ac

Can the world avoid a new nuclear arms race?

Can the world avoid a new nuclear arms race? 18 November 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) Chatham House and Online

Leading experts discuss how states are expanding nuclear arsenals amid rising geopolitical challenges.

Leading experts discuss how states are expanding nuclear arsenals amid rising geopolitical challenges.

The Doomsday Clock stands at 90 seconds to midnight – the closest to global catastrophe it has ever been. As geopolitical competition intensifies, nuclear risks are resurging at an alarming rate. The collapse of key arms control agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, has removed crucial safeguards against arms races. Efforts to extend or replace existing treaties face significant hurdles in the current geopolitical climate.

Nuclear rhetoric has become more aggressive, as evidenced by Russian and North Korean nuclear threats. Several nuclear-armed states are also engaging in extensive modernization programmes of their nuclear arsenals, potentially fuelling a new arms race.

Despite these pressures, the number of nuclear possessor states has held steady so far. The ongoing Iranian efforts to build nuclear weapons is the closest attempt by a new state to acquire nuclear weapons. As the global security environment becomes more and more tense, existing nuclear possessor states increasingly rely on their nuclear weapons. This might threaten the global consensus against nuclear proliferation.

This session examines these competing pressures and propose strategies to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons use and proliferation. Our expert panel explores diplomatic initiatives, technical measures, and policy innovations to address these critical challenges.

This expert panel discusses key questions including:

  • Are we already in the middle of a global nuclear arms race?
  • How can international arms control treaties be negotiated in the current geopolitical environment?
  • Does a new US president change the nuclear calculus? Is the US still able to reassure allies of its ‘extended deterrence’?
  • How can we reduce the risk of additional proliferation? Which states might want to acquire nuclear weapons and what can we do about it?

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.




ac

Addressing Russia’s use of forced displacement in Ukraine

Addressing Russia’s use of forced displacement in Ukraine 7 November 2024 — 12:30PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) Chatham House and Online

Experts consider the role international law could play in responding to Russia’s forcible movement of people during its war against Ukraine.

In the two and a half years since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, evidence has emerged of Russia’s use of forced deportation and forcible transfer. Russia has also employed arbitrary detention as a tool of war and occupation.

Much attention has been on the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrants against Russian President Vladimir Putin and his children’s commissioner Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova. These warrants were issued in relation to the alleged war crimes concerning the unlawful deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia and the unlawful transfer of thousands of children from occupied areas of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian citizens are being arrested and sent to Russia to serve prison sentences. They are often detained without charge and conviction.

This panel discussion explores:

  • What evidence is emerging of Russia using unlawful deportation and transfer of children, and the arbitrary detention of civilians?
  • What is the role and significance of international law on these issues?
  • What challenges might these practices create for later peace negotiations, as well as the securing of justice?
  • What is the process of releasing illegally detained Ukrainians, and Ukrainian children in particular, and reuniting them with their families? How do Russian volunteers inside Russia cooperate with Ukrainian NGOs to facilitate family reunification?

The event includes a screening of part of the documentary After the Rain: Putin’s Stolen Children

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.




ac

Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East

Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East Expert comment LJefferson

The Egyptian army is a formidable force lacking air superiority capabilities to match its size and ambitions. China understood this predicament and offered to help.

The reported agreement for Egypt to buy the Chinese Chengdu J-10C 4.5 generation fighter jets is part of a broader shift from focusing on modernizing ground troops to bolstering the air force. The details of the deal have not yet been published. Nonetheless, it reveals Egypt has two motivations beyond backing its arsenal with another fighter jet.

Elusive Western technology

The most important motivation for Egypt’s military diversification strategy (and the biggest source of frustration) is the perceived Western technology starvation.
   
A quick examination of the map around Egypt shows that the most significant perceived threats to its national security are located in remote places where Egypt doesn’t traditionally enjoy ground troops’ presence. These include Ethiopia, the Southern Red Sea, Libya and the vulnerability a potential Israel–Iran regional war would create. From the generals’ perspective in Cairo, this list is more than a catalyst to build a modern and capable long arm.

