with a lame duck U.S. president hobbled by a crisis-wracked economy and a president-elect impotently waiting at the sidelines, with European leaders bickering over seemingly arcane matters, and with the leaders of the emerging economies sitting on the fence, unwilling or unprepared to take responsibility for fixing problems not of their making.

As it turned out, the first G20 Summit was by most standards a success. It served as a platform for heads of state to address the current financial turmoil and the threats of the emerging economic crisis facing not only the U.S. and Europeans, but increasingly also the rest of the world. The communiqué unmistakably attributes blame for the crisis where it belongs—to the advanced countries. It lays out a set of principles and priorities for crisis management and an action plan for the next four months and beyond, and it promises to address the longer-term agenda of reform of the global financial system. Very importantly, it also commits the leaders to meet again in April 2009 under the G20 umbrella. This assures that the November G20 Summit was not a one-off event, but signified the beginning of a new way of managing the world economy. The U.S. Treasury, which apparently drove the decision to hold the G20 rather than a G8 summit and which led the brief preparation process, deserves credit for this outcome.

A Long Debate over Global Governance Reform Short-circuited

With this successful summit a number of unresolved issues in global governance were pushed aside virtually overnight:

• The embarrassing efforts of past G8 summits to reach out to the leaders of emerging market economies with ad hoc invitations to join as part-time guests or through the well-meaning expedient of the “Heiligendamm Process”—under which a G8+5 process was to be institutionalized—were overtaken by the fact of the G20 summit.
• A seemingly endless debate among experts about what is the optimal size and composition for an expanded summit—G13, G14, G16, G20, etc. —was pragmatically resolved by accepting the format of the already existing G20 of finance ministers and central bank presidents, which has functioned well since 1999. With this, the Pandora’s Box of country selection remained mercifully closed. This is a major accomplishment, which is vitally important to preserve at this time.
• The idea of a “League of Democracies” as an alternative to the G8 and G20 summits, which had been debated in the U.S. election, was pushed aside by the hard reality of a financial crisis that made it clear that all the key economic players had to sit at the table, irrespective of political regime.
• Finally, the debate about whether the leaders of the industrial world would ever be willing to sit down with their peers from the emerging market economies as equals was short circuited by the picture of the U.S. president at lunch during the G20 Summit, flanked by the presidents of two of the major emerging economies, Brazil and China. This photograph perhaps best defines the new reality of global governance in the 21st Century.

Is the G20 Summit Here to Stay?

The communiqué of the November 15, 2008 Summit locked in the next G20 summit and hence ordained a sequel that appears to have enshrined the G20 as the new format to address the current global financial and economic crisis over the coming months and perhaps years. Much, of course, depends on the views of the new U.S. administration, but the November 2008 Summit has paved the way for President Obama and his team to move swiftly beyond the traditional G8 and to continue the G20 format.

In principle there is nothing wrong with exploring options for further change. However at this juncture, we strongly believe that it is best for the new U.S. administration to focus its attention on making the G20 summit format work, in terms of its ability to address the immediate crisis, and in terms of subsequently dealing with other pressing problems, such as global warming and global poverty. There may be a need to fine-tune size and composition, but more fundamental changes, in our view, can and should wait for later since arguments about composition and size—who is in and who is out—could quickly overwhelm a serious discussion of pressing substantive issues. Instead, the next G20 Summit in the United Kingdom on April 2, 2009 should stay with the standard G20 membership and get on with the important business of solving the world’s huge financial and economic problems.

One change, however, would be desirable: At the Washington Summit in November 2008 two representatives for each country were seated at the table, usually the country’s leader and finance minister. There may have been good reasons for this practice under the current circumstances, since leaders may have felt more comfortable with having the experts at their side during intense discussions of how to respond to the financial and economic crisis. In general, however, a table of 40 chairs undoubtedly is less conducive to an open and informal discussion than a table half that size. From our experience, a table of 20 can support a solid debate as long as the format is one of open give and take, rather than a delivery of scripted speeches. This is not the case for a table with 40 participants. The G8 format of leaders only at the table, with prior preparation by ministers who do not then participate in the leaders level summits, should definitely be preserved. To do otherwise would dilute the opportunity for informal discussion among leaders, which is the vital core of summit dynamics.

What Will Happen to the G8 Summit and to the G7 and G20 Meetings of Finance Ministers?

As the world’s financial storm gathered speed and intensity in recent months, the inadequacy of the traditional forums of industrial countries—the G8 group of leaders and the G7 group of finance ministers—became obvious. Does this mean that the G8 and G7 are a matter of the past? Most likely not. We would expect these forums to continue to meet for some time to come, playing a role as caucus for industrial countries. In any event, the G20 finance ministers will take on an enhanced role, since it will be the forum at which minister-level experts will lay the ground on key issues of global financial and economic management to ensure that they are effectively addressed at summit level by their leaders. The G20 Summit of November 15 was prepared by a meeting of G20 finance ministers in this fashion.

