China’s involvement in UN peacekeeping contributions has been on the rise for some time. China is also stepping up its own military and security operations abroad to protect its commercial and strategic interests, particularly in Africa. In doing so, China is exposing itself to a more complex set of issues – including international legal issues – with which it is only just starting to grapple.

China’s contribution to UN peacekeeping over the last 10 years has expanded dramatically. In September 2016, it pledged $1 billion to help fund UN peace, security and development activities, while in 2018 it supplied 10.3 per cent of the UN peacekeeping budget, up from 3.93 per cent in 2012. China is also the largest contributor of peacekeeping forces among the five permanent members of the Security Council. As well as its regular troop contributions, it has also established a stand-by rapid deployment force of 8,000 peacekeeping troops.

For China, increased involvement in UN peacekeeping offers what it likes to refer to as a ‘win-win’ situation. China’s contribution is very valuable at a time when peacekeeping is in need of resources, given the cutbacks from the other four permanent members of the Security Council in both financial and personnel contributions, waning US support for the UN and pressures on the UN budget.

China’s increased involvement in UN peacekeeping has coincided with the adoption of a more pragmatic position in relation to its traditionally staunch adherence to the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention.

China was initially sceptical of the UN’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, endorsed by member states in 2005, which seeks to protect populations from gross human rights violations, and which can include recourse to use of force by the international community, if authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Over time, though, Beijing has softened its stance to intervention and has gradually acknowledged the ability to respond to humanitarian catastrophes in certain circumstances, for example voting in favour of the Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2013. 

The softening of China’s stance on non-intervention is also evident in the significant rise not only in the involvement of Chinese troops in UN peacekeeping, but also in the deployment of Chinese military and security forces in a number of African states in order to protect China’s investment and infrastructure projects located there.

In 2017, China established its first foreign naval base in Djibouti, and in 2018 it held military drills in several African countries. The significant increase in China’s military presence in Africa since 2015 gives rise to a number of more complex issues for both China and the local communities involved. According to a recent report, China’s growing military and security presence in Africa is leading to concern in some local constituencies. The fact that China’s state-centric perception of security and development downplays the importance of human rights is likely to compound these tensions on the ground.

New international law implications

The growing presence of Chinese peacekeeping, police and security forces abroad also carries implications for China in a number of different areas of international law with which it has only recently started to grapple. These include the law on the use of force and, given that many Chinese infrastructure projects are situated in fragile states, the law of armed conflict.

The mushrooming presence of Chinese companies and investments abroad also carries implications for the Chinese state, and for the companies concerned, under international human rights law (particularly the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights). The international law on state responsibility could also be relevant if security companies owned or employed by the Chinese government, where their actions are attributable to China, become complicit in breaches of international law by other governments (such as human rights abuses).

Compared to other areas of international law, such as international economic law and the law of the sea, China has not invested much to date in education in these areas, which may leave it exposed as it increases its global footprint. It was clear from a recent Chatham House roundtable at Columbia Law School in New York that China is now seeking to rapidly upskill in these areas.

China’s global economic and security ambitions appear to be tilting China towards a more interventionist approach, which is extending beyond UN peacekeeping contributions towards security and military missions of its own. Time will tell how China will respond to the challenge of burnishing its image as a good global citizen while maintaining an approach to peacekeeping, security and development which is closely informed by its own economic and security interests.

In recent years, cybercrime has evolved from a niche technological concern into a prominent global issue with substantial preventative and remedial costs for businesses and governments alike. Despite heavy investment in sophisticated cybersecurity measures and the adoption of several legal, organizational and capacity-building measures, cybercrime remains a major threat which is evolving on a daily basis. Today’s cybercrime is more aggressive, more complex, more organized and – importantly – more unpredictable than ever before.

The challenges posed by cybercrime are experienced acutely by countries undergoing digital transformations: as the level of connectivity rises, so too does the potential for online theft, fraud and abuse. Cybercrime is pervasive but governments can work to limit its impact by creating a resilient overall economy and robust institution, and appropriately equipping law enforcement and the justice system to navigate its novel challenges.

