VOLUME 289 (2014) PAGES 6604–6618In Fig. 4G, in the foxi1 panel, the images in Fig. 4G, i and l, corresponding to “smad1 MO” and “smad5 MO + samd1/9 mRNA” samples, respectively, were inadvertently reused during figure preparation. This error has now been corrected using images pertaining to each treatment and sample. This correction does not affect the results or conclusions of the work.jbc;295/52/18650/F4F1F4Figure 4G.

Tsvangirai Leaves an Important Political Legacy in Southern Africa Expert comment sysadmin 21 February 2018

The story of Zimbabwe’s ‘people’s champion’ offers a powerful example to a region in need of new political compromises.

The death of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai is a loss for Zimbabwe. In nearly three decades of speaking truth to power, Tsvangirai helped to change his nation and the region.

Southern Africa’s new politics

His death marks a period of transition for regional governments and opposition parties alike. The Zuma era has ended in South Africa while Mozambique, Namibia and Angola have also seen political transitions, pushing modernization agendas to appeal to young citizenries that increasingly see politics in separate terms from the liberationist struggles of the previous generation.

Regional opposition movements also face winds of change: the longstanding opposition leader in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Etienne Tshekedi, passed away in 2017, and Mozambique’s Afonso Dhlakama and Kenya’s Raila Odinga are both aging. These movements similarly need to appeal to a younger audience or risk losing relevance.

From trade unionist to opposition leader

Tsvangirai’s career is an eloquent illustration of these challenges. Born in Buhera in rural eastern Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai worked in textiles and mining before politics – diverse experience which gave him crucial exposure to the lives of ordinary people across the country. In his early years, he also worked for ZANU-PF, before leaving to forge his own political path. He became increasingly active in mining politics, rising to the executive of the National Mineworker’s Union and, in 1989, to secretary-general of the powerful Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.

In the late 1990’s, Zimbabwe was riven by questions over land, war veterans, the Congo conflict, a shrinking economy and growing doubts about ZANU-PF itself. Opposition leaders of the time could not answer them; those such as Edgar Tekere and Margaret Dongo struggled to win support beyond their local constituencies, and liberation leader Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU had been merged with ZANU-PF in the 1987 Unity Accord.

But in 2000, Zimbabwe’s ‘perfect storm’ of a divisive constitutional referendum, land redistribution and a June election made Tsvangirai and the newly minted MDC, formed in 1999, a national rival to ZANU-PF. Through subsequent national elections in 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013, Zimbabwe remained polarized between competing visions of Zimbabwe future: ZANU-PF’s powerful black liberationist politics of identity and the opposition’s equally compelling liberal democracy agenda.

Tsvangirai’s achievement was to provide a credible alternative to liberation icon Robert Mugabe. Tsvangirai also resuscitated Zimbabwe’s tradition of urban nationalism, and was a successor to Benjamin Burombo and other mid-century Zimbabwean urban leaders. Tsvangirai would in turn be a touchstone for contemporary urban activists Evans Mawarire, Linda Masarira and others.

From opposition to coalition

The political struggle for Zimbabwe became global, with Mugabe and Tsvangirai both winning support from rival international power blocs. In March 2007, pictures of a beaten and bloodied Tsvangirai helped to galvanize support for the MDC in the 2008 elections. But the disputed result and violent subsequent run-off between Tsvangirai and Mugabe led the regional community to push both men into a coalition government, with Tsvangirai as prime minister.

Despite continuous ructions, the Government of National Unity (GNU) held, and stabilized Zimbabwe’s collapsed economy, until 2013. Although often politically out-manoeuvred by Mugabe, Tsvangirai deserves credit for getting the opposition a share of political power and for holding his nerve against many who wanted to collapse the GNU.

Tsvangirai was no saint; his complicated love life, and tacit approval of violent attacks on party dissenters, do him no credit. More importantly, the MDC neglected its grassroots supporters during the GNU, and paid the price in its comprehensive 2013 electoral defeat. But although diminished, Tsvangirai remained Zimbabwe’s most popular opposition politician, and the MDC’s new leaders will have quite a task ahead of them, even if they have been planning since his courageous 2016 public admission of colon cancer.

The MDC after Tsvangirai

Nelson Chamisa, one of the three MDC vice presidents, has now been appointed as acting president by the party’s national committee. Chamisa inherits a fractured and fractious party, and one which has also fallen out with the Tsvangirai family. The other two vice presidents, Thokozani Khupe and Elias Mudzuri, have also set their sights on party leadership.

At 40, Chamisa, an orator with grassroots appeal, has a huge task. With general elections due by July, he has to unite the party, counter Zimbabwe’s rising ethno-politics, prove himself as leader of a broader opposition coalition and take on a resurgent President Emmerson Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF.

Electorally, the opposition’s strongest card has always been the urban vote and the economy. But Mnangagwa has fast forwarded a comprehensive economic reform and internationalist agenda. This, and Mugabe’s exit, have forced Chamisa, Joice Mujuru and other opposition leaders to play catch-up. Zimbabwe’s elections, the first since 2000 without Mugabe and Tsvangirai as contenders, will be of global interest as the country navigates the new political dynamics.

The people’s champion

Morgan Tsvangirai’s resilience earned him respect from friends and foes alike, with Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa and Vice President Constantino Chiwenga visiting him at home a few weeks ago. A former nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, Tsvangirai, popularly known by his totem of ‘Save’ and also called mudhara [the old man] deserves national hero status. He will certainly be remembered as the ‘people’s champion’, and a pioneer in bridging the generational and ideological fissures that have shaped Southern Africa’s politics.

With their leader now gone, the turbulent MDC will undoubtedly be hoping for a ‘remembrance vote’ in his memory to carry them through the elections. But beyond that, his story offers a powerful example to a region in need of new political compromises.

Afonso Dhlakama’s Death Changes the Calculation for Peace Prospects in Mozambique Expert comment sysadmin 4 May 2018

If politicians continue to act in good faith, the death of the opposition leader may be a significant opportunity to finally draw a line under Mozambique’s long war.

The unexpected death of opposition and ex-rebel leader Afonso Dhlakama on 3 May is a game changer for Mozambique’s politics and an almost-completed peace process. The 65-year old Dhlakama, who died of a heart attack, had led Renamo for 38 years and had totally dominated his party. Dhlakama regularly boasted that he was Mozambique’s ‘father of democracy’, despite not allowing competition within his own party, and he leaves a legacy of more than 30 years of struggle, through both armed action and peaceful politics.

A long war

Originally Renamo had been a tool for the white minority regimes of Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa to challenge the socialist Frelimo political party that took power in Mozambique in 1975. But under Dhlakama’s command, by the late 1980s Renamo had become increasingly independent and rooted in Mozambique. After Renamo’s long war with Frelimo ground to a hurting stalemate, a transition led to Mozambique’s first multiparty elections in 1994, and the creation of a new joint army. A ‘pay and scatter’ programme successfully dispersed and reintegrated many thousands of ex-combatants.

But early post-election gains did not translate to lasting peace. Disarmament was a time-limited, technical process, and devoted declining resources and attention to clusters of ex-combatants that failed to disperse. In addition, Dhlakama was allowed to maintain an armed militia under the guise of a presidential guard.