It may well be that the dynamics of interactions within the G20 will cause coalitions to be formed, shifting over time as issues and interests change. This could at times and on some issues involve a coalition of traditional G7 members. However, with increasing frequency, we would expect that some industrial countries would temporarily team-up with emerging market country members, for example on agricultural trade policies, where a coalition of Argentina, Australia, Brazil and Canada might align itself to challenge the agricultural protection policies of Europe, Japan and the United States. Or in the area of energy, a coalition among producer states, such as Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Saudi Arabia might debate the merits of a stable energy supply and demand regime with an alliance among energy users, such as China, Europe, Japan, South Africa and the United States. It is this potential for multiple, overlapping and shifting alliances, which creates the opportunities for building trust, forcing trade-offs and forging cross-issue compromises that makes the G20 summit such an exciting opportunity.

What Should Be the Agenda of Future G20 Summits?

The communiqué of the November 2008 G20 Summit identified three main agenda items for the April 2009 follow-up summit: (1) A list of key issues for the containment of the current global financial and economic crisis; (2) a set of issues for the prevention of future global financial crises, including the reform of the international financial institutions, especially the IMF and World Bank; and (3) a push toward the successful conclusion of the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations.

The first item is obviously a critical one if the G20 is to demonstrate its ability to help address the current crisis in a meaningful way. The second item is also important and timely. The experience with reform of the global financial institutions in the last few years has demonstrated that serious governance changes in these institutions will have to be driven by a summit-level group that is as inclusive as the G20. We would hope that Prime Minister Gordon Brown, as chair—with his exceptional economic expertise and experience in the international institutions, especially the IMF—will be able to forge a consensus at the April 2 summit in regard to reform of the international financial institutions. The third agenda item is also important, since the Doha Round is at a critical stage and its successful conclusion would send a powerful signal that the world community recognizes the importance of open trade relations in a time of crisis, when the natural tendency may be to revert to a protectionist stance.

However, we believe three additional topics should be added to the agenda for the April 2009 G20 Summit:

• First, there should be an explicit commitment to make the G20 forum a long-term feature of global governance, even as the group may wish to note that its size and composition is not written in stone, but subject to change as circumstances change.
• Second, the communiqué of the November summit stated that the G20 countries are “committed to addressing other critical challenges such as energy security and climate change, food security, the rule of law, and the fight against terrorism, poverty and disease”. This needs to be acted upon. These issues cannot be left off the table, even as the global financial and economic crisis rages. If anything, the crisis reinforces some of the key challenges which arise in these other areas and offers opportunities for a timely response. The U.K.-hosted summit should launch a G20 initiative to develop framework ideas for the post-Kyoto climate change agreement at Copenhagen.
• Third, assuming the April 2009 summit commits itself—as it should—to a continuation of the G20 summit format into the future, it must begin to address the question of how the summit process should be managed. We explore some of the possible options next.

How Should the G20 Summit Process Be Managed?

So far the G7, G8 and G20 forums have been supported by a loose organizational infrastructure. For each group the country holding the rotating year-long presidency of the forum takes over the secretariat function while a team of senior officials (the so-called “sherpas”) from each country meets during the course of the year to prepare the agenda and the communiqué for leaders and ministers. This organization has the advantage of avoiding a costly and rigid bureaucracy. It also fosters a growing level of trust and mutual understanding among the sherpas.

The problem with this approach has been two-fold: First, it led to discontinuities in focus and organization and in the monitoring of implementation. For the G20 of finance ministers, this problem was addressed in part by the introduction of a “troika” system, under with the immediate past and future G20 presidencies would work systematically with the current G20 presidency to shape the agenda and manage the preparation process. Second, particularly for the countries in the G20 with lesser administrative capacity, the responsibility for running the secretariat for a year during their country’s presidency imposed a heavy burden.

For the G20 summit, these problems will be amplified, not least because these summits will require first-rate preparation for very visible and high-level events. In addition, as the agenda of the G20 summit broadens over time, the burden of preparing a consistent multi-year agenda based on strong technical work will be such that it cannot be effectively handled when passed on year to year from one secretariat in one country to another secretariat in another country, especially when multiple ministries have to be engaged in each country. It is for this reason that the time may have come to explore setting up a very small permanent secretariat in support of the G20 summit.

The secretariat should only provide technical and logistical support for the political leadership of the troika of presidencies and for the sherpa process, but should not run the summit. That is the job of the host member governments. They must continue to run the summits, lead the preparations and drive the follow-up. The troika process will help strengthen the capacity of national governments to shoulder these burdens. Summits are the creatures of national government authorities where they have primacy, and this must remain so, even as the new summits become larger, more complex and more important.

Implications for the Obama Administration

The November 2008 G20 Summit opened a welcome and long-overdue opportunity for a dramatic and lasting change in global governance. It will be critical that the leaders of the G20 countries make the most of this opportunity at the next G20 Summit on April 2. The presence of U.S. President Obama will be a powerful signal that the United States is ready to push and where necessary lead the movement for global change. President-elect Obama’s vision of inclusion and openness and his approach to governing, which favors innovative and far-reaching pragmatic responses to key national and global challenges, make him a great candidate for this role.