To advance the discourse surrounding these issues, this workshop will assess the current cyber threat landscape and how it is evolving. It will identify the main obstacles encountered by law enforcement, the judiciary and prosecutors in their fight against cybercrime. It will also compare national, regional and global approaches that countries can use to effectively curb cybercrime and tackle its emerging challenges.

The GCC states have invested significantly in cybersecurity and have made large strides in protecting governments, businesses and individuals from cyber threats, with the aim of delivering on their ambitious national strategies and future visions. However, several challenges to cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the region persist, putting those ambitious plans at risk.

These challenges include the uneven nature of cybersecurity protections, the incomplete implementation of cybersecurity strategies and regulations, and the issues around international cooperation. Such challenges mean that GCC states need to focus on the more difficult task of cyber resilience, in addition to the simpler initial stages of cybersecurity capacity-building, to ensure they harness the true potential of digital technologies and mitigate associated threats.

Set against this background, this workshop will explore opportunities and challenges to cyber resilience in the GCC focusing on four main pillars:

1. Cyber resilience: in concept and in practice
2. Building an effective cybersecurity capacity
3. The potential of regional and international cooperation to cyber resilience
4. Deterrence and disruption: different approaches

This event will be held in collaboration with the Arab Regional Cybersecurity Centre (ARCC) and OMAN CERT.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. 

In January 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople granted the Orthodox Church of Ukraine a self-governing status, ending its centuries-long subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate. The Russian Orthodox Church condemned this decision and severed its links with the Constantinople Patriarchate.

More than 500 parishes have left the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to join the newly independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC).

What challenges is the new church facing? Has its independence been recognized by other Orthodox churches? How is it affected by the schism between Constantinople and Moscow? What are UOC’s priorities in relations with the West and with the Orthodox world?

What does Britain’s departure from the EU mean for the country’s policy towards the South Caucasus, a small region on the periphery of Europe, fractured by conflict? Although Britain is not directly involved in any of the region’s peace processes (except in the case of the Geneva International Discussions on conflicts involving Georgia, as an EU member state), it has been a significant stakeholder in South Caucasian stability since the mid-1990s.

Most obviously, Britain has been the single largest foreign investor in Caspian oil and gas. Yet beyond pipelines, Britain also has been a significant investor in long-term civil society-led strategies to build peace in the South Caucasus.

Through what was then the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, in the early 2000s the Department for International Development (DfID) pioneered large-scale peacebuilding interventions, such as the Consortium Initiative, addressing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in 2003-09. These built civic networks in the South Caucasus and partnerships with British-based NGOs.

This experience left a strong intellectual legacy. British expertise on the South Caucasus, including specific expertise on its conflicts, is highly regarded in the region and across the world.

There is also a strong tradition of British scholarship on the Caucasus, and several British universities offer Caucasus-related courses. Through schemes such as the John Smith Fellowship Trust, the Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellowship at Chatham House and Chevening Scholarships, significant numbers of young leaders from the South Caucasus have spent time in British institutions and built effective relationships within them.

Three challenges

This niche as a champion of long-term, strategic peacebuilding and repository of area-specific knowledge should not be lost as Britain’s relationship with the EU and regional actors evolves. This can be ensured through awareness of three challenges confronting a post-Brexit Caucasus policy.

The first challenge for London is to avoid framing a regional policy in the South Caucasus as an extension of a wider ‘Russia policy’. Deteriorating Russian-British relations in recent years strengthen a tendency to view policies in the European neighbourhood through the traditional prisms of Cold War and Russian-Western rivalries.

Yet an overwhelming focus on Russia fails to capture other important aspects of political developments in South Caucasus conflicts. Although often referred to as ‘breakaway’ or ‘occupied’ territories, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh are not ungoverned spaces. They have evolved into examples of what scholars call ‘de facto states’ that, to differing degrees, control territory, provide governance and exercise internal sovereignty.