Mounting economic inequality, notably in opposition strongholds such as central Mozambique, saw Renamo made political gains and Dhlakama nearly won the 1999 presidential elections. (Some believe he did.) The result focused Frelimo’s attention on the threat that Renamo posed and, ultimately, a strategy of pursuing total Frelimo domination across the country, culminating in a crushing Frelimo victory at the 2009 elections.

This humiliated and marginalized former Renamo rebels, resulting in Dhlakama ordering their return to targeted armed violence in 2013. Frelimo’s new leader, President Filipe Nyusi, took power in 2015 and sought direct dialogue with Dhlakama. Five rounds of internationally mediated peace talks took place from July to December. Finally, in late December 2016, Dhlakama announced a unilateral truce, which was extended twice and subsequently made indefinite.

New peace talks also started and, in August 2017 and February 2018, President Nyusi and Dhlakama showed the courage to meet in person, near Renamo’s base in central Mozambique, to build up mutual trust and discuss the details of the emerging peace deal – including the demobilization or integration into government security forces for Renamo’s now mostly middle-aged gunmen.

Dhlakama the ‘Big Man’

Dhlakama’s sudden death has fundamentally changed the negotiation dynamics. He never allowed for any serious succession planning, and ensured all key decisions were his and his alone. Renamo had already decided that he would be its presidential candidate for the 2019 national elections.

His party is significantly weakened by his death and unlikely able to fully recover – but needs to try and reach consensus quickly on a successor, as it will also compete in municipal elections in October and was expecting significant gains. There will be a number of contenders to succeed him including from the parliamentary wing, led by his niece Ivone Soares, its secretary general, Manuel Bissopo, and a few others.

But Renamo’s key leverage for now remains some 1,000 middle-aged gunmen in central Mozambique who have been stoically loyal to Dhlakama since the 1980s and who have little respect for the younger generation of professional politicians based in Maputo. Some may be bought off by government offers, others integrated into localised organized crime groups and others into internal Renamo sectarianism. The risk of fragmentation is real.

Renamo’s weakness could also embolden Frelimo hardliners to seek a return to unilateral domination of Mozambique’s political landscape, and to undermine the peace process. That would be a serious tactical mistake by Frelimo, as a lasting deal is close and the death of Dhlakama could actually assist in making this settlement lasting. Dhlakama was quixotic and prone to changing his mind, often influenced by the last person he spoke to – his death potentially introduces greater predictability in negotiations and in any post-deal implementation.

President Nyusi is clearly aware of this as he hailed on state television TVM that Dhlakama was ‘a citizen who has always worked for Mozambique’ and said he was distraught at the news of his death. He stated, ‘I hope that we as Mozambicans can continue to do everything so things do not go down.’ He also addressed Renamo’s support base by saying that ‘[Dhlakama] did everything so that there would be peace. The last time he spoke to me, he said he was not going to miss out anything in peace negotiations.’

Renamo’s gunmen are fatigued and want to retire with dignity but are vulnerable to manipulation and political miscalculation by Mozambican’s positioning politicians. International partners and investors can engage, by emphasizing that sustainable peace is the only pathway to poverty reduction and inclusive economic development.

This includes assisting development and reconciliation projects in areas impacted by the renewed conflict since 2013. Long-term investment for development in Renamo’s key constituencies could help avoid fragmentation at a critical time – faith groups and NGOs may also have a key role to play.

If Mozambique’s politicians continue to act in good faith, the death of Dhlakama may constitute a significant opportunity to finally draw a line under Mozambique’s long war.

Public Service, Accountability and Delivery in Malawi 17 October 2018 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 October 2018 Chatham House, London

Water, Energy and Development in Angola: From Ambition to Actuality 13 December 2018 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 November 2018 Chatham House, London

Ramaphosa Must Act Fast With New Mandate in South Africa Expert comment sysadmin 23 May 2019

In the wake of South Africa’s election, political constraints will ebb momentarily. The president should seize the opportunity to deliver meaningful change.

On 25 May, Cyril Ramaphosa will be inaugurated as president of South Africa, having dragged the African National Congress (ANC) over the line in the 8 May election. The ANC gained a 57 per cent majority, its lowest vote since 1994, its status as national liberator deeply eroded by successive corruption scandals. Only Ramaphosa’s personal popularity stopped it haemorrhaging more support.

His sustained action against corrupt public servants and promises of job-creating economic growth has attracted support from beyond the ANC’s base, including a significant minority of white voters, and generated significant international goodwill. Ramaphosa now has a short window of opportunity to reset social democracy in South Africa before the political cycle of municipal, party and national elections from 2021 to 2024 forces his attention back to party politics.

Defining ‘Ramaphosa-ism’

But personal popularity is fickle, and goodwill alone will not turn around the ailing economy. To attract investment and keep the electorate on side, Ramaphosa’s government needs to move beyond pragmatic crisis responses and articulate a clear, shared vision for how market intervention can allow the economy to grow while simultaneously delivering social transformation.

Growth will be hard to achieve in the short term. The economy is expected to grow 1.2% in 2019 and 1.5% in 2020, according to the IMF. Consumer confidence remains subdued, and a decade of declining GDP per capita and increasing inequality has put a strain on households. A ‘fiscal stimulus’ in 2018 delivered very little new government spending, and over the past 10 years, the government wage bill has increased three times higher than the rate of inflation.

Eskom, the state electricity provider, has debts equating to the GDP of Latvia and is not the only state-owned enterprise (SOE) that has required bailing out by the government. There are plans to break up Eskom into three separate entities but calls for deeper reform – or even privatization – are growing.

The president’s responses to these challenges will go a long way to defining ‘Ramaphosa-ism’ and the role of government in pursuing equitable economy growth.

Economic expectations under Ramaphosa

Ramaphosa was a champion of the introduction of a minimum wage and a proponent of the National Development Plan, which relies on growth to drive job creation. His support for land reform is an individual conviction as much as it is a party line, although his views are softer than many in the party, with state-owned land being the initial target.

Investor uncertainty on land tenure and regulations in mining will need to be addressed through passing key pieces of legislation on land reform and the revised Mining and Petroleum Resources Development Act.

Where Ramaphosa differs from his predecessors is his links with business. Thabo Mbeki enjoyed a relationship of mutual respect with business; this disintegrated under Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa, however, is part of South Africa’s business community, having founded the Shanduka Group, with investments in multiple sectors including retail, telecoms and extractives, and served as chairman of MTN and Bidvest. As president, he has surrounded himself with close economic advisers from business and banking.

In the short term, anti-corruption measures and competent appointments will ease investor woes. In the long term, there is a need to improve the ease of doing business, including labour market reforms, and to make South Africa a more competitive business environment by reducing the hold of large conglomerates on the economy. Ramaphosa may also make greater use of public-private partnerships for large projects.

Political constraints

Ramaphosa faces few immediate political challenges. The ANC is still deeply divided, but although Ramaphosa does not enjoy the ideological support of the entire party, his opponents are leaderless post-Zuma, and have been unable to offer a coherent alternative. ANC Secretary General Ace Magashule has fallen into the role of interim figurehead of this faction, and allegations of corruption would make it difficult for him to aspire to national leadership.

The need to avoid splits before the election meant Ramaphosa had to make concessions, and his first cabinet in February 2018 included opponents and those accused of corruption or incompetence, such as Malusi Gigaba and Bathabile Dlamini. Such concessions to political opponents are unlikely to continue after the election.