We would hope that President Obama would make clear early on that:

• He supports the G20 summit as the appropriate apex institution of global governance for now;
• He may wish to discuss how to fine-tune the summit’s composition for enhanced credibility and effectiveness but without fundamentally questioning the G20 framework;
• He supports cooperative solutions to the current financial crisis along with a serious restructuring of the global financial institutions;
• He will look to the G20 summit as the right forum to address other pressing global issues, such as climate change, energy, poverty and health; and
• He is ready to explore an innovative approach to effectively manage the G20 summit process.

These steps would help ensure that the great promise of the November 2008 G20 Summit is translated into a deep and essential change in global governance. This change will allow the world to move from a governance system that continues to be dominated by the transatlantic powers of the 20th century to one which reflects the fundamentally different global economic and political realities of the 21st century. It would usher in a framework of deliberation, consultation and decision making that would make it possible to address the great global challenges and opportunities that we face today in a more effective and legitimate manner.

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Earlier this month, Missouri voters overwhelmingly rejected a 10-year, 3/4 cent sales tax increase to boost statewide transportation investment. With local referendums an increasingly popular method to raise transportation funding in an era of federal uncertainty, the result has lessons for Missouri’s transportation interests and the country as a whole.

Like many states, Missouri has a clear infrastructure deficit. A legislatively-mandated citizens committee found the state needs an additional $600 million to $1 billion in investment per year. The problem is finding the money. Outside of federal funds, the state primarily relies on a 17.3 cent gasoline tax and local property taxes to fund transportation projects, plus location-specific revenue streams like a half-cent sales tax in St. Louis city and county. Yet with Missouri residents driving less in recent years—down 5 percent per capita between 2000 and 2012-—there is less money available to fund critical projects.

This vote offered one remedy. The statewide bump in sales tax would’ve generated upwards of $5 billion over the ten-year period. The new monies would go to 800 projects across Missouri, primarily for roadways. The governance was a similarly unequal split, with the state department of transportation directly controlling all but 10 percent of the new revenue.

And this is where the referendum’s problems become clear. While each of the state’s seven transportation districts managed their own project list, there was no guarantee local sales taxes would be spent on local projects. There were also legitimate questions whether a heightened focus on roadways made sense in the face of falling statewide driving. This was at the heart of the opposition argument, led by Missourians for Better Transportation Solutions.

In many ways, the Missouri results reflect what happened in a failed 2012 Atlanta referendum. That transportation package contained a hodgepodge of road and rail projects, barely increased connectivity across the sprawling metro region and couldn’t align local interest groups. Much like Missouri, Atlanta has clear transportation needs—but voters sensed the current plan wouldn’t do enough to adequately improve their commutes and livability.

As Missouri’s transportation leaders regroup, they’d be wise to follow the “economy-first” lesson of successful referendums in places like Los Angeles, Denver and Oklahoma City. The common thread in all three was a great job proving the need for greater infrastructure investment. But as my colleagues outlined in a recent report, they also captured how transportation could support industrial growth and metro-wide economic health. Americans have proven time and again they’ll pay for transportation projects, but they want to know what they’re getting and how it will benefit their communities.

In this sense, I’m heartened by a recent Kansas City Star editorial related to their failed streetcar vote the same day. Even with a failed vote, the metro area still needs a better infrastructure network. The key is for public, private and civic leaders to continue working with the public to determine which transportation investments will best support regional economic growth for decades to come.

Ballot measures may fail, but they’ll always provide lessons to improve the plans that will pass.

Event Information

Antibacterial drugs are a critical component of the nation’s public health armamentarium, and have saved millions of lives by preventing and treating a range of bacterial infections. However, antibacterial drug development has been hampered by challenges unique to the antibacterial drug market, which have stifled innovation and left patients and providers with fewer options to treat increasingly resistant infections. One consequence of the dwindling antibacterial drug pipeline has been a reduction in effective oral antibacterial drug treatment options, which are particularly important in the ambulatory and transitional care contexts. Recent proposals to re-invigorate the antibacterial pipeline are geared towards serious infections treated in the inpatient setting, which may lead to a greater focus on intravenous therapies. However, addressing both current and future needs in the infectious diseases space will require a balanced mix of both oral and parenteral antibacterial drugs.

In cooperation with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform at Brookings held an expert workshop on November 20, 2014, to identify the most promising strategies to support oral antibacterial drug development. Participating stakeholders included experts from the drug development and health care industries, the clinical community, government, and academia. These stakeholders shared their insights on potential regulatory, scientific, and economic strategies to reinvigorate the oral antibacterial drug pipeline. 

Event Materials

• Reinvigorating the Oral Antibacterial Drug Development Pipeline Agenda
• Reinvigorating the Oral Antibacterial Drug Development Pipeline Discussion Guide
• Biographies 20141118
• Reinvigorating the Oral Antibacterial Drug Development Pipeline Slide Deck

Summary

Global education plays an important role in contributing to U.S. foreign policy objectives. In a recent speech, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton highlighted education, along with health, agriculture, security, and local governance as the core areas for U.S. international development investment. She emphasized the importance of education, particularly of girls and youth, in improving global stability, speeding economic growth, and helping global health, all of which advance U.S. interests in the world.