The race started in 2015 after the Obama administration paused an arms transfer to Cairo in 2013 that included four F-16C Block 52 fighter jets amid toppling the Muslim Brotherhood government. The psychological effect of Washington’s decision in Cairo increased Egypt’s risk tolerance towards challenging its military ties with the US by diversifying away from it. 

Egypt ordered the MiG-29M2 fighter jets from Russia and the French Rafales this same year. In 2018, Egypt negotiated a $2 billion deal with Russia to purchase the Su-35 fighter jet, seen in Washington as crossing a red line and triggering a warning to Egypt that it would impose sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This caused the deal to collapse.

The main factor of the US military sales in the Middle East is the upholding of the Israel Military Qualitative Edge principle over its neighbours. This principle requires the US to ensure Israel is superior over other regional countries’ strategic military capabilities, especially in air power.

For Egypt, this has long been a strategic vulnerability. The US turned down multiple requests by Egypt to purchase the active radar long-range AIM-120 AMRAAM fire-and-forget missile that can be launched from the F-16 fighter jets, the main striking force in Egypt’s arsenal. 

Unlike the Gulf and other states (such as Jordan and Turkey), Egypt was only allowed the old AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinders, which are shorter in range and technologically inferior. Israel also allegedly pressured the Trump administration to refuse Egypt’s request to buy the F-35 stealth fight jets in 2019.

The US and Israel reportedly pressured France to not sell to Egypt the MBDA’s Meteor 100 km air-to-air missile with the Rafale fighters. Instead, Egypt received the 80 km MICA missile as part of the deal to buy 30 Rafales in 2021. Acquiring this advanced radar system and long-range missiles was likely behind Cairo’s deal to purchase 24 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from Italy in 2022. However, it is unlikely that they will come with the full package.

Egypt thought the Chinese J-10C Vigorous Dragon fighter may solve this predicament. The Chinese fighter has a beyond-visual range AESA radar and can carry the PL-15 200 km air-to-air missile, similar to the Rafale’s Meteor. The J-10C’s price tag is attractive for Egypt at $40-50 million, much less than the F-16 and Rafales.

The Chinese fighters are also a hedge against Russia’s sanctioned fighter jets, traditionally a second choice for the Egyptian air force.

Risky manoeuvres 

This doesn’t mean Egypt is on a path to abandon its weapons purchases from its Western partners. Egyptian weapons procurement policy is not only motivated by technical considerations. It also serves political objectives. Egypt still receives $1.3 billion every year in military and economic aid from Washington. Regime security and backing are two objectives that will likely encourage Cairo to rely on Western weapons systems for decades. 

However, from Egypt’s military perspective, the time may have come to resort to the Cold War tactics of diversification and counterbalancing. Being forced to accept old technology during the significant modernization of its air force creates a technical and operational necessity to seek this technology elsewhere. 

Egyptian weapons procurement policy is not only motivated by technical considerations. It also serves political objectives.

The regional uncertainty since Hamas’s 7 October attack on Israel and the war that followed in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and Israel’s intermittent confrontations with Iran makes make it imperative for the Egyptian strategic planners to take risky manoeuvres while targeting specific capabilities they seem desperate to acquire. 

The threat to deploy CAATSA sanctions against Egypt in 2019 makes the J-10C deal with China an interesting case study for all Middle Eastern allies of the West. It shows an uptick in Egypt’s risk tolerance to overcome its technological dilemma. It allows other countries considering the Chinese fighters (mainly Saudi Arabia) to gauge Washington’s reaction and design their future approach accordingly.   

Another motivation is to pressure the US, UK, and their allies to reconsider their implicit embargo on certain advanced technology by showing that Cairo now has alternatives. This tactic seems to work. General Frank McKenzie, the former head of US Central Command, said during a congressional hearing in 2022 that Washington will finally provide Egypt with the F-15 heavy-weight air superiority fighter, a longstanding demand by Cairo.