Meanwhile, opposition parties made some advances in the election, but where Zuma was an easy target, they are still grappling with how to confront Ramaphosa. The party with the biggest gains was the Economic Freedom Fighters, whose increase of just over 4 points from the last election gave it 11 per cent of the vote this time. They will likely continue to be an effective disruptor. Ramaphosa may also be challenged by trade unions on his reforms, notably over any break-up of SOEs.

But the biggest and most immediate external political challenge for Ramaphosa will be rebuilding trust between government and society, in a context where social protest has become an alternative form of political participation. A turnout of 65 per cent may be considered normal in Western democracies but is a notable drop for a country as politicized as South Africa, driven by frustration and a sense of exclusion as much as apathy. Turnout by young people was even lower.

Achieving the vision

South Africa has all the platforms it needs to project its renewal and attract vital external investment – it is a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, it will take over as chair of the African Union in 2020, it is a member of BRICS and it is the only African member of the G20. But in the recent past, it has struggled to tell a coherent story about its vision for the future and offer to the world.

In the immediate wake of the election, internal and external political constraints will ebb. Ramaphosa must act fast to deliver results before the election cycle starts again. To attract much needed investment stimulus, he will not only need to articulate and market his vision for South Africa, but also outline how he plans to achieve it.

Mine Action in Angola: Clearing the Legacies of Conflict to Harness the Potential of Peace Other resource sysadmin 14 June 2019

This publication draws on and updates the briefing note published following a meeting of the All- Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Angola on 26 April 2017. It also incorporates insights from a Chatham House Africa Programme conference session on the legacies of the Angolan Civil War, held on 23 March 2018; and draws on the Africa Programme’s research into conservation-driven development models in Southern Africa.

Almost two decades after the end of its civil war, Angola remains one of the most heavily landmine-contaminated countries in the world. The Angolan government has committed to clearing its landmines by 2025, and there is constructive collaboration between the government and mine clearing agencies in this endeavour, but the target will be achievable only if a decline in funding from international donors is reversed. International funding for mine clearance in Angola fell by more than 80 per cent between 2005 and 2017, and this sharp drop in external support has compounded the impact on domestic funding for national clearance efforts as a result of the downturn in prices for Angola’s main export commodities.

The national mine action agency, the Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária (CNIDAH), is supported by the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and the HALO Trust. By 2017, 15 years after the end of the civil war, these organizations had collectively helped clear 56 per cent of known landmine-contaminated land. State-led demining has focused principally on clearing areas designated for infrastructure projects. Now, it is critical that humanitarian demining in largely agricultural and conservation areas is prioritized to bring to an end the daily threat to Angola’s rural poor – as well as to the country’s livestock and wildlife – of injury or death as a result of landmine accidents.

Angola has some of the world’s most important remaining wilderness, including the tributary system for the unique Okavango Delta, and the country has the potential to host one of the most diverse wildlife populations on the continent. However, the presence of landmines and other remnants of the civil war render large areas of the country unsafe both for wildlife and for the local people, whose ability to derive a sustainable livelihood from their natural environment is fundamental to its protection.

Wildlife and tourism provide important economic opportunities for diversification beyond an oil-dominated economy. Critically, Angola’s economic diversification and development objectives can only be achieved if the landmines that prohibit access to land for agriculture, mining, tourism and wildlife are cleared.

There are economic opportunities for released land in the most heavily mined provinces of Cuando Cubango and Moxico. Already, some new funding for mine action in Angola, if upscaled or matched by international donors, could be transformative for its people, and for the conservation of the region’s vital biodiversity.

Hope, Peace and Reconciliation: Pope Francis in Mozambique Expert comment sysadmin 4 September 2019

A papal visit will highlight the importance of the recently signed peace agreement between the government and opposition.

Pope Francis’ visit to Mozambique on 4–6 September comes at a critical political moment. The theme for the papal Africa trip (which also includes Madagascar and Mauritius) is ‘pilgrim of hope, peace and reconciliation’. This is especially relevant for Mozambique, as this is the first week of the official campaign for Mozambique’s sixth national elections on 15 October.

It is also the one-month anniversary of the Maputo Accords for Peace and Reconciliation between the government and the armed opposition, RENAMO (and the fifth anniversary of the previous such agreement in 2014).

What is unusual is that the pope accepted to visit Mozambique just after a peace accord and in the run-up to national elections. Something similar has happened only once, when Pope John Paul II visited Angola in June 1992 (following the Bicesse Accords) prior to the country’s first ever national elections in September. Unfortunately Pope John Paul’s preaching of reconciliation and pluralism failed and civil war resumed some months later, following rejection of the preliminary election results. Angola’s civil war only finally ended a decade later in 2002.

The last papal visit to Mozambique was also by Pope John Paul II in 1988, when civil war was still ongoing, and the country was still a single party state. Despite the war, massive congregations attended and RENAMO reached local ceasefires and agreements to maintain electricity supply to honour the visit. Some of the seeds for the Rome peace process were laid during this trip – especially as it also represented a formal reconciliation of FRELIMO, the ruling party, with the Catholic Church.

This papal visit to Mozambique is equally anticipated, as was highlighted several times during speeches at the 6 August peace agreement signing in Maputo. When I was in Maputo last month, sales of papal-pictured capulanas (a Mozambican sarong) were brisk and Mozambican television carried countdown clocks on many programmes for the touchdown of Pope Francis on national soil.

The Catholic Church has played an instrumental role in promoting peace in Mozambique over the years. The 1977–92 civil war ended through negotiations hosted at the Sant’ Egidio lay community in Rome, and the current Archbishop of Bologna, Dom Matteo Zuppi (who led the Sant’ Egido negotiations in 1992 and is soon to be made a cardinal) was an official witness to 6 August accords signing.

When targeted armed conflict resumed in 2013, faith groups once more re-engaged and in 2016 Sant’ Egidio once more co-led mediation efforts, less successfully than in 1991–92. Sant’ Egidio (including during a presidential visit to Rome in July) contributed to convincing the Vatican that this papal visit should occur before the October elections.

President Filipe Nyusi anxiously wanted this visit to occur before the elections. He is seeking re-election for his second and final term and a papal visit should help win some votes. His party, FRELIMO, is also worried about securing a majority in the national assembly, as it has been weakened by patchy delivery of services and ongoing high-level corruption scandals.

This year, President Nyusi’s priorities have been to show that he can attract international investment (such as Andarko’s recently announced final investment decision on its gas project), a peace agreement with RENAMO (the August agreements) and a papal visit, so a successful trip would complete his goals.

The pope’s ‘hope, peace and reconciliation’ message of his visit is important. Twice previously, the FRELIMO-led government and RENAMO have reached definitive agreements, in Rome (1992) and Maputo (2014), but failed to fully end bloodshed. This new August 2019 agreement is the third attempt, and if it is to last, it will require political goodwill, compromise and an acceptance of more inclusive national politics by both parties.

There are two immediate threats to this agreement. The first is the forthcoming 15 October elections and their conduct could make or break it. Accepting reconciliation and greater pluralism underpins this agreement, but RENAMO expects to increase its share of the parliamentary vote and win a majority in some provinces (and therefore indirectly elect their choice for governor).