But how effective has the U.S. government been in supporting global education? Unfortunately, its many good education activities and programs are not leveraged for maximum impact on the ground, especially in situations of armed conflict and state fragility. Challenges of U.S. foreign assistance—for example, fragmentation across multiple agencies, lack of policy coherence, diminished multilateral engagement—generally affects its work in education. Luckily some of the core strengths of U.S. assistance have an impact as well, specifically the large amount of resources (in total terms, if not relative terms) devoted to education and the vast breadth and depth of American academic, philanthropic and NGO partners engaged in pioneering work on education in the developing world.

This report analyzes the effectiveness of U.S. government education work specifically in relation to conflict-affected and fragile states. Findings across five domains—global reach, resources, technical expertise, policy and multilateral partnerships—show that U.S. education aid falls critically short of what it is capable of achieving. The U.S. government has substantial strengths in this area, especially in global reach, resources, and technical expertise, demonstrating a real comparative advantage in the field of education in situations of conflict and fragility. However, its fragmented policy across agencies and its limited multilateral engagement prevent it from maximizing its strengths, leaving it punching below its weight on this important issue. In this sense, the U.S. government is a classic underachiever, failing to efficiently deploy its many capabilities and potential for maximum impact.

There has never been a better time for looking at the aid-effectiveness of U.S. government education work. The Obama administration is bringing increased focus on the Paris Principles for Aid Effectiveness to its development initiatives. The U.S. Congress is actively engaged with pending legislative action to modernize foreign assistance and improve U.S. support for universal education. Two major reviews of foreign assistance are underway: the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review led by the Department of State and USAID, and the Presidential Study Directive on U.S. Global Development Policy led by the White House.

Questions about foreign assistance reform asked in these two reviews can be applied to the education sector. For example, how can the U.S. government improve its education assistance by using a “whole-of-government” approach, by focusing on comparative advantages and strengths, and by improving coordination and by increasing multilateral engagement?

Careful analysis and answers to these questions can help propel the U.S. from its current position as an underachiever to being a leader in global education, specifically in contexts of conflict and state fragility.

This report makes nine specific recommendations, many of which could be achieved without any substantial increase in funding, that would enable the U.S. government to greatly increase the effectiveness of its education aid to populations living in contexts of conflict and state fragility.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the face of unprecedented global challenges, effective global cooperation increasingly requires a partnership between state and non-state actors. Many international institutions now involve non-state actors in arenas that were once the exclusive province of states. The paper analyzes the evolution of civil society participation in the governance of international institutions and highlights the shift from a model based on consultation toward a model of multistakeholder governance. The paper argues that consultation is a less effective approach to involving civil society in achieving the mission of these institutions and suggests that more robust forms of multi-stakeholder participation by civil society can foster greater accountability and better deliberation. It analyzes competing claims about the desirability of including civil society in the governance of international institutions and suggests that an emerging constituency model can promote more effective multi-stakeholder governance. Constituency structures are already central features of several global health institutions and are now being contemplated by institutions in other sectors, including by the Education for All—Fast Track Initiative.

Multi-stakeholder approaches to governance are likely to become more widespread in the years to come in order to harness the contributions of a plethora of private actors engaged in responding to a wide range of global challenges. Even with enhanced cooperation between states, it is increasingly clear that non-state actors are essential to responding to key challenges across a wide range of sectors. Although it is possible to imagine expanded cooperation between state and non-state actors without opening up the governance structures of international institutions, it is less likely that these institutions will be successful in the longrun without a shift toward greater multi-stakeholder involvement in the institutions themselves.

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American voters are angry. But while the ill effects of globalization top their list of grievances, nobody is well served when complex economic issues are reduced to bumper-sticker slogans – as they have been thus far in the presidential campaign.

It is unfair to dismiss concerns about globalization as unfounded. America deserves to have an honest debate about its effects. In order to yield constructive solutions, however, all sides will need to concede some inconvenient truths – and to recognize that globalization is not the same phenomenon it was 20 years ago.

Protectionists fail to see how the United States’ eroding industrial base is compatible with the principle that globalization boosts growth. But the evidence supporting that principle is too substantial to ignore.

Recent research by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) echoes the findings of other academics: global flows of goods, foreign direct investment, and data have increased global GDP by roughly 10% compared to what it would have been had those flows never occurred. The extra value provided by globalization amounted to $7.8 trillion in 2014 alone.

And yet, the shuttered factories dotting America’s Midwestern “Rust Belt” are real. Even as globalization generates aggregate growth, it produces winners and losers. Exposing local industries to international competition spurs efficiency and innovation, but the resulting creative destruction exacts a substantial toll on families and communities.

Economists and policymakers alike are guilty of glossing over these distributional consequences. Countries that engage in free trade will find new channels for growth in the long run, the thinking goes, and workers who lose their jobs in one industry will find employment in another.