Few disagree that these entities would not survive without external patronage. But neither does that patronage explain their sustainability on its own. Russia-centricity diminishes Britain’s latitude to engage on the full range of local drivers sustaining these entities, contributing instead to less effective policies predicated on competition and containment.

A second and related challenge is to maintain and develop Britain’s position on the issue of engaging populations in these entities. De facto states appear to stand outside of the international rules-based system. Yet in many cases, their civil societies are peopled by skilled and motivated activists who want their leaders to be held accountable according to international rules.

Strategies of isolation ignore these voices and contribute instead to fearful and demoralized communities less likely to engage in a transformation of adversarial relationships. Making this case with the wider international community, and facilitating the funding of local civil societies in contested territories, would be important steps in sustaining an effective British policy on the resolution of conflicts.    

The third challenge for Britain is to maintain a long-term approach to the conflicts of the South Caucasus alongside potential short-term imperatives in other policy fields, as relationships shift post-Brexit.

In this fluid international environment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has a role to play both as an internal champion of a long-term peacebuilding strategy and a coordinator of British efforts with those of multilateral actors engaged in the South Caucasus. These include the United Nations, the EU’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia and OSCE’s Special Representative for the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, all of which have built relationships with relevant actors on the ground.

Recommendations

Britain’s niche as a champion and advocate of a strategic approach to peaceful change can be secured post-Brexit in the following ways.  

First, in-house expertise is crucial to effective peacebuilding programming. The Foreign Office’s research analysts play a vital role in generating independent internal advice and liaising with academic and NGO communities. Their role could be supplemented by the reinstatement of a regional conflict adviser post, based in Tbilisi, tasked with strengthening Britain’s regional presence on conflict issues and coordinating policy at a regional level.

This post, with a remit to cover conflicts and build up area knowledge and relationships can contribute significantly to working closely with local civil societies, where so much expertise and knowledge resides, as well as other stakeholders.

Second, programming should build in conflict sensitivity by dissociating eligibility from contested political status. This can encourage local populations to take advantage of opportunities for funding, study, comparative learning and professional development irrespective of the status of the entity where they reside.

The Chevening Scholarships are an excellent example, whereby applicants can select ‘South Caucasus’ as their affiliated identity from a drop-down menu. This enables citizens from across the region to apply irrespective of the status of the territory in which they live.   

Finally, a holistic understanding of peace is crucial. Programming in unrecognized or partially-recognized entities should acknowledge that effective peacebuilding needs to embrace political dynamics and processes beyond cross-conflict contact and confidence building. Local actors in such entities may find peacebuilding funding streams defined exclusively in terms of cross-conflict contact more politically risky and ineffective in addressing domestic blockages to peace.

While cross-conflict dynamics remain critical, ‘single-community’ programming framed in terms of civic participation, inclusion, civil society capacity-building, minority and human rights in contested territories, and building the confidence from within to engage in constructive dialogue, are no less important.

The ’global Britain’ promised by Brexit remains a fanciful idea. Quiet, painstaking work to build on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus, on the other hand, is a realistic and attainable goal.

After a tumultuous 2019 when Moldova witnessed the end of the Plahotniuc era, the country seems bound for an equally difficult year ahead.
 
Increasing international isolation, a temporary working coalition between the Socialists and the Democrats, concentration of power and resources in the hands of President Igor Dodon, and presidential elections in autumn are among the ordeals to be discussed at this event. Ms Sandu will assess how Moldova can move beyond these challenges and return to a path for sustainable democratic reform. 

This event is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. We would like to take this opportunity to thank founding partner AIG and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo plc, and EY for their generous support of the forum.

In January 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople granted the Orthodox Church of Ukraine a self-governing status, ending its centuries-long subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate. The Russian Orthodox Church condemned this decision and severed its links with the Constantinople Patriarchate.

More than 500 parishes have left the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to join the newly independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC).

What challenges is the new church facing? Has its independence been recognized by other Orthodox churches? How is it affected by the schism between Constantinople and Moscow? What are UOC’s priorities in relations with the West and with the Orthodox world?