A second threat is the ‘Military Junta’, a RENAMO splinter group that claims to be 500 strong, but probably accounts for 80 armed persons. It rejects the 6 August agreement and warns that it could disrupt the elections. This group has asked for mediation, and hopefully can be accommodated in a side deal to the main one agreed in August, which already provides for the reintegration of over 5,000 RENAMO supporters and combatants.

A recent Chatham House research paper on elite bargains in Mozambique concluded that the October elections will be the first immediate test of the August agreement. If the elections pass without significant electoral manipulation or violence and this August deal sticks on the third attempt, the domestic focus should then move onto poverty reduction, combating inequality, education and solving the new security crisis with Islamic militants in Cabo Delgado province.

Mozambique’s Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement: One Year On 6 August 2020 — 2:30PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 July 2020 Online

August 6, 2020 marks one year since the Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement was signed in Maputo. The agreement, signed by the President of Mozambique Filipe Nyusi and RENAMO leader Ossufo Momade, and witnessed by regional and international political and religious leaders, ended the return to conflict that started in 2013.

It also paved the way for Mozambique’s national elections in October 2019. Since the agreement, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) won a landslide victory in the elections, weakening RENAMO, and a splinter group has conducted targeted armed violence in Manica and Sofala provinces. Yet, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process has made progress.

At this event, senior figures reflect on the peace agreement and the key factors of its success. The event also draws upon insights from the authors of recent publications on the latest peace agreement in the context of longer term trends of democratization and peace-building in Mozambique.

A Chatham House Africa Programme research paper published in August 2019, Prospects for a Sustainable Elite Bargain in Mozambique: Third Time Lucky?, examined how the deal was achieved. The Portuguese version includes the full text of the peace accord. Read the research paper in Portuguese or English here.

Black perspectives on international relations 27 October 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

How can black perspectives help the world tackle global challenges and expand our understanding of international relations?

As social boundaries change, the viewpoints of black academics, thought leaders and policymakers have grown in both influence and strength worldwide, challenging western and institutional norms. 

However, many institutions and organizations, long established with the exclusion of black voices, have to adapt if there is to be greater inclusion and diversity of thought when tackling major global issues.

Growing reflection on the legacy of colonialism and the importance of the power of diversity may be needed for today’s problems.

The search for global racial equality has seen a growing commitment to ensuring the black experience is at the heart of geopolitical discussions.

This panel discussion looks at what changes are occurring now and how is the conversation shifting. It also examines the challenges posed by the increasing politicization of race and culture issues in the current political environment.

Key questions discussed by the panel include:

• What is the importance of black voices in international relations and where are the main challenges to greater incorporation?

• What are some of the leading perspectives, approaches and beliefs within Africa and across the black diaspora regarding international relations?

• To what extent are governments, businesses and leading global institutions making efforts to include more black voices in decision-making?

• How are black academics changing wider geopolitical conversations and to what extent can deeper conversations lead to change?

• Will an ‘African Century’ bring black perspectives on international relations to the fore of the geopolitical agenda?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 

Advanced technologies in the face of war 24 October 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 October 2022 Online

How is NATO strengthening its technological edge?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought with it a heavy focus on technology and weaponry, particularly as casualties mount and large numbers of equipment are lost on both sides. The conflict has highlighted how states and their militaries seek technological superiority and how access to advanced capabilities can help shape the course of the war.

Aiming to sharpen the Alliance’s technological edge, NATO is working to support the development of emerging and potentially disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, biotechnologies and quantum technologies that are seen as presenting both risks and opportunities for the Alliance.

As part of this work, NATO’s newly formed Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), hosted by both the UK and Estonia, brings together academia, industry and government to support the development of critical technologies to deter and defend against existing and future threats.

Key questions to be considered by the panel include:

• How will the technologies that form the focus of DIANA’s efforts strengthen the Alliance and prepare it to better deal with threats to peace and security across the region?

• How will these technologies be applied and used in war?

• To what extent can a war be won by technology?

• Is Ukraine, and other future conflict zones, in danger of becoming a testing ground for emerging technologies?

• What has the war in Ukraine taught NATO about modern warfare and how should the Alliance respond to this?

• After the commotion of AUKUS, how will the Alliance manage the sharing of technologies and IP among member states?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 

American democracy in 2022: Trump, insurrection, and midterm elections 31 October 2022 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 7 October 2022 Online

How much has Donald Trump changed US politics and democracy, and will Trump and ‘Trumpism’ be more or less significant in the years ahead?

America’s democracy is divided, polarized and fragmenting. Inequality and internal division have a long history. But Trump’s lasting influence on the Republican party, and politics more broadly, continues to leave a mark. Repeated denials of President Joe Biden’s 2020 election win, wrapped in claims of electoral fraud, have eroded faith in the democratic institutions.

The memories of 6 January are still fresh, reminding all of the dangers posed by such actions. All told, America’s democracy has taken a beating in recent years.

To help make sense of the events over recent years and consequences for the coming mid-terms, Peter Baker and Susan Glasser (authors of The Divider: Trump in the White House 2017–2021) walk through in detail how the American politics of today has been arrived at.

Key questions discussed include:

• What has been learned from the January 6 Committee?

• Is there a likelihood of a similar event in the future?

• When and how will Trump lose his influence over the Republican party? 

• What are the broader ramifications of the Trump era?

• What did the events of 6 January mean for America’s relationships globally?

 As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 

The race to vaccinate 16 January 2023 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 December 2022 Chatham House and Online

What are the lessons from the UK’s COVID-19 vaccination campaign?

The first COVID-19 vaccination in the UK was administered on 8 December 2020, eight months after the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic on 11 March.

With multiple rounds of vaccines having now been administered widely, the UK is in a position to live effectively with the virus and the prospects of more lockdowns and COVID-19 restrictions have diminished.

The story behind the UK’s biggest vaccination campaign in British history is told during this discussion with Kate Bingham and Tim Hames, authors of The Long Shot: The Inside Story of the Race to Vaccinate Britain, which describes the management of complex political and operational challenges.

Juggling vaccine suppliers, Whitehall and the media, all had the potential to threaten the Vaccine Taskforce’s efforts.

This event explores the UK’s experience and lessons learned. The panel explore:

• How were the most challenging obstacles to the UK’s vaccine development, scale-up and delivery overcome?
• What does the success of the UK vaccine development and delivery mean in an international context?
• What has the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted about global cooperation on vaccine administration worldwide?
• As the pandemic moves into the rear-view mirror, how can industry and government work better together for future vaccination campaigns?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 

Disruptive technologies by nation states and malign cyber actors – the US response 16 February 2023 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Lisa Monaco, the US deputy attorney general, discusses how autocratic governments and malign cyber actors use disruptive technologies to project power and engage in illicit activity.

Weaponizing data, ransomware attacks and other illicit cyber activity represent significant threats to national security. 

Governments and malicious cyber actors around the world exploit disruptive technology to engage in criminal activity, track citizens and coerce other countries thereby weakening the rules-based order and fundamental principles of democracy. 

Lisa Monaco discusses how the world is at an inflection point when it comes to meeting this challenge and describes how the US and partner nations are responding to protect their citizens and the broader international community.

Key questions to discuss include:

• What steps does the US government need to take to properly address this threat?
• How are countries coordinating policies to confront the problem?
• To what extent does this challenge go beyond US-China competition?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

Chatham House Primer: Social media and democracy 21 March 2023 — 6:00PM TO 6:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 February 2023 Chatham House

From the Arab Spring to the 2016 Trump election win, how have democracies benefited and suffered from the impact of social media? 