In the real world, however, this process is messy and protracted. Workers in a shrinking industry may need entirely new skills to find jobs in other sectors, and they may have to pack up their families and pull up deep roots to pursue these opportunities. It has taken a popular backlash against free trade for policymakers and the media to acknowledge the extent of this disruption.

That backlash should not have come as a surprise. Traditional labor-market policies and training systems have not been equal to the task of dealing with the large-scale changes caused by the twin forces of globalization and automation. The US needs concrete proposals for supporting workers caught up in structural transitions – and a willingness to consider fresh approaches, such as wage insurance.

Contrary to campaign rhetoric, simple protectionism would harm consumers. A recent study by the US President’s Council of Economic Advisers found that middle-class Americans gain more than a quarter of their purchasing power from trade. In any event, imposing tariffs on foreign goods will not bring back lost manufacturing jobs.

It is time to change the parameters of the debate and recognize that globalization has become an entirely different animal: The global goods trade has flattened for a variety of reasons, including plummeting commodity prices, sluggishness in many major economies, and a trend toward producing goods closer to the point of consumption. Cross-border flows of data, by contrast, have grown by a factor of 45 during the past decade, and now generate a greater economic impact than flows of traditional manufactured goods.

Digitization is changing everything: the nature of the goods changing hands, the universe of potential suppliers and customers, the method of delivery, and the capital and scale required to operate globally. It also means that globalization is no longer exclusively the domain of Fortune 500 firms.

Companies interacting with their foreign operations, suppliers, and customers account for a large and growing share of global Internet traffic. Already half of the world’s traded services are digitized, and 12% of the global goods trade is conducted via international e-commerce. E-commerce marketplaces such as Alibaba, Amazon, and eBay are turning millions of small enterprises into exporters. This remains an enormous untapped opportunity for the US, where fewer than 1% of companies export– a far lower share than in any other advanced economy.

Despite all the anti-trade rhetoric, it is crucial that Americans bear in mind that most of the world’s customers are overseas. Fast-growing emerging economies will be the biggest sources of consumption growth in the years ahead.

This would be the worst possible moment to erect barriers. The new digital landscape is still taking shape, and countries have an opportunity to redefine their comparative advantages. The US may have lost out as the world chased low labor costs; but it operates from a position of strength in a world defined by digital globalization.

There is real value in the seamless movement of innovation, information, goods, services, and – yes – people. As the US struggles to jump-start its economy, it cannot afford to seal itself off from an important source of growth.

US policymakers must take a nuanced, clear-eyed view of globalization, one that addresses its downsides more effectively, not only when it comes to lost jobs at home, but also when it comes to its trading partners’ labor and environmental standards. Above all, the US needs to stop retrying the past – and start focusing on how it can compete in the next era of globalization.

Editor's note: this piece first appeared on Project-Syndicate.org.

As I anticipated in my post on Tuesday, the Hong Kong government on Wednesday announced the details for the 2017 election of the Chief Executive (CE). Based on press commentary from China, it is clear that the PRC government, which has sovereignty over Hong Kong, approves the package. But to understand the implications for democracy in Hong Kong, it is important to look at the details of the proposal.

Since Hong Kong became a special administrative region of China in 1997, the CE has been chosen by an election committee of between 800 and 1,200 individuals. Beijing had promised that starting in 2017 the CE would be elected by the voters of Hong Kong through universal suffrage. Yesterday’s proposal is the latest step in a transition process toward that system. (For all of the recommendations, see the speech of Chief Secretary Carrie Lam to the Legislative Council.) As I outlined in Tuesday’s post, the principal point of controversy for more than a year has been Beijing’s insistence that a nominating committee choose who gets to stand for election. Hong Kong’s democratic camp believes that the nominating committee will give China an opportunity to “screen out” individuals it does not like.

The most prominent element of the Hong Kong government’s proposal yesterday is a recommendation on the procedural mechanism by which the Nominating Committee (NC) would review candidates. This was important for two reasons. One, under the plan the NC will have the authority to pick two or three final candidates to actually run in the election. Two, Mrs. Lam made clear that that the NC’s membership would be similar to the 1,200-person election committee that has picked the CE up until now and is weighted in favor of people who are biased toward Beijing.

Thus, who the NC considers before making its final nominations becomes critical. That will determine whether the election will provide a choice between the majority who have long favored a quick transition to democracy, and those who have preferred to move slower; and also between those who believe that the current economic system benefits only the rich and should be reformed, and those who are happy with current policies.

The proposed procedural mechanism mandates that any individual who can get recommendations from one-tenth to one-twentieth of the NC will be a “potential candidate” and have the opportunity to articulate his/her policy views to the NC and the public in a transparent way. In effect, this means that the NC will likely consider between five to ten individuals for final nomination. And because pan-democrats will have be at least a minority of the NC membership, as they do in the election committee, they will be able to recommend at least one democrat as a potential candidate. That in turn creates the possibility that a democrat could become a final nominee and compete to become CE. In that case, voters who have supported democracy and believe current economic policies are flawed would have a candidate who shares their general outlook. This mechanism would seem to be consistent with what the spokesman of the U.S. Consulate-General said earlier today: “The legitimacy of the chief executive will be greatly enhanced if the chief executive is selected through universal suffrage and Hong Kong’s residents have a meaningful choice of candidates.”