What does Britain’s departure from the EU mean for the country’s policy towards the South Caucasus, a small region on the periphery of Europe, fractured by conflict? Although Britain is not directly involved in any of the region’s peace processes (except in the case of the Geneva International Discussions on conflicts involving Georgia, as an EU member state), it has been a significant stakeholder in South Caucasian stability since the mid-1990s.

Most obviously, Britain has been the single largest foreign investor in Caspian oil and gas. Yet beyond pipelines, Britain also has been a significant investor in long-term civil society-led strategies to build peace in the South Caucasus.

Through what was then the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, in the early 2000s the Department for International Development (DfID) pioneered large-scale peacebuilding interventions, such as the Consortium Initiative, addressing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in 2003-09. These built civic networks in the South Caucasus and partnerships with British-based NGOs.

This experience left a strong intellectual legacy. British expertise on the South Caucasus, including specific expertise on its conflicts, is highly regarded in the region and across the world.

There is also a strong tradition of British scholarship on the Caucasus, and several British universities offer Caucasus-related courses. Through schemes such as the John Smith Fellowship Trust, the Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellowship at Chatham House and Chevening Scholarships, significant numbers of young leaders from the South Caucasus have spent time in British institutions and built effective relationships within them.

Three challenges

This niche as a champion of long-term, strategic peacebuilding and repository of area-specific knowledge should not be lost as Britain’s relationship with the EU and regional actors evolves. This can be ensured through awareness of three challenges confronting a post-Brexit Caucasus policy.

The first challenge for London is to avoid framing a regional policy in the South Caucasus as an extension of a wider ‘Russia policy’. Deteriorating Russian-British relations in recent years strengthen a tendency to view policies in the European neighbourhood through the traditional prisms of Cold War and Russian-Western rivalries.

Yet an overwhelming focus on Russia fails to capture other important aspects of political developments in South Caucasus conflicts. Although often referred to as ‘breakaway’ or ‘occupied’ territories, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh are not ungoverned spaces. They have evolved into examples of what scholars call ‘de facto states’ that, to differing degrees, control territory, provide governance and exercise internal sovereignty.

Few disagree that these entities would not survive without external patronage. But neither does that patronage explain their sustainability on its own. Russia-centricity diminishes Britain’s latitude to engage on the full range of local drivers sustaining these entities, contributing instead to less effective policies predicated on competition and containment.

A second and related challenge is to maintain and develop Britain’s position on the issue of engaging populations in these entities. De facto states appear to stand outside of the international rules-based system. Yet in many cases, their civil societies are peopled by skilled and motivated activists who want their leaders to be held accountable according to international rules.

Strategies of isolation ignore these voices and contribute instead to fearful and demoralized communities less likely to engage in a transformation of adversarial relationships. Making this case with the wider international community, and facilitating the funding of local civil societies in contested territories, would be important steps in sustaining an effective British policy on the resolution of conflicts.    

The third challenge for Britain is to maintain a long-term approach to the conflicts of the South Caucasus alongside potential short-term imperatives in other policy fields, as relationships shift post-Brexit.

In this fluid international environment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has a role to play both as an internal champion of a long-term peacebuilding strategy and a coordinator of British efforts with those of multilateral actors engaged in the South Caucasus. These include the United Nations, the EU’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia and OSCE’s Special Representative for the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, all of which have built relationships with relevant actors on the ground.

Recommendations

Britain’s niche as a champion and advocate of a strategic approach to peaceful change can be secured post-Brexit in the following ways.  

First, in-house expertise is crucial to effective peacebuilding programming. The Foreign Office’s research analysts play a vital role in generating independent internal advice and liaising with academic and NGO communities. Their role could be supplemented by the reinstatement of a regional conflict adviser post, based in Tbilisi, tasked with strengthening Britain’s regional presence on conflict issues and coordinating policy at a regional level.

This post, with a remit to cover conflicts and build up area knowledge and relationships can contribute significantly to working closely with local civil societies, where so much expertise and knowledge resides, as well as other stakeholders.