With social media now a well-entrenched, yet still recent, component of societies, democracies are still grappling with the impact bought about by this new form of communication and promotion.

For all that social media has bought people closer together and brought government, business and civic leaders, it has also been said to have fuelled divisions and hate. Governments and businesses are now drawing battle lines on the legal responsibilities required of social media platforms as we slowly determine the role they play in our society.

This Primer will discuss key questions including:

• What are the current legal responsibilities of social media companies? What sort of laws and regulations must they abide by?
• How are governments looking to change to this?
• How have some countries manipulated social media to monitor and censor their populations?
• Can social media truly tackle harmful and dangerous content?
• Is it possible to combat disinformation and what role should social media platforms play?
• How can we make social media best fit our society in the future?
• How should we govern online space?

A drinks reception will follow this event.

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Can diplomacy advance human rights? 25 April 2023 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 7 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

How is diplomacy contributing to advancing human rights through the multilateral system?

The international human rights system has come under significant pressure in recent years. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the US-China rivalry have created difficult political pressures, while major global challenges including climate change and global inequality demand answers. Effective diplomacy on human rights has become increasingly difficult, with incentives stacked against bold action.

The relationship between diplomacy and human rights is an uneasy one. Diplomacy is an art of negotiation, persuasion and compromise. Human rights are tightly defined and universal. The relationship between the two may seem paradoxical, but in the context of an unstable world order, it has never been more important.

In the 75th anniversary year of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this discussion will explore the critical role of diplomacy in advancing human rights in the future.

• What are the critical human rights challenges today? What is the role of diplomacy in addressing them?

• What is the impact of intensifying competition between the US and China on the human rights system?

• Is there an opening for more leadership emerging from the Global South?

• What is the future of the human rights system in the context of this polarized world?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

General practice leaders in Wales have voted unanimously to reject the Welsh government’s GP contract offer for 2024-25.The BMA’s ​General Practitioners Committee Wales said the government’s general medical services contract offer for the current financial year “fails to provide a credible and sustainable future” for general practice.GPs in Wales will now vote on whether to accept or reject the contract in a referendum that will open later this month.Gareth Oelmann, chair of the committee, said, “The decision to disregard the serious concerns and valuable contribution of general practice in Wales is beyond insulting, it is dangerous, leaving more surgeries and their patients in peril. We are concerned that this offer will leave more practices with no option but to close. GPs are being denied the resources they need to deliver vital services to the population.”The BMA said it was not yet able to disclose any details on the offer, and...

How do Eurasian kleptocracies earn and use their money? 9 November 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 October 2021 Chatham House and Online

This event explores the presence of corrupt funds from Eurasia in Western democracies, what they are used for, and how they can be constrained.

The Pandora Papers once again shone the spotlight on the UK being home to corrupt funds from kleptocracies, where the ruling elite abuse their political power for private gain.

In recent years much focus has been placed on this term, and the possible effects such money could have on Western democracies.

• How do such states create this wealth in the first place?
• How do these funds make their way to the UK?
• Is the term kleptocracy appropriate for the majority of countries in Eurasia?
• What evidence is there that such funds are ‘weaponized’ to achieve foreign policy goals?

This event discusses the term, how it can be applied, and the differences between how ’grey’ funds are used by various countries. It also highlights how the UK and the wider international community can counteract these flows, both from a legal point of view, and via other methods.

Here we go again: Russia’s energy ‘diplomacy’ in Moldova Expert comment LJefferson 6 December 2021

The gas crisis shows that while the new Moldovan government may wish for geopolitics to go away, they are a weapon Russia will deploy at will.

In October, Moldova came under the spotlight when Russia, its primary provider of gas, slashed supplies by a third and refused to extend the existing contract.

The crisis was resolved at the end of October when Russia and Moldova signed a new contract, in which Moscow has used Moldova’s gas dependence to extract geopolitical concessions, weaken the new pro-western Chisinau government and drive a wedge between the EU and Moldova.

A chronic failure to reform

Moldova became a classic case of state capture when political elites – including nominally pro-European political elites – engaged in massive rent-extraction.

Up until 2020, when pro-reform forces came to power, Moldovan politics offered rapid route to riches for both the nominally pro-European parties and the pro-Russian Socialist Party; each was responsible for playing up ethnic and geopolitical cleavages in the country to mobilize votes and shore up legitimacy.

These predatory elites hollowed out Moldova economically and politically by a chronic failure to reform, in particular the energy sector which became a major source of rent.

However, this started to change when the pro-reform forces came to power as a result of the 2020 presidential and then 2021 parliament elections. The pro-reformist Maia Sandu defeated the incumbent president Igor Dodon (58 per cent to 42 per cent) in November of that year. And then her party got 58 per cent of the vote in the parliamentary elections which followed in July 2021.

Her Party of Action’s (PAS) winning formula was to focus on corruption and domestic reforms – rather than playing the ‘geopolitical’ card, a favourite strategy of their predecessors. As Sandu put it, the elections marked ‘the end of the reign of thieves in Moldova’.

A gas crisis is initiated  

Russia’s response to these results was to initiate a gas crisis. Up until the victory of the pro-reform forces, Russia had annually renewed a gas contract signed in 2007. However, in September 2021, Russia refused to renew the contract as it had done many times before and instead insisted on a new contract, which allowed Russia to create linkages between energy prices, debt settlement, a halt on energy market reforms and, it can be logically inferred, further integration with the EU.

Moldova’s national energy company, Moldovgaz, is 63.5 per cent de facto owned by Gazprom with the Moldovan government owning the remaining 35.5 per cent. (Moldova was forced to give Gazprom a controlling stake when faced with a cut in supplies in January 2006). It is therefore hardly surprising that no efforts were made to de-monopolise the sector and diversify energy supplies.

This lack of modernization can be explained by the somewhat surreal fact that in any negotiations and planning, Moldovagaz – majority owned by Gazprom – represents the Moldovan side in negotiations with Gazprom. So, when it came to signing of the new five-year contract in October 2021, Russia, through Gazprom, was able to institute a contract which made gas prices conditional on various geopolitical conditions.

It is noteworthy that Moldova’s original 2007 gas contract had been renewed annually despite the supposed accrual of debt. However, the very nature of this debt is suspect. While Moldova’s debt is said to be approximately $700 million, the debt of the much smaller breakaway Transnistria was around $7.3 billion.

The exact level and source of the debt remain murky. Russia appears to be making Moldova liable to repay at least some of Transnistria’s debt while only demanding the debt settlement with Moldova, but not with Transnistria.

High stakes for Moscow

Moreover, the contract is used to derail liberalisation of the energy market in line with EU’s energy market rules (through the so-called unbundling of supplies and distribution) which Moldova had committed itself to since the country joined the Energy Community in 2010.

Referring to ‘the non-application of forced reorganization and sanctions against Moldovagaz’, the new gas contract forces Moldova to postpone implementing the unbundling of supplies and distribution by making it conditional on resolving the energy debt.