Let me be clear: the pan-democrats do not like this proposal. They do not like a mechanism that amounts to screening by China, and this one certainly opens a backdoor for Beijing to veto candidates it doesn’t like. In addition, the pan-democrats would like to have a promise from Beijing that this is not the end of the reform process when it comes to electing the CE, but Mrs. Lam gave no hope on that score, even though she said future circumstances might require more change.

The pan-democrats were likely unhappy about the government’s refusal to propose changes on two specific issues. Both concern the sub-sectors that will make up the NC, which will be copied from the current election committee. These subsectors represent different parts of the Hong Kong community, but the balance of voting power favors subsectors that 1) represent various business interests, 2) support Beijing on most issues, and 3) are afraid of populist movements. Back in December, the government floated the idea of shifting the balance of power among the existing subsectors so that under-represented groups got more votes, but on one condition, that the existing subsectors agreed. In the end, no change was made here, perhaps due to the stated reasons that there was no social consensus to make this change and that doing so would only create more political controversy. The more likely reason is that the subsectors that stood to lose their relative power were not willing to have their oxen gored.

The second issue had to do with “corporate voting” within subsectors. In some subsectors the constituent members decide their choices based on the preference of the leader of the member organizations. For example, in a subsector made up of commercial firms, the CEO of each member firm decides how to cast the firm’s vote. The alternative would be to have a larger number of people associated with the firm contribute to the decision, up to all the employees. As a matter of principle, the pan-democratic camp has long called for an end to corporate voting, and while there was an opportunity to do so on this occasion, the government didn’t take it.

So, the pan-democratic bloc in the Legislative Council walked out during Mrs. Lam’s presentation to the Legislative Council and has vowed to vote against this proposal. And if all of them did vote against, that would kill the proposal, because it must pass the Legislative Council by a two-thirds margin and the establishment caucus does not have enough votes on its own. On the other hand, Beijing and the Hong Kong government do not need to win over the whole of the disparate democratic camp. They just have to peel off four opposition legislators to secure the necessary majority. Presumably these would be more moderate politicians who might conclude that the reform package is “good enough” compared to the alternative. That is, Beijing and the Hong Kong government say that if the package is vetoed, election of the CE would revert to the 1,200-member election committee, delaying a one-person, one-vote election for some time. The danger for these moderates in voting for the proposal is that they will be excoriated by their colleagues for defecting and betraying principles, to the point of facing a challenge from within their camp in the next legislative election.

Hong Kong public opinion and legislators in particular have to face a couple of critical questions. The first is whether a system that produces a contest between at least one establishment candidate and one democratic candidate is indeed “good enough.” The recommended system could be improved upon in several ways, of that there is no doubt. On the other hand, if this system works as optimists think it could, then Hong Kong voters will have a real choice in picking their leader, for the first time in history.

Second, would this mechanism indeed produce an election contest between at least one establishment candidate and one democratic candidate? Is there a way in which members of the establishment could nominally consider a democratic potential candidate and then deny him or her the nomination? In fact there is. The government’s proposal specifies that after all the potential candidates have been heard from, the NC members then select two or three nominees. Each NC members get two votes, and nomination requires 50 percent. So establishment members of the NC, after going through the motions of considering a pan-democrat, could simply not give that person the majority needed for nomination. The procedure and their numerical majority give them the power to do so.

But is such a bait-and-switch tactic wise politically? If this mechanism is sold both to the public and moderate democrats as a “good enough” way to produce a competitive election but the result is a contest between two individuals associated with the establishment and the status quo, how much legitimacy will the process itself and the person ultimately selected have? Will the polarization, obstructionism, and protests that have come to mark Hong Kong politics subside or grow? Will Beijing face more stability in Hong Kong or less?

In short, does this mechanism not put the establishment in a position that it almost has to nominate a moderate democrat if it is to enjoy broad community respect? And if the establishment is being challenged to do the right thing, so are the democrats. As imperfect as they see the current package, if it creates a good enough chance of electing one of their own, would the democrats not lose community respect if they reject it and deny voters a choice (they already know that Beijing and others will blame them for reverting to the old system)?

This dual challenge creates the possibility of a compromise. The missing ingredient, of course, is the mistrust that each camp has about the intentions of the other, mistrust born of the decades-long struggle over whether Hong Kong should have a genuinely democratic system. Providing that ingredient will be a challenge itself. 

William Galston and E.J. Dionne, Jr. make the case for universal voting – a new electoral system in which voting would be regarded as a required, civic duty. Why not treat showing up at the polls in the same way we treat a jury summons, which compels us to present ourselves at the court? Galston and Dionne argue that universal voting would enhance the legitimacy of our governing institutions, greatly increasing turnout and the diversity of the American voter base, and ease the intense partisan polarization that weakens our governing capacity.