Building favours

The J-10C fighter jet ticks all the boxes: It satisfies Cairo’s diversity strategy and technological needs. It is under the sanctions threshold since it is less technologically savvy than the most controversial J-20 5th generation fighters, the equivalent to Russia’s SU-35. And it takes Egypt’s military partnership with China to a new level.

A heavyweight military power like Egypt relying on Chinese fighters would almost certainly boost China’s share in the regional weapons market.

The rumour that the Chinese fighters are bought to replace the ageing versions of Egypt’s significant F-16 fleet is a source of pride for Beijing since its military technology started to be seen as a competitor to Western technology. A heavyweight military power like Egypt relying on Chinese fighters would almost certainly boost China’s share in the regional weapons market, just like Cairo’s purchase of the Rafale boosted its popularity globally.




ac

Trust in US democracy is at stake in this election

Trust in US democracy is at stake in this election Expert comment rgold.drupal

A narrow win for either side could make things worse. The rest of the world should be prepared for a disruptive transition.

With less than two weeks to election day in the United States, polls suggest the gap between Harris and Trump has narrowed even further in the swing states where the election will be decided. A fierce contest has ensued as each campaign seeks to drive voter turnout. In such a tight race, this will be decisive. But in an election that many Americans perceive as being existential for the country’s future, a narrow victory by either side will heighten the risk of a contested election.

Many Americans are pessimistic about the ability of democracy to deliver a reliable result. Two thirds of Republican voters continue to believe that the 2020 election was stolen from Donald Trump and for many of these, Biden’s inauguration may have demonstrated the weakness, not the strength, of US democracy. 

This environment has contributed to widespread anticipation of a contested election, as well as preparations for the possibility of a delayed result. Political disinformation and deep polarization across the country could mean that a narrow victory leads to more legal challenges and even political violence.  6 January, the anniversary of the assault on the US Capitol and the day Congress will certify the Electoral College has been designated a National Special Security Event. 

The issue of how quickly and reliably votes are certified has become an arena for argument. In the 2022 midterms, 22 county officials in key states voted to delay certification. Democrats have noted with alarm that this year, around 70 pro-Trump election ‘conspiracists’ are positioned to review the results in swing states.

Those nervous about the possibility of a narrow vote being overturned will be watching to see if Republicans maintain or increase their majority in the House of Representatives, since the newly elected House will shape who holds the gavel when a joint session of Congress returns to certify the US presidential election result. Republican control of the House could give the former president more ability to influence this vote. 

A resilient democracy

But there should be room for optimism. Democracy in America has been remarkably resilient. In 2016, Democrats swallowed their unease with Donald Trump. Despite rumours of Russian interference in the election, they accepted the election result.

If fears of another contested election materialise, it will be the third time in recent history that the US has struggled to confirm a result. 

Four years later, the US was far more polarized, trust in institutions had decreased, and challenges to the elections reflected this. The Trump campaign filed more than 60 lawsuits in 9 states challenging election processes and voter certification. In every single case, courts confirmed the results.  After the 6 January insurrection on the US Capitol, Congress returned to its chambers and, on the very same day, confirmed the electoral results. 

If fears of another contested election materialise, it will be the third time in recent history that the US has struggled to confirm a result. In 2000, the Supreme Court intervened to decide on a recount in Florida, effectively delivering victory to George W Bush – a memory alongside the 6 January Capitol riots contributing to America’s anxiety ahead of polling day. 

International response

The US’s partners and rivals may be ill-prepared for a contested election. 

If Trump or Harris, or both, claim victory before it is clearly settled, world leaders will need to decide how to react. Diplomatic protocol may dictate that leaders wait until the US confirms the results through official channels but there are concerns that not everyone will play by these rules. 




ac

Members' question time: What has COP29 achieved?

Members' question time: What has COP29 achieved? 25 November 2024 — 1:00PM TO 1:45PM Anonymous (not verified) Online

Join us and ask our senior research fellow, Ruth Townend anything about the outcome from COP29. Submit your questions in advance.