Furthermore, Moldova ominously agreed to create an ‘intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation’ with Russia, which effectively blocks Moldova’s economic integration with the EU. (This demand is hardly new as Russia previously requested, and was granted, a seat at the negotiating table on a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and Ukraine. The trilateral EU-Ukraine-Russia negotiations have made it clear that Russia is seeking a veto over European integration of all neighbouring countries.)  

Targeting Moldova’s new reformist government reflects high personal stakes for Moscow. Moldova’s caretaker (kurator) in the Kremlin is Dimitrii Kozak, who in 2003 masterminded the so-called ‘Kozak Memorandum’. This sought to reintegrate breakaway Transnistria into a Moldova-Transnistria federation.

It was thwarted at the last minute but the Russian leadership has not given up on its plan. Now using his position as the deputy head of Presidential Administration, Kozak is masterminding Russia’s rehashed policy towards Moldova and has attempted to bring back his Memorandum as a political blueprint for a ‘settlement’.

Russia’s heavy-handed energy ‘diplomacy’

The new Moldovan government is caught in a crossfire of domestic expectations and Russian geopolitical demands. The gas crisis shows that while the new government may wish for geopolitics to go away, they are a weapon Russia will deploy at will.

The Moldovan government is brand new so it has relatively little experience of dealing with Russia’s heavy-handed ‘energy diplomacy’. But the EU has been on the receiving end of this before – this is a direct replica of Russia’s strategy toward Armenia and Ukraine – and neither ended well for the target countries or for the EU.

So, Russia’s plans for Moldova are likely to have similar consequences for the EU’s latest attempts to be a convincing foreign policy actor. 

The West must face down Putin The World Today MVieira 1 February 2022

If Russia’s ambitions are not checked, the implications will be global, warns James Nixey

After seven years of invasions, annexations, assassinations, abuses and now the current crisis in European security over the fate of Ukraine, one thing has been laid bare: the true nature of the Russian state.

Moscow made its ambition clear in mid-December with the unprecedented and public issuing of ultimatums in the form of draft treaty proposals.

Portrayed by Russia as an attempt to end Nato’s expansion eastwards, the Kremlin is in fact demanding that the United States and western institutions roll back their security guarantees to Eastern Europe. 

These are not two sides of the same coin if one believes and accepts the principles of the Helsinki Accords that the successor states to the Soviet Union are just as independent and sovereign as Russia.

Russia’s demands laid bare equate to giving it a free hand in Eastern Europe. This should not be reduced to simplistic labels such as ‘territorial expansionism’ or a ‘return to the Soviet Union’, both of which can be picked at for a lack of accuracy.

But it is, in Russia’s own words, the most explicit statement yet of its long-standing desire to return to a former age, where great powers directed their respective spheres of influence – a yearning for a time of empire and a disregard for the flow of history.

The intense diplomatic and media focus since then suggests there is a consensus that Russia has gone beyond being an awkward player at the negotiation table or a bully who can be dealt with further down the line.

But this has not as yet led to the operational conclusion that Russia must be challenged and ultimately faced down, no matter how unpalatable.

The logical response to the exposure of Russia’s true intentions would be an overhaul of western policy. Yet the West persists in its article of faith that dialogue with Russia will bring about a change in its behaviour – despite all evidence to the contrary. 

Western politicians have been anxious to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. But the Kremlin is likely to see this course of action as confirmation that it can proceed unchecked. When Moscow has chosen the path of conflict, efforts at dialogue rarely bring a peaceful resolution. 

Russia is blessed with particularly talented negotiators. While it has its fair share of angry ultra-nationalists who are easily dismissed, it also has more subtle brains at official and unofficial levels with whom western politicians are eager to engage to claim morsels of intelligence or to show that the Kremlin is not beyond redemption.

Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, is an intelligent and experienced man, who is adept at dismissing the protests of most of his western counterparts. In such circumstances, and with such a pressing need to avoid a war, dialogue must be tightly contained as it has the potential to lead to compromise in areas where there should be none.

Russia’s ambitions for a land empire

Eastern European states which were part of the Soviet Union or signatories to the Warsaw Pact are geographically closer to Russia and as a result more physically at risk. But their history and close relations with Moscow in the past have allowed them to acquire experience and expertise in dealing with their more powerful neighbour.

They uphold principled stances on sovereign rights, which has led the Kremlin to brand the Baltic states, Ukraine and more recently Moldova as traitors. To the West, on the other hand, they can often be seen as awkward or getting in the way.

While the sandwiched eastern states may have much to teach us about dealing with Russia, some central European countries have a closer relationship with Moscow. Serbia’s security services have recently been exposed as being under the influence of Russia’s own FSB, the Federal Security Service, successor to the KGB, and have colluded in repressing Moscow’s political opponents. At the same time, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary continues to defy the European Union with its repressions and is one of the few states that looks to Russia as a model. 

What is at stake here is a basic grasp of the nature of relations between states in the 21st century. What Russia is insisting on is its right to a land empire which is entirely at odds with the principles of statehood that now govern Europe, and indeed much of the rest of the world.

By failing to address the real nature of Russia’s demands, Europe is avoiding critical decisions that will affect its future security for generations to come. The implications of that avoidance do not only affect Europe – they are global in importance. 

Other powers, most notably China, will watch closely how the West responds to Russia and gauge its willingness to support allies, friends and partners against aggression.

Any failure to respond firmly to Russia’s approach of demanding limits on the sovereignty of its neighbours, backed by the threat of military force, can only encourage similar strong-arm tactics elsewhere. It is notable that, from Chechnya to Syria, Russia has not yet suffered an unambiguous defeat when it has asserted its ambitions through military power. 

Resolving the incompatibility between the way Russia sees itself and what the rest of Europe views as the acceptable limits of Russian power will be a long, painful process. Facing down Russia will take skill, time, spine, money, grit and self-sacrifice. Sanctions, for example, hurt those imposing them as well as the receiver. These are attributes in short supply in what Russia considers to be the weak, decadent West. 

Since such resources are unlikely to be found, the unappetizing future for relations is most likely to involve Russia continuing to chip away at European sovereignty while its own structural flaws further weaken it to the point of irrelevance, or to push it to take ever more extreme risks.

President Maia Sandu on democracy and politics in Moldova Video jon.wallace 4 July 2022

The president covers Moldova’s challenges as it seeks closer integration with the European Union.

President Maia Sandu discusses challenges to Moldovan democracy and society during an interview at Chatham House’s 2022 London Conference.

She covers issues including corruption, the presence of Russian troops in the Transnistria region, neutrality in Moldova’s constitution, popular support for EU membership and refugees from Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Gorbachev's complex legacy is beyond the popular belief Expert comment NCapeling 3 September 2022

The last major figure with a decisive Cold War role, Mikhail Gorbachev was not as bad as Putin’s Russia portrays him, but also not as heroic as the West thinks.

Arguably the worst year of the Cold War since the Cuban Missile Crisis was 1983, with three major incidents which escalated East-West tensions – and any one of them could have led to a full-scale war.

The first was the Korean Airline KAL007 being shot down by an SU15 fighter aircraft for straying into Soviet airspace, killing all 269 passengers and crew. Then came the identification of signals from Soviet satellites as being incoming US intercontinental ballistic missiles – Colonel Stanislav Petrov, going against all protocols, thankfully decided to report them as a false alarm before he could be sure.

The third was perhaps the most dangerous, being the misinterpretation of a live-fire NATO exercise which was believed by some in both East Germany and Russia to be a front for an imminent attack.

All three incidents occurred in the few months following the infamous March 1983 ‘Star Wars’ speech by US president Ronald Reagan, in which he talked about nuclear arms control and laid out the US case for a ballistic missile defence programme.

At that time Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was the youngest serving member of the USSR Politburo, known to be a favourite of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, and it is highly likely he had been aware of these close calls and was part of discussions within Kremlin decision-making circles.

A changemaker both inside and outside the USSR

Following the deaths of Andropov in 1984 and his replacement Konstantin Chernenko in 1985, Gorbachev’s appointment as general secretary of the Communist Party saw him immediately begin to change the Soviet Union from within – and also change relationships with the major Western powers, especially the US, Germany, and the UK.

His policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) were primarily aimed at internal reforms but translated into a major reset of international relations and international security. During his six years as leader, Gorbachev initiated many arms control negotiations which resulted in treaties and increased both the transparency and the confidence between the USSR and the US.

These included the 1986 Stockholm Accord which emanated from the Helsinki Process and allowed for the observation and inspection of large-scale military exercises, the 1985 resumption of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks which lead to START I, and the 1987 INF Treaty in which the USSR ‘out-yessed’ the US – the most open and transparent disarmament treaty in terms of notification and verification measures ever agreed.

There was also a reciprocal moratorium on nuclear weapons tests starting from 1985 – which laid the groundwork for the 1996 CTBT – the 1991 Chemical Weapons Convention, and the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

The most dramatic moment of all was when Gorbachev and Reagan met at a summit in Reykjavik and came close to deciding to eliminate nuclear weapons – but the initiative failed to reach agreement, mainly because Reagan could not drop his commitment to ballistic missile defences and Gorbachev could not accept the offer of joint development.

Nonetheless, all these nuclear arms control treaties led the way for their descendants which have kept nuclear weapons in check ever since and are still in place in the form of the New START agreement.

But despite these outstanding achievements, Gorbachev had blind spots – such as enabling rather than destroying the USSR bioweapons programme, unlike the US which had dismantled its own bioweapons offensive capability by 1973.

And it is now known that, despite negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia withheld information on new chemical weapons agents – Novichoks – which have since been used to lethal effect by Russia in Salisbury and against figures opposing the current regime.

His misguided faith in a Soviet future

Gorbachev was markedly different to his predecessors as secretary general. He was neither as decrepit nor as hardline, and he understood from the outset that the Soviet Union was, by the 1980s, finally dying.

Using the intellectual abilities of Aleksandr Yakovlev, he forced through the reforms which simultaneously captured the imagination of the free world and liberated his countrymen and women.

But although he built solid relationships – even friendships – with the world’s major heads of state and improved the USSR’s human rights, releasing dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, but many – especially Ukrainian dissidents – continued to languish in camps.

The greatest disappointment in Gorbachev’s legacy was he completely believed the USSR could be reformed and still survive as an entity while others, such as Boris Yeltsin and Ronald Reagan, understood it had to be dismantled.

This shortcoming is especially uncomfortable as today’s Russia continues to insist it has a given right to control other former Soviet states, to the extent it is willing to destroy them if they do not concede.

Fibroblast activation protein (FAP) is abundantly expressed in the stroma of most human solid tumors. Clinical-stage radiolabeled FAP ligands are increasingly used as tools for the detection of various cancer lesions. To unleash the full therapeutic potential of FAP-targeting agents, ligands need to remain at the tumor site for several days after administration. We recently described the discovery of OncoFAP, a high-affinity small organic ligand of FAP with a rapid accumulation in tumors and low uptake in healthy tissues in cancer patients. Trimerization of OncoFAP provided a derivative (named TriOncoFAP, or OncoFAP-23) with improved FAP affinity. In this work, we evaluated the tissue biodistribution profile and the therapeutic performance of OncoFAP-23 in tumor-bearing mice. Methods: OncoFAP-23 was radiolabeled with the theranostic radionuclide ¹⁷⁷Lu. Preclinical experiments were conducted on mice bearing SK-RC-52.hFAP (BALB/c nude mice) or CT-26.hFAP (BALB/c mice) tumors. ¹⁷⁷Lu-OncoFAP and ¹⁷⁷Lu-FAP-2286 were included in the biodistribution study as controls. Toxicologic evaluation was performed on Wistar rats and CD1 mice by injecting high doses of OncoFAP-23 or its cold-labeled counterpart, respectively. Results: ¹⁷⁷Lu-OncoFAP-23 emerged for its best-in-class biodistribution profile, high and prolonged tumor uptake (i.e., ~16 percentage injected dose/g at 96 h), and low accumulation in healthy organs, which correlates well with its potent single-agent anticancer activity at low levels of administered radioactivity. Combination treatment with the tumor-targeted interleukin 2 (L19-IL2, a clinical-stage immunocytokine) further expands the therapeutic window of ¹⁷⁷Lu-OncoFAP-23 by potentiating its in vivo antitumor activity. Proteomics studies revealed a potent tumor-directed immune response on treatment with the combination. OncoFAP-23 and ^natLu-OncoFAP-23 exhibited a favorable toxicologic profile, without showing any side effects or signs of toxicity. Conclusion: OncoFAP-23 presents enhanced tumor uptake and tumor retention and low accumulation in healthy organs, findings that correspond to a strongly improved in vivo antitumor efficacy. The data presented in this work support the clinical development of ¹⁷⁷Lu-OncoFAP-23 for the treatment of FAP-positive solid tumors.

To date, the imaging and diagnosis of hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) rely on CT/MRI, which have well-known limitations. Glypican-3 (GPC3) is a cell surface receptor highly expressed by HCC but not by normal or cirrhotic liver tissue. Here we report initial clinical results of GPC3-targeted PET imaging with [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-DOTA-RYZ-GPC3 (RAYZ-8009), a peptide-based GPC3 ligand in patients with known or suspected HCC. Methods: [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009 was obtained after labeling the peptide precursor with ⁶⁸Ga from a ⁶⁸Ge/⁶⁸Ga generator and heating at 90°C for 10 min followed by sterile filtration. After administration of [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009, a dynamic or static PET/CT scan was acquired between 45 min and 4 h after administration. Radiotracer uptake was measured by SUVs for the following tissues: suspected or actual HCC or hepatoblastoma lesions, non–tumor-bearing liver, renal cortex, blood pool in the left ventricle, and gastric fundus. Additionally, tumor–to–healthy-liver ratios (TLRs) were calculated. Results: Twenty-four patients (5 patients in the dynamic protocol; 19 patients in the static protocol) were scanned. No adverse events occurred. Two patients had no lesion detected and did not have HCC during follow-up. In total, 50 lesions were detected and analyzed. The mean SUV_max of these lesions was 19.6 (range, 2.7–95.3), and the mean SUV_mean was 10.1 (range, 1.0–49.2) at approximately 60 min after administration. Uptake in non–tumor-bearing liver and blood pool rapidly decreased over time and became negligible 45 min after administration (mean SUV_mean, <1.6), with a continuous decline to 4 h after administration (mean SUV_mean, 1.0). The opposite was observed for HCC lesions, for which SUVs and TLRs continuously increased for up to 4 h after administration. In individual lesion analysis, TLR was the highest between 60 and 120 min after administration. Uptake in the gastric fundus gradually increased for up to 45 min (to an SUV_max of 31.3) and decreased gradually afterward. Conclusion: [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009 is safe and allows for high-contrast imaging of GPC3-positive HCC, with rapid clearance from most normal organs. Thereby, [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009 is promising for HCC diagnosis and staging. Further research is warranted.