Citing the implementation of universal voting in Australia in 1924, the authors conclude that universal voting increases citizen participation in the political process. In the United States, they write, universal voting would promote participation among citizens who are not likely to vote—those with lower levels of income and education, young adults, and recent immigrants. By evening out disparities in the electorate, universal voting would put the state on the side of promoting broad civic participation.

In addition to expanding voter participation, universal voting would improve electoral competition and curb hyperpolarization. Galston and Dionne assert that the addition of less partisan voters in the electorate, would force candidates to shift their focus from mobilizing partisan bases to persuading moderates and less committed voters. Reducing partisan rhetoric would help ease polarization and increase prospects for compromise.. Rather than focusing on symbolic, political gestures, Washington might have an incentive to tackle serious issues and solve problems.

Galston and Dionne believe that American democracy cannot be strong if citizenship is weak. And right now, they contend citizenship is strong on rights but weak on responsibilities. Making voting universal would begin to right this balance and send an important message: we all have the duty to help shape the country that has given us so much.

Galston and Dionne recognize that the majority of Americans are far from ready to endorse universal voting. By advancing a proposal that stands outside the perimeter of what the majority of Americans are likely to support, Galston and Dionne aim to enrich public debate—in the short term, by advancing the cause of more modest reforms that would increase participation; in the long term, by expanding public understanding of institutional remedies to political dysfunction. 

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Audio

• Dionne and Galston discuss their paper on universal voting

President Obama is right to keep at it in Afghanistan, argues a new policy brief by Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow and director of research for the Brookings Foreign Policy program.

Some have criticized the president’s decision to maintain a significant troop presence there (5,500 troops), instead of following through on the planned military withdrawal. But Afghanistan remains very important to American security, O’Hanlon contends, and the situation in the country is far from hopeless in spite of recent setbacks. We should reinvigorate American efforts in Afghanistan, he argues—not returning to levels seen in previous years, but ramping up somewhat from our current posture.

O’Hanlon calls Obama’s resolve in Afghanistan commendable, but writes that he and his administration are still making mistakes on U.S. policy toward the war-torn country. He advises that Washington make two specific changes to its military strategy in Afghanistan:

1. Allow U.S. and NATO airpower to target the Islamic State and the Taliban (currently, they can only fight those groups if directly attacked). The narrow rules of engagement constraining foreign forces were intended to push Afghan armed forces to defend their territory themselves. While a worthy goal, O’Hanlon says, these rules often prevent us from attacking ISIS (though the targeting strategy towards the group may be changing) as well as the Taliban. They also impose unrealistically high demands on Afghan forces and make too fine a distinction between an array of aligned extremist groups operating in the country.
2. Expand U.S. force presence from the current 5,500 troops to around 12,000 for a few years. In O’Hanlon’s opinion, our current numbers are not enough to work with fielded Afghan forces, and skimping on ground forces has contributed to security challenges in places like Helmand, for instance, which experienced new setbacks in 2015. More broadly, leaders in Washington and Brussels should stress the value of a long-term NATO-Afghanistan partnership, rather than emphasizing an exit strategy. This will signal Western resolve to the Taliban and other groups. While the next commander in chief should set the United States on a gradual path toward downsizing American troops in Afghanistan, he believes it would be a mistake for Obama to do so in the short term.

The long haul

O’Hanlon also argues that the United States needs to take a longer-term perspective on key political and economic issues in Afghanistan. On the economic front, there seems to be little thinking about an agricultural development plan for Afghanistan, associated infrastructure support, and land reform, among other challenges. On the political front, conversations often tend to focus on shorter-term issues like organizing parliamentary elections, reforming the Independent Election Commission, or modifying the current power-sharing arrangement. In the process, conversations about foundational political strategy focusing on Afghan institutions and the health of its democracy get short-changed. The parliament is in need of reforms, for instance, as is the political party system (which should encourage Afghans to group around ideas and policy platforms, rather than tribes and patronage networks).

O’Hanlon concludes that the situation in Afghanistan today, while fraught, is understandable given the Taliban’s resilience and NATO’s gradual withdrawal of 125,000 troops. We should not be despondent, he writes—rather, we should identify specific strategies that can help improve the situation. At the end of the day, Afghans must make the big decisions about the future of their country. But as long as the United States and its partners are still providing tremendous resources—and as long as security threats emanating from South Asia continue to threaten the United States—leaders in Washington should use their influence wisely.

Good morning and welcome to the "future." At approximately 4:29 p.m. Hill Valley time on Oct. 21, Doc Brown and Marty McFly arrive at the present day. For many millennials especially, the 1985 film series Back to the Future represented the far-flung fantastical future that many dreamed would come. But how does the Reagan-era vision of a future where we don't need roads compare to our daily lives today?

Sadly, you probably came to work today on the same street you may have trodden as a child back in 1985 without a hover board. But our future is still pretty fantastic, and many of the outlandish futuristic devices you saw in the 1989 film Back to the Future II are closer than you think—or already here. Here are three predictions that the film made that today might actually turn the head of an ‘80s time traveler

Drone proliferation

When Doc Brown and Marty McFly arrived in 2015, the sky was filled with more flying cars than the drones that sometimes dot our skies, but the film did point to some potential uses for unmanned remote flying devices. In the future, the film envisioned drones for walking the dog and even remote photography drones reporting on the day's news. While drones today don't exactly fill these roles, that future is perhaps closer than you think.