Second, programming should build in conflict sensitivity by dissociating eligibility from contested political status. This can encourage local populations to take advantage of opportunities for funding, study, comparative learning and professional development irrespective of the status of the entity where they reside.

The Chevening Scholarships are an excellent example, whereby applicants can select ‘South Caucasus’ as their affiliated identity from a drop-down menu. This enables citizens from across the region to apply irrespective of the status of the territory in which they live.   

Finally, a holistic understanding of peace is crucial. Programming in unrecognized or partially-recognized entities should acknowledge that effective peacebuilding needs to embrace political dynamics and processes beyond cross-conflict contact and confidence building. Local actors in such entities may find peacebuilding funding streams defined exclusively in terms of cross-conflict contact more politically risky and ineffective in addressing domestic blockages to peace.

While cross-conflict dynamics remain critical, ‘single-community’ programming framed in terms of civic participation, inclusion, civil society capacity-building, minority and human rights in contested territories, and building the confidence from within to engage in constructive dialogue, are no less important.

The ’global Britain’ promised by Brexit remains a fanciful idea. Quiet, painstaking work to build on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus, on the other hand, is a realistic and attainable goal.

After a tumultuous 2019 when Moldova witnessed the end of the Plahotniuc era, the country seems bound for an equally difficult year ahead.
 
Increasing international isolation, a temporary working coalition between the Socialists and the Democrats, concentration of power and resources in the hands of President Igor Dodon, and presidential elections in autumn are among the ordeals to be discussed at this event. Ms Sandu will assess how Moldova can move beyond these challenges and return to a path for sustainable democratic reform. 

Recommendations

Enhanced dialogue and intensified international cooperation in four areas could significantly improve the functioning of global mineral markets:

1. Deal with the last remnants of producer-country cartels 
   Consumer countries should make a publicly visible case that in an age of interdependence and global supply chains, any remaining forms of producer-country cartels are an anachronism. Given limited means to coerce governments to stop supporting the last remaining mineral cartels in potash, a ‘naming and shaming’ approach in key forums such as the Group of Twenty (G20) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is likely to be most effective. Such action could be initiated by the three largest potash importers China, India and Brazil, and should seek support from others such as the EU and Japan.
    
2. Prevent damaging export restrictions through win-win arrangements
   WTO litigation against export restrictions is unlikely to be a silver bullet and in the short term cooperative policy dialogues, such as those pursued by the OECD, offer the best prospects for concrete results. Such dialogues should also be initiated by major emerging economies and could focus on providing incentives such as investment packages or technology-sharing to entice producer countries to abstain from imposing restrictions. Consumers should continue to push for more specific and stricter WTO rules on export restrictions. Japan, the EU and the US should seek to include similar measures in regional trade negotiations.
    
3. Strengthen cooperation among regulators on clandestine private cartels and other anti-competitive practices 
   Concerted action will be required by governments to tackle anti-competitive practices such as clandestine cartels, price-fixing and territorial agreements. Key regulators, such as those in the EU and China, should expand collection and sharing of data and best practice on anti-trust enforcement in minerals markets. In key cases they could also coordinate prosecution. Sustained investment in institutional capacity is required in many emerging economies; this should be supported through bilateral cooperation and via regional forums. Governments should also resuscitate the stalled negotiations on the WTO’s role in competition policy.
    
4. Enhance governance for transnational market platforms and pricing mechanisms
   The responsibility to regulate key nodes in global minerals markets will remain in the hands of national bodies, but coordination is vital given interconnected global markets. International organizations and regulators should strengthen structural cooperation and exchange in the area of physical markets and with greater involvement of emerging economies. An informal high-level forum on regulating physical markets could reinvigorate debate, foster new perspectives and stimulate new partnerships. Governments in key consumer countries should also give their national regulators a clear mandate in minerals markets.

Drawing on his experience in government, Rory Stewart shares his observations into the impact corruption can have on society.

This event is organized in association with Transparency International UK as part of Transparency International UK’s Annual Lecture series.

The president of Malta discusses the current security challenges in the Mediterranean region, reflecting on the role of international cooperation in addressing climate change, migration and refugee flows.