This analysis aimed to identify clinical factors associated with positivity on repeat ⁶⁸Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT after a negative scan in patients with recurrent prostate cancer (PCa) under observation. Methods: This single-center, retrospective analysis included patients who underwent at least 2 ⁶⁸Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT scans (PET1 and PET2) at UCLA between October 2016 and June 2021 for recurrent PCa with negative PET1 and no PCa-related treatments between the 2 scans. Using Prostate Cancer Molecular Imaging Standardized Evaluation criteria to define negative and positive scans, the final cohort was divided into PET2-negative (PET2-Neg) and PET2-positive (PET2-Pos). The same PET1 was used twice in the more than 2 PET cases with inclusion criteria fulfilled. Patient characteristics and clinical parameters were compared between the 2 cohorts using Mann–Whitney U test and Fisher exact test. Areas under the curve (AUCs) of the receiver operating characteristic and the Youden index were computed to determine the discrimination ability of statistically significant factors and specific cut points that maximized sensitivity and specificity, respectively. Results: The final analysis included 83 sets of 2 PET/CT scans from 70 patients. Thirty-nine of 83 (47%) sets were PET2-Neg, and 44 of 83 (53%) sets were PET2-Pos. Prostate-specific antigen (PSA) increased from PET1 to PET2 for all 83 (100%) sets of scans. Median PSA at PET1 was 0.4 ng/mL (interquartile range, 0.2–1.0) and at PET2 was 1.6 ng/mL (interquartile range, 0.9–3.8). We found higher serum PSA at PET2 (median, 1.8 vs. 1.1 ng/mL; P = 0.015), absolute PSA difference (median, 1.4 vs. 0.7 ng/mL; P = 0.006), percentage of PSA change (median, +270.4% vs. +150.0%: P = 0.031), and median PSA velocity (0.044 vs. 0.017 ng/mL/wk, P = 0.002) and shorter PSA doubling time (DT; median, 5.1 vs. 8.3 mo; P = 0.006) in the PET2-Pos cohort than in the PET2-Neg cohort. Receiver operating characteristic curves showed cutoffs for PSA at PET2 of 4.80 ng/mL (sensitivity, 34%; specificity, 92%; AUC, 0.66), absolute PSA difference of 0.95 ng/mL (sensitivity, 62%; specificity, 71%; AUC, 0.68), percentage of PSA change of a positive 289.50% (sensitivity, 48%; specificity, 82%; AUC, 0.64), PSA velocity of 0.033 ng/mL/wk (sensitivity, 57%; specificity, 80%; AUC, 0.70), and PSA DT of 7.91 mo (sensitivity, 71%; specificity, 62%; AUC, 0.67). Conclusion: Patients with recurrent PCa under observation after a negative ⁶⁸Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT scan with markedly elevated serum PSA levels and shorter PSA DT are more likely to have positive findings on repeat ⁶⁸Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT.

Single-domain antibodies (sdAbs) demonstrate favorable pharmacokinetic profiles for molecular imaging applications. However, their renal excretion and retention are obstacles for applications in targeted radionuclide therapy (TRT). Methods: Using a click-chemistry–based pretargeting approach, we aimed to reduce kidney retention of a fibroblast activation protein α (FAP)–targeted sdAb, 4AH29, for ¹⁷⁷Lu-TRT. Key pretargeting parameters (sdAb-injected mass and lag time) were optimized in healthy mice and U87MG (FAP⁺) xenografts. A TRT study in a pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma (PDAC) patient-derived xenograft (PDX) model was performed as a pilot study for sdAb-based pretargeting applications. Results: Modification of 4AH29 with trans-cyclooctene (TCO) moieties did not modify the sdAb pharmacokinetic profile. A 200-µg injected mass of 4AH29-TCO and an 8-h lag time for the injection of [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-PEG₇-tetrazine resulted in the highest kidney therapeutic index (2.0 ± 0.4), which was 5-fold higher than that of [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-4AH29 (0.4 ± 0.1). FAP expression in the tumor microenvironment was validated in a PDAC PDX model with both immunohistochemistry and PET/CT imaging. Mice treated with the pretargeting high-activity approach (4AH29-TCO + [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-PEG₇-tetrazine; 3 x 88 MBq, 1 injection per week for 3 wk) demonstrated prolonged survival compared with the vehicle control and conventionally treated ([¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-4AH29; 3 x 37 MBq, 1 injection per week for 3 wk) mice. Mesangial expansion was reported in 7 of 10 mice in the conventional cohort, suggesting treatment-related kidney morphologic changes, but was not observed in the pretargeting cohort. Conclusion: This study validates pretargeting to mitigate sdAbs’ kidney retention with no observation of morphologic changes on therapy regimen at early time points. Clinical translation of click-chemistry–based pre-TRT is warranted on the basis of its ability to alleviate toxicities related to biovectors’ intrinsic pharmacokinetic profiles. The absence of representative animal models with extensive stroma and high FAP expression on cancer-associated fibroblasts led to a low mean tumor-absorbed dose even with high injected activity and consequently to modest survival benefit in this PDAC PDX.

This study evaluates the diagnostic utility of PET/MRI for primary, locoregional, and nodal head and neck squamous cell carcinoma (HNSCC) through systematic review and metaanalysis. Methods: A systematic search was conducted using PubMed and Scopus to identify studies on the diagnostic accuracy of PET/MRI for HNSCC. The search included specific terms and excluded nonhybrid PET/MRI studies, and those with a sample size of fewer than 10 patients were excluded. Results: In total, 15 studies encompassing 638 patients were found addressing the diagnostic test accuracy for PET/MRI within the chosen subject domain. Squamous cell carcinoma of the nasopharynx was the most observed HNSCC subtype (n = 198). The metaanalysis included 12 studies, with pooled sensitivity and specificity values of 93% and 95% per patient for primary disease evaluation, 93% and 96% for locoregional evaluation, and 89% and 98% per lesion for nodal disease detection, respectively. An examination of a subset of studies comparing PET/MRI against PET/CT or MRI alone for evaluating nodal and locoregional HNSCC found that PET/MRI may offer slightly higher accuracy than other modalities. However, this difference was not statistically significant. Conclusion: PET/MRI has excellent potential for identifying primary, locoregional, and nodal HNSCC.

Tens of thousands of striking Boeing machinists voted Monday to ratify a new contract, ending their seven-week work stoppage.

The Supreme Court appeared skeptical that companies should be required to include past events in their risk disclosure statements during oral arguments for Facebook Inc. vs. Amalgamated Bank on Wednesday.

As Nissan on Thursday reported a roughly half-billion- dollar revenue drop in 2024, the Japanese automaker said it will cut 9,000 jobs and reduce manufacturing capacity by 20%.

More than 500,000 space heaters from GoveeLife and GoveeSmart Electric are being recalled because of safety issues, according to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission.

Mattel has apologized after inadvertently directing customers of its new line of Wicked dolls to a pornographic website, stating it is taking action to remove the misprinted toys' packaging.