As COP29 prepares to conclude in Baku, Azerbaijan, this year’s conference has taken place against a backdrop of ever worsening climate impacts and escalating financial needs for developing countries. Being hosted by Azerbaijan has been significant, a country whose economy is heavily reliant on fossil fuels. As delegates and officials prepare to leave, the urgency for global climate action intensifies.

Join us as Ruth Townend, our Senior Research Fellow for the Environment and Society Centre to provide the latest insight and analysis from COP. She will give an overview of the key developments from Baku, new global commitments that have been agreed and how this sets up COP 30 in Brazil in 2025.

Submit your questions to Ruth Townend in advance of the event. Your questions will drive the conversation.




ac

Computer Hacking: How Big is the Security Threat?




ac

Undercurrents: Episode 8 - Ronan Farrow on Diplomacy




ac

Undercurrents: Episode 9 - Digital Subversion in Cyberspace, and Oleg Sentsov's Hunger Strike




ac

Unfulfilled Ambitions: the State of Democracy in Africa




ac

Drugs and Organized Crime: The Challenges Facing Southeast Asia




ac

Undercurrents: Episode 11 - New Approaches to Peacebuilding, and Gender-Inclusive Growth at the G20




ac

Unelected Power: Finding Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State




ac

A Decade on from the Financial Crisis: the Legacy and Lessons of 2008 - The Rt Hon Lord Darling of Roulanish




ac

Cyber Security Series: Comparing Best Practice Across Europe




ac

Managing the Real and Perceived Challenges Facing the World




ac

The Future of Democracy in Asia




ac

Securing Peace in the 21st Century: The Roles of Diplomacy and Statesmanship




ac

Assessing the Midterm Elections and the Impact on the Trump Presidency




ac

Undercurrents: Episode 21 - EU-US Relations after the Midterms, and Tackling the Illegal Wildlife Trade in Africa




ac

Frosty Neighbours? Unpacking Narratives of Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations




ac

Is Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace Achievable?




ac

Migration and Health: Barriers and Means to Achieving Universal Health Coverage




ac

Une Nouvelle Révolution? Macron and the Gilets Jaunes




ac

Undercurrents: Episode 25 - The End of Liberal Foreign Policy, and the Legacy of the Paris Peace Conference




ac

Is Technology Destroying Democracy?




ac

China and the Future of the International Order – Peace and Security




ac

China and the US: Through Each Other’s Eyes




ac

The Challenge of Ambition? Unlocking Climate Action and the Outcomes of COP24




ac

Stacey Abrams: Democracy and the Politics of Identity




ac

The Militarization of the Black Sea After the Annexation of Crimea




ac

American Diplomacy: Past, Present and Future




ac

Sustainable Solutions to Challenges Faced by Displaced People and Refugees




ac

Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: The Future of Peace and Security in the Western Balkans




ac

Are ‘Digital Parties’ the Future of Democracy in Europe?




ac

The Kremlin Spectrum: Western Approaches Towards Russia




ac

Undercurrents: Episode 33 - Chinese Millennials, and Attacks on Infrastructure in Gaza




ac

Screening Room: Displaced




ac

Direct Democracy: Participation Without Populism?




ac

Iran, Islam and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change 20 Years On




ac

Climate Action: A Role for Civil Disobedience?




ac

Securing Our Climate Future: Risk, Resilience and Diplomacy




ac

Podcast: International Law, Security and Prosperity in the Asia-Pacific




ac

Peacemaking in an Era of Global Extremism




ac

Undercurrents: Episode 40 - Illicit Financial Flows, and Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific




ac

Rethinking 'The Economic Consequences of the Peace'




ac

Tackling Toxic Air Pollution in Cities




ac

Technology Diplomacy in the Digital Age




ac

The State of Democracy in Turkey




ac

Undercurrents: Episode 48 - UK Intelligence Agencies, and Paying for Climate Action




ac

Undercurrents: Episode 52 - Defining Pandemics, and Mikheil Saakashvili's Ukrainian Comeback