"Private actors will soon operate drones in equal if not greater numbers than the government," Brookings Fellow Wells Bennett wrote in a report on civilian use of drones last year. Amazon has tested drones to aid in home and business delivery. CNN has been given clearance by the government to explore the use of drones for reporting. Even law enforcement and public safety officials have used drones to aid in policing and fighting fires.

The widespread use of drones in daily life is probably still part of our future rather than our present in 2015, but regulations for this future are being written today. Federal regulators just this week announced that recreational drones will need to be registered. Last year as part of our project on civilian robotics, Gregory McNeal offered his own suggestions for federal and state regulators on how best to tackle civilian drone regulations.

Cybernetic humans and wearable technology

In the 1989 film, Marty faces off against his son's cybernetic bully, Griff Tannen. The bullies of the present don't exactly resemble Griff or Locutus of Borg, but cybernetics is closer than you think—even resting in your palm right now.

Taking a walk through Hill Valley in the real 2015, a time traveler might see several pedestrians immersed in their smartphones or glancing at notifications on their wearable devices. In our homes, virtual reality is becoming more prominent as well. Systems like Oculus and Google Cardboard resemble very closely the remote television visors worn by Marty's kids in the future.

"The proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude that [cell phones] were an important feature of human anatomy," Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in a 2014 opinion referencing the cybernetic future we are living today. Benjamin Wittes and Jane Chong acknowledge in their report on the emerging cyborg future that the connection we have with technology is becoming more personal. While surveillance laws of the past might make distinctions between human tissue and the devices we use in our daily lives, Wittes and Chong argue that perhaps the separation between the human being and technology in some cases is no longer there—and the law should adapt to acknowledge this.

Flying cars and the transportation of the future

The most-often panned prediction of the film is admittedly the most disappointing—there are no flying cars in our future. This has been a fantasy for even Baby Boomers who were thrilled by the Jetsons' view of the 21st Century. Flying cars do exist in a limited form, but they are more accurately described as ultra-portable planes that require a pilot’s license to fly. However, the future of transportation is even better than Marty or Doc Brown ever realized; they just needed to travel a few more years in the future to see it happen.

Driverless cars have the potential to be the biggest seismic shift in transportation that many of us will experience in our lifetime. Numerous automotive makers and even Google are preparing for the autonomous future. Imagine your vehicle circling the parking lot to pick you up after a film; traversing rush hour traffic to deliver your daughter to softball practice; even serving as designated driver on Friday night after drinks at the bar.

The future seems like a fantasy, but liability concerns about whom to sue when an automated vehicle gets in a fender bender—or worse—clouds this would-be future.

"While liability will always be important with respect to motor vehicle operation, automation will dramatically increase safety on the highways by reducing both the number and severity of accidents," writes John Villasenor in his report on how to tackle liability in the driverless era. Despite many reservations about driverless cars, Villasenor argues that current liability law frameworks would be well equipped to address concerns.

Of course, whether the DeLorean Motor Company will come out of mothballs and produce a driverless DeLorean remains to be seen.

Discuss the future's impact on the modern workforce

At least according to Robert Zemeckis, we've arrived in the future. Not that you’re here, join us at 2 p.m. Oct. 26 when we'll discuss one of the important consequences of all of this technological automation: its impact on the workforce and the availability of social benefits.

While falling off the "fiscal cliff" (of automatic spending cuts and tax increases if Congress fails to act) could hurt the economy, expert William Gale says the actual result, if coupled with a temporary economic stimulus, would be greater incentives to make a better long-term budget deal.

Video

• William Gale: Combine Going Over the Fiscal Cliff with a Stimulus

Event Information

On July 20 and 21, defense ministers from several nations will gather in Washington, D.C. at the invitation of U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. The meeting will bring together representatives from countries working to confront and defeat the Islamic State (or ISIL). French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian will be among those at the summit discussing how to accelerate long-term efforts to fight ISIL in Iraq and Syria. The close relationship between France and the United States has provided a solid base for security cooperation for decades, and in recent years, France has become one of America’s strongest allies in fighting terrorism and a prominent member of the international coalition to defeat ISIL.

On July 20, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings hosted Minister Le Drian for a discussion on French and U.S. cooperation as the two countries face multiple transnational security threats. Since becoming France’s defense minister in 2012, Le Drian has had to address numerous new security crises emerging from Africa, the Middle East, and within Europe itself. France faced horrific terrorist attacks on its own soil in January and November 2015 and remains under a state of emergency with its armed forces playing an active role in maintaining security both at home and abroad. Le Drian recently authored “Qui est l’ennemi?” (“Who is the enemy?”, Editions du Cerf, May 2016), defining a comprehensive strategy to address numerous current threats.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #USFrance

Video

• Introduction and featured speaker
• Discussion
• Introduction et conférencier invité
• Débat

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160720_france_defense_